Multi-link wireless communication security

Abstract

This application provides systems, methods, and apparatus for wireless communication performed by a wireless communication device. An example wireless communication device includes an Access Point (AP) Multilink Device (MLD). The AP MLD sends a beacon frame to a Radio Station (STA) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a corresponding AP of the AP MLD. The AP MLD receives an association request from a STA MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a corresponding STA of the STA MLD. During a handshake operation with the STA MLD, the AP MLD generates one or more cryptographic keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD. The AP MLD verifies the plurality of STA MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys.

Description

[Technical Field]

[0001] This patent application claims priority to U.S. Provisional Patent Application No. 62 / 985,311, entitled "MULTI-LINK WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SECURITY," filed March 4, 2020, and U.S. Non-Provisional Patent Application No. 17 / 189,895, entitled "MULTI-LINK WIRELESS COMMUNICATION SECURITY," filed March 2, 2021, which have been assigned to the assignee of this application. All disclosures of the prior applications are considered part of this patent application, and their entire contents are incorporated herein by reference.

[0002] The content of this case is generally about wireless networks, and more specifically about making multi-link wireless communication secure. [Previous Technology]

[0003] A Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) can be formed by one or more Access Points (APs) that provide a shared wireless communication medium for use by multiple client devices (also known as Stations (STAs)). The basic building block of a WLAN conforming to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard family is a Basic Service Set (BSS) managed by the AP. Each BSS is identified by a Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID) advertised by the AP. The AP periodically broadcasts beacon frames to enable any STA within the AP's wireless range to establish or maintain a communication link with the WLAN. [Summary of the Invention]

[0004] The system, method and apparatus of this case each have several innovative forms, and none of these innovative forms are solely responsible for the desired properties disclosed herein.

[0005] One innovative aspect of the subject matter described in this case can be implemented as a method for wireless communication. The method can be performed by an Access Point (AP) Multilink Device (MLD) and may include: sending a beacon frame to a Radio Station (STA) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a corresponding AP of the AP MLD; receiving an association request from the STA MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a corresponding STA of the STA MLD; generating one or more encryption keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD during a handshake operation with the STA MLD; and verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys.

[0006] In some embodiments, the method may also include: generating a pairwise transient key (PTK) at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys; and exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the STA MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. In some instances, the method may also include: sending a first Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message to the STA MLD; and receiving a second EAPoL message from the STA MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. In some embodiments, the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce), and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). In some instances, the generation of the PTK is at least in part based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce. In some other instances, the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the STA MAC addresses.

[0007] In some embodiments, the method also includes: sending a third EAPoL message to the STA MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses. In some instances, the method also includes: receiving a fourth EAPoL message from the STA MLD; and in response to the fourth EAPoL message exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the STA MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.

[0008] Another innovative aspect of the subject matter described in this case can be implemented as a wireless communication device. The wireless communication device may include: at least one modem; at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one modem; and at least one memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor and storing processor-readable code, which, when executed by the at least one processor in conjunction with the at least one modem, is configured to: send a beacon frame to a wireless station (STA) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a corresponding AP of the AP MLD; receive an association request from the STA MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a corresponding STA of the STA MLD; generate one or more encryption keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD during a handshake operation with the STA MLD; and verify the plurality of STA MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys.

[0009] In some embodiments, the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: generate a pairwise transient key (PTK) at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys; and exchange one or more encrypted packets with the STA MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. In some instances, the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: send a first Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message to the STA MLD; and receive a second EAPoL message from the STA MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. In some embodiments, the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce), and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). In some cases, the generation of the PTK is at least in part based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce.

[0010] In some other embodiments, the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data envelopes (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the STA MAC addresses. In some instances, the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to send a third EAPoL message to the STA MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses.

[0011] Another innovative aspect of the subject matter described in this case can be implemented as a method for wireless communication. This method can be performed by a radio station (STA) multi-link device (MLD) and can include: receiving a beacon frame from an access point (AP) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a respective AP of the AP MLD; sending an association request to the AP MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a respective STA of the STA MLD; generating one or more encryption keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD during a handshake operation with the AP MLD; and verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys.

[0012] In some embodiments, the method may also include: generating a pairwise transient key (PTK) at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys; and exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the AP MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. In some instances, the method may also include: receiving an Extensible Authentication Protocol over a First Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message from the AP MLD; and sending a second EAPoL message to the AP MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. In some examples, the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce), and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). In some embodiments, the generation of the PTK is at least in part based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce.

[0013] In some other embodiments, the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data envelopes (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses. In some instances, the method may also include: receiving a third EAPoL message from the AP MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the AP MAC addresses. In some forms, the method may also include: sending a fourth EAPoL message to the AP MLD; and exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the AP MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.

[0014] Another innovative aspect of the subject matter described in this case can be implemented as a wireless communication device. The wireless communication device may include: at least one modem; at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one modem; and at least one memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor and storing processor-readable code, which, when executed by the at least one processor in conjunction with the at least one modem, is configured to: receive a beacon frame from an access point (AP) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a corresponding AP of the AP MLD; send an association request to the AP MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a corresponding STA of the STA MLD; generate one or more encryption keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD during a handshake operation with the AP MLD; and verify the plurality of AP MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys.

[0015] In some embodiments, the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: generate a pair of transient keys (PTKs) at least in part based on the handshake operation; and exchange one or more encrypted packets with the AP MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. In some instances, the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: receive an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message on a first local area network (LAN) from the AP MLD; and send a second EAPoL message to the AP MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. In some embodiments, the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce), and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC).

[0016] In some instances, the generation of the PTK is at least partially based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce. In some other instances, the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses. In some implementations, the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: receive a third EAPoL message from the AP MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the AP MAC addresses.

[0017] Details of one or more embodiments of the subject matter described herein are set forth in the accompanying drawings and the following description. Other features, features, and advantages will become apparent from the specification, drawings, and claims. Note that the relative dimensions in the following figures may not be drawn to scale.

Implementation Method

[0018] To describe the innovative nature of this invention, the following description pertains to certain specific implementations. However, those skilled in the art will readily recognize that the teachings herein can be applied in a variety of different ways. The described implementations can be implemented in any device, system, or network capable of transmitting and receiving radio frequency (RF) signals according to one or more of the following: the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 802.11 standard, the IEEE 802.15 standard, the Bluetooth® standard as defined by the Bluetooth Special Interest Group (SIG), or the Long Term Evolution (LTE), 3G, 4G, or 5G (New Radio (NR)) standards issued by the 3GPP. The described implementations can be implemented in any device, system, or network capable of transmitting and receiving RF signals according to one or more of the following technologies or techniques: Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA), Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA), Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA), Orthogonal FDMA (OFDMA), Single Carrier FDMA (SC-FDMA), Single User (SU) Multiple Input Multiple Output (MIMO), and Multiple User (MU) MIMO. The described implementations can also be implemented using other wireless communication protocols or RF signals suitable for use in one or more of Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs), Wireless Local Area Networks (WLANs), Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWANs), or Internet of Things (IoT) networks.

[0019] Before a STA can exchange data frames with an AP, the STA must authenticate and associate with the AP by exchanging a series of management frames during a process known as association. Information sent between the AP and an unassociated STA may be unencrypted and therefore vulnerable to attacks from one or more third parties. That is, a malicious actor may access and / or manipulate the sent information during the association process, causing subsequent communication between the AP and STA to be inaccurate, potentially delaying or even causing communication failures. For example, a malicious actor may spoof the Media Access Control (MAC) address of the AP or STA during the association process.

[0020] Once the STA is authenticated and associated with the AP, the device can execute a security protocol to generate encryption keys, which the AP and STA can use to protect data carried in subsequent data frames. For example, the AP and STA can generate encryption keys by exchanging four Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAP) (EAPoL) messages during a security protocol known as a "four-way handshake." At least some of these encryption keys are generated using the MAC addresses of the AP and the STA. Therefore, four-way handshake has traditionally been used as a means of verifying the addresses of the AP and the STA.

