Global navigation satellite system (GNSS) receiver operation during spoofing

Abstract

In the event that global navigation satellite system (GNSS) signal spoofing can occur, a GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced operational state with respect to one or more GNSS bands that can be spoofed. According to embodiments, the reduced operational state with respect to a GNSS band can include performing one or more of the following functions with respect to that GNSS band: disabling data demodulation and decoding, disabling time setting (e.g., time of week (TOW), week number, etc.), disabling acquisition of unknown / invisible satellites, disabling satellite differencing, disabling error recovery, reducing non-coherent integration time, and duty cycling power to one or more receiver blocks associated with the GNSS band.

Description

Background Technology

[0001] Modern electronic devices often include systems capable of receiving signals from satellite navigation systems and using these signals to determine the device's position and other information such as speed, heading, and altitude. These satellite navigation systems are commonly referred to as Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Such GNSS receivers can be integrated into consumer electronics devices such as smartphones or smartwatches, as well as into navigation systems for various types of vehicles, including cars, trucks, ships, and airplanes. GNSS receivers receive signals from multiple satellites orbiting the Earth, process these signals to determine the GNSS receiver's position, and use these signals to determine the position of devices, vehicles, etc. However, some devices (referred to as "spoofers" in this article) can mimic or "spoof" GNSS signals. Summary of the Invention

[0002] According to this disclosure, an example method for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver may include operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band. The method may further include receiving at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The method may further include determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal. The method may further include obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band. The method may further include operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to obtaining the data. The method may further include receiving at the GNSS receiver a second set of GNSS signals, the second set of GNSS signals including a second at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The method may further include determining a second positioning estimate based at least in part on a second set of GNSS signals, wherein: determining the second positioning estimate is based at least in part on a third at least one GNSS signal, the third at least one GNSS signal being received via the second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, and determining that the second positioning estimate is not based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0003] According to this disclosure, an example device for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver may include a GNSS receiver, a memory, and one or more processors communicatively coupled to the GNSS receiver and the memory, wherein the one or more processors are configured to operate the GNSS receiver in a first state relating to a first GNSS frequency band. The one or more processing units may also be configured to receive a first set of GNSS signals via the GNSS receiver, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The one or more processing units may also be configured to determine a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal. The one or more processing units may also be configured to acquire data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band. The one or more processing units may also be configured to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to acquiring the data. The one or more processing units may also be configured to receive a second set of GNSS signals at a GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including a second at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band. The one or more processing units may also be configured to determine a second positioning estimate based at least in part on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: the determination of the second positioning estimate is based at least in part on a third at least one GNSS signal received via the second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band, and the determination of the second positioning estimate is not based on any GNSS signals received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0004] According to this disclosure, an example apparatus for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver may include components for operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band. The apparatus may also include components for receiving at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including at least one first GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The apparatus may also include components for determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal. The apparatus may also include components for acquiring data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band. The apparatus may further include components for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to acquiring the data. The apparatus may also include means for receiving at the GNSS receiver a second set of GNSS signals, the second set of GNSS signals including at least one second GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The apparatus may further include components for determining a second positioning estimate based at least in part on a second set of GNSS signals, wherein: determining the second positioning estimate is based at least in part on a third at least one GNSS signal, the third at least one GNSS signal being received via a second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, and determining that the second positioning estimate is not based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0005] According to this disclosure, an example non-transitory computer-readable medium stores instructions for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the instructions including code for operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band. The instructions may also include code for receiving at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The instructions may also include code for determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal. The instructions may also include code for obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band. The instructions may also include code for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to obtaining said data. The instructions may also include code for receiving at the GNSS receiver a second set of GNSS signals, the second set of GNSS signals including a second at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The instruction may also include code for determining a second positioning estimate based at least in part on a second set of GNSS signals, wherein: the second positioning estimate is determined to be based at least in part on a third at least one GNSS signal, the third at least one GNSS signal being received via the second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, and the second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0006] These illustrative examples are mentioned not to limit or restrict the scope of this disclosure, but to provide examples to aid in understanding it. The illustrative examples are discussed in the detailed descriptions that provide further description. The advantages offered by the various examples can be further understood by examining this specification. Attached Figure Description

[0007] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form a part of this specification, illustrate one or more specific examples and, together with the description of the examples, serve to explain the principles and implementation of the specific examples.

[0008] Figure 1 This is a diagram illustrating an example positioning system according to some embodiments, in which the techniques described herein for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver during possible deception can be implemented.

[0009] Figure 2This is a simplified diagram of a GNSS system according to an embodiment.

[0010] Figure 3 This is a simplified block diagram of an example signal processing architecture that can be used in a GNSS receiver according to an embodiment.

[0011] Figure 4 This is a diagram depicting an example scenario of GNSS spoofing taking place.

[0012] Figure 5 This is an example diagram illustrating how the power of one or more components of a GNSS receiver is duty-cycled according to an embodiment.

[0013] Figure 6 This is a diagram illustrating an example of how multiple features are duty-cycled according to an embodiment.

[0014] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of a method for operating a GNSS receiver according to an embodiment.

[0015] Figure 8 This is a block diagram of an embodiment of a mobile device.

[0016] According to certain example implementations, the same reference numerals in various figures indicate the same elements. Furthermore, multiple instances of an element can be indicated by a letter or hyphen following the first digit of the element, followed by a second digit. For example, multiple instances of element 110 can be indicated as 110-1, 110-2, 110-3, etc., or 110a, 110b, 110c, etc. When only the first digit is used to refer to such an element, it should be understood that any instances of that element (e.g., element 110 in the previous examples would refer to elements 110-1, 110-2, and 110-3, or elements 110a, 110b, and 110c) Detailed Implementation

[0017] Several illustrative examples will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings, which form part of this specification. While specific examples in which one or more aspects of this disclosure may be implemented are described below, other examples may be used and various modifications may be made without departing from the scope of this disclosure or the spirit of the appended claims.

[0018] Throughout this specification, references to "an example" or "example" mean that a particular feature, structure, or characteristic described in connection with that example is included in at least one example of the claimed subject matter. Therefore, the appearance of the phrase "in an example" or "example" throughout this specification does not necessarily refer to the same example. Furthermore, a particular feature, structure, or characteristic may be combined in one or more examples.

[0019] Depending on the specific example and the application, the methods described herein can be implemented by various means. For example, these methods can be implemented in hardware, firmware, software, and / or combinations thereof. For instance, in a hardware implementation, the processing unit can be implemented in one or more application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), digital signal processors (DSPs), digital signal processing devices (DSPDs), programmable logic devices (PLDs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), processors, controllers, microcontrollers, microprocessors, electronic devices, other device units designed to perform the functions described herein, and / or combinations thereof.

[0020] As used herein, the terms “mobile device” and “user equipment” (UE) are used interchangeably and are not intended to be specific or limited to any particular radio access technology (RAT) unless otherwise stated. Generally, a mobile device and / or UE can be any wireless communication device (e.g., mobile phone, router, tablet, laptop, tracking device, wearable (e.g., smartwatch, glasses, augmented reality (AR) / virtual reality (VR) headset, etc.), vehicle (e.g., car, boat, aircraft, motorcycle, bicycle, etc.), Internet of Things (IoT) device, etc.), or other electronic device that can be used for Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) positioning as described herein. According to some embodiments, a mobile device or UE can be used to communicate over a wireless communication network. A UE can be mobile or (e.g., at times) stationary and can communicate with a radio access network (RAN). As used herein, the term UE can be used interchangeably as access terminal (AT), client device, wireless device, subscriber device, subscriber terminal, subscriber station, user terminal (UT), mobile device, mobile terminal, mobile station, or variations thereof. Typically, a UE can communicate with the core network via the RAN, and through the core network, the UE can connect to external networks (such as the Internet) and other UEs. Other mechanisms for the UE to connect to the core network and / or the Internet are also possible, such as through wired access networks, wireless local area network (WLAN) networks (e.g., based on IEEE 802.11), etc.

[0021] The term "instruction" as used herein refers to an expression representing one or more logical operations. For example, an instruction may be "machine-readable," meaning it can be interpreted by a machine to perform one or more operations on one or more data objects. However, this is merely an example of an instruction, and the claimed subject matter is not limited thereto. In another example, the instructions mentioned herein may relate to encoded commands that can be executed by processing circuitry having a set of commands that includes the encoded commands. Such instructions may be encoded in machine language that the processing circuitry understands. Again, these are merely examples of instructions, and the claimed subject matter is not limited thereto.

[0022] The term "storage medium" as used herein refers to a medium capable of holding an expression perceptible to one or more machines. For example, a storage medium may include one or more storage devices for storing machine-readable instructions and / or information. Such storage devices may include any of several media types, including, for example, magnetic, optical, or semiconductor storage media. Such storage devices may also include any type of long-term, short-term, volatile, or non-volatile device storage device. However, these are merely examples of storage media, and the subject matter claimed is not limited to these aspects.

[0023] Unless otherwise stated, it will be apparent from the following discussion that, throughout this specification, terms such as “processing,” “calculation,” “operation,” “selection,” “forming,” “enabling,” “disabling,” “positioning,” “terminating,” “identifying,” “initiating,” “detecting,” “acquiring,” “managing,” “maintaining,” “representing,” “estimating,” “receiving,” “sending,” and “determining” refer to actions and / or processes that can be performed by a computing platform such as a computer or similar electronic computing device, manipulating and / or converting data represented as physical electronic and / or magnetic quantities and / or other physical quantities within the computing platform’s processor, memory, registers, and / or other information storage, transmission, reception, and / or display devices. For example, such actions and / or processes can be performed by the computing platform under the control of machine-readable instructions stored in a storage medium. These machine-readable instructions may include, for example, software or firmware stored in a storage medium that is included as part of the computing platform (“e.g., included as part of processing circuitry or external to such processing circuitry”). Furthermore, unless otherwise stated, processes described herein with reference to flowcharts or other means may also be performed and / or controlled wholly or in part by such a computing platform.

[0024] The term "spacecraft" (SV) used herein refers to an object capable of transmitting signals to a receiver on the Earth's surface. In a particular example, such an SV could include a geostationary satellite. Alternatively, an SV could include a satellite orbiting in orbit and moving relative to its stationary position on Earth. However, these are merely examples of SVs, and the subject matter for which protection is claimed is not limited to these aspects. SV may also be referred to herein simply as a "satellite."

[0025] The term "location" as used in this article refers to information indicating the fall of an object or thing relative to a reference point. Here, for example, such a location could be represented as geographic coordinates, such as latitude and longitude. In another example, such a location could be represented as geocentric XYZ coordinates. In yet another example, such a location could be represented as a street address, a municipality or other government jurisdiction, a postal code, etc. However, these are merely examples of how locations can be represented in specific contexts, and the subject matter for which protection is claimed is not limited to these aspects.

