Energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multi-party computation privacy protection

By employing a secure multi-party computation method, energy storage data is converted into secret shares and interactively computed, solving the problems of privacy leakage and high computing resource demand in data sharing in energy storage networks, and achieving efficient privacy protection and computing resource conservation.

CN115766073BActive Publication Date: 2026-06-19NORTH CHINA ELECTRIC POWER UNIV +1

Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
NORTH CHINA ELECTRIC POWER UNIV
Filing Date
2022-09-29
Publication Date
2026-06-19

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

In existing energy storage networks, data sharing poses a risk of privacy breaches, and traditional homomorphic encryption computing resources are demanding and difficult to adapt to dynamically changing energy storage node environments.

Method used

A secure multi-party computation method is adopted to convert energy storage data into random number secret shares and difference secret shares. The data is then exchanged and summed through privacy addition or multiplication operations. Random number triplets are generated using a 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol to achieve privacy-preserving data sharing.

Benefits of technology

It effectively resists malicious behavior, protects the privacy and security of energy storage data, reduces the demand for computing resources, and is suitable for flexible and diverse energy storage node data sharing scenarios.

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Patent Text Reader

Abstract

This invention relates to a method for sharing energy storage data that supports secure multi-party computation and privacy protection, comprising the following steps: Energy storage nodes convert energy storage data into two secret shares, namely a random number secret share and a difference secret share; calculate the two secret shares of the task answer through privacy addition or multiplication operations; energy storage nodes exchange the two secret shares of the task answer; and the energy storage nodes sum the secret shares obtained from the exchange to complete the energy storage data sharing. This invention employs a data sharing algorithm based on secure multi-party computation to resist malicious behavior and protect the privacy of energy storage data during the sharing process, while also implementing an efficient protocol to cope with the flexible and ever-changing data sharing between energy storage nodes.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, specifically to a method for sharing energy storage data that supports secure multi-party computation and privacy protection. Background Technology

[0002] As environmental problems caused by fossil fuel extraction become increasingly severe, renewable energy has become a key factor in solving these problems. However, renewable energy sources, such as electricity, suffer from intermittency and instability. Energy storage systems, which can absorb electricity during low-load periods and output it during high-load periods, are an effective means of compensating for the shortcomings of renewable energy.

[0003] New energy vehicles, such as electric vehicles, have received widespread attention from all sectors of Chinese society in recent years. When equipped with a bidirectional charger, electric vehicles can charge from the grid, discharge to the grid, and also transmit electricity to other electric vehicles. Therefore, electric vehicles can be viewed as energy storage devices, and the vehicle network composed of electric vehicles can be considered a distributed energy storage network (referred to as an energy storage network), with each electric vehicle being a distributed energy storage node (referred to as an energy storage node) in the energy storage network.

[0004] In existing technologies, the development of energy storage networks (technology) in terms of market application and promotion is constrained, mainly because: energy storage networks have strong spatial and temporal dispersion characteristics, the level of networked management and control is not high, and a large number of energy storage nodes cannot participate in grid interaction through interconnection.

[0005] With the development of "Internet+", integrating energy storage networks with information technology to establish interconnectivity between energy storage nodes, solve data sharing issues, and improve interoperability has become an important research direction. Domestic and international scholars have conducted extensive research and practice in this area. In existing research and practice, energy storage technology serves as a supporting technology for renewable energy and distributed generation. Improving the informatization level of energy storage technology can effectively improve resource utilization, and data sharing technology is the cornerstone of informatization.

[0006] Ci Song et al. focused on the application of distributed energy storage technology in data centers, replacing traditional UPS with distributed energy storage to significantly improve energy utilization, while achieving energy optimization allocation in data centers and realizing data sharing of distributed energy storage [1]. Zhao Wei et al. proposed a networked operation platform architecture for energy storage with "local and remote two-level deployment and multi-system integrated application" to realize information management and interconnection sharing of distributed energy storage resources [2]. Hailing Zhu et al. proposed a unique sharing strategy. They considered that a group of users were willing to use a public energy storage system in a cooperative manner. Through algorithms, they dynamically calculated how to perform optimal charging and discharging of the energy storage system, thereby minimizing the energy consumption cost of each user and satisfying their personal preferences [3]. However, none of the above schemes considered the problem of energy storage data sharing. If there are malicious users, they may steal and leak the energy storage data shared by each energy storage node.

[0007] Fatih Yucel et al. considered the risk of privacy leakage that electric vehicles may face when transmitting energy storage data, and proposed a privacy-preserving charge-discharge matching algorithm based on this [4]. This matching algorithm is based on a public key and private key system when transmitting energy storage data shared by each energy storage node. Each operation requires considerable computing resources and is not suitable for dynamically changing electric vehicles.

