Communication system for mitigating incoming spoofed callers using social media

Abstract

A communication system mitigating the risk of an incoming spoofed caller. The method involves issuing a token or a digital certificate to each network connection of a user, such as to each member of a social media platform to which the user is connected. The method includes determining a validity of the token or certificate of the network connection with a receiving party, which may be performed in response to searching and identifying the receiving party by a calling party. The method includes transmitting a message to the receiving party by the calling party in response to the validity confirmation of the token or the digital certificate. A message is transmitted that includes a calling identifier to be displayed to provide calling ID to the receiving party and a time of the intended call. The message may provide connection details, mutual connections, and historical events with the calling party.

Description

COJ\IJ1\H 1NICJ\TION SYSTEM FOR MITIGKrING INCO1\1ING SPOOFED CALLERS USING SOCIAL IVlEDIJ\ FIELD OF THE INVENTION 10001 l The present disclosure generally relates to electronic communication methods and systems including those utilizing the Internet and cloud-based solutions. ]\lore particularly, examples of the disclosure relate to electronic communication methods and systems that can mitigate incoming spoofed callers using social media to identify trusted ca1lers. BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE 100021 1\'lobile and web applications allow users, such as operators of smartphones and other portable computing devices as well as tablets, laptop, notebook, and desktop computers, to perform a ·wide range of communication functions. Of course, one continuing use of smarq,hones and portable computing devices (together "client devices") is to participate in audio and video calls \Vith friends, farnily, co-\vorkers, and other an1uaintances (e.g., people known ro the call recipient (or the "cal.led party"). \Vhile not: a new problem, an ongoing and challenging issue is ho\v to detect and block calls from unwanted callers. 10003! ln recent years, telemarketing organizations, scammers, and others spoof caller ID in an attempt to have the caHed party receive calls from such unwanted callers. Caller ID spoofing is the practice of causing the telephone net\vork to indicate to the receiver of a call that the origin:1tnr of the call is a station nther than the tnic originating station. This c:rn lead tn a caller ID display on a client device such as a smartphonc showing a phone nurnbci· different from that of the telephone from which the call was placed. The term "spoofing" is commonly used to describe situations in which the motivation is considered malicious by the originator. One effect of the ,vi despread availability of caller ID spoofing is that many in the public believe that you can no longer trust call ID. 10004] Call spoofing is being used by scamrners to hide their real identity and make fraudulent calls. 'fhe caller deliberately falsifies the infonnation transmitted to the display of the receiver's device to disguise their identity. Unfortunately, this can result in an incoming call appearing to originate from a trusted contact or from a local number, and the called party may ans\ver the call and faH into the trap of the scammers. / \ recent study suggests that people fell victim to call scams leading to a lnss of S8.9 billion (l-1SD) in the United States alone, with the Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 average person reporting receipt of twenty-three spam calls per month. Call spoofing is \videspreacl, with the number of fake calls (e.g., calls \Vith a misrepresentation of the caller's identity) including 26.3 billion robocalls that were placed to U.S. phone numbers in 2018 and with estimates in 2019 indicating half of all ceHphone calls being from spam callers. 10005] Caller ID on smartphones and other client devices fundamentally has no authent.icaLion mechanism such that it i~ easily spoofed. Various solution~ have been introduced ro derect caller ID spoofing, but these solutions have failed ro successfully address rhis deficiency in existing communication systems. In brief, these involve use of call filters, covert channels, and 1dent1fymg the caller by tracmg the calls to the corresponding SlP-lSUP mtenvorkmg, using single-ended audio features to determine call provenance, calculating packet loss and no1se profiles to detennine source and path of the call, and digit-'!! signatures. 10006] One exemplary approach is bheled as the STIR / SHAKEN t"echnique. To overco1ne the influx of unwanted calls in the service provider's nenvork, the industry has created two standards: (1) STIR (Secure Telephone Identity Revisited) and (2) SHAKEN (Signaturebased Handling of Asserted Information using tokens). Together, these f\.vo standards create the frame,vork to ensure every SIP-signaled call has a certificate of authenticity attached to it (e.g., a digiLal signalurt:) that alluws ~t:rvice providers lo \ erify caller ID lo mitigaLe unwanted rubucall, and anempts ro prevent bad actors from using caller 1D spoofing. \X'irh STIR / Sil1\KEN, a service provider can try to restore their end customer's trust in the validity of caller ID. 100071 Another approach is "iVisher," which attempts to provide real-time detection of caller ID spoofing. A.n iVisher system is confif_,>ured for detecting a concealed incoming number (e.g., a caller ID) in SlP VoIP initiated phone calls. The iVisher system is capable of detecting a concealed caller lD ,vithout significantly impacting the OV('rnll call setup time. Another approach is provided by SecureLogix, which delivers a unified voice network security and call verification sys tern. It protects the customer frorn call attacks and authenticates inbound calls through a s1nan and affordable auto-authentication solution that is scalable across a contact cente1· and enterprise. _An additional technique that has been implemented is called Knowledge-based }rnthentication or KBr\. KBJ\ requires kno,vledge of private information of the individual to prove that the person providing the identity information is the mvner of the identity. 10008] Others have employed "PinDrOp," which is a mechanism to assist users in deterrrnning call provenance, i.e., the source and the path taken by a call. The mechanism employs techniques to detect and measure single-ended audio features to identify all of the applied voice codecs and to calculate packet loss and noise profiles while remaining agnostic to characteristics of the speaker's voice (as this may legitimately change when interacting with a large organization). 2 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 In the absence of verifiable call metadata, these features in combination with machine learning allow the mechanisn1 to detennine the tta\·ersal of a call through as 1nany as three different providers (e.g., cellular, then VoIP, then PSTN, and all combinations and subsets thereof) v,,ith high accuracr. 10009] 1\ny discussion of problems provided in this section has been included in this disclosure solely fDr Lhe purp\Jses \J[ pro\·iding a background for the present invention and shuuld nor be raken as an admission that anv or all of the discussion was known ar rhe rime rht: invt:nrion was n1ade. BRIEF Dl:SCRIPTION OF THE DRA \'\'ING FIGURES 1001 O] The subiect matter of the present disclosure is particularly pointed out and distinctly claimed in the concluding portion of the specification. A more complete understanding of the present disclosure, however, may best be obtained bi· referring to the derailed description and claims when considered in connection with the dra,ving figurt:s, wherein like numei-als denote like elements and ,vherein: 100111 FIG. 1 illustrates an electronic, cloud-based cmnmunication system adapted to mitigate incuming spuufed callers using sucial media in accordance wiLb e:x.emplary embudi1nenls of the disclosure. 10(H2] FIG. 2 illustrates a functional block diagram of a communication system (e.g., a partial implementat10n of the system of FlG. 1) showmg more detail of embodiments of client devices and of spoofed caller mitigation components that may be provided on a social media platfo1m or elsewhere on the cloud. 1oon1 FlG. 3 illustrates a method of mitigating spoofed callers with functional blocks that may be performed using a communication system (e.g., the systems of F]GS. 1 and 2). 10014] FIG. 4 illustrates a call sn1uence or use case scenario as may be provided during operations of the systems of FIG. 1 and / or FIG. 2.