[0026] The location determination techniques described herein can be used in various wireless communication networks, such as Wireless Wide Area Networks (WWAN), WLANs, and Wireless Personal Area Networks (WPANs). The terms "network" and "system" are used interchangeably herein. A WWAN can be a Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) network, a Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) network, a Frequency Division Multiple Access (FDMA) network, an Orthogonal Frequency Division Multiple Access (OFDMA) network, a Single Carrier Frequency Division Multiple Access (SC-FDMA) network, etc. A CDMA network can implement one or more RATs, such as CDMA2000, Wideband CDMA (W-CDMA), etc. Here, CDMA2000 can include technologies implemented according to the IS-95, IS-2000, and IS-856 standards. A TDMA network can implement Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM), Digital Advanced Mobile Telephone Systems (D-AMPS), or some other RAT. GSM and W-CDMA are described in documents from an alliance called the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). CDMA2000 is described in documents from an alliance called 3GPP2 (3rd Generation Partnership Project 2). 3GPP and 3GPP2 documents are publicly available. WLANs can include IEEE 802.11x networks, and WPANs can include Bluetooth networks, such as IEEE 802.15x. The location determination technology described herein can also be used for any combination of WWAN, WLAN, and / or WPAN.

[0027] According to examples, devices and / or systems can estimate their position, at least in part, based on signals received from SVs. Specifically, such devices and / or systems can obtain pseudorange measurements, which include approximate distances between the associated SV and the navigation satellite receiver. In a particular example, this pseudorange can be determined at a receiver capable of processing signals from one or more SVs that are part of a GNSS (also known as a Satellite Positioning System (SPS)). Examples of GNSS systems include the Global Positioning System (GPS) established by the United States; the Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), established by the Russian Federation and conceptually similar to GPS; the BeiDou Navigation Satellite System (BDS) created by China; and Galileo, which is also similar to GPS but was created by the European Community and is planned to be fully operational in the near future. To determine its position, the satellite navigation receiver can obtain pseudorange measurements from four or more satellites and their positions at the time of transmission. Knowing the orbital parameters of the SV, the position at any point in time can be calculated. Then, pseudorange measurements can be determined at least in part based on the time it takes for the signal to travel from the SV to the receiver multiplied by the speed of light. While the techniques described herein may be provided as a specific illustration of an implementation of location determination in GPS and / or SPS of the contellation of SV type, it should be understood that these techniques can also be applied to other types of GNSS systems, and the claimed subject matter is not limited thereto.

[0028] The GNSS mentioned in this article refers to navigation systems including SVs, which transmit synchronous navigation signals according to a common signaling format. Such GNSS may include, for example, a constellation of SVs in geosynchronous orbit, to simultaneously transmit navigation signals from multiple SVs within the constellation to most locations on the Earth's surface. SVs, as members of a particular GNSS constellation, typically transmit navigation signals in a format unique to that particular GNSS format. Therefore, the techniques used to acquire navigation signals transmitted by SVs in a first GNSS can be modified to acquire navigation signals transmitted by SVs in a second GNSS. In specific examples, although the claimed subject matter is not limited to this aspect, it should be understood that GPS, Galileo, and GLONASS each represent GNSSs distinct from the other two named SPSs. However, these are merely examples of SPSs associated with different GNSSs, and the claimed subject matter is not limited thereto.

[0029] According to embodiments, a navigation receiver can obtain a pseudorange measurement of a particular SV, at least in part, based on the acquisition of a signal from a particular SV encoded with a periodically repeating pseudo-noise (PN) (or pseudo-random noise (PRN)) code sequence. Acquiring such a signal may include detecting a time-based "code phase" associated with a point in the PN code sequence. For example, in one particular embodiment, this code phase may be referenced to a locally generated clock signal and the state of a particular chip in the PN code sequence. However, this is merely an example of how code phases can be represented, and the claimed subject matter is not limited thereto.

[0030] According to an embodiment, code phase detection can provide several ambiguous candidate pseudoranges or pseudorange hypotheses at the PN code interval. Therefore, the navigation receiver can obtain a pseudorange measurement to the SV at least in part based on the solution of the detected code phase and ambiguity, selecting one of the pseudorange hypotheses as the pseudorange measurement to the SV. As described above, the navigation receiver can estimate its position at least in part based on pseudorange measurements obtained from multiple SVs.

[0031] As shown below according to a specific embodiment, a navigation receiver can acquire a first signal from a first SV to detect the code phase of the first signal. When acquiring a second signal from a second SV, the navigation receiver can search for a code phase within a finite code phase search range in the second signal, at least in part, based on the code phase of the acquired first signal. Therefore, the code phase of the acquired first signal allows such a navigation receiver to acquire the second signal faster and / or with fewer processing resources.

[0032] Signals transmitted by GNSS SVs typically have very low signal strength (e.g., less than -120 dBm) when they reach a GNSS receiver. Therefore, radio interference can overwhelm weak GNSS signals, leading to satellite signal loss and potentially loss of positioning. However, malicious actors can exploit this effect to "spoof" GNSS signals. This can be used to transmit incorrect information in a competing signal, which the GNSS navigation system then uses to determine navigation or time data that differs from that determined based on the genuine GNSS signal. Therefore, spoofing is a smart form of interference that causes the receiver to report incorrect time and / or navigation information. This can cause vehicles and / or other equipment relying on GNSS navigation signals to deviate from their routes, or in extreme cases, a GNSS spoofing system may control the navigation system and redirect the vehicle to an unintended location. Therefore, spoofing systems can lead to accidents or other damage. Consequently, GNSS-based devices and / or systems can implement spoofing detection and / or spoofing mitigation to reduce the impact of such spoofing.

[0033] The embodiments described herein address these and other problems by providing modified GNSS receiver operation once the GNSS receiver receives information indicating possible spoofing. More specifically, once the GNSS receiver receives information indicating possible spoofing (e.g., determining that the probability of spoofing exceeds a threshold or receiving an indication that spoofing is occurring), the GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced operating state relative to one or more GNSS frequency bands that may be being spoofed. By operating the GNSS receiver in a reduced operating state relative to one or more GNSS frequency bands that may be being spoofed, as provided in the embodiments described below, the embodiments help mitigate the adverse effects of such spoofing on positioning and / or timing applications supported by the GNSS receiver, provide power savings, and enable the determination of when possible spoofing has ceased. Additional details are provided after the description of the positioning and GNSS system.

[0034] Figure 1 This is a simplified illustration of a positioning system 100 according to an embodiment, in which a UE 105, a location server (LS) 160, and / or other components of the positioning system 100 can perform the techniques described herein for operating a GNSS receiver during spoofing (or potential spoofing). The techniques described herein can be implemented by one or more components of the positioning system 100. The positioning system 100 may include a UE 105, one or more GNSS satellites 110 (or SVs) for GNSS such as GPS, a base station 120, an access point (AP) 130, a location server (LS) 160, a network 170, and an external client 180. Generally, the positioning system 100 is capable of estimating the location of the UE 105 based on the known locations of radio frequency (RF) signals received and / or delivered by the UE 105 and other components that transmit and / or receive RF signals (e.g., GNSS satellite 110, base station 120, AP 130).

[0035] In this example, Figure 1 The UE 105 is illustrated as a smartphone device; however, the UE can be any suitable device including GNSS capabilities, or a device or machine with integrated GNSS capabilities. Therefore, the UE 105 can include personal devices such as smartphones, smartwatches, tablets, laptops, etc. However, the UE can also include a wider category of devices and can include vehicles with integrated GNSS receivers and positioning systems, such as boats, cars, trucks, airplanes, containers, etc.

[0036] It should be noted that, Figure 1Only a general description of the various components is provided; any or all of them can be appropriately utilized, and each can be replicated as needed. Specifically, although only one UE 105 is illustrated, it should be understood that many UEs (e.g., hundreds, thousands, millions, etc.) can utilize positioning system 100. Similarly, positioning system 100 may include more than Figure 1 The illustrated number of base stations 120 and / or access points 130 may be greater or less. The illustrated connections to the various components in the positioning system 100 include data and signaling connections, which may include additional (intermediate) components, direct or indirect physical and / or wireless connections and / or additional networks. Furthermore, depending on the desired functionality, components may be rearranged, combined, separated, replaced, and / or omitted. For example, in some embodiments, an external client 180 may be directly connected to the LS 160. Those skilled in the art will recognize numerous modifications to the illustrated components.

[0037] Depending on the desired functionality, network 170 may include any of a variety of wireless and / or wired networks. Network 170 can include, for example, any combination of public and / or private networks, local area networks (LANs) and / or wide area networks (WANs). Furthermore, network 170 may utilize one or more wired and / or wireless communication technologies. In some embodiments, network 170 may include, for example, cellular or other mobile networks, WLANs, WWANs, and / or the Internet. Specific examples of network 170 include Long Term Evolution (LTE) wireless networks, fifth-generation (5G) wireless networks (also known as New Radio (NR) wireless networks), Wi-Fi wireless LANs (WLANs), and the Internet. LTE, 5G, and NR are wireless technologies defined or being defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP). Network 170 may also include more than one network and / or more than one type of network.

[0038] Base station (BS) 120 and access point (AP) 130 are communicatively coupled to network 170. In some embodiments, base station 120 may be owned, maintained, and / or operated by a cellular network provider and may employ any of a variety of wireless technologies, as described below. Depending on the technology of network 170, base station 120 may include a Node B, an evolved Node B (eNodeB or eNB), a Base Transceiver Station (BTS), a Radio Base Station (RBS), an NR Node B (gNB), a Next Generation eNB (ng-eNB), etc. Base station 120, as a gNB or ng-eNB, may be part of a Next Generation Radio Access Network (NG-RAN), which may connect to a 5G core network (5GC) if network 170 is a 5G network. For example, AP 130 may include a Wi-Fi AP or a Bluetooth AP. Therefore, by accessing network 170 via base station 120 using a first communication link 133, UE 105 is able to deliver and receive information with network-connected devices (e.g., LS 160). Additionally or alternatively, because AP 130 can also be communicatively coupled to network 170, UE 105 can use the second communication link 135 to communicate with devices that include Internet connectivity, including LS 160.

[0039] LS 160 may include a server and / or other computing devices configured to determine the estimated location of UE 105 and / or provide data (e.g., “auxiliary data”) to UE 105 to facilitate location determination. According to some embodiments, LS 160 may include a Home Secure Subscriber Plane Positioning (SUPL) positioning platform (H-SLP) that can support SUPL Subscriber Plane (UP) positioning solutions defined by the Open Mobile Alliance (OMA) and can support location services for UE 105 based on subscription information of UE 105 stored in LS 160. In some embodiments, LS 160 may include a Discovered SLP (D-SLP) or an Emergency SLP (E-SLP). LS 160 may also include an Enhanced Serving Mobility Location Center (E-SMLC) that supports the location of UE 105 using a Control Plane (CP) positioning solution for LTE radio access for UE 105. LS 160 may also include a Location Management Function (LMF), which supports the location of UE 105 using a Control Plane (CP) positioning solution for 5G or NR radio access for UE 105. In the CP positioning solution, from the perspective of network 170, signaling for controlling and managing the location of UE 105 can use existing network interfaces and protocols and exchange signaling notifications as signaling between elements of network 170 and with UE 105. In the UP positioning solution, from the perspective of network 170, signaling for controlling and managing the location of UE 105 can be exchanged as data (e.g., data transmitted using Internet Protocol (IP) and / or Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)) between LS 160 and UE 105.