[0021] Recent improvements to the IEEE 802.11 standard family include support for multi-link (ML) communication. Devices with ML capabilities (including APs and STAs) can be referred to as multi-link devices (MLDs). Accordingly, an AP MLD can communicate with a STA MLD simultaneously via multiple communication links. Each communication link can be used for communication between the corresponding AP of the AP MLD and the corresponding STA of the STA MLD. An AP MLD can have a MAC address (also called an "MLD address"), and each of its APs can also have a corresponding MAC address. A STA MLD can have a MAC address, and each of its STAs can also have a corresponding MAC address. Therefore, additional considerations may be needed to use a four-way handshake to protect unencrypted information exchanged before association.

[0022] Various implementation methods relate to data transmission in multi-link (ML) environments. Some implementation methods specifically relate to securing data transmission between AP multi-link devices (MLDs) and STA MLDs. In some implementation methods, one or more APs may belong to an AP MLD, and one or more STAs may belong to a STA MLD.

[0023] Each of the plurality of APs and STAs may have a Media Access Control (MAC) address. According to the embodiments described herein, the AP MLD and STA MLD may exchange the MAC addresses of each of the APs and STAs during at least one period of the beacon discovery process or the association process. In some embodiments, the AP MLD and STA MLD may be configured to verify the authenticity of the MAC addresses during the handshake operation. The AP MLD and STA MLD may generate one or more cryptographic keys during the handshake operation. The AP MLD and STA MLD may use one or more cryptographic keys to encrypt subsequent data communication on the communication link. If the AP MLD or STA MLD fails to verify one or more MAC addresses of the AP or STA during the handshake operation, operation of the AP MLD and STA MLD in the associated state may be prevented.

[0024] The specific implementation of the subject matter described in this application can be implemented to achieve one or more of the following potential advantages. By exchanging the MAC addresses of each AP of the AP MLD and each STA of the STA MLD during at least one period of the beacon discovery process or association process, the various embodiments of this application can enable the AP MLD and STA MLD to verify the authenticity of the MAC addresses exchanged during the association process.

[0025] Figure 1 illustrates a block diagram of an example wireless communication network 100. Depending on the configuration, the wireless communication network 100 may be an instance of a wireless local area network (WLAN), such as a Wi-Fi network (hereinafter referred to as WLAN 100). For example, WLAN 100 may be a network implementing at least one of the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocol standard families (e.g., standards defined by the IEEE 802.11-2016 specification or its amendments, including but not limited to 802.11ah, 802.11ad, 802.11ay, 802.11ax, 802.11az, 802.11ba, and 802.11be). WLAN 100 may include a number of wireless communication devices, such as access points (APs) 102 and multiple stations (STAs) 104. Although only one AP 102 is illustrated, WLAN network 100 may also include multiple APs 102.

[0026] Each of STA 104 may also be referred to as a mobile station (MS), mobile device, mobile handheld device, wireless handheld device, access terminal (AT), user equipment (UE), user station (SS), or user unit, etc. STA 104 may represent various devices such as mobile phones, personal digital assistants (PDAs), other handheld devices, notebook computers, tablet computers, laptops, display devices (e.g., TVs, computer monitors, navigation systems, etc.), music or other audio or immersive sound devices, remote control devices ("remote controllers"), printers, kitchen or other household appliances, remote control keys (e.g., for passive keyless entry and start (PKES) systems), etc.

[0027] A single AP 102 and the associated set of STAs 104 can be referred to as a Basic Service Set (BSS), which is managed by the respective AP 102. Figure 1 further illustrates an example coverage area 108 of AP 102, which can represent the Basic Service Area (BSA) of WLAN 100. The BSS can be identified to users by a Service Set Identifier (SSID) or to other devices by a Basic Service Set Identifier (BSSID), which can be the Media Access Control (MAC) address of AP 102. AP 102 periodically broadcasts a beacon frame ("beacon") including the BSSID to enable any STA 104 within the wireless range of AP 102 to "associate" or reassociate with AP 102 to establish a corresponding communication link 106 with AP 102 (hereinafter also referred to as a "Wi-Fi link"), or to maintain the communication link 106. For example, the beacon may include an identifier of the main channel used by the corresponding AP 102 and a timing synchronization function for establishing or maintaining timing synchronization with AP 102. AP 102 may provide access to the external network to each STA 104 in the WLAN via the corresponding communication link 106.

[0028] To establish a communication link 106 with AP 102, each of STA 104 is configured to perform passive or active scanning operations ("scanning") on frequency channels in one or more frequency bands (e.g., 2.4 GHz, 5 GHz, 6 GHz, or 60 GHz bands). To perform passive scanning, STA 104 detects beacons, which are transmitted by the corresponding AP 102 at periodic time intervals called Target Beacon Transmission Time (TBTT) (which is measured in units of time (TU), one of which can be equal to 1024 microseconds (µs)). To perform active scanning, STA 104 generates and sequentially sends probe requests on each channel to be scanned, and detects probe responses from APs 102. Each STA 104 can be configured to identify or select an AP 102 to associate with based on scan information obtained through passive or active scanning, and to perform authentication and association operations to establish a communication link 106 with the selected AP 102. At the end of the association operation, AP 102 assigns an Association Identifier (AID) to STA 104, which AP 102 uses to track STA 104.

[0029] Due to the increasing prevalence of wireless networks, STA 104 can have the opportunity to select one of multiple BSSs within its range, or to select from multiple APs 102, which together form an Extended Service Set (ESS) comprising multiple connected BSSs. The extended network station associated with WLAN 100 can be connected to a wired or wireless distribution system that allows multiple APs 102 to be connected within such an ESS. Thus, STA 104 can be covered by multiple APs 102 and can associate with different APs 102 at different times for different transmissions. Furthermore, after associating with an AP 102, STA 104 can also be configured to periodically scan its surroundings to identify more suitable APs 102 to associate with. For example, STA 104 moving relative to its associated AP 102 can perform a "roaming" scan to identify another AP 102 with desirable network characteristics such as a higher Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) or reduced traffic load.

[0030] In some cases, STA 104 can form a network without AP 102 or any other devices besides STA 104 itself. An example of such a network is a random network (or wireless random network). A random network can also be referred to as a mesh network or peer-to-peer (P2P) network. In some cases, a random network can be implemented within a larger wireless network such as WLAN 100. In this implementation, although STA 104 may be able to communicate with each other via communication link 106 through AP 102, STA 104 can also communicate directly with each other via direct wireless link 110. Furthermore, two STA 104 can communicate via direct communication link 110, regardless of whether the two STA 104 are associated with and served by the same AP 102. In such a random system, one or more of STA 104 can assume the role of AP 102 in the BSS. This type of STA 104 can be referred to as the group owner (GO) and can coordinate transmissions within any network. Examples of direct wireless links 110 include Wi-Fi direct connections, connections established via Wi-Fi Tunnel Direct Link Establishment (TDLS) links, and other P2P group connections.

[0031] AP 102 and STA 104 can operate and communicate according to the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocol standard family (such as the standards defined by the IEEE 802.11-2016 specification or its amendments, including but not limited to 802.11ah, 802.11ad, 802.11ay, 802.11ax, 802.11az, 802.11ba, and 802.11be). These standards define the WLAN radio and baseband protocols at the PHY layer and Media Access Control (MAC) layer. AP 102 and STA 104 send and receive wireless communications (hereinafter also referred to as "Wi-Fi communication") to each other in the form of Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) Protocol Data Units (PPDUs). AP 102 and STA 104 in WLAN 100 can transmit PPDUs on unlicensed spectrum, which can be a portion of the spectrum including bands traditionally used by Wi-Fi technology, such as the 2.4 GHz band, 5 GHz band, 60 GHz band, 3.6 GHz band, and 900 MHz band. Some implementations of AP 102 and STA 104 described herein can also communicate in other bands, such as the 6 GHz band, which can support both licensed and unlicensed communications. AP 102 and STA 104 can also be configured to communicate on other bands, such as sharing licensed bands, where multiple service providers may have licenses to operate in one or more of the same or overlapping bands.

