System and method of locating, authenticating, and securing network devices via muon detection

Abstract

Described herein are systems and methods of locating, authenticating and securing network devices via muon detection. In one embodiment, there is provided a system (100) of networked devices (102-106), wherein each device (102-106) comprises a muon detector (102A-106A) configured to detect the arrival of muons and generate a stream of temporally ordered muon events. Information contained in the stream of temporally ordered muon events is able to be used to determine the relative positions of the devices (102-106), to synchronize local clocks at the devices (102-106) and to facilitate authentication of communications between the devices (102-106) by using the event time of intersecting muon events as a True Random Numbers.

Description

SYSTEM AND METHOD OF LOCATING, AUTHENTICATING, AND SECURING NETWORK DEVICES VIA MUON DETECTIONFIELD OF THE INVENTION

[0001] The present application relates to data security and in particular to a system for securely authenticating data transfer between network devices.

[0002] Embodiments of the present invention are particularly adapted for securely authenticating data transfer between devices through generation of true random numbers utilizing cosmic ray muon timestamps. However, it will be appreciated that the invention is applicable in broader contexts and other applications.BACKGROUND

[0003] The need for more features and flexibility in personal area networks (e.g. offices, homes, factories, warehouses, construction and mine sites) see large numbers of devices interconnected in a large network. An example of a large-scale network is a ubiquitous sensor network (USN). Large-scale communication infrastructure is not required for a USN and instead, this network spontaneously creates new functions and services based on information collected through machine-to-machine (M2M) communication from many small sensor devices installed in several locations. USN sensors (or loT) devices have built-in wireless equipment for near-field communication (NFC), allowing devices to communicate directly with each other on an ad-hoc basis to form a network and collect data observed by sensors by using multi-hop routing. Examples of potential applications of USNs include distributed sensors for remote monitoring in agriculture, asset management and control, home / office / site security, and building automation system (BAS).

[0004] Each device within a network represents a potential vulnerability to remotely hijacking of the entire system from unauthorized third party access to any one device. For example, in the case of BAS, by taking control over a single device, an attacker can gain access to vital data such as a building's air conditioning and ventilation system, blueprints for floors and roofs, and even water pipe diagrams. It is also possible to shut down the server from a remote location by turning off one section of the system, like the air-conditioning system. In other words, if there is even one vulnerable terminal or access point, the entire system could be threatened or controlled from a remote location.

[0005] One of the biggest threats for such a network is the presence of third parties who could infiltrate the system to inject malicious data into the network intentionally. Such an intrusion into sensor terminals usually takes place after acquiring leaked passwords and ID lists (including security keys). As the number of terminals increases, the user IDs and passwords that need to be managed inflate dramatically. Additionally, these passwords should be frequently changed since the threat of cyber-attacks on the computer security system originates in the leakage of such expired passwords. It is not trivial to establish a common security infrastructure to distribute the passwords shared among all sensor nodes (terminals), and often, there are no procedures to change shared passwords frequently (which would make these terminals more difficult to crack).

[0006] Recently, work has been done by Professor Hiroyuki K. M. Tanaka of the University of Tokyo to harness the random nature of muons for the purpose of positioning systems (see Reference 1 ), time synchronization (see Reference 2) and device authentication (see Reference 3). However, this prior work is primarily academic in nature. Future advancements of the concepts are needed to develop the technology into practical real-world systems.

[0007] Any discussion of the background art throughout the specification should in no way be considered as an admission that such art is widely known or forms part of common general knowledge in the field.SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION

[0008] In accordance with a first aspect of the present invention, there is provided a system for authenticating communications between two or more devices on a network, the system comprising: a first authenticator module associated with a first device on the network, the first authenticator module comprising: a first muon detector configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons; a first clock device configured to generate a first local clock signal; a first processor configured to: a) synchronise the digital pulses with the first local clock signal;b) generate a first timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the first muon detector and the local clock signal; c) generate a first password based on the first timestamp; and a first communications interface configured to transmit the first password to a second device on the network; a second authenticator module associated with the second device, the second authenticator module comprising: a second muon detector configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons; a second clock device configured to generate a second local clock signal that is synchronized with the first local clock signal; a second communications interface configured to receive the first password; a second processor configured to: a) synchronise the digital pulses with the second local clock signal; b) generate a second timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the second muon detector and the second local clock signal; c) generate a second password based on the second timestamp; d) compare the first and second passwords; wherein, upon detection of the first and second passwords matching, communications between the first and second devices is authenticated.

[0009] In some embodiments, the first and second muon detectors comprise Silicon Photomultiplier (SiPM) devices.

[0010] In some embodiments, the first and second passwords represent truncated or filtered versions of the first and second timestamps respectively. In some embodiments, the first password is compared with a plurality of second passwords by the second processor. In some embodiments, the plurality of second passwords are selected to be within a predetermined time window of the time of generation of the first password. In someembodiments, the predetermined time window includes time before and after the time of generation of the first password.

[0011] In some embodiments, the distance between the first and second devices is known. In some embodiments, the distance between the first and second devices is determined, at least in part, based on differences in muon timing detected at the first and second muon detectors. In some embodiments, the distance between first and second devices is determined from location signals from respective GPS or GNSS devices associated with the first and second devices.

[0012] In some embodiments, the first and second passwords are retained in memory for a period of time while the first and second devices are detected to be located greater than a threshold distance from each other. In some embodiments, the first and second passwords are shared when devices are detected to be within a threshold distance from each other.

[0013] In some embodiments, passwords are transferred between network devices at a predetermined period of time. In some embodiments, the predetermined period of time is dependent on a distance between the first and second devices.

[0014] In some embodiments, the first and second authenticators have a unique timecode indicative of a time in which the authenticator detects a first muon event.

[0015] In some embodiments, the first and second authenticator modules each include an orientation sensor to determine an orientation of the respective authenticator module.

[0016] In some embodiments, the first and / or second devices include a mobile device.

[0017] In some embodiments, the first and second authenticator modules are integrated into the first and second devices respectively. In other embodiments, the first and second authenticator modules are connectable with the first and second devices respectively.

[0018] In some embodiments, the first and second authenticator modules are configured to send, receive and compare passwords to perform bidirectional authentication of devices.

[0019] In some embodiments, the first clock device comprises a GPS Disciplined Oscillator (GPS-DO) device.

[0020] In accordance with a second aspect of the present invention, there is provided an authenticator for authenticating devices on a network, the authenticator comprising: a muon detector configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons;a clock device configured to generate a local clock signal; a processor configured to: a) synchronise the digital pulses with the local clock signal; b) generate a first timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the muon detector and the local clock signal; and c) generate a first password based on the first timestamp; and a communications interface configured to transmit the first password to other devices on the network and to receive a second password from other devices on the network; wherein, upon receipt of a second password from another device on the network, the processor is configured to perform an authentication process by comparing the first password with the second password, and wherein communication between the devices are authenticated when the first and second passwords match.

[0021] In accordance with a third aspect of the present invention, there is provided a device adapted to be connected to or incorporating therein an authenticator according to the second aspect.

[0022] in accordance with a fourth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a method of authenticating devices on a network, the method comprising the steps: at a first device on the network: detecting the arrival of muons at a first muon detector associated with the first device and, in response generating digital pulses; generating a first timestamp based on digital pulses generated by the muon detector and a local clock signal that is synchronised with local clock signals of other devices on the network; and generating a first password based on the first timestamp; transmitting the first password to one or more other devices on the network; at a second device on the network: receiving the first password; comparing the first password with a second password generated based on muons detected at a second muon detector associated with the second device;authenticating communication between the first and second devices when the first password matches the second password.

[0023] In accordance with a fifth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a system of networked devices, wherein each device comprises a muon detector configured to detect the arrival of muons and generate a stream of temporally ordered muon events, wherein information contained in the stream of temporally ordered muon events is able to be used to determine the relative positions of the devices, to synchronize local clocks at the devices and to facilitate authentication of communications between the devices by using the event time of intersecting muon events as a True Random Numbers.