[0040] As previously described, the estimated location of UE 105 can be based on measurements of RF signals delivered and / or received by UE 105. Specifically, these measurements can provide information about the relative distance and / or angle between UE 105 and one or more components in positioning system 100 (e.g., GNSS satellite 110, AP 130, base station 120). Based on the distance and / or angle measurements and the known locations of one or more components, the estimated location of UE 105 can be geometrically estimated (e.g., using multi-angle and / or multi-point positioning).

[0041] While ground components such as AP 130 and base station 120 may be stationary, the embodiments are not limited thereto. Mobile components may be used. For example, in some embodiments, the location of UE 105 may be estimated at least in part based on measurements of RF signals 140 communicating between UE 105 and one or more other UEs 145 (which may be mobile or stationary). As shown, other UEs may include, for example, mobile phones 145-1, vehicles 145-2, and / or static communication / location devices 145-3. When one or more other UEs 145 are used in determining the location of a particular UE 105, the UE 105 for which its location is to be determined may be referred to as the “target UE,” and each of the one or more other UEs 145 used may be referred to as an “anchor UE.” For the location determination of the target UE, the corresponding locations of the one or more anchor UEs may be known and / or jointly determined with the target UE. Direct communication between one or more other UEs 145 and UE 105 may include sidelinks and / or similar device-to-device (D2D) communication technologies. The sidelink, as defined by 3GPP, is a form of D2D communication based on cellular LTE and NR standards.

[0042] According to some embodiments, such as when UE 105 is included in and / or integrated into a vehicle, one form of D2D communication used by UE 105 may include vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. V2X is a communication standard for vehicles and related entities to exchange information about the traffic environment. V2X may include vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) communication between vehicles that support V2X, vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I) communication between vehicles and infrastructure-based devices (often referred to as roadside units (RSUs)), vehicle-to-person (V2P) communication between vehicles and nearby people (pedestrians, cyclists, and other road users), etc. Furthermore, V2X can use any of a variety of wireless RF communication technologies. For example, cellular V2X (CV2X) is a form of V2X that uses cellular-based communication, such as LTE (4G), NR (5G), and / or other cellular technologies, in the direct communication mode defined by 3GPP. Figure 1The UE 105 illustrated in the diagram may correspond to a component or device on a vehicle, RSU, or other V2X entity used for communicating V2X messages. Therefore, static communication / location device 145-3 (which may correspond to an RSU) and / or vehicle 145-2 may communicate with UE 105, and the location of UE 105 may be determined using techniques similar to those used by base station 120 and / or AP 130 (e.g., using multi-angle and / or multi-positioning). It can be further noted that, according to some embodiments, UE 145 (which may include V2X devices), base station 120, and / or AP 130 may be used together (e.g., in a WWAN positioning solution) to determine the location of UE 105.

[0043] The estimated location of UE 105 can be used in various applications, such as assisting the user of UE 105 in direction finding or navigation, or assisting another user (e.g., a user associated with external client 180) in locating UE 105. "Location" is also referred to herein as "location estimate," "estimated location," "position," "location," "location estimation," "location lock," "estimated location," "location lock," or "lock." The location of UE 105 can include the absolute location of UE 105 (e.g., latitude and longitude and possibly altitude) or the relative location of UE 105 (e.g., a location expressed as a distance to north or south, east or west, and possibly above or below some other known fixed location or at some other location, such as the location of UE 105 at some known previous time). Location can also be specified as a geographic location (as latitude and longitude) or a city location (e.g., based on a street address or using other location-related names and labels). Location may also include indications of uncertainty or error, such as the level and possible vertical distance of the expected location error, or an indication of the area or volume (e.g., circular or elliptical) that the UE 105 expects to be located in with a certain confidence level (e.g., 95% confidence level).

[0044] External client 180 may be a web server or remote application that can be associated with UE 105 in some way (e.g., accessible by a user of UE 105), or it may be a server, application, or computer system that provides location services to one or more other users, which may include obtaining and providing the location of UE 105 (e.g., enabling services such as friend or relative finders, asset tracking, or the location of children or pets). Additionally or alternatively, external client 180 may obtain the location of UE 105 and provide it to emergency service providers, government agencies, etc.

[0045] like Figure 1As shown, the location of UE 105 can be determined in a variety of ways. Furthermore, the positioning engine (e.g., a Kalman filter) executed by user equipment 105 can use positioning estimates from one or more of various sources (GNSS, RAT-based positioning, etc.) to determine the final estimated location of UE 105. Figure 2 The corresponding description below provides some additional details on how to determine the location of the GNSS receiver for the UE 105.

[0046] Figure 2 This is a simplified diagram of GNSS system 200, illustrating how GNSS is typically used to determine the precise location of GNSS receiver 210 on Earth 220. As previously stated, GNSS receiver 210 can be incorporated into UE 105 or similar mobile device, and GNSS positioning can be one of several positioning technologies used to determine the location of the UE / mobile device. In general, GNSS system 200 enables precise GNSS positioning lock-on for GNSS receiver 210, which receives radio RF signals from GNSS satellites 230 from one or more GNSS constellations. Figure 2 The GNSS satellite 230 can communicate with Figure 1 (Corresponding to GNSS satellite 110).

[0047] Will understand, Figure 2 The diagram provided is a significant simplification. In reality, there can be dozens of satellites and a given GNSS constellation, and many different types of GNSS systems. As mentioned above, GNSS systems include, for example, GPS, Galileo, GLONASS, and BDS. Furthermore, GNSS systems can include the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) over Japan, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) over India, and so on. In addition to the basic positioning functions described later, GNSS enhancements (e.g., satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS)) can be used to provide higher accuracy. Such enhancements can be associated with, or be able to be used with, one or more global and / or regional navigation satellite systems, such as, for example, the Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), the European Geostationary Navigation Coverage Service (EGNOS), the Multifunctional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), and the Geo Augmentation Navigation System (GAGAN).

[0048] GNSS positioning is based on trilateration, a method of determining positioning by measuring distances to known coordinate points. Generally, the determination of the three-dimensional positioning of a GNSS receiver 210 can rely on determining the distances between the GNSS receiver 210 and four or more satellites 230. As shown, 3D coordinates can be based on a coordinate system centered on the Earth's center of mass (e.g., XYZ coordinates; latitude, longitude, and altitude; etc.). The distance between each satellite 230 and the GNSS receiver 210 can be determined using precise measurements of the time difference between when the corresponding satellite 230 transmits a radio frequency (RF) signal and when the GNSS receiver 210 receives that signal. To help ensure accuracy, not only does the GNSS receiver 210 need to accurately determine when it receives the corresponding signal from each satellite 230, but many additional factors also need to be considered and accounted for. These factors include, for example, clock differences between the GNSS receiver 210 and the satellites 230 (e.g., clock skew), the precise position of each satellite 230 at the time of transmission (e.g., determined by broadcast ephemeris), the effects of atmospheric distortion (e.g., ionospheric and tropospheric delays), etc.

[0049] To perform conventional GNSS positioning lock, the GNSS receiver 210 can determine its distance to each satellite 230 using code-based positioning, based on a determined delay in a generated pseudo-random binary sequence received from the RF signals received from each satellite, and taking into account the previously mentioned additional factors and error sources. Using the distance and position information of the satellites 230, the GNSS receiver 210 can then determine a positioning lock of its position. This positioning lock can be determined, for example, by an independent positioning engine (SPE) that can be executed by one or more processors of the GNSS receiver 210. However, code-based positioning is relatively inaccurate and, without error correction, is susceptible to many of the aforementioned errors. Even so, code-based GNSS positioning can provide the GNSS receiver 210 with meter-level positioning accuracy.

[0050] More accurate carrier-based ranging is based on the carrier of the RF signal from the satellite and error correction can be performed using measurements at a base station or reference station (not shown) to help reduce errors from the previously mentioned error sources. More specifically, errors in carrier-based ranging of satellite 230 observed by GNSS receiver 210 (e.g., atmospheric error sources) can be mitigated or eliminated based on similar carrier-based ranging of satellite 230 using a high-precision GNSS receiver at a base station in a known location. These measurements and the location of the base station can be provided to GNSS receiver 210 for error correction. For example, this positioning lock can be determined by a Precise Positioning Engine (PPE) that can be executed by one or more processors of GNSS receiver 210. More specifically, in addition to the information provided to the SPE, the PPE can use base station GNSS measurement information and additional correction information, such as precise orbit and clock, troposphere and ionosphere, to provide high-precision carrier-based positioning lock. Several GNSS technologies can be used in PPE, such as differential GNSS (DGNSS), real-time dynamic (RTK) and precise point positioning (PPP), and can provide sub-meter accuracy (e.g., centimeter level).

[0051] Figure 3 The illustration shows a simplified block diagram of an example signal processing architecture 300, which can be used in GNSS receivers (e.g., Figure 2 The GNSS receiver 210 can also be incorporated. Figure 1 In UE 105, GNSS signal acquisition and tracking are achieved, and pseudorange (distance measurement) for GNSS-based positioning is determined. This signal processing architecture 300 can be implemented in the hardware and / or software components of the GNSS receiver, such as... Figure 8 The GNSS receiver 880, which will be described in more detail below, uses a signal processing architecture 300 to process the received signal with a frequency F determined at least in part based on a first carrier frequency f1 and a second carrier frequency f2. LO The local oscillator (LO) signal is mixed to process the two GNSS signals GNSS1 and GNSS2. For example... Figure 3 As shown, depending on the specific implementation, the signal processing architecture 300 can receive signals GNSS1 and GNSS2 at a single RF antenna 302, a bandpass RF filter 304 such as a surface acoustic wave (SAW) filter, and a low-noise amplifier 306. Then, as shown, the received GNSS signals can be down-converted to an intermediate frequency by mixing the received signals with the LO signal.

[0052] In this context, "downconversion" can involve transforming an input signal having a first frequency characteristic into an output signal having a second frequency characteristic. In a particular implementation, although the claimed subject matter is not limited in this respect, such downconversion can include the transformation of a first signal into a second signal, wherein the second signal has a frequency characteristic lower than that of the first signal. Here, in a particular example, such downconversion can include transforming an RF signal into an intermediate frequency (IF) signal, or an IF signal into a baseband signal and / or baseband information. However, these are merely examples of downconversion, and the claimed subject matter is not limited thereto.

[0053] In a particular implementation, F is selected at approximately the midpoint between f1 and f2. LO The down-converted signal portion from the signals received from components 302 and 304 can be substantially covered by bandpass filters 308 and 310. Here, for example, for F... LO Choosing a specific frequency can result in a mirror frequency component of one down-converted GNSS signal substantially overlapping with the desired signal component of another down-converted GNSS signal. In certain embodiments, the effect of this overlap can be avoided without attenuating the mirror frequency component before mixing with the LO. However, it should be understood that in other implementations, F LO It can be chosen at any location other than approximately the midpoint between f1 and f2, and the subject matter for which protection is sought is not restricted in this respect.

