A compact DCS architecture for nuclear power reactors

Abstract

The present invention relates to a compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, including a non-safety-level DCS and a safety-level DCS. An operator workstation is arranged in a main control room. The operator workstation is used to issue safety-level equipment control instructions to monitor safety-level equipment. The safety-level equipment control instructions are sequentially transmitted to the safety-level equipment via a terminal bus, a real-time server, a control bus, a control station, and a CIC cabinet; the safety-level equipment feeds back safety-level equipment information according to the safety-level equipment control instructions, and the safety-level equipment information is sequentially transmitted to the operator workstation via a safety-level bus A or a safety-level bus B, a control bus, a real-time server, and a terminal bus. The present invention simplifies the DCS system and meets the requirements of compact arrangement and defense level of nuclear safety.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] The present invention relates to the technical field of nuclear power plants, and in particular to a compactly arranged DCS architecture for a nuclear power reactor. Background Art

[0002] The digital distributed control system (DCS) is a comprehensive control system that has emerged with the continuous rise of modern large-scale industrial production automation and the increasingly complex process control requirements. It has extremely strong data processing and communication capabilities and is a modern equipment for completing process control and management and improving the safety, reliability and management efficiency of nuclear power plant operations. At present, the digital nuclear power main control room architecture scheme based on DCS can refer to the main control room architecture scheme of land-based commercial nuclear power plants, such as Figure 1 The digital nuclear power plant DCS architecture shown in the figure is divided into two parts: safety-level DCS and non-safety-level DCS, which are implemented on different platforms. The safety-level DCS mainly monitors the information of safety-level equipment, while the non-safety-level DCS mainly monitors the information of non-safety-level equipment. The two can transmit information through the gateway. The operator workstation (OWP) in the main control room is equipped with a non-safety-level monitoring device (NC-VDU). The monitoring signal sent by the operator workstation is transmitted to the server through the monitoring network (MNET), and then connected to the control cabinet on the first floor through the system network (SNET). The local non-safety-level equipment is monitored through the control cabinet; at the same time, the OWP also has a safety-level information monitoring means, which calls the safety-level monitoring device (S-VDU) on the OWP through the monitoring network (MNET) and the gateway to the safety-level human-machine interface bus (HM Data Bus), and then monitors the safety-level equipment information on the S-VDU. The S-VDU monitors the safety-level equipment through the safety-level bus (Safety Bus) to the equipment interface module (CIM). Among them, there are several ways to monitor safety-level equipment:

[0003] 1. Non-security-level monitoring equipment in the main control room → monitoring network → non-security-level gateway → security-level gateway → human-machine interface bus → security-level monitoring equipment in the main control room → security-level bus → CIC cabinet → equipment;

[0004] 2. Security-level monitoring equipment in the main control room → security-level bus → CIC cabinet → equipment;

[0005] 3. Diversity system monitoring equipment in the main control room → diversity system terminal bus → diversity system server → diversity system control bus → diversity system cabinet → CIC cabinet → equipment.

[0006] Among them, → indicates the flow direction of the control instruction.

[0007] The above digital nuclear power plant DCS architecture is aimed at the main control room of onshore nuclear power plants, which has sufficient space and is large in scale to ensure that the equipment has sufficient redundancy and diversity. However, for the compact nuclear power main control room, it cannot meet the requirements due to limited building space. Summary of the invention

[0008] The present invention aims to propose a compact nuclear power reactor DCS architecture to meet the compactness requirement of a nuclear power main control room.