[0024] In accordance with a sixth aspect of the present invention, there is provided a door lock system for a door, the system comprising: a door password authentication module mounted on or within the door and configured to detect the arrival of muons and, in response, generate one or more passwords based on a detected time of arrival of muons; an electromechanical actuator adapted to selectively lock or unlock a locking mechanism of the door in response to a control signal; and a communications module configured to communicate with one or more devices across a network to send and receive passwords from the muon detector and to receive control signals from the one or more devices, wherein the one or more devices each comprise a device password authentication module for generating passwords based on timing of detected muons; wherein upon detection of a password from one of the one or more devices that matches a password generated by the door password authentication module, the door password authentication module authenticates that device to allow it to remotely send a control signal via the communications module to the electromechanical actuator to lock or unlock the locking mechanism.

[0025] In some embodiments, the communications module communicates with the one or more devices via an intermediate wireless network.

[0026] In some embodiments, the communications module communicates with the one or more devices via a cellular network.

[0027] In accordance with a seventh aspect of the present invention, there is provided a wireless network comprising a plurality of networked devices, wherein each networked device comprises a muon-based authentication module configured to: detect the arrival of muons and generate timestamps based on the muon arrival times; generate one or more passwords based on the generated timestamps; send and receive passwords to others of the networked devices over a network; compare the locally generated passwords with passwords received from others of the networked devices; and upon detecting one or more matched passwords, authenticating data communications between the networked devices for which the one or more passwords matched.

[0028] In some embodiments, the network is a home network comprising domestic network devices. In other embodiments, the network is an office network comprising office network devices. In other embodiments, the network is a wireless network within an automated or semi-automated industrial facility.

[0029] In some embodiments, the network comprises a mine site and wherein the networked devices comprise one or more of mining machines, mining vehicles and / or mobile devices carried by mine personnel.

[0030] In some embodiments, one or more of the networked devices comprises a reference authentication module comprising a large area scintillator device configured to detect muons and generate one or more passwords based on timestamps corresponding to detected muon arrival times. The reference authentication modules may comprise scintillators having an area greater than 20x20 cm2. In other embodiments, reference authentication modules may comprise scintillators having an area greater than 10x10 cm2. In some embodiments, the reference authentication modules act as repeaters for authenticating devices located at large distances from each other.

[0031] In some embodiments, a muon-based authentication module of a first networked device is adapted to authenticate communication between two other networked devices which are located sufficiently far from one another that they cannot detect coincident muon events.BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE FIGURES

[0032] Example embodiments of the disclosure will now be described, by way of example only, with reference to the accompanying drawings in which:Figure 1 a schematic illustration of a system of networked devices, each having an associated muon detector for detecting incident muon events;Figure 2 is a schematic illustration of two muon-based authenticator modules associated with two of the networked devices of Figure 1 ;Figure 3 is a process flow diagram illustrating the primary steps in a method of updating a password using the system of Figure 1 ;Figure 4 is a process flow diagram illustrating the primary steps in a method of logging into a device within the system of Figure 1 ;Figure 5 is a table listing example muon event data acquired in a period of about 4 seconds, the table illustrates timestamps and corresponding passwords;Figure 6 is a process flow diagram illustrating the primary steps in a method of authenticating devices on a network;Figure 7 is a schematic illustration of a smart door locking system that utilizes muonbased authentication between the door and a mobile device;Figure 8 is a schematic illustration of a home network comprising a plurality of loT connected devices comprising muon-based authenticator modules; andFigure 9 is a schematic side view of a mine site comprising a plurality of vehicles and personnel carrying muon-based authenticator modules configured to communicate with each other to provide muometric positioning within the mine site.DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION

[0033] With reference initially to Figure 1 , described herein is a system 100 of networked devices 102-106. The devices 102-106 may include any electronic devices capable of being connected across a wired or wireless network, including mobile devices such as smartphones,tablet computers, laptop computers, servers, modems, routers, network repeaters, appliances and other Internet of Things (loT) connected devices. In system 100, each device 102-106 comprises a muon detector 102A-106A configured to detect the arrival of muons (p) and generate a stream of temporally ordered muon events. The information contained in the stream of temporally ordered muon events is able to be used to:• determine the relative or absolute positions of devices 102-106;• synchronize local clocks at the devices; and• facilitate authentication of communications between the devices by using the event time of intersecting muon events as True Random Numbers (TRNs).

[0034] As described below, the muon detectors 102A-106A may form part of an authenticator module that is associated with each device 102-106. In some embodiments, the authenticator modules are integrated within the devices themselves and may leverage the hardware of the devices (e.g., the processor of a smartphone). In other embodiments, the authenticator modules are connectible with the respective devices by way of an electrical connection such as USB connector or wireless connection such as Wi-Fi (IEEE 802.11 ) or Bluetooth (IEEE 802.15.1 ).

[0035] More specific details about the implementation and operation of system 100 are set out below.System overview

[0036] Referring now to Figure 2, system 100 is capable of authenticating communications between two or more devices (e.g. devices 102-106) on a network. In Figure 2, two devices 102 and 103 are illustrated. Each device 102 and 103 includes a respective authenticator module 202 and 203 for performing the authentication process described below.

[0037] In the illustrated scenario of Figure 2, authenticator module 202 associated with device 102 performs a password sending process and authenticator module 203 associated with device 103 performs a password receiving and authentication process. However, it will be appreciated that each authenticator module is capable of performing the reciprocal process of sending / receiving passwords and performing password authentication. In some embodiments, bidirectional authentication of a device can occur. Similarly, although only authentication between two modules 202 and 203 is illustrated and described, it will be appreciated that eachdevice in the network may include an associated authenticator module capable of performing the process described herein.

[0038] First authenticator module 202 comprises first muon detector 102A, which is configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons. Muon detectors 102A- 106A may comprise a scintillation detector that consists of a photodetector (PD) connected to a plastic scintillator sheet via an acrylic light guide or wavelength shift (WLS) fibers. Preferably, the photodetector comprises a Silicon Photomultiplier (SiPM) device. SiPMs comprise an array of single-photon avalanche diodes (SPADs) integrated on a common silicon substrate. Each SPAD is capable of detecting photons and, in response, produce an electrical signal. Each SPAD is preferably operated in Geiger mode to detect individual photons.

[0039] In some embodiments, muon detectors 102A-106A comprise smart detector devices such as those described in PCT Patent Application Publication WO 2021 / 046602 entitled Sensor and Coincidence Radiation Detection Device. In some embodiments, the PDs may comprise photodiodes such as a Si Pin Photodiode. Suitable scintillator devices may comprise organic solids such as Poly vinyl Toluene, organic liquids, optical fibres such as a Wavelength Shifting (WLS) fibres and other scintillating fibres, Inorganic devices such as Nal(TI), Csl, LYSO, solid state devices such as High-Purity Germanium (HPGe), or other devices such as drift tubes Geiger Muller (GM).

[0040] First authenticator module 202 also comprises a first clock device 206 configured to generate a first local clock signal 208. By way of example, first clock device 206 may comprise an oven-controlled crystal oscillator device. However, first clock device 206 may comprise or be associated with other devices such as GPS Disciplined Oscillator (GPS-DO), UTC, other crystal oscillators such as TCXO (Temperature compensated crystal oscillator) and atomic clocks such as a Rubidium atomic clock. In some embodiments, first clock device 206 may leverage a GPS device 240 described below.

[0041] A GPD-DO is a timing device that combines a GPS receiver with a stable oscillator, such as a quartz or rubidium oscillator. The GPSDO uses signals from GPS satellites to continuously adjust and correct the oscillator, ensuring precise timekeeping and frequency stability. The GPS receiver generates a 1 Pulse Per Second (1 PPS) signal, which is synchronized to GPS time. This 1 PPS signal may be synchronized with the National MarineElectronics Association (NMEA) data output and is generally accurate to within a few nanoseconds of Coordinated Universal Time (UTC).

[0042] Authenticator module 202 further comprises comparator 210, a time to digital converter (TDC) 212, a pulse counter (scaler) 214, a processor 216 such as a CPU or FPGA, and a communications interface 218 such as an I / O bridge to Wi-Fi / BLE (Bluetooth Low Energy). In some embodiments, some or all of these components are integrated onto a single integrated circuit 220 or microprocessor. In some embodiments, the functions of these components may be collectively referred to as being performed by processor 216. In some embodiments, some of all of these components may leverage the equivalent components of the associated network device. By way of example, where the network device is a smartphone, the smartphone’s processor may be used as processor 216 and the smartphone’s wireless adaptor may be used as communications interface 218.