[0054] The in-phase (I) and quadrature (Q) components filtered by the associated bandpass filters (BPFs) 308 and 310 can then be digitally sampled at analog-to-digital converter (ADC) circuits 312 and 314 to provide digitally sampled in-phase and quadrature components for further processing (e.g., acquisition and / or tracking as described herein). Here, ADCs 312 and 314 can be adapted to sample the output signals of BPFs 308 and 310 at or above the Nyquist rate of the combined signal. Furthermore, the implementation shown here includes ADCs 312 and 314 between the first and second down-conversion stages. However, it should be understood that other architectures can be implemented without departing from the claimed subject matter. For example, in other implementations, analog-to-digital conversion can occur after the second down-conversion. Again, these are merely example implementations, and the claimed subject matter is not limited to these aspects.

[0055] In alternative implementations, ADCs 312 and 314 can be replaced by a single complex ADC or a single time-shared and / or multiplexed ADC, where appropriate delays are shared between in-phase and quadrature signal paths.

[0056] In a particular implementation, GNSS1 and / or GNSS2 may comprise any pair of several different GNSS signal pairs. In one particular embodiment, although the claimed subject matter is not limited in this respect, GNSS1 and GNSS2 may be selected such that f1 and f2 are frequency-close to each other to achieve low-cost manufacturing of the RF filter 304 (e.g., a SAW filter) and / or low-noise amplifier (LNA) 306 by limiting the operating frequency band. Although, as shown above in a particular embodiment, GNSS1 and GNSS2 may be selected such that f1 and f2 are frequency-close (e.g., both in the L1 band or both in the L2 band), the claimed subject matter is not limited to this aspect. In an alternative embodiment, as described above, GNSS signals transmitted on larger carrier frequencies may be down-converted to a common intermediate frequency in a single receiver channel. In one particular example, an SV in a GNSS constellation may transmit multiple GNSS signals on different carrier frequencies and / or bands (e.g., L1 and L2 bands).

[0057] In a particular embodiment, the bandwidth of BPF 308 and 310 can be based on a common intermediate frequency (IF). o The BPFs 308 and 310 are designed to process portions of the GNSS signals received from both GNSS1 and GNSS2, with a focus on the vicinity of these signals. Furthermore, the bandwidths of the BPFs 308 and 310 can be implemented wide enough to capture sufficient information from the GNSS signals received from GNSS1 and GNSS2 without introducing significant noise outside the frequency bands of spectra 302 and 304. Additionally, the BPFs 308 and 310 can be chosen to be narrow enough so that the ADCs 312 and 314 can sample at a given sampling rate (e.g., approximately at the Nyquist rate) without significant distortion.

[0058] Depending on the specific implementation, the in-phase and quadrature components sampled by ADCs 312 and 314 can be further processed by complex down-conversion and digital baseband 316 to generate in-phase and quadrature components and output pseudorange derived from the GNSS signal. According to some embodiments, the output of complex down-conversion and digital baseband 316 can be more broadly referred to as a measurement, which may include pseudorange or pseudorange and carrier phase.

[0059] The components for digital conversion from RF antenna 302 to ADCs 312 and 314 may be referred to herein as “RF front-end” and / or “analog front-end”. As described above, the signal processing architecture 300 is capable of processing multiple frequencies using a single RF antenna 302 and / or a single set of analog front-end components. To process other frequencies, the GNSS receiver may have multiple signal processing architectures 300 to be able to process GNSS satellite signals from multiple frequency bands and / or multiple GNSS constellations. For example, a GNSS receiver (e.g., GNSS receiver 210) may include a first signal processing architecture for processing frequency bands L1 and L2, and a second signal processing architecture for processing frequency band L5. In some embodiments, the GNSS receiver may include different analog front-end components for different frequency bands (some of which may be shared, as in the case of GPS L1 and L2), and may share a single digital processing chip and / or digital processing architecture to perform multiple downconversion and digital baseband processing, as shown in block 316. Some embodiments may have separate digital processing circuitry.

[0060] Depend on Figure 3 The pseudorange output from the illustrated architecture is used to determine the position of a GNSS receiver (and / or a GNSS receiver integrated into or used in conjunction with a GNSS receiver for cooperative positioning of devices, vehicles, etc.). Because the pseudorange depends on signals received from GNSS satellites, spoofing of signals (e.g., timing and / or navigation signals) in one or more GNSS bands can adversely affect the positioning estimate determined by the GNSS receiver. Such spoofing will refer to... Figure 4 To provide a more detailed description.

[0061] Figure 4 This diagram depicts a scenario where a vehicle 400 using GNSS navigation is receiving false GNSS satellite signals; that is, it illustrates an example of deception. Similarly, GNSS receivers can be integrated into other types of devices (mobile phones, navigation devices, GNSS tags, etc.), and the embodiments described herein are not limited to vehicle applications. In this example, vehicle 400 receives (e.g., using a GNSS receiver) genuine GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 from multiple GNSS satellites 410, 412, 414, and 416. (GNSS satellites 410, 412, 414, and 416 can be integrated with...) Figure 2 GNSS satellites 230 and / or Figure 1 (Corresponding to GNSS satellite 110). GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 are received by antenna 420 attached to vehicle 400. Electrically connected to antenna 420 (can be used with...) Figure 3A GNSS receiver 422 (corresponding to the RF antenna 302) receives signals 402, 404, 406, and 408, and calculates the GNSS position coordinates of the location based on measurements of ranging information (e.g., pseudorange) contained in signals 402, 404, 406, and 408. The vehicle 400 in various embodiments can include a navigation system and possibly an autonomous driving system that uses the calculated GNSS coordinates of the vehicle 400's position to drive the vehicle 400 along a prescribed route. It should be understood that although antenna 420 is shown as receiving GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 from four GNSS satellites 410, 412, 414, and 416, antenna 420 can receive GNSS satellite signals from any number of GNSS satellites. Antenna 420 receives GNSS satellite signals from multiple GNSS satellites, where multiple is any number greater than one. (See also: Regarding...) Figure 3 The antenna 420 may include multiple antennas and / or analog front-end components.

[0062] Figure 4 A deception device 424 is also depicted. The deception device 424 may include an antenna 428 and a transmitter 432. The deception device 424 is capable of generating a wireless deception signal 426 received by the vehicle antenna 420. The deception signal 426 may be a composite signal containing multiple fake GNSS satellite signals. The deception signal 426 can be generated to mimic real GNSS satellite signals from one or more frequency bands of one or more GNSS constellations. In various embodiments, the deception device 424 is located at a fixed geographical location. In some embodiments, the deception device 424 may be configured to be mobile (e.g., attached to another vehicle or vessel).

[0063] The GNSS signal spoofer 424 can be designed to create fake GNSS satellite signals in a variety of ways. In some embodiments, the spoofer 424 creates a spoof signal 426 by simulating a real GNSS satellite signal programmed with desired fake satellite data. Figure 4 In this process, the deception device 424 captures the real GNSS signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 at antenna 428, and then rebroadcasts these signals using transmitter 432. Figure 4 In the illustrated embodiment, the spoofer 424 creates a deceptive signal 426 by rebroadcasting live GNSS signals received at a location different from the GNSS navigation system to be spoofed. It should be understood that the spoofer 424 can create and broadcast the deceptive signal 426 using any method for creating the deceptive signal 426, which includes data intended to be accepted as a genuine GNSS signal. The spoofer 424 or multiple spoofers 424 can also simulate stationary or moving locations. For example, some spoofers 424 are capable of simulating locations moving around a geographic area (e.g., within a circle).

[0064] exist Figure 4 In the illustrated embodiment, the spoofer 424 may include an antenna 428 and a transmitter 432. The spoofer 424 generates a spoof signal 426 by rebroadcasting GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 received at the spoof antenna from real GNSS satellites 410, 412, 414, and 416. Satellites 410, 412, 414, and 416 may be the same as or different from satellites 410, 412, 414, and 416. The spoof antenna 428 may be located at a spoof position offset from the real vehicle 400. The real GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 are combined into a composite spoof signal 426 and rebroadcast by the spoof transmitter 432.

[0065] The spoofing signal 426 can be a composite signal of multiple GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 received by antenna 420. When GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408 are rebroadcast from the spoofing transmitter, they become false GNSS satellite signals because they contain data received by spoofing antenna 428 at a location different from the true location, resulting in a spoofed location 430. The spoofing signal 426 can contain any number of false GNSS satellite signals.

[0066] The power level of the spoofing signal 426 can be set such that when the antenna 420 receives the spoofing signal 426, its power exceeds that of the genuine GNSS satellite signals 402, 404, 406, and 408. Therefore, the receiver 422 uses the spoofing signal 426 to calculate GNSS-based position. Specifically, the receiver 422 will measure the GNSS satellite signal phase (code phase and / or carrier phase) of the spoofing GNSS satellite signal 426. The value will use code phase and / or carrier phase. The system calculates GNSS position coordinates for a different location than the actual location and reports the vehicle as being in a different location than its true location. In some cases, this is the intention of the spoofer 424—to cause the receiver 422 to determine and report that the vehicle 400 is in an incorrect location, namely a spoofed location 430 offset from the true location. It can also spoof navigation systems to cause navigation devices to provide false timing data. Furthermore, GNSS devices can be used for critical timing applications. Therefore, spoofing can cause GNSS receivers to provide false timing data.

[0067] Because deception can lead to these and other adverse effects, various techniques have been developed to detect it. These techniques can include, for example, performing consistency checks using data from inside and / or outside the GNSS receiver, including checks between different positioning systems. Mobile devices that include GNSS receivers may also have the ability to determine location using other techniques. For example, as mentioned above, the UE (e.g., Figure 1 UE 105) can be able to perform RAT-based positioning (e.g., using a previous reference). Figure 1 The described methods include AP 130, base station 120 and / or UE 145, dead reckoning (e.g., based on motion sensors), and / or other positioning techniques combined with GNSS-based positioning. These positioning techniques can be used not only to determine the precise location of the UE, but also to determine whether GNSS signal spoofing is possible (e.g., in cases where the GNSS-based positioning estimate is inconsistent with the positioning estimate of one or more other positioning techniques). Furthermore, within the GNSS receiver itself, comparisons can be made between GNSS signals from different constellations and / or different GNSS frequency bands (also referred to herein as "GNSS bands") to identify potentially spoofed GNSS signals / bands. Therefore, spoofing detection techniques enable GNSS receivers and / or mobile devices in which GNSS receivers are integrated to determine whether spoofing is occurring or is likely to occur on one or more GNSS bands and / or constellations. It should be noted that the embodiments provided herein are described with respect to GNSS bands that are "potentially spoofed." This means that although a GNSS band may not necessarily be spoofed, the determination of whether spoofing is occurring has exceeded a threshold probability or confidence level based on one or more techniques used to detect spoofing. According to some embodiments, a GNSS receiver can determine that spoofing is occurring based on the GNSS receiver being located in an area where GNSS spoofing has been previously identified, or within a threshold distance of that area. For example, such an area can be established based on crowdsourced information from various GNSS receivers. This information can be maintained by a server and distributed to various GNSS receivers (e.g., via a communication link, such as the Internet).