[0015] FIG. 5 illustrates a variant of the scenario of FlG. 4 that encapsulates relevant apps under each participant's mobile or diem de,ice. 10016] FlG. 6 illustrates a call se(1uence or use case scenario in which the heads-up message gets delayed. l()(ll 71 lt \vill be appreciated that elements in the figures are illustrated for simplicity and clarity and have not necessarily been drawn to scale. For example, the dimensions of some of the elements in the fi6i-ures may be exaggerated relative to other elements to help to impruve understanding of illu,trated embodiment, of the present invention. Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EXEMPLARY F.MBODIJ\IENTS 10018j The description of exempla1-y embodiments of the present invention provided below 1s merely exemplary and is intended for purposes of illustration only; the follo,ving description is not intended to limit the scope of the invention disclosed herein. Moreover, recitation of multiple embodiments having stated features is not intended to exclude other embodiments having addit.ional features or other embodiments incorpm-ating different combinations of rhe srared features. 10019! 1\s set forth in more detail below, exemplary embodiments of the disclosure rdate to electronic communicatton systems, and corresponding methods performed lw such svstems, that can, for example, enhance the person-to-person communications including telephone communications bet\veen t\vo (or more) callers. In brief, the communication system (and corresponding method(s) implemented hy such a system) is adapted for mitigating (e.g., identifying, controlling, blocking, and the like) incoming spoofed callers through the use of social media.