[0043] The TDC 212 measures the time interval (DTtwhere / is the event number) between the moment of PD outputs and the moment when the closest edge of the pulses (e.g. 10 MHz) outputted from the local clock 206 (e.g. GPS-DO). The time range of the current TDC must be sufficiently longer than 100 ns to measure the period of these (10 MHz) pulses. By counting the number of 10 MHz pulses ( o) using pulse counter 214, and adding t, to Mo x 100 ns, the muon’s time of arrival at the authenticator module 102 can be acquired. As is described later, the timestamp, To+ Nwx 100 ns + DT,, is filtered or truncated to update the password, where To is defined as time zero (a parameter which can be arbitrarily set by a user).

[0044] Processor 216 is configured to perform a number of functions including to synchronize the digital pulses generated by muon detector 102A with first local clock signal 208 and to generate a first timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by first muon detector 102A and local clock signal 208. By way of example, the timestamp may be represented as a 14 digit number to represent time in units picoseconds. By way of example, a timestamp may be “58,821 ,295,602,123” (see Figure 5). However, it will be appreciated that timestamps of other length may be used.

[0045] Processor 216 then generates a first password based on the first timestamp. The password typically represents a truncated or filtered version of the timestamp. It is typically not possible to use all of the digits of a timestamp. Due to the muon rate, the first 2 digits are likely to repeat over and over again. Therefore, in practice, the longest practical length of thepassword that can be created within an order of 10 seconds tends to be (12+k) digits long. Moreover, the last 5 digits are not likely to match between these detectors due to the fluctuations coming from the detector's jitter and the local clock’s granularity. Therefore, the most practically useful password length will be (7+k) digits. In this work, this process to cut off or truncate the first and the last digits from the timestamp is called “timestamp filtering”. Using the above example timestamp of “58,821 ,295,602.123”. a corresponding password might be generated as “821295” (see Figure 5).

[0046] The process of generating a password described above is repeated for multiple muon detection instances such that a temporal stream of passwords are generated over time. In T seconds, authenticator module 102 generates TNF timestamps, where N is the muon rate and R is the signal to (background) noise ratio. Thus, authenticator module 102 can generate TRN passwords at a rate of A / R1Hz.

[0047] Communications interface 218 is configured to transmit the generated first password (or set of passwords) to second authenticator module 202 associated with another device on the network. The communication of the password may be via any conventional wired or wireless communications protocol that is supported by the network such as Wi-Fi.

[0048] Authenticator module 202 preferably includes identical hardware to that of authenticator module 102 described above. In particular, authenticator module 202 comprises a second muon detector 103A configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons at the second device 103. A second clock device 222 is configured to generate a second local clock signal 224 that is synchronized with the first local clock signal 208. Authenticator module 102 further includes a comparator 226, a TDC 228, a pulse counter (scaler) 230, a processor 232 and a second communications interface 234 that is configured to receive the password transmitted from authenticator module 202. Some or all of these components are integrated onto an integrated circuit 236 or microprocessor. Again, the functions of these components may collectively be referred to as being performed by processor 232.

[0049] Processor 232 is configured to synchronize the digital pulses with the second local clock signal 224 and generate a second timestamp or set of timestamps based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the second muon detector and the second local clock signal 224. Based on the timestamp, processor 232 then generates a second password or set of passwords based on the second timestamp or set of timestamps ina similar manner to that described above. Like with the first password, the second password typically represents a truncated or filtered version of the second timestamp.

[0050] As authenticator module 203 is performing the authentication process, processor 232 is further configured to compare the first and second passwords. This is achieved using comparator 226. Comparator 2226 compares the first and second passwords (or equivalently the timestamps of the detected muon pulses) and determines whether the passwords sufficiently match (meaning the detected pulses correspond to a common muon event).

[0051] Upon detection of the first and second passwords matching, communications between the first and second devices is authenticated. In the above manner, the two authenticator modules 202 and 203 generate two identical TRNs without physical data transfer for the authentication process. Matching these TRNs at the different devices acts as a secure and private key for a traditional private-public key exchange of encrypted data (or securely connected communications) or a shared private key in a symmetric-key algorithm, or used as a one-time password for the most secure data transfer possible. The fact that a shared TRN exists is the foundational basis from which other encryption and security protocols can be derived.

[0052] A similar process occurs between other network devices using the associated authenticator modules. The process can occur in an ongoing manner such that passwords are repeatedly transmitted and compared for matching to continue authentication.

[0053] Although only two network devices are illustrated in Figure 2, it will be appreciated that the system can be scaled up to include any number of devices. In fact, the greater the number of devices, the better the network performance and security as network devices can be used as repeaters to update passwords across extended physical distances. The contrast is to existing networks that, for larger systems, have more points of vulnerability as access to one device compromises the rest.

[0054] In operation, if both network devices are sufficiently close (in the order of meters), then many of the incident muons should be coincidentally detected by both authenticator modules. Therefore, with sufficient clock synchronization, both authenticator modules should independently generate identical timestamps and passwords, which can be matched for authentication. This synchronization can be enhanced by utilizing a GPS-DO device as thelocal clock device for one or more of the authenticator modules as mentioned above. This increased temporal synchronization can enhance the range between devices up to about 180 meters and over a stable period of days.

[0055] The password update rate is proportional to the size of the detector. If the muon detector size is equivalent to the size of a smartphone (102cm2) or the size of the laptop PC (103cm2), the password update rate is ~1 x£T2Hz m-2or ~10x£T2Hz m-2respectively for a near-vertical arrangement, where D [m] is the distance between the detectors. As described below, since the practical number of digits that can be used for the passwords is 6-7 digits, R1W ^N must be smaller than 106-107. Otherwise, the number of trials to log into the device with the authenticator module exceeds the number of trials required for a brute force attacker to crack this password. This number limits the nodal distance of authenticator modules. However, provided the authenticator modules are within a few 10s of meters (like in most home networks), password update issue should not be a problem.

[0056] In some embodiments, the distance between the first and second network devices 102 and 103 is known. This distance knowledge may be determined using in-built Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) such as GPS devices 240 and 242 associated with the first and second devices 102 and 103. In some embodiments, GPS devices 240 and 242 are GPO-DO devices capable of operating as the local clock devices. Although GPS devices 240 and 242 are illustrated as being part of authenticator modules 202 and 203, it will be appreciated that devices within the associated network device 102 and 103 may be leveraged.

[0057] Preferably, the distance between the first and second devices is determined, at least in part, based on differences in muon timing detected at the first and second muon detectors. This is referred to as precision Muon Positioning System (MuPS) or Muometric Navigation System (MuWNS). This technique is described in Reference 1 below and the subject matter of this disclosure is incorporated herein by way of cross-reference.

[0058] Where system 100 includes two or more network devices, the devices and associated authenticator modules can be used as reference devices in a similar manner to satellites in a GNSS system. Where the muon detectors of the different network devices are highly time-correlated, relative distances between the devices can be ascertained by averaging the difference in muon arrival times for coincident events at the respectivedetectors. Time synchronization across the different devices of the network may be provided by regularly comparing the relative timing of incident muon events detected at different devices and resynchronizing local clocks accordingly. This concept is referred to as Cosmic Time Calibration (CTC) and is outlined in Reference 2 below. The subject matter of Reference 2 is incorporated herein by way of cross-reference.

[0059] The concepts of MuWNS and CTC rely on the fact that muons travel at approximately the speed of light and regularly occur at essentially all locations across the surface of the Earth. This accurately known speed and ubiquity of occurrence of events allows the relative timing of muon events observed at different locations to be used to reference clocks to an accuracy in the order of nanoseconds and to extrapolate distances between the associated detectors based on TOF differences. Where the position of one or more of the network devices is known to a high accuracy (e.g. referenced with a GNSS system), the remaining positions of devices in the network can be extrapolated.

