Information processing system, information processing method, and information processing program
Patent Information
- Application Number
- HK62026124870
- Authority / Receiving Office
- HK · HK
- Patent Type
- Applications
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Priority Date
- 2023-03-03
- Filing Date
- 2026-06-16
- Publication Date
- 2026-09-11
Smart Images

Figure 00000000_0000_ABST
Abstract
Description
(19) *EP004679782A1* (11) EP 4 679 782 A1 (12) EUROPEAN PATENT APPLICATION published in accordance with Art. 153(4) EPC (43) Date of publication: 14.01.2026 Bulletin 2026 / 03 (21) Application number: 23926372.6 (22) Date of filing: 30.06.2023 (51) International Patent Classification (IPC): H04L 12 / 66 (2006.01) H04L 12 / 22 (2006.01) H04L 41 / 06 (2022.01) H04L 43 / 08 (2022.01) H04L 9 / 40 (2022.01) H04L 43 / 026 (2022.01) H04L 45 / 64 (2022.01) (52) Cooperative Patent Classification (CPC): H04L 63 / 1416; H04L 12 / 22; H04L 12 / 66; H04L 43 / 026; H04L 45 / 64; H04L 63 / 0236; H04L 63 / 1425; H04L 63 / 1441; H04L 63 / 1458 (86) International application number: PCT / JP2023 / 024529 (87) International publication number: WO 2024 / 185163 (12.09.2024 Gazette 2024 / 37) (84) Designated Contracting States: AL AT BE BG CH CY CZ DE DK EE ES FI FR GB GR HR HU IE IS IT LI LT LU LV MC ME MK MT NL NO PL PT RO RS SE SI SK SM TR Designated Extension States: BA Designated Validation States: KH MA MD TN (30) Priority: 03.03.2023 JP 2023033210 (71) Applicant: NTT Docomo Business, Inc. Tokyo 100‑8019 (JP) (72) Inventors: • TAKATSU, Takeshi Tokyo 100‑8019 (JP) • HATADA, Mitsuhiro Tokyo 100‑8019 (JP) (74) Representative: Hoffmann Eitle Patent‑ und Rechtsanwälte PartmbB Arabellastraße 30 81925 München (DE) (54) INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM, INFORMATION PROCESSING METHOD, AND INFORMATION PROCESSING PROGRAM (57) An information processing system (1) is an in- formation processing system including: an upper NW device (100) being a device constituting an overlay net- work; and a lower NW device (200) being a device con- stituting an underlay network. In this system, the upper NW device (100) detects unauthorized communication, and notifies the lower NW device (200) of information related to the unauthorized communication detected. The lower NW device (200) acquires information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device (200), determines an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to unauthorized communica- tion notification of which is provided, and blocks the information related to unauthorized communication no- tification of which is provided as unauthorized commu- nication in accordance with the inconsistency level de- termined. EP 4 67 9 78 2 A 1 Processed by Luminess, 75001 PARIS (FR) 2 1 EP 4 679 782 A1 2 Description [Technical Field]
[0001] The present invention relates to an information processing system, an information processing method, and an information processing program. [Background Art]
[0002] Conventionally, there are security countermea- sure techniques in end-point terminals such as personal computers and servers. For example, there are related techniques of detecting suspicious communication or behavior at an end point by using Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). [Citation List] [Non Patent Citation]
[0003] Non Patent Literature 1: ICT Business Online (currently docomo business Watch): The IT trend terms EDR [searched on June 20, 2023], Internet (https: / / www. ntt.com / bizon / glossary / e-e / edr.html) [Summary of Invention] [Technical Problem]
[0004] The related technique includes problems in terms of cost and security. For example, EDR needs to be deployed on each terminal, requiring high cost. In addition, terminals such as office automation (OA) de- vices and Internet of Things (IoT) terminals on which EDR cannot be deployed have not undergone the measure, and thus, security risk remains. Furthermore, there are cases where a normally functioning terminal is erro- neously detected as an unauthorized terminal, or a nor- mal communication destination from a normally function- ing terminal is erroneously detected as an unauthorized communication destination.
[0005] The present invention has been made in view of the above, and aims to provide an information processing system, an information processing method, and an in- formation processing program for achieving improve- ment in security and reduction in cost. [Solution to Problem]
[0006] In order to solve the above-described problems and achieve the object, an information processing sys- tem according to the present invention is an information processing system including: an upper network (NW) device being a device constituting an overlay network; and a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, wherein the upper NW device in- cludes: a detector configured to detect unauthorized communication; and a notifier configured to notify the lower NW device of information related to the unauthor- ized communication detected by the detector, and the lower NW device includes: an acquirer configured to acquire information related to communication of a term- inal connected to the lower NW device; a determiner configured to determine an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to unauthorized communication no- tification of which is provided by the notifier; and a blocker configured to block the information related to unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier as unauthorized communication in accor- dance with the inconsistency level determined by the determiner. [Advantageous Effects of Invention]
[0007] According to the present invention, it is possible to achieve improvement in security and reduction in cost. [Brief Description of Drawings]
[0008] FIG. 1 is a diagram for illustrating a related techni- que. FIG. 2 is a diagram for illustrating an example of a configuration of an information processing system according to an embodiment. FIG. 3 is a diagram for illustrating an example of a configuration of an upper NW device according to the embodiment. FIG. 4 is a diagram for illustrating an example of a configuration of a lower NW device according to the embodiment. FIG. 5 is a diagram for illustrating an outline of processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. FIG. 6 is a diagram for illustrating an example of detection processing and determination processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. FIG. 7 is a diagram for illustrating an example of detection processing and determination processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. FIG. 8 is a diagram for illustrating an example of detection processing and determination processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. FIG. 9 is a diagram for illustrating an example of blocking processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. FIG. 10 is a diagram for illustrating an example of the blocking processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 3 3 EP 4 679 782 A1 4 FIG. 11 is a flowchart for illustrating an example of a flow of processing performed by the information processing system according to the embodiment. FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating an example of a computer that executes an information processing program. [Embodiments for Carrying Out the Invention]
[0009] Hereinafter, embodiments of an information processing system, an information processing method, and an information processing program according to the present application will be described in detail with refer- ence to the drawings. Note that the present invention is not limited by the embodiment. In the description of the drawings, the same portions are denoted by the same reference numerals, and redundant description is omitted. [Related technique]
[0010] First, a related technique will be described with reference to FIG. 1. FIG. 1 is a diagram for illustrating a related technique.