[0020] FIG. 1 illustrates an electronic, cloud-based communication system 100 in accordance with exen1plary ernbodiments of the disclosure that is specially adapted to n1itigate spoofed callers. The sysLe1n 100 is shown at a high levd and includes a cummLmicatiuns netwurk l 04 and a telco nerwork or system 108 (note, a social media framework can also become the telecornmunications framework such that the Facebook (or other social media service or platform) user is receivmg a call from a fake profile, in \vhich case the systems and methods described herein can mitigate the spoofed identity using the social media utility / application). with the net\vork 104 being used to facilitate digital communications via the Internet or similar net,vorks, thus providing an out-nf-band signaling path relative to the telco network 108, and with nct,vork 108 being representative of a wireless (or wired) system run or operated by a telephone service provider to provide communication links bet\veen comn1l.mications or client devices (e.g., cellphones, smartphones, computing devices configured for making telephone calls, and so on). The system_ 100 further includes a social media server or system 110 that is accessible by client devices over the communications network 104, and it may be used to facilitate use of one or more social media applications or services such as, but not limited to Facebook™, Twittern1, Inst:agram™, LinkedJnT1'1, and the like as the present invention is useful with nearly any social media ScITer 110. 10021! The system 100 includes a first client device 120 that may be a member of the social media service provided by server / system 110 and interact with the social media sever 110. Further, the first client device 120 may use (concurrently or separately in ~ome circumstances) the 4 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 telco nenvork 108 to communicate '.vith second and third client devices L10 and 140. In some cases, the fii-st client device 120 may use the system 100 (as discussed in detail be1o,v) to mitigate spoofed callers by verifying that a requested communication link or call as shown ,vith arro,v 134 from the second client device 130 is a trusted or non-spoofed caller (i.e., being used by a trnsted user or operator) through interactions ,vith the social media server 110 Yia network 104. In other cases, though (such as when an Internet connection is nol readily available), the client device 120 will locally perform similar spoofed caller mitigation to derermine whether a call or communication link 146 over the telco network 108 should be trusted and accepted or be 1dent1fied as llkely bemg from a spoofed caller and be blocked or rejected. 10022] De,·ices 120, 130, and 140 can be or can include any suitable device ,vith wired or ,vireless communication features that can connect to net'."<mrks l 04 and 108 (with three being sho'.vn for simplicity hut the system 100 typically including many of such device and including additional telco networks 108 and social media servers / systems 110). For example, devices 120, 130, and 140 can include a wearable device, a tablet computer, a wired phone, a mobile phone, a personal (e.g., laptop or desktop) computer, a streaming deYice, such as a game console or other media streaming device, or the like. lfl02J] The system 100 is configured Lu: (a) avuid spouf calls; and (b) prnvid1:: a 1111::an, of allowing blocked calls in exceptional situations that may be user defined (e.g., "Block all calls except those I know through my friends or work buddies"). The system implements a process or method that mitigates risk involved with spoofed or scam callers by leveraging the existing nen.vork of trusted contacts previously filtered through a social net\vorking channel via the social media sever 110 (\vhich may provide local data fr)r use in detecting spoofed callers locally by the client device 120 such as for client device 140 n:'c1uesting link / call 146). 10024! The system 100 uses the established trust over the social media utility or service provided by the server / system 110 and then informs the called party (e.g., operator of the first client device 120 in FIG. 1) that a caller (e.g., an operator of second and third client devices 130, 140) in your social media netv.rork has or is about to call as shown by arrows 134, 146. The same tl"ust can be extended, in some cases, to tertiary contacts. For example, C may be a friend of B, and A is a friend of B. Therefore, the system 100 may be configured such that when C calls;\ it knows the background of the caller (e.g., i\ knows something about C that may allo\v them to trust them enough to receive their call). in some embodiments of svstem 100, a token or certificate is issued (e.g., by an application on the media server 110 or an application running on client deYices 120, 130, and / or 140) for every trusted contact that was added to a network for the social media utility or service provided by server / system 110. 'i Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 10025] FIC. 2 illustrates a functional block diagram of a communication system 200 (e.g., a panial implementation of the system of FIG. 1) shmving more detail (than in FIG. 1) of embodiments of client devices and of spoofed caller mitigation components that may be provided on a social media platforrn or else\.vhere on the cloud. Particularly, the system 200 includes one or more communications net,vorks 205 that communicatively link a called or receiving party's client device 230 ,md a caller Dr calling party's client device 250 and also link t.bL: devices 230 and 250 with a social media plat-form system or hub 210. To rhis end, the nerworks 205 may include net\vorks used to provide the clevict:s 230 and 250 ,vith an Internet connection and / or with telecommunication serv1ees (such as those provided by cellular or ,vireless serv1ees to which the operators of the de,-ices 230 and 250 have subscribed). 10026] The social media platform system 210, which may be provided via one~t<Hnany servers and dat'il storage devices, includes a processor 212 running software or executing code / instn1ctions to provide functions of both a social media platform module 214 (e.g., to pr<n-ide social media sen-ices by interacting with social media applications on client devices) and a dialer service module 216 (e.g., to provide spoofed caller mitigation services by interacting ,vith dialer applications on client devices). In sorne embodiments, the dialer service module 216 is pruvitkd on a separate snvL:r or sysLL:m accessible via d1L: nL:twurk 205. The prucessur 212 manages access to data srorage 220. The data storage 220 is used to store (e.g., in one or more databases) tbe social networks 222 for the caller and the called pany, and this may include storing records for trustnl identities 224 for each caller and called party (or user of the social media platform). Further, the data storage 220 is used to store a token or certificate 226 that includes a connection definition 228 for pairs of users of the social media platform who may be allowed to call each other over the network 205 in system 2()0. 10027] The client devices 230 and 250 likely will have similar configurations with different names and featrnTS discussed with reference to FIG. 2 to assist in discussion of operations when being used / opernkd to receive a call (i.e., the called party clit:nt device 230) and to make a call (i.e., the caller client device 250), with it being understood that both can operate to perform either function at different operating time of the system 200. i\s shown, the called party diem device 230 includes a processor 232 managing operations of input and output (I / 0) devices 234 such as to communicate with the social media platform system 210 as shown at 274 via net\vork 205 and to communicatt: with the caller client dt:vice 250 as shown at 278 via net\vork 2U5. The 1 / 0 devices 234 may include a display device 236 for displaying a graphical user interface (GUI) 237, and the GUI 237 may be modified during operations of the system 200 to display a heads up message 238 or an alerting message 239 to assist in mitigating spoofed calJers. 6 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 10028] The processor 212 further operates to execute code / instructions and / or rnn sofr,vare downloaded on the device 230 (e.g., into local memory 246) to provide the functionality of a social media app 240 and a dialer app 244. The called party client device 230 includes memory 246 that may be used to store data (at least ternporarily) for display in the GUI 237 and to store a dialer app confi6,-,_m1tion 248 for use by the dialer app 244 (:md / or this may be stored in the data »torage 220 for u~e by the dialer ~ervice nmdule 21 (J). 10029] Similarly, rhe caller client device 250 includes a processor 252 managing operations of 1 / () devices 254 such as to communicate \vith the social media platform system 210 as shO\vn at 270 via network 205 and to communJCate -.v1th the caller chent device 2.30 as shown at 278 via network 205. The 1 / 0 devices 234 may include a display device 256 for displaying a graphical user interface (GlJl) 258, and the GUI 237 may be modified during operations of ,he system 200 to display data related to mitigating spoofed callers. The processor 252 executes code / instructions or runs software to provide the functionality of a social media app 260 (typically the same one as app 240 on called party client device 230) and a dialer app 264. The caller client device 250 includes memory 266 that may be used to stcJte data (at least ten,porarily) for display in the GUI 258 and to store a dialer app configuration 268 for use by the dialer app 264 (and / or this may be stured in the data storage 220 fur use by the dialer service module 216). 10030] \'v'ith the general components of the system 200 understood, it may be useful to discuss the system's operations ro achieve mitigation of spoofed callers and to highhght features that make the system 200 different from prior solutions. The system 200 leverages trusted communications based on an existing social media net,vork 222 -.vhere trust may be publicly acknowledged. For ex:imple, a user of the soci;i] rnedi:1 phtform system 210 may have defined a network 222 ,vith a plurality of people they internet with or "trust" (e.g., in Facebook, the trusted identity 224 may be a friend in their network 222), but, prior to the system 200, the network 222 only was used to identif)· relationships and not for used in receiving calls from those in their net..vork 222. 10031] The system 200 utilizes a trusted network / relationship (as defined in social media platform network 222) over a social media platfonn (provided by system 210 and apps 240, 260 on client devices 2,"SO, 250) between the caller (or operator of caller client device 250) and the receivrng or called party (or operator of called party client device 230) for verification purposes. Such verification may include prior ''intimation" (such as "friending" \vhen the platfom1 210 prm·ides the Facebook service) of the intended call by the caller party to the receiving or called p:irty. ln some cases, ;i social media voice endpoint, such as Facebook .i\lessenger Audio, nrny be 7 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 8 used to make a call through the social media framework to the client device connected to the network (e.g., see U.S. Pat. No. 10,616,419). In such a situation, the social media user may be fake and the proposed system 200 can be used to distinguish a real account from a fake one.