[0009] The embodiment of the present invention provides a compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, including a main control room, a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS;

[0010] The non-safety-level DCS includes a terminal bus, a control bus, a real-time server, a control station, and an operator workstation arranged in a main control room; the operator workstation is connected to the terminal bus, and the control station is connected to the control bus;

[0011] The safety-level DCS includes a safety-level bus A and a safety-level bus B, wherein the safety-level bus A and the safety-level bus B are connected to the control bus through a gateway, wherein the safety-level bus A is connected to the first protection group, the third protection group and several CIC cabinets, and the safety-level bus B is connected to the second protection group, the fourth protection group and several CIC cabinets; the above CIC cabinets are also connected to the control station;

[0012] The operator workstation is used to issue safety-level equipment control instructions to monitor safety-level equipment. The safety-level equipment control instructions are transmitted to the safety-level equipment via the terminal bus, real-time server, control bus, control station, and CIC cabinet in sequence;

[0013] The safety-level device feeds back safety-level device information according to the safety-level device control instruction, and the safety-level device information is sequentially transmitted to the operator workstation via the safety-level bus A or the safety-level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus.

[0014] Preferably, one end of the control station is connected to the control bus, and the other end is connected to the non-safety-level device;

[0015] The operator workstation is also used to issue non-safety-level device control instructions to monitor non-safety-level devices. The non-safety-level device control instructions are transmitted to the safety-level devices via the terminal bus, the real-time server, the control bus, and the control station in sequence. The non-safety-level devices feed back non-safety-level device information based on the non-safety-level device control instructions. The non-safety-level device information is transmitted to the operator workstation via the control station, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus in sequence.

[0016] Preferably, the operator workstation includes a primary-loop operator workstation, a secondary-loop operator workstation and a crew chief workstation; the primary-loop operator workstation, the secondary-loop operator workstation and the crew chief workstation are respectively connected to the terminal bus for communication, and the primary-loop operator workstation, the secondary-loop operator workstation and the crew chief workstation are each configured with a non-safety-level monitoring device, and the non-safety-level monitoring device is used to display the safety-level device information or the non-safety-level device information.

[0017] Preferably, the safety-level bus A and the safety-level bus B are also connected to a safety-level monitoring device respectively.

[0018] Preferably, the real-time server comprises a nuclear island real-time server and a conventional island real-time server, and the nuclear island real-time server and the conventional island real-time server are respectively connected to the terminal bus and the control bus.

[0019] Preferably, a large screen is also provided in the main control room, and the large screen is connected to the terminal bus for displaying security-level device information or non-security-level device information; the security-level device information is transmitted to the large screen in sequence via the security-level bus A or the security-level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus, and the non-security-level device information is transmitted to the large screen in sequence via the control station, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus.

[0020] The embodiment of the present invention proposes a compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture. Compared with the prior art, it greatly simplifies the DCS system and equipment scale, cancels the gateway from the safety level to the non-safety level in the first path of the land reactor described in the background technology part; cancels the safety level monitoring equipment (S-VDU) in the main control room, and only sets the non-safety level monitoring equipment (NC-VDU) in the main control room; monitors all safety level and non-safety level equipment through three operator workstations under normal working conditions. In the event of an accident, that is, when the three operators are unable to effectively monitor the safety level equipment, monitoring is performed through a dedicated safety level monitoring equipment (S-VDU), which is connected to the safety level bus of the safety level DCS. The DCS architecture proposed in this embodiment meets the requirements of compact layout design and meets the standard's requirements for the defense level of nuclear safety. In addition, safety level equipment is the top priority of cost. In this embodiment, the safety level monitoring equipment of the operator workstation is canceled and implemented through non-safety level equipment, which greatly saves costs.

[0021] Other features and advantages of the present invention will be described in the following description, and partly become apparent from the description, or be embodied by practicing the present invention. The objectives and other advantages of the present invention can be achieved and obtained by the structures specifically pointed out in the description, claims and drawings. Of course, it is not necessary to achieve all the advantages described above at the same time in any product or method implementing the present invention. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

[0022] In order to more clearly illustrate the embodiments of the present invention or the technical solutions in the prior art, the drawings required for use in the embodiments or the description of the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For ordinary technicians in this field, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without paying creative work.

[0023] Figure 1 It is a schematic diagram of the DCS architecture structure of a nuclear power plant described in the background technology.