[0060] With knowledge of the relative positioning or distance between network devices, various higher level functions can be performed. By way of example, different modes of operation of system 100 may be implemented depending on the distance between network devices.

[0061] In some embodiments, passwords are transferred between network devices or authenticated at a predetermined period of time. This predetermined period of time may dependent on a detected distance between the first and second devices. For devices located a further distance apart, passwords may be transferred or authenticated after a greater period of time than when the devices are closer.

[0062] With reference to Figure 3, in the context of a Microsoft Windows-based device, when an authenticator module requests to update a password, the following described method 300 is performed at each terminal. It will be appreciated that similar methods can be performed on other devices such as on Linux based devices.

[0063] At step 301 , a Local Security Authority (LSA) of the associated network device receives the password change request from the authenticator module. At step 302, the LSA looks up a password filter dynamic linking library (dll) (Passfilt.dll). At step 303, the authenticator module receives passwords generated from the local authenticator module and, at step 304, the password filter checks the received passwords for the new password.

[0064] At step 305, if successfully verified, the password is stored in a Security Account Manager (SAM) of the associated network device. Finally, at step 306, if it is successfully stored, the updated password is reported to Passfilt.dll, and the function PasswordChangeNotifyO is called.

[0065] The processes of method 300 are repeated every time the LSA detects the password change.

[0066] Referring now to Figure 4, when a user wants to log into one of the network devices, the following described method 400 is performed.

[0067] At step 401 , the login user's interface process is initiated at the device interface. This may be performed at the standard device login such as an unlock screen of a smartphone or at a dedicated network login interface. At step 402, Winlogon launches the LSA Logonllser function. On non-Windows based devices such as Linux devices, an alternate application service is called to launch the user logon software. At step 403, LSA looks up for an authentication package in a dynamic link library.

[0068] At step 404, the authenticator module provides the password, and Winlogon calls LsaCallAuthenticationPackage in LSASS (LSA Server Service) to check the user credentials. At step 406, after authentication, Winlogon continues the process to let the user log into the device.

[0069] The counter module is used for counting the number of incorrect password inputs to activate the system shutdown or the system lock process.

[0070] By following this process, while each device is protected by the frequently updated passwords, the user can safely log into each device with the user's terminal even without knowing the password. Therefore, the user does not have to remember all passwords associated with each device, or to frequently and manually change them.

[0071] System 100 may be operated in a number of different modes. Example operative modes of system 100 are summarized below.

[0072] Holdover Mode - This represents a normal mode of operation involving regular exchange of passwords for authentication. As mentioned above, at greater distances between two muon detectors, fewer coincident muon events are detected between the devices. Assuch, the number of passwords that can be authenticated reduces approximately as the square of that distance.

[0073] Holdover Mode leverages the fact that not every password generated by authenticator module 202 can be used as a password by authenticator module 203 to log into second network device 103. Referring now to Figure 5, there is illustrated an example temporally ordered list of muon events acquired in a period of about 2 seconds. The first, second, third, fourth and fifth columns respectively indicate the event ID, the timestamp generated by Detectori (D1 Time) of a first authenticator module, the timestamp generated by Detector2 (D2 Time) of a second authenticator module, the filtered D1 Time (PW1 ), and the filtered D2 Time (PW2). The shaded boxes indicate the timestamps matching within a time window of 1 microsecond (the second and the third columns), and the corresponding filtered timestamps (the fourth and the fifth columns). The boxes in the fifth column indicate the password set used for logging into the first authenticator module protected by the password indicated by the corresponding boxes in the fourth column.

[0074] As illustrated, due to a muon detector’s efficiency and background noise, not every first password matches every second password (non-shaded PW1 and PW2 in Figure 5). If the non-matching PW1 is set as a password of the first authenticator module, the user of network device 2 cannot log into network device 1 with PW2. In order to solve this problem, a password set (indicated by the boxes in the fifth column of Figure 5) that consists of several PW2 versions is retained in the random access memory (RAM) of the second authenticator module until the completion of the password verification process. In other words, a first password transmitted from the first network device is retained and compared with a plurality of second passwords generated at the second network device. This is the Holdover mode of operation. The set of passwords generated by the second device that are compared to the first password may comprise passwords generated within a predetermined time window of the time of generation of the first password. This predetermined time window may comprise time before and after the time of generation of the first password.

[0075] The half width of the password set is defined as the number of passwords (NPASSWORD) generated before and after the moment when PW1 is generated. Therefore, the total width of the password set is 2NPASSWORD. In the example case shown in Figure 5, 5 passwords are generated before the moment when PW1 is generated, and 5 passwords generated after the moment when PW1 is generated are retained in the second authenticatormodule. The second authenticator module uses this password to log into the first authenticator module to communicate with device 1 .

[0076] If the first authenticator module sets PW1 with the non-matching password (nonmarked PW1 in Figure 2), the user of network device 2 cannot log into network device 1 even with this password set. In this case, the second authenticator module needs to wait until the next password is set at the first authenticator module. These combined timestamps are used as a new password that replaces the previous password.

[0077] In some embodiments, system 100 may enter the Holdover mode while the first and second devices are detected to be located greater than a threshold distance from each other (where password refresh rate is lower and timing errors are higher). This is valuable where the network devices are mobile such as smartphones.

[0078] In other words, the first and / or second passwords are retained in memory for a period of time while the two devices are detected to be located greater than a threshold distance from each other (e.g. greater than 10 m from each other). Conversely, when the network devices are detected to be within a threshold distance from each other (e.g. 10 m), system 100 may operate in normal operation mode wherein a first and second passwords are shared and verified (either in a one-time fashion or repeatedly).

[0079] Disciplined Mode - This mode refers to the process when the local clocks of the different authenticator modules are synchronized. The timestamps used for password segments can be arbitrary, but these need to be well synchronized between authenticator modules. When initiating system 100, the local clocks between authenticator module 202 and 203 can be synchronized by using NTP server-free software such as NetTime (with an accuracy of at least 10 ms). When the local clock time has drifted, the local clocks must be resynchronized. This can be achieved using CTC technique described in Reference 2, which operates on the assumption that the two muon detectors are close enough that each incoming muon will pass through both detectors at almost exactly the same time (the time difference would be <100 ns within 30 meters).

[0080] As an example, assume that the coincidence rate of NW ~ 1 Hz and A / R1~ 4 Hz. First, for example, the coincidence events between the first and second muon detectors are searched for by second processor 232 within a time window of 1 ms (the first-stage time window). Within this time window, the accidental coincidence rate is 2 x 4 x 4 x 10'3=0.032 Hz. If this time window is 10 ms, the accidental coincidence rate will be 0.32 Hz. Once the coincidence events are found, the time window is set to be 1 microsecond (the second- stage time window). If no coincidence events with this second-step time window are observed for the time (7WAIT) that is sufficiently longer than the average time interval f1W1(e.g., 3 seconds), the time window will be set back to 1 ms.

[0081] This process is repeated until coincidence events are found in the time window of 100 ns. After this initiating process, system 100 transitions from the Disciplined Mode to theHoldover Mode. However, the calibration can be performed at predetermined periods of tj (e.g., Holdover Mode for 1 minute, and Disciplined Mode for 1 second) to re-synchronize the two detectors and to avoid errors coming from time drifting of the detector’s clock. This process can occur between any pair of devices on the network.

[0082] During the CTC-disciplined Mode, the passwords are not updated since the timestamps are physically exchanged via Wi-Fi and thus, the timestamp information can be susceptible to being cracked in principle. In other words, the timestamps used for CTC are not used for passwords.

[0083] Juxtapose Mode - This mode is performed where a user needs to be physically present to login to a device, to control the device, and to retain the OTP style authentication. In this case, the users can use the authenticator module (e.g. authenticator embedded smartphones) to log into their device. Since the password is used only one time for logging into a device (and is deleted right after use), an loT device in a home / office / factory network can be more strongly protected.

[0084] Juxtapose Mode may be activated upon detection of devices being within a predetermined threshold distance from each other (e.g. 1 meter). Alternatively or in addition, Juxtapose mode may be activated upon detection of a security issue such as a potential unauthorized access to the network or a predetermined number of incorrect login attempts at a device. In this latter scenario, switching to Juxtapose Mode requires the device to be brought into close proximity to another device for reauthentication.

