Devices, systems, and methods using microtransponders

Abstract

We provide optimized optically triggered transponders and digital security systems that incorporate them. [Solution] An object that stores biometric information includes at least one microtransponder (MTP) 104 configured with an identifier. The identifier of the MTP is indexed to the object. The MTP and the indexing information associated with the object are stored in a database of the security system. The MTP reads a data beam 133 to an OMTP reader 102, and the data reported by the MTP is processed to determine the authenticity of the object.

Description

TECHNICAL FIELD

[0001] CROSS-REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

[0001] This application claims priority from U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,812 entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods Using Microtransponders" filed on September 1, 2021, U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,810 entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods Using Microtransponders" filed on September 1, 2021, U.S. Patent Application No. 17 / 462,809 entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods Using Microtransponders" filed on September 1, 2021, U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 079,763 entitled "Devices, Systems, and Methods for Associating Biometric Data to Items" filed on September 17, 2020, U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 151,018 entitled "MTP Protected Integrated Circuits" filed on February 18, 2021, U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 173,716 entitled "Display Surfaces Embedded with Secure Taggant" filed on April 12, 2021, and U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 63 / 166,753 entitled "Portable Connected Devices with MTP Reader" filed on March 26, 2021, the entire contents of each of which are incorporated herein by reference.

[0002]

[0002] The present disclosure relates to optimized optically triggered transponders, application examples thereof, and / or systems incorporating the same. BACKGROUND ART

[0003]

[0003] As described in U.S. Patent No. 7,098,394, very small optically triggered transponders (MTPs) can be used to provide identifiers, for example, identifiers used together in nucleic acid assays. These have been proven to be stable under physiological conditions. Therefore, they can be used as implantable tagging devices for animals, as described in more detail in U.S. Patent No. 8,353,917. MTPs can provide output signals as RF or as light (U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018 / 0091224). Such MTPs are available as p-Chip® transponders from PharmaSeq, Inc., Monmouth Junction, New Jersey. [Overview of the project]

[0004]

[0004] The various purposes, features, and advantages of the disclosed subject matter can be better understood when considered together with the following drawings, in reference to the following detailed description of the disclosed subject matter, in conjunction with the following drawings, where similar reference numerals identify similar elements. [Brief explanation of the drawing]

[0005] [Figure 1]

[0005] Block diagram of the operation of an MTP sensor system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 2]

[0006] Schematic diagram illustrating some embodiments of the MTP in this disclosure. [Figure 3]

[0007] An exemplary side view of an MTP according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 4]

[0008] An exemplary top view of an MTP according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 5]

[0009] Functional block diagrams of exemplary MTPs according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 6]

[0010] Schematic diagrams of clock recovery circuits according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 7]

[0011] Cross-sectional view of a photoconductor according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 8]

[0012] Timing diagrams of voltage signals and light intensity at each node in Figure 6, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 9]

[0013] Functional block diagrams of MTP readers according to several embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 10A]

[0014] A diagram illustrating, in a simplified form, how strings were transmitted under the old system. [Figure 10B] A diagram illustrating in a concise form how a string is transmitted under an inverted antenna system according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 11A]

[0015] An exemplary figure illustrating the reversal of the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 11B]

[0016] Another exemplary figure illustrating the reversal of the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 12]

[0017] A diagram of a security inlay fitted to a wine bottle, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 13]

[0018] Exemplary cross-sectional views of security inlays according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 14]

[0019] Enlarged view of an exemplary security inlay fitted to a wine bottle, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 15]

[0020] A flowchart illustrating an exemplary process configured to utilize a highly durable, self-destructing optically triggered transponder according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 16]

[0021] A diagram illustrating the process of implementing a smart paper contract according to several embodiments of this disclosure. [Figure 17]

[0022] An exemplary system diagram for generating secure document smart contracts using blockchain integration, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 18]

[0023] A diagram of an exemplary digital identity creation process according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 19]

[0024] A diagram of an exemplary ownership assignment process according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 20]

[0025] A block diagram of a portable device having an MTP reader system, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 21]

[0026] A diagram of a device tagged with MTP, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 22]

[0027] A diagram of an example of an MTP attached to a display surface, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. [Figure 23]

[0028] A diagram of an example of interlayer lamination of a display including an MTP, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF EMBODIMENTS OF THE INVENTION

[0006]

[0029] It should be understood that the disclosed subject matter is not limited in its application to the details of construction and the arrangement of components set forth in the following description or illustrated in the drawings. The disclosed subject matter is capable of other embodiments and of being practiced and carried out in various ways. It should also be understood that the phraseology and terminology used herein is for the purpose of description and should not be regarded as limiting. Accordingly, those skilled in the art will appreciate that the concepts on which the present disclosure is based can be readily utilized as a basis for designing other structures, methods, and systems for carrying out the several purposes of the disclosed subject matter. Therefore, the claims should be construed to include such equivalent constructions to the extent they do not depart from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0007]

[0030] While the disclosed subject matter is described and illustrated in the exemplary embodiments described above, please understand that this disclosure is made only as an example, and that numerous modifications may be made to the details of the implementation of the disclosed subject matter without departing from the spirit and scope of the disclosed subject matter.

[0008]

[0031] According to some embodiments of the present disclosure, an optically triggered transponder is provided which includes a clock recovery circuit optimized to facilitate MTP signal transmission and MTP ID reading.

[0009]

[0032] In some embodiments, the optically triggered transponder may include an inverse antenna system configured to provide accurate MTP signal transmission and processing, resulting in an MTP ID reader with simpler processing and a greater reading distance.

[0010]

[0033] In some embodiments, an optically triggered transponder may be contained within a security inlay to establish proof of the authenticity of an article. For example, a security inlay may be used to verify high-value articles and / or articles for which claims of food safety, fair trade, or sustainability have market value (e.g., lettuce, coffee beans, etc.). However, a security inlay is not limited to use with any particular article or group of articles. A security inlay may include (a) a bottom inlay segment, (b) an upper inlay segment configured to fit into or be positioned thereon in the bottom inlay segment, and (c) an optically triggered transponder positioned between the two inlay segments, having a top and bottom surface, the bottom surface being bonded to the bottom inlay segment and the top surface being bonded to the upper inlay segment, wherein the security inlay is configured such that the optically triggered transponder cannot be read by separating the upper inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment.

[0011]

[0034] In some embodiments, optically triggered transponders may be configured with a highly durable self-destruct function to provide a super anchor for object authentication, object tracking, and locating.

[0012]

[0035] In some embodiments, one or more super-anchors may be used with various objects to implement smart paper contracts and improve document security.

[0013]

[0036] In some embodiments, one or more super-anchors may be integrated with blockchain technology to generate secure document smart contracts.

[0014]

[0037] In some embodiments, the system may explicitly, irrevocably, and permanently link an individual's biometric identity to a unique digital identity that can be used to unconditionally and permanently assign possession or ownership of physical objects. Tangible property may include, but is not limited to, (a) documents, (b) perishable articles, (c) samples, (d) objects, and (e) living organisms, for example, in which the legal right of ownership is exclusive to the individual.

[0015]

[0038] Some embodiments may include an optical identification and sensor system integrated with one or more mobile devices, wireless devices, and connected devices, such as a cellular phone, laptop computer, tablet, handheld computing device, or dedicated wireless hand scanner. Such a sensor system may be integrated within the device or added externally. Furthermore, such a system may be configured to read multiple security elements, such as QR codes®, barcodes, RFID, etc., in addition to MTPs, in a single interrogation, i.e., as part of one or more separate security markings. In some embodiments, the sensor system may be used to read (synonymous with "interrogate") multiple security markings simultaneously. Furthermore, a security marking may comprise a single security element, such as a single MTP, or multiple security elements, such as an MTP embedded within a QR code. Furthermore, multiple elements can be combined to form a composite security marking. Security markings may be read sequentially or in parallel. Furthermore, the order in which the markings are read can itself be a security feature. Radio frequency identification (RFID) tags, unique QR codes, special inks, and holograms are examples of security elements used to enable secure marking. However, these tend to occupy a significant surface area on an object, making them less attractive for tagging smaller objects. Furthermore, security markings, including holograms, typically require viewing from multiple angles to observe the holographic effect, which is often time-consuming. Additionally, elements such as secure inks are often not durable against wear and tear. However, MTPs are unparalleled for this purpose and do not suffer from some of the drawbacks highlighted above. This is due to their small size, ease of detection, and robust authentication system. Their low manufacturing cost constitutes their benefits and allows them to be easily scaled.

[0016]

[0039] In some embodiments, memory-equipped MTPs can be fused onto the surface of an integrated circuit. Their small size, ease of detection, low manufacturing cost, and robust authentication system make MTPs particularly advantageous for deployment at scale. MTPs can be "read" using a reader to retrieve them from memory, which enables authentication of both the MTP and the underlying integrated circuit. The "reading" of the MTP can be done while the integrated circuit remains in its original state within the device and / or while the integrated circuit is functioning.

[0017]

[0040] Some embodiments may include MTPs on or within a display. Displays have become an inseparable part of modern digital communication tools. The displays described herein refer to electronic devices capable of visually representing information or patterns. Such displays may function through the transmission, reflection, or transfection of light. Common examples of displays include the screens of laptop, smartphone, or tablet computers, televisions, and digital signboards. Due to their small size, MTPs are uniquely well-suited for inclusion within or on displays. Such inclusion may be carried out in various ways, at different locations within or on the display.

[0018]

[0041] This disclosure should be understood to be limited to the structural details and configurations described or shown in the following descriptions or drawings in its applications. This disclosure is subject to various embodiments and can be practiced and implemented in a variety of ways. Furthermore, the language and terminology used herein and in this abstract are for illustrative purposes only and should not be considered limiting.

[0019]

[0042] Please understand that the following detailed explanation is illustrative only and does not limit the subject matter claimed.

[0020]

[0043] Figure 1 shows a block diagram of an optical microtransponder (MTP) sensor system 100 ("System 100") according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. System 100 comprises an MTP reader 102 and an MTP 104. In some embodiments, the MTP 104 is bonded or glued to an object via an adhesive so as to act as an identifier for the object. The MTP 104 may be bonded to, embedded in, or otherwise mounted to an object 110, which may be any object requiring individual unique identification (ID) data, such as a microscope slide, a test animal or insect, clothing, or an electronic component. A magnified view of the MTP 104 is shown within the breakout shown in Figure 1, showing the MTP components of a substrate 160, an optical element 150, and an optical communication circuit 155. The height of the MTP 104 can be, for example, about 20 μm to 60 μm and may depend on the number of layers stacked and the number of sensors for a particular MTP 104. The MTP 104 may be an integrated circuit that can typically be in a persistent dormant, unpowered state until it is powered on when illuminated by an excitation beam 132 from the MTP reader 102. When illuminated, the MTP 104 can power on (generally instantly, for example, in a much shorter time than one second) and transmit a data beam 133 to the MTP reader 102 via light. In some embodiments, the data beam 133 may be light emission (e.g., from a light-emitting diode (LED)) or, in other embodiments, a reflection / absorption mechanism (e.g., shuttering via an LCD). In an alternative embodiment, the MTP 104 receives a separate stimulus, such as a modulated code on the excitation beam 132, which initiates the transmission of sensor data. Alternatively, the transmission of the data beam 133 is triggered by receiving data from an internal sensor or a linked sensor. Some embodiments of the system 100 may include an onboard power supply, such as a battery, and / or one or more subsystems powered by the onboard power supply. Such subsystems may include, but are not limited to, volatile memory that can be sustained by battery power, one or more sensors in addition to the optical element 150, and / or other features.

[0021]

[0044] In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 is a visible focused light or laser beam, and the data beam 133 is an infrared light beam emission (e.g., from an infrared light-emitting diode). The data beam 133 may include a signal to identify a particular MTP 104 to an MTP reader 102, for example using an identification number unique to that particular MTP 104. Using the unique identification information, the MTP reader 102 may transmit data to a computer (not shown) to uniquely identify the object 110. In some embodiments, the user operates the MTP reader 102 to illuminate the MTP 104 with light or other electromagnetic signals that cause the MTP 104 to transmit the data beam 133 via light or other electromagnetic signals. For example, in some embodiments, the range of electromagnetic spectrum used by the MTP 104 for this signaling may include one or more subsets of the subterahertz portion of the spectrum, including infrared and longer wavelengths. The data beam 133 is then received by the MTP reader 102. Next, the MTP reader 102 can clearly decode the data beam 133 carrying identification data in order to identify the object 110.

[0022]

[0045] "Laser" is defined herein as coherent, directional light that can be visible light. Light sources include light from light-emitting diodes (LEDs) for communication, solid-state lasers, semiconductor lasers, and the like. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may comprise visible laser light (e.g., wavelength 660 nm). In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 during operation may illuminate a larger area than that occupied by the MTP 104, thereby allowing the user to easily locate and read the MTP 104. In some embodiments, the excitation beam 132 may comprise light of other wavelengths in the visible and / or invisible spectrum necessary to supply sufficient power using the photocell of the MTP 104. The data beam 133 may emit light at a different wavelength than the excitation beam 132. For example, the data beam 133 may be 1300 nm IR light, while the excitation beam is 660 nm red light. However, other wavelengths, such as the near-infrared (NIR) band, may be used for optical communication, and alternative embodiments may use other communication techniques, such as reflection signaling, to return the modulated data signal to the MTP reader 102. In some alternative embodiments, the OMTP 104 is a microtransponder (MTP) equipped with an antenna (e.g., an integrated antenna) for communicating ID information to the corresponding reader via radio waves rather than optical signals.

[0023]

[0046] The clock recovery circuit 106 can extract a clock pulse signal from the received modulated light beam, as described in more detail below in relation to Figures 6-8. In one embodiment, the light from the excitation beam 132 is amplitude-modulated (e.g., pulsed) at about 1 MHz to provide a data clock that can be used by the MTP 104 to supply, for example, an operational clock pulse for transmitted ID data bits. The timing of the pulse group can be set so that the duty cycle and average power level fall within the requirements for registering as a Class 3R laser device.

[0024]

[0047] Exemplary MTPs, such as the p-Chip, can be monolithic (single-element) integrated circuits (e.g., 600 μm × 600 μm × 100 μm) capable of transmitting their identification code over radio frequency (RF). Figure 2 shows schematic diagrams of exemplary MTPs according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. The MTP may include photocells (202a, 202b, 202c, 202d), a clock recovery circuit 206 (e.g., a clock signal extraction circuit), a logic state machine 204, a loop antenna 210, and a 64-bit memory (not shown) supporting more than 1.1 billion possible ID codes. The photocells, when illuminated by a pulsed laser, can power the electronic circuits on the chip with about 10% efficiency. The chip can transmit its ID through a modulated current in the antenna 210. A fluctuating magnetic field around the chip may be received by a nearby coil in a reader, and the signal can be digitized, analyzed, and decoded. p-Chips can be manufactured on silicon wafers in a foundry using CMOS processes similar to those used in the manufacture of memory chips and computer processors. The wafers may undergo post-manufacturing processes including laser coding, passivation, thinning, and dicing to produce individual p-Chips. The p-Chip surface may be made of silicon dioxide deposited as the final passivation layer.

[0025]

[0048] Figure 3 shows a side view of an exemplary MTP104 according to at least one embodiment of the present invention. The MTP104 may comprise a stack of individual integrated circuit layers 300, 302, 304, 306, and 308. Layer 302 may support a protection and passivation layer. Layer 304 may comprise logic, clock, sensor, and transmitter circuits. Layers 306 and 308 may comprise storage capacitors, and 300 is the substrate. Those skilled in the art will understand that the functions of the MTP104 can be organized into layers of other configurations. For example, this stack may be configured such that, for example, uniformly stacked layers of different thicknesses can be manufactured using 3D IC processes known in the art.

[0026]

[0049] MTP104 can be manufactured using mixed-signal manufacturing techniques, typically used to create sensor electronics or analog-to-digital converters that combine both analog and digital devices. In exemplary embodiments, each layer has a thickness of approximately 12 μm and dimensions of 100 μm × 100 μm. In one embodiment, the dimensions of MTP104 are 100 × 100 × 50 μm. Alternative embodiments may use more or fewer layers depending on the sensor application.