[0068] The embodiments described herein address the question of how a GNSS receiver can operate once it receives information indicating possible spoofing. More specifically, once a GNSS receiver receives information indicating possible spoofing (e.g., determining that the probability of spoofing exceeds a threshold or receiving an indication that spoofing is occurring), the embodiments allow the GNSS receiver to operate in a reduced operating state relative to one or more GNSS bands that may be being spoofed. For simplicity, spoofing of a “GNSS band” as used herein corresponds to spoofing (or possible spoofing) of one or more signals received at the GNSS receiver via that GNSS band, where the spoofing signal mimics a signal transmitted by a GNSS satellite (e.g., GNSS timing and / or navigation signals). By operating the GNSS receiver in a reduced operating state relative to one or more GNSS bands that may be being spoofed, as provided in the embodiments described below, the embodiments help mitigate the adverse effects of such spoofing on positioning and / or timing applications supported by the GNSS receiver, allow power savings, and enable the determination of when possible spoofing has ceased. According to embodiments, the operational state of downscaling a GNSS band includes performing one or more of the following functions with respect to that GNSS band: disabling data demodulation and decoding, disabling time settings (e.g., time of week (TOW), week number, etc.), disabling acquisition of unknown / invisible satellites, disabling satellite differential, disabling error recovery, reducing incoherent integration time, and duty cycling the power of one or more receiver blocks associated with the GNSS band. Further details regarding these functions are provided in the following paragraphs.

[0069] Regarding disabling data demodulation and decoding, the data transmitted on signals sent by GNSS satellites includes information about satellite positions, transmission times, and other satellites in the constellation. Therefore, if the signals in the GNSS band are spoofed, the transmitted data is likely unreliable and should not be used to calculate receiver positions and times. Furthermore, this may occur in the processor (e.g., Figure 3 Data demodulation and decoding in block 316 consume power. Therefore, since the data is unreliable and may not be used, embodiments can disable data demodulation and decoding, which can save power.

[0070] According to some embodiments, as described below, demodulation and decoding can be re-enabled from time to time (e.g., periodically, based on trigger events, etc.) to perform data consistency checks and / or other operations that may help determine whether possible spoofing of the GNSS band is underway. Thus, data demodulation and decoding can be duty-cycled (e.g., periodically enabled / disabled over predetermined time intervals), enabling periodic "spot checks" if needed. This duty-cycled approach can be achieved by using components such as... Figure 3 The signal processing architecture 300 may be performed by powering down one or more components. This may include, for example, any component of the RF front end (or any subset thereof), digital processing circuitry (e.g., the complex downconversion and digital baseband at block 316), or a combination thereof.

[0071] Disabling time settings for GNSS bands is another way for a GNSS receiver to operate in a reduced operational state regarding GNSS bands. In various GNSS receivers, when time uncertainty exceeds a threshold uncertainty, the receiver can decode time from satellite data received via a GNSS band to calculate its time position. However, if a GNSS band can be spoofed, this function can be disabled to help ensure that the time is not decoded from a spoofed signal (in which case the time may be unreliable). This function makes the GNSS receiver more resistant to spoofing because using an incorrect time setting prevents the receiver from acquiring satellite signals in non-spoofed GNSS bands. Therefore, according to some embodiments, a GNSS receiver can be configured to disable time settings for GNSS bands that may be spoofed.

[0072] For GNSS signals in certain frequency bands (e.g., GPS L1), there may be a significant risk of cross-correlation, where a strong signal from one GNSS satellite can be misdetected as a weak signal from a different satellite. In normal (non-spoofing) operation, many GNSS receivers can search for GNSS satellites, even if they are not expected to be visible or have an unknown state. This operation helps ensure that all cross-correlation attackers are tracked. It also provides a recovery mechanism when erroneous locations are provided from external sources. However, in the case of GNSS band spoofing, if these GNSS satellites (not expected to be visible or have an unknown state) are detected, they are likely from the spoofer, not any actual, newly detected GNSS satellites. Therefore, according to some embodiments, by disabling the acquisition of unknown / invisible satellites after obtaining data indicating possible spoofing regarding one or more GNSS bands, the GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced operating state for the GNSS band, which helps avoid acquiring additional signals that may come from the spoofer. This frees up the GNSS receiver's resources (memory and power) and saves power. According to some embodiments, similar to disabling data demodulation and decoding, the ability to scan for invisible / unknown GNSS satellites can be re-enabled (e.g., periodically) to help determine whether possible spoofing is in progress.

[0073] Satellite differential (or "SV differential") is a technique in which a two-dimensional search window (in both code phase and Doppler dimensions) for a GNSS satellite can be reduced based on coarse position and time estimates and code phase and Doppler measurements from another GNSS satellite. However, in scenarios where GNSS bands can be spoofed, measurements of satellite signals from within a GNSS band may be unreliable. Thus, according to some embodiments, by disabling satellite differential based on measurements of signals received via potentially spoofed GNSS bands, a GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced state of operation with respect to the GNSS band.

[0074] According to some embodiments, various checks can be performed in the GNSS receiver to prevent it from getting stuck at the wrong time or location. Example checks include code carrier consistency and subframe misalignment checks. If these checks result in the determination that GNSS data (e.g., time and / or location data) is incorrect, an error recovery process may be triggered, which could lead to measurement interruptions across all signal bands. These checks may be unreliable in the event of GNSS band spoofing. For example, a spoofer might transmit satellite signals with deliberately misaligned subframes. Therefore, according to some embodiments, if a GNSS band may be spoofed, the GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced operating state with respect to the GNSS band by disabling the error recovery process if these checks regarding the GNSS band fail. This improves the robustness of the GNSS receiver's positioning engine during spoofing, allowing the GNSS receiver to determine positioning estimates based on signals from non-spoofed GNSS bands without the risk that failed checks on spoofed GNSS bands could trigger an error recovery process that would interrupt the GNSS receiver's positioning estimation capabilities. According to some embodiments, the checks themselves can still be run to help determine whether GNSS band spoofing is occurring.

[0075] Inter-Signal Time Deviation (ISTB) is the relative time deviation between different GNSS bands and constellations. A GNSS receiver can estimate the ISTB using satellite measurements from different GNSS bands and constellations. The ISTB can include analog and digital processing delays of the receiver itself. Typically, a GNSS receiver can estimate and track the ISTB of various GNSS bands using measurements of the GNSS signal and calculated positions. However, in spoofing scenarios, the ISTB between a spoofed signal in one GNSS band and a genuine signal in another GNSS band is likely to differ from the ISTB between the two genuine signals. With this in mind, according to some embodiments, by disabling ISTB estimation / update using measurements obtained from signals in potentially spoofed GNSS bands, the GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced operational state regarding the GNSS band. That is, calculating individual spoofed ISTB values ​​can be useful to determine whether GNSS band spoofing is occurring. Therefore, some embodiments can do so.

[0076] Regarding reducing incoherent integration time (or "dwell time"), GNSS receivers receive GNSS satellite signals at very weak signal levels (below the receiver noise floor). Therefore, correlation techniques are used to improve the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) and receiver sensitivity. In these correlation techniques, correlation is performed by multiplying the received signal by a known pseudo-random noise (PRN) sequence and integrating over an integration period that includes both coherent and incoherent components. Coherent integration uses amplitude and phase information, while incoherent integration uses only energy. Coherent integration improves SNR, while incoherent integration improves the probability of false alarms (PFA) for a given detection threshold, thus improving sensitivity. In many applications, coherent integration is typically much less than one second (e.g., 20 ms), while incoherent integration is typically one second (matching 1 Hz positioning reports) and may be longer. However, in the presence of strong spoofing signals, weak signals detected with an incoherent integration time greater than one second are likely to be cross-correlated. Therefore, according to some embodiments, it may be better for the GNSS receiver not to search for weak signals, especially when acquisition of unknown / invisible satellites is also disabled. Therefore, according to some embodiments, by reducing the incoherent integration time relative to typical operation (e.g., reducing the incoherent integration time to less than one second for embodiments that typically utilize one second or longer incoherent integration time), the GNSS receiver can operate in a reduced operating state relative to the GNSS band. This reduction in incoherent integration time not only reduces errors related to cross-correlation but also reduces receiver resource requirements, thereby potentially saving power.

[0077] According to some embodiments, this reduction in the incoherent integration time can be duty-cycled (e.g., cycling between reduced and unreduced incoherent integration times) to help determine whether possible spoofing of the GNSS band is underway. According to some embodiments, duty-cycled incoherent integration time may include adjusting one or more components (e.g., for processing signals received through a potentially spoofed GNSS band) for processing signals received through the band. Figure 3 One or more components shown are powered off and / or shut down for a period of time. For example, by performing duty cycle quantization per second, the incoherent integration period can be reduced to less than one second, in which one or more components of the GNSS receiver used to process potentially spoofed GNSS bands are powered off for a portion of the one-second period. These components may include one or more receiver blocks, such as RF / analog front-end components, ADCs, and digital baseband processor (BP) channels. By utilizing component duty cycle quantization in this way to reduce incoherent integration, the GNSS receiver can obtain continuous measurements of potentially spoofed GNSS bands at 1 Hz while significantly reducing power. Thus, according to some aspects, this functionality can be similar to the duty cycle quantization feature enabled in some GNSS receivers to reduce power under benign signal conditions.

[0078] As described in the specification, one or more components for processing signals received via the GNSS band are turned on and off according to the duty cycle (e.g., Figure 3 (The components shown) allow the GNSS receiver to operate in a reduced operating state relative to potentially spoofed GNSS frequency bands. See below for reference. Figure 5 and Figure 6 Additional details regarding this duty cycle are provided.

[0079] Figure 5 This is an example diagram illustrating how the power of one or more components of a GNSS receiver is duty-cycled according to an embodiment. In this example, cycle 510 repeats periodically and includes an on portion 520 and an off portion 530. Specifically, in the case where cycle 510 is one second (1000 milliseconds), an on portion 520 lasting N milliseconds results in an off portion 530 lasting 1000-N milliseconds. Depending on the desired functionality, different embodiments may have different cycle lengths and / or different values ​​of N. According to some embodiments, when operating in a normal operating state, the GNSS receiver may keep the components always powered on (e.g., where the on portion 520 is equal to the length of cycle 510, and there is no off portion 530). When operating in a reduced operating state, the GNSS receiver may operate in a manner similar to that shown, where each cycle 510 includes an off portion 530. Additionally or alternatively, the GNSS receiver may duty cycle the components in normal operating conditions (e.g., having a cycle 510 with an on portion 520 and an off portion 530), but the duty cycle may be adjusted such that when operating in a reduced operating state, the off portion 530 comprises a larger portion of the cycle 510. Ultimately, a reduced operating state may include duty cycle powering one or more components such that the on portion 520 of the cycle 510 is reduced relative to the normal operating state.