[0032] Each frequency band may include multiple sub-bands or frequency channels. For example, PPDUs conforming to the revised versions of the IEEE 802.11n, 802.11ac, and 802.11ax standards can be transmitted on the 2.4 and 5 GHz bands, each of which is divided into multiple 20 MHz channels. Thus, these PPDUs are transmitted on physical channels with a minimum bandwidth of 20 MHz, but larger channels can be formed by channel confinement. For example, PPDUs can be transmitted on physical channels with bandwidths of 40 MHz, 80 MHz, 160 MHz, or 320 MHz by confining multiple 20 MHz channels together.

[0033] Each PPDU is a composite structure comprising a PHY preamble and a payload in the form of a PLCP Service Data Unit (PSDU). The information provided in the preamble can be used by the receiving device to decode subsequent data in the PSDU. In the case of transmitting the PPDU over a constrained channel, the preamble field can be copied and transmitted in each of the multiple component channels. The PHY preamble may include a traditional portion (or "traditional preamble") and a non-traditional portion (or "non-traditional preamble"). The traditional preamble can be used for packet detection, automatic gain control, and channel estimation, etc. The traditional preamble can also generally be used to maintain compatibility with legacy equipment. The format, encoding, and information provided in the non-traditional portion of the preamble are based on the specific IEEE 802.11 protocol used for transmitting the payload.

[0034] Figure 2 illustrates an example Protocol Data Unit (PDU) 200 that can be used for wireless communication between an AP and multiple STAs. For example, the PDU 200 can be configured as a PPDU. As shown, the PDU 200 includes a PHY preamble 202 and a PHY payload 204. For example, the preamble 202 may include a legacy portion, which itself includes: a legacy short training field (L-STF) 206, which may consist of two binary phase shift keying (BPSK) symbols; a legacy long training field (L-LTF) 208, which may consist of two BPSK symbols; and a legacy signal field (L-SIG) 210, which may consist of two BPSK symbols. The legacy portion of the preamble 202 can be configured according to the IEEE 802.11a wireless communication protocol standard. The preceding signal 202 may also include a non-traditional portion, which includes one or more non-traditional fields 212, for example, conforming to IEEE wireless communication protocols, such as IEEE 802.11ac, 802.11ax, 802.11be or higher wireless communication protocol standards.

[0035] L-STF 206 typically enables the receiving device to perform automatic gain control (AGC) and coarse timing and frequency estimation. L-LTF 208 typically enables the receiving device to perform fine timing and frequency estimation and also to estimate the radio channel. L-SIG 210 typically enables the receiving device to determine the duration of the PDU and to use the determined duration to avoid transmission on the PDU. For example, L-STF 206, L-LTF 208, and L-SIG 210 can be modulated according to a BPSK modulation scheme. The payload 204 can be modulated according to a BPSK modulation scheme, a quadrature BPSK (Q-BPSK) modulation scheme, a quadrature amplitude modulation (QAM) scheme, or another suitable modulation scheme. The payload 204 can typically carry higher-layer data, for example, in the form of a Media Access Control (MAC) Protocol Data Unit (MPDU) or an aggregated MPDU (A-MPDU).

[0036] Figure 3 illustrates an example L-SIG 310 in the PDU 200 of Figure 2. L-SIG 310 includes a data rate field 322, reserved bits 324, a length field 326, a co-occurrence bit 328, and a tail field 330. The data rate field 322 indicates the data rate (note that the data rate indicated in the data rate field 322 may not be the actual data rate of the data carried in the payload 304). The length field 326 indicates the length of the packet in units such as symbols or bytes. The co-occurrence bit 328 can be used to detect bit errors. The tail field 330 includes a tail bit that can be used by a receiving device to terminate the operation of a decoder (e.g., a Viterbi decoder). The receiving device can use the data rate and length indicated in the data rate field 322 and the length field 326 to determine the duration of a packet in units such as microseconds (µs) or other time units.

[0037] Access to shared wireless media is typically controlled by a Distributed Coordination Function (DCF). With DCF, there is usually no centralized master device for allocating time and frequency resources for the shared wireless media. Instead, wireless communication devices such as AP 102 or STA 104 must wait for a specific period before being allowed to transmit data, and then contend for access to the wireless media. In some implementations, wireless communication devices can be configured to implement DCF via carrier sense multiplexed access (CSMA) technology with collision avoidance (CA) and timing intervals. Before transmitting data, the wireless communication device can perform a clear channel assessment (CCA) and determine which wireless channels are idle. CCA includes physical (PHY-level) carrier sensing and virtual (MAC-level) carrier sensing. Physical carrier sensing (or packet detection (PD)) is implemented by measuring the received signal strength of a valid frame and then comparing that received signal strength to a value to determine if the channel is busy. For example, if the received signal strength of a detected preceding signal is higher than that value, the media is considered busy. Physical carrier sensing also includes energy detection (ED). Energy detection involves measuring the total energy received by the wireless communication device, regardless of whether the received signal represents a valid frame. If the detected total energy is higher than a certain value, the media is considered busy. Virtual carrier sensing is implemented using a Network Allocation Vector (NAV), which is an indicator of the time it takes for the media to become idle. The NAV is reset whenever a valid frame not addressed to the wireless communication device is received. The NAV effectively serves as the duration that must elapse before the wireless communication device can contend for access, even if no symbols are detected or even if the detected energy is lower than that value.

[0038] As mentioned above, DCF is implemented by using time intervals. These time intervals include slot time (or "slot interval") and inter-frame gap (IFS). Slot time is the basic unit of timing and can be determined based on one or more of transmit / receive turnaround time, channel sensing time, propagation delay, and MAC processing time. For each slot, measurements for channel sensing are performed. All transmissions can begin at slot boundaries. Examples of IFS types include: Short IFS (SIFS), Distributed IFS (DIFS), Extended IFS (EIFS), or Arbitrated IFS (AIFS). For example, DIFS can be defined as the sum of SIFS and twice the slot time. The values ​​for the time slot and IFS can be provided by appropriate standard specifications, such as a standard in the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocol standard family (e.g., a standard defined by the IEEE 802.11-2016 specification or its amendments, including but not limited to 802.11ah, 802.11ad, 802.11ay, 802.11ax, 802.11az, 802.11ba, and 802.11be)).

[0039] When NAV reaches 0, the wireless communication device performs physical carrier sensing. If the channel remains idle for the appropriate IFS (e.g., DIFS), the wireless communication device initiates a backoff timer, where the backoff timer represents the duration for which the device must sense that the medium is idle before it is allowed to transmit. Each time medium idleness is sensed during the corresponding time slot interval, the backoff timer is decremented by one time slot. If the channel remains idle before the backoff timer expires, the wireless communication device becomes the holder (or "owner") of the transmission opportunity (TXOP) and can begin transmitting. TXOP is the duration for which the wireless communication device can transmit frames on the channel after winning contention for the wireless medium. Alternatively, if one or more carrier sensing mechanisms indicate that the channel is busy, the MAC controller within the wireless communication device will not allow transmission.

[0040] Each time a wireless communication device generates a new PPDU for transmission in a new TXOP, it randomly selects a new backoff timer duration. The available bit distribution that can be randomly selected for the backoff timer is called the contention window (CW). If the wireless communication device transmits a PPDU when the backoff timer expires, but the media is still busy, a collision may occur. Additionally, if there is too much energy on the wireless channel in other aspects resulting in a low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR), communication may be disrupted or otherwise fail to be successfully received. In this case, the wireless communication device may not receive communication to acknowledge the transmission of the PDU within the timeout interval. The MAC can then exponentially increase the CW, for example, by doubling it, and randomly select a new backoff timer duration from the CW before each retransmission attempt of the PPDU. Before each retransmission attempt, the wireless communication device can wait for the duration of the DIFS, and if the media remains idle, continue to initiate new backoff timers. Each of the following four access classes (AC) has a different CW and TXOP duration: Voice (AC_VO), Video (AC_VI), Background (AC_BK), and Best-effort (AC_BE). This allows specific types of traffic to be prioritized in the network.