[0032] In some cases, the system200 will operate to generate and deliver to the called party a heads up message, which may be displayed on their client device 230 as isshown at 238 in FIG. 2. This may be achieved by the caller’s dialer app 264, before the caller places a call 278, sending a heads up message 238 with a timestamp to the called party (or their client device 230) through the social media app 260 and platform system 210 in which the calling and the called parties already have a pre-established trusted relationship (as defined by the caller / called network 222 and a token or certificate 226 with a connection definition 228 (two caller / called identifiers, for example). The message 238 may take the form of an alert, an icon, and / or a message allowing the operator of the client device 230 to allow or prevent / block the requested call from caller client device 250.

[0033] In other cases, the system 200 may generate an alerting message that is transmitted to and displayed as shown at 239 in the GUI 237 of the called party client device 230. In these operational cases, the called party dialer app 244 receives a call 278 over network 205 and observes or determines a caller ID as a known caller ID (such as via its social media network 222 and the trusted identities 224), but the dialer app 244 recognizes that a heads up message 238 was not received from any social media app 240 and module 214 to which it is registered. In response, the called party dialer app 244 sends an injury or inquiry message, through the social media app 240, 214, and 260 (the social media service associated with this contact making identified in the caller ID) as shown with arrows 274 and 270. The injury or inquiry message is sent to the caller client device 250 for display in the GUI 258 (as shown at 239 when the device 230 may operate as a caller device), and the message is configured to request the operator of the caller client device 250 to confirm that the call 278 is genuine (originating from the device 250 and the trusted operator). If positive confirmation is received (such as via a return message 270, 274 via the social media apps 260, 214, 240), the called party’s dialer app 244 accepts the call 278. If negative or no confirmation is received (such as within a preset time period), the called party’s dialer app 244 rejects the call 278 as likely being a spoofed caller.