[0027]

[0050] Figure 4 shows an exemplary top view of the MTP 104. The diagram shown in Figure 4 is that of the upper layer 302 in Figure 3. In one embodiment, the top of layer 302 includes transmitting elements such as an LED array 400 surrounding the MTP 104. In other embodiments, the LED array may be a single LED in the center of 410 (shown as LED 420 with a dashed line) or other topography for directed light emission. The arrangement of the LED array 400 illustrates an example of an embodiment that emphasizes light generation. Alternative embodiments may include various topographic layouts that are favorable for power harvesting or for capturing sensor data, etc. In some embodiments, the LEDs may include focusing lenses or other optical systems.

[0028]

[0051] An array of photocells 402, 404, and 406, and a photoconductor 408, are centrally located on the upper layer 302. As shown in the figure, each photocell in the array 401 may be physically sized to generate power for a specific circuit in the MTP 104, and one may be dedicated to clock / carrier signal extraction as described below in relation to Figure 4. Photocell 402, being the largest in the area, generates a voltage Vdd (in some embodiments, a negative voltage Vneg) to operate the output transistor 416 to drive an electron emission transmitter (in some embodiments, realized as an LED in the optical communication circuit 155). Photocell 404 generates a positive voltage for the logic / sensor circuit 410, and photocell 406 generates a negative voltage Vneg for the logic / sensor circuit block 410. The photoconductor 408 is used, for example, to extract a clock pulse to operate the logic / sensor circuit 410. As shown in the figure, these power cells are coupled to capacitors, for example, in layer 306 or 308, to store the energy generated by the photocells when illuminated by laser light. In some embodiments, the energy extracted from the clock photoconductor 408 is applied to a differentiator (described below in relation to Figure 6) that extracts clock edges, which are amplified and used to provide timing signals to logic and sensing circuits. As shown in the figure, multiple identification fuses 418 are located on surface 414. By selectively opening each of these fuses, the MTP 104 is provided with a unique identification code range beyond the default base page of code values ​​that can be hardcoded within the chip logic. In alternative embodiments, the ID values ​​may be electronically coded using electronic antifuse technology. Furthermore, there are embodiments that include electronic memory for data, signal processing, and identification storage.

[0029]

[0052] Figure 5 shows a functional block diagram of an exemplary MTP104 according to at least one embodiment of the present invention. The MTP104 may comprise an optical element 150, energy storage 504, a clock / carrier extraction network 506 (i.e., a clock recovery circuit 106), a sensor 508, logic 510, a transmit switching circuit 512, and an IR LED 155. The optical element 150 may include dedicated photocells such as a clock extraction photoconductor 408, energy harvesting photocell arrays 404 and 406, and a transmit photocell 402. The energy harvesting photocell arrays 404 and 406 may be coupled to the energy storage 504 to constitute a photocell that converts light energy from illumination into electric current.

[0030]

[0053] A clock photoconductor 408, which is part of the clock recovery circuit and may be physically located separately from those recovery circuits, can detect a clock pulse signal for the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506. In some embodiments, the energy storage 504 is a plurality of capacitors, each having at least one capacitor coupled to a photocell in the photocell arrays 404, 406. The energy stored in the energy storage unit 504 can be coupled to an electronic circuit. Since the laser light is pulsed, energy from the laser can be stored, and the MTP 104 can operate with that stored energy. Unlike the photocell arrays 404 and 406, the energy of the photocell 402 is not stored, and the transmitter switching circuit 512 can "dump" all of its energy to the transmitting element 155 via the output transistor 416. When the received laser pulse energy is extracted by the clock / carrier extraction circuit 506, the logic state machine (i.e., logic 510) can form a data packet with ID bits and sensor data and provide these to the transmit data switch 512 to form an optical transmit signal. Logic 510 can directly integrate sensor and ID signals into a composite data frame of the OOK (On / Off Key) emitter. Modulation symbols can be applied to transmitter 512 and transmitted along with each pulse of energy.

[0031]

[0054] Sensor 508 may comprise one or more sensors for measuring, for example, the properties of biological cells. Analog data from Sensor 508 can be converted into pulse-width modulated signals or other binary signaling methods that encode analog quantities in the time domain in a way that is suitable for pulsing IR light-emitting diodes for direct transmission to MTP reader 102, without requiring conventional power and area-intensive analog-to-digital conversion techniques. Illustrative sensors include, but are not limited to, dielectric sensors, absolute temperature proportional (PTAT) sensors, pH sensors, redox potential sensors, and / or optical sensors.

[0032]

[0055] Clock recovery circuit

[0056] Figure 6 is a schematic diagram of a clock recovery circuit 506 according to one or more embodiments of the present invention. The clock recovery circuit 506 may comprise a photoconductor 602 (shown in detail in Figure 6) having a resistance R1 that varies as a function of the received light intensity, a reference resistor 604 having a fixed resistance R2, an amplifier 606, and an inverter 608. The source terminal of the photoconductor 602 is coupled to the first terminal of the resistor 604 at node A. Node A is coupled to the input of the amplifier 606, and the output of the amplifier 606 is coupled to the inverter 608 which generates a clock signal recovered at its output.

[0033]

[0057] The series combination of the photoconductor 602 and the resistor 604 forms a voltage divider R coupled between the voltage VDD and ground. Specifically, in this embodiment, the drain terminal of the photoconductor 602 is coupled to the voltage VDD from the energy storage 504, which maintains the voltage when the lighting is off, and the second terminal of the resistor 604 is coupled to ground. Since the resistance R1 of the photoconductor 602 varies as a function of the received light intensity, and the voltage at node A is determined by the ratio of resistances R1 and R2, a modulated light input incident on the photoconductor 602 generates a modulated voltage signal at the input of the amplifier 606.

[0034]

[0058] In some embodiments, a coupling capacitor 610 is added before the amplifier 606. The voltage divider R and the coupling capacitor 610 form a differentiator that can extract the clock edge when the modulation frequency is as low as a few kilohertz (about 1 MHz or higher, which may not be necessary). The inverter 608 digitizes the analog output of the amplifier 606, resulting in the exemplary digital waveform shown in Figure 8. Figure 8 shows the timing diagram of the light intensity and voltage signals at each node of the clock recovery circuit 506 with the coupling capacitor of Figure 6.

[0035]

[0059] Figure 7 shows a cross-sectional view of an exemplary photoconductor 602 according to several embodiments of the present invention. In some embodiments, the size of the photoconductor 602 can be 5 μm × 5 μm or larger. As shown in Figure 6, the photoconductor 602 may use a long-channel n-MOSFET in an isolated deep n-well bucket. The n-well and deep n-well (D-nwell) can completely seal the p-well in the p-substrate and the transistor components, i.e., the source, drain, and gate, which are confined within the bucket. The gate layer, for example, made from a polysilicon material, may be placed on top of an insulating layer such as silicon dioxide (SiO2). With respect to the spectrum, the polysilicon material absorbs light of shorter wavelengths, such as blue light, but transmits light of longer wavelengths, such as red light. When using an excitation beam 132 having a longer wavelength, such as a red light beam, the polysilicon material filters and blocks the shorter wavelengths and transmits the longer wavelengths. Thus, the polysilicon material suppresses shorter wavelengths. For example, indoor light flickering at a speed of 60 Hz (e.g., fluorescent light) can generate some interference or noise with more spectrum in the shorter wavelength range (blue wavelength), and polysilicon material can effectively block the flicker from indoor light, allowing only the desired energy beam (e.g., red light) to pass through.

[0036]

[0060] Furthermore, the photoconductor 602 (sometimes referred to as a photoresistor) allows the clock recovery circuit 106 to function under both low and high illumination conditions, in contrast to the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit. For example, under sufficiently high illumination, the excess flooding charge in the photodiode cannot be sufficiently discharged, leading to malfunction of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit. In contrast, the photoconductor 602 can be operated in current mode, and since the photocharge is constantly drained by the electric field in the photoconductor 602, it is less affected by high-illumination flooding phenomena. Moreover, the deep n-well bucket of the photoconductor 602 is isolated so that the n-wells physically form a potential barrier that prevents charges generated outside the bucket from entering the bucket, ensuring that only photons reaching inside the bucket can contribute to the conductivity of the photoresistor 602. Thus, the excess photogenerated charge during high illumination that could lead to malfunction of the photodiode-based clock recovery circuit is suppressed within the clock recovery circuit 106.

[0037]

[0061] Furthermore, this FET device can have a very small physical footprint. The inverter 608 may comprise a static CMOS inverter device with NMOS and PMOS transistors and two states, high or low. When the inverter input is higher than the reference voltage, it is considered high; when it is lower than the reference voltage, it is considered low, and then the output is inverted. The static CMOS inverter has a sufficiently high gain in its narrow transition region to amplify the signal, so it can also function as an analog amplifier, allowing the clock recovery circuit 506 to have a very small footprint. If the extracted clock pulse is extremely low, the amplification by amplifier 606 may not be sufficient to reach the threshold voltage for inverting the logic state, and in these cases, the inverter 608 can further boost the overall amplification to reach that threshold.

[0038]

[0062] The clock recovery system can be applied to MTPs that transmit signals via RF, such as the one described in U.S. Patent Application No. 14 / 631,321 filed on February 25, 2015, and to those that transmit signals via light (for example, via LEDs).

[0039]

[0063] Inverted antenna system

[0064] Each p-Chip may be programmed with a unique serial number or identifier (ID). A p-Chip can be read by an MTP reader (e.g., a wand) using its unique ID. An MTP reader can be a handheld device connected to a standard Windows® PC, laptop, or tablet, used to read MTPs and capable of reading the serial number or ID of individual p-Chips.

[0040]

[0065] Figure 9 shows a functional block diagram of an MTP reader according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 9, an exemplary MTP ID reader may be USB powered and may include a USB 2.0 transceiver microcontroller, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), a power converter and regulator, a laser diode with a programmable current driver, an optical collimation / focusing module, and a tuned air coil pickup having a high-gain, low-noise differential RF receiver. The laser emits an average optical power of 60 mW modulated at 1 MHz at a wavelength of 658 nm when reading the p-Chip identifier (ID). The ID is read when the p-Chip is placed within a suitable distance (e.g., <10 mm) from the reader. The waveform generated by the p-Chip is compared against a data clock (laser modulated) used for synchronization of the transmitted ID data bits. The resulting ID read from the p-Chip is fast (<0.01 seconds) and is reported on a PC or tablet. MTP ID readers may be able to read p-Chips under difficult conditions, such as through white paper, blue-tinted glass (approximately 1 mm thick), or transparent plastic laminate. Other MTP readers are also under development (for example, devices for reading IDs when the p-Chip is submerged in fluid). Another version under development is a battery-operated Bluetooth® reader that can be used with a PC or cell phone.

[0041]

[0066] Several embodiments may provide an efficient means of increasing the signal strength emitted by these small MTPs. p-Chip data may be transmitted using data coding such that the transmitted bits have a value of 1 are one-third to two-thirds. On average for all IDs, this may be half the data with a value of 1. The "1" digital signal is transmitted with the laser on, and the "0" digital signal is transmitted with the laser off (the energy stored in the photocell provides a small amount of energy for transmission). The signal power follows the ratio of 1s to 0s in the data. Some embodiments may transmit the "1" digital signal in the same way as currently transmitted, but the "0" digital signal is transmitted with the laser on and the current flowing in the opposite direction to the current for the "1" digital signal. This ensures that all IDs are transmitted with the same power. The data may be transmitted when the laser is on. This may double the power of the transmitted signal (the signal is 6 dB stronger at the receiver on average). This method may make signal processing easier and make it easier to distinguish between 1s and 0s. This may lead to MTP ID readers with greater reading distances and simpler processing.

[0042]

[0067] For example, the p-Chip® MTP can be queried with a light flashing at 1 MHz with a 50% duty cycle. This can be achieved with a laser or a focusing LED, for instance.

[0043]

[0068] Figure 10 shows in a simplified form how the string "1101" is transmitted under the old system and under the inverted antenna system described herein. For each off / on cycle, such as c1, c2, c3, or c4 in Figure 10A, the MTP ID reader looks for a radio signal that identifies the transmission of a "1" digital signal or a "0" digital signal. In the case of the first exemplary MTP output at the top of Figure 10, which shows a prior art system as shown in a simplified form, a 0 is transmitted when the light source is off. However, the photocell capacitance used to transmit the 0 is limited. In fact, this limited signal indicates a "0". The limited energy applicable to the 0 means that the S / N at the MTP reader is limited by the SNR for the 0. This means that, in principle, a "1" can be read over a significantly larger distance, but the MTP signal can only be read over a shorter distance applicable to the "0" component of the signal. This specification provides a method that includes reversing the direction of the current in the RF output antenna to transmit a "0" digital signal so that substantially the same current is used for a "1" digital signal and a "0" digital signal (see bottom of Figure 10B). In some embodiments, unlike Figure 10, a given bit ("1" or "0") or digital signal in the p-Chip® MTP may be transmitted within eight consecutive optical cycles.

[0044]

[0069] One means of reversing the antenna current is to use a switching circuit such as an H-bridge. Figure 11A shows one exemplary diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 11A, antenna 10 is connected to a voltage source V in The antenna can be operated by an H-bridge 20. By selectively closing switches S1 and S4, the current through the antenna 10 can be directed in the direction indicated by the arrows. By selectively closing switches S2 and S3, the current through the antenna 10 can be directed in the opposite direction.

[0045]

[0070] Figure 11B shows another exemplary diagram of reversing the direction of antenna operation according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. Another means of reversing the antenna current is to use two switches, such as S1A and S2A in Figure 11B, and two antennas (e.g., 10A, 10B). By selectively closing switch S1A, the current through antenna 10A may be directed in one direction indicated by the arrow. By selectively closing switch S2A, the current through antenna 10B may be directed in the opposite direction. When S1 is selectively closed, the current moves in direction D1. When S2A is selectively closed, the current moves in direction D2, opposite to direction D1. The antennas may be formed in separate metal layers or on the same layer. Only one FET (S1A or S2A) may be closed at any given time. Whenever either FET is turned on, a reverse current may be coupled to the other antenna. The body diode of the off FET may provide a current path for the coupled signal.

[0046]

[0071] In some embodiments, the antenna options described herein may be provided by a monolithic integrated circuit. In some embodiments, the monolithic integrated circuit may be sized to a thickness of approximately 2 mm × 2 mm × 0.2 mm or less.

[0047]

[0072] In some embodiments, the signal strength for an MTP incorporating the two-phase transmission described above is increased by approximately 6 dB. This increases the reliable reading distance of the MTP reader. In some embodiments, the number of cycles entrusted with transmitting one bit is 8 data periods. Each laser cycle is 1 data period. Each time the number of data periods doubles, there is a signal processing gain of 3 dB. 8 data periods is 3 times doubling (2, 4, 8). This results in a signal processing gain of 9 dB. By increasing from 8 to 64 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64) or 128 (2, 4, 8, 16, 32, 64, 128), the signal processing gain can increase from 9 dB to 18 dB (for 64 repetitions) or 21 dB (for 128 repetitions). A current p-Chip using 8 repetitions for its 64 data cells when the laser is used at 1 MHz can transmit IDs at a rate of 2,000 per second. By increasing the repetition rate to 128, the read rate can be reduced to 128 reads per second with a signal gain of 21 dB. This can increase the read distance. The laser rate can be increased or decreased (for example, within the range of 500 kHz to 5 MHz). The repetition rate can be controlled by selecting one of 8 repetition rates (3 additional memory bits).

[0048]

[0073] Security Inlay

[0074] MTP can also be used to implement security features. These can be RF-based MTPs or optical-based MTPs.

[0049]

[0075] Such security features are enhanced if the MTP cannot be removed from the secured object without its MTP function being destroyed. An exemplary object that may require such security features is a bottle of fine wine. Although wine is used as an exemplary object herein to facilitate the illustration and explanation of security inlay structures and functions, as stated above, security inlays are not limited to use with wine bottles. Along with this, inlays containing MTPs are provided that may be designed to destroy the MTP when the tape or foil seal is damaged.

