A decentralized blockchain-based digital identity wallet

A decentralized identity management system using hardware key generation and advanced cryptographic protocols addresses security and scalability issues, ensuring user sovereignty and regulatory compliance in digital identity management.

SA1020255030A1Pending Publication Date: 2026-10-05TAHANI MOHAMMED ALZUBAIDI
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Patent Information

Application Number
SA1020255030
Authority / Receiving Office
SA · SA
Patent Type
Applications
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2025-07-12
Publication Date
2026-10-05

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

Existing digital identity systems lack robust security, privacy, and scalability, failing to maintain user sovereignty and compliance with regulatory frameworks, especially in decentralized environments.

Method used

A decentralized identity management system utilizing hardware key generation, biometric authentication, Shamir Secret Sharing, blockchain consensus, and advanced cryptographic protocols like FIDO2, Zero Knowledge Proof, and multi-key custody to secure and manage digital identities, ensuring compliance and user control.

Benefits of technology

Provides secure, scalable, and compliant digital identity management with user sovereignty, integrating hardware security, biometric authentication, and regulatory adherence, enabling seamless transactions and revocation processes.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The invention presents a decentralized digital identity wallet operating on an authorized blockchain network. A mobile application generates a decentralized identifier (DID) and a private key stored within the device's hardware security module. A trusted authority issues verifiable, digitally signed credentials, which are stored encrypted in the wallet, while the public keys and revocation log are recorded in a distributed ledger. When requesting a service, the user signs the challenge using passwordless FIDO2 authentication and submits a verifiable offer that reveals minimal data, supporting zero-knowledge proof to establish attributes without disclosing full information. The system includes smart contracts for issuance and revocation, offline caching via signed QR codes, and a device integrity check prior to activation. Encrypted template partitioning and decentralized governance ensure privacy and data sovereignty, with scalability to include facial or iris recognition and link identity to payments and government support. Figure (1)
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Description