[0080] The value of N can vary depending on the required functionality. For example, it can be predetermined based on the type of operating state (e.g., normal operating state versus degraded operating state). Additionally or alternatively, the value of N can be based on the type of functionality expected during the degraded operating state. Examples of this are described below. Figure 6 As shown in the image.

[0081] Figure 6This is a diagram illustrating an example of how multiple features according to an embodiment are duty-cycled. Here, duty-cycled processing is performed for the following functions: data demodulation and decoding, searching for unknown and invisible satellites, and searching for weak signals (e.g., increasing incoherent integration to standard operating conditions). The on portion of each duty cycle may correspond to the period during which components used to process signals in potentially spoofed GNSS bands are powered on, and the off portion of each duty cycle may correspond to the period during which one or more components used to process signals are powered off or operate at low power (relative to operation during the on portion of the duty cycle). Additionally or alternatively, because GNSS processing can be performed using one or more software functions, the on portion of each duty cycle may correspond to the period during which one or more software components used to process signals in potentially spoofed GNSS bands are disabled, and the off portion of each duty cycle may correspond to the period during which one or more software components used to process signals are enabled. Therefore, the "duty cycle" feature described herein may include power duty cycle sizing of hardware components and / or disabling / enabling software components used to provide these features. According to some embodiments, duty cycle sizing of these and / or other features may be performed on each GNSS band that may be spoofed. Thus, if it is determined that possible spoofing occurs across an entire constellation or multiple constellations, this function can be performed on all GNSS bands in the constellation.

[0082] It can be seen that different functions have different duty cycles. In this example, loop 610 (periodic) for data demodulation and decoding is longer than loop 620 for unknown / invisible satellite search, and loop 620 for unknown / invisible satellite search is longer than loop 630 for weak signal search. According to the example, data demodulation and decoding can be enabled every 12.5 minutes, unknown / invisible satellite search can be enabled every 10 minutes, and weak signal search can be enabled every 5 minutes. As mentioned earlier, the length or proportion of the on-time portion of each duty cycle can vary depending on the required function. Different timers can be used to track different duty cycles (e.g., different timers can be used for loops 610, 620, and 630), and the timers can be implemented via hardware and / or software.

[0083] According to some embodiments, duty cycle-based power is applied to the power used to perform different functions based on different environments. For example, if a GNSS receiver is determined to be in an area where spoofing is known to occur, data demodulation is duty cycle-based, such as... Figure 6 As shown, however, other functions may not be duty-cycled. However, in other deception environments, GNSS receivers can perform duty-cycled searches for unknown / invisible satellites and / or weak signals, such as... Figure 6 As shown.

[0084] As described above, by periodically performing one or more characteristics of a GNSS receiver by adjusting the duty cycle of the power of one or more components of the GNSS receiver, information can be obtained to help determine whether spoofing is in progress, while conserving GNSS receiver resources and power. According to some embodiments, one or more components of the GNSS receiver can be... Figure 6 The method shown involves periodically powering on the components to perform signal power checks. That is, the front-end components are used to track the signal power while the back-end components (e.g., digital signal processors) are powered off. Power to the back-end components is restored once the GNSS signal power falls within the range corresponding to a non-spoofed GNSS signal.

[0085] According to some embodiments, power-on of one or more components of a GNSS receiver can be coordinated with timing signals from other data sources to help determine whether GNSS timing is accurate. For example, according to some embodiments, data demodulation and decoding can be enabled during a period when the WAN provides a precise time reference, enabling the GNSS receiver to compare WAN timing with GNSS timing from the demodulated / decoded signals, which can be used to determine whether GNSS spoofing is in progress.

[0086] Figure 7 This is a flowchart of a method 700 for operating a GNSS receiver according to an embodiment. (For execution) Figure 7 The components of the functions shown in one or more blocks can be implemented by the hardware and / or software components of a GNSS receiver and / or a mobile device utilizing a GNSS receiver. Example components of the mobile device are shown in... Figure 8 As shown in the diagram, this will be described in more detail below.

[0087] At block 710, the function includes operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. Here, the first state may include a normal operating state, wherein, as shown in a later function of method 700, GNSS signals received via the first GNSS frequency band are processed and used to determine a positioning estimate of the GNSS receiver and / or the mobile device including the GNSS receiver. This can be done, for example, when no spoofing is detected with respect to the first GNSS frequency band, or when a value indicating possible spoofing is below a threshold. According to some embodiments, the GNSS receiver may be able to receive GNSS signals from multiple frequency bands (e.g., the first GNSS frequency band and at least a second GNSS frequency band). The function may include the ability to receive GNSS signals via multiple constellations. Components for performing the function at block 710 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensors 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of the mobile device 800, such as… Figure 8 As shown.

[0088] At block 720, the function includes receiving a first set of GNSS signals at a GNSS receiver, the first set of GNSS signals including at least one first GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. Here, each GNSS signal may include GNSS signals received from GNSS satellites (e.g., communication timing and navigation information). Because multiple satellites can transmit signals via the GNSS frequency band, the GNSS receiver can receive multiple GNSS signals via the first GNSS frequency band. For a GNSS receiver that determines a 3D positioning estimate from the first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals may include signals from at least four GNSS satellites. Components for performing the function at block 720 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensor 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of mobile device 800, such as... Figure 8 As shown.

[0089] At block 730, the function includes determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on a first at least one GNSS signal. Here, the first positioning estimate may include a GNSS-based positioning estimate based on at least one GNSS signal and (optionally) other GNSS signals received in a first set of GNSS signals. Similarly, this can include GNSS signals received using GNSS bands and / or GNSS constellations separate from the first GNSS band. The first positioning estimate may be determined by a positioning engine, which may be operated by a GNSS receiver and / or a processing unit communicatively coupled thereto (e.g., within a mobile device). Additional details regarding the positioning engine (e.g., positioning engine type, where it is executed, etc.) are provided elsewhere herein. According to some embodiments, the determined first positioning estimate may be provided to a mobile device user, another device (e.g., a remote device or server), a processor within the mobile device, an operating system or application within the mobile device, etc. Components for performing the function at block 730 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensors 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of the mobile device 800, such as... Figure 8 As shown.

[0090] At block 740, this function includes obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS band. Spoofing can be determined using any of a variety of spoofing detection techniques. As described above, this can include comparisons of resulting pseudoranges on the signal and / or GNSS band and / or constellation, consistency checks with other sensors and / or positioning techniques (e.g., dead reckoning, RAT-based positioning, etc.), and / or so on. This determination can be performed within the GNSS receiver and / or by other components (e.g., application processor or remote device). Thus, obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first band can include receiving data from a spoofing detection algorithm executed by processing within the GNSS receiver, receiving data from a separate processor, receiving data via a wireless communication interface with a separate device (e.g., a remote server), etc. Components for performing the function at block 740 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensors 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of mobile device 800, such as... Figure 8 As shown.

[0091] In block 750, the function includes operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to acquiring data. Here, the second state may include a reduced operating state as described in detail elsewhere in the embodiments described herein. Therefore, according to some embodiments of method 700, operating the GNSS receiver in the second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band may include disabling data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal. According to some embodiments, disabling data demodulation and decoding may include turning off or reducing the clock rate of the GNSS receiver's digital processor. The GNSS receiver's digital processor may be configured to perform... Figure 3 This corresponds to the processing components of the downconverter and digital baseband 316. Such components may include, for example... Figure 8 The GNSS baseband / combined baseband 885 of the GNSS receiver 880 shown and described below. Additionally or alternatively, the processing components may include components within the DSP 820 and / or processor 810.

[0092] As described in the previously described embodiments, operating a GNSS receiver in a reduced operating state may include additional or alternative functions. According to some embodiments, operating a GNSS receiver in a second state relative to a first GNSS band may include ignoring time data decoded from a second or at least one GNSS signal. Additionally or alternatively, operating a GNSS receiver in a second state relative to a first GNSS band may include disabling satellite detection operations performed by the GNSS receiver to acquire signals from unknown or invisible GNSS satellites. Specifically, satellite detection based on potentially spoofed GNSS bands may be disabled. According to some embodiments, operating a GNSS receiver in a second state relative to a first GNSS band may include disabling satellite differential operations performed by the GNSS receiver using a second or at least one GNSS signal. Additionally or alternatively, operating a GNSS receiver in a second state relative to a first GNSS band may include disabling error recovery operations performed by the GNSS receiver. According to some embodiments, operating a GNSS receiver in a second state relative to a first GNSS band may include disabling ISTB operations performed by the GNSS receiver using a second or at least one GNSS signal. Additionally or alternatively, operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band may include reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver to detect at least one GNSS signal received at the GNSS receiver via the first GNSS band. In such embodiments, reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver may include duty cycle adjustment of the power of one or more components used to process at least one GNSS signal received at the GNSS receiver via the first GNSS band.

[0093] The components used to perform the functions at block 750 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensor 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of mobile device 800, such as... Figure 8 As shown.

[0094] At block 760, the function includes receiving a second set of GNSS signals at the GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including at least one second GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver operates in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. Here, the second set of GNSS signals may include signals from the same or different satellites that receive the first set of GNSS signals. However, unlike the first set of GNSS signals, the GNSS receiver operates in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band when the second set of GNSS signals is received. Similarly, one or more of the previously described techniques for operating the GNSS receiver relative to the first GNSS frequency band (e.g., disabling data demodulation and decoding, disabling timing, reducing incoherent integration time, etc.) may be implemented. Components for performing the function at block 760 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensor 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of mobile device 800, such as... Figure 8 As shown.

[0095] In block 770, the function includes determining a second positioning estimate based at least partially on a second set of GNSS signals, wherein (i) the second positioning estimate is determined to be based at least partially on a third at least one GNSS signal received via the second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, and (ii) the second positioning estimate is not based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band. Therefore, when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band, the GNSS receiver can continue to perform GNSS-based positioning based on at least one GNSS signal received via the second GNSS band (and optionally, one or more signals from one or more other GNSS bands). Furthermore, the GNSS receiver can continue to do so until possible spoofing no longer occurs (e.g., the probability or confidence level of spoofing is below a threshold), at which point the GNSS receiver can revert to standard operation relative to the first GNSS band. Thus, some embodiments of method 700 may further include determining that spoofing may no longer occur in the first GNSS band, and, in response to determining that spoofing may no longer occur, operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0096] As described above, according to some embodiments, the GNSS receiver can continue to "spot-check" signals received via the first GNSS band to determine whether possible spoofing of the first GNSS band is in progress. To this end, the GNSS receiver can perform duty cycle adjustments on the power of one or more components used to process signals received via the first GNSS band, as detailed in the previously described embodiments. Thus, according to some embodiments of method 700, the method can further include cycling between operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band for a first predetermined time period and operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band for a second predetermined time period during the time period in which spoofing may occur. This helps the GNSS receiver use spoofing detection techniques (such as consistency checks, outlier detection, etc.) to determine whether possible spoofing is still occurring.