[0011] In the following, a device constituting an overlay network will be denoted as an upper NW device, while a device constituting an underlay network will be denoted as a lower NW device. Here, the upper NW device refers to, for example, a cloud proxy server or Unified Threat Management (UTM) equipment. The lower NW device refers to, for example, a network device such as Deep Packet Inspection (DPI) equipment, a router, and a switch.
[0012] In the conventional security countermeasures, networks are divided into a reliable "inside" and an un- reliable "outside", and countermeasures are taken at the boundary. An example of the inside network is a data center connected by an in-house local area network (LAN) or a virtual private network (VPN), and an example of the outside network is the Internet. For example, as a countermeasure taken at the boundary, security equip- ment such as a firewall, a proxy, or an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) / Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) is in- stalled at the boundary to monitor and control the com- munication, thereby blocking a cyberattack from the out- side.
[0013] Such prior security measures assume that data and systems to be protected are inside the network. However, with the spread of the cloud, it is not unusual that there is a target to be protected on the Internet on the outside. In this manner, the targets to be protected are scattered in various locations to blur the boundary, mak- ing it difficult to take sufficient measures with a conven- tional mindset.
[0014] In view of this circumstance, the concept of zero trust is spreading. In the zero trust security service, various security countermeasures are taken on the as- sumption that all communications are not to be trusted. Specific examples of this include enhancement of user authentication by encryption of a communication path regardless of the inside and outside of the network, use of multi-factor authentication, and the like, and integrated log monitoring of the network and various devices con- nected to the network. A large number of security solu- tions for implementing the zero trust have already emerged. For example, there has been provided a solu- tion such as EDR that enables quick detection and hand- ling of a cyberattack by monitoring a client device and analyzing a log.
[0015] As a security countermeasure technique in end- point terminals such as personal computers and servers, there is a related technique of detecting suspicious com- munication and behavior at the end point terminal by EDR.
[0016] The related technique, however, includes pro- blems in terms of cost and security. For example, EDR needs to be deployed on each terminal, requiring high cost. In addition, countermeasures are not taken in OA devices and IoT terminals in which EDR cannot be de- ployed, and a security risk remains. Furthermore, a nor- mally functioning terminal is erroneously detected as an unauthorized terminal in some cases.
[0017] In view of this, an information processing sys- tem 1 according to the present embodiment described below is an information processing system including: an upper NW device 100 being a device constituting an overlay network; and a lower NW device 200 being a device constituting an underlay network. In this system, the upper NW device 100 detects unauthorized commu- nication, and notifies the lower NW device 200 of infor- mation related to the unauthorized communication de- tected. The lower NW device 200 acquires information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device 200, determines an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to the unauthorized commu- nication notification of which is provided, and blocks the information related to unauthorized communication no- tification of which is provided as unauthorized commu- nication in accordance with the inconsistency level de- termined.
[0018] With such an information processing system, effects such as cost reduction and security enhancement can be obtained. In addition, by blocking communication from a terminal that performs unauthorized communica- tion, communication is controlled in units of devices with- out blocking the entire NW, thereby achieving robust security while ensuring the availability of the NW.
[0019] Furthermore, the information processing sys- tem 1 provides a zero trust security service unique to a provider (carrier). The zero trust security uses a config- uration in which the underlay NW and the overlay NW cooperate to perform protection in an Information and Communication Technology (ICT) environment with in- creased complexity and cyber risk by new ways of work- 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 4 5 EP 4 679 782 A1 6 ing such as working remotely and new business expan- sion by utilization of IoT and the like.
[0020] The information processing system 1 provides a secure Network as a Service (NaaS) type ICT service closely linking the function of the overlay NW and the function of the underlay NW. A company that receives the service of the information processing system 1 can easily start, revise, and cancel the service of the information processing system 1 immediately by applying from a management portal site without spending a cost for In- formation Technology (IT) vendor outsourcing or spend- ing a cost for NW design, making it possible to reduce operational cost taken from design to application.
[0021] Regarding the information processing system 1, the overlay NW and the underlay NW are provided by the same provider. In addition, the user who uses the information processing system 1 can perform flexible use of the system, for example, using only the overlay NW of this system and using the underlay NW of another com- pany. [Configuration of information processing system]
[0022] Next, a configuration of the information proces- sing system 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 2. As illustrated in FIG. 2, the information processing sys- tem 1 includes an upper NW device 100 and a lower NW device 200. Each of these devices will be described below. In the information processing system 1, the num- ber of the upper NW devices 100 and the number of the lower NW devices 200 are not limited to one, and each device may be provided in plurality.
[0023] The upper NW device 100 is a device that controls an upper network of the information processing system 1. The upper NW device 100 detects unauthor- ized communication and notifies the lower NW device 200 of the detected result.
[0024] The lower NW device 200 is a device that con- trols a lower network of the information processing sys- tem 1.