[0085] Remote Mode - This mode involves giving up the One-Time Password (OTP) style authentication and using the last matched password until the next updating of the password. With this option, the system does not update the password of an authenticator module so thata user can use the previously generated password (which is transferred to their devices via an information traffic such as Wi-Fi) to log into their remote terminals until it is switched to the Juxtapose Mode.

[0086] Switching between Juxtapose Mode and Remote Mode may be made based on physical proximity (detection of devices within a predetermined threshold distance) or based on the level of security (e.g. detection of a potential security threat switches the system to Juxtapose Mode).

[0087] Hybrid Mode - This represents a hybrid of the Remote Mode and the Juxtapose Mode. An example of using the Hybrid Mode is in relation to a smart door lock system described below.

[0088] In some embodiments, the authenticator modules have a unique timecode indicative of a time in which the authenticator detects a first muon event. The first muon event may be the first event upon activation of the network device or authenticator module. The modules can be initially authenticated via a special initiation process (using NTP etc. at a millisecondlevel precision) to attain the “first-stage time window” which creates a unique timecode for each detector. Prior to entering a “Disciplined Mode” for time synchronization and subsequent password matching, this special timecode can act as an additional password.

[0089] Since this timecode is arbitrary, it is nearly impossible for a third party to predict or calculate the exact timecode used in the detector associated with this terminal. Since the time that the detector clock is set to zero usually happens when the system or authenticator is installed and switched on (and since the users can reset this clock anytime they want), it is difficult for an unauthorized third party to know or discover this timecode. Therefore, the only way a third-party attacker is able to obtain this timecode is to physically gain access to or steal the device hardware and successfully log into this hardware to get this information.

[0090] In system 100, the rate that passwords can be verified is dependent on the number of coincident muon events detected at multiple devices across the network. As mentioned above, at greater separation distances, fewer coincident muon events are detected. As such, the frequency of passwords that can be verified to authenticate the devices is reduced. At larger distances (greater than tens of meters), the time differences between muon events also becomes more significant, which reduces time accuracy.

[0091] A similar issue occurs when the muon detectors of different devices are oriented in different directions. The number of coincident muon events detected is dependent on the size of the common solid angle formed between the detection fields of two muon detectors. Thus, having knowledge of a device’s orientation is useful to estimate likely coincident muon events (and therefore common passwords and error rates). In some embodiments, at least some of the authenticator modules include an orientation sensor such as an accelerometer or Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU) to determine an orientation of the respective authenticator module.

[0092] If two muon detectors of authenticator modules are oriented at vastly different angles or positioned sufficiently far apart, it is possible that neither authenticator module will detect common muon events. In this circumstance, the two authenticator modules will not be able to authenticate communications between the two associated devices. To counter this issue, system 10 preferably comprises a large number of devices hosting authenticator modules. With a greater number of devices disposed at different positions and at different angles, the likelihood of devices not being able to be authenticated reduces. The intermediate devices can act as repeaters for further distant devices. That is, a greater number of devices and authenticator modules increases the security of the network. This is in contrast to other networks where a larger number of devices represent more points of vulnerability.

[0093] In large sized networks, two distantly located devices may not be able to match passwords due to the scintillator devices not being able to capture coincident muon events within given timeframes. As such, in some embodiments, network devices may be configured to operate as repeaters or intermediate authentication devices to authenticate to distantly located devices on the network. In this operation, the intermediate network device may authenticate separately with the two distantly located devices and subsequently send an authentication signal to the two devices to allow them to communicate securely on the network.

[0094] In some embodiments, system 100 comprises one or more reference authenticator devices for increasing the number of muon events detected. Such reference authenticator devices are generally fixed in location (but may be mobile) and preferably comprise a larger surface area scintillator for detecting a greater number of muons and are preferably located at a desired stationary position within the associated network to maximize coincidence muon detection with other networked devices. The use of such reference devices can be helpful in enhancing the location of devices via MuPS / MuWNS and the time synchronization of devicesusing CTC. In particular, a reference authenticator device is designed to detect a large number of muon events and can hence provide a short time delay for a coincident intersecting event with the myriad of nearby devices on the network.

[0095] One example application of system 100 is a smart home network comprising various loT devices that are examples of network devices 102-106 of Figure 1. A smart home network 800 is illustrated schematically in Figure 8 and described below. In such a network, each of the loT devices have an authenticator module embedded therein for authenticating secure data communications between the devices.

[0096] In addition to the embedded authenticator modules, one or more reference authenticator devices may be used to augment the network. In this scenario, reference trackers represent larger stationary authenticator modules having larger scintillators for detecting a higher rate of muons. By way of example, suitable reference trackers may measure 50x50 cm2and may be installed in suitable locations such as above a ceiling or underneath a floor in a house. The reference trackers can be useful for acting as repeater devices for other, typically more mobile loT devices in the network. The larger scintillators capture more muon events, which can assist in better device positioning, higher password update rates and better time synchronization. The use of reference trackers can be particularly advantageous for indoor navigation (e.g., to operate an autonomous indoor robot) and in underground environments.

[0097] In network 700 illustrated in Figure 7, which utilizes system 100, a user’s approach to a door 702 is detected via their smartphone with MuWNS at a cm-level accuracy. Upon detection of the smartphone, system 100 may be switched from the Remote Mode to the Juxtapose Mode (and similarly switched from the Juxtapose Mode to the Remote Mode when the users are leaving the house). This is described in more detail below.

[0098] The time required for password generation and sharing can be shortened within a multi-hop ad-hoc network. This is described in more detail with reference to the smart home network 800 of Figure 8.

[0099] Referring now to Figure 6, the operation of system 100 described above facilitates a method 600 of authenticating devices on a network. Initial steps 601 to 604 are performed at a first device on the network while steps 605 to 607 are performed at a second device of the network. At step 601 , the arrival of muons at a first muon detector associated with the firstdevice is detected. In response digital pulses are generated by a muon detector device such as those described above. At step 602, a first timestamp is generated based on digital pulses generated by the muon detector and a local clock signal that is synchronized with local clock signals of other devices on the network. At step 603, a first password is generated based on the first timestamp. The first password may be stored in local memory of the first device or first muon detector. At step 604, the first password is transmitted to one or more other devices on the network.

[0100] At step 605, at a second device on the network, the first password is received via wireless communication between the first and second devices. At step 606, the first password is compared with a second password generated based on muons detected at a second muon detector associated with the second device. The generation of the second password generally follows the steps 601 to 603 described above but at the second muon detector. The second password may be stored in local memory of the second device or second muon detector. The first password received from the first device may be temporarily stored at the second device or second muon detector but is preferably not stored permanently at the second device or second muon detector for security purposes. At step 607, communication between the first and second devices is authenticated when the first password matches the second password.Example Application - Smart door lock

[0101] The present invention has many practical applications and one particular application is a smart door lock system that allows users to remotely lock and unlock the door via a smartphone or other mobile device (e.g. smartwatch) and the internet. In such an application, parents do not need to provide the door key to their children since they could unlock the door remotely for their children. However, if the system password was leaked, anyone would be able to unlock the door.

[0102] Referring to Figure 7, there is illustrated a smart door lock system 700 for wirelessly locking or unlocking a door 702 using an internet enabled mobile device such as a smartphone 704. Door 702 is equipped with a door locking module 706 that comprises a first muon-detector authenticator module 708 as described above in electrical communication with an electromechanical actuator 710 for electrically activating or deactivating a door lock 712. Smart door lock module 706 may be integrated into door 702 or within door lock 712 itself such that it can be integrated into a conventional door. The electromechanical actuator 710 may comprise a servomotor, electromagnet or other actuator device.

[0103] Smartphone 704 is equipped with a second muon-detector authenticator module 714 as described above. Both first and second authenticator modules 708 and 714 perform password authentication via coincident muon detection and timestamp / password comparison in the manner described above. Data transfer occurs wirelessly through wireless transceivers embedded within both smartphone 704 and smart door lock module 706. The wireless transceiver within smartphone 704 may comprise one of the device’s conventional wireless devices such as a WiFi device or Bluetooth device for local communication or 4G, 5G or 6G wireless transceiver for transmission via the internet. Door lock module 706 may be powered by a local battery or connected to mains power. Door lock module 706 is preferably also connected to the internet such as via WiFi, Ethernet or coaxial cable so as to be able to communicate with smartphone 704 over long distances.