[0034] During operation of system 200, the called party social media app 240 passes the notification (e.g., confirmation that the call should be accepted or blocked) to the called party dialer app 244, and the dialer app 244 may subscribe to the social media app 240 for such notifications. The called party dialer app 244 may, in some embodiments, be configurable, with CA 3131869 Date reçue / Received date 2025-01-15 the configuration (default or set by an operator of the device 230) 248 stored in memory 246. For example, the dialer app 244 may be configurable to accept calls from the trusted parties defined for their net'.vork 222 (as sho\vn at 244 in FIG. 2). The "trusted parties" or identities may be expanded in some cases to include those parties or possible callers that are connected through social media-verified ones, e.g., trusted if a friend of a friend in the network 222 or a member of a netw\nk belonging ID one of the trusted idcntiLies or "Criencb" 224 uf the called party\ social media nerwork 222. 10035! Once the call 278 gets placed and called party's dialer app 244 receives the call 278, the called party's dialer app 244 venfies the call 278 is expected w1th the presented caller ID and allows the call 278 to proceed. The dialer app 244 also obtains the calling party's identity (as may be defined in trusted identity 224 and / or in tl1e connection definition 228 in the token or certificate 226), and the identity may be how the caller is identified in a mutual friend list, in followers of the called party, a mobile identification number, a phone nu1nber, a connection, or other suitable identification. This identity or "number" is then displayed (e.g., in the GUI 237 or otherwise in the display 236)) by the dialer app 244 on the called parry client device 230 as the calling party number or identifier. It should he ren1emhered, though, that a token / certificate wuuld be used Lu verify this number / caller as a trusted pany. Fur example, a "friend" cuuld include an established business such as a bank. Businesses that arc trusted in \'our social media nen,vork \vrmld not just have a phone number that is recorded in the sodal media pn1fik but \v·ould also be assigned a token / certificate (which is important since phishing and other spoofing may involve calling from a number associated with a business and recognized by a dialer app as such). 10036] \Xiith the sptem 200 understood, it may nn\v be useful tn de~crihe its operations to perform a method of mitigating spoofed callers 300, as shown in FIG. 3 providing functional blocks or r:nethod steps that may be performed using the communication system 200 (and / 01· the system 100 of FIG. 1). As discussed with reference to FIG. 2, the system 200 may be configured to issue a token or digital certificate 226 to the users connected over one, t\vo, or n1ore social media platforms (such as the one provided by system 210 and local social media apps 240,260 on client devices 2.10, 2.':iO). l()(fP] In this regard, the method 300 may begin at :304 with determining each user's connections over the social media platform, This step 304 may mclude each social media user (e.g., operators of called party and caller client devices 230, 250) subscribing to the dialer service 216, -..vhich may result in loading of dialer apps 244 and 264 upon the client devices 230, 250. In some cases, the social media user registers \vith dialer apps through its API and subscribes for 9 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 notifications (both receive and transmit directions). The dialer apps 244, 264 registers with the corresponding or local social media apps 240, 260 such through its API (e.g., Facebook Developer's Kit or the like) and subscribes for notification (again both receive and transmit directions). 10038] 111e social media user may submit their caller ID, name, or other identifiable facl\>r, and, in step 304, the system (e.g., the dialer service mudule 21(1) acls to sture these identifiers or factors in the records 224 for each rrusred identiry in each caller / called parry\ nen.vork or connections definition 222 in data srorage 220 (e.g., ,vithin a database defining each user's connections that are allmved or trusted to receive calls from dunng operation of the svstem 200). For example, a social media user may have a handle within the social media platform but have a different name or identifier for other uses such as for work that they can provide for use in identifying them as a caller in the system 200 (e.g., ID of calling party in heads up and alerting messages 238, 239). \'vith this information, the method 300 continues at 310 with the dialer service module 216 issuing a token or digital certificate 226 to each connection (pair of social media users as defined in a connection definition 228) connected over the social media platform p1vvided by module 214 and system 210. Step 320 rnay involve the connected users providing their idcntificaliun details fur u M:: in the token 226 as part of this cunnectiun definition 228 ur this darn may be collected in step 304 (as discussed above). 10039] \'v'ith these initial or background functions completed (and, note, these may be updated in response to changes in a user's nel:\vork 222 including the issuing of a token 226 tO a newly added connection / trnsted identity 224), the method 300 continues at 326 with the initiation of a ne\v call. In step 326, the calling party (such as with their dialer app 264) searches for and identifies a receiving or called party (operator of device 230) to whom he / she intends to make a call. The dialer app 264 communicates with the dialer service module 216 to determine at 330 ,vhether a valid token 226 exists. In some embodiments, the system 200 determines the validity of the token or the digital certificate 226 associated with the receiving or called parry such as by searching through the social rnedia platforn1 (e.g., are the calling party and receiving party Facebook friends, Linkedln contacts, Twitter followers, \X:'hatsApp contacts, or the like) or step 3.10 may simply involve detennining whether the token / certificate 226 exists defining the connection definition 228 (e.g., indicating that the calling party is allowed to call the receiving party). 10040! If a valid token exists or the connection is otherwise verified, the method 300 continues at 332 with the dialer app 264 verifying that the calling party is not a spoofed caller, and the method 300 continues at 340 with transmitting a message to the receiving party over the social 10 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 media platform. J\s indicated at 3SO, the message (e.g., a heads up message 238) may be composed on the caller client device to include a time of the intended call as ,veil as to include the identifier or identification details for the calling party (previously provided as discussed above). Hence, in operations of the system 200, after confirmation of caller validity, the calling party is allmved to transmit a message to the receiving party over the social media platform (e.g., via Faccbook Me~senger or the like), through which they are crnmected, notifying them of Lhe upcoming call including derails such as name, calling number, caller ID, and / or rhe like, 10041 l In some cases, though, the system 200 will be unable to verify (in steps 330 and 538) the calling partv (e.g., there 1s no sooal media connect10n 111 net'.vork 222 or there 1s no token or digital certificate 226 defining a connection 228 between the calling party and the receiving party). In such cases, the system 200 may operate to block the calling party from communicating ,vid1 the receiving party (e.g., hlock the transmittal of a heads up message 238) or, alternatively, the system 200 may allmv at 340 the calling party to send a heads up message 238 to allmv them to choose whether or not to accept a call from the calling party (see block / step 390 in FIG. 3). For example, if no token or digital certificate 226 is discovered ber-veen the calling parry and the recei-ving party, the system 200 will either not allow the calling party to send a message (or, in sume cases, call) the receiving parL~ ur intimate the receiving party with a message indicating that an upcoming call may soon be received from a calling parry rhar is nor verified (at \vhich poinr the called party can make an informed decision to answer or ignore the call 278). Specifically, a receivrng party may receive a denied call message over the social media platform or via the alerts on the dialer app 244 (e.g., "Your Identity r.fay Have Been Breached on Social Media Platform N"). 