[0008] In existing technologies, homomorphic encryption-based sharing methods can be used for data sharing. Homomorphic encryption can protect energy storage data while sharing it. The principle of homomorphic encryption is briefly described as follows: Homomorphic encryption uses energy storage data as the original data, encrypts the original data to obtain ciphertext data, performs specific homomorphic operations on the ciphertext data to obtain the ciphertext operation result, and decrypts the ciphertext operation result to obtain decrypted data. This decrypted data is equivalent to the operation result obtained by performing corresponding operations on the original data, thus making the energy storage data usable but invisible.

[0009] The homomorphic operations mentioned above are also called homomorphic operations, which are divided into two types: homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication, also known as addition homomorphism and multiplication homomorphism. Two original data a and b satisfy the encryption function Dec(En(a)⊙En(b))=a⊕b, where En is the encryption operation, Dec is the decryption operation, and ⊙ and ⊕ correspond to the operations on the original data and ciphertext data fields, respectively. When ⊕ represents addition, the encryption is called addition homomorphic encryption; when ⊕ represents multiplication, the encryption is called multiplication homomorphic encryption.

[0010] Homomorphic encryption is divided into semi-homomorphic encryption, approximate homomorphic encryption, and fully homomorphic encryption. Semi-homomorphic encryption only supports one homomorphic addition or homomorphic multiplication. Approximate homomorphic encryption supports both homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication, but the number of executions is finite. Fully homomorphic encryption supports both homomorphic addition and homomorphic multiplication, and the number of executions is unlimited.

[0011] Homomorphic encryption schemes generally assume data sharing in a two-party scenario, meaning there are two parties: a sender and a receiver. A homomorphic encryption scheme should have at least four functions:

[0012] 1) Key generation function: The sender uses this function to generate the key and some public parameters required for encryption;

[0013] 2) Encryption function: The sender uses this function to encrypt the original data (referring to energy storage data) with a key to obtain ciphertext data, which is then transmitted to the receiver.

[0014] 3) Evaluation function: The receiver performs homomorphic operations on the ciphertext data using the given method, and the result of the ciphertext operation is transmitted from the receiver to the sender.

[0015] 4) Decryption function: The sender uses this function to decrypt the ciphertext operation result to obtain the decrypted data. This decrypted data is equivalent to the operation result that should be obtained after performing the corresponding operation on the original data.

[0016] Because homomorphic encryption is too expensive, the industry often uses semi-homomorphic encryption, such as Paillier homomorphic encryption, which has additive homomorphic operations, so multiplying the ciphertext data is equivalent to adding the original data.

[0017] The biggest drawback of homomorphic encryption is its requirement for powerful computing capabilities, placing stringent demands on computer hardware. This is especially true in large-scale industrial applications, where insufficient computing power can have a significant negative impact. Currently, most of the popular fully homomorphic encryption algorithms are still in the research phase in laboratories, with few large-scale applications.

[0018] Homomorphic encryption methods also suffer from long decryption times and high storage space requirements. The more complex the homomorphic encryption, the longer the decryption time and the larger the storage space required.

[0019] The information disclosed in this background section is intended only to enhance the understanding of the general background of the invention and should not be construed as an admission or in any way implying that the information constitutes prior art known to those skilled in the art. Summary of the Invention

[0020] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, the present invention aims to provide a method for sharing energy storage data that supports secure multi-party computation and privacy protection. While enabling energy storage data sharing, it can effectively resist malicious behavior and protect the privacy and security of energy storage data during the sharing process. At the same time, it implements an efficient protocol to cope with the flexible and ever-changing data sharing between energy storage nodes.

[0021] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0022] A method for sharing energy storage data that supports secure multi-party computation and privacy protection is characterized by the following steps:

[0023] The energy storage node converts the energy storage data into two secret shares, namely a random number secret share and a difference secret share;

[0024] Calculate the two secret shares of the task answer using privacy addition or multiplication operations;

[0025] Two secret shares of the answer to the task of interaction between energy storage nodes;

[0026] Energy storage nodes sum up the secret shares obtained through interaction to complete energy storage data sharing.

[0027] Based on the above technical solution, in order to obtain the two secret shares of the interactive task answer, it is necessary to establish a two-way connection between energy storage nodes that share energy storage data in advance.

[0028] Based on the above technical solution, the energy storage nodes adopt the following secret sharing steps to convert their respective local energy storage data into two secret shares:

[0029] The energy storage node generates a random number and calculates the difference between the local energy storage data and the random number to obtain the local difference value;

[0030] The energy storage node uses the random number as a secret share of the random number;

[0031] Energy storage nodes store the local difference locally as a secret share of the difference;

[0032] The energy storage node shares a secret share of the random number with the peer.