[0104] Operation of system 700 may be via a proprietary software application (app) installed on smartphone 704. The app provides functionality for a user to request locking or unlocking of door 702 via the interface of smartphone 704. This can be performed remotely via the smartphone’s connection to the internet so as to lock or unlock the door 702 from large distances away. Password authentication between smartphone 704 and authenticator module 708 may occur at predetermined time intervals and / or according to rules as per the above described modes of operation such as Remote Mode and Juxtapose Mode.

[0105] Upon selection of a lock / unlock operation by a user on the app of smartphone 704, a password authentication process is performed to ensure that smartphone 704 is authenticated to control door lock module 706. Once authenticated, the lock / unlock command is electrically or wirelessly communicated from authenticator module 708 to actuator 710 to perform the required lock / unlock operation of door lock 712.

[0106] Although only a single smartphone device is illustrated in Figure 7, it will be appreciated that a number of smartphone or other internet enabled mobile devices (such as smartwatches) may be authenticated with smart door lock system 700 to lock and unlock door 702.

[0107] When authorized users (e.g., parents) are located far (many miles) away from their house entrance door, the previously authenticated password is retained in the user’s smartphone 704, and this password is used to remotely lock and unlock door 702. This password doesn’t change while the smartphone 704 is distant from the door 702 (during the system Remote Mode). When a user with the smartphone 704 approaches their door, thesystem detects their approach by using MuWNS or other location-based detection such as GNSS, and the system is switched to the Juxtapose Mode. Then the users is able to hold up smartphone 704 at or adjacent to in the door, and the door 702 can be unlocked within a timeframe in the order of one second. Once the system is switched to the Juxtapose Mode, the password update is resumed.

[0108] Although the door lock password doesn’t change during the Remote Mode, the lock is securely protected for the following reasons. (A) the users do not have to know or have access to the passwords, so there is no password leakage risk. (B) Even if an unauthorized intruder attempts to crack the door lock system, after a certain number (e.g., 100) of incorrect passwords have been inputted, the system 700 can be configured to remain locked for a certain period of time (e.g., 10 minutes). At this point, the system mode may automatically switch to the Juxtapose Mode wherein the smartphone must be brought close to the door to re-authenticate. Once the system is switched to the Juxtapose Mode, the users cannot remotely lock / unlock the door. In this mode, the system 700 may be configured such that passwords are frequently changed (several times per minute) to prevent further intrusion by the attackers. Moreover, at the moment when the maximum amount of attempted password inputs is exceeded, the system 700 can be set up to activate a security alarm and this incident can be automatically reported to a private security company.Example Application - Smart home network

[0109] Referring now to Figure 8, there is illustrated schematically a smart home network 800 comprising various loT devices that are examples of network devices 102-106 of Figure 1 . Network 800 also includes two reference authenticator modules 802 and 804. In network 800, each of the loT devices have an authenticator module embedded therein for authenticating secure data communications between the devices based on coincident muon detection.[001 10] Figure 8 also illustrates typical distances and angles formed by the authenticator modules of the loT devices relative to one or more reference authenticator modules 802 and 804. In network 800, reference authenticator modules 802 and 804 are disposed such that their scintillator surface extends substantially horizontally to maximize the number of muons detected (which arrive primarily vertically from space). Also shown are corresponding password update rates in units of password per minute (PPM). As can be seen, the rate ofpassword update is inversely proportional to the distance from and angle relative to the reference authenticator modules 802 and 804. The size of the scintillator surface area also affects the password update rate (a larger scintillator detects more muon events). However, in network 800, each of the authenticator modules within the loT devices are assumed to have a common scintillator size.[001 1 1 ] Reference authenticator modules 802 and 804 are described above and generally comprise larger versions of the authenticator modules housed within the various loT devices. In particular, modules 802 and 804 comprise a larger surface area scintillator for detecting a greater number of muons and are preferably located at a desired stationary position within the associated network to maximize or enhance coincidence muon detection with other networked devices. In the illustrated scenario, reference authenticator modules 802 and 804 measure about 50x50 cm2with one module 802 installed above a ceiling and one module 804 installed underneath a floor. However, in other embodiments, reference authenticator modules may have other dimensions such as 10x10 cm2or greater, 20x20 cm2or greater, 30x30 cm2or greater, 40x40 cm2or greater or 1 m2or greater.[001 12] Location of reference authenticator module 802 above a ceiling may be advantageous for loT devices such as wall mounted televisions, internet connected lighting, air conditioning units and devices located on a higher floor of a building. Location of reference authenticator module 804 under a floor may be advantageous for floor-mounted devices, underfloor heating devices and indoor navigation devices (e.g., to operate an autonomous indoor robot). Additional reference authenticator modules may be located at other locations around an environment.[001 13] The time required for password generation and sharing can be shortened within a multi-hop ad-hoc network. For example, the time required for generating a password between the smart door lock and the far right audio speaker is about 10 minutes. However, if other loT devices positioned in between the smart door lock and audio speaker are used as relay stations, this timeframe can be significantly reduced such that the password generation rate is much higher. This time can be further reduced by using the reference authenticator modules as intermediate relay stations.Example Application - Security system[001 14] Similar to network 800, other types of networked devices can be used for authentication. These include security systems, where a network of cameras and sensors are connected on a network. Each camera / sensor can be integrated with a muon-based authenticator module and used to authenticate the device with other devices on the network.Example Application - Automated or semi-automated industrial facility[001 15] Embodiments of the present invention also have applications in industry such as in warehouses, manufacturing facilities and other industrial facilities that include a number of networked devices. Authentication of devices is particularly important in applications where devices are constantly entering or exiting a connected network, such as in a modern automated or semi-automated warehouse. In these applications, devices such as drones, delivery trucks and the associated mobile devices of personnel are coming and going from the facility and connecting and disconnecting from a wireless network.[001 16] Such a network in this environment may comprise a wireless LAN network such as a Wi-Fi network that communicate wirelessly between devices based on IEEE802.1 1 wireless protocols. Each of the devices in the network are fitted with a muon-based authentication module as described above, to detect the arrival of muons and, in response, generate one or more passwords based on a detected time of arrival of muons. The passwords are compared and matched with corresponding passwords generated at the authentication modules of other devices connected to the network.[001 17] Example network devices within an automated or semi-automated industrial facility include: Desktop or laptop computers; Mobile devices such as smartphones or tables carried by personnel; Servers; Delivery trucks; Door lock systems; Security devices; Drones / UAVs;Automated or semi-automated cranes; Autonomous mobile robots; Autonomous packing robots; Automated storage and retrieval systems; Palletizing and depalletizing robots; and[001 18] Within a warehouse or other industrial facility, the size may justify using one or more reference authentication modules, as described above. These larger surface area muon detector modules are able to detect more muon events and, as such, authenticate with nearby devices more regularly. In addition, the networked devices may be configured to operate as repeaters for authentication between more distantly located devices across the environment. For example, a computer device within a warehouse office may be located 30-40 meters from a delivery driver’s mobile device at an entrance to the warehouse. An intermediately located device may be used to authenticate passwords between the two distantly located devices.Example Application - Mining System[001 19] Referring now to Figure 9, there is illustrated a mine site 900 for mining an ore. Mining vehicles, e.g. vehicles 902 and 904 travelling in harsh underground environments need to be accurately tracked to ensure they are in a known and safe location. For similar reasons, it is important to track personnel, e.g. 906, 908, 910 and 912, around a mine site. It is typically difficult to track vehicles and people deep underground as satellite-based navigation systems such as GNSS are unable to reach the vehicles.

[0120] People and vehicles on mine site 900 may be monitored by a muon-based localization service such as precision Muon Positioning System (MuPS) or Muometric Navigation System (MuWNS) mentioned above. The primary concept of these techniques are summarized in Reference 1 .