[0024] Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of a compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture structure in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0025] Reference numerals:

[0026] Main control room-1, terminal bus-2, control bus-3, real-time server-4, control station-5, safety level bus A-6, safety level bus B-7, first protection group-8, third protection group-9, CIC cabinet-10, second protection group-11, fourth protection group-12, engineer station-13, history server-14, computing server-15, communication station-16, severe accident monitoring system-17, large screen-18, third-party instrumentation and control system-19, field equipment-20. DETAILED DESCRIPTION

[0027] Various exemplary embodiments, features and aspects of the present disclosure will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. The same reference numerals in the accompanying drawings represent elements with the same or similar functions. Although various aspects of the embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, the drawings are not necessarily drawn to scale unless otherwise specified.

[0028] In addition, in order to better illustrate the present invention, numerous specific details are provided in the specific embodiments below. It should be understood by those skilled in the art that the present invention can also be implemented without certain specific details. In some examples, means, components and circuits well known to those skilled in the art are not described in detail in order to highlight the main purpose of the present invention.

[0029] The embodiments of the present invention are directed to Figure 1 The DCS architecture shown in the figure proposes a Figure 2 The compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture shown includes a main control room, a safety-level DCS and a non-safety-level DCS.

[0030] Among them, Figure 1 As shown in the right part, the non-safety-level DCS in this embodiment includes a terminal bus, a control bus, a real-time server and a control station that are communicatively connected in sequence; the operator workstation is connected to the terminal bus, and the control station is connected to the control bus.

[0031] Among them, Figure 1 As shown in the left part, the safety-level DCS in this embodiment includes a safety-level bus A and a safety-level bus B. The safety-level bus A and the safety-level bus B are respectively connected to the control bus through a gateway. The safety-level bus A connects the first protection group, the third protection group and several CIC cabinets, and the safety-level bus B connects the second protection group, the fourth protection group and several CIC cabinets, wherein the above CIC cabinets are also connected to the control station.

[0032] Among them, the CIC cabinet is used to receive multiple control instructions for security-level devices, and to perform priority management on multiple control instructions from different locations, and then the CIC cabinet gives priority to executing control instructions with higher priorities. In this embodiment, the CIC cabinet sends the control instructions to the corresponding security-level devices based on the priority information of the control instructions under the operator workstation.

[0033] It should be noted that CIC cabinet (Component Interface System) is a general term, which varies according to the scale of different units. In this embodiment, there are 2 safety-level buses, divided into A / B columns, the first protection group and the third protection group are in column A, the second protection group and the fourth protection group are in column B, and all ESFAC, DTC, and S-VDU are not necessarily only one on each safety-level bus. Among them, the protection group is used to collect sensor and device status information related to the safety level for participating in the protection function, and at the same time perform logical processing of the automatic control function and issue operation instructions to the safety-level device.

[0034] Among them, each protection group preferably includes a reactor protection system (RPS), a data transmission cabinet (DTC), a safety facility drive cabinet (ESFAC) and a safety-level monitoring device (S-VDU), etc. It should be noted that the functional device composition of the protection group is configured according to actual technical requirements, and is not specifically limited in this embodiment. The partial composition of the protection group of different nuclear power reactors may be different.

[0035] Furthermore, the operator workstation is used to issue safety-level equipment control instructions to monitor safety-level equipment, and the safety-level equipment control instructions are transmitted to the safety-level equipment via the terminal bus, real-time server, control bus, control station, and CIC cabinet in sequence.

[0036] Specifically, this embodiment Figure 1 The safety-level equipment monitoring method of the DCS architecture has been improved, and the following monitoring methods / channels are proposed:

[0037] Operator workstation → terminal bus → real-time server → control bus → control station → CIC cabinet → safety-level equipment;

[0038] →Indicates the transmission direction of the safety-level device control instructions.

[0039] Among them, the safety-level device feeds back safety-level device information according to the safety-level device control instruction, and the safety-level device information is transmitted to the operator workstation via the safety-level bus A or safety-level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus in sequence.