[0041] As mentioned above, AP 102 and STA 104 can support multi-user (MU) communication; that is, concurrent transmission from one device to each of multiple devices (e.g., multiple simultaneous downlink (DL) communications from AP 102 to the corresponding STA 104), or concurrent transmission from multiple devices to a single device (e.g., multiple simultaneous uplink (UL) communications from the corresponding STA 104 to AP 102). To support MU transmission, AP 102 and STA 104 can utilize multi-user multiple-input multiple-output (MU-MIMO) and multi-user orthogonal frequency division multiple access (MU-OFDMA) technologies.

[0042] In the MU-OFDMA scheme, the available spectrum of the radio channel can be divided into multiple resource elements (RUs), each resource element comprising multiple different frequency subcarriers ("tones"). Different RUs can be allocated or assigned by AP 102 to different STAs 104 at a specific time. The size and distribution of RUs can be referred to as RU allocation. In some implementations, RUs can be allocated in 2 MHz intervals; therefore, the minimum RU can include 26 tones consisting of 24 data tones and 2 pilot tones. Thus, in a 20 MHz channel, a maximum of 9 RUs can be allocated (e.g., 2 MHz, 26-tone RUs) (because some tones are reserved for other purposes). Similarly, in a 160 MHz channel, a maximum of 74 RUs can be allocated. Larger RUs of 52-tone, 106-tone, 242-tone, 484-tone, and 996-tone can also be allocated. Adjacent RUs can be separated by empty subcarriers (e.g., DC subcarriers) to reduce interference between adjacent RUs, reduce receiver DC offset, and avoid transmit center frequency leakage.

[0043] For UL-MU transmission, AP 102 can send a trigger frame to initiate and synchronize UL-MU-OFDMA or UL-MU-MIMO transmissions from multiple STAs 104 to AP 102. This trigger frame allows multiple STAs 104 to concurrently send UL traffic to AP 102 in time. The trigger frame can address one or more STAs 104 via a corresponding Association Identifier (AID), and can assign one or more RUs (Remote Access Units) to each AID (and therefore each STA 104) for sending UL traffic to AP 102. AP can also designate one or more Random Access (RA) RUs, where unscheduled STAs 104 can contend for those RA RUs.

[0044] Figure 4 illustrates a block diagram of an example wireless communication device 400. In some embodiments, the wireless communication device 400 may be an instance of a device for use in a STA, such as one of the STA 104 described above with reference to Figure 1. In some embodiments, the wireless communication device 400 may be an instance of a device for use in an AP, such as the AP 102 described above with reference to Figure 1. The wireless communication device 400 is capable of transmitting (or outputting for transmission) and receiving wireless communications (e.g., in the form of wireless packets). For example, wireless communication devices can be configured to transmit and receive packets in the form of Physical Layer Convergence Protocol (PLCP) Protocol Data Units (PPDUs) and Media Access Control (MAC) Protocol Data Units (MPDUs) conforming to IEEE 802.11 wireless communication protocol standards (such as the wireless communication protocol standards defined by the IEEE 802.11-2016 specification or its amendments, including but not limited to 802.11ah, 802.11ad, 802.11ay, 802.11ax, 802.11az, 802.11ba, and 802.11be).

[0045] The wireless communication device 400 may be or may include a chip, a system-on-a-chip (SoC), a chipset, a package, or a device including one or more modems 402, such as a Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11 compatible) modem. In some embodiments, one or more modems 402 (collectively referred to as "modems 402") additionally include a WWAN modem (e.g., a 3GPP 4G LTE or 5G compatible modem). In some embodiments, the wireless communication device 400 also includes one or more radios 404 (collectively referred to as "radios 404"). In some embodiments, the wireless communication device 406 also includes one or more processors, processing blocks, or processing elements 406 (collectively referred to as "processors 406") and one or more memory blocks or elements 408 (collectively referred to as "memory 408").

[0046] The modem 402 may include intelligent hardware blocks or devices, such as, for example, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs). The modem 402 is typically configured to implement a PHY layer. For example, the modem 402 is configured to modulate packets and output modulated packets to radio 404 for transmission over a wireless medium. The modem 402 is similarly configured to receive modulated packets received by radio 404 and demodulate packets to provide demodulated packets. In addition to modulators and demodulators, the modem 402 may also include digital signal processing (DSP) circuitry, automatic gain control (AGC), encoders, decoders, multiplexers, and demultiplexers. For example, in transmission mode, data obtained from processor 406 is provided to a decoder, which encodes the data to provide encoded bits. The encoded bits are then mapped to points in the modulation cluster (using a selected MCS) to provide modulated symbols. The modulated symbols can then be mapped to NSS spatial streams or NSSTS space-time streams. The modulated symbols in the corresponding spatial or space-time streams can then be overridden, transformed via an inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT) block, and subsequently provided to DSP circuitry for Tx windowing and filtering. The digital signal can then be provided to a digital-to-analog converter (DAC). The resulting analog signal can then be provided to an upconverter and finally to radio 404. In embodiments involving beamforming, the modulated symbols in the corresponding spatial streams are pre-encoded via a manipulation matrix before being provided to the IFFT block.

[0047] In receive mode, the digital signal received from radio 404 is provided to the DSP circuit, which is configured to acquire the received signal, for example, by detecting the presence of the signal and estimating the initial timing and frequency offset. The DSP circuit is also configured to digitally adjust the digital signal, for example, by using channel (narrowband) filtering, analog impairment adjustment (e.g., correcting I / Q imbalance), and applying digital gain to ultimately obtain the narrowband signal. The output of the DSP circuit can then be fed to the AGC, which is configured to determine an appropriate gain using information extracted from the digital signal, for example, in one or more received training fields. The output of the DSP circuit is also coupled to a demodulator, which is configured to extract modulated symbols from the signal and, for example, calculate the log-probability ratio (LLR) for each bit position of each subcarrier in each spatial stream. The demodulator is coupled to a decoder, which can be configured to process the LLR to provide decoded bits. The decoded bits from all spatial streams are then fed to a demultiplexer for demultiplexing processing. The demultiplexed bits can then be descrambled and provided to the MAC layer (processor 406) for processing, evaluation, or interpretation.

[0048] Radio 404 typically includes at least one radio frequency (RF) transmitter (or "transmitter chain") and at least one radio frequency receiver (or "receiver chain"), which may be combined into one or more transceivers. For example, the RF transmitter and receiver may include various DSP circuits, each including at least one power amplifier (PA) and at least one low-noise amplifier (LNA). The RF transmitter and receiver may then be coupled to one or more antennas. For example, in some embodiments, wireless communication device 400 may include, or be coupled to, multiple transmitting antennas (each with a corresponding transmitting chain) and multiple receiving antennas (each with a corresponding receiving chain). Symbols output from modem 402 are provided to radio 404, which then transmits the symbols via the coupled antennas. Similarly, symbols received via the antennas are acquired by radio 404, which then provides the symbols to modem 402.

[0049] Processor 406 may include intelligent hardware blocks or devices, such as, for example, processing cores, processing blocks, central processing units (CPUs), microprocessors, microcontrollers, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), programmable logic devices (PLDs) (such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)), individual gate or transistor logic, individual hardware components, or any combination thereof, designed to perform the functions described herein. Processor 406 processes information received via radio 404 and modem 402, and processes information to be output via modem 402 and radio 404 for transmission via wireless media. For example, processor 406 may implement a control plane and MAC layer configured to perform various operations related to the generation and transmission of MPDUs, frames, or packets. The MAC layer is configured to perform or facilitate operations or techniques such as frame encoding and decoding, spatial multiplexing, space-time block coding (STBC), beamforming, and OFDMA resource allocation. In some implementations, processor 406 can typically control modem 402 to enable modem to perform the various operations described above.