Figure (1) illustrates how the system starts operating immediately upon installation of the mobile wallet application (1) on the user's device. This application automatically calls the hardware key generator (2), which resides within the device's secure and trusted environment. The generator creates a public-private key according to the ECDSA-P384 curve. Based on the resulting public key, the application then generates a decentralized identifier compliant with the W3C DID standard. Both are stored in the device's protected internal memory, making it impossible to extract the private key from outside the hardware. Immediately afterward, the application integrates with the FIDO2 authentication stack (3). This integration links the local biometric identifier (fingerprint or facial recognition) to the private key, so that all subsequent network signatures are subject to local biometric authentication and do not require passwords. After this initial setup is successful, the application allows the user to optionally activate the key backup service (4). If the owner chooses to activate it, the recovery secret is divided into fragments using the Shamir Secret Sharing algorithm, and each fragment is encrypted separately with a key derived from a recovery phrase specified by the user.These fragments are distributed either to trusted repositories or stored in an encrypted cloud vault, and can only be retrieved by gathering the required quorum and performing multi-factor authentication. The application then broadcasts a transaction to the authorized blockchain network (5) via a JSON-RPC interface. This transaction carries a DID document, which includes the public key and endpoints. The consensus node (operating under the IBFT 2.0 mechanism) verifies the signature and ensures the transaction is duplicate, then inserts it into a new block, returning the block number and its digital timestamp to the application. The application retains this data for future verification. When a user wants official credentials, they go to a registration point with an authorized entity operating the official issuer node (7). The registration process begins by verifying original identity documents or matching biometrics with the national database. Upon verification, the dedicated interface triggers a call to the version smart contract (6) on the same chain.The smart contract creates a verifiable (VC) credential in JSON-LD format, signed with the authority's key, and its fingerprint and unique identifier are recorded in the ledger, while the credential's encrypted content is stored locally within the application (1). If the issuing authority is a civil society organization or a development bank, a community issuer node (8) performs the same function, provided it has the issuing authority agreed upon by the network policy reference. Upon completion, the decentralized revocation register (9) is automatically updated to include the credential reference and its active status. When a device is reported lost or credential misuse is suspected, any trusted entity creates a revocation transaction broadcast directly to the network. The consensus node then reclassifies the credential as revoked and notifies all wallets by broadcasting signed DIDComm payments. When a user interacts with a remote service, the service server initiates an exchange by generating a signed random challenge and sending a DIDComm message (11) to the wallet. The wallet receives the message and performs FIDO2 authentication to confirm the user's presence.Upon authentication, the application consults the ABAC property-based access policy engine (13) to determine what data the wallet will disclose. If the server requires proof of a characteristic (such as reaching a certain age) without full identity disclosure, the Zero Knowledge Proof protocol (10) is invoked to generate a zk-SNARK proof based on stored credentials. The private key signs both the challenge and the proof, and the response is sent to the server. Upon receiving the response, the server verifies the signature via the OpenID-DID bridge (12) if its architecture is based on OpenID Connect. The bridge extracts the public key from the registered DID document, checks the revocation record (9), and then translates the result into a standard ID-Token that the underlying system understands and grants service based on internal policies. If the service is associated with a payment or government support transaction, the money transfer gateway agent (14) converts the credit into a JWT payment token that is signed and submitted to the national payment gateway, taking advantage of the co-signing option via the multi-key custody system (15) that integrates the user and custodian signatures according to the MuSig protocol to ensure collective control of the transaction.In environments with limited connectivity, the wallet switches to offline mode and activates caching (17). This layer stores credentials and session keys encrypted locally and generates a signed QR code valid for a limited number of minutes or uses. Upon reconnection, all temporary records are automatically synchronized with the ledger, and the used codes are invalidated. In the event of a legal dispute, a competent judge issues a signed digital order that is escalated to the Judicial Escalation Unit (18). The competent node verifies the judicial signature and, depending on the ruling, orders either the transfer of the credential to a new DID belonging to the rightful owner or its permanent revocation. The execution transaction is broadcast to the chain, time-stamped, and cannot be altered. Before allowing any highly sensitive operation, the wallet activates the Device Trust Connector (19), which sends proof of the operating system's integrity to the official authentication service. Access to the private key is blocked if rooting or any modification harmful to the secure environment is detected. All gas and service charges are documented in the encrypted cost log (20), and the application displays them to the user with complete transparency.Smart contract and wallet updates are implemented by an automatic update engine (21) that uses a proxy pattern to ensure data integrity during the transition to the new logic. New issuers can leverage the API (22), written in TypeScript and Java, to create their own issuing contracts or validation gateways, all of which undergo built-in compatibility testing before deployment to the network. If a fingerprint cannot be read for any reason, biometric authentication migrates to a local, face-matching backup identification service (23) using the FaceNet algorithm and the same private key for signing. A proactive risk alert system (24) monitors the distribution of credential usage via a GeoIP map and an Isolation Forest-based anomaly detection algorithm; upon detecting unusual geographic activity, the application sends an immediate notification to the user and signs a short-term alert that is logged to the network.Finally, the decentralized governance dashboard (25) displays performance statistics, transaction volumes, and consensus status, and allows holders of decentralized identifiers to participate in quadratic voting on network development proposals, so that each vote records a new block bearing the participant's DID signature, accompanied by an unalterable time stamp. Through this systematic interrelationship between generation, protection, issuance, verification, and revocation units, a secure and integrated digital identity transfer is achieved, and at every step, user sovereignty is maintained and the system complies with current technical and regulatory frameworks, thus paving the way for a reliable and scalable industrial application in the future.

Claims

1. A decentralized digital identity wallet system comprising: a mobile application that generates a decentralized identifier and links it to a private key stored within a hardware security module; an authorized blockchain network where identifier documents and an instant revocation log are recorded; a smart contract for issuing digitally signed verifiable credentials; a FIDO2 authentication stack that operates with biometric authentication without passwords; and a DIDComm message exchange mechanism that enables the transmission of verification challenges and credential offers between the application and validators.

2. The system adheres to security element 1, incorporating a zero-knowledge proof layer that generates cryptographic proof enabling the user to prove a specific attribute without revealing their full personal data. 3- The system is in accordance with security element 1, where it includes a cache service that works offline and creates a signed QR code that allows local verification and automatic synchronization of records when the network connection is restored.

4. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, featuring a multi-key custody mechanism that utilizes a group signing protocol. This ensures that high-value transactions are only executed after approval by multiple predefined parties.

5. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, including a device integrity authentication module that verifies the operating system is free from rooting or unauthorized modifications before granting access to the private key.

6. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, including a geo-anomaly detection algorithm that monitors credential usage in unusual locations and sends an immediate alert to the user when a risk criterion is met.

7. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, including an automatic update engine that uses a proxy-based model to enable smart contract and wallet application upgrades without compromising data integrity or requiring key re-registration.

8. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, including an encrypted cost log that records gas and service charges associated with each transaction and displays them to the user in a transparent interface within the application.

9. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, which includes a digital arbitration node that executes signed court orders to invalidate or transfer credentials, and the action is recorded with an unalterable time stamp in the ledger.

10. The system is compliant with Security Element 1, which includes an integration bridge that converts decentralized verification results into OpenID Connect and OAuth 2.0-compatible identity tokens to enable traditional systems to accept digital credentials.