[0033] Based on the above technical solution, the specific steps for calculating the two secret shares of the task answer through privacy addition are as follows:

[0034] The energy storage node adds the secret share of the difference stored locally to the secret share of the random number from the peer to obtain the sum.

[0035] Based on the above technical solution, the energy storage node D0 calculates the difference secret share ΔV0 + the random number secret share A1 to obtain the sum Z0;

[0036] Energy storage node D1 calculates the difference secret share ΔV1 + random number secret share A0, and obtains the sum Z1;

[0037] After obtaining the sum, the specific steps are as follows:

[0038] Energy storage node D0 sends the summation result Z0 to the peer energy storage node D1;

[0039] Energy storage node D1 sends the summation result Z1 to the peer energy storage node D0;

[0040] The sum of the calculated results Z0 and Z1 at energy storage node D0 is added together.

[0041] The energy storage node D1 calculates the sum of the results Z1 and Z0.

[0042] Based on the above technical solution, the specific steps for calculating the two secret shares of the task answer through privacy multiplication are as follows:

[0043] Random number triplets are generated between two energy storage nodes using an unintentional transmission extension protocol. Each random number triplet consists of three random numbers (a, b, c), where a and b are kept secret from all energy storage nodes, and c satisfies c = a. b, that is, the product of a and b equals c. These three random numbers are split into two secret shares and stored in two energy storage nodes respectively. The energy storage nodes only know the values ​​of the secret shares of a and b locally.

[0044] The generation of random triples requires the execution of a 2-to-1 related unintended transmission extension protocol between two energy storage nodes;

[0045] Using random number triples, calculate the answer to a privacy-preserving multiplication task.

[0046] Based on the above technical solution, in the 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol, the two energy storage nodes act as the sender and receiver respectively, and perform a total of L unintentional transmissions.

[0047] In each unintentional transmission, the sender will send a random value. and related functions The receiver selects its own position. ,from and Select one data accept;

[0048] The sender does not know which data the receiver has selected; the receiver only knows the content of the data it has received.

[0049] Based on the above technical solution, the specific steps for generating random number triples by executing the 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol are as follows:

[0050] Step 1) Random number Random number generated locally by the sender The receiver generates random numbers locally, and the binary length of each generated random number is L. Since a and b are random numbers and cannot be known by either party, the secret share of random numbers generated locally by the sender and receiver indicates that a and b are secretly shared between the sender and receiver.

[0051] Step 2) The recipient uses Use the value (0 or 1) of each bit in the binary representation as the selection bit. ,Right now There are a total of L selection bits;

[0052] Step 3) The sender uses Set relevant functions This indicates the number of times a related unintentional transmission has occurred, using a random number. If the binary length is set to the maximum value of i, then there are a total of L related functions;

[0053] Step 4) The sender and receiver execute the Related Unintentional Transport Extension Protocol (RUT). The RUT is considered a black-box protocol, with the sender providing L related functions. and random numbers The receiver provides L choices, each with a value of r; ultimately, the receiver receives L data points. ;

[0054] Step 5) Sender settings Recipient settings ;

[0055] Verification shows that This achieved The secret is shared between the sender and the receiver. and yes Two secret shares;

[0056] Step 6) The sender and receiver then execute steps 2 to 5 again, but this time the receiver... The binary bits are used as selection bits, and the sender uses them to select the desired bits. The relevant functions are set; the final sender obtains the secret share. The recipient receives a secret share. Verification shows that and yes The secret share, namely ;

[0057] Step 7) Sender settings Recipient settings Finally, a random number c is secretly shared between the sender and receiver, which can be verified. and These are two secret shares of c, namely ;

[0058] At this point, both the sender and receiver have obtained their secret share of the random number triplet. Furthermore, since the random number triplet is independent of the input data, the consumption of computing resources can be reduced by pre-generating a large number of random number triplets.

[0059] Based on the above technical solution, and considering energy storage node D0 as the sender and D1 as the receiver, the specific steps for calculating the answer to the privacy multiplication task using random number triples are as follows:

[0060] Step 1) The sender calculates the first intermediate parameter locally using the following formula. Second intermediate parameter ;

[0061] ;

[0062] The receiver calculates the first intermediate parameter locally using the following formula. Second intermediate parameter ;

[0063] ;

[0064] This step uses random numbers. With random numbers The secret share concealed and The true value of the secret share, because of random numbers. With random numbers The secret share is not known to the peer node, therefore even if subsequent steps make it public. and The value will not leak individual data. and The value;

[0065] Step 2) Both parties share their own and Then both parties calculate the sum locally, and both the sender and receiver receive the result. and ;

[0066] This step was made public to both parties involved. and The value, and Is it using random numbers? With random numbers Covering up energy storage data and What we get is a temporary intermediate number;

[0067] Step 3) Sender calculates The receiver calculates This can be verified. and that is The secret share, namely Privacy multiplication is written as ;

[0068] When the result of a multiplication is needed, the sender and receiver obtain the result by sharing their respective secret shares. .