[0050] Memory 408 may include tangible storage media, such as random access memory (RAM) or read-only memory (ROM), or combinations thereof. Memory 408 may also store non-transitory processor or computer executable software (SW) code containing instructions, wherein the instructions, when executed by processor 406, cause the processor to perform various operations for wireless communication described herein, including the generation, transmission, reception, and interpretation of MPDUs, frames, or packets. For example, the various functions of the components disclosed herein, or the various blocks or steps of the methods, operations, processes, or algorithms disclosed herein, may be implemented as one or more modules of one or more computer programs.

[0051] Various implementations are generally related to data transmission in a multi-link (ML) environment. Some implementations are specifically concerned with securing data transmission between an AP multi-link device (MLD) and a STA MLD. In some implementations, one or more APs may belong to an AP MLD, and one or more STAs may belong to a STA MLD.

[0052] Each of the plurality of APs and STAs may have a Media Access Control (MAC) address. According to the implementation described herein, the AP MLD and STA MLD may exchange the MAC addresses of each AP and STA during at least one period of the beacon discovery process or the association process. In some implementations, the AP MLD and STA MLD may be configured to verify the authenticity of the MAC addresses during the handshake operation. The AP MLD and STA MLD may generate one or more cryptographic keys during the handshake operation. The AP MLD and STA MLD may use one or more cryptographic keys to encrypt subsequent data communications on the communication link. If the AP MLD or STA MLD fails to verify one or more MAC addresses of the AP or STA during the handshake operation, operation of the AP MLD and STA MLD in the associated state may be prevented.

[0053] Specific implementations of the subject matter described in this application may be implemented to achieve one or more of the following potential advantages. By exchanging the MAC addresses of each AP of the AP MLD and each STA of the STA MLD during at least one process in the beacon discovery process or association process, the various embodiments of this application can enable the AP MLD and STA MLD to verify the authenticity of the MAC addresses exchanged during the association process.

[0054] Figure 5 illustrates a sequence diagram illustrating an example operation 500 for wireless communication between several wireless devices. In some embodiments, example operation 500 may be performed between an AP and a STA. The AP may be any suitable AP, including, for example, AP 102 of Figure 1 or device 400 of Figure 4. In some embodiments, the AP may be a multi-link device ("AP MLD"). The AP MLD may include multiple APs, each with a unique Media Access Control (MAC) address. The AP MLD may also have a MAC address, which may be the same as or different from any MAC address of the multiple APs. The STA may be any suitable STA, including, for example, STA 104 of Figure 1 or STA 400 of Figure 4. In some embodiments, the STA may be an MLD ("STA MLD"). The STA MLD may include multiple STAs, each with a unique MAC address. The STA MLD may also have a MAC address, which may be the same as or different from any MAC address of the multiple STAs.

[0055] At time t0, the AP MLD may broadcast a beacon frame ("beacon"). In some embodiments, the STA MLD may not receive the beacon. In this embodiment, the STA MLD may send a probe request to the AP MLD at time t1, and the AP MLD may send a probe response to the STA MLD at time t2. In some other embodiments, the STA MLD may receive the beacon. In this embodiment, the STA MLD may not send a probe request, and the AP MLD may not send a probe response.

[0056] At time t3, STA MLD may send an authentication request to AP MLD. In response to the authentication request, AP MLD may send an authentication response to STA MLD at time t4.

[0057] At time t5, the STA MLD may send an association request to the AP MLD. In some implementations, the association request may include the MAC address ("STA MAC address") of each STA belonging to the STA MLD. As mentioned above, each STA may operate on the corresponding one of the communication links between the AP MLD and the STA MLD.

[0058] In response to the association request, the AP MLD may send an association response to the STA MLD at time t6. In some implementations, the association response may include the MAC address ("AP MAC address") of each AP belonging to the AP MLD. As mentioned above, each AP may operate on a corresponding one of the communication links between the AP MLD and the STA MLD.

[0059] In some other embodiments, the AP MAC address may be included in a beacon, such as a beacon sent at time t0. The AP MAC address may be included in the beacon, except in the association response or not. In some embodiments, at least one AP belonging to the AP MLD may send one or more beacons including the AP MAC address. The STA MLD may explore the one or more beacons and send an association request including the MAC address of each STA belonging to the STA MLD in the same manner as described above with respect to time t5.

[0060] At time t7, the STA MLD can be authenticated and associated with the AP MLD, and can continue to perform security protocols with the AP MLD, such as a four-way handshake operation. In the example of Figure 5, the AP MLD and STA MLD each generate a pair of transient keys (PTKs) based on exchanging four Extensible Authentication Protocol over LAN (EAP) (EAPoL) messages during the four-way handshake operation. For example, the AP MLD initiates the handshake operation by sending a first EAPoL message ("msg 1") to the STA MLD at time t7. The first EAPoL message may include the AP nonce (ANonce).

[0061] In response to the first EAPoL message, the STA MLD sends a second EAPoL message ("msg 2") to the AP MLD at time t8. The second EAPoL message may include one or more of the STA nonce (SNonce) or message integrity code (MIC).

[0062] In some embodiments, the second EAPoL message may also include a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs). In some cases, the STA MLD may encapsulate a plurality of first MAC addresses in the first set of KDEs. The plurality of first MAC addresses may include the MLD address of the STA MLD and the MAC address of each STA belonging to the STA MLD. At time t9, the AP MLD may confirm that each of the plurality of first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the STA MAC addresses received in the association request at time t5. In this way, the AP MLD may verify the authenticity of the STA MAC addresses exchanged during the association process. In some embodiments, one or more of the STA MAC addresses may be included in subsequent data communications, such as in a MAC header.

[0063] After time t9, the AP MLD can continue to generate one or more encryption keys, which can be used to protect data carried in subsequent data frames. In the example of Figure 5, the AP MLD generates a PTK at time t10. The AP MLD can generate the PTK based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), ANonce, and SNonce. The PTK can be used to encrypt subsequent data communications on multiple communication links.

[0064] In response to the second EAPoL message, AP MLD sends a third EAPoL message ("msg 3") to STA MLD at time t11. The third EAPoL message may include a group temporary key (GTK) that is secured or encrypted with a PTK.

[0065] In some embodiments, the third EAPoL message may also include a set of second KDEs. In some cases, the AP MLD may encapsulate a plurality of second MAC addresses in the set of second KDEs. The plurality of second MAC addresses may include the MLD address of the AP MLD and the MAC address of each AP belonging to the AP MLD. At time t12, the STA MLD may confirm that each of the plurality of second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the AP MAC addresses received in the association response at time t6. In this way, the STA MLD may verify the authenticity of the AP MAC addresses exchanged during the association process. In some embodiments, one or more of the AP MAC addresses may be included in subsequent data communications, such as in a MAC header.

[0066] After time t12, the STA MLD can continue to generate one or more encryption keys, which are used to protect the data carried in subsequent data frames. In the example of Figure 5, the STA MLD generates a PTK at time t13. In some implementations, the STA MLD can generate the PTK based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), an ANonce, and a SNonce. The PTK can be used to encrypt subsequent data communications on multiple communication links.

[0067] If, between time t7 and time t15, the AP MLD or STA MLD fails to verify one or more MAC addresses of the STA MAC address or the AP MAC address respectively, the MLD may be prevented from operating in the associated state.