[0050]

[0076] In some embodiments, light-triggered transponders may be used within a security inlay for security purposes. For example, a security inlay may provide a reliable method for authenticating wine. In the wine industry, corks or stoppers may be sealed in capsules or foil designed to prevent the stopper from being removed without peeling the capsule. This provides a certain degree of security. However, in the case of fine wines, it may be worthwhile to commit the wicked act of acquiring the equipment to duplicate the capsule. Wax seals can be added, but these have the same flaw as they become more valuable to counterfeit.

[0051]

[0077] An exemplary security inlay may include (a) a bottom inlay segment, (b) an upper inlay segment configured to fit and be positioned in the bottom inlay segment, and (c) an optically triggered transponder positioned between the two inlay segments, having a top and bottom surface, the bottom surface of which is bonded to the bottom inlay segment and the top surface of which is bonded to the upper inlay segment. The security inlay is configured such that the optically triggered transponder is destroyed in a way that makes it unreadable by separating the upper inlay segment from the bottom inlay segment.

[0052]

[0078] Figure 12 shows a security inlay fitted to a wine bottle. As shown in Figure 12, the inlay 10 is shown beneath the capsule 20 of the wine bottle 22. Figure 13 is a cross-sectional view of an exemplary security inlay design according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 13, the inlay 10 consists of two parts, an upper 10A and a bottom 10B, with an MTP 18 fitted between them. These parts can be made of clear or partially clear plastic by one of several techniques, such as 3D printing, molding, or heated plastic pressing. In some embodiments, a specially prepared MTP 18 that is easily mechanically broken is used. For example, the structural integrity of the MTP can be reduced by a notch 12 on the back of the MTP or by making the MTP very thin (e.g., about 10 to about 30 microns). The MTP can be bonded to the inlay to ensure breakage. The bonding points can be asymmetrical, as shown, to ensure uneven force when the upper inlay portion separates from the bottom inlay portion. As shown in Figure 13, one half of the MTP can be bonded to the inlay bottom 10B (glue 16), and the other half can be bonded to the inlay top 10A. Grooves can be made in both the top and bottom of the inlay to accommodate the glue. In one embodiment, as shown in Figure 13, the bottom inlay segment has a bottom groove for accommodating glue so as to be bonded to the bottom surface of the optically triggered transponder. The top inlay segment has a top groove for accommodating glue so as to be bonded to the top surface of the optically triggered transponder.

[0053]

[0079] The two inlay halves may be held in place by a weaker element, such as a mechanical fit (including slight notches and corresponding ridges), or by appropriately placed droplets of weak glue, such as around the inlay (between the halves). The inlay design ensures that when the two inlay halves are separated (when the capsule is removed from the bottle), the MTP is destroyed and no longer electrically functional. If a forger attempts to cut the capsule around the inlay, the glue 26 may be selected to resist solvent washing (by polymerization, for example). The glue 26 may also be applied in a clean pattern that can be visualized by the human eye or imaging equipment. The glue pattern may be on the topmost fragile surface, or both the top and bottom may have a glue pattern. Using these features, any attempt to recycle the inlay becomes visually detectable. At the same time, the inlay and the internal MTP may be mechanically stable and easily manipulated by hand or robot, provided they are handled properly.

[0054]

[0080] Figure 14 shows a magnified view of an exemplary security inlay fitted to a wine bottle according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 14, an inlay 10 that may look like a thin button may be glued to both the stopper / cork 24 and the capsule 20 with glue 26. If the bottled wine is original, the MTP ID can be read, for example, with a custom ID reader (e.g., a wand) or a cell phone-based attachment, covering, or application. However, by removing the capsule from the bottle (before the wine bottle is opened), the inlay is divided into two parts, and at the same time, the MTP placed within the inlay 10 is permanently damaged. The MTP can no longer be read. Therefore, verification of the wine bottle is no longer possible.

[0055]

[0081] The size of the inlay can be selected to cover all or most of the upper surface of the stopper 24. In some embodiments, the inlay straddles the opening of the wine bottle. A counterfeiter cannot remove the inlay without rendering the MTP unusable. When the bottle is properly opened, the top 10A peels off together with the capsule. The bottom does not substantially interfere with the use of a corkscrew. In some embodiments, the bottom is made even thinner to further facilitate the use of a corkscrew.

[0056]

[0082] The winemaker may receive the inlay from a specialized factory. The inlay may be bonded to the cork by the winemaker and then to the capsule. Bonding may be done continuously, or glue may be pre-placed on the top and bottom of the inlay. The glue is cured by any number of mechanisms, including photopolymerization (since the inlay is at least translucent in some embodiments), chemical setting, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The capsule may be pressed onto the inlay to ensure that the inlay is properly bonded.

[0057]

[0083] Alternatively, the capsule maker may pre-glue the inlay to the inside of the capsule. The winemaker can then glue the central part of the inside of the capsule to the cork. This can be done by pre-treating the inlay inside the capsule with glue (perhaps protected by a removable plastic wrap). In this scenario, all the winemaker needs to do to certify the wine is remove the wrap before placing the inlay-capsule in the wine bottle.

[0058]

[0084] If the capsule is transparent, the MTP can be read immediately. If a non-transparent capsule is used, an opening may be made in the capsule to read the MTP within the inlay. This opening may be small so that the inlay 10 can still adhere sufficiently to the capsule.

[0059]

[0085] In some embodiments, the top of the capsule includes metal foil, except for a small window to allow querying by an MTP photodetector. The window may be covered with a clear plastic coating. In some embodiments, the capsule is a laminate of an opaque material and a clear material, with the opaque material having no window.

[0060]

[0086] In some embodiments, the MTP may be larger, perhaps by one dimension, than those sold as p-Chip® transponders. This size can ensure good asymmetrical adhesion to the top and bottom inlay portions. Authentication is possible throughout the entire chain of control, from the winemaker through the distribution network to the customer. At every step, the authenticity of the wine can be verified by reading the MTP ID.

[0061]

[0087] If necessary, the MTP ID can be connected to a central wine database via the internet, and the MTP ID is provided to the database and recorded there along with the timestamp and the identity of the MTP reader device. Thus, if properly configured, the data provider can maintain a history of the wine bottle. If the end customer wishes to check the authenticity of the wine, several methods may be possible. Firstly, the fact that the seller can read the ID in front of the customer provides reassurance. Secondly, the seller can search the database and present the bottle history to the customer. Thirdly, the customer can enter the MTP ID and use an app on their smartphone to retrieve the bottle history. Fourthly, if the customer has their own ID reader, the customer can verify the information themselves.

[0062]

[0088] Therefore, a reliable method for authenticating wine or other objects is provided. The disclosed security inlay is flexible to operations involving the entire inlay, extremely sensitive to separation of halves, easy to install, and can be inconspicuous in most situations.

[0063]

[0089] Although the present invention is illustrated using a wine bottle, it can be used with any container sealed with a capsule or tape such that the inlay, including a portion of the capsule or tape, must be separated from the container. Such uses may include bottles containing pharmaceutical drugs, fragrance bottles, or similar bottles. Other uses may include labels or other elements placed on or incorporated into plastic, metal, and / or composite materials, including Consumer Packaged Goods (CPGs). In the case of shipping boxes, the tape may have sufficient adhesive strength to prevent removal without damaging the cardboard. Similarly, the label may have sufficient adhesive strength to prevent removal without damaging the label and / or the container underneath.

[0064]

[0090] When a wine bottle uses a screw-top closure, such as a Stelvin® closure, the security inlay can be attached to the bottle below the screw threads and below the capsule. In some embodiments, the bottom of the inlay may have a curved lower shape to match the neck of the bottle. In some embodiments, the capsule can be bonded to the wine neck within the area of ​​the security inlay.

[0065]

[0091] A capsule can refer to a tightly fitting metal or plastic foil that forms part of the closure of an object so that the object cannot be opened without damaging the capsule. Lamination refers to bonding, fusing, or adhering between polymer layers or between a polymer layer and a fabric layer, such that the laminate is a single structure within the scope of its intended use.

[0066]

[0092] The disclosures described herein relate to improved MTP for signal transmission and methods for forming or using them.

[0067]

[0093] Monolithic security features including MTP

[0094] Monolithic security features can be created by casting, embedding, or incorporating MTPs into a substrate via an additive manufacturing process. Alternatively, such security features can also be created by attaching MTPs to the substrate after they have been formed. Monolithic security features may be designed so that their structure and configuration cause the MTPs to break or, in some way, permanently render the MTPs unusable by external features, or to transfer the MTPs across external features. As an example, MTPs may be embedded within heat-shrink tubing sealing a twist cap. The MTPs may be positioned so that when the twist cap is loosened, the MTPs may encounter a slope, wedge, or other structure on the container. The heat-shrink substrate may be designed to deform as it passes through the structure, but not necessarily completely absorb or dissipate the increasing forces from that structure. As the MTPs encounter and move over the structure, the resistance may force the MTPs or MTP subcomponents to break, thereby neutralizing them.

[0068]

[0095] Security features indexed by multiple MTPs

[0096] The present invention may use authentication of multiple microtransponders as a paired combination, or a combination of microtransponders and tagants, to establish a higher level of security. All tagants must be present and readable to verify the content. The inability of any microtransponder to respond may indicate non-authentic content. At least one microtransponder in a multi-layered indexing sequence may be a brittle chip that can become physically unresponsive when the container is first opened. The brittle chip can be created by a post-fabrication process, i.e., thinning of the chip substrate, to ensure that it breaks when bent or attempted to be removed from the substrate. In some embodiments, methods to ensure the disabling of the chip may be implemented by designing a fracture plane or cutting a slot into the chip to detach the antenna.

[0069]

[0097] In one embodiment, a physical object (e.g., a container) may be fitted with chips A and B from a proper pair formation when both signals respond to interrogation.

[0070]

[0098] In one embodiment, if only chip A is attached to a physical object and chip B is not physically present for interrogation by the reader, the reader cannot authenticate the product because the database requires responses from both chips. If both chip A and chip B are present in the physical object, but chip B can be destroyed when opened, the reader cannot authenticate the product because chip B is neutralized.

[0071]

[0099] In one embodiment, similar to the example of a physical object having chips A and B, a physical object may have different pair-related or legitimate pair-forming indexings via chips C and D. The pair-forming of chips C and D may be legitimate, but it may be unique and not equal to the pair-forming of chips A and B. If a counterfeiter obtains chips A and C and adds them to their package, the reader cannot authenticate these chips because chips A and C do not constitute a legitimate pair-forming.

[0072]

[0100] Optically triggered microtransponder (MTP) with highly durable self-destructing super-anchors.

[0101] Physically Unreliable Objects (PUFs) are known and can be employed as a key element in physical, digitally-based anti-counterfeiting authentication systems. A PUF is a physical object embodied in a physical structure, and is easy to evaluate but difficult to predict, even for an attacker with physical access to the PUF. A key element of a PUF is the use of naturally occurring, randomly occurring features or properties that can be used as unique, distinctive features of individual objects that are otherwise very similar. A PUF relies on the uniqueness of its physical microstructure, which typically includes random components that already exist inherently within the physical object, or are explicitly introduced into or generated within the physical object during its manufacture. The nature of the physical microstructure associated with a PUF is substantially uncontrollable and unpredictable. To evaluate a PUF, a so-called challenge-response authentication scheme is used. The "challenge" is a physical stimulus applied to the PUF, and the "response" is its reaction to the stimulus. The response relies on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure and can therefore be used to authenticate PUFs, and the physical objects in which they form. A specific challenge and its corresponding response together form what is known as a "challenge-response pair" (CRP).

[0073]

[0102] In practical applications, a PUF (Potentially Unidentifiable Function) can be interrogated in some form, referred to as a challenge. The PUF has a response to the interrogation that clearly exposes, identifies, or verifies a unique random feature. The response is then compared to a digital reference. If the unique random feature of the PUF matches the digital reference, the outcome of the challenge is affirmative authentication. If the unique random feature of the PUF does not match the digital reference, the challenge may fail, and therefore the PUF, and the corresponding physical object to which it is attached, are considered fake rather than genuine.

[0074]

[0103] The definition of a PUF can be said to focus on naturally occurring random physical structures or phenomena that provide uniqueness, relying on the uncontrollable and unpredictable nature of the physical microstructure, which can make replicating (cloning) the chip exceptionally difficult. The challenge of revealing the random characteristics of on-chip PUFs lies in ring oscillation and FPGA architecture, both of which can degrade over time and lack long-term durability.

[0075]

[0104] Despite the sophisticated features and uses of the widespread PUF (Potentially Unidentified Frame), several significant problems remain to be addressed. While the initial digital reference of a PUF may be locked and virtually immutable over time, the physical PUF used to generate the digital reference can begin to degrade immediately. Over time, and / or as a result of handling, environmental conditions, or usage conditions, the unique characteristics of a legitimate original PUF may be compromised or modified to the point where it eventually fails to challenge its digital twin. In this case, a genuine item may be mistakenly identified as a counterfeit or imitation. Therefore, there is a need to provide a more durable method for guaranteeing the authenticity of an object.

[0076]

[0105] This disclosure provides an inventive method for assigning uniqueness by applying MTPs having a unique ID to a large number of similar objects. In some embodiments, non-random features may be assigned, embedded, or incorporated into the object. In some embodiments, non-random features may be difficult to reach, and attempts to manipulate or alter unique features will render them unusable or destroyed. Furthermore, embodiments of this disclosure may be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive with a high level of durability and reliable functionality. The combination of ultra-high durability and tamper-proof construction may lead to super-anchors (SAs). SAs are not PUFs insofar as PUFs are based on random physical features and / or degrade over time.

[0077]

[0106] The main concept of this disclosure is that it may provide an object (super-anchor) having a unique embedded feature to increase the durability of the object. The super-durable object may be embedded within the matrix of a chip. Other attempts to utilize durable techniques for ICs, namely on-chip devices, involve different microstructures of the chip itself. In this disclosure, the super-anchor can be highly durable because the MTP ID number is a unique, fixed feature that is integrated within the bulk medium (e.g., the chip structure) but can be separated from there. The unique feature can be isolated from the degradation of the bulk. The super-anchor may provide a non-random bus-secure function. The super-anchor may be tamper-proof and / or self-destructive in response to an attempt to alter the unique ID. A further application of self-destructive design may be used to ensure authentic packaging so that containers and vessels are not reused to hold counterfeit goods. For example, a final use case of a self-destructive super-anchor may be used within a security inlay.

[0078]

[0107] Figure 15 is a flowchart illustrating an exemplary process configured to utilize a super-anchor for physical object authentication according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. A highly durable, self-destructing super-anchor may be used for object authentication, object tracking, and traversal under the control of a digital security system including a manufacturer database. The digital security system may include one or more computing devices to facilitate object authentication, object tracking, and traversal. The digital security system may include at least a security computing device that communicates with a plurality of user computing devices over a network. The security computing device may include a processor, memory, and a communication interface to enable communication over the network. The digital security system may receive MTP registration information from an MTP ID secure reader (e.g., an ID reader) over the network and process the MTP ID information.

[0079]

[0108] In step 1501, a super-anchor (SA) may be manufactured by embedding or incorporating an MTP having a unique ID into a tagant, on a tagant substrate, or within a tagant layer. The tagant may or may not have a PUF embodied in its physical structure. The super-anchor may be manufactured by incorporating the MTP into the tagant structure, while the tagant may be manufactured as part of a multilayer manufacturing process. An example of co-manufacturing of a tagant and a super-anchor may be casting a thermoplastic tag or label by a molding process. An example of multilayer co-manufacturing may include laminating an MTP into a credit card, label, or tape so that the MTP becomes part of the monolithic structure of the tag or object. The resulting tag or tagant may be a label, dot, laminate, tape, or any physical structure. The primary objectives of Tagant may include (1) providing a surface for attaching a super-anchor to a physical object in order to track the physical object, and / or (2) acting as a passive or active part of a tamper-evident, tamper-resistant, or self-destruct mechanism.

[0080]

[0109] For example, a super-anchor could be described as an optically triggered MTP with a unique ID attached to or embedded within a tagant that has physical anti-replica function (PUF) along with self-destructive and highly durable features.

[0081]

[0110] In step 1502, the MTP's unique ID number may be registered in the digital security system and / or manufacturer database and indexed to the MTP.