[0025] The lower NW device 200 determines whether the information regarding the unauthorized communica- tion notification of which is provided from the upper NW device 100 is erroneous detection, and blocks the un- authorized communication when the information is not erroneous detection. In contrast, when the information is erroneous detection, the device deletes the information related to unauthorized communication, which has been used for detection. [Configuration of upper NW device]
[0026] Next, a configuration of the upper NW device 100 will be described with reference to FIG. 3. As illu- strated in FIG. 3, the upper NW device 100 includes a communication module 110, a control module 120, and a storage module 130. Note that these modules may be held by a plurality of devices in a distributed manner. Hereinafter, processing of these modules will be de- scribed.
[0027] The communication module 110 is implemen- ted by a Network Interface Card (NIC) or the like, and enables communication between the control module 120 and an external device via a telecommunications link such as a Local Area Network (LAN) or the Internet. For example, the communication module 110 enables communication between the external device and the control module 120.
[0028] The storage module 130 is implemented by a semiconductor memory element such as Random Ac- cess Memory (RAM) or flash memory, or a storage device such as a hard disk or an optical disk. The information stored in the storage module 130 includes, for example, terminal information managed by the upper NW device 100, terminal information managed by the lower NW device 200, information related to unauthorized commu- nication used for detection, information related to un- authorized communication used for determination of er- roneous detection, information regarding detected un- authorized communication, and other information neces- sary for blocking unauthorized communication. Here, the information related to unauthorized communication used for detection includes information such as terminal in- formation of a communication destination of unauthor- ized communication and an IP address of a communica- tion destination of unauthorized communication. The information related to unauthorized communication used for determination of erroneous detection includes infor- mation such as content of communication involving the lower NW device 200 and cyberattack information. Note that the information stored in the storage module 130 is not limited to the example described above.
[0029] Here, the information related to unauthorized communication used for determination of erroneous de- tection refers to a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destina- tion address as the unauthorized communication de- tected in the overlay network.
[0030] The control module 120 is implemented by using a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a Network Pro- cessor (NP), a Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or the like, and executes a processing program stored in the memory. As illustrated in FIG. 3, the control module 120 includes a detector 121 and a notifier 122. Herein- after, each part included in the control module 120 will be described.
[0031] The detector 121 detects unauthorized commu- nication. For example, the detector 121 detects un- authorized communication by the security function. For example, the detector 121 detects unauthorized commu- nication by the UTM security function.
[0032] For example, when an IP address of a connec- tion destination of a packet matches the IP address of the unauthorized communication stored in advance in the storage module 130, the detector 121 detects the com- munication as an unauthorized communication and spe- 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 5 7 EP 4 679 782 A1 8 cifies the IP address of the connection destination as the IP address of the unauthorized communication destina- tion. Methods of detecting unauthorized communications that may be used by the detector 121 include, not only an IP address, but also a communication date / time, beha- viors of packets observed at the time of an attack such as a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, a SYN flooding attack, or a buffer overflow attack, and any other existing detection method.
[0033] The notifier 122 notifies the lower NW device 200 of the information regarding the unauthorized com- munication detected by the detector 121. For example, as information regarding unauthorized communication detected by the detector 121, the notifier 122 notifies the lower NW device 200 of information such as a detection date / time, a detection type, a connection destination IP address / port, and a connection source IP address / port of the unauthorized communication.
[0034] For example, a notifier 122 specifies a commu- nication destination of the unauthorized communication using the information regarding the unauthorized com- munication detected by the detector 121, and then no- tifies the lower NW device 200 of the specified commu- nication destination of the unauthorized communication. The "connection destination IP address / port" includes one or both of the connection destination IP address and the connection destination port. The "connection source IP address / port" includes one or both of the con- nection source IP address and the connection source port. [Configuration of lower NW device]
[0035] Next, a configuration of the lower NW device 200 will be described with reference to FIG. 4. As illu- strated in FIG. 4, the lower NW device 200 includes a communication module 210, a control module 220, and a storage module 230. Note that these modules may be held by a plurality of devices in a distributed manner. Hereinafter, processing of these modules will be de- scribed.
[0036] The communication module 210 is implemen- ted by an NIC or the like, and enables communication between the control module 220 and an external device via a telecommunications link such as a LAN or the Internet. For example, the communication module 210 enables communication between the external device and the control module 220.
[0037] The storage module 230 is implemented by a semiconductor memory element such as RAM or flash memory, or a storage device such as a hard disk or an optical disk. The information stored in the storage module 230 includes, for example, terminal information managed by the upper NW device 100, terminal information man- aged by the lower NW device 200, information related to the communication of the terminal connected to the lower NW device 200, information related to unauthorized communication used for detection, information related to unauthorized communication used for determination of erroneous detection, information regarding detected unauthorized communication, and other information ne- cessary for blocking unauthorized communication. Here, the information related to unauthorized communication used for detection includes information such as terminal information of a communication destination of unauthor- ized communication and an IP address of a communica- tion destination of unauthorized communication. The information related to unauthorized communication used for determination of erroneous detection includes infor- mation such as content of communication involving the lower NW device 200 and cyberattack information. Note that the information stored in the storage module 230 is not limited to the example described above.
[0038] The control module 220 is implemented by using a CPU, an NP, an FPGA, or the like, and executes a processing program stored in the memory. As illu- strated in FIG. 4, the control module 220 includes an acquirer 221, a determiner 222, a blocker 223, and a deleter 224. Hereinafter, each part included in the control module 220 will be described.
[0039] The acquirer 221 acquires information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device 200. For example, the acquirer 221 acquires information related to communication of OA equipment or IoT equipment connected to the lower NW device 200.