[0068] In the example of Figure 5, in response to the third EAPoL message, the STA MLD sends a fourth EAPoL message ("msg 4") to the AP MLD at time t14 to end the four-way handshake. After time t14, the AP MLD and STA MLD can use the PTK to encrypt subsequent data communications on multiple communication links. For example, at time t15, the AP MLD can send encrypted downlink (DL) data to the STA MLD. In some implementations, the AP MLD can use the PTK generated at time t10 or a portion of the PTK (e.g., the TK portion of the PTK) to encrypt the DL data. As another example, at time t16, the STA MLD can send uplink (UL) data to the AP MLD. In some implementations, the STA MLD can use the PTK generated at time t13 or a portion of the PTK (e.g., the TK portion of the PTK) to encrypt the UL data.

[0069] In some other embodiments, the first set of KDEs may be included in, for example, the fourth EAPoL message at time t14 (instead of the second EAPoL message). Between time t14 and time t15, the AP MLD may verify the STA address based on the first set of KDEs.

[0070] In addition, or alternatively, one or more of the association requests or association responses may include other information besides the MAC address. In this implementation, the AP MLD and / or STA MLD may verify other information during the handshake operation in a similar manner to that described above regarding the MAC address. For example, the other information may include one or more attributes of the AP MLD and / or STA MLD, such as attributes that relate to the security of communications on multiple communication links. In some cases, the verified other information may be included in the MAC header of subsequent data communications.

[0071] In some embodiments, one or more of the AP MLD and STA MLD may perform another association or reassociation process. For example, the STA MLD may reassociate with an AP other than the AP MLD via Fast Roaming or Fast BSS Transition (FT) or Fast Initial Link Establishment (FILS), during which the STA MLD and / or another AP may exchange information, such as one or more MAC addresses. In this embodiment, the information may be included in one or more frames, Fast BSS Transition Elements (FTE), or Information Elements (IE). In some cases, as described above, the STA MLD or another AP may verify the information in a manner similar to how the AP MLD and STA MLD verify MAC addresses during a four-way handshake. In some embodiments, the information may be verified during security protocols other than a four-way handshake.

[0072] Figure 6 illustrates a flowchart of an example process 600 for supporting multi-link communication in wireless communication. In some embodiments, operation 600 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., AP 102 of Figure 1 or wireless communication device 400 of Figure 4) that operates as an AP or within an AP. In some cases, the AP may be an AP MLD.

[0073] In some embodiments, at block 610, the AP MLD sends a beacon frame to the radio station (STA) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to the respective AP of the AP MLD. At block 620, the AP MLD receives an association request from the STA MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to the respective STA of the STA MLD. At block 630, the AP MLD generates one or more encryption keys during a handshake operation with the STA MLD, the one or more encryption keys being configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD. At block 640, the AP MLD verifies the plurality of STA MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys.

[0074] Figure 7A illustrates a flowchart of an example operation 700 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 700 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., AP 102 of Figure 1 or wireless communication device 400 of Figure 4) operating as an AP or within an AP. In some instances, the AP may be an AP MLD. In some embodiments, operation 700 begins after verifying a plurality of STA MAC addresses at block 640 in Figure 6.

[0075] For example, in block 702, AP MLD generates a pair of transient keys (PTK) based at least in part on one or more cryptographic keys. In block 704, AP MLD exchanges one or more encrypted packets with STA MLD, each of which includes a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.

[0076] Figure 7B illustrates a flowchart of an example operation 710 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 710 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., AP 102 of Figure 1 or wireless communication device 400 of Figure 4) operating as an AP or within an AP. In some instances, the AP may be an AP MLD. In some embodiments, operation 710 begins after verifying a plurality of STA MAC addresses at block 640 in Figure 6.

[0077] For example, in block 712, the AP MLD sends a First Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message to the STA MLD. In block 714, the AP MLD receives a second EAPoL message from the STA MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. In some implementations, the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce), and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a Message Integrity Code (MIC). In some instances, the PTK is generated at least in part based on a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF), a Paired Master Key (PMK), an ANonce, or a SNonce. In some other instances, the second EAPoL message also includes a set of First Key Data Encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the STA MAC addresses. In some implementations, the AP MLD sends a third EAPoL message to the STA MLD, which includes a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses.

[0078] Figure 7C illustrates a flowchart of an example operation 720 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 720 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., AP 102 of Figure 1 or wireless communication device 400 of Figure 4) operating as an AP or within an AP. In some cases, the AP may be an AP MLD. In some embodiments, operation 720 begins after verifying a plurality of STA MAC addresses at block 640 of Figure 6.

[0079] For example, in block 722, AP MLD receives a fourth EAPoL message from STA MLD. In block 724, in response to the fourth EAPoL message, AP MLD and STA MLD exchange one or more encrypted packets, each of which includes a temporary key (TK) generated based on PTK.

[0080] Figure 8 illustrates a flowchart of an example process 800 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 800 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., one of STA 104 of Figure 1 or wireless communication device 400 of Figure 4) operating as a STA or within a STA. In some instances, the STA may be a STA MLD. Alternatively, the STA may be part of a STA MLD.

[0081] In some embodiments, at block 810, the STA MLD receives a beacon frame from an access point (AP) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a respective AP of the AP MLD. At block 820, the STA MLD sends an association request to the AP MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a respective STA of the STA MLD. At block 830, the STA MLD generates one or more cryptographic keys during a handshake operation with the AP MLD, the one or more cryptographic keys being configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD. At block 840, the STA MLD verifies the plurality of AP MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys.

[0082] Figure 9A illustrates a flowchart illustrating an example operation 900 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 900 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., STA 104 of Figure 1 or wireless communication device 400 of Figure 4) operating as a STA or within a STA. In some instances, the STA may be a STA MLD. Alternatively, the STA may be part of a STA MLD. In some embodiments, operation 900 begins after verifying a plurality of AP MAC addresses at block 840 of Figure 8.

[0083] For example, in block 902, STA MLD generates a pair of transient keys (PTK) based at least in part on one or more cryptographic keys. In block 904, STA MLD exchanges one or more encrypted packets with AP MLD, each of which includes a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.

[0084] FIG9B illustrates a flowchart of an example operation 910 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 910 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., one of STA 104 in FIG1 or wireless communication device 400 in FIG4) operating as a STA or within a STA. In some instances, the STA may be a STA MLD. Alternatively, the STA may be part of a STA MLD. In some embodiments, operation 910 begins after verifying a plurality of AP MAC addresses at block 840 in FIG8.

[0085] For example, in block 912, the STA MLD receives an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message from the AP MLD on a first local area network (LAN). In block 914, in response to the first EAPoL message, the STA MLD sends a second EAPoL message to the AP MLD. In some implementations, the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce), and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). In some instances, the PTK is generated at least in part based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), an ANonce, or a SNonce. In some other instances, the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses. In some implementations, the STA MLD receives a third EAPoL message from the AP MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses includes confirming that each second MAC address matches a corresponding one of the AP MAC addresses.

[0086] FIG9C illustrates a flowchart of an example operation 920 for wireless communication supporting multi-link communication. In some embodiments, operation 920 may be performed by a wireless communication device (e.g., one of STA 104 in FIG1 or wireless communication device 400 in FIG4) operating as a STA or within a STA. In some instances, the STA may be a STA MLD. Alternatively, the STA may be part of a STA MLD. In some embodiments, operation 920 begins after verifying a plurality of AP MAC addresses at block 840 in FIG8.

[0087] For example, in block 922, STA MLD sends a fourth EAPoL message to AP MLD. In block 924, STA MLD and AP MLD exchange one or more encrypted packets, each of which includes a temporary key (TK) generated based on PTK.