[0121] To achieve this, in mine site 900, each of the vehicles 902 and 904 and personnel 906, 908, 910 and 912 are equipped with muon-based authenticator modules as described above. Each of the authenticator modules act as reference detectors to form reference coordinates. Three or more reference detectors can be used to locate devices in a similar manner to GPS location. This muometric positioning does not require active signalgeneration and enables positioning in the aforementioned environments within a reference coordinate defined by the three-dimensional positions of multiple detectors.

[0122] One requirement is that each of the authenticator modules are accurately time synchronized to within a few nanometers. This can be achieved by regularly comparing the relative timing of incident muon events detected at different devices and resynchronizing local clocks accordingly as outlined in Reference 2. The receiver detector defines the relative position within this coordinate by using the following relationship:L? = (%j - xp)2+ yt- yp)2+ (zf- zp)2

[0123] where L, is the geometrical distance between the th reference detector located at (Xi, y,, z and the receiver detector located at (xp, yp, zp).

[0124] Since the muon's traveling speed is approximately the speed of light in a vacuum, the distance (Li) between the reference detector and the receiver detector is determined by the muon's time of flight (TOF) between them. Since Li, x,, y,, and z, are known, the location of a receiver detector located at (xp, yp, zp) can be determined.

[0125] As also illustrated in Figure 9, mine site 900 may utilize reference authenticator modules 914, 916 and 918 positioned at desired locations throughout the mine to increase the coincidence muon detection with other authenticator modules. These reference authenticator modules are particularly useful at lower depths of the mine where smaller authenticator modules located on moving devices such as vehicle 904 and personnel 906 and 908 detect fewer muons. Proximity to a reference authenticator module increases the chances of a coincidence muon detection, providing more opportunities for muometric positioning.

[0126] Other devices within mine site 900 may also be part of the network, such as a crushing machine 914. This device can be monitored remotely for performance and maintenance but could be a point of attack for the network. By integrating a muon-based authenticator module within crushing machine 906 and other devices, a network of the mine site 900 can facilitate secure connections and tracking between devices.Overview and advantages of the invention

[0127] Embodiments of the present invention rely on counting and recording the timing of random muon detection events to quickly create common TRNs without needing to previously share them. The system updates the devices’ passwords wirelessly and dynamically withoutinformation exchange, and users are not responsible for input / management of these passwords. The password exchange and authentication occurs without any person or user having possession or knowledge of the passwords.

[0128] The invention leverages recent developments in the coincident detection of muons by combining secure password transfer, device positioning and time synchronization to enhance the security of a network of devices. By using a Holdover Mode, devices can remain secure in scenarios where device imperfections or few coincident muon events occur.

[0129] By combining many muon detection devices, a smart system can be developed to securely connect devices and exchange information. Devices can act as repeaters for other devices such that time synchronization and positioning can be obtained between two devices spaced apart by a large distance. An ad-hoc multi-hop network can be used to reduce the Holdover Mode time for password confirmation. Contrary to existing networks, increasing the number of devices can enhance the security of the network.

[0130] Embodiments of the present invention is able to provide a secure network that provides precision positional capability for GPS-denied environments such as underground, indoors and inner-city environments. The system can determine when devices are in close proximity and hence operate in a Juxtapose Mode (where devices are forced to refresh passwords frequently in Holdover Mode) and a Remote Mode (where devices are too far to update and the last confirmed password remains in use). In some embodiments, muometric positioning is not required if there is a robust and reliable accurate positioning capability.

[0131] Suitable applications for the present invention include but are not limited to:• Building automation systems;• Smart homes systems;• Warehouses;• Datacenters;• Factories;• Mine sites;• Underground facilities;• Military applications;• Smart cities;• Robotic systems;• Autonomous vehicles

[0132] The present invention is unique from most data security systems in that it relies on data that are difficult to generate artificially. It does not rely on the physical transfer of mathematically derived passwords. By detecting the arrival times of cosmic-ray muons, a naturally occurring phenomenon that can be used to generate TRN sequences, with a muon detector, single-use timestamps can be generated and utilized as pre-shared passwords.

[0133] The key features and advantages of the present invention comprise:(A) the passwords are frequently updated,(B) the password is used only one time to log into the terminal, and is updated immediately after login,(C) individuals, including the terminal users, do not have to know or have access to the passwords,(D) the passwords consist of naturally generated TRNs, and(E) the passwords are transferred between nodes wirelessly without using information traffic. These features make it impossible for a third party to crack the terminal from a remote location.References

[0134] The subject matter of the following references are incorporated herein by way of cross-reference.3. Tanaka, H.K.M. Cosmic coding and transfer storage (COSMOCATS) for invincible key4. S. Krishnan, C. Webster, A.R. Duffy, G. Brooks, R. Clay, J. Mould (2020) Improving the energy resolution while mitigating the effects of dark-noise, for a microcontroller based SiPM sensor J INST, 15, 9, P090285. S. Krishnan, C. Webster, A.R. Duffy, G. Brooks, R. Clay, J. Mould (2019) SiPM Smart Sensor Based Portable Coincidence System for Distributed Field Applications JINST, 14, 9, P09026Interpretation

[0135] Unless specifically stated otherwise, as apparent from the following discussions, it is appreciated that throughout the specification discussions utilizing terms such as "processing," "computing," "calculating," “determining”, analyzing” or the like, refer to the action and / or processes of a computer or computing system, or similar electronic computing device, that manipulate and / or transform data represented as physical, such as electronic, quantities into other data similarly represented as physical quantities.

[0136] In a similar manner, the term "processor" may refer to any device, portion of a device or plurality of devices that processes electronic data, e.g., from registers and / or memory to transform that electronic data into other electronic data that, e.g., may be stored in registers and / or memory. A “computer” or a “computing machine” or a "computing platform" may include one or more co-located or distributed processors.

[0137] Reference throughout this specification to “one embodiment”, “some embodiments” or “an embodiment” means that a particular feature, structure or characteristic described in connection with the embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of the presentdisclosure. Thus, appearances of the phrases “in one embodiment”, “in some embodiments” or “in an embodiment” in various places throughout this specification are not necessarily all referring to the same embodiment. Furthermore, the particular features, structures or characteristics may be combined in any suitable manner, as would be apparent to one of ordinary skill in the art from this disclosure, in one or more embodiments.

[0138] As used herein, unless otherwise specified the use of the ordinal adjectives "first", "second", "third", etc., to describe a common object, merely indicate that different instances of like objects are being referred to, and are not intended to imply that the objects so described must be in a given sequence, either temporally, spatially, in ranking, or in any other manner.

[0139] In the claims below and the description herein, any of the terms “comprising”, “comprised of”, “which comprises” or similar are open terms that mean including at least the elements / features that follow, but not excluding others. Thus, the term “comprising” and its variations, when used in the claims or description, should not be interpreted as being limitative to the means or elements or steps listed thereafter. For example, the scope of the expression a device comprising A and B should not be limited to devices consisting only of elements A and B. Similarly, any of the terms “including”, “which includes”, “that includes” or similar as used herein are also open terms that also mean including at least the elements / features that follow the term, but not excluding others. Thus, “including” is synonymous with and means “comprising”.

[0140] It should be appreciated that in the above description of exemplary embodiments of the disclosure, various features of the disclosure are sometimes grouped together in a single embodiment, Fig., or description thereof for the purpose of streamlining the disclosure and aiding in the understanding of one or more of the various inventive aspects. This method of disclosure, however, is not to be interpreted as reflecting an intention that the claims require more features than are expressly recited in each claim. Rather, as the following claims reflect, inventive aspects lie in less than all features of a single foregoing disclosed embodiment. Thus, the claims following the Detailed Description are hereby expressly incorporated into this Detailed Description, with each claim standing on its own as a separate embodiment of this disclosure.

[0141] Furthermore, while some embodiments described herein include some but not other features included in other embodiments, combinations of features of different embodiments are meant to be within the scope of the disclosure, and form different embodiments, as wouldbe understood by those skilled in the art. For example, in the following claims, any of the claimed embodiments can be used in any combination.