[0040] The determiner 222 determines an inconsis- tency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection desti- nation address as the information regarding the un- authorized communication notification of which is pro- vided by the notifier 122. For example, the determiner 222 calculates an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network in which the connection destination address is the same as that of the information regarding the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122, and then determines whether the inconsistency level is a predetermined threshold or more. When the inconsis- tency level is the predetermined threshold or more, the determiner 222 determines that the information is ob- tained as erroneous detection. Note that the information regarding the flow data may be data acquired from each piece of communication equipment in the underlay NW or may be data stored in an external device.
[0041] Here, a specific example of a method of calcu- lating the inconsistency level by the determiner 222 will be described. For example, the determiner 222 acquires flow data having the same connection destination IP address included in the information regarding unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122.
[0042] Subsequently, the determiner 222 calculates the inconsistency level based on any one or a plurality of the communication date / time, the connection destina- tion port number, the communication protocol, and the number of bytes transferred between pieces of flow data. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 6 9 EP 4 679 782 A1 10 For example, in a case where the inconsistency level is calculated based on the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the number of bytes transferred, the determiner 222 determines, for all the acquired flow data, whether a ratio of records in which no total matching is achieved in the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the number of bytes transferred, is a predetermined threshold (for example, 50%) or more. In a case where the ratio is the predetermined threshold or more, the determiner 222 determines that the detection result in the overlay network is obtained as erroneous detection. Note that the method of calculating the inconsistency level is not limited to this, and the determiner 222 may count the number of unmatched records instead of the ratio of unmatched records and may determine whether the number of unmatched records is a predetermined threshold or more. Here, the information match may not be an exact match but may be a partial match.
[0043] In addition, for example, in a case where the inconsistency level is calculated by also using the com- munication date / time between pieces of flow data, the determiner 222 may list the communication dates and times in order from the oldest one, calculate an average value of differences between the communication dates and times among pieces of data with close communica- tion dates and times, determine whether the average value is a predetermined threshold (for example, one minute) or more, and may then determine that the detec- tion result in the overlay network has been obtained as erroneous detection in a case where the average value is the predetermined threshold or more.
[0044] That is, for example, in a case where unauthor- ized communication with the Command and Control server (C2 server) is detected in the overlay network, the determiner 222 determines the inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the connection destination address same as that of the communication. In a case where the incon- sistency is high, the determiner 222 determines the com- munication not as unauthorized communication with the C2 server but as erroneous detection.
[0045] The blocker 223 blocks the information regard- ing the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 as unauthorized commu- nication in accordance with the inconsistency level de- termined by the determiner 222. For example, when the determiner 222 determines that the inconsistency level is less than a predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 determines that the information is not erroneous detec- tion, and blocks the information regarding the unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 as unauthorized communication.
[0046] For example, when the determiner 222 has determined that the inconsistency level is less than a predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 blocks the communication to the unauthorized communication des- tination by using the information regarding the connec- tion source IP address / port of the unauthorized commu- nication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 and the information regarding the connection desti- nation and the connection source IP address / port of the terminal connected to the lower NW device 200 acquired by the acquirer 221.
[0047] In addition, for example, when the determiner 222 determines that the inconsistency level is less than the predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 blocks communication from the unauthorized communication source by using the information regarding the unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122. For example, when the determiner 222 has determined that the inconsistency level is less than a predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 blocks the communication from the unauthorized communication terminal by using the information regarding the connec- tion source IP address / port of the unauthorized commu- nication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 and the information regarding the connection desti- nation and the connection source IP address / port of the terminal connected to the lower NW device 200 acquired by the acquirer 221.
[0048] In addition, for example, when the determiner 222 determines that the inconsistency level is less than the predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 blocks the communication from the NW including the unauthorized communication source by using the information regard- ing the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122. For example, when the determiner 222 has determined that the inconsistency level is less than a predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 blocks the communication from the NW including the unauthorized communication terminal by using the in- formation regarding the connection source IP address / - port of the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 and the information regarding the connection destination and the connection source IP address / port of the terminal connected to the lower NW device 200 acquired by the acquirer 221.
[0049] When the inconsistency level is determined to be a predetermined threshold or more by the determiner 222, the deleter 224 notifies the upper NW device 100 of an instruction to delete the information related to the unauthorized communication used for the detection. For example, in a case where the determiner 222 deter- mines not to take action, the deleter 224 notifies the upper NW device 100 of an instruction to delete the content of communication involving the lower NW device 200 and the cyberattack information, as the information related to the unauthorized communication used for detection.
[0050] Note that the information related to the un- authorized communication used for the erroneous detec- tion deleted by the deleter 224 may be stored in the upper NW device 100 or an external device. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 7 11 EP 4 679 782 A1 12 [Outline of processing performed by information pro- cessing system]
[0051] Next, an outline of processing performed by the information processing system 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 5. FIG. 5 is a diagram for illustrating an outline of processing performed by the information pro- cessing system 1.
[0052] First, the acquirer 221 of the lower NW device 200 acquires information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device 200. For example, the information related to communication of OA equipment, IoT equipment, or the like connected to the lower NW device 200 is acquired.
[0053] Subsequently, the detector 121 of the upper NW device 100 detects unauthorized communication.
[0054] Subsequently, the notifier 123 of the upper NW device 100 notifies the lower NW device 200 of informa- tion regarding unauthorized communication detected by the detector 121.
[0055] Subsequently, a determiner 222 determines whether the information related to the unauthorized com- munication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 corresponds to the information related to the un- authorized communication used for determination of er- roneous detection.
[0056] In a case where the determiner 222 has deter- mined to take action, the blocker 223 blocks communica- tion of a terminal that performs unauthorized communi- cation based on the information regarding unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122.
[0057] In contrast, when the determiner 222 deter- mines not to take action, the deleter 224, when the determiner 222 determines not to take action, the deleter 224 notifies the upper NW device 100 of an instruction to delete the information related to the unauthorized com- munication.