[0088] Examples of embodiments are described in the following numbered clauses: 1. A method for wireless communication performed by an access point (AP) multilink device (MLD), the method comprising: sending a beacon frame to a radio station (STA) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a respective AP of the AP MLD; receiving an association request from the STA MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a respective STA of the STA MLD; generating one or more encryption keys during a handshake operation with the STA MLD, the one or more encryption keys being configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD; and verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys. 2. The method according to paragraph 1 further includes: generating a pairwise transient key (PTK) at least partially based on the one or more cryptographic keys; and exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the STA MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. 3. The method according to paragraph 2 further includes: sending a first Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message to the STA MLD; and responding to the first EAPoL message by receiving a second EAPoL message from the STA MLD. 4. The method according to paragraph 3, wherein: the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). 5. The method according to any one or more of paragraphs 2-4, wherein the generation of the PTK is at least partially based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce. 6. The method according to Clause 4, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data envelopes (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses includes: confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the STA MAC addresses. 7. The method according to Clause 6, further comprising: sending a third EAPoL message to the STA MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses. 8. The method according to Clause 7, further comprising: receiving a fourth EAPoL message from the STA MLD; and responding to the fourth EAPoL message by exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the STA MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.9. A wireless communication device, comprising: at least one modem; at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one modem; and at least one memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor and storing processor-readable code, the processor-readable code being configured, when executed by the at least one processor in conjunction with the at least one modem, to: send a beacon frame to a radio station (STA) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a respective AP of the AP MLD; receive an association request from the STA MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a respective STA of the STA MLD; generate one or more encryption keys during a handshake operation with the STA MLD, the one or more encryption keys being configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD; and verify the plurality of STA MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys. 10. The wireless communication device according to Article 9, wherein the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: generate a pairwise transient key (PTK) at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys; and exchange one or more encrypted packets with the STA MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. 11. The wireless communication device according to Article 10, wherein the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: send a first Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message to the STA MLD; and receive a second EAPoL message from the STA MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. 12. The wireless communication device according to Article 11, wherein: the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). 13. The wireless communication device according to any one or more of Clauses 10-12, wherein the generation of the PTK is at least partially based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce. 14. The wireless communication device according to Clause 12, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of STA MAC addresses includes: confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the STA MAC addresses.15. The wireless communication device according to Article 14, wherein the execution of processor-readable code is also configured to: send a third EAPoL message to the STA MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses. 16. A method for wireless communication performed by a wireless station (STA) multilink device (MLD), the method comprising: receiving a beacon frame from an access point (AP) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a respective AP of the AP MLD; sending an association request to the AP MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a respective STA of the STA MLD; generating one or more encryption keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD during a handshake operation with the AP MLD; and verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys. 17. The method according to Section 16 further comprises: generating a pairwise transient key (PTK) at least in part based on the one or more cryptographic keys; and exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the AP MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. 18. The method according to any one or more of Sections 16 to 17 further comprises: receiving an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message from the AP MLD on a first local area network (LAN); and responding to the first EAPoL message by sending a second EAPoL message to the AP MLD. 19. The method according to Section 18, wherein: the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). 20. The method according to any one or more of Clauses 17-19, wherein the generation of the PTK is at least partially based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce. 21. The method according to Clause 19, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses. 22. The method according to Clause 21, further comprising: receiving a third EAPoL message from the AP MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the AP MAC addresses.23. The method pursuant to Section 22 also includes: sending a fourth EAPoL message to the AP MLD; and exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the AP MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. 24. A wireless communication device comprising: at least one modem; at least one processor communicatively coupled to the at least one modem; and at least one memory communicatively coupled to the at least one processor and storing processor-readable code, the processor-readable code being configured, when executed by the at least one processor in conjunction with the at least one modem, to: receive a beacon frame from an access point (AP) MLD, the beacon frame including a plurality of AP Media Access Control (MAC) addresses belonging to a respective AP of the AP MLD; send an association request to the AP MLD, the association request including a plurality of STA MAC addresses belonging to a respective STA of the STA MLD; during a handshake operation with the AP MLD, generate one or more encryption keys configured to encrypt communication between the AP MLD and the STA MLD; and verify the plurality of AP MAC addresses at least in part based on the one or more encryption keys. 25. A separate wireless communication device according to Article 24, wherein the execution of processor-readable code is also configured to: generate a pair of transient keys (PTKs) at least in part based on the handshake operation; and exchange one or more encrypted packets with the AP MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK. 26. A wireless communication device according to any one or more of Articles 24-25, wherein the execution of processor-readable code is also configured to: receive an Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message on a first local area network (LAN) from the AP MLD; and send a second EAPoL message to the AP MLD in response to the first EAPoL message. 27. A wireless communication device according to Article 26, wherein: the first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC). 28. The wireless communication device according to any one or more of Clauses 25-27, wherein the generation of the PTK is at least partially based on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce. 29. The wireless communication device according to Clause 27, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the STA MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses.30. The wireless communication device according to Article 29, wherein the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: receive a third EAPoL message from the AP MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the AP MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses, wherein verifying the plurality of AP MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the AP MAC addresses.

[0089] As used herein, the phrase “at least one” in a list of items means any combination of such items, including a single member. For example, “at least one of a, b, or c” is intended to cover: a, b, c, ab, ac, bc, and abc.

[0090] The various illustrative logics, logic blocks, modules, circuits, and algorithmic processes described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented as electronic hardware, computer software, or a combination of both. The interchangeability of hardware and software has been generally described in the functional specifications and illustrated in the various illustrative components, blocks, modules, circuits, and processes described above. Whether such functionality is implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints imposed on the entire system.

[0091] Hardware and data processing means for implementing the various illustrative logics, logic blocks, modules, and circuits described herein in conjunction with the various forms disclosed herein may be implemented or executed by a general-purpose single-chip or multi-chip processor, a digital signal processor (DSP), an application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC), a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) or other programmable logic device, individual gate or transistor logic, individual hardware components, or any combination thereof. A general-purpose processor may be a microprocessor, or any general-purpose processor, controller, microcontroller, or state machine. A processor may also be implemented as a combination of computing devices, such as a combination of a DSP and a microprocessor, multiple microprocessors, a combination of one or more microprocessors with a DSP core, or any other such configuration. In some embodiments, specific processes and methods may be performed by circuitry dedicated to a given function.

[0092] In one or more embodiments, the described functions can be implemented in hardware, digital electronic circuits, computer software, firmware (including the structures disclosed in this specification and their equivalents) or any combination thereof. The embodiments of the subject matter described in this specification can also be implemented as one or more computer programs, that is, one or more computer program instruction modules encoded on a computer storage medium for execution by a data processing device or for controlling its operation.

[0093] If implemented in software, such functions can be stored as one or more instructions or codes on or transmitted via a computer-readable medium. The processing of the methods or algorithms disclosed herein can be implemented in a processor-executable software module that can reside on a computer-readable medium. Computer-readable media includes computer storage media and communication media, with communication media including any media capable of transferring computer programs from one place to another. Storage media can be any available media accessible to a computer. For example, and not as a limitation, such computer-readable media can include RAM, ROM, EEPROM, CD-ROM or other optical disk memory, magnetic disk memory or other magnetic storage devices, or any other media that can be used to store required program code in the form of instructions or data structures and is accessible to a computer. Furthermore, any connection can be properly referred to as computer-readable media. As used herein, magnetic disks and optical disks include optical discs (CDs), laser discs, optical discs, digital versatile discs (DVDs), floppy disks, and Blu-ray discs, wherein magnetic disks typically reproduce data magnetically, while optical discs reproduce data optically using lasers. The aforementioned combinations should also be included within the scope of computer-readable media. Furthermore, the operation of a method or algorithm may reside as one or any combination or set of code and instructions on machine-readable and computer-readable media that can be incorporated into a computer program product.