[0082]

[0111] In step 1503A, a manufactured SA having a unique ID number or unique serial number may be digitally indexed and attached to a physical object. The super anchor may or may not have acceptable means of attaching it to the physical object as part of its structure and configuration. The means, methods, and processes for bonding the super anchor to the physical object can vary widely depending on the configuration and conditions of use for the physical object receiving the super anchor. The super anchor may be attached directly to the physical object with known materials and processes, such as adhesives, sealants, waxes, tapes, and films. Glues or other adhesives may be cured by any number of mechanisms, including photopolymerization, chemical setting, oxidative radiation, and / or other techniques. The materials may have immediate or latent action. The attachment material may be reactive. Reactive materials may be activated by pressure, chemicals, temperature lamps, sound, or other radiation sources. Such materials and processes are illustrative and not limiting. The super anchor may be sewn into or injected into the object.

[0083]

[0112] In some embodiments, superanchors may be supplied and used as unattached objects, with or without subsequent processing, interrogation, and identification of attached species, along with reactive sites or substrates that may be modified for specific adsorption and binding of chemical and / or biological species. After identification, the bound species can be removed, thereby regenerating the superanchor. Thus, superanchors can form platforms and scaffolds for random or precise growth sequencing in automated or semi-automated processes. Unattached superanchors, with or without reactive sites or substrates, can be dispersed in a continuous medium such as a fluid. Dynamic object information of a superanchor can be determined by capturing its unique ID at one or more sites within a closed vessel. Dynamic object information can be used to determine the flow characteristics of the continuous medium. Real-time rheological and tribological data can be calculated. Algorithms and software for computational fluid dynamics can be developed and used to provide highly detailed evidence of fluid dynamics and velocity gradients. Modeling of industrial material flow and reaction conditions, evidence for the capabilities of mixing equipment, and design of fluid processing systems can be greatly improved.

[0084]

[0113] In step 1503B, data associated with a physical object stored in the digital security system may be updated with object index information so that the physical object can be searched for and read using a unique ID number and product data within the digital security system. Product data may include a serial number or identifier associated with the physical object, such as radio frequency identification (RFID) or a QR code.

[0085]

[0114] In step 1504, when the user receives a physical object attached to the manufactured SA, the user may securely log in to the digital security system via the user computing device to initiate the authentication process for the physical object.

[0086]

[0115] In step 1505, a secure reader (for example, an ID reader) may be used to illuminate an SA attached to a physical object and receive the SA signal.

[0087]

[0116] In step 1506, the secure reader receives the SA signal and may decode the received SA signal to obtain a unique ID number or serial number indexed to the SA. A user computing device may run an application to communicate with the secure reader to receive the decoded ID of the SA associated with a physical object.

[0088]

[0117] In step 1507, the user computing device may communicate with the digital security system via the network and send the decrypted ID of the SA to the digital security system. The digital security system may compare the decrypted unique ID associated with the physical object against the ID number stored within the digital security system.

[0089]

[0118] In step 1508A, based on the comparison results, the digital security system may determine whether the decrypted unique ID number is registered.

[0090]

[0119] In step 1508B, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID is not registered, the digital security system may generate a “not authentic” message to display on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0091]

[0120] In step 1508C, the digital security system may update data associated with a physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity verification.

[0092]

[0121] In step 1509A, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID number is registered in the digital security system, the digital security system may further determine whether the decrypted unique ID number matches a stored ID number associated with a physical object.

[0093]

[0122] In step 1509B, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID number does not match a stored ID number associated with a physical object, the digital security system may generate a “not authentic” message to display on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0094]

[0123] In step 1509C, based on the determined authenticity result in 1509A, the digital security system may update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity verification.

[0095]

[0124] In step 1510A, in response to determining that the decrypted unique ID matches a stored ID indexed on a physical object, the digital security system may generate a “genuine” message for display on the user interface of the user computing device.

[0096]

[0125] In step 1510B, based on the determined authenticity result in 1510A, the digital security system may update the data associated with the physical object with user and challenge information for object authenticity verification.

[0097]

[0126] Embodiments of this disclosure may provide MTP having an ultra-durable super-anchor used for tagging, authenticating, and preventing counterfeiting of physical objects.

[0098]

[0127] In some embodiments, the manufactured super anchor (SA) may be combined with RFID or QR code technology and certain encryption technologies to further enhance physical object tracking and anti-counterfeiting protection.

[0099]

[0128] In some embodiments, the manufactured SA may be printed as a label on any type of surface of a physical object. In some embodiments, the manufactured SA may be printed as a label to replace RFID or QR codes for special security document transfer.

[0100]

[0129] Embodiments of this disclosure may provide an MTP having an ultra-durable super-anchor that is incorporated into or integrated with business systems, databases for digital security systems, distributed ledgers, blockchains, blockchain interoperability, and interoperability of object and financial-based blockchains.

[0101]

[0130] In some embodiments, storing a secure, unique ID number for a manufactured SA indexed to an attached physical object can be implemented by storing the SA's registered unique ID and associated data related to the physical object on a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger. In this way, the registered unique ID and associated data can be stored and remembered in a manner that makes tampering virtually impossible. Furthermore, storing a secure, registered unique ID and associated super-anchor data on a blockchain or blockless distributed ledger can enable, for example, remote verification and tracking of object authenticity by authorized recipients along the supply chain of the associated physical object or group of objects.

[0102]

[0131] In some embodiments, the above process may be adapted for use in analyzing the flow characteristics and / or other features of a continuous medium. For example, in step 1503A, the SA may be dispersed within the continuous medium (rather than being physically attached to a solid medium, for example). The SA may then be illuminated and may respond multiple times as described above. Each time may be recorded, and the position of the SA in the medium may also be recorded. These times-stamped SA positions may be processed to determine at least one fluid characteristic of the continuous medium, as described above.

[0103]

[0132] Microtransponder-based smart paper contract

[0133] The authenticity of paper-based credit certificates can be insecure. Large-scale fraud can occur regarding the authentication of paper-based credit certificates. For example, certificates can be requested online from universities from anywhere in the world, printed, and sent directly anywhere. Fake credit certificates can be used for various fraudulent purposes and sent to doctors, psychologists, or other professionals. Authentication of documents is typically time-consuming and incurs significant costs for consumers, which should be avoided. Furthermore, record searches can delay housing and real estate transactions, disrupting business flow and revenue generation for days.

[0104]

[0134] p-Chip® MTP (for example, configured in some cases as a highly durable self-destructing super-anchor) can be used to implement MTP-based smart paper contracts. Embodiments of this disclosure describe MTP-based paper contract techniques that can provide low-cost registration and authentication of processing devices while increasing the traceability and security of digital or printed paper articles.

[0105]

[0135] MTP-based smart paper contracts can eliminate the multiple steps and costs associated with creating secure, authentic digital records and smart contracts. MTP-based smart paper contracts can provide low-cost registration and authentication of printers and marking devices, and can increase the traceability and security of printed materials. MTP-based smart paper contracts can utilize machine tokenization for purposes such as service payments. Unlike print-based security features such as watermarks or special dyes or pigments embedded in paper documents and certificate substrates, as well as 2D codes such as QR codes and DataMatrix codes, p-Chip® MTP is not easily duplicated and can offer a very affordable option for digital authentication.

[0106]

[0136] Adding documents or physical records to a digital security system or similar functional database, data lake, or computer-based archival and verification system requires that the documents be scanned and a unique ID or serial identifier added. Smart paper contracts based on p-Chip® MTP may have a low-cost energy-activated identifier attached and / or embedded within the MTP substrate, giving the document a unique and physically immutable ID number.

[0107]

[0137] As used herein, the terms “smart contract,” “smart paper contract,” “printed article,” or “printed object” may include, but are not limited to, any type of printable article, including contracts, financial transactions, copies, certificates, checks, secure credentials, medical records, quality records, housing certificate searches, automobiles, ships, agricultural equipment, and recreational vehicles. For example, MTP-based smart paper contracts may be used to create documents such as secure credentials, contacts, certificates, and quality records. Specific raw material and product characteristics may be substantiated by analytical certificates, medical records, genomic certificates such as variety or guaranteed seeds.

[0108]

[0138] As used herein, the term “paper” is used as an easily understandable but not limited embodiment of the present invention, which may include any printing-related substrate, such as synthetic paper, film, cardboard, plastic, metal, wood, and composite materials. Furthermore, the concepts of this disclosure may encompass the printing of labels and packaging as a novel method for creating secure “smart labels,” secure “smart tags,” and secure “smart packages.” The present invention may encompass both conventional 2D and 3D printing processes for the aforementioned substrates and printed articles.

[0109]

[0139] Figure 16 shows a functional diagram of implementing a smart paper contract according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. As shown in Figure 16, the functional unit 16A may include a database and operations associated with the activities of the sender and recipient. The smart contract sender (e.g., document sender) may register achievements or events with a digital security system via a first computing device (in block 1602). The sender's data and documents may be stored in database 1601 (e.g., DB1) as client records. The sender may create a print order (in block 1603) and store the order and associated financial data in database 1604 (e.g., DB4) as client financial data. The smart contract sender may transfer secure print data to the smart contract recipient (e.g., document recipient) (in block 1605).

[0110]

[0140] As shown in Figure 16, the functional unit 16B may include a database, as well as operations performed by authorized printers and marking devices associated with the digital security system.

[0111]

[0141] In block 1613, authorized printers and marking devices may be registered in the digital security system with their respective assigned security serial numbers. Authorized printers may receive purchase orders from senders. Authorized printers may convert the secure print data associated with the purchase orders into machine-executable instructions (in block 1614). The received secure print data and purchase orders may be stored in database 1616 (e.g., DB2). Authorized printers may acquire security substrates (in block 1612) and print secure documents (in block 1615). The security substrates (in block 1612) and the operation of printing secure documents (in block 1615) may be stored in database 1617 (e.g., DB4). Authorized marking devices may acquire security inks (in block 1618) and be configured to print 2D security marks on secure documents (in block 1619). The terms “security substrate” and “security ink” refer to legacy materials and processes for creating secure documents by printing. Numerous commercially available substrates and inks are possible. An example of a security substrate may be paper with a watermark or embossed structure. Another example may be paper pre-printed with "invisible ink." Under normal sunlight illumination, the ink does not reflect in the visible spectrum. When exposed to UV light, the pre-printed letters or marks will downconvert higher energy light into the visible spectrum, becoming visible to the observer. Paper can be natural or synthetic based, and therefore the more general term "substrate" may be used. Synthetic paper may be more expensive and can be manufactured with specific spectral responses designed into their bulk properties, providing another level of security. Incorporating color-changing (gonio-apparent) fibers into the paper or substrate to be printed on can add another layer of security, as the streaks exhibit a unique color reflection that can change as the viewing angle of the document changes. Color-changing is a feature of the material.The material is very expensive, and in the case of official state-produced documents, it may be a controlled substance. Security ink can be a specific physical structure of pigment or dye that can produce a changing reflection (observable color) to people and / or machines. Both security substrate (block 1612) and security ink (block 1618) can be raw materials procured by the printer. Customers can specify security substrate and ink or any combination as part of their print order to obtain secure documents.

[0112]

[0142] 2D security marking is the current state of printing techniques. In addition to using secure inks and combinations of secure inks, the print design can have intentional structures that are printed in ultra-high definition. Careful inspection or low-magnification magnification can reveal microstructures that an uninformed forger would not notice or be able to create. 2D security marks can also be called PUFs, according to the original definition by Virginia Tech, in that the microstructure is a function of ink droplet splatter, absorption into the printing substrate, and variation in drying. This 2D structure can be photographed and digitized. Digital features can be identified through combined edge finding algorithms for shape, as well as in combination with other image factors such as area, color, and brightness. Digital files can be given a unique ID. The unique ID and file image can be archived in a database and indexed with the digital file. Furthermore, digital image captures can be compared against archived images as PUF challenge response sequences to determine authenticity.

[0113]

[0143] Recent developments in attaching or embedding RFID devices within printed paper provide another level of security for printed documents, thereby making the RFID tag number part of the digital identification number or digital ID for the printed document. RFID-enabled paper is available for digital printing platforms such as HP Indigo printers. In some cases, RFID tags may be attached to documents after printing. The advantages of using RFID technology for the authentication of printed documents are consistent with using them within other security media. The disadvantages of this security mechanism are that it can be duplicated by unauthorized entities, it is not highly durable in use, and it is expensive. The embodiments described herein may be used in addition to, or in place of, the 2D security marks described above, with RFID-enabled paper.

[0114]

[0144] A printed secure document with a 2D security mark and / or embedded RFID tag may be sent to the document recipient (in block 1620), and the associated record may be stored in database 1621 (e.g., DB5). The secure document with the 2D security mark may be sent to the smart contract recipient along with the invoice (in block 1622). The smart contract recipient may receive a digital copy of the secure document via email or text message over the network, along with the printed secure document with the 2D security mark via email (in block 1606). The smart contract recipient may receive and sign the secure document (in block 1607). A digital twin of the signed document may be created (in block 1608) and stored in database 1609 (e.g., DB6). The smart contract recipient may process or pay the invoice associated with the document received via a second computing device over the network, and the transaction record may be stored in the client financial database 1611 (e.g., DB7). The financial transaction record of the paid invoice is sent to a digital security system via a second computing device (in block 1623) and can be stored in database 1624 (e.g., DB8). The MTP-based document security measures described herein may be used instead of, or in combination with, conventional 2D security marks and / or embedded RFID tags. In either case, a smart paper contract formed using the embodiments described herein may be more durable and secure than a document secured solely by conventional 2D security marks and / or embedded RFID tags.

[0115]

[0145] Generating secure document smart contracts using blockchain integration

[0146] In some embodiments, blockchain may be used to apply a predetermined collision-resistant hash function to track and trace smart contract documents. As used herein, a collision-resistant hash function refers to a special type of hash function, i.e., a mathematical function or algorithm, that maps data of any size to a fixed-size bit string of hash values ​​and is also designed as a one-way function, i.e., a function that is easy to compute per input but difficult to reverse given an image of random inputs. Preferably, the collision-resistant hash function is designed such that it is difficult to find two different datasets d1 and d2 such that hash(d1) = hash(d2). These are hash functions that can mathematically prove a certain sufficient level of security. In this security solution, the security of the cryptographic hash function is further enhanced by the fact that the MTP ID number reading result of a marking with a smart anchor, in particular the composite security marking disclosed herein, is performed at a specific place and time where the physical object bearing that marking actually exists at such a place and time. This can be used to increase the absolute level of security that can be achieved while still providing a given required level of security, or to enable the use of collision-resistant hash functions that work with smaller datasets as input and / or output, such as shorter data strings.

[0116]

[0147] By utilizing blockchain technology, MTP IDs can be used in conjunction with collision-resistant hash functions to generate smart contracts. Generating smart contracts may involve multi-layered indexing processes for object authentication, object tracking, and tracking. For example, combining a unique MTP ID number 1 associated with each printable page in a box of smart paper with a unique ID number 2 associated with the paper box containing all the smart paper may allow the smart paper to arrive at a printer with a predetermined identifier that can be immediately integrated into a blockchain collision-resistant hash function when printed. Furthermore, in this disclosure, each authorized printer and / or marking device may have its own unique identification ID number 3. The unique MTP ID 1 from the paper can be combined with the unique ID 2 of the paper box and the unique serial ID number 3 of the authorized printer or marking device. Furthermore, all relevant MTP IDs can be applied to a collision-resistant hash function to create a similar blockchain-enabled identification. This identification can be used as an additional level of security for registering printers or marking devices for machine tokenization payments. In some embodiments, the unique ID1 of the smart paper's MTP may be used to register the fax machine and to enhance the security of the fax machine for data transmission.

[0117]

[0148] Figure 17 shows an exemplary system diagram for generating secure document smart contracts while integrating with a blockchain. The exemplary system 1700 may include multiple smart paper SP(Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, authorized printing device 1706, authorized p-Chip reader 1707 (e.g., p-Chip identifier reader), and blockchain secure archive 1710. Each of the multiple smart paper SP(Ni) 1703, smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705, and authorized printing device 1706 may have embedded super-anchors, each configured with its own p-Chip MTP and super-anchor. The authorized p-Chip super-anchor reader 1707 may be registered in a digital security system along with its serial number. The authorized p-Chip super-anchor reader 1707 and collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be incorporated into the digital authorized printing device 1706.