[0058] In this manner, the information processing sys- tem 1 allows the upper NW device 100 and the lower NW device 200 to closely cooperate with each other to detect, determine, and block unauthorized communication.
[0059] [Detection / determination processing per- formed by information processing system]
[0060] Next, detection processing and determination processing performed by the information processing system 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 6. FIG. 6 is a diagram for illustrating detection processing and determination processing performed by the informa- tion processing system 1.
[0061] FIG. 6(1) illustrates information related to un- authorized communication used for detection, such as a type of an unauthorized communication destination and an IP address. The information related to the unauthor- ized communication used for the detection may be stored in the cloud proxy of the upper NW device 100 or the storage module 130 of the upper NW device 100.
[0062] The detector 121 of the upper NW device 100 detects unauthorized communication as illustrated in FIG. 6(2) by using information such as the type of un- authorized communication destination and the IP ad- dress stored in the cloud proxy. FIG. 6(2) illustrates an example of information regarding communication de- tected as unauthorized communication by the detector 121.
[0063] Subsequently, the determiner 222 of the lower NW device 200 determines an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information regarding the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122. FIG. 6(3) illustrates a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network, having the same connection destina- tion address as the information regarding the unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122.
[0064] For example, the determiner 222 calculates an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network in which the connection destination address is the same as that of the information regarding the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122, and then deter- mines whether the inconsistency level is a predetermined threshold or more. When the inconsistency level is the predetermined threshold or more, the determiner 222 determines that the information is obtained as erroneous detection.
[0065] For example, in a case where the inconsistency level is calculated based on the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the num- ber of bytes transferred, the determiner 222 determines, for all the acquired flow data, whether a ratio of the number of records in which no total matching is achieved, among the number of all records, in the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the number of bytes transferred, is a predetermined threshold (for example, 50%) or more. In a case where the ratio is the predetermined threshold or more, the determiner 222 determines that the detection result in the overlay network is erroneous detection.
[0066] For example, in the example of FIG. 7, among the ten pieces of flow data, there is one record in which no total matching is achieved in the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the num- ber of bytes transferred, indicating that ratio is about "10%". Accordingly, the determiner 222 determines that the inconsistency level is less than the predetermined threshold "50%". That is, the determiner 222 determines that the inconsistency is not high, and determines that the detection result in the overlay network is not erroneous detection. In this case, the blocker 223 blocks the un- authorized communication based on the information re- garding unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122.
[0067] In addition, for example, in the example of FIG. 8, among the 10 pieces of flow data, there are eight 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 8 13 EP 4 679 782 A1 14 records in which no total matching is achieved in the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the number of bytes transferred, indicating that the ratio is about "80%". Accordingly, the determiner 222 determines that the inconsistency level is the pre- determined threshold "50%" or more. That is, the deter- miner 222 determines that the inconsistency is high, and determines that the detection result in the overlay net- work is erroneous detection. In this case, the deleter 224 notifies the upper NW device 100 to delete the informa- tion (FIG. 8(1)) about the unauthorized communication used for the detection. [Blocking processing performed by information proces- sing system]
[0068] Next, blocking processing performed by the information processing system 1 will be described with reference to FIGS. 9 and 10. FIGS. 9 and 10 are diagrams for illustrating the blocking processing performed by the information processing system 1.
[0069] As illustrated in FIG. 9, the blocker 223 of the lower NW device 200 uses detection information regard- ing unauthorized communication to block the unauthor- ized communication by using the DPI.
[0070] Similarly to FIG. 6(1), FIG. 10(1) illustrates in- formation related to unauthorized communication used for detection, such as the type of unauthorized commu- nication destination and the IP address. Similarly to FIG. 6(2), FIG. 10(2) illustrates information regarding detected unauthorized communication.
[0071] As illustrated in FIG. 10(3), using the detection information of the unauthorized communication destina- tion (connection destination IP address / port of the un- authorized communication), the blocker 223 of the lower NW device 200 blocks, by using the DPI, the commu- nication with the unauthorized communication destina- tion. This allows the information processing system 1 to block the communication with an unauthorized commu- nication destination at an early stage.
[0072] That is, referring to the example in FIG. 10(3), the blocker 223 blocks the communication in which there is a match between the IP address "203.0.113.15" of the connection destination transmitted from the upper NW device 100 and the IP address of the connection destina- tion.
[0073] Moreover, as illustrated in FIG. 10(4), using the detection information of the unauthorized communica- tion destination (connection source IP address / port of the unauthorized communication), the blocker 223 of the lower NW device 200 blocks, by using the DPI, the communication from the terminal performing unauthor- ized communication. This allows the information proces- sing system 1 to block an infected terminal and prevents the spread of infection.
[0074] That is, referring to the example in FIG. 10(4), the blocker 223 blocks the communication in which there is a match between the connection source IP address "192.0.2.118" transmitted from an upper NW device 100 and the connection source IP address.
[0075] Moreover, as illustrated in FIG. 10(5), using the detection information of the unauthorized communica- tion destination (connection source IP address / port of the unauthorized communication), the blocker 223 of the lower NW device 200 blocks, by using the DPI, the communication from the NW including the terminal per- forming unauthorized communication. This allows the information processing system 1 to block the NW to which the infected terminal belongs and prevents the spread of infection.
[0076] That is, referring to the example in FIG. 10(5), the notifier 122 converts the connection source IP ad- dress "192.0.2.118" transmitted from the upper NW de- vice 100 into an IP address "192.0.2.0 / 24" masked with a subnet mask, and notifies the lower NW device 200 of the connection source IP address "192.0.2.0 / 24". Accord- ingly, the blocker 223 blocks communication whose con- nection source IP address corresponds to "192.0.2.0 / 24", thereby blocking not only the infected terminal but also the NW to which the infected terminal belongs.