[0069] The energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multi-party computation and privacy protection described in this invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0070] 1. A data sharing algorithm based on secure multi-party computation is adopted to resist malicious behavior of the participants. The energy storage data first obtains two secret shares through secret sharing, and then the secret shares are shared and calculated among the energy storage nodes. The energy storage data is available but not visible, thus protecting the privacy and security of the energy storage data during the sharing process.

[0071] 2. Before the emergence of shared tasks, each energy storage node uses the 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol to generate a large number of random number triples to cope with the flexible and ever-changing data sharing between energy storage nodes.

[0072] Once a shared task is initiated, each energy storage node uses a pre-generated random number triplet to execute the privacy-preserving data sharing method, requiring only a small amount of computing resources to complete the task computation.

[0073] 3. The energy storage data sharing method described in this invention is applicable to any scenario that requires arithmetic operations, such as energy trading, electric vehicle charging and discharging matching, etc. Attached Figure Description

[0074] The present invention includes the following figures:

[0075] The accompanying drawings are provided to better understand the invention and are not intended to unduly limit the scope of the invention. Wherein:

[0076] Figure 1 The flowchart of the energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multi-party computation and privacy protection described in this invention.

[0077] Figure 2 A flowchart of a privacy-preserving addition operation. Detailed Implementation

[0078] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings. This detailed description is an illustration in conjunction with exemplary embodiments of the invention, including various details of the embodiments to aid understanding, and should be considered merely exemplary. Therefore, those skilled in the art will recognize that various changes and modifications can be made to the embodiments described herein without departing from the scope and spirit of the invention. Similarly, for clarity and brevity, descriptions of well-known functions and structures are omitted in the following description.

[0079] In an energy storage network, in order to achieve purposes such as energy dispatch and energy trading, two energy storage nodes (referred to as energy storage nodes) need to share energy storage data, which includes information such as current location, remaining power, and battery parameters.

[0080] In traditional energy storage data sharing scenarios, energy storage nodes share data by uploading and downloading. However, this poses a risk of privacy leaks. Malicious parties can use the energy storage data to predict the driving path and destination of electric vehicles, threatening personal safety. Although homomorphic encryption technology can be used to protect the security of energy storage data, homomorphic encryption requires a large amount of computation during encryption, decryption, and homomorphic operations. The location of electric vehicles changes constantly during driving, and the resulting vehicle network is dynamic. In this scenario, if traditional homomorphic encryption is used, the data latency when sharing energy storage data will increase, and the latency will compromise the timeliness of the shared data.

[0081] To ensure the security of energy storage data, such as Figure 1 As shown, this invention provides a method for sharing energy storage data that supports secure multi-party computation and privacy protection, including the following steps:

[0082] The energy storage node converts the energy storage data into two secret shares, namely a random number secret share and a difference secret share;

[0083] Calculate the two secret shares of the task answer using privacy addition or multiplication operations;

[0084] Two secret shares of the answer to the task of interaction between energy storage nodes;

[0085] Energy storage nodes sum up the secret shares obtained through interaction to complete energy storage data sharing.

[0086] Based on the above technical solution, in order to obtain the two secret shares of the interactive task answer, it is necessary to establish a two-way connection between energy storage nodes that share energy storage data in advance.

[0087] For example:

[0088] Taking electric vehicles as an example of energy storage nodes, the energy storage nodes that need to share energy storage data are energy storage node D0 and energy storage node D1. When an electric vehicle (energy storage node D0) is driving, it needs to share energy storage data with other electric vehicles (energy storage node D1). Both parties obtain each other's power information, location information, and road information. By sharing energy storage data, electric vehicles can make better decisions during driving, such as route planning, energy trading, and charging and discharging matching.

[0089] Energy storage node D0 broadcasts a sharing request via the wireless network;

[0090] The energy storage node D1 that accepts the sharing request communicates with the energy storage node D0 and establishes a two-way connection.

[0091] Based on the above technical solution, the energy storage nodes adopt the following secret sharing steps to convert their respective local energy storage data (privacy data) into two secret shares:

[0092] The energy storage node generates a random number and calculates the difference between the local energy storage data and the random number to obtain the local difference value;

[0093] The energy storage node uses the random number as a secret share of the random number;

[0094] Energy storage nodes store the local difference locally as a secret share of the difference;

[0095] The energy storage node shares a secret share of the random number with the peer.