[0097] The components used to perform the functions at block 770 may include processor 810 (or more), DSP 820, wireless communication interface 830, sensor 840 (or more), memory 860, GNSS receiver 880, and / or other components of mobile device 800, such as... Figure 8 As shown.

[0098] Figure 8 This is a block diagram of an embodiment of a mobile device 800, which can be as described in the embodiments described herein and in conjunction with... Figures 1-7 Used in conjunction with other devices. For example, mobile device 800 is capable of performing... Figure 7 Method 700 includes one or more functions. Furthermore, the mobile device 800 can interact with the UE described herein (e.g., Figure 1 This corresponds to UE 105. It should be noted that... Figure 8 This description is intended only to provide a general overview of the various components of the mobile device 800, any one or all of which may be appropriately utilized. In other words, because the UE can vary greatly in functionality, it may only include... Figure 8 Part of the components shown. It can be noted that in some cases, Figure 8 The components shown can be located in a single physical device and / or distributed across a variety of networked devices that can be arranged in different physical locations.

[0099] The mobile device 800 is shown as including hardware elements capable of being electrically coupled (or otherwise communicated, as applicable) via a bus 805. The hardware elements may include one or more processors 810, which may include, but are not limited to, one or more general-purpose processors, one or more special-purpose processors (such as digital signal processing (DSP) chips, graphics accelerator processors, application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), etc.) and / or other processing structures, units, or components capable of being configured to perform one or more methods described herein. Figure 8 As shown, depending on the desired functionality, some embodiments may have a separate DSP 820. The mobile device 800 may also include one or more input devices 870, which may include, but are not limited to, one or more touchscreens, touchpads, microphones, buttons, dial pads, switches, etc.; and one or more output devices 815, which may include, but are not limited to, one or more displays, light-emitting diodes (LEDs), speakers, etc.

[0100] The mobile device 800 may also include a wireless communication interface 830, which may include, but is not limited to, a modem, a network card, an infrared communication device, a wireless communication device and / or a chipset (such as a Bluetooth device, an IEEE 802.11 device, an IEEE 802.15.4 device, a Wi-Fi device, or a WiMAX device). TM Equipment, cellular communication facilities, etc.), and / or similar, which enables mobile device 800 to communicate via the methods described herein. Figure 1 The described network communicates. The wireless communication interface 830 allows data to communicate with the network, base stations (e.g., eNB, ng-eNB, and / or gNB) and / or other network components, computer systems, transmit / receive points (TRPs), and / or any other electronic devices described herein. This communication can be performed via one or more wireless communication antennas 832 that deliver and / or receive wireless signals 834. According to some embodiments, the wireless communication antenna 832 may include multiple discrete antennas, antenna arrays, or any combination thereof. The antenna 832 is capable of transmitting and receiving wireless signals using beams (e.g., Tx beams and Rx beams). Beamforming techniques can be performed using digital and / or analog methods, utilizing appropriate digital and / or analog circuitry. The wireless communication interface 830 may include such circuitry.

[0101] Depending on the desired functionality, the wireless communication interface 830 may include separate receivers and transmitters, or any combination of transceivers, transmitters, and / or receivers, to communicate with base stations (e.g., ng-eNBs and gNBs) and other terrestrial transceivers (e.g., wireless devices and access points). The mobile device 800 can communicate with various data networks, including a wide range of network types. As previously mentioned, a WWAN can be a CDMA network, TDMA network, FDMA network, OFDMA network, SC-FDMA network, WiMAX (IEEE 802.16), and so on. 5G, LTE, Advanced LTE, NR, GSM, and WCDMA are described in 3GPP documentation. Similarly, a WLAN can be an IEEE 802.11x network, and a WPAN can be a Bluetooth network, IEEE 802.15x, or some other type of network.

[0102] The mobile device 800 may also include sensors 840 (or more). Such sensors may include, but are not limited to, one or more inertial sensors, radar, LiDAR, sonar, accelerometers (or more), gyroscopes (or more) and / or other inertial measurement units (IMUs) (or more), cameras 848 (or more), magnetometers (or more), compasses, altimeters (or more), microphones (or more), proximity sensors (or more), light sensors (or more), barometers, etc., some of which may be used to complement and / or enhance the positioning estimation functions described herein.

[0103] Embodiments of the mobile device 800 may also include a GNSS receiver 880 capable of receiving signals 884 from one or more GNSS satellites via one or more GNSS frequency bands using a GNSS antenna 882 (which in some implementations may be combined with antennas 832 (or more)). For this purpose, the GNSS receiver 880 may include... Figure 3 The signal processing architecture 300 and / or similar processing components. As previously described, the signal processing architecture 300 can be used to process signals received from a single GNSS band or two GNSS bands with similar baseband frequencies. Thus, the GNSS receiver 880 can include many similar... Figure 3 The signal processing architecture 300 is a signal processing architecture capable of processing signals received via multiple GNSS bands / constellations. In some embodiments, the GNSS receiver 880 may include front-end analog components for each GNSS band (or a pair of GNSS bands with similar baseband frequencies) and may share digital circuitry (e.g., complex downconversion and digital baseband 316) across multiple GNSS bands. Additionally or alternatively, the digital circuitry may be independent for each GNSS band.

[0104] The GNSS receiver 880 is capable of extracting the location of the mobile device 800 from GNSS satellites of a GNSS system, such as GPS, Galileo, LONASS, Compass, the Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) over Japan, the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) over India, and BeiDou over China, using conventional techniques. Furthermore, the GNSS receiver 880 is capable of using various augmentation systems (e.g., satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS)), which can be associated with or used in conjunction with one or more global and / or regional navigation satellite systems. By way of example and not limitation, SBAS may include augmentation systems that provide integrity information, differential corrections, etc., such as Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS), European Geostationary Navigation Coverage Service (EGNOS), Multifunctional Satellite Augmentation System (MSAS), GPS-assisted Geographic Augmentation Navigation, or GPS and Geographic Augmentation Navigation System (GAGAN). Therefore, as used herein, GNSS may include any combination of one or more global and / or regional navigation satellite systems and / or augmentation systems, and GNSS signals may include GNSS, GNSS-like systems, and / or other signals associated with such one or more GNSS.

[0105] It can be noted that although the GNSS receiver 880 is in Figure 8 The components are illustrated, but embodiments are not limited thereto. As used herein, the term "GNSS receiver" may include hardware and / or software components configured to acquire GNSS measurements (measurements from GNSS satellites). Thus, in some embodiments, a GNSS receiver may include a measurement engine (as software) run by one or more processors, such as processor 810, DSP 820, and / or a processor within a wireless communication interface 830 (e.g., in a modem). The GNSS receiver may also optionally include a positioning engine capable of determining the location of the GNSS receiver using GNSS measurements from the measurement engine by employing an extended Kalman filter (EKF), weighted least squares (WLS), a hatch filter, a particle filter, etc. The positioning engine may also be run by one or more processors, such as processor 810 or DSP 820.

[0106] The mobile device 800 may also include and / or communicate with memory 860. Memory 860 may include, but is not limited to, local and / or network-accessible memory, disk drives, drive arrays, optical storage devices, solid-state storage devices such as random access memory (RAM) and / or read-only memory (ROM), which can be programmable, flash-updatable, and / or similar. Such storage devices can be configured to implement any suitable data storage, including but not limited to various file systems, database structures, etc.

[0107] The memory 860 of the mobile device 800 may also include software elements (not shown), including an operating system, device drivers, executable libraries, and / or other code, such as one or more applications, which may include computer programs provided by various embodiments and / or may be designed to implement methods provided by other embodiments and / or configure systems as described herein. By way of example only, one or more programs described above may be implemented as code and / or instructions executable by the mobile device 800 (e.g., using processor 810 (or more)). Then, in one aspect, such code and / or instructions may be used to configure and / or adjust a general-purpose computer (or other device) to perform one or more operations according to the described methods.

[0108] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that substantial modifications can be made to meet specific requirements. For example, custom hardware may be used, and / or specific components may be implemented in hardware, software (including portable software such as small applications), or both. Furthermore, connectivity to other computing devices, such as network input / output devices, may be employed.

[0109] Referring to the accompanying drawings, components capable of including memory can include non-transitory machine-readable media. As used herein, the terms "machine-readable media" and "computer-readable media" refer to any storage medium involved in providing data that enables a machine to operate in a particular manner. In the embodiments provided above, various machine-readable media may involve providing instructions / code to a processor and / or other devices for execution. Additionally or alternatively, machine-readable media may be used to store and / or carry such instructions / code. In many implementations, computer-readable media are physical and / or tangible storage media. Such media can take many forms, including but not limited to non-volatile media, volatile media, and transmission media. Common forms of computer-readable media include, for example, magnetic and / or optical media, any other physical media with a hole pattern, RAM, PROM, EPROM, FLASH-EPROM, any other memory chip or cartridge, the carrier wave described below, or any other medium from which a computer can read instructions and / or code.

[0110] The methods, systems, and devices discussed herein are examples. Various procedures or components may be appropriately omitted, substituted, or added in various embodiments. For example, features described with respect to certain embodiments may be combined in various other embodiments. Different aspects and elements of embodiments may be combined in a similar manner. The various components of the accompanying drawings provided herein can be implemented in hardware and / or software. Furthermore, technology is evolving, and therefore many elements are examples and the scope of this disclosure is not limited to those specific examples.

[0111] Primarily for general reasons, referring to such signals as bits, information, values, elements, symbols, characters, variables, terms, numbers, numerals, etc., sometimes proves convenient. However, it should be understood that all these or similar terms are associated with appropriate physical quantities and are merely convenient notations. Unless otherwise stated, it is evident from the above discussion that, throughout the discussion of this specification, the use of terms such as “processing,” “calculating,” “operating,” “determining,” “identifying,” “ascertaining,” “associating,” “measuring,” “executing,” etc., refers to the action or process of a particular device, such as a dedicated computer or similar dedicated electronic computing device. Therefore, in the context of this specification, a dedicated computer or similar dedicated electronic computing device capable of manipulating or converting signals is generally referred to as a physical electronic, electrical, or magnetic quantity within the memory, registers, or other information storage, transmission, or display device of the dedicated computer or similar dedicated electronic computing device.

[0112] The terms “and” and “or” as used herein can include a variety of meanings, which are also expected to depend at least in part on the context in which the terms are used. Typically, “or” when used to relate a list, such as A, B, or C, is intended to mean A, B, and C, here in the sense of inclusion, and A, B, or C, here in the sense of exclusivity. Furthermore, the term “one or more” as used herein can be used to describe any feature, structure, or property in the singular form, or can be used to describe some combination of features, structures, or properties. However, it should be noted that this is merely an illustrative example, and the claimed subject matter is not limited to this example. Additionally, the term “at least one” when used to relate a list, such as A, B, or C, can be interpreted to mean any combination of A, B, and / or C, such as A, AB, AA, AAB, AABBCCC, etc.

[0113] Several embodiments have been described, and various modifications, alternative constructions, and equivalents may be used without departing from the spirit of this disclosure. For example, the elements described above may simply be components of a larger system, and other rules may take precedence over or otherwise modify the application of the various embodiments. Furthermore, many steps may be taken before, during, or after considering the foregoing elements. Therefore, the above description does not limit the scope of this disclosure.