[0077] In this manner, the information processing sys- tem 1 allows the upper NW device 100 and the lower NW device 200 to cooperate with each other to detect un- authorized communication and block each communica- tion related to a terminal that performs unauthorized communication. [Flowchart]
[0078] Next, a flow of processing performed by the information processing system 1 will be described with reference to FIG. 11. Note that the following steps can be executed in different orders, and may include processing to be omitted.
[0079] First, the acquirer 221 of the lower NW device 200 acquires information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device 200 (Step S101). For example, the acquirer 221 acquires informa- tion related to communication of OA equipment or IoT equipment connected to the lower NW device 200.
[0080] The information acquired by the acquirer 221 of the lower NW device 200 is transmitted to the upper NW device 100 (Step S102). Subsequently, the detector 121 of the upper NW device 100 detects unauthorized com- munication (Step S103). For example, the detector 121 detects unauthorized communication by the security function.
[0081] Subsequently, the notifier 122 of the upper NW device 100 notifies the lower NW device 200 of informa- tion regarding unauthorized communication detected by the detector 121 (Step S104). For example, as informa- tion regarding unauthorized communication detected by the detector 121, the notifier 122 notifies the lower NW device 200 of information such as a detection date / time, a detection type, a connection destination IP address / port, 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 9 15 EP 4 679 782 A1 16 and a connection source IP address / port of the unauthor- ized communication.
[0082] Subsequently, the determiner 222 of the lower NW device 200 determines an inconsistency level among pieces of flow data having the same connection destina- tion address as the information regarding the unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 (Step S105). For example, the determiner 222 calculates the inconsistency level based on any one or a plurality of the communication date / time, the con- nection destination port number, the communication pro- tocol, and the number of bytes transferred between the pieces of flow data having the same connection destina- tion address as the information regarding the unauthor- ized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122.
[0083] Subsequently, the determiner 222 of the lower NW device 200 determines whether the calculated in- consistency level is a predetermined threshold or more (Step S106). Here, when the determiner 222 determines that the value is not the predetermined threshold or more (Step S106 "NO"), the blocker 223 of the lowerNW device 200 blocks the unauthorized communication based on the information regarding the unauthorized communica- tion notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 (Step S107). For example, the blocker 223 blocks the communication of the unauthorized communication to the communication destination using the information re- garding the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122.
[0084] In contrast, when the determiner 222 deter- mines that the value is less than the predetermined threshold (Step S106 "YES"), the deleter 224 of the lower NW device 200 provides notification of deletion of the information related to the unauthorized communication used for detection (Step S108). For example, in a case where the determiner 222 determines not to take action, the deleter 224 notifies the upper NW device 100 of an instruction to delete the content of communication invol- ving the lower NW device 200 and the cyberattack in- formation, as the information related to the unauthorized communication used for detection. [Effects]
[0085] The information processing system 1 according to the embodiment is an information processing system including: the upper NW device 100 being a device con- stituting an overlay network; and the lower NW device 200 being a device constituting an underlay network. In this system, the upper NW device 100 includes: the detector 121 that detects unauthorized communication; and the notifier 122 that notifies the lower NW device 200 of information related to the unauthorized communica- tion detected by the detector 121. The lower NW device 200 includes: the acquirer 221 that acquires information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device 200; the determiner 222 that deter- mines an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information re- lated to the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122; and the blocker 223 that blocks information regarding unauthorized commu- nication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 as unauthorized communication in accordance with the inconsistency level determined by the determiner 222.
[0086] With this configuration of the information pro- cessing system 1, the upper NW device 100 detects unauthorized communication, the lower NW device 200 determines an inconsistency level, and the lower NW device 200 blocks communication in accordance with the inconsistency level, thereby achieving improve- ment in security and reduction in cost. Furthermore, in the information processing system 1, by separating the de- tection point and the blocking point, for example, even in a case where an attack by a large-scale botnet occurs and the communication of the C2 server of the botnet is detected by the upper NW device 100 and even in a case where the overlay network is not used, the communica- tion can be blocked in a wide range by the underlay network, making it possible to suppress spread of da- mage.
[0087] In addition, with a configuration in which the information processing system 1 blocks communication from a terminal that performs unauthorized communica- tion, communication is controlled in units of devices with- out blocking the entire NW, thereby achieving robust security while ensuring the availability of the NW.
[0088] In the information processing system 1 accord- ing to the embodiment, the determiner 222 in the lower NW device 200 calculates an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network in which the connection destination address is the same as that of the information regarding the unauthorized com- munication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122, determines whether the inconsistency level is a predetermined threshold or more, determines that the detection is erroneous when the inconsistency level is the predetermined threshold or more. When the determiner 222 has determined that the inconsistency level is less than the predetermined threshold, the blocker 223 de- termines that the information is not erroneous detection and blocks the information regarding the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier 122 as unauthorized communication.
[0089] With this configuration, the information proces- sing system 1 confirms whether erroneous detection has occurred depending on whether the inconsistency level of the flow data having the same connection destination address as the information regarding the unauthorized communication detected by the upper NW device 100 exceeds the threshold, and then blocks the communica- tion of the unauthorized communication to the commu- nication destination, thereby achieving improvement in 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 10 17 EP 4 679 782 A1 18 security and reduction in cost.
[0090] In the information processing system 1 accord- ing to the embodiment, the determiner 222 in the lower NW device 200 calculates the inconsistency level based on any one or a plurality of the communication date / time, the connection destination port number, the communica- tion protocol, and the number of bytes transferred among pieces of flow data.