[0096] Sharing a secret share of random numbers ensures that the local energy storage data is not leaked, for example:

[0097] Energy storage node D0 possesses local energy storage data X0. Energy storage node D0 generates a random number A0 locally as a random number secret share and calculates the difference between X0 and A0 as the difference secret share ΔV0. Energy storage node D0 shares the random number secret share A0 with the peer energy storage node D1.

[0098] Energy storage node D1 has local energy storage data X1. Energy storage node D1 generates a random number A1 locally as a random number secret share and calculates the difference between X1 and A1 as the difference secret share ΔV1. Energy storage node D1 shares the random number secret share A1 with the peer energy storage node D0.

[0099] Based on the above technical solution, the specific steps for calculating the two secret shares of the task answer through privacy addition are as follows:

[0100] The energy storage node adds the secret share of the difference stored locally to the secret share of the random number from the peer to obtain the sum.

[0101] For example, such as Figure 2 As shown:

[0102] Energy storage node D0 calculates the difference secret share ΔV0 + the random number secret share A1, and obtains the sum Z0;

[0103] Energy storage node D1 calculates the difference secret share ΔV1 + random number secret share A0, and obtains the sum Z1.

[0104] Based on the above technical solution, after obtaining the summation result, the following specific steps are also included:

[0105] Energy storage node D0 sends the summation result Z0 to the peer energy storage node D1;

[0106] Energy storage node D1 sends the summation result Z1 to the peer energy storage node D0;

[0107] The sum of the calculated results Z0 and Z1 at energy storage node D0 is added together.

[0108] The energy storage node D1 calculates the sum of the results Z1 and Z0.

[0109] like Figure 2 As shown, through the privacy-preserving addition operation described above, the sum of the calculated results Z0 and Z1 obtained by the energy storage nodes through interaction (mutual sharing) is equal to the sum of the calculated energy storage data X0 and X1. Therefore, without leaking energy storage data to the other end, the energy storage node can calculate the sum of the calculated energy storage data X0 and X1.

[0110] Based on the above technical solution, the specific steps for calculating the two secret shares of the task answer through privacy multiplication are as follows:

[0111] Random number triplets are generated between two energy storage nodes using an unintentional transmission extension protocol. Each random number triplet consists of three random numbers (a, b, c), where a and b are kept secret from all energy storage nodes, and c satisfies c = a. b, that is, the product of a and b equals c. These three random numbers are split into two secret shares and stored in two energy storage nodes respectively. The energy storage nodes only know the values ​​of the secret shares of a and b locally.

[0112] The generation of random triples requires the execution of a 2-to-1 related unintended transmission extension protocol between two energy storage nodes;

[0113] Using random number triples, calculate the answer to a privacy-preserving multiplication task.

[0114] Based on the above technical solution, in the 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol, the two energy storage nodes act as the sender and receiver respectively, and perform a total of L unintentional transmissions.

[0115] In each unintentional transmission, the sender will send a random value. and related functions The receiver selects its own position. ,from and Select one data accept;

[0116] The sender does not know which data the receiver has selected; the receiver only knows the content of the data it has received.

[0117] Based on the above technical solution, the specific steps for generating random number triples by executing the 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol are as follows:

[0118] Step 1) Random number Random number generated locally by the sender The receiver generates random numbers locally, and the binary length of each generated random number is L. Since a and b are random numbers and cannot be known by either party, the secret share of random numbers generated locally by the sender and receiver indicates that a and b are secretly shared between the sender and receiver.

[0119] Step 2) The recipient uses Use the value (0 or 1) of each bit in the binary representation as the selection bit. ,Right now There are a total of L selection bits;

[0120] Step 3) The sender uses Set relevant functions This indicates the number of times a related unintentional transmission has occurred, using a random number. If the binary length is set to the maximum value of i, then there are a total of L related functions;

[0121] Step 4) The sender and receiver execute the Related Unintentional Transport Extension Protocol (RUT). The RUT is considered a black-box protocol, with the sender providing L related functions. and random numbers The receiver provides L choices, each with a value of r; ultimately, the receiver receives L data points. ;

[0122] Step 5) Sender settings Recipient settings ;

[0123] Verification shows that This achieved The secret is shared between the sender and the receiver. and yes Two secret shares;

[0124] Step 6) The sender and receiver then execute steps 2 to 5 again, but this time the receiver... The binary bits are used as selection bits, and the sender uses them to select the desired bits. The relevant functions are set; the final sender obtains the secret share. The recipient receives a secret share. Verification shows that and yes The secret share, namely ;

[0125] Step 7) Sender settings Recipient settings Finally, a random number c is secretly shared between the sender and receiver, which can be verified. and These are two secret shares of c, namely ;

[0126] At this point, both the sender and receiver have obtained their secret share of the random number triplet. Furthermore, since the random number triplet is independent of the input data, the consumption of computing resources can be reduced by pre-generating a large number of random number triplets.