10042] As indicated in box / step 360, the called party client device 230 is operated to provide identification details for the calling party, with the heads up (or other) message 238 being displayed over the screen 236 of the receiving party's device 230. As indicated in box / step 370, the message 238 may provide an indication of whether or not the calling party has been verified as being a trusted caller v-ia their social m.edia networks. Then at step 380, it is noted that the message 238 may include information such as connection derails (e.g., identifier for the calling party), mutual connections (e.g., the calling party is a friend of a friend in the social media platform), historical events involving the calling party over the social media platform. The method 300 continues at step :WO with the receiving party being able to take action in some embodiments via the dialer app 244 such as to accept or reject the call or to postpone the call to a later time. This information may be transmitted back to the calling party, e.g., via a social media message or an alert / notification from their dialer app 264, or the dialer app 244 of the receiving 11 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 party device 230 may simply act on this user selection, e.g., by allowing the call to be received, by blocking the call 278, and so on. 10043] To summarize, the systems 100 and 200 may be operated to perform a method of n1itigating the risk of an incorning spoofed caller. The method includes the follo,ving steps or stages: (a) issuing a token or a digital certificate to each netv.rork connection of a user (e.g., to each JTtember of a social media plat.fDrm tu which the user is connected (with connect.ion or "rrusr'' being defined \Virhin the social media platform)); 0)) receiving at least one idencificacion detail of each user connected over the social media platform (e.g., a calling name, a calling number, a callmg ID, or the like); (c) detemunmg a vahclity of the token or the d1g1tal cemficate of the network connection '.\~th a receiving party (which may be performed in response to searching and identifying the receiving party by a calling party); (cl) transmitting a message to the receiving party by the calling party in response to the validity confirmation of the token or the digital certificate of the network connection of the calling party with the receiving party over the social media platform (e.g., a message may be generated and transmitted that includes at least one of a calling number and / or name to be clisplayed to provide calling ID to the receiving party and a time of tbe intended calJ); (e) vinv1ng the connection details, nmtual connections, and / or historical events wid1 the calling part) in n:spunse lu receiving the message frum the calling pany uver the sucial media plarform; and (f) rrig:gering an acrion based on rhc received message such as an accept, a reject, or a postpone action for the requested / intended call. 10044! As ,vill be appreciated from the above discussion, the ne\v system offers protect1on from unsolicited callers or spammers by ensuring that only verified callers (e.g., an operator of a client device in FIGS. 1 ~3) are able to contact someone using the system and unverified callers \vill be flagp;ed as coming from an untrusted source (bnt, note that in some implementations the callee / receiving party may decide to accept either or neither call from a calln / calling party). The proposed method implemented by the system may involve a social media server (e.g., Facebook), a caller app, and a cloud PBX (for TDJ\I calls). \'i: / benever an incorning call is received, the caller app verifies that the user of the calling client device is tmsted by reviewing the social profile associated \vith the caller. \Vhenever a user creates their social media profile, the call recipient depends on the meshing of those so called "contacts" or "friends" that establishes a network of familiarization. 10045] The caller app originally may create a digital token for every social rnedia contact that the recipient has in their personal network. The trusted neN.rork can be configured to include primary contacts (e.g., first order connections), secondary contacts (second order connections), and even tertiary contacts who are third in order or level within the social media framework, e.g., 12 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 Linkedln, Liker.com, Facebook, Twiner, or the like. 1\luh-iple social media footprints can be used to build up the trusted contact list, which may be stored by the caller app (locally on a client device or on a network-available server). In some implementations, it may be preferred that the allowed contacts may be created either on the basis of a cross-referenced identity (e .g., "I krnn.. .. - this person from my Facebook net,vork, and I am manually adding their number to the this profile ... ") or learned frum an existing profile that already includes their various respective phone numbers. Variations may include voice capabiliries rhat are built imo social media uriliries such as Facebook V nice and Video Calling. 10046] In either case, once the system extracts a new profile, the system may store the ne,v profile as an alias in the caller app (or in a way accessible by the app). As mentioned, for each alias, a digital token is created and then stored by the caller app as well. The alias can also function as a prerequisite in calling that person within the caller app. The digital token is used by the caller app to determine when to allow an incoming caller to be labelled as someone the recipient can trust. In some cases, the trusted incoming caller is also indicated within the caller app graphical interface such as by using a notification (e.g., <Incoming_Caller_:r:-..;;ame> is a,,. Trusted Contact" (with the circle being shown green or otherwise indicating the call is a "Go" or can be accepted) or the like). 100471 It may be useful at this point to describe one useful (but non-limiting) general usec: ise. 1n this exempl;iry use c;ise, a mil comes in frnm the PBX (or social media apparntns) and the header infonnation (CID) is verified by the caller app. The incoming identity is checked against the metadata represented in the alias, which leads the caller app to verify that this is either a nr.:-1.v caller or an existing contact. The system can then check if a digital token is present. The presence of a Luken is what determim:~ if a call is alluwed and nut the sule presence uf an alias. Sometimes, a known contact may not be someone the user associated with a caller app wants to accept calls from, such as an annoying friend / network connection, a local business you connected to on Facebook ("Liked"), and so on. f'or these connections with an alias assigned, a digital token can be rescinded (or never issued), but they remain a known connection (or "friend") in the social media network. The presence of a digital token dete1mines if the call should be allowed, in which case the PBX connects the parties. The caller app, in some implementations, can issue a hard block of the call or simply advise the user of a client device that the incoming caller is trusted or not be tn1sted (so that the user can choose to accept it or not). 100-18] To further clarify the operations of system (such as system 100 or system 200 of Fl Gs. 1 and 2), it may be useful to presented call or data flow sequences for additional use cases. FIG. 4 illustrates a call seyuence ur use case scenariu, with diagram 400, as may be provided Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 during operations of the systems of Fl(;_ 1 and / or FIG. 2. Fl(;_ 5 illustrates a variant of the scenario of FIG. 4, ,vith diagram 500, that encapsulates relevant apps under each participant's mobile or client de,"ice. FIG. 6 illustrates a call sequence or use case scenario, ·with diagram 600, in ,vhich the heads-up message gets delayed. 10049] Scenario dia1::,>ram 40fl of FIG. 4 shows the case ,vhere a heads-up message makes it Ljuickly through the network and alerts the callee prior to the PSTN ndwork (or other communication network used for calling) signaling. Scenario diagram 500 of FIG. 5 is a varianr of the use case or scenario of FIG. 4 in which the relevant applications are encapsulated or shown under each paruopant's mobile or client device (m th.1s example, the caller 1s .-\dam usmg his mobile device (e.g., a smartphone or the like) and the callee or receiving party is Ben using his mobile device). ]n FIG. 6, the use case 600 shows the case in which the heads-up message is delayed from reaching the callee (such as "Ben" in the FIC. 5 example), hut it still arrives in a timely enough manner to allow the callee to use it n1ake a decision as to whether or not to answer a received call on their mobile or client device.