[0142] In the description provided herein, numerous specific details are set forth. However, it is understood that embodiments of the disclosure may be practiced without these specific details. In other instances, well-known methods, structures and techniques have not been shown in detail in order not to obscure an understanding of this description.

[0143] Similarly, it is to be noticed that the term coupled, when used in the claims, should not be interpreted as being limited to direct connections only. The terms "coupled" and "connected", along with their derivatives, may be used. It should be understood that these terms are not intended as synonyms for each other. Thus, the scope of the expression a device A coupled to a device B should not be limited to devices or systems wherein an output of device A is directly connected to an input of device B. It means that there exists a path between an output of A and an input of B which may be a path including other devices or means. "Coupled" may mean that two or more elements are either in direct physical, electrical or optical contact, or that two or more elements are not in direct contact with each other but yet still co-operate or interact with each other.

[0144] Embodiments described herein are intended to cover any adaptations or variations of the present invention. Although the present invention has been described and explained in terms of particular exemplary embodiments, one skilled in the art will realize that additional embodiments can be readily envisioned that are within the scope of the present invention.

Claims

What is claimed is:1 . A system for authenticating communications between two or more devices on a network, the system comprising: a first authenticator module associated with a first device on the network, the first authenticator module comprising: a first muon detector configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons; a first clock device configured to generate a first local clock signal; a first processor configured to: a) synchronise the digital pulses with the first local clock signal; b) generate a first timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the first muon detector and the local clock signal; c) generate a first password based on the first timestamp; and a first communications interface configured to transmit the first password to a second device on the network; a second authenticator module associated with the second device, the second authenticator module comprising: a second muon detector configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons; a second clock device configured to generate a second local clock signal that is synchronized with the first local clock signal; a second communications interface configured to receive the first password; a second processor configured to: a) synchronise the digital pulses with the second local clock signal; b) generate a second timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the second muon detector and the second local clock signal; c) generate a second password based on the second timestamp; d) compare the first and second passwords;wherein, upon detection of the first and second passwords matching, communications between the first and second devices is authenticated.

2. The system according to claim 1 wherein the first and second muon detectors comprise Silicon Photomultiplier (SiPM) devices.

3. The system according to claim 1 or claim 2 wherein the first and second passwords represent truncated or filtered versions of the first and second timestamps respectively.

4. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first password is compared with a plurality of second passwords by the second processor.

5. The system according to claim 4 wherein the plurality of second passwords are selected to be within a predetermined time window of the time of generation of the first password.

6. The system according to claim 5 wherein the predetermined time window includes time before and after the time of generation of the first password.

7. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the distance between the first and second devices is known.

8. The system according to claim 7 wherein the distance between the first and second devices is determined, at least in part, based on differences in muon timing detected at the first and second muon detectors.

9. The system according to claim 7 wherein the distance between first and second devices is determined from location signals from respective GPS or GNSS devices associated with the first and second devices.

10. The system according to any one of claims 7 to 9 wherein the first and second passwords are retained in memory for a period of time while the first and second devices are detected to be located greater than a threshold distance from each other.1 1 . The system according to claim 10 wherein the first and second passwords are shared when devices are detected to be within a threshold distance from each other.

12. The system according to any one of claims 7 to 11 wherein passwords are transferred between network devices at a predetermined period of time.

13. The system according to claim 12 wherein the predetermined period is dependent on a distance between the first and second devices.

14. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first and second authenticators have a unique timecode indicative of a time in which the authenticator detects a first muon event.

15. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first and second authenticator modules each include an orientation sensor to determine an orientation of the respective authenticator module.

16. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first and / or second devices include a mobile device.

17. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first and second authenticator modules are integrated into the first and second devices respectively.

18. The system according to any one of claims 1 to 16 wherein the first and second authenticator modules are connectable with the first and second devices respectively.

19. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first and second authenticator modules are configured to send, receive and compare passwords to perform bidirectional authentication of devices.

20. The system according to any one of the preceding claims wherein the first clock device comprises a GPS Disciplined Oscillator (GPS-DO) device.21 . An authenticator for authenticating devices on a network, the authenticator comprising: a muon detector configured to generate digital pulses in response to detected muons; a clock device configured to generate a local clock signal; a processor configured to: a) synchronise the digital pulses with the local clock signal; b) generate a first timestamp based on digital pulses corresponding to one or more incident muons by the muon detector and the local clock signal; and c) generate a first password based on the first timestamp; and a communications interface configured to transmit the first password to other devices on the network and to receive a second password from other devices on the network; wherein, upon receipt of a second password from another device on the network, the processor is configured to perform an authentication process by comparing the first password with the second password, and wherein communication between the devices are authenticated when the first and second passwords match.

22. A device adapted to be connected to or incorporating therein an authenticator according to claim 21 .

23. The device according to claim 22 including one or more of a smartphone, tablet computer, laptop computer, appliance, or network hardware device.

24. A method of authenticating devices on a network, the method comprising the steps: at a first device on the network: detecting the arrival of muons at a first muon detector associated with the first device and, in response generating digital pulses; generating a first timestamp based on digital pulses generated by the muon detector and a local clock signal that is synchronised with local clock signals of other devices on the network; and generating a first password based on the first timestamp; transmitting the first password to one or more other devices on the network; at a second device on the network: receiving the first password; comparing the first password with a second password generated based on muons detected at a second muon detector associated with the second device; authenticating communication between the first and second devices when the first password matches the second password.

25. A system of networked devices, wherein each device comprises a muon detector configured to detect the arrival of muons and generate a stream of temporally ordered muon events, wherein a muon detector or network device uses information contained in the stream of temporally ordered muon events to determine the relative positions of the devices, to synchronize local clocks at the devices and to facilitate authentication of communications between the devices by using the event time of intersecting muon events as True Random Numbers.

26. A door lock system for a door, the system comprising: a door password authentication module mounted on or within the door and configured to detect the arrival of muons and, in response, generate one or more passwords based on a detected time of arrival of muons;an electromechanical actuator adapted to selectively lock or unlock a locking mechanism of the door in response to a control signal; and a communications module configured to communicate with one or more devices across a network to send and receive passwords from the muon detector and to receive control signals from the one or more devices, wherein the one or more devices each comprise a device password authentication module for generating passwords based on timing of detected muons; wherein upon detection of a password from one of the one or more devices that matches a password generated by the door password authentication module, the door password authentication module authenticates that device to allow it to remotely send a control signal via the communications module to the electromechanical actuator to lock or unlock the locking mechanism.

27. The door lock system according to claim 26 wherein the communications module communicates with the one or more devices via an intermediate wireless network.

28. The door lock system according to claim 26 wherein the communications module communicates with the one or more devices via a cellular network.

29. A wireless network comprising a plurality of networked devices, wherein each networked device comprises a muon-based authentication module configured to: detect the arrival of muons and generate timestamps based on the muon arrival times; generate one or more passwords based on the generated timestamps; send and receive passwords to others of the networked devices over a network; compare the locally generated passwords with passwords received from others of the networked devices; and upon detecting one or more matched passwords, authenticating data communications between the networked devices for which the one or more passwords matched.

30. The wireless network according to claim 29 wherein the network is a home network comprising domestic network devices.31 . The wireless network according to claim 29 wherein the network is an office network comprising office network devices.

32. The wireless network according to claim 29 wherein the network is a wireless network within an automated or semi-automated industrial facility.

33. The wireless network according to claim 29 wherein the network comprises a mine site and wherein the networked devices comprise one or more of mining machines, mining vehicles and / or mobile devices carried by mine personnel.

34. The wireless network according to any one of claims 29 to 33 wherein one or more of the networked devices comprises a reference authentication module comprising a large area scintillator device configured to detect muons and generate one or more passwords based on timestamps corresponding to detected muon arrival times.

35. The wireless network according to claim 34 wherein the reference authentication modules comprise scintillators having an area greater than 20x20 cm2.

36. The wireless network according to claim 34 or claim 35 wherein the reference authentication modules act as repeaters for authenticating devices located at large distances from each other.

37. The wireless network according to any one of claims 29 to 36 wherein muon-based authentication module of a first networked device is adapted to authenticate communication between two other networked devices which are located sufficiently far from one another that they cannot detect coincident muon events.

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