[0127] Based on the above technical solution, and considering energy storage node D0 as the sender and D1 as the receiver, the specific steps for calculating the answer to the privacy multiplication task using random number triples are as follows:

[0128] Step 1) The sender calculates the first intermediate parameter locally using the following formula. Second intermediate parameter ;

[0129] ;

[0130] The receiver calculates the first intermediate parameter locally using the following formula. Second intermediate parameter ;

[0131] ;

[0132] This step uses random numbers. With random numbers The secret share concealed and The true value of the secret share, because of random numbers. With random numbers The secret share is not known to the peer node, therefore even if subsequent steps make it public. and The value will not leak individual data. and The value;

[0133] Step 2) Both parties share their own and Then both parties calculate the sum locally, and both the sender and receiver receive the result. and ;

[0134] This step was made public to both parties involved. and The value, and Is it using random numbers? With random numbers Covering up energy storage data and What we get is a temporary intermediate number;

[0135] Step 3) Sender calculates The receiver calculates This can be verified. and that is The secret share, namely Privacy multiplication is written as ;

[0136] When the result of a multiplication is needed, the sender and receiver obtain the result by sharing their respective secret shares. .

[0137] The following are specific application examples of the sharing method described in this invention.

[0138] Electric vehicles often experience travel anxiety due to battery capacity limitations. Therefore, being able to purchase additional battery power from other electric vehicles with surplus charge can alleviate this anxiety to some extent. This application example focuses on how to integrate the present invention's solution to achieve both the availability and invisibility of energy storage data during data sharing when matching the charging and discharging of electric vehicles.

[0139] In this charge-discharge matching scenario, consider two types of electric vehicles: electric vehicles that are low on power and need to be recharged, referred to as demand-side electric vehicles; and electric vehicles that are fully charged and wish to provide power in exchange for a reward, referred to as supply-side electric vehicles.

[0140] The matching method used is a variant of the stable matching algorithm proposed by David Gale and Lloyd Shapley. Our variant algorithm operates on a round-by-round basis, because the environmental state differs between different rounds as the electric vehicle is constantly moving.

[0141] Define the set of electric vehicles on the demand side as Electric vehicle group of energy suppliers Suppose that after the energy supplier's electric vehicle is matched with a demander's electric vehicle, it drives to the demander's location, and then the two exchange electricity.

[0142] Define electric vehicle preference, denoted by symbol . Demand side For a certain energy supplier The preference is .in This is the difference between the total battery capacity and the remaining battery capacity. Energy supplier Can be provided The specific meaning of energy will be explained in the next paragraph. Considering that the energy supplied by energy providers far exceeds the demand, and the demand side can only use [energy available for use]... Therefore, a minimum value function is used to eliminate this special case.

[0143] For the energy supplier Define preferences . Indicates the current remaining battery power. express Energy consumption per kilometer. Considering that most real-world roads are grid-like, therefore... express and Distance between Clearly, the energy supplier's current remaining battery power, minus the energy consumed during the journey to the charging location, leaves the energy that can be provided to the demander. .

[0144] The specific steps for each round of the entire matching algorithm are as follows:

[0145] 1. Each demander If it believes that the current battery level is insufficient to reach its destination, it can broadcast its request to charge wirelessly via in-vehicle self-organizing network, cellular network, or other means.

[0146] 2. Energy supplier Constantly monitor requests in the broadcast. When a request is received from a party, respond to that party. Both parties are peer nodes.

[0147] 3. Both parties use the aforementioned secret sharing method to split the energy storage data, and then use the aforementioned privacy addition and privacy multiplication calculation methods to calculate the energy supplier's... For the demand side The preference values, and the demand side For functional side The specific steps for calculating mutual preference values ​​using the above algorithm for privacy are as follows:

[0148] 3.1 Both parties generate a sufficient number of random triples by executing the 2-out-of-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol. Since the entire task algorithm is known, the number of triples is fixed.

[0149] 3.2 Both parties will divide their energy storage data into secret shares and share them with the other party's node. That is, the demand side... The amount of electricity already consumed and current location information Segmented storage and Between. Energy supplier At the same time, it holds private data (such as the current remaining battery power). Energy consumption per kilometer and current location information Similarly, it is split into secret shares and shared with the peer node.