[0050] In the two examples shown by diagmms 400, 500, and 600, spoofing is comrnlled or 1nitigated using the existence of n1essaging applications associated with one (or more) social media applicalirn1s (such as Facebouk i\kssenger, Linkedln l'vlessaging, and the Like) and lht:: endto- end encryption provided by such messaging applications. These two features of social media applications mean that both the trusted relationships and secure communication channels have already been established and can be used to provide enhanced mitigation of spoofed callers.

[0051] J\s a result, the heads-up messages \V(m]d ride on the pre-established communication channels without the need for a dialer service module 216, in some preferred cases or implementations of system 200 . .Instead, the social media application 240, 260 on mobile or client devices 230, 250 in the system 200 of FIG. 2 provide API for the dialer apps 244, 264 to: (i) register; and (ii) send messages it ( e.g., Adam, in the example of FIG. 5, is calling: Ben with this number at this time). The social media app, with its messaging component, would form a message for the peer's social tTtedia app on the callee's side. ()nee recei,-ed, the callee's social media app \vould interpret this message and instead of posting it to the social media app GUI, it would instead be adapted to alert the callee's dialer app (that previously had registered with it for such a service). 100521 The message sequence charts 400, 500, and 600 show an approach to spoofed caller mitigation that uses the pre-established trusted relationship and also the way to communicate privately though a secure communication channel that \Vas also pre-established as part of the social media-associated messaging app. To achieve an end-tcH:-nd encryption (so that 14 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 only ;\dam and Ben can read the content of messages they exchange and anybody else who might be either snooping or iust serve as a transport medium or service see it as gibberish), the system is configured such that only the device users (e.g., first and second users labeled Adam and Ben above) have full control of their pri-..ate keys, but typically not the social media servers or service providers. Posting on a social media platform (such as Twitter or Faccbook) is public in nature, but exchanging messages \ViLh memben, of Lhat social nelviork 5houkl nol be via the messaging services or applications provided by rhe social media applications assodarcd with such platforms. Stated differently, the system 200 may utilize dialer apps 244, 264 that are enhanced or modified (not iust a dialer app that most mobile or client devices have alreadv mstalled and use to make mobile / PSTN calls) to be able to interface with messaging apps associated with social media via an enhanced r\Pl that the messaging app ,vould provide and send hcads~up messages as out of band (with respect to the mohilc / PSTN network) signaling messages. 10053] The operations of the system (such as system 200 of FIG. 2) shown in use case / scenario 400, 500 is one \'-la)' the social media designation for a kno,.vn contact can be used to verify an out of band caH (i.e., PSTN). In some cases, the social media platform might have an open architecture alhnving the phone / client device dialer app to directly connect with the M>eial media server to verify Lhal the dialer app's ITljUesl Lo verif) a user is received. The :social media server could then issue a rhurnbs up or acknowledgement, which can be remembered using a digital token or the like for future calls. The allowed call will proceed provided the digital token remams valid. As discussed above, the first rime the unkno,vn caller calls will result in an initial checking of the social media profile that leads to the digital token and associated steps. Then, subsequent calls from the person / same caller will result in steps to verify that the token is still a valid one. 1f not such as when the caller ends up being unfriended, the dialer app may alert the recipient that this person cannot be trusted. 10054] Another option is that the dialer app is used to interface \vith the installed social media client app as a means to yerify the contact through the social media server. So instead of a caller rnanually sending a 1nessage via a social 111edia n1essaging se1Yice (e.g., "1 an1 about to call you from this number"), the messaging is automated by the systems described herein. This approach docs not make social media platform-based call, but it, instead, uses the messaging service of the social media platform as an out of bane! signaling path for heads-up messages. The call sull goes through the mobile / PSTN network. 10055! In FIG. L nerumrk 104 can include or be, for example. an internet protocol (IP) nenvork. Exemplary types of nenvorks suitable for communication with nenvork 104 can be or include a local area net\vork, a wide~area network, a metropolitan area network, wireless nenvorks, LS Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 a private branch exchange (PBX), or a portion of the lmerneL Various components of net,vork 104 can be coupled to one or more other components using an Ethernet connection, other wired connections, and / or wireless interfaces. Network 104 can be coupled to other networks and / or to other devices typically coupled to networks. By ,vay of particular example, network 104 includes a communication nenvork, and nenvork 104 can be coupled to additional networks that can lJe coupled Lo one or rnore devices, such as devices 120, 130, and 140, which may communicare via spoofed caller mirigarion provided during operations of rhe sysrem 100. 10056! It vvill be appreciated from the above description that the communication systems taught herem may be used to provide auto-venficat10n of callers 111 real time usmg cost effecti,0e and pre-established nenvork connections over social media platforms. Social groups other than friends or official contacts of social media platforms may also be utilized to mitigate spoofed callers such as special interest or other defined groups such as "Tuesday Tech at the Pub" and the like that rnay be groups identified hr a social media platfonn without necessarily being friend as these connections defined by the platfom1s may be trusted by some users of the system. Such levels of "trust" can be confi6,11red or defined as sho,vn at 248 for each user's dialer app 244 so that a user can dial up or down the list of those trusted and allo,ved to place calls to their client devices. NuLe, lht: "trust" may be applied un a persun-by~persun level and / or may be applied Lu groups of possible callers including businesses or organizations (e.g., the connection may be with such a group and result in the dialer app allowing calls from anyone linked to that group (e.g., accept calls from emplovees of Hospital D, Bank _I, and so on, from members oLM\" Craft Club, and the like). The scope of the mitigation performed by communications systems of the present description are not limited to providing automated security protection from unsavory call centers and voice nem-orks but can also provide defense against one or more nf the following: TDoS attacks; call pumping; robocalls; account takeover attacks; and other threats. Typically, the system is configured to validate an incoming call using the social media based infom1ation (including tmsted connections) without the need to go through a telephone company (including wireless providers). 10057] Further, ,vith regard to social media users receiving voice caHs from imposters, the systems described herein may be configured such that the fake accounts that could be created could be declined on the basis of a token not being present. So, as with regular phone devices, received calls frorn devices using social media platforms / service can be: verified usmg social media.