[0040] Specifically, Figure 1 The security level device information monitoring process is as described in the background technology section. Figure 1 It can be seen from the security level device information monitoring process of the architecture that the security level device information monitoring process of this embodiment has been simplified. Figure 1 and Figure 2 It can be seen that the DCS architecture of this embodiment greatly simplifies the DCS system and equipment scale, optimizes the connection between the non-safety-level DCS terminal bus and the safety-level DCS human-machine interface bus, and eliminates Figure 1 The safety-level to non-safety-level gateway, cable and human-machine interface bus connecting the gateway in the DCS architecture shown are directly connected to the control station and the CIC cabinet, and at the same time, the diversity drive system is also cancelled.

[0041] Among them, one end of the control station is connected to the control bus, and the other end is connected to the non-safety-level equipment; the control station is used to collect monitoring information such as on-site sensors and equipment status and perform logical processing, and send the information to other control stations or control rooms for monitoring, while receiving the operation command signal of the main control room and the automatic control command of the system and sending them to the on-site equipment.

[0042] Among them, the operator workstation is also used to issue non-safety-level equipment control instructions to monitor non-safety-level equipment. The non-safety-level equipment control instructions are transmitted to the safety-level equipment via the terminal bus, real-time server, control bus, and control station in sequence. The non-safety-level equipment feeds back non-safety-level equipment information according to the non-safety-level equipment control instructions. The non-safety-level equipment information is transmitted to the operator workstation via the control station, control bus, real-time server, and terminal bus in sequence.

[0043] Preferably, the operator workstation includes a primary-loop operator workstation, a secondary-loop operator workstation and a crew chief workstation; the primary-loop operator workstation, the secondary-loop operator workstation and the crew chief workstation are respectively connected to the terminal bus for communication, and the primary-loop operator workstation, the secondary-loop operator workstation and the crew chief workstation are each configured with a non-safety-level monitoring device (NC-VDU), and the non-safety-level monitoring device (NC-VDU) is used to display the safety-level device information or the non-safety-level device information.

[0044] Specifically, when safety-level equipment information or non-safety-level equipment information is fed back to the first-loop operator workstation, the second-loop operator workstation or the crew chief workstation, the corresponding non-safety-level monitoring device (NC-VDU) displays the received safety-level equipment information or non-safety-level equipment information.

[0045] Preferably, the safety-level bus A and the safety-level bus B are also connected to a safety-level monitoring device (S-VDU) respectively.

[0046] Specifically, if Figure 2 As shown, in this embodiment, Figure 2 A safety-level monitoring device (S-VDU) is installed at the safety-level DCS on the left side. Under normal working conditions, all safety-level and non-safety-level equipment are monitored through three operator workstations. In the event of an accident, that is, when the three operators are unable to effectively monitor the safety-level equipment, the safety-level monitoring device (S-VDU) is used to directly monitor the information of the safety-level equipment.

[0047] The real-time server includes a nuclear island real-time server and a conventional island real-time server, and the nuclear island real-time server and the conventional island real-time server are respectively connected to the terminal bus and the control bus. The nuclear island real-time server is used to send the relevant information collected and processed by the control cabinet to the main control room for display, and send the operation instructions of the main control room to the first-layer control cabinet to control the on-site equipment. The conventional island real-time server has the same function as the nuclear island server. During normal operation, the nuclear island server transmits the relevant information of the nuclear island, and the conventional island server transmits the relevant information of the conventional island; in the event of a fault, the nuclear island server and the conventional island server can serve as backup for each other.

[0048] Preferably, a large screen is also provided in the main control room, and the large screen is connected to the terminal bus for displaying safety-level device information or non-safety-level device information; the safety-level device information is sequentially transmitted to the large screen via the safety-level bus A or safety-level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus, and the non-safety-level device information is sequentially transmitted to the large screen via the control station, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus for display.

[0049] The non-safety DCS includes an engineer station, a history server and a computing server, and the engineer station and the history server are connected to the terminal bus respectively. Specifically, the engineer station is used to modify the system configuration and configuration, and can be used to debug the control algorithm during the debugging stage; the history server is used to collect, store and retrieve long-term historical data; the computing server is used for the alarm and log management of the DCS system, and provides alarm and log information services to the control room workstation, and provides the global computing function of the nuclear power reactor.