[0150] 3.3 Both parties use secretly shared location data to calculate the distance between them. After the aforementioned privacy-sharing data is processed, and Each has a secret share of its location information, as well as a random number triple generated unintentionally during transmission. Privacy calculations determine the distance between the two. The algorithm is as follows:

[0151] 1) Demand side The difference between the secret shares of the two local x-coordinates is calculated, and the power supplier also calculates the difference between its own local secret shares of the two x-coordinates. The reconstructed result of these two differences is equal to the difference between the two x-coordinates.

[0152] 2) Demand side and energy supplier Generate two random decimals, ensuring that the sum of these two random decimals is still less than 1 and greater than 0. This is to determine the sign of the product after multiplying it with the two differences.

[0153] 3) Demand side and energy supplier The privacy multiplication described above is used with the help of random number triples, and then the calculation result is shared to determine whether the result is positive or negative;

[0154] 3) If the number is negative, multiply both nodes by -1 to find the absolute value of the difference in x-coordinates. This absolute value is secretly shared between the two nodes.

[0155] 4) Similarly, calculate the difference in the absolute values ​​of the y-coordinates;

[0156] 5) Finally, the two secret shares of the distance between the two are obtained and stored on the demand side respectively. and energy supplier .

[0157] 3.4. Using the privacy multiplication method described above, calculate... The value is calculated, and the result is secretly shared between the two nodes. Then, privacy addition is used to calculate... The secret share is calculated interactively by both nodes and then summed to obtain... Then the demand side The minimum value can be obtained by calculating the function locally. right Preferences.

[0158] 4. After the demander and all the energy suppliers that can be reached have calculated their preferences, the demander will select the energy supplier with the highest preference value and send a charging matching invitation.

[0159] 5. The energy supplier selects the preferred demander from the received invitations. Once the match is complete, both the energy supplier and demander remain silent in the next round, simultaneously driving to the charging location to complete the energy transaction.

[0160] Proceed to the next round until all demanders or energy suppliers have completed their pairings.

[0161] References:

[0162] 1. Ci Song, Li Hongjia. Exploration and practice of distributed energy storage technology [J]. National Defense Science and Technology, 2014 (3): 6-9.

[0163] 2. Zhao Wei, Xiao Xiang, Zheng Yaodong, et al. Architecture and control strategy of distributed energy storage network operation platform [J]. High Voltage Engineering, 2019, 45(10): 3256-3262.

[0164] 3. Zhu H, Ouahada K. A distributed real-time control algorithm for energy storage sharing[J]. Energy and Buildings, 2021, 230: 110478.

[0165] 4. Yucel F, Akkaya K, Bulut E. Efficient and privacy preserving supplier matching for electric vehicle charging[J]. Ad Hoc Networks, 2019,90: 101730.

[0166] The contents not described in detail in this specification are existing technologies known to those skilled in the art.

[0167] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. The scope of protection of the present invention is not limited to the above embodiments. Any equivalent modifications or changes made by those skilled in the art based on the content disclosed in the present invention should be included within the scope of protection set forth in the claims.