[0118]

[0149] The unique serial number of the p-Chip of the authorized p-Chip super anchor reader 1707 can be used to add an additional layer of security by generating a corresponding hash value using a collision-resistant hash function 1708. While it can be fully integrated into the printing workflow, in some embodiments the collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be implemented electronically away from the digitally authorized printing device 1706 in real time by the printing entity.

[0119]

[0150] In some embodiments, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be configured to receive secure document content 1701 and print commands 1702 from a user via a network in order to generate a secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be configured to load smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 from a smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705 in order to create a print item for the secure document smart contract 1709. The digitally authorized printing device 1706 may communicate with and automatically control an authorized p-Chip super anchor reader 1707 to read the super anchor IDs of the loaded smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and the smart paper container SPC(Mi) 1705.

[0120]

[0151] In one embodiment, the digitally authorized printing device 1706 may have a super-anchor embedded or incorporated, which includes an MTP with an ID number, to enhance the security status of the printing device 1706. This incorporation may enable the digitally authorized printing device 1706 and its output to be recognized as a verified and trusted source.

[0121]

[0152] In one embodiment, a digitally authorized printing device 1706 may be registered through a blockchain trust center, enabling all subsequent printing to be secure within the blockchain, thereby eliminating costly and time-consuming steps. A collision-resistant hash function 1708 may be applied to the p-Chip MTP ID number associated with the digitally authorized printing device 1706, the print command 1702, and the print time and print date stamps generated by the printing device 1706 to generate a highly secure document smart contract.

[0122]

[0153] In one embodiment, integrating the p-Chip into the paper and paper container can provide two additional levels of security, associated together with a unique super-anchor having its own unique ID number. For example, smart paper SP(Ni)1703 is produced by embedding a p-Chip MTP with a 2D super-anchor into the printed paper, which can be linked to a 2D p-Chip ID number (e.g., a first and second ID). Smart paper container SPC(M i )1705 is the third p-Chip MTP paper container SPC (M i ) is generated by embedding it within 1705 and can be linked to a third ID number. A digitally authorized printing device 1706 may have an MTP with a fourth ID number embedded or incorporated into it. A collision-resistant hash function 1708 is generated by creating a smart contract pre-manufactured for printing, at the time of manufacture, using smart paper SP(Ni) 1703 and smart paper container SPC(M i This may apply to 1705, and to its partners or their licenses. Therefore, existing physical records scanned for the purpose of digital archiving, or newly created records, can immediately become part of the data for a smart contract.

[0123]

[0154] The collision-resistant hash function 1708 can be applied to other entity- or document-specific information, significantly increasing security at an exceptionally low cost. For example, there are different reasons to reduce costs as document security increases. 1) Using multiple print-based super anchors may not be cost-effective. 2) Using 2D security markings and p-Chip ID numbers from smart paper 1704, one p-Chip ID number from paper container 1705, and one p-Chip ID number from digitally authorized printing device 1706 can provide multiple levels (e.g., four levels) of unique identification for a single security document. 3) Replacing existing 2D security markings with one to three or more p-Chips can significantly improve document security while greatly reducing operating costs for printing devices and the cost of secure printing for end users.

[0124]

[0155] In some embodiments, p-Chip authentication may be applied to individual print cartridges for security-grade inks that may be associated with different brands. Using a unique p-Chip ID number for each ink cartridge, along with different p-Chip ID numbers for the printing device, could be another way to significantly increase security for existing 2D print-based systems.

[0125]

[0156] In some embodiments, smart paper and smart paper containers may be labeled with material lot numbers and container numbers. The lot number may have Certificate of Analysis (CoA) information that can identify multiple physical fixed pieces of information for a unique product and / or batch of material. The respective p-Chip ID numbers indexed to or associated with smart paper and smart paper containers may be replaced with or configured to include the material lot number and container product number of the smart paper container. In one embodiment, any number of unique and variable physical data points for a batch may be used as PUFs. Furthermore, the above-described super-anchors may be added to a 3D printing device to generate secure 3D prints.

[0126]

[0157] Authentication of 3D printed objects using embedded MTP that utilizes a process to convert to smart contracts.

[0158] This disclosure provides cost-effective methods and systems for identifying and authenticating parts and components produced by additive manufacturing. The proliferation of additive manufacturing processes, equipment, and techniques can be highly promising, potentially revolutionizing the physical production of objects. It increases speed while reducing equipment capital costs and the cost per unit of printed material. The cost reduction may have made it feasible to create and sell non-original counterfeit products. The negative impacts of counterfeiting can be well-established, including loss of revenue and taxes, as well as an increase in warranty claims. While these harmful consequences have large-scale negative impacts on a global scale, there may be even greater concerns regarding human health and the safety of counterfeit parts, potentially leading to substantial death or injury to people and animals.

[0127]

[0159] Attaching a p-Chip® MTP to a printed object can provide an object with a unique identification number that can be protected against counterfeiting by utilizing the challenge-response mechanism described above. As described above, a p-Chip® MTP can be used to transform a printed object into a smart component and / or smart contract in the manner outlined in smart paper as described above.

[0128]

[0160] p-Chip® MTP can be directly incorporated into printed objects by placement on the printing stage. For example, an MTP may have an adhesive or tape that is activated by mechanical, thermal, or radiation-based methods to fuse into the object. An MTP may be incorporated using a sacrificial medium that can be destroyed by the printing process, subprocesses, or post-printing processes. p-Chip® MTP can be directly incorporated into printed objects by tape, asset tags, or labels.

[0129]

[0161] In some embodiments, p-Chip® MTP may be incorporated as a subcomponent by mechanically or additively mounting or embedding the p-Chip® within the matrix through a separate process. For example, one manifestation may be a thin base with an embedded MTP. This base may be made of the same material or be compatible with the material of the object to be printed. Printing may be performed on the thin base. Alternatively, the thin base may be attached by adhesive, coating, or polymer material of organic, inorganic, or hybrid composition. In some embodiments, similar materials and shapes may be used with the embedded MTP, such as pegs, tabs, labels, caps, or any other structural elements of a finished part, component, subcomponent, or assembly. In some embodiments, the structure may be attached to the printed part as an external surface and fused. The MTP, and the component containing the MTP, may be intentionally overprinted as a hidden security feature to allow for the durability of the MTP over its service life.

[0130]

[0162] MTP can be added to certain features of printed materials that provide mechanical protection during service or act as an overt or concealed function for reading during the distribution, sale, and service life of the goods. Existing robotics may be used to break down objects immediately after printing, either as a separate station or a separate process within the workflow.

[0131]

[0163] As described above, MTP can be printed on or attached to an object and combined with 2D security marking, RFID, and other known PUF technologies for an additional layer of security against the object. MTP can be manufactured as a label printed on an object. MTP can be embedded within a paper document as a smart contract.

[0132]

[0164] Various materials can be used in end-use applications, including medical and dental implants for humans or animals, such as metals, ceramics, plastics, polymer materials, single components, mixtures of multiple components, and additive manufacturing of combinations thereof.

[0133]

[0165] 3D printed objects using MTP may require specific operating conditions, efficacy, or limits, such as temperature range and flexibility. Bulk properties of the printed material, such as flexibility, bending radius, and coefficient of thermal expansion, may be carefully considered to ensure that no stresses are induced that could disable subcomponents, break the MTP chip, or cause the part to detach during servicing. For example, an MTP label may be printed on an object to which RFID is applied to provide an additional layer of flexibility and security to the object. For example, depending on the materials and methods used in the production of the transponder antenna, as well as the method and orientation of the transponder chip bonding on the substrate, any passive RF transponder may have a minimum (e.g., 3 inches in diameter) allowable bending radius (radius of curvature). Bending or flexing a finished passive RFID transponder medium to a radius smaller than this minimum radius at any point in the application process may result in RFID failure due to antenna breakage or destruction of the chip antenna bonding. RFID label manufacturers may provide values ​​for the minimum bending radius. Objects printed with MTP labels may have exceptional flexibility compared to conventional RFID labels. For example, the p-Chip has been successfully mounted and read on a 1 / 4-inch automotive brake line.

[0134]

[0166] Specific issues concerning additive manufacturing of ceramics and metals may apply. All materials and equipment common to additive manufacturing can be utilized for 3D printed objects by MTP. For example, laser marking of polymer materials can be used to create identification and 2D security marks. Laser marking is a commercial process in which laser marking pigments are embedded within a matrix (polymer, paint, adhesive, plastic, etc.).

[0135]

[0167] Pigments can be randomly dispersed within a composite material. The composite material can be irradiated with high-energy radiation, heating the pigment and, in response, scorching the surrounding continuous phase of the part or coating, thereby changing its color. By controlling the radiation beam, symbols, structures, or identification numbers can be generated that are embedded within or on the surface of the part. Laser marking can be an affordable way to add part numbers to objects, but laser marking pigments, radiation sources, and automated controls are ubiquitous. This is not a very safe marking method. If laser marking is used to characterize the random features described for printing smart contracts, super-anchors can be created, which can be safer than simple laser marking. These methods can be widely used with carbon-based materials and composites.

[0136]

[0168] Another method of laser marking is direct metal ablation. A high-power laser can corrode the metal surface, changing its color (anodic oxidation) and potentially leaving a permanent mark.

[0137]

[0169] Super Anchors can replace laser marking and 2D security marks for plastic and organic-based objects. These can be used for defensive security. 3D printers for ceramics and metals may have high-power lasers for sintering. In some embodiments, Super Anchors can be attached to inorganic 3D printed items that have 2D laser marks. In some embodiments, Super Anchors can be attached to inorganic 3D printed items to replace 2D laser marks and increase security.

[0138]

[0170] In some embodiments, photoactivated MTPs may include longer waveforms, such as terahertz, which are developed for IC signaling.

[0139]

[0171] In some embodiments, an acoustic signal may be used instead of light to transmit and read the MTP chip ID. Compatible devices and circuit elements, including modulation / demodulation circuits, coding / decoding circuits, and MTP readers, may be developed via a piezoelectric device on the MTP chip associated with the corresponding acoustic signal.

[0140]

[0172] Furthermore, a mobile application may be provided to be compatible with a corresponding MTP reader for scanning MTPs attached to physical objects. The mobile application may be configured to communicate with a digital security system to register physical objects to which MTP labels are attached or MTPs are embedded. The mobile application may be configured to communicate with a digital security system to track and authenticate physical objects registered within the digital security system. The mobile application may be configured to read the MTPID printed on the object with a corresponding MTP reader and send the read ID directly to the digital security system or a similar functional database for the object authentication process described in Figure 15.

[0141]

[0173] Improved reading distance microtransponder (MTP)

[0174] Current-generation MTPs may have limited readability when mounted directly to a metal substrate. The modulated light required to activate the MTP's solar cell can interact with the metal substrate, which can generate eddy currents within the metal. These generated eddy currents can reduce the intensity response of the RF signal from the MTP. Successfully acquiring and decoding the RF signal containing the MTP's unique identity number is a function of the signal distance between the MTP and its reader.

[0142]

[0175] Embodiments of this disclosure describe techniques for improving the reading distance for MTPs by eliminating eddy currents. The signal distance for p-Chips directly mounted on a metal surface can be reduced by up to 30% compared to non-metallic substrates. MTPs with improved reading distances can be embedded with the described high-durability self-destructing PUF functionality. It may be possible to construct a physical gap between the metal substrate and the object affected by eddy currents. Such methods may rely on tapes, shims, or filler polymer adhesives, laminates, or films that are outside the manufacturing and construction of integrated circuits (ICs). Given the wide range of substrates and mounting methods for end-use applications of p-Chip® MTPs, a single, mass-produced, and affordable solution may not be possible for post-manufacturing isolation of MTPs from metal substrates. Eddy current resistance from metal substrates can be very advantageous to achieve as part of the on-chip structure.

[0143]

[0176] In some embodiments, successful eddy current elimination can be achieved with active or passive materials, and / or combinations thereof. Active materials can absorb, scatter, disrupt, or reflect eddy currents from the chip and its signals. Filler materials such as ferrite are also known to act as active materials. Passive materials do not interact with eddy currents at all and can provide physical isolation between the substrate and the IC signals. Glass, ceramics, and inorganic media are known materials that provide passive isolation and are compatible with IC manufacturing.

[0144]

[0177] In some embodiments, the base or near-base layer of the IC design may be fabricated from a passive material or filled with an active material. The base layer is formed post-foundry by attaching the passive or active substrate to the MTP chip.

[0145]

[0178] For the base layer of IC design, various methods or techniques may be used, but are not limited to these, and include the following: 1) A physical construction process by vapor phase or chemical deposition. While the majority of passivation layers are constructed to prevent corrosion of ICs and components, extending the thickness of the back of the chip by depositing a non-conductive inorganic layer acts as a physical spacer to isolate the IC and its circuitry from the metal substrate that could cause interference. 2) A process for constructing a physical layer from a liquid medium, followed by thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry. The two chemical properties described can create highly durable, non-conductive films and structures with excellent adhesion to other inorganic surfaces. Such sol-gel systems can be applied as liquid coatings by casting, spraying, dipping, or spin-based application to precision films. 3) Attaching an active or passive monolithic layer to a wafer by a liquid, gel, or solid medium and subsequent thermal or radiation curing in the field of polysilazane / polysiloxane chemistry. The same sol-gel system may be used as an adhesive to bond other structures, such as glass plates, to the back of the IC wafer. In some embodiments, the passive monolithic layer may be glass or a filled glass structure. 4) Hybrid organic-inorganic polymer matrices are thought to have greater flexibility and could be an organic approach to lower-temperature applications. One drawback of sol-gel films is that they can be brittle. Adding small amounts of organic material to the inorganic sol-gel system can reduce this brittleness. A material trade-off for creating hybrid sol-gels is the degradation of high temperature resistance.

[0146]

[0179] All end-use applications involve metals, or may include metal-filled layers or particles.

[0147]

[0180] This disclosure may identify known or understood scopes of use, effectiveness, or limitations. While high-temperature service conditions are characteristic of p-Chip® MTP, metallic objects used in low-temperature or ambient-temperature applications, such as asset tagging, are equally important. Therefore, organic-based eddy current desorption methods may also be used for low-temperature to ambient-temperature applications. Various materials may be used in the manufacturing process of MTPs with improved signal distance, but are not limited to inorganic films, coatings, and adhesives, high-temperature hybrid organic-inorganic matrices and materials, and high-temperature organic insulating materials.

[0148]

[0181] MTP and biometric data

[0182] Some embodiments may involve the acquisition and integration of digital data from microtransponders, which are specific to tangible property, in order to form a digital linkage with (a) an individual's biometric data and / or (b) that individual's personal metadata. Such embodiments may include, for example, a computing device that includes an interface for interacting with a unique package of digital information on a tangible article that permanently and immortally links that information to the biometric data of its owner at the point of issuance.

[0149]

[0183] While some examples in this specification discuss cases where ownership of an object is linked to a single owner, embodiments may support options for multiple owners, custodians, temporary owners, temporary custodians, etc., in a state where ownership transfer is possible. Digital linkage may be performed at the time and point of issuance or collection of tangible property. In other embodiments, digital linkage may be performed separately from the issuance or collection of tangible property and linked retrospectively when an authorized individual or entity exists. These embodiments may also provide subsequent verification and authentication of ownership of tangible property to an individual, performed in conjunction with or independently of the point of issuance or collection. In some embodiments, the digital identity of the tangible property and the biometric and / or metadata of the individual may together be used as queries against a database of verified linkages between the digital identity, biometric and / or metadata. By querying the database with the combined digital identity and biometric and / or metadata, results may be returned that allow for clear verification of ownership of tangible property to an individual. In some other embodiments, such authentication may be performed remotely. Some embodiments of the present invention would be such linkages that are carried out only once in an individual's lifetime. In other preferred embodiments, the present invention enables the transfer of ownership and legal status of tangible property by a duly authorized individual or entity to a new authorized owner of tangible property.