[0050] Wherein, the non-safety DCS includes a communication station, one end of which is connected to the control bus, and the other end is connected to a third-party instrumentation and control system, and the third-party instrumentation and control system is connected to field equipment (non-safety-level equipment); the communication station is used for information communication with the third-party system, and the third-party system is monitored according to the control instructions under the operator workstation. Specifically, the third-party system is a system that implements logical processing in the non-DCS system.

[0051] The DCS architecture further includes a severe accident monitoring system, which is connected to the CIC cabinet and the control bus, respectively. Specifically, the severe accident monitoring system is used for mitigation in the event of a severe accident condition in which all AC power is lost.

[0052] It should be noted that the nuclear power reactor DCS architecture of this embodiment mainly improves the monitoring method of safety-level equipment, and thereby simplifies the nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, so that the simplified DCS architecture can meet the compact layout requirements. Among them, CIC cabinets, conventional island real-time servers, nuclear island servers, control stations, communication stations, engineer stations, historical servers, computing servers, severe accident systems, reactor protection systems, data transmission cabinets, safety facility drive cabinets, safety-level monitoring equipment, and non-safety-level monitoring equipment are all conventional configurations in the existing nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, so the functions and specific structures of these functional components are well known to technicians in the relevant field, and are not described in detail in this embodiment.

[0053] The embodiment of the present invention meets the requirements of the standard for the in-depth defense system, and at least two defense levels are implemented using different platforms, and the two are independent of each other. Among them, in-depth defense refers to the following technical requirements according to HAF102-2016 "Nuclear Power Plant Design Safety Regulations":

[0054] Level 1: Prevent plant deviations from normal operation and prevent system failures by correctly and conservatively designing the plant in accordance with appropriate quality levels and engineering practices;

[0055] Level 2: Detect and correct deviations from normal operating conditions to prevent expected operating events from escalating into accident conditions;

[0056] Level 3: Control events not prevented by the previous level of defense through inherent safety features, fail-safe design, additional equipment and procedures, so that the nuclear power plant reaches a stable and acceptable state after these events and maintains at least one barrier to contain radioactive materials;

[0057] Level 4: Mitigation of severe accidents through accident management procedures, additional measures and procedures to prevent the progression of accidents, and measures to mitigate the consequences of selected severe accidents, and ensuring that radioactive releases are kept as low as practicable;

[0058] Level 5: Mitigate the radiological consequences of potential releases of radioactive material resulting from accident conditions through appropriately equipped emergency control centers and on-site and off-site emergency response plans.

[0059] Among them, the fifth level (Level 5) does not involve the instrumentation and control system, so the defense levels for the instrumentation and control system are as follows:

[0060] LEVEL 1: Prevention line;

[0061] pass Figure 1 The non-safety-level equipment on the right side of the two large blocks in the middle is implemented to maintain the nuclear power reactor within the operating limits and avoid shutdown and activation of special safety facilities.

[0062] LEVEL 2: Main defense line;

[0063] pass Figure 1 The middle left side is implemented (including protection group, ESFAC and DTC, CIC, S-VDU, etc.) to deal with design basis accidents.

[0064] LEVEL 3: Diversity defense line;

[0065] pass Figure 1The right side in the middle plus the right side and CIC are implemented, and the signal is sent to CIC through the control station to control the field equipment to deal with the failure of the main defense line. Among them, the failure of the main defense line only considers the failure of software common cause failure CCF, and does not consider the failure of hardware equipment failure, so CIC can still be used here.

[0066] LEVEL 4: Severe accident prevention line;

[0067] The embodiments of the present invention provide more diverse monitoring means, especially the second-layer monitoring information decouples the security-level and non-security-level monitoring devices to achieve diverse monitoring methods.

[0068] The embodiment of the present invention reduces the DCS second-layer monitoring equipment, and also provides better conditions for the design of a compactly arranged nuclear power main control room, and facilitates the implementation of human-centered design such as channel and equipment layout.