[0091] With this configuration, the information proces- sing system 1 calculates the inconsistency level of the flow data having the same connection destination ad- dress as the information regarding the unauthorized communication detected by the upper NW device 100 based on the communication date / time, the connection destination port number, the communication protocol, and the number of bytes transferred among pieces of flow data, and blocks the communication of the unauthor- ized communication to the communication destination according to the inconsistency level, thereby achieving improvement in security and reduction in cost.
[0092] The lower NW device 200 of the information processing system 1 according to the embodiment further includes the deleter 224 that notifies the upper NW device 100 of deletion of information related to un- authorized communication used for detection in a case where the determiner 222 has determined that the in- consistency level is a predetermined threshold or more.
[0093] With this configuration, in a case where the inconsistency among pieces of flow data having the same connection destination address as that of the in- formation related to the unauthorized communication detected by the upper NW device 100 is the threshold or more, the information processing system 1 determines that the information is erroneous detection and deletes the information related to the unauthorized communica- tion used for detection, thereby achieving improvement in security and reduction in cost. [Program]
[0094] It is also possible to create a program in which the processing executed by the information processing system 1 in the above embodiment is described in a language executable by a computer. In this case, by execution of the program by the computer, effects similar to those of the above embodiment can be obtained. Furthermore, the program may be recorded in a compu- ter-readable recording medium, and the program re- corded in the recording medium may be read and exe- cuted by the computer to implement processing similar to the above-described embodiment.
[0095] FIG. 12 is a diagram illustrating an example of a computer that executes an information processing pro- gram. As illustrated in FIG. 12, a computer 1000 includes, for example, memory 1010, a CPU1020, a hard disk drive interface 1030, a disk drive interface 1040, a serial port interface 1050, a video adapter 1060, and a network interface 1070. These units are connected to each other via a bus 1080.
[0096] The memory 1010 includes read only memory (ROM) 1011 and RAM 1012. The ROM 1011 stores, for example, a boot program such as a Basic Input Output System (BIOS). The hard disk drive interface 1030 is connected to a hard disk drive 1090. The disk drive interface 1040 is connected to a disk drive 1100. For example, the disk drive 1100 is a drive into which a removable storage medium such as a magnetic disk or an optical disk is inserted. For example, the serial port interface 1050 is connected to a mouse 1110 and a key- board 1120. For example, the video adapter 1060 is connected to a display 1130.
[0097] Here, as illustrated in FIG. 12, the hard disk drive 1090 stores an operating system (OS) 1091, an application program 1092, a program module 1093, and program data 1094, for example. Each table described in the above embodiment is stored in the hard disk drive 1090 or the memory 1010, for example.
[0098] Furthermore, the information processing pro- gram is stored in the hard disk drive 1090 as, for example, a program module describing commands to be executed by the computer 1000. Specifically, the program module 1093 describing each processing to be executed by the computer 1000 described in the above embodiment is stored in the hard disk drive 1090.
[0099] Furthermore, data used for information proces- sing performed by the information processing program is stored as program data in the hard disk drive 1090, for example. The CPU 1020 reads the program module 1093 and the program data 1094 stored in the hard disk drive 1090 to the RAM 1012 as necessary, and executes each procedure described above.
[0100] The program module 1093 and the program data 1094 related to the information processing program are not limited to the form of being stored in the hard disk drive 1090, and may be stored in a removable storage medium and read by the CPU 1020 via the disk drive 1100 or the like, for example. Alternatively, the program mod- ule 1093 and the program data 1094 related to the control program may be stored in another computer connected via a network such as a LAN or a Wide Area Network (WAN) and read by the CPU1020 via the network inter- face 1070. [Others]
[0101] Various embodiments, described herein in de- tail with reference to the drawings as a plurality of embo- diments, are merely examples and are not intended to limit the present invention to the plurality of embodi- ments. The features described herein may be implemen- ted by various methods, including various modifications and improvements based on the knowledge of those skilled in the art.
[0102] In addition, the "terms such as a part (a module or a noun with suffix -er or suffix -or)" described above can be read as a unit, a means, a circuit, or the like. For 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 11 19 EP 4 679 782 A1 20 example, a communication module, a control module, and a storage module can be replaced with a commu- nication unit, a control unit, and a storage unit, respec- tively. [Explanation of Reference]
[0103] 1 INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEM 100 UPPER NW DEVICE 110 COMMUNICATION MODULE 120 CONTROL MODULE 121 DETECTOR 122 NOTIFIER 130 STORAGE MODULE 200 LOWER NW DEVICE 210 COMMUNICATION MODULE 220 CONTROL MODULE 221 ACQUIRER 222 DETERMINER 223 BLOCKER 224 DELETER 230 STORAGE MODULE Claims 1. An information processing system comprising: an upper NW device being a device constituting an overlay network; and a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, wherein the upper NW device includes: a detector configured to detect unauthorized communication; and a notifier configured to notify the lower NW de- vice of information related to the unauthorized communication detected by the detector, and the lower NW device includes: an acquirer configured to acquire informa- tion related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device; a determiner configured to determine an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination ad- dress as the information related to un- authorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier; and a blocker configured to block the informa- tion related to unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the no- tifier as unauthorized communication in ac- cordance with the inconsistency level de- termined by the determiner. 2. The information processing system according to claim 1, wherein the determiner calculates an inconsis- tency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the informa- tion related to the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier, determines whether the inconsistency level is a predetermined threshold or more, and deter- mines that the detection is erroneous when the inconsistency level is the predetermined threshold or more, and when the determiner has determined that the inconsistency level is less than the predeter- mined threshold, the blocker determines that the detection is not erroneous and blocks the information related to the unauthorized commu- nication notification of which is provided by the notifier as unauthorized communication. 