[0150]

[0184] MTPs and optically triggered optical microtransponders (OMTPs), which wirelessly transmit unique and enduring digital identities, can be used to link tangible property to individuals, with such linkage information being transferred and stored within a remote digital trust center. Their small size, ease of detection, durability, and robust authentication systems make MTPs and OMTPs useful for mounting on any physical property. Furthermore, their low manufacturing cost constitutes their benefits, allowing them to be easily scaled and mounted, embedded, or associated with any tangible property article. They are extremely durable and can even be placed in vivo, as described in U.S. Patent No. 7,098,394. OMTPs can provide output signals as RF or as optical (see, for example, U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018 / 0091224). Such OMTPs are commercially available as p-Chip® transponders from PharmaSeq, Inc. in Monmouth Junction, New Jersey.

[0151]

[0185] Digital identities, including their association with an individual's biometrics and / or metadata, can be securely stored in a trust center. Verification of digital identities can be performed by accessing the trust center. Access to the trust center can be performed as often as needed, or simultaneously, from multiple locations such as commercial establishments, document-issuing public institutions, and government checkpoints, using multiple computing devices, including cellular phones, laptop computers, and tablet computers, equipped with software interfaces or applications.

[0152]

[0186] In other embodiments, an individual's digital identity may be associated with a physical object, such as a material possession, thereby clearly identifying the owner of the possession. When such possession is sold, the trust center can be updated so that the identity of the new owner is linked to the possession, thereby creating an immortal traceability and transfer of ownership.

[0153]

[0187] Another embodiment of the present invention for confirming the presence of individuals in a timely manner at events such as sports events and conferences.

[0154]

[0188] Optically triggered transponders (MTPs) and methods that may be used in conjunction with a biometric association system are described in detail above. To associate biometric data with an article, biometric data may be collected and a digital identity may be created. Ownership of the article may then be assigned to the given digital identity. An exemplary embodiment for creating a digital identity is described with reference to Figure 18.

[0155]

[0189] Figure 18 shows an exemplary digital identity creation process 1800 according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. Process 1800 provides an exemplary method for creating digital identities for use with the MTP described herein. In some embodiments, some or all digital identities may be formed using process 1800 or a modified form thereof, while in other embodiments, digital identities may be procured or created by other means.

[0156]

[0190] Under 1802, a user may initiate the process by accessing a web-based application that is specific to a company or authorized entity requiring the establishment of an account. The application may enable the user to create an account, fill in the required personal data, and store that information within a trust center. The entire process can be carried out by an individual from anywhere with an internet connection and may be provided, for example, by a combination of hardware, software, firmware, and / or network elements known to those skilled in the art.

[0157]

[0191] Alternative data import processes may include having individuals register in front of or at a kiosk-like device owned and secured by a trusted public entity, such as a government agency, bank, or retail store.

[0158]

[0192] In 1804, the system may accept scanned or submitted images of at least one government-issued authentication card, such as a driver's license or passport, to create an account in 1806. Security against fraud is a function of the type of government-issued authentication card that may be required by the system. The images may be stored within the Trust Center. The data from the government may be used to write to the relevant personal data fields for that account. Known technologies such as optical character recognition (OCR) may be used to convert the information gathered from scanning government-issued authentication cards into text. In 1808, purpose-specific software may transport the text information to the correct personal information fields within the Trust Center.

[0159]

[0193] In some embodiments, the individual submitting the document may (if desired) verify that they are the person actually represented in the document against anyone who has stolen or found the document. For example, Daon does this during the verification process by live checking of facial movements, etc., to ensure that the user is the person in question and that it is not a photograph or other simulation / representation of the person making the submission. Similar steps can be implemented in some embodiments of the methods described herein. These and / or other KYC (know your customer) protocols may be implemented to add a layer of security to the process.

[0160]

[0194] In version 1810, the system may receive user-filled fields that contain the user's own personal information but are not written by government data. In version 1812, this data may be merged with previous entries to form a composite personal data record within the Trust Center.

[0161]

[0195] In 1814, the application may allow individuals to record one or more biometric data using their mobile devices. These mobile devices may transmit data such as fingerprints, retinal scans, speech, and gait (movement) patterns. Users may register one or more of their mobile devices that they wish to use to input personal biometric data in this step. Registering personal devices within the Trust Center as authorized access devices may be required in 1816 if a user wishes to use their personal hardware to access the Trust Center or to submit biometric information as challenge-response verification at a point of sale. In 1818, personal biometric data may be stored separately within the Trust Center but linked to a composite personal data record, thereby forming a complete digital identity of the individual within the Trust Center.

[0162]

[0196] The definition of a complete digital identity can vary depending on the entity and the required level of security. For example, a low-level security digital identity might have minimal personal data in an application, such as address, email, and status (premier, gold, platinum). This information could be entered by the user in 1810. A low-level security digital identity might also have information from a government-issued credit certificate 1804, and minimal single personal biometric information such as a fingerprint, facial, or retinal scan entered in 1814.

[0163]

[0197] Higher levels of security digital identity can utilize multiple government-issued documents that are more difficult to duplicate, such as passports, driver's licenses, and birth certificates or marriage licenses, in 1804. Dividing multiple government-issued documents into a triangle makes it more difficult for criminals to establish a false identity. The amount of personal information entered by individuals in 1810 can also increase. Software and a trust center within the application can be used to cross-check scanned data received in 1804 using user input data received in 1810. The amount of biometric data required for high-security digital identity can also increase. Using multi-layered biometric information for challenge-response verification can make it particularly difficult for anyone other than the actual user to successfully demonstrate that they match the digital identity in the trust center. One example of such a system may store five distinct biometric inputs: fingerprints, voice recordings, facial scans, retinal scans, and simple mechanical movements such as walking. For verification, the user would choose three of the five stored biometric challenges and perform them in front of a camera or video input device. Tolerances for physical matching for each of the biometric examples above may already exist and may be adapted for use herein. Comparisons of input images and / or videos may be compared against archived data within the Trust Center. To establish trust, all three challenges must meet the current tolerances within the Trust Center.

[0164]

[0198] In 1820, digital identities can be archived within a system that can be web-based, cloud-based, or distributed ledger-based. In 1822, each time a digital identity is accessed, a time / date stamp and the IP address associated with that stamp can be recorded.

[0165]

[0199] Once a digital identity is established, ownership may be assigned, as shown in Figure 19. Figure 19 illustrates an exemplary ownership assignment process 1900 according to some embodiments of the present disclosure.

[0166]

[0200] In 1902, the user opens a software application to begin a session. The user may be asked to verify themselves by recording one or more distinct biometric data points on their mobile device, at a kiosk, or in front of an audiovisual capture environment from a trusted public institution. The user's on-site biometric information may be compared at the trust center with the information received through process 1800 described above.

[0167]

[0201] In 1904, the user acquires a marked physical object (e.g., by an MTP such as a p-Chip). The MTP may assign a unique serial identification number to each item it is attached to.

[0168]

[0202] In 1906, physical objects can be scanned with an MTP (e.g., p-Chip) reader. The reader may be a separate device or integrated into the point of sale. Examples may include tickets, badges, wristbands, and cards. The reader may have a unique serial number and may be registered as an authorized reader in a trust center. As a trusted device, it may be hardwired to the entity and directly connected to a trust center. Data output format and routing may be managed by purpose-specific software to accurately and automatically share information with the trust center. Authorized users or trusted public authorities may operate the reader but cannot control or modify the acquired data. The reader may be configured to interact with enterprise data systems, as well as related trust centers housing personal digital identities.

[0169]

[0203] After scanning, in 1908, metadata about the object, such as the date of manufacture and place of origin, stored in the business data system, can be accessed, and in 1910, current transaction data about the user's purchase of the physical object can be accessed. In 1912, the data accessed in 1908 and 1910 can be linked to the individual's personal digital identity in the trust center. p-Chip enables the immediate linking of heterogeneous datasets that remain, and should remain, isolated before purchase.

[0170]

[0204] In 1914, a digital record of a purchase / transaction may be created for that individual within the Trust Center, and a copy of the digital record may be stored within the sales entity's warranty and service data system. In some embodiments, the digital record may include and / or replace a digital warranty for the purchase / transaction. If warranty services for the purchase / transaction are required in the future, the information in the warranty and service data system may be retrieved and used as a basis for determining eligibility for warranty services, without the additional requirement, in some embodiments, that the user has taken the additional step of explicitly registering for the warranty.

[0171]

[0205] In 1916, if desired, a physical certificate of legal qualification or proof of purchase could be printed.

[0172]

[0206] The methods and systems described above for linking biometric information to objects can be used in a variety of ways. For example, physical objects, including personal belongings such as handbags, paintings, and artifacts, can be tagged with OMTP and linked to the digital identity of their owner at the time of purchase. This would serve as proof of true ownership of the property and can be verified by using a reader with access to a trust center that is capable of reading the tagged OMTP.

[0173]

[0207] Tagged possessions that appear similar, identical, substantially identical, or identical to those described above, but are not tagged with an OMTP, may be identified as forgeries. Tagged possessions that appear similar, identical, substantially identical, or identical to those described above, but whose owner's digital identity obtained to read the OMTP and access the Trust Center is different from that of the person who has the right to possess them, may be considered stolen or misused.

[0174]

[0208] When the above-mentioned tagged possessions are sold or exchanged, linking to the new owner's digital identity may be carried out in the presence of an authorized public authority or individual. If an object tagged with MTP or OMTP is lost, stolen, or destroyed, the Trust Center may change the status of the said item to reflect the new status, prevent resale of the object, or, in the case of criminal activity, to prosecute individuals and corporations.

[0175]

[0209] As described above, an automated digital record can be created from the acquired information. This record can serve as a de facto purchase record of the item for the owner and guarantor. In some cases, the automated digital record may include, or replace, an automated digital warranty. Where applicable, warranty terms, obligations, and disclaimers may be recorded in one place for immediate mobile access by the owner.

[0176]

[0210] The system described above has the ability to maintain a virtually unlimited amount of purchase / ownership records for individuals or groups of individuals who create the necessary digital identities within the system, regardless of brand, purchase date, or place of purchase. The system can function as a virtual closet or safe deposit box for legal credentials and can be made interoperable across multiple trust center platforms.

[0177]

[0211] Portable connected device with MTP reader

[0212] Secure markings are used commercially on a regular basis and may be affixed to the surface of a physical object, placed within or on it. Examples of such markings may include QR codes, holograms, or RFID tags. Also relevant are tamper-evident shrink wrap for bottles (affixed to the bottle cap), secure inlays placed inside an object (as disclosed above), or holographic stickers affixed to the edges of packaging. Furthermore, secure markings may be designed for single use so that the marking becomes invalid, neutralized, or destroyed after a single authentication.

[0178]

[0213] Authenticating security markings solely through visual inspection is a slow and time-consuming process. Furthermore, detecting evidence of tampering becomes a difficult challenge when a new, similar security marking is placed in the same location as a tampered security marking. In some cases, it may be impossible to find evidence of tampering, even if the security marking is present.

[0179]

[0214] Physical unclonable functions (PUFs) have been identified as a solution to such problems. A physical unclonable function is a physical object embodied in a physical structure that is easy to assess for authenticity but impossible to replicate, even with access to the PUF. A key element of a PUF is the use of a naturally occurring, randomly occurring feature or property that can be used as a unique and distinctive feature of individual objects that are otherwise very similar. An overview and examples of PUFs can be found in the review article Gao, Y., Al-Sarawi, SF & Abbott, D. Physical unclonable functions. Nature Electronics 3, 81-91 (2020). https: / / doi.org / 10.1038 / s41928-020-0372-5, and on the website https: / / en.wikipedia.org / wiki / Physical_unclonable_function (accessed August 29, 2020), as well as in the references cited herein.

[0180]

[0215] To evaluate PUF (Pulse-Based Fact), a so-called challenge-response authentication method is used. The "challenge" is the physical stimulus applied to the PUF, and the "response" is the reaction to the stimulus. A particular challenge and its corresponding response together form a so-called "challenge-response pair."

[0181]

[0216] In practical applications, a PUF may be interrogated in some form, referred to as a challenge. The PUF has a response to an interrogation that clearly exposes, identifies, or substantiates a unique random feature. The unique random feature (also called the "response") is collected by a corresponding device referred to as the "reader." The reader compares the response to a digital reference, either by itself or in conjunction with a computing device. If the PUF's response matches the digital reference, the challenge is successful. If the PUF's response differs from the digital reference, the challenge may fail. In this inconsistency, the PUF and / or the corresponding physical object to which it is attached are considered to be forged or counterfeit.

[0182]

[0217] The identification of the PUF is performed by a reader, such as reader 102 described above. The reader is an optical sensor system that emits a light beam ("challenge") and receives data from the PUF ("response"). The response may be in the form of a radio frequency (RF) signal so that the process can be "optical input-RF output", or the response may be in the form of a light beam so that the process can be "optical input-optical output".

[0183]

[0218] The process of reading a PUF is as follows: Light from the reader is used by the PUF to power its circuit, the circuit responds with an RF burst or a second beam of light containing encoded data, and the data is sent back to the reader. The reader collects this response and decodes it for information from the PUF. Therefore, the reader is crucial for forming the challenge-response pair. The reader can emit light (challenge) at one or more frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum and capture the response from the PUF at one or more frequencies in the electromagnetic spectrum.

[0184]

[0219] The reader may be connected to the computing device via cable or wireless technology. Furthermore, such a reader may be able to read multiple PUFs simultaneously. In such cases, responses from multiple PUFs are decoded separately to prevent confusion. The process of decoding responses from PUFs may be performed simultaneously or sequentially. The process of matching the decoded information with the record may be performed in real time or after a certain period, either directly from the reader or together with another computing device.

[0185]

[0220] Mobile communication devices such as cellular phones, smartphones, tablets, handheld minicomputers, and computing devices have become ubiquitous and can be easily networked with other devices via local area networks (LANs), wide area networks, and / or the internet. Such connections are achieved by wired cables or wireless techniques. Examples of standards and protocols for such wireless connections include, but are not limited to, Wi-Fi, Bluetooth®, Global Standards for Mobile Communications (GSM®), Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Long-Term Evolution (LTE®), WiMAX, and multi-generational technical standards for cellular communications (4G, 5G, etc.).

[0186]

[0221] A system for optical identification of MTPs using a sensor system was previously disclosed in U.S. Patent Application Publication No. 2018 / 0091224A1, which is incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. Such a sensor system can be incorporated within a mobile wireless communication so that a standalone device can scan and authenticate an MTP by communicating with an external trust center. Such sensors may be integrated within the flash and camera of a mobile communication device. For example, Figure 20 shows a block diagram of a portable device 2000 with an MTP reader system 102 integrated and / or connected thereto, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. The features and functions of the MTP reader system 102 are the same as those described above with reference to Figure 1, and the same reference numerals are used in Figure 20.

[0187]

[0222] In Figure 20, the portable device 2000 (e.g., the mobile communication device described above) includes an MTP reader system 120. In some embodiments, the MTP reader system 120 can utilize the built-in capabilities of the portable device 2000 (e.g., using standard sensors, optical emitters, and hardware / software elements of the portable device 2000). The mobile communication device can have a reader embedded to interrogate the MTP. Alternatively, such a reader can be attached to the mobile communication device through a port in the device or via a connecting cable. Furthermore, such a reader can be integrated into the casing, shell, or superstructure of the mobile communication device so that the reader is available when the mobile communication device is placed in a casing. In some embodiments, the capabilities of the reader can be integrated into the existing hardware infrastructure of the mobile communication device. This example, however, includes a flash on the mobile communication device acting as an optical beam source for interrogation. In other examples, the camera of the mobile communication device can act as a receiver of the optical beam from the MTP (response). These examples together can constitute a challenge-response pair.

[0188]

[0223] In other embodiments, as described above, the MTP reader system 120 may be communicatively coupled to the portable device 2000 (for example, by wire or wirelessly) and therefore may include some or all of the hardware and software used to provide MTP interrogation functionality.

[0189]

[0224] To enhance the security of tagged objects, multiple MTPs can be placed on, within, or attached to the object. MTPs can be positioned at different locations on or within the object's surface. In some embodiments, MTPs can be positioned so that they are camouflaged around packaging or a physical object. In other examples, MTPs may be embedded within the structure of a physical object, such as a thermoplastic container or a 3D printed object. This can be achieved by inserting the MTP into the mold of a thermoplastic container during blow molding, injection molding, or during the curing process of a 3D printed object. The latter can be achieved in several ways. In one embodiment, the MTP can be placed on the surface of a platform where 3D printing is performed so that the MTP is incorporated into the surface of the 3D printed object. In other embodiments, the MTP can be placed on a newly printed layer of a multilayer 3D print, before printing a new layer on top of the MTP, so that the MTP is sandwiched between layers. When doing so, care may be taken to ensure that the orientation of the MTP is desirable for the selected function. In yet another embodiment, MTP may be added as one of the components of a multi-component thermosetting 3D printing process.