[0094] Various modifications to the embodiments described herein will be apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein can be applied to other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of this application. Therefore, the scope of the patent application is not intended to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but rather to conform to the broadest scope consistent with the content of this application, the principles and novel features disclosed herein. 100: Wireless communication network 102: Access point (AP) 104: Station (STA) 106: Communication link 108: Coverage area 110: Direct wireless link 200: Protocol data unit (PDU) 202: Preamble signal 204: PHY payload 206: Traditional short training field (L-STF) 208: Traditional long training field (L-LTF) 210: Traditional signal field (L-SIG) 212: Non-traditional field 310: L-SIG 322: Data Rate Field 324: Reserved Bits 326: Length Field 328: Parity Bits 330: Tail Field 400: Wireless Communication Equipment 402: Modem 404: Radio 406: Wireless Communication Equipment 408: Memory 500: Operation 600: Procedure 610: Block 620: Block 630: Block 640: Block 700: Operation 702: Block 704: Block 710: Operation 712: Block 714: Block 720: Operation 722: Block 724: Block 800: Operation 810: Block 820: Block 830: Block 840: Block 900: Operation 902: Block 904: Block 910: Operation 912: Block 914: Block 920: Operation 922: Block 924: Block [Simplified Explanation of the Diagram]

[0096] Figure 1 illustrates a schematic diagram of an example wireless communication network.

[0097] Figure 2 illustrates an example Protocol Data Unit (PDU) that can be used for communication between an Access Point (AP) and several Stations (STA).

[0098] Figure 3 illustrates an example field in the PDU of Figure 2.

[0099] Figure 4 illustrates a block diagram of an example wireless communication device.

[0100] Figure 5 illustrates a timing diagram describing an example operation of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0101] Figure 6 illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0102] Figure 7A illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0103] Figure 7B illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0104] Figure 7C illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0105] Figure 8 illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0106] Figure 9A illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0107] Figure 9B illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication.

[0108] Figure 9C illustrates a flowchart of an example process of wireless communication that supports multi-link communication. [Biomaterial Storage]

[0109] Domestic storage information (please note in order of storage institution, date, and number): None. International storage information (please note in order of storage country, institution, date, and number): None.

Claims

1. A method for wireless communication performed by a first multilink device (MLD), the method comprising the steps of: at the first multilink device (MLD), transmitting a beacon frame to a second MLD, the beacon frame including a first plurality of media access control (MAC) addresses of a corresponding first device associated with the second MLD; at the first MLD, transmitting an Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message, the EAPoL message including: A Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) that encapsulates a second plurality of MAC addresses associated with the second MLD; And at the first MLD, the first plurality of MAC addresses are verified at least in part based on the KDE by matching the first plurality of MAC addresses with the second plurality of MAC addresses encapsulated in the KDE.

2. The method as described in claim 1 also includes the steps of: sending a first local area network (LAN) Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message to the second MLD; and receiving a second EAPoL message from the second MLD in response to the first EAPoL message.

3. The method as described in claim 2, wherein: The first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC).

4. The method as described in claim 3, wherein the generation of the PTK is based at least in part on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce.

5. The method as described in claim 3, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing a bit address of the second MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein the step of verifying the first plurality of MAC addresses includes the following steps: confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the MAC addresses.

6. The method as described in claim 5 also includes: Send a third EAPoL message to the second MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing one address and a plurality of second MAC addresses of the first MLD.

7. The method as described in claim 6 also includes the steps of: receiving a fourth EAPoL message from the second MLD; and in response to the fourth EAPoL message exchanging one or more encrypted packets with the second MLD, each of the one or more encrypted packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.

8. A first multi-link device (MLD), comprising: At least one data center; At least one processor is communicatively coupled to the at least one modem; and at least one memory, communicatively coupled to the at least one processor and storing processor-readable code, which, when executed by the at least one processor in conjunction with the at least one modem, is configured to: at the first multi-link device (MLD), send a beacon frame to a second MLD, the beacon frame including a first plurality of media access control (MAC) addresses of a corresponding first device associated with the second MLD; at the first MLD, send an Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message, the EAPoL message including: a Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) encapsulating a second plurality of MAC addresses associated with the second MLD; And at the first MLD, the first plurality of MAC addresses are verified at least in part based on the KDE by matching the first plurality of MAC addresses with the second plurality of MAC addresses encapsulated in the KDE.

9. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 8, wherein the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: send a first local area network (LAN) Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message to the second MLD; and in response to the first EAPoL message, receive a second EAPoL message from the second MLD.

10. The wireless communication device as described in claim 9, wherein: The first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC).

11. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 10, wherein the generation of the PTK is based at least in part on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce.

12. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 10, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing an address of the second MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses, wherein the step of verifying the first plurality of MAC addresses includes the following steps: confirming that each of the first MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the MAC addresses.

13. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 12, wherein the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to send a third EAPoL message to the second MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing one address of the first MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses.

14. A method for wireless communication performed by a first multilink device (MLD), the method comprising the steps of: at the first multilink device (MLD), receiving a beacon frame from a second MLD, the beacon frame including a first plurality of media access control (MAC) addresses of a corresponding first device associated with the second MLD; at the first MLD, receiving an Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message, the EAPoL message including: A Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) that encapsulates a second plurality of MAC addresses associated with the second MLD; And at the first MLD, the first plurality of MAC addresses are verified at least in part based on the KDE by matching the first plurality of MAC addresses with the second plurality of MAC addresses encapsulated in the KDE.

15. The method as described in claim 14 also includes the steps of: receiving an Extensible Authentication Protocol over a First Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message from the second MLD; and responding to the first EAPoL message by sending a second EAPoL message to the second MLD.

16. The method as described in claim 15, wherein: The first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC).

17. The method as described in claim 16, wherein the generation of the PTK is based at least in part on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce.

18. The method as described in claim 16, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing a first MLD address and a plurality of first MAC addresses.

19. The method as described in claim 18 also includes: Receive a third EAPoL message from the second MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing an address and a plurality of second MAC addresses of the second MLD, wherein verifying the first plurality of MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the MAC addresses.

20. The method as described in claim 19 also includes the steps of: sending a fourth EAPoL message to the second MLD; and exchanging one or more sealed packets with the second MLD, each of the one or more sealed packets including a temporary key (TK) generated based on the PTK.

21. A first multi-link device (MLD), comprising: At least one data center; At least one processor is communicatively coupled to the at least one modem; and at least one memory, communicatively coupled to the at least one processor and storing processor-readable code, which, when executed by the at least one processor in conjunction with the at least one modem, is configured to: at the first multi-link device (MLD), receive a beacon frame from a second MLD, the beacon frame including a first plurality of media access control (MAC) addresses of a corresponding first device associated with the second MLD; at the first MLD, receive an Extensible Authentication Protocol over a Local Area Network (LAN) (EAPoL) message, the EAPoL message including: a Key Data Encapsulation (KDE) encapsulating a second plurality of MAC addresses associated with the second MLD; And at the first MLD, the first plurality of MAC addresses are verified at least in part based on the KDE by matching the first plurality of MAC addresses with the second plurality of MAC addresses encapsulated in the KDE.

22. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 21, wherein the execution of the processor-readable code is also configured to: receive a first local area network (LAN) Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) (EAPoL) message from the second MLD; and in response to the first EAPoL message send a second EAPoL message to the second MLD.

23. The wireless communication device as described in claim 22, wherein: The first EAPoL message includes an AP nonce (ANonce); and the second EAPoL message includes a STA nonce (SNonce) and a message integrity code (MIC).

24. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 23, wherein the generation of the PTK is based at least in part on a pseudo-random function (PRF), a pairwise master key (PMK), the ANonce, or the SNonce.

25. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 23, wherein the second EAPoL message also includes a set of first key data encapsulations (KDEs) representing the address of the first MLD and a plurality of first MAC addresses.

26. The wireless communication device as claimed in claim 25, wherein the execution of processor-readable code is also configured to: receive a third EAPoL message from the second MLD, the third EAPoL message including a group temporary key (GTK) and a set of second KDEs representing the address of the second MLD and a plurality of second MAC addresses, wherein verifying the first plurality of MAC addresses includes confirming that each of the second MAC addresses matches a corresponding one of the MAC addresses.

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