[0114] In light of this description, embodiments may include different combinations of features. Examples of implementations are described in the following numbered clauses:

[0115] Clause 1. A method for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the method comprising: operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; receiving at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal; obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band; and, in response to obtaining the data, operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; receiving at the GNSS receiver a first... Two sets of GNSS signals, the second set of GNSS signals including at least a second GNSS signal received via a first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS; and determining a second positioning estimate based at least in part on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: the second positioning estimate is determined based at least in part on at least a third GNSS signal received via a second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, and the second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0116] Clause 2. The method according to Clause 1, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal.

[0117] Clause 3. The method described in Clause 2, wherein disabling data demodulation and decoding includes turning off or reducing the clock rate of the digital processor of the GNSS receiver.

[0118] Clause 4. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-3, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes ignoring time data decoded from a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0119] Clause 5. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-4, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling satellite detection operations performed by the GNSS receiver to acquire signals from unknown or invisible GNSS satellites.

[0120] Clause 6. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-5, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band includes disabling satellite differential operation performed by the GNSS receiver using a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0121] Clause 7. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-6, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band includes disabling error recovery operations performed by the GNSS receiver.

[0122] Clause 8. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-7, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling inter-signal time deviation (ISTB) operation performed by the GNSS receiver using a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0123] Clause 9. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-8, wherein operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver to detect a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0124] Clause 10. The method according to Clause 9, wherein reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver includes duty cycle equalization of the power of one or more components used to process the second at least one GNSS signal.

[0125] Clause 11. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-10 further includes determining that spoofing may no longer occur in the first GNSS band; and in response to determining that spoofing may no longer occur, operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0126] Clause 12. The method according to any one of Clauses 1-11 further includes, during the period in which spoofing may occur, cycling between operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band for a first predetermined time period and operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band for a second predetermined time period.

[0127] Clause 13. An apparatus for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the apparatus comprising: a transceiver; a memory; and one or more processors communicatively coupled to the transceiver and the memory, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: operate the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; receive at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; determine a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal; acquire data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band; and, in response to acquiring the data, in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band... The system operates a GNSS receiver in a certain state; receives a second set of GNSS signals at the GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including a second at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band; and determines a second positioning estimate based at least in part on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: the second positioning estimate is determined based at least in part on a third at least one GNSS signal received via the second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, and the second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signals received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0128] Clause 14. The device according to Clause 13, wherein when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, one or more processors are configured to disable data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal.

[0129] Clause 15. The device according to Clause 14, wherein, when data demodulation and decoding are disabled, one or more processors are configured to turn off or reduce the clock rate of the digital processor of the GNSS receiver.

[0130] Clause 16. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-15, wherein when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, one or more processors are configured to ignore time data decoded from a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0131] Clause 17. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-16, wherein, when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relating to a first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to disable satellite detection operations performed by the GNSS receiver to acquire signals from unknown or invisible GNSS satellites.

[0132] Clause 18. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-17, wherein when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, one or more processors are configured to disable satellite differential operation performed by the GNSS receiver using a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0133] Clause 19. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-18, wherein when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, one or more processors are configured to disable error recovery operations performed by the GNSS receiver.

[0134] Clause 20. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-19, wherein when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, one or more processors are configured to disable inter-signal time deviation (ISTB) operation performed by the GNSS receiver using a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0135] Clause 21. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-20, wherein, when the GNSS receiver is operated in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to reduce the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver to detect a second at least one GNSS signal.

[0136] Clause 22. The device according to Clause 21, wherein one or more processors are configured to duty cycle the power of one or more components used for processing a second at least one GNSS signal when reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver.

[0137] Clause 23. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-22, wherein one or more processors are further configured to: determine that spoofing is no longer possible in the first GNSS band; and, in response to determining that spoofing is no longer possible, operate the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0138] Clause 24. The device according to any one of Clauses 13-23, wherein one or more processors are further configured to: cycle between operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band for a first predetermined time period and operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band for a second predetermined time period during a time period in which spoofing may occur.

[0139] Clause 25. An apparatus for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the apparatus comprising: means for operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; means for receiving at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; means for determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal; means for obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band; means for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to obtaining the data; and means for receiving at the GNSS frequency band a first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band; means for determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal; means for obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band; and means for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band in response to obtaining the data; and means for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The receiver includes components for receiving a second set of GNSS signals, the second set of GNSS signals including at least a second GNSS signal received via a first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band; and components for determining a second positioning estimate based at least partially on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: components for determining the second positioning estimate based at least partially on at least a third GNSS signal received via a second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band; and components for determining that the second positioning estimate is not based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0140] Clause 26. The apparatus according to Clause 25, wherein the components for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band include components for disabling data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal.

[0141] Clause 27. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the instructions comprising codes for: operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; receiving at the GNSS receiver a first set of GNSS signals, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS frequency band while the GNSS receiver is operating in the first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on the first at least one GNSS signal; obtaining data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS frequency band; and, in response to obtaining the data, operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; in G The NSS receiver receives a second set of GNSS signals, the second set of GNSS signals including a second at least one GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band; and determines a second positioning estimate based at least in part on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: the second positioning estimate is determined based at least in part on a third at least one GNSS signal received via the second GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band, and the second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signal received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in the second state relative to the first GNSS band.

[0142] Clause 28. The computer-readable medium pursuant to Clause 27, wherein the code for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band includes code for disabling data demodulation and decoding of a second at least one GNSS signal.

Claims

1. A method for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the method comprising: The GNSS receiver is operated in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; A first set of GNSS signals is received at a GNSS receiver, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal, the first at least one GNSS signal being received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The first positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a first at least one GNSS signal; Obtain data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS band; In response to acquiring the data, the GNSS receiver operates in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; A second set of GNSS signals is received at the GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including at least one second GNSS signal, the at least one second GNSS signal being received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; as well as The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a third at least one GNSS signal, which is received via a second GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signals received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

2. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal.

3. The method according to claim 2, wherein, Disabling data demodulation and decoding includes turning off or reducing the clock rate of the digital processor in the GNSS receiver.

4. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes ignoring time data decoded from at least one second GNSS signal.

5. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling satellite detection operations performed by the GNSS receiver to acquire signals from unknown or invisible GNSS satellites.

6. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band includes disabling satellite differential operations performed by the GNSS receiver using at least one second GNSS signal.

7. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling error recovery operations performed by the GNSS receiver.

8. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes disabling inter-signal time deviation (ISTB) operation performed by the GNSS receiver using at least one second GNSS signal.

9. The method according to claim 1, wherein, Operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band includes reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver to detect at least one second GNSS signal.

10. The method according to claim 9, wherein, Reducing the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver includes duty cycle equalization of the power of one or more components used to process a second at least one GNSS signal.

11. The method of claim 1, further comprising: It was determined that deception could no longer occur in the first GNSS band; as well as In response to determining that spoofing is no longer possible, the GNSS receiver is operated in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band.

12. The method of claim 1, further comprising: During the period in which deception may occur, the GNSS receiver cycles between operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band for a first predetermined time period and operating in a first state relative to the first GNSS band for a second predetermined time period.

13. An apparatus for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the apparatus comprising: GNSS receiver; Memory; as well as One or more processors, communicatively coupled to a GNSS receiver and a memory, wherein the one or more processors are configured to: The GNSS receiver is operated in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; A first set of GNSS signals is received via a GNSS receiver, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal, the first at least one GNSS signal being received via a first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; The first positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a first at least one GNSS signal; Obtain data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS band; In response to acquiring the data, the GNSS receiver operates in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; A second set of GNSS signals is received at the GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including at least one second GNSS signal, the at least one second GNSS signal being received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; and The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a third at least one GNSS signal, which is received via a second GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signals received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

14. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to disable data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal.

15. The device according to claim 14, wherein, To disable data demodulation and decoding, one or more processors are configured to turn off or reduce the clock rate of the digital processor in the GNSS receiver.

16. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to ignore time data decoded from at least one second GNSS signal.

17. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to disable satellite detection operations performed by the GNSS receiver to acquire signals from unknown or invisible GNSS satellites.

18. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band, one or more processors are configured to disable satellite differential operation performed by the GNSS receiver using at least one second GNSS signal.

19. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to disable error recovery operations performed by the GNSS receiver.

20. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to disable inter-signal time deviation (ISTB) operation performed by the GNSS receiver using a second at least one GNSS signal.

21. The device according to claim 13, wherein, In order to operate the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band, one or more processors are configured to reduce the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver to detect a second at least one GNSS signal.

22. The device according to claim 21, wherein, To reduce the incoherent integration time used by the GNSS receiver, one or more processors are configured to perform duty cycle regulation on the power of one or more components used to process a second at least one GNSS signal.

23. The device according to claim 13, wherein, One or more processors are also configured to: It was determined that deception could no longer occur in the first GNSS band; and In response to determining that spoofing is no longer possible, the GNSS receiver is operated in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band.

24. The device according to claim 13, wherein, One or more processors are also configured to cycle between operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS band for a first predetermined time period and operating the GNSS receiver in a first state relative to the first GNSS band for a second predetermined time period during the time period during which spoofing may occur.

25. An apparatus for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the apparatus comprising: Components for operating a GNSS receiver in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; Components for receiving a first set of GNSS signals at a GNSS receiver, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal, the first at least one GNSS signal being received via a first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a first state relative to a first GNSS frequency band; Components for determining a first positioning estimate based at least in part on a first at least one GNSS signal; Components used to obtain data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS band; Components for operating a GNSS receiver in a second state relative to a first GNSS frequency band in response to acquiring the data; Components for receiving a second set of GNSS signals at a GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including at least one second GNSS signal, the at least one second GNSS signal being received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; as well as The component is used to determine a second positioning estimate based at least in part on a second set of GNSS signals, wherein: The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a third at least one GNSS signal, which is received via a second GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signals received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

26. The apparatus according to claim 25, wherein, The components for operating the GNSS receiver in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band include components for disabling data demodulation and decoding of at least one second GNSS signal.

27. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storing instructions for operating a Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receiver, the instructions including codes for: The GNSS receiver is operated in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; A first set of GNSS signals is received at a GNSS receiver, the first set of GNSS signals including a first at least one GNSS signal, the first at least one GNSS signal being received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a first state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; The first positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a first at least one GNSS signal; Obtain data indicating that spoofing may be occurring in the first GNSS band; In response to acquiring the data, the GNSS receiver operates in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; A second set of GNSS signals is received at the GNSS receiver, the second set of GNSS signals including at least one second GNSS signal, the at least one second GNSS signal being received via the first GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band; as well as The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on the second set of GNSS signals, wherein: The second positioning estimate is determined at least in part based on a third at least one GNSS signal, which is received via the second GNSS frequency band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS frequency band. The second positioning estimate is determined not to be based on any GNSS signals received via the first GNSS band when the GNSS receiver is operating in a second state relative to the first GNSS band.

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