[0190]

[0225] "Identification" occurs when the leader and MTP participate in the challenge-response sequence and the data from the MTP is correctly registered. Authentication occurs when the data from the MTP matches the records in the trust center. Authentication may also occur when the data received from the MTP does not necessarily perfectly match the records, but the data is within a given set of parameters and is considered acceptable.

[0191]

[0226] Including multiple security markings in combination with the MTP can further deter counterfeiting. Examples of such security markings include QR codes, barcodes, holograms, and RFID tags. One or more of the tags may be placed next to the MTP or at different locations on the object relative to the MTP. Alternatively, security tags can be stacked on top of each other to form a composite security marking.

[0192]

[0227] MTP-protected integrated circuits

[0228] Counterfeit electronics, particularly counterfeit integrated circuits, pose a widespread problem across various industries. In addition to failures due to poor build quality, counterfeit circuits often become nodes for introducing malware, spyware, or other malicious software into devices, resulting in damage, loss of functionality, or communication leaks. Detecting counterfeit circuits is a challenging task due to their small size, their placement (often inside devices), and the lack of a universal method for verifying the authenticity of various circuit components.

[0193]

[0229] Some techniques for certifying integrated circuits involve subjecting a test circuit to various diagnostic tests (for example, measuring impedance, resistance, temperature, or other parameters of the circuit in a controlled test environment) and comparing the results against a known genuine circuit or against the results of previous tests on the same circuit, requiring controlled conditions and skilled testers.

[0194]

[0230] Other techniques may include injecting high-energy ions such as boron or phosphorus into integrated circuits to introduce intentionally unique, random defect regions into the circuit. These defect regions may be uniquely characterized by electrical or optical means and can act as physical anti-replica features (PUFs) for authentication based on a catalog of such defects. This technique alters the manufacturing process and has the problem of lacking the persistence or durability of the random features, thus failing to enable the cataloging of previously manufactured genuine integrated circuits ("backward authentication") to allow for harmonized implementation across devices.

[0195]

[0231] To address these and / or other issues, memory-enabled MTPs, such as those mentioned above, can be fused onto the surface of integrated circuits. Their small size, ease of detection, low manufacturing cost, and robust authentication system make MTPs particularly advantageous for deployment at scale. MTPs can be "read" using a reader to retrieve them from memory, which allows for authentication of both the MTP and the underlying integrated circuit. The "reading" of the MTP can be done while the integrated circuit remains in its original state within the device and / or while the integrated circuit is functioning. Furthermore, this technique eliminates the need for modifications to existing manufacturing setups for integrated circuits and the step of fusing the MTP to the circuit.

[0196]

[0232] The ability to quickly read, identify, and authenticate MTPs offers significant advantages when multiple objects need to be rapidly identified and authenticated. Non-exclusive examples include assembly lines, warehouses, retail stores, sorting facilities, and storage facilities.

[0197]

[0233] Reading MTP can be achieved by using a laser-enabled reader (e.g., a wand) connected via code to a computing device such as a laptop, desktop computer, mobile phone, tablet, or dedicated handheld reader, or wirelessly. The device may be able to compare the information collected by the reader with data stored on a computer or a trusted external location ("trust center").

[0198]

[0234] In some embodiments, multiple MTPs can be fused to different components of a circuit board. Authentication of the circuit as a whole can be linked to the authentication of multiple individual components on the circuit board. Furthermore, this provides an indestructible method for identifying whether a component has been switched between circuit boards.

[0199]

[0235] In some embodiments, a list of MTPs can be stored on a secure server ("trust center"). The reader compares the information recovered from the MTPs (i.e., from reading the MTPs) with the information retrieved from the trust center. If the two pieces of information are linked to a predetermined function, the read MTP is considered authentic. Access to the trust center can be encrypted, for example, via blockchain technology.

[0200]

[0236] In some embodiments, an integrated circuit, which is considered authentic to the user's satisfaction by any means known in the prior art, can be harmonized by fusing a suitable MTP into the circuit and listing the MTP to a trust center. Thus, the solutions described herein offer a unique opportunity to harmonize the generational sequence of integrated circuits and ensure safety.

[0201]

[0237] MTP can provide tamper-proof, permanent security marking for application in integrated circuits. Its small size (e.g., 600 μm × 600 μm × 100 μm), durability across a wide temperature range (e.g., -200°C to 500°C), ease of detection, and robust, permanent authentication make MTP easily usable as security marking for integrated circuits. Their low manufacturing cost constitutes their benefits and allows them to be easily scaled.

[0202]

[0238] Furthermore, since MTP does not communicate electronically with integrated circuits, it can be identified and authenticated independently of the nature of integrated circuits, enabling universal application. Therefore, MTP can be used for various devices or devices with multiple integrated circuits. An example of the former is during the manufacturing of laptop computer motherboards, where each motherboard can be sequentially connected with MTP. An example of the latter is complex electronic devices such as communication satellites, which dissipate thermal, electrical, and mechanical stress and are highly durable over many cycles of operation. There are numerous circuit boards, and various components of each circuit board can be "tagged".

[0203]

[0239] The MTP can be authenticated while a device containing an integrated circuit is in operation. This is particularly advantageous because it eliminates the need for a skilled technician to remove the integrated circuit or components from the device for testing. As a result, with the right reader, multiple circuits within a complex device can be read simultaneously, saving time and effort.

[0204]

[0240] MTPs can be used to tag various components, and since MTPs typically do not interfere with the function of the components, they can be used for various circuits within the same device or multiple devices. Furthermore, the unique small size of MTPs enables a permanent method for sequentially tagging components on individual integrated circuit chips or circuit boards. In doing so, it becomes possible to record details of each individual component via a trust center. Such details can include the manufacturing date, component performance metrics, and the placement of the component on the circuit board. Moreover, the chronological compilation of the stored information about each component can serve as a digital service record for the component. This information could potentially be used to authenticate warranty claims for a component.

[0205]

[0241] MTP can tag integrated circuits in several ways (also known as "fusion splicing"), and the choice of method may be appropriate to the application.

[0206]

[0242] In some cases, MTPs can be directly bonded to the surface of an integrated circuit using a suitable adhesive. Such an adhesive can help shield the MTP from thermal, electrical, or mechanical stress on the underlying integrated circuit, or alternatively, help dissipate thermal, electrical, or mechanical stress on the MTP. Furthermore, such an adhesive will not cause the MTP to separate under the standard operating conditions of the integrated circuit. Adhesives of such properties may contain a suitable thermal filler and may be thermally conductive and / or electrically conductive. In such a method, the MTP can be placed at various locations on the circuit or circuit board to allow easy access for future "reading" of the MTP. Moreover, this method allows integrated circuits and circuit boards that have been previously determined to be authentic by other techniques to be tagged with MTPs ("backward authentication").

[0207]

[0243] In some ways, MTPs can be incorporated within a casing covering an integrated circuit. In a practical illustration of this embodiment, the MTP can be bonded, fused, or cast into the casing covering the integrated circuit. The casing can be permeable to the incident response energy of the MTP. Such casings can be made from polymer materials such as epoxy, urethane, or acrylic resin. Another example of the same embodiment involves casing materials that are metal and other inorganic-based, and / or filled with them. A further example of the same embodiment involves incorporating MTPs between multiple layers of conformal coating covering an integrated circuit. Similarly, multiple MTPs can be incorporated while wrapping a circuit board. This method can be useful when "backward-certifying" a previously manufactured circuit or circuit board.

[0208]

[0244] In some methods, the MTP can be embedded on the surface of the polymer casing while the chip is being fabricated. The MTP is fused to the surface of the integrated circuit as the polymer cures. During this process, appropriate care may be taken to ensure that the orientation of the MTP is such that it can be read by a reader.

[0209]

[0245] In some methods, MTPs can be placed within recesses of a circuit board during the circuit board fabrication process. This allows for authentication of the entire circuit board against the integrated circuits on it. In a practical example of this method, multiple MTPs can be placed in different locations on the circuit so that the entire circuit board is considered authentic based on the authentication of a predetermined set of placed MTPs. The placement of each MTP can be recorded in a compendium (known as the "trust center"). Access to the trust center can be controlled and restricted to a selected set of access nodes.

[0210]

[0246] In some cases, MTPs may be attached to or laminated on labels attached to integrated circuits, electrical components, or assemblies.

[0211]

[0247] In some methods, the MTP may be incorporated into a case, a component of the case, or a structure in which safety is ensured by the additive manufacturing process. A practical embodiment of this method may include a case for an integrated chip that is printed together with the placement of the MTP within an additively printed matrix. Once the matrix hardens, the MTP is fused into the casing. Care may be taken to ensure that the MTP is positioned in the correct orientation.

[0212]

[0248] Figure 21 shows a device 2100 tagged with MTP according to several embodiments of the present disclosure. Device 2100 includes several circuit boards 2110, 2120, 2130 and their elements to demonstrate various ways in which MTP can be used for tagging. Some devices 2100 may be tagged exactly as shown in the figure, but it should be understood that other devices may have other configurations and / or may be tagged using a subset or various combinations of the MTP tagging techniques described herein.

[0213]

[0249] The following example is illustrated in Figure 21 with respect to the following structure. Device 2100 includes a circuit board 1 2110 having two integrated circuits (ICs). IC1 2112 is untagged in this example to show contrast with IC2 2114, which is tagged with MTP M1. Device 2100 also includes a circuit board 2 2120 equipped with an optical module 2122 and a chipset 2124. The chipset 2124 includes IC3 2126 and IC4 2128. The optical module 2122 is tagged with MTP M2, IC3 2126 is tagged with MTP M3, IC4 2128 is tagged with MTP M4, the chipset 2124 is tagged with MTP M5, and the circuit board 2 2120 is tagged with MTP M6. Device 2100 also includes a circuit board 3 2130 equipped with a controller 2132, a CPU 2134, and a memory 2136. The controller 2132 is tagged with MTP M7, the CPU 2134 is tagged with MTP M8, the memory 2136 is tagged with MTP M9, and the circuit board 3 2130 is tagged with MTP M10. Device 2100 itself is tagged with MTP M11.

[0214]

[0250] In the first example, the memory-enabled MTP is fused onto the surface of a genuine integrated circuit chip using adhesive at the manufacturing site. At this point, the chip is considered "tagged." The fabricated chip is used by a device manufacturer to integrate it into a printed circuit board to manufacture selected devices, such as a transistor radio. The device manufacturer lists the MTP and the underlying integrated circuit to a trust center. IC2 2114 is certified by M1 throughout the life of the electronic device 2100 and circuit board 1 2110.

[0215]

[0251] Later, inspectors who wish to verify the authenticity of the chip can use an MTP reader to scan the surface of the circuit board. As the reader passes over the tagged integrated circuit IC2 2114, the information stored in the memory of the MTP M1 is released and received by the reader. The information received from the MTP is compared with information retrieved from the trust center. If a match is found, the chip is considered authentic.

[0216]

[0252] In the second example, assume that IC1 2112 was tagged with an MTP at the factory and later replaced with an untagged counterfeit device that does not have an MTP tag as shown in the figure. Similar to the first exemplary embodiment, an inspector scans the surface of circuit board 1 2110 for the counterfeit device. When the reader passes over integrated circuit IC1 2112, the reader receives no information. Therefore, the current device occupying the position of IC1 2112 is considered to be counterfeit.

[0217]

[0253] In the third example, as in the first example, the inspector scans the surface of circuit board 2 2120 for a counterfeit device. As the reader passes over integrated circuit IC4 2128, the information stored in the memory of MTP M4 is released and received by the reader. When the information received from M4 is compared with the information retrieved from the trust center, an inconsistency is found. Therefore, the chip occupying the location of IC4 2128 is considered counterfeit. The data in the trust center can be updated to reflect that the components associated with the MTP are considered counterfeit or otherwise tampered with.

[0218]

[0254] In the fourth example, during the manufacturing of an electronic device, multiple components of the circuit board are tagged using memory-enabled MTPs. The manufacturer lists the device, components, and tagged MTPs in a trust center. Using Figure 21 as an example, the trust center record for electronic device 2100 would include 11 MTPs, each with a unique serial identification number. The relationship between each MTP and the individual circuit boards 2110, 2120, 2130 and electronic device 2100 can be documented in the trust center record. Such devices can be deployed in service. The authentication process and workflow for digital components may proceed as follows: When an inspector scans the individual circuit boards of device 2100, the information stored in the memory of each MTP is received. This information is compared against the information retrieved from the trust center. If there is a perfect match, device 2100 is considered authentic.

[0219]

[0255] In the fifth example, if the inspector scans the surface of any circuit board but does not receive information from the MTP as described in the fourth example, the device 2100 is determined to be counterfeit or serviced with non-genuine replacement parts.

[0220]

[0256] In the sixth example, as described in the fourth example, an inspector scans the surface of a circuit board for counterfeit devices. As the reader passes over the circuit board, information stored in the memory of various MTPs is released and received by the reader. When the information received from the set of MTPs is compared with the information retrieved from the trust center, inconsistencies are found between the sets of information. Therefore, some components are considered to be counterfeit or have been deliberately scrambled across other circuit boards. The data in the trust center can be updated to reflect the finding that components associated with an MTP are considered to be counterfeit or otherwise tampered with.

[0221]

[0257] In the seventh example, when an authorized user repairs / makes modifications to a circuit board with a memory-enabled MTP as described in the fourth example, the user updates the Trust Center with information about the new set of MTPs. This enables proper authentication in the future. For example, if a service technician updates memory module 2136 with a factory-authorized parts memory module containing a new MTP (M9b), the record will show the time and date of the service, the serial identification number of the new memory module contained in M9b, and all relevant data about the new memory module. The actions of the previous memory module 2136 will be updated as a separate record in the Trust Center using (M9). All historical information linking memory module 2136 to circuit board 3 2130 and electronic device 2100 will be maintained in the Trust Center. The current record for the previous memory module 2136 will indicate that it is no longer part of circuit board 3 2130 and electronic device 2100.

[0222]

[0258] In the eighth example, all service activities for MTP-tagged hardware, whether electronic or not, are logged and archived as digital service records detailing the services performed, along with the origin, performance capabilities, and diagnostic results of the hardware as a unit and each component of the hardware. The digital service records are permanently linked to the hardware identification number shown in the last entry in the Trust Center records for the electronic device 2100 and are transferred along with ownership.

[0223]

[0259] In Example 9, the insurance agent uses the digital service records described in Example 8 to determine the service / maintenance of components tagged with MTP. The insurance agent may then use this information to determine a warranty claim.

[0224]

[0260] Display surface with embedded secure tag

[0261] The term "display" as used herein refers to an electronic device capable of visually representing information or patterns. Such displays may function through the transmission, reflection, or transfection of light. Common examples of displays include the screens of laptops, smartphones, or tablet computers, televisions, and digital signboards.

[0225]

[0262] The display may optionally interact with the user or its external environment, such as by accepting input or responding to stimuli. Input may take the form of touch, sound, vibration, gesture, incident light, or electrical signals. Responding to the environment may include dimming the display in response to incident light (photochromism), adaptive hue, etc.

[0226]

[0263] A display capable of accepting haptic input is generally referred to as a “touchscreen.” Touchscreens are often transparent, but can also be semi-transparent or even opaque. Touchscreen displays can be found on a variety of devices, including smartphones, laptops, or tablet computers, “smart” appliances such as refrigerators and ovens, and in automobiles, ships, and aircraft. Touchscreens are widely deployed as human-machine interfaces (HMIs) for industrial process control applications. Optionally, such devices may be interconnected with each other via the “Internet of Things.” The touchscreens described herein are not limited to flat surfaces, but can also be curved, bent, or capable of being repeatedly bent / flexed to various angles.