[0058] As used herein, the terms application, module, analyzer, engine, and the like can refer to computer program instructions, encoded on computer storage medimn for execution by, 16 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23 or to control the operation of, data processing apparatus. Alternatively or additionally, the program instructions can be encoded on an artificially-generated propagated signal, e.g., a machine-generated electrical, optical, or electromagnetic signal, which is generated to encode infonnation for transmission to suitable receiver apparatus for execution by a data processing apparntus. ;\ computer storage medium can be, or be included in, a computer-readable storage device, a con1put.er-readable storage subst.rnlc, a randrn11 ur serja) access 111em\>ry array \Jr devjcc, or a combination of one or more of rhe subsrrares and devices. Jvioreover, while a computer storage medium is not a propagated signal, a computt:r storage medium can be a source or destmauon of computer program mstructions encoded 111 an art1fie1ally-generated propagated signaL Tht: computt:r storagt: medium can also be, or be included in, ont: or more separate physical components or media (e.g., solid-state memory that forms part of a device, disks, or other storage devices). 10059] The present invention has been described above with reference to a number of exemplary embodiments and examples. It should be appreciated that the particular embodiments shown and described he1·ein are illustrative of the invention and its best mode and are not intended to lin1it in any ,vay the scope of the invention as set forth in tbe clain1s. The features of the various embudi111enls 111ay stand alone ur be c0111bined in any cumbinatiun. Further, unless orhenvise noted, various illustrated steps of a merhod can be pcrfonned set1ucnrially or ar the same lime, and not necessarily be performed in the order illustrated. Ir ,vill be recognized that changes and modifications may be made to the exemplary embodiments without departing from the scope of the present invention. These and other changes or modifications are intended to be included ,vithin the scope of the present invention, as expressed in the following claims. 17 Date Re9ue / Date Received 2021-09-23

Claims

18 Claims 1. An electronic communication system adapted to mitigate spoofed callers comprising: a first client device communicatively linked to a communications network; a social media application configured to interact via the communications network with a social media platform to generate a connection network defining a set of trusted members for an operator of the first client device, where the operator of the first client device is a user; and on the first client device, a dialer application configured to: validate an operator of a second client device as a trusted caller of the operator of the first client device by determining whether the operator of the second client device belongs to the set of trusted members; and after validating the operator of the second client device as a trusted caller, receive and display at the first client device a message including an identifier for the operator of the second client device and a proposed time for a call from the trusted caller, the message received over the social media platform, where the operator of the second client device is another user.

2. The electronic communication system of claim 1, further comprising data storage accessible via the communications network storing a token or digital certificate for each member in the set of trusted members and wherein the validating, performed by the dialer application or another validity verification module, comprises accessing the data storage to verify the operator of the second client device is associated with one of the tokens or digital certificates.

3. The electronic communication system of claim 2, wherein each of the tokens or digital certificates includes an identifier for a particular one of the set of trusted members and wherein the dialer application is configured to display the identifier associated with the operator of the second client device after completing the validating.

4. The electronic communication system of any one of claims 1 - 3, wherein the message further includes at least one of details regarding a connection between the operators of the first and second client devices, mutual connections of the operators of the first and second client devices, and historical events associated with prior communications between the operators of the first and second client devices. CA 3131869 Date reçue / Received date 2025-01-15 19 5. The electronic communication system of any one of claims 1 - 4, wherein, after the validating, the dialer application is configured to request input, via operations of the first client device, from the operator of the first client device to accept, reject, or reschedule a time for a call proposed by the trusted caller via the social media platform and wherein, in response, the dialer application accepts, rejects, or reschedules the call.

6. The electronic communication system of any one of claims 1 - 5, wherein the trusted members include an organization or group or include a participant of the social media platform having a connection to one of the trusted members.

7. The electronic communication system of any pne of claims 1 - 6, further comprising the second client device, wherein the second client device is configured to communicate with the social media platform to identify the operator of the first client device and to generate the message related to a proposed call between the operators of the first and second client devices for transmittal to the first client device via the social media platform.

8. The electronic communication system of any one of claims 1 -7, wherein the dialer application is configured to validate an operator of a second client device as a trusted caller by determining that a call has been received at the first client device from the second client device prior to receipt of the message and, in response, transmitting an inquiry message via the social media platform to the second client device requesting confirmation the operator of the second client device placed the call.

9. The electronic communication system of any any one of claims 1 -8, wherein the social media application is configured to support a voice call and the dialer application is configured to validate an operator of a second client device as a trusted caller by determining whether the operator of the second client device belongs to the set of trusted members by verifying the operator is associated with a social media identity that is trusted. CA 3131869 Date reçue / Received date 2025-01-15