Claims

1. A method for energy storage data sharing supporting secure multiparty computation privacy protection, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: The energy storage node converts the energy storage data into two secret shares, namely a random number secret share and a difference secret share; Calculate the two secret shares of the task answer using privacy addition or multiplication operations; Two secret shares of the answer to the task of interaction between energy storage nodes; Energy storage nodes sum up the secret shares obtained through interaction to complete energy storage data sharing; The specific steps for calculating the two secret shares of the task answer using privacy addition are as follows: The energy storage node adds the secret share of the difference stored locally to the secret share of the random number from the peer to obtain the sum, specifically; Energy storage node D0 calculates the difference secret share ΔV0 + the random number secret share A1, and obtains the sum Z0; Energy storage node D1 calculates the difference secret share ΔV1 + random number secret share A0, and obtains the sum Z1; After obtaining the sum, the specific steps are as follows: Energy storage node D0 sends the summation result Z0 to the peer energy storage node D1; Energy storage node D1 sends the summation result Z1 to the peer energy storage node D0; The sum of the calculated results Z0 and Z1 at energy storage node D0 is added together. The sum of the results Z1 and Z0 is calculated for energy storage node D1; The specific steps for calculating the two secret shares of the task answer using privacy multiplication are as follows: Random number triplets are generated between two energy storage nodes using an unintentional transmission extension protocol. Each random number triplet consists of three random numbers (a, b, c), where a and b are kept secret from all energy storage nodes, and c satisfies c = a. b, that is, the product of a and b equals c. These three random numbers are split into two secret shares and stored in two energy storage nodes respectively. The energy storage nodes only know the values ​​of the secret shares of a and b locally. The generation of random triples requires the execution of a 2-to-1 related unintended transmission extension protocol between two energy storage nodes; Using random number triples to calculate the answer to a privacy-preserving multiplication task; The specific steps for generating random number triples by executing the 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol are as follows: Step 1) a and b are random numbers. For a's secret share, For b's secret share, Generated locally by the sender Generated locally by the recipient, the and The binary length of each number is L; since a and b are random numbers and cannot be known by either party, the secret share of random numbers generated locally by the sender and receiver indicates that a and b are secretly shared between the sender and receiver. Step 2) The recipient uses Selecting bits based on the value of each bit in binary ,Right now There are a total of L selection bits, the The value of each bit in binary is either 0 or 1, a 1i This represents the value of the i-th bit in the binary random number a1; Step 3) The sender uses Set relevant functions 'i' indicates the number of times the relevant unintentional transmission has occurred, represented by a random number. If the binary length is set to the maximum value of i, then there are a total of L related functions; Step 4) The sender and receiver execute the Related Unintentional Transport Extension Protocol (RUT). The RUT is considered a black-box protocol, with the sender providing L related functions. and random numbers The receiver provides L choices, each with a value of r; ultimately, the receiver receives L data points. ; Step 5) Sender setting , receiver setting ; Verification shows that This achieved The secret is shared between the sender and the receiver. and yes Two secret shares; Step 6) The sender and receiver then execute steps 2 to 5 again, but this time the receiver... The binary bits are used as selection bits, and the sender uses them to select the desired bits. The relevant functions are set; the final sender obtains the secret share. The recipient receives a secret share. Verification shows that and yes The secret share, namely ; Step 7) Sender settings Receiver settings Finally, a random number c is secretly shared between the sender and receiver, which can be verified. and These are two secret shares of c, namely ; At this point, both the sender and receiver have obtained their secret share of the random number triplet. Furthermore, since the random number triplet is independent of the input data, the consumption of computing resources can be reduced by pre-generating a large number of random number triplets.

2. The energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multiparty computation privacy protection of claim 1, wherein, To obtain the two secret shares of the answer to the interactive task, a two-way connection needs to be pre-established between energy storage nodes that share energy storage data.

3. The energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multiparty computation privacy protection of claim 1, wherein, Energy storage nodes use the following secret sharing steps to convert their respective local energy storage data into two secret shares: The energy storage node generates a random number and calculates the difference between the local energy storage data and the random number to obtain the local difference value; The energy storage node uses the random number as a secret share of the random number; Energy storage nodes store the local difference locally as a secret share of the difference; The energy storage node shares a secret share of the random number with the peer.

4. The energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multi-party computation and privacy protection as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In the aforementioned 2-to-1 related unintentional transmission extension protocol, the two energy storage nodes act as the sender and receiver, respectively, and perform a total of L unintentional transmissions. In each unintentional transmission, the sender will send a random value. and related functions The receiver selects its own position. ,from and Select one data accept; The sender does not know which data the receiver has selected; the receiver only knows the content of the data it has received.

5. The energy storage data sharing method supporting secure multiparty computation privacy protection of claim 1, wherein, Treating energy storage node D0 as the sender and D1 as the receiver, the specific steps for calculating the answer to the privacy multiplication task using random number triplets are as follows: Step 1) The sender calculates the first intermediate parameter locally using the following formula. Second intermediate parameter ; ; The receiver computes locally a first intermediate parameter and a second intermediate parameter ; ; In the above two formulas, ΔV0 and ΔV1 are the secret shares of the difference between energy storage nodes D0 and D1, respectively, and A0 and A1 are the secret shares of the random number between energy storage nodes D0 and D1, respectively. This step uses random numbers. With random numbers The secret share conceals the local energy storage data owned by energy storage node D0. With the local energy storage data possessed by energy storage node D1 The true value of the secret share, because of random numbers. With random numbers The secret share is not known to the peer node, therefore even if subsequent steps make it public. and The value will not leak individual data. and The value; Step 2) Both parties share their own and Then both parties calculate the sum locally, and both the sender and receiver receive the result. and ; This step was made public to both parties involved. and The value, and Is it using random numbers? With random numbers Covering up energy storage data and What we get is a temporary intermediate number; Step 3) Sender calculates The receiver calculates This can be verified. and that is The secret share, namely ; Multiplication of privacy is written as ; When the result of a multiplication is needed, the sender and receiver obtain the result by sharing their respective secret shares. ; In the above formulas, a0, b0, and c0 are the secret shares of the random number triplet obtained by the sender, and a1, b1, and c1 are the secret shares of the random number triplet obtained by the receiver.