A non-access stratum authentication method for LTE-R vehicle-ground communication

Abstract

The invention discloses a non-access stratum authentication method for LTE-R vehicle-ground communication, the main operations of which are: A. Global Subscriber Identification Card (USIM) registration: Home Subscriber Server (HSS) utilizes the identity authorization master key MK to All on-board mobile units (OBU) authorize dynamic anonymous identity TID; B, initial authentication of non-access layer: use hash chain to complete two-way authentication between on-board mobile unit (OBU) and LTE-R network; C, non-access layer Re-authentication: When the on-board mobile unit (OBU) initiates authentication again within the scope of the mobile management entity (MME), it directly uses the i-th hash chain authentication anchor H i (Seed) Complete the two-way authentication between the vehicle-mounted mobile unit (OBU) and the mobile management entity (MME); D, last re-authentication; E, hash chain update; this method can resist desynchronization attacks, redirection attacks, High reliability and good real-time performance.

Description

technical field [0001] The invention relates to a mutual authentication method between LTE-R vehicle-ground communications. Background technique [0002] With the rapid development of high-speed railways, more business bearing requirements are put forward for wireless communication systems. GSM-R (Railway Special Mobile Communication System) is limited by the characteristics of narrowband mobile communication, and it is difficult to meet the needs of future railway systems for video surveillance and passenger mobile information. services and other business needs. At the Seventh High-Speed ​​Railway Conference held in December 2010, the International Union of Railways (UIC) clearly stated that railway wireless communication technology will leapfrog 3G directly to broadband LTE-R (Long Term Evolution for Railway, Railway Dedicated Long Term Evolution System) evolution. At that time, the railway communication system will adopt the LTE-R system completely based on broadband, a...

AI Technical Summary

Problems solved by technology

[0005] (1) The authentication vector forwarding method is used to realize the mutual authentication between the mobile management entity and the vehicle-mounted mobile unit. This method has high communication and calculation costs, and the exhaustion of the authentication vector will lead to the restart of the initial authentication, which greatly increases the mobility management. The communication overhead and delay brought by the entity to the home user server to obtain the authentication vector

[0006] (2) IMSI lacks protection

And it can also be used to track the access behavior or movement path of the vehicle-mounted mobile unit in the network, causing security risks such as privacy leakage

[0007] (3) Vulnerable to redirection attacks

Since the access authentication is initiated in a wireless environment, the attacker can manipulate the pseudo-base station equipment with the base station function to induce the vehicle-mounted mobile unit to connect to the wireless channel of the pseudo-base station, so as to capture the access authentication request of the vehicle-mounted mobile unit and send It leads to the external network and poses a threat to the communication security of the mobile unit on the vehicle

[0008] Aiming at the above problems, document 1 "Performance and security enhanced authentication and key agreement protocol for SAE / LTE network" (Degefa F B, Lee D, Kim J, etal. Computer Networks, 2016, 94:145-163) proposed an improved EPS-AKA scheme, through the introduction of the international mobile user identification key S, it is easy to become a system security bottleneck