[0069] Compared with the prior art, the DCS architecture of this embodiment greatly simplifies the DCS system and equipment scale, eliminates Figure 1 The gateway from the safety level to the non-safety level and the human-machine interface bus connecting the gateway in the first path of the DCS architecture of the land reactor shown in the figure are shown; the safety level and non-safety level monitoring equipment in the main control room are independent, and all safety level and non-safety level equipment are monitored by three operator workstations under normal working conditions. In the event of an accident, there is a dedicated safety level equipment monitoring, which meets the requirements of compact layout design and meets the standard's defense level requirements for nuclear safety. In addition, safety level equipment is the top priority of cost. This embodiment cancels the safety level monitoring equipment (S-VDU) of the operator workstation and implements it through non-safety level equipment (NC-VDU), which greatly saves costs.

[0070] The embodiments of the present invention have been described above, and the above description is exemplary, not exhaustive, and is not limited to the disclosed embodiments. Many modifications and variations will be apparent to those of ordinary skill in the art without departing from the scope and spirit of the described embodiments. The selection of terms used herein is intended to best explain the principles of the embodiments, practical applications, or technical improvements in the market, or to enable other persons of ordinary skill in the art to understand the embodiments disclosed herein.

Claims

1. A compact nuclear power reactor DCS architecture, characterized in that: Including main control room, safety-level DCS and non-safety-level DCS; The non-safety-level DCS includes a terminal bus, a control bus, a real-time server, a control station, and an operator workstation arranged in a main control room; the operator workstation is connected to the terminal bus, and the control station is connected to the control bus; The safety-level DCS includes a safety-level bus A and a safety-level bus B, wherein the safety-level bus A and the safety-level bus B are connected to the control bus through a gateway, wherein the safety-level bus A is connected to the first protection group, the third protection group and several CIC cabinets, and the safety-level bus B is connected to the second protection group, the fourth protection group and several CIC cabinets; the above CIC cabinets are also connected to the control station; The operator workstation is used to issue safety-level equipment control instructions to monitor safety-level equipment, and the safety-level equipment control instructions are sequentially transmitted to the safety-level equipment control instructions via the terminal bus, the real-time server, the control bus, the control station, and the CIC cabinet; The safety-level device feeds back safety-level device information according to the safety-level device control instruction, and the safety-level device information is sequentially transmitted to the operator workstation via the safety-level bus A or the safety-level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus.

2. The compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that: One end of the control station is connected to the control bus, and the other end is connected to the non-safety-level device; The operator workstation is also used to issue non-safety-level device control instructions to monitor non-safety-level devices. The non-safety-level device control instructions are transmitted to the safety-level devices via the terminal bus, the real-time server, the control bus, and the control station in sequence. The non-safety-level devices feed back non-safety-level device information based on the non-safety-level device control instructions. The non-safety-level device information is transmitted to the operator workstation via the control station, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus in sequence.

3. The compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture according to claim 2, characterized in that: The operator workstation includes a primary-loop operator workstation, a secondary-loop operator workstation and a crew chief workstation; the primary-loop operator workstation, the secondary-loop operator workstation and the crew chief workstation are respectively connected to the terminal bus for communication; the primary-loop operator workstation, the secondary-loop operator workstation and the crew chief workstation are each configured with a non-safety-level monitoring device, and the non-safety-level monitoring device is used to display the safety-level device information or the non-safety-level device information.

4. The compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that: The safety-level bus A and the safety-level bus B are also connected to a safety-level monitoring device respectively.

5. The compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that: The real-time server comprises a nuclear island real-time server and a conventional island real-time server, and the nuclear island real-time server and the conventional island real-time server are respectively connected to the terminal bus and the control bus.

6. The compactly arranged nuclear power reactor DCS architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that: A large screen is also provided in the main control room, and the large screen is connected to the terminal bus for displaying safety-level device information or non-safety-level device information; the safety-level device information is sequentially transmitted to the large screen via the safety-level bus A or the safety-level bus B, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus, and the non-safety-level device information is sequentially transmitted to the large screen via the control station, the control bus, the real-time server, and the terminal bus.

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