[0227]

[0264] Displays are often constructed by stacking multiple individual layers of materials, each having a specific function. The most common structure of such a display includes a liquid crystal display layer, an optional polarizing layer, a sensing layer, one or more optional optically transparent adhesive layers, and a protective layer. The touchscreens described herein may function via resistive or capacitive techniques.

[0228]

[0265] While not limited to this, displays such as touchscreens are often replaced due to structural damage or loss of functionality. In some cases, counterfeit screens or replacements not authorized by the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) are used. Such screens can result in a poor user experience for the device, shorten the product's lifespan, damage the product, or void the product's warranty.

[0229]

[0266] As generally discussed above, MTPs and optically triggered optical microtransponders (OMTPs) wirelessly transmit unique, enduring digital identities that can be used to link tangible objects (such as displays) to personal or unique device identifiers, and such linkage information is transferred and stored within a remote digital trust center. Their low manufacturing cost constitutes their benefits, allowing them to be easily scaled and attached to, embedded in, or associated with any tangible property item. Furthermore, the small size of MTPs makes them unparalleled suitable for inclusion in or on displays. Such inclusion can be carried out in or on displays at different locations within or on the display through a variety of methods.

[0230]

[0267] For example, in some embodiments, one or more MTPs may be attached to the display at one or more surface locations. Figure 22 shows an example of an MTP 2202 attached to a display surface 2200 according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. In this example, the MTP is an OMTP 2202 (e.g., OMTP 1A, OMTP 1B, and OMTP 1C) and is attached to the transparent and / or touchscreen 2200 (e.g., transparent / touchscreen 1A, transparent / touchscreen 1B, and transparent / touchscreen 1C) by a non-deformable attachment. The attachment may be in various locations, as shown in the side and top views of the transparent / touchscreen 2200 example. The attachment may be any method or system that maintains engagement between the transparent / touchscreen 2200 and the OMTP 2202 even when the transparent / touchscreen 2200 is bent (e.g., by being touched by a user), i.e., a non-deformable attachment.

[0231]

[0268] In some embodiments, one or more MTPs may be embedded within a display. For example, many displays are constructed from multiple structural and / or functional layers, and MTPs can be placed between these layers. Figure 23 shows an example of an interlayer lamination of a display 2200 including an MTP 2202, according to some embodiments of the present disclosure. In this example, the interlayer lamination 2300 is located between the transparent / touchscreen 2A layer 2302 and the transparent / laminate 2B layer 2304. The MTP 2202 (specifically, OMTP2 in this example) is located within the interlayer lamination 2300 and is therefore located between the transparent / touchscreen 2A layer 2302 and the transparent / laminate 2B layer 2304.

[0232]

[0269] In conclusion

[0270] The preceding description presents several products or technologies that may be used in combination with the disclosed MTP. Various elements, devices, modules, and circuits are described above in relation to their respective functions. These elements, devices, modules, and circuits are considered means for carrying out their respective functions as described herein.

[0233]

[0271] While the foregoing describes embodiments of the present invention, other further embodiments of the present invention can be devised without departing from its basic scope, and the scope thereof is determined by the following claims.

[0234]

[0272] Publications and references cited herein, including but not limited to patents and patent applications, are incorporated herein by reference in their entirety in the entirety in the entirety they are cited, as if each individual publication or reference were specifically indicated to be incorporated herein by reference in its entirety. The patent applications for which this application claims priority are also incorporated herein by reference as described above with respect to publications and references.

[0235]

[0273] While several embodiments have been discussed above, other implementations and applications are also within the scope of the following claims. Although the present invention is described herein with reference to specific embodiments, it should be understood that these embodiments are merely illustrative of the principles and applications of the present invention. Therefore, it should be understood that numerous modifications can be made to the exemplary embodiments, and other configurations can be devised without departing from the spirit and scope of the invention as defined by the following claims. More specifically, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that any embodiment described herein may advantageously have the subordinate features of another embodiment, as described as having those subordinate features.

Claims

1. A method for ensuring the safety of an object, Embedding one or more microtransponders (MTPs) within one tagant, multiple tagants, packaging, or an object, or a combination thereof, wherein each of the one or more MTPs is configured to have its own identifier. Receiving biometric information of an individual associated with the object through at least one biometric input device, Indexing the respective identifiers and biometric information of the MTPs to the object, The MTP, the biometric information, and the indexing information associated with the object are stored in the database of the digital security system. Reading each of the aforementioned identifiers via an identifier reader, Receiving biometric information input later via at least one biometric input device, A method comprising checking the indexing information based on reading the identifier and the biometric information entered later, in order to determine whether each of the identifiers and the biometric information entered later are both associated with the object.

2. Each MTP is, One or more photocells configured to receive light during the reading period of the identifier, A circuit configured to generate a response to the light received by the one or more photocells, A transmitter configured to transmit the aforementioned response, thereby enabling the reading of the aforementioned identifier, and The method according to claim 1, comprising:

3. The reading of the aforementioned identifier is: The identifier reader transmits the optical signal to one or more MTPs, The method according to claim 1, further comprising receiving and decoding each signal sent from one or more MTPs.

4. The method according to claim 1, further comprising determining whether each of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object, and displaying an authentic message on the identifier reader in response to determining that each of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object.

5. The method according to claim 1, further comprising determining whether each of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are both associated with the object, and displaying a non-authentic message on the identifier reader in response to determining that at least one of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information is not associated with the object.

6. Receiving the aforementioned biometric information and receiving the subsequently entered biometric information are at least one of the following: To receive a unique security code, To receive input of a unique screen pattern, Reading fingerprints, Receiving a document, Perform optical character recognition on the aforementioned document. Perform facial recognition, Perform speech recognition. Performing physical movements, Perform a retinal scan, or those combinations The method according to claim 1, comprising at least one of the following.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein storing the indexing information comprises applying at least one cryptographic algorithm to the indexing information.

8. The method according to claim 7, wherein verifying the indexing information comprises decrypting at least a portion of the indexing information.

9. The at least one biometric input device receives updated biometric information of the individual associated with the object, Indexing the updated biometric information to the object, Updating the MTP, the biometric information, and the indexing information associated with and stored in the database of the digital security system to include the updated biometric information. The method according to claim 1, further comprising:

10. The object that stores the biometric information includes an additional MTP, The method according to claim 1, wherein receiving the biometric information includes reading data from the additional MTP via the identifier reader.

11. A system for ensuring the safety of objects, A biometric input device configured to receive biometric information of an individual associated with an object, At least one identifier reader configured to read the identifier of one or more microtransponders (MTPs) embedded in one tagant, multiple tagants, packaging, or the object, or a combination thereof, The system comprises at least one biometric input device and at least one processor that communicates with the at least one identifier reader, The system includes at least one non-temporary memory that communicates with the processor and stores instructions, and when an instruction is executed by the at least one processor, the system provides the at least one processor with: Indexing the respective identifiers and biometric information of the MTPs to the object, The MTP, the biometric information, and the indexing information associated with the object are stored in the database of the digital security system. Reading each of the aforementioned identifiers via the aforementioned identifier reader, Receiving biometric information input later via at least one biometric input device, In order to determine whether each of the aforementioned identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are both associated with the object, the indexing information is checked based on the reading of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information. A system that performs a process that includes the following features.

12. Each MTP is, One or more photocells configured to receive light during the reading period of the identifier, A circuit configured to generate a response to the light received by the one or more photocells, A transmitter configured to transmit the aforementioned response, thereby enabling the aforementioned reading, The system according to claim 11, comprising:

13. The reading of the aforementioned identifier is: The identifier reader transmits the optical signal to one or more MTPs, The system according to claim 11, further comprising receiving and decoding each signal sent from one or more MTPs.

14. The system according to claim 11, further comprising determining whether each of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object, and displaying an authentic message on the identifier reader in response to determining that each of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are associated with the object.

15. The system according to claim 11, further comprising determining whether each of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information are both associated with the object, and displaying a non-authentic message on the identifier reader in response to determining that at least one of the identifiers and the subsequently entered biometric information is not associated with the object.

16. The at least one biometric input device comprises at least one of a user interface, scanner, camera, fingerprint reader, microphone, or a combination thereof. Receiving the aforementioned biometric information and receiving the subsequently entered biometric information are at least one of the following: To receive a unique security code, To receive input of a unique screen pattern, Reading fingerprints, Receiving a document, Perform optical character recognition on the aforementioned document. Perform facial recognition, Perform speech recognition. Performing physical movements, Perform a retinal scan, or those combinations The system according to claim 11, comprising at least one of the following.

17. The system according to claim 11, wherein storing the indexing information comprises applying at least one cryptographic algorithm to the indexing information.

18. The system according to claim 17, wherein verifying the indexing information comprises decrypting at least a portion of the indexing information.

19. The aforementioned process is, The at least one biometric input device receives updated biometric information of the individual associated with the object, Indexing the updated biometric information to the object, Updating the MTP, the biometric information, and the indexing information associated with and stored in the database of the digital security system to include the updated biometric information. The system according to claim 11, further comprising:

20. The object that stores the biometric information includes an additional MTP, The system according to claim 11, wherein receiving the biometric information includes reading data from the additional MTP via the identifier reader.

21. General-purpose lighting devices and A general-purpose camera, General-purpose transceiver, A processor that communicates with the general-purpose lighting device, the general-purpose camera, and the general-purpose transceiver, A non-temporary memory that communicates with the aforementioned processor and stores instructions The processor is provided with the following, and when the instruction is executed by the processor, the processor To generate an optical transmission pattern configured to trigger a response by an optically triggered microtransponder (MTP), To illuminate the general-purpose lighting device according to the aforementioned light transmission pattern, After the illumination is performed, the general-purpose camera or the general-purpose transceiver receives a signal from the MTP, Decoding the signal from the MTP A smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device that performs the processing described above.

22. The system further includes a general-purpose display, and the processing described above is: The general-purpose transceiver transmits the decoded signal from the MTP to the trust center via the network, Receiving an indication of authenticity or non-authenticity from the Trust Center through the aforementioned network, The general-purpose display will display information based on the indication. A smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device according to claim 21, further comprising the above.

23. A lighting device, a receiver, and a peripheral device with a peripheral interface, A smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device comprising a general-purpose peripheral interface, a processor that communicates with the general-purpose peripheral interface, and non-temporary memory that communicates with the processor and stores instructions. Equipped with, When the aforementioned instruction is executed by the processor, the processor will: To facilitate communication between the peripheral device and the processor via the aforementioned peripheral interface and the aforementioned general-purpose peripheral interface, To generate an optical transmission pattern configured to trigger a response by an optically triggered microtransponder (MTP), To cause the lighting device to illuminate according to the aforementioned light transmission pattern, After the illumination, the receiver receives a signal from the MTP, Decoding the signal from the MTP A system that performs a process that includes the following features.

24. The aforementioned smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device further comprises a display and a transceiver. The aforementioned process is, The transceiver transmits the decoded signal from the MTP to the trust center via the network, Receiving an indication of authenticity or non-authenticity from the Trust Center through the aforementioned network, The system according to claim 23, further comprising displaying information based on the indication using the display.

25. The system according to claim 23, wherein the peripheral device is embodied as a case configured to at least partially house the smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device.

26. The system according to claim 23, wherein the peripheral interface and the general-purpose peripheral interface are wireless transceivers, and the communication comprises a signal transmitted wirelessly.

27. The system according to claim 23, wherein the receiver comprises at least one of an optical sensor and an RF receiver.

28. A smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device equipped with a general-purpose peripheral interface, A lighting device, a receiver, a peripheral interface, a processor that communicates with the lighting device, the receiver, and the peripheral interface, and a peripheral device that communicates with the processor and has non-temporary memory for storing instructions. Equipped with, When the aforementioned instruction is executed by the processor, the processor will: To facilitate communication between the peripheral device and the processor via the aforementioned peripheral interface and the aforementioned general-purpose peripheral interface, To generate an optical transmission pattern configured to trigger a response by an optically triggered microtransponder (MTP), To cause the lighting device to illuminate according to the aforementioned light transmission pattern, After the illumination, the receiver receives a signal from the MTP, Decoding the signal from the MTP A system that performs a process that includes the following features.

29. Equipped with a transceiver, The aforementioned smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device further comprises a display, The aforementioned process is, The transceiver transmits the decoded signal from the MTP to the trust center via the network, Receiving an indication of authenticity or non-authenticity from the Trust Center through the aforementioned network, To display information on the display based on the aforementioned indication. The system according to claim 28, further comprising:

30. The system according to claim 28, wherein the peripheral device is embodied as a case configured to at least partially house the smartphone, tablet, or portable computing device.

31. The system according to claim 28, wherein the peripheral interface and the general-purpose peripheral interface are wireless transceivers, and the communication comprises a signal transmitted wirelessly.

32. The system according to claim 28, wherein the receiver comprises at least one of an optical sensor and an RF receiver.

33. A method for protecting electronic devices, The invention relates to fabricating the aforementioned electronic device, wherein the fabrication involves attaching at least one electromagnetic radiation triggered microtransponder (MTP) to the electronic device, and the MTP is configured to include an identifier. Indexing the identifier of the MTP to the electronic device, The indexing information associated with the MTP and the electronic device is stored in the security system's database. A method for providing this.

34. The method according to claim 33, wherein the attachment of the MTP is carried out by adhesive, coating, lamination, deposition process, fusion process, or a combination thereof.

35. The method according to claim 33, wherein the mounting of the MTP is carried out by attaching the MTP to a casing or structure covering the electronic device.

36. The method according to claim 33, wherein the installation of the MTP is carried out by embedding the MTP in the electronic device.

37. The method according to claim 33, wherein the installation of the MTP comprises forming a cavity within the electronic device and arranging the MTP within the cavity.

38. Using an identifier reader that communicates with the security system, the MTP is read, In response to the aforementioned reading, a response is received from the MTP, where the response includes a response identifier. The response identifier is compared with the indexing information, The authenticity of the electronic device is determined based on the above comparison. The method according to claim 33, further comprising:

39. The method of claim 38, further comprising indicating the non-authenticity of the electronic device in response to the determination, and updating the indexing information associated with the electronic device to reflect the non-authenticity.

40. Repairing or updating the aforementioned electronic device, wherein the repair or updating includes replacing the MTP with a second MTP, or attaching the second MTP to the electronic device in addition to the MTP, the second MTP comprising a second identifier, Indexing the second identifier of the second MTP to the electronic device, The second MTP and the second indexing information associated with the electronic device are stored in the database of the security system. The method according to claim 33, further comprising:

41. The method according to claim 33, wherein the electronic device comprises a screen, and the mounting of the MTP is carried out in such a manner that the surface of the screen is not deformed by the mounting.

42. The method according to claim 33, wherein the electronic device includes a touchscreen, and the MTP is mounted in such a way that the mounting does not affect the touch detection function of the touchscreen.

43. The method according to claim 33, wherein the electronic device comprises a screen formed from a plurality of layers, and the mounting of the MTP is carried out by arranging the MTP between adjacent layers of the plurality of layers.

44. The method according to claim 33, wherein the electronic device comprises a screen formed of multiple layers, and the mounting of the MTP is carried out by placing the MTP in one of the multiple layers.

45. The method according to claim 33, further comprising attaching an additional security marking to the electronic device that is triggered in a manner different from the MTP.

46. The method according to claim 33, further comprising constituting the identifier, wherein the identifier is based on or linked to one or more unique identifiers of the electronic device.

47. A method for authenticating electronic devices, Reading electronic devices using an identifier reader that communicates with a security system, In response to reading the electronic device, a response is received from an electromagnetic radiation-triggered microtransponder (MTP) attached to the electronic device, wherein the response includes a response identifier. The response identifier is compared with the indexing information stored in the security system's database. The authenticity of the electronic device is determined based on the above comparison. A method for providing this.

48. The method according to claim 47, wherein determining authenticity comprises detecting a match between the response identifier and a stored identifier in the indexing information, and in response determining that the electronic device is authentic.

49. The method according to claim 47, wherein determining authenticity comprises detecting an inconsistency between the response identifier and the stored identifier in the indexing information, and in response determining that the electronic device is counterfeit.

50. The method according to claim 47, further comprising indicating the non-authenticity of the electronic device in response to the determination, and updating the indexing information associated with the electronic device to reflect the non-authenticity.

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