3. The information processing system according to claim 2, wherein the determiner calculates the in- consistency level based on any one or a plurality of communication date / time, connection destination port number, a communication protocol, and number of bytes transferred, among the pieces of flow data. 4. The information processing system according to claim 2, further including a deleter configured to notify the upper NW device of deletion of information related to unauthorized communication used for de- tection in a case where the determiner has deter- mined that the inconsistency level is a predeter- mined threshold or more. 5. An information processing method to be executed by an upper NW device being a device constituting an overlay network, and a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, the infor- mation processing method comprising: an acquisition process of acquiring, by the lower NW device, information related to communica- 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 12 21 EP 4 679 782 A1 22 tion of a terminal connected to the lower NW device; a detection process of detecting, by the upper NW device, unauthorized communication; a notification process of notifying, by the upper NW device, the lower NW device of information related to the unauthorized communication de- tected by the detection process; a determination process of determining, by the lower NW device, an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destina- tion address as the information related to un- authorized communication notification of which is provided by the notification process; and a blocking process of blocking, by the lower NW device, the information related to the unauthor- ized communication notification of which is pro- vided by the notification process as unauthor- ized communication in accordance with the in- consistency level determined by the determina- tion process. 6. An information processing program that causes a computer functioning as an upper NW device being a device constituting an overlay network, and a com- puter functioning as a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, to execute following steps, the information processing program that causes the computer functioning as the upper NW device to execute: a detection step of detecting unauthorized com- munication; and a notification step of notifying the lower NW device of information related to the unauthorized communication detected by the detection step, the information processing program that causes the computer functioning as the lower NW de- vice to execute: an acquisition step of acquiring information related to communication of a terminal con- nected to the lower NW device; a determination step of determining an in- consistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination ad- dress as the information related to un- authorized communication notification of which is provided by the notification step; and a blocking step of blocking the information related to unauthorized communication no- tification of which is provided by the notifi- cation step as unauthorized communication in accordance with the inconsistency level determined by the determination step. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 13 EP 4 679 782 A1 14 EP 4 679 782 A1 15 EP 4 679 782 A1 16 EP 4 679 782 A1 17 EP 4 679 782 A1 18 EP 4 679 782 A1 19 EP 4 679 782 A1 20 EP 4 679 782 A1 21 EP 4 679 782 A1 22 EP 4 679 782 A1 23 EP 4 679 782 A1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 24 EP 4 679 782 A1 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 摘要 信息处理系统(1)是一种信息处理系统,包括:上层 NW 设备(100),所述上 层 NW 设备(100)是构成覆盖网络的设备;以及下层 NW 设备(200),所述下 层 NW 设备(200)是构成底层网络的设备的。在所述系统中,所述上层 NW 设 备(100)检测未授权通信,并将与所检测到的所述未授权通信相关的信息通知 给所述下层 NW 设备(200)。所述下层 NW 设备(200)获取与连接至所述下层 NW 设备(200)的终端的通信相关信息,确定所述底层网络中的与所提供的未 授权通信相关的信息具有相同连接目的地址的多个流数据之间的不一致性级别, 并根据所确定的所述不一致性级别,将所提供的所述未授权通信相关的信息作为 未授权通信进行阻断。
Claims
1. An information processing system comprising: an upper NW device being a device constituting an overlay network; and a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, wherein the upper NW device includes: a detector configured to detect unauthorized communication; and a notifier configured to notify the lower NW device of information related to the unauthorized communication detected by the detector, and the lower NW device includes: an acquirer configured to acquire information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device; a determiner configured to determine an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier; and a blocker configured to block the information related to unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier as unauthorized communication in accordance with the inconsistency level determined by the determiner.
2. The information processing system according to claim 1, wherein the determiner calculates an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier, determines whether the inconsistency level is a predetermined threshold or more, and determines that the detection is erroneous when the inconsistency level is the predetermined threshold or more, and when the determiner has determined that the inconsistency level is less than the predetermined threshold, the blocker determines that the detection is not erroneous and blocks the information related to the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notifier as unauthorized communication.
3. The information processing system according to claim 2, wherein the determiner calculates the inconsistency level based on any one or a plurality of communication date / time, connection destination port number, a communication protocol, and number of bytes transferred, among the pieces of flow data.
4. The information processing system according to claim 2, further including a deleter configured to notify the upper NW device of deletion of information related to unauthorized communication used for detection in a case where the determiner has determined that the inconsistency level is a predetermined threshold or more.
5. An information processing method to be executed by an upper NW device being a device constituting an overlay network, and a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, the information processing method comprising: an acquisition process of acquiring, by the lower NW device, information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device; a detection process of detecting, by the upper NW device, unauthorized communication; a notification process of notifying, by the upper NW device, the lower NW device of information related to the unauthorized communication detected by the detection process; a determination process of determining, by the lower NW device, an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notification process; and a blocking process of blocking, by the lower NW device, the information related to the unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notification process as unauthorized communication in accordance with the inconsistency level determined by the determination process.
6. An information processing program that causes a computer functioning as an upper NW device being a device constituting an overlay network, and a computer functioning as a lower NW device being a device constituting an underlay network, to execute following steps, the information processing program that causes the computer functioning as the upper NW device to execute: a detection step of detecting unauthorized communication; and a notification step of notifying the lower NW device of information related to the unauthorized communication detected by the detection step, the information processing program that causes the computer functioning as the lower NW device to execute: an acquisition step of acquiring information related to communication of a terminal connected to the lower NW device; a determination step of determining an inconsistency level among a plurality of pieces of flow data in the underlay network having the same connection destination address as the information related to unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notification step; and a blocking step of blocking the information related to unauthorized communication notification of which is provided by the notification step as unauthorized communication in accordance with the inconsistency level determined by the determination step.
