A simulation method for the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective behavior of farmers.

Abstract

This invention discloses a method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior, belonging to the field of integrated management of agricultural water and soil resources in irrigation districts. This invention is the first to simulate the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior. By simulating field water supply, the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation activities, and the proportion of farmers not paying water fees, it explores the integration of water management and land management. Furthermore, this invention establishes a dynamic relationship between factor changes and their impact on outcomes, providing an analytical tool for integrated management of water and soil resources in irrigation districts, and offering decision support to relevant management agencies, thus contributing to the sustainable development of irrigation.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of integrated management of agricultural water and soil resources in irrigation areas, and more specifically, relates to a method for simulating the dynamic relationship between the degree of land fragmentation and the collective behavior of farmers. Background Technology

[0002] It is well known that farmer cooperation is crucial to the overall effectiveness of irrigation. However, the refusal of some farmers to participate in this cooperation has disrupted irrigation systems and hindered the raising of funds for canal maintenance. Water fee collection rates have fallen below 80%, leading to a continuous decline in the irrigation system's water delivery capacity and further resulting in the extraction of large amounts of groundwater to compensate for insufficient supply. Therefore, management measures such as updating and repairing canal systems, strengthening agricultural water user associations, and establishing end-point canal maintenance organizations are currently being implemented to improve irrigation sustainability.

[0003] The effectiveness of these measures is largely influenced by land fragmentation. Land fragmentation refers to the spatial division of farmland into unconnected plots, with most plots smaller than 0.6 hectares, indicating a high degree of fragmentation. Land fragmentation has a direct negative impact on collective irrigation behavior. Collective irrigation behavior refers to small, spontaneously formed groups of farmers during crop production to reduce water costs and improve water resource utilization. Studies show that land fragmentation significantly increases the cost for farmers to engage in farmland irrigation cooperation. Farmers with larger irrigated plots are more willing to participate in the construction and maintenance of small-scale farmland irrigation facilities and join farmer water user cooperatives.

[0004] To analyze the effectiveness of irrigation management measures in the context of high land fragmentation, it is necessary to link land fragmentation, farmers' collective irrigation behavior, and irrigation sustainability. Previous studies on the influencing factors of farmers' collective behavior generally first design multiple indicators to represent the degree of land fragmentation, the intensity of farmers' collective irrigation behavior, and factors that may influence this behavior. Then, data are collected and the values ​​of each indicator are calculated using methods such as questionnaires and surveys. Finally, statistical methods such as econometric models and hypothesis testing are used to analyze the significance of the correlations among the indicators, thereby identifying the main factors influencing farmers' collective irrigation behavior. These studies provide qualitative descriptions of the effects of the main factors, but they do not establish a dynamic relationship between factor changes and the resulting impact. Summary of the Invention

[0005] In response to the shortcomings and improvement needs of existing technologies, this invention provides a method and system for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective behavior of farmers. Its purpose is to solve the technical problem that existing research on irrigation sustainability has not yet established a dynamic relationship between factor changes and their impact on results, making it difficult to guide the formulation of irrigation district management measures.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, this invention provides a method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior, comprising the following steps:

[0007] S1, simulating field water supply in year T:

[0008]

[0009] In the formula, T is an integer greater than or equal to 2, and FI T is the field water supply in year T, a is the total irrigated area of ​​the irrigation district, d is the irrigation quota per unit area, and F T E is the water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal in year T. T This is the water conveyance efficiency of the Dou Nong Canal in year T.

[0010] The water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal and the water conveyance efficiency of the distribution canal in year T are respectively expressed as:

[0011] F T =cρ1(LG T-1 )

[0012] E T =cρ2(LG T-1 )

[0013]

[0014] In the formula, functions cρ1 and cρ2 respectively illustrate the change in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals with the degree of water fee loss, and LG T -1 It represents the extent of water cost loss in year T-1, WA T-1 This is the actual water fee paid by farmers in the irrigation area in year T-1, where qp is the price per cubic meter of water.

[0015] S2, simulating the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T:

[0016]

[0017]

[0018] gi=gi1(fr)gi2(IrF T-1 )gi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0019] mi=mi1(fr)mi2(IrF T-1 )mi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0020] In the formula, IrNo T This represents the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T, and 0 ≤ IrNo T≤1; gi and mi represent the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; the functions gi1 and mi1 represent the effects of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; gi2 and mi2 represent the degree of irrigation failure IrF in the irrigation district in year T-1, respectively. T-1 Regarding the impact of increasing or decreasing the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, gi3 and mi3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increase and decrease, respectively;

[0021] Wherein, the degree of land fragmentation fr = m / a; m represents the number of plots;

[0022] IrF of irrigation failure in the irrigation district in year T-1 T-1 , represented as:

[0023]

[0024] In the formula, IrNoWM T-1 and IrYesWM T-1 These represent the number of farmers who drew water from the irrigation canals in year T-1 and those who did not participate in the collective irrigation action, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWQ T-1 These are the irrigation quotas for farmers who do not participate in and those who participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWS T-1 These represent the water savings of farmers who did not participate in and those who participated in collective irrigation efforts in year T-1, respectively.

[0025] S3, simulating the percentage of water bills not paid in year T:

[0026]

[0027]

[0028] gn=gn1(fr)gn2(IrNo T-1 )gn3(CNo T-1 )

[0029] mn=mn1(fr)mn2(IrNo T-1 )mn3(CNo T-1 )

[0030] In the formula, CNo T The percentage of water fees not paid in year T, and 0 ≤ CNo T≤1; gn and mn represent the increment and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn1 and mn1 represent the impact of the degree of land fragmentation fr on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn2 and mn2 represent the impact of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T-1 on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; gn3 and mn3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increment and decrease, respectively.

[0031] Another aspect of the present invention provides a dynamic simulation system for the relationship between land fragmentation and collective behavior of farmers, comprising the following modules:

[0032] The field water supply module is used to simulate the field water supply in year T:

[0033]

[0034] In the formula, T is an integer greater than or equal to 2, and FI T is the field water supply in year T, a is the total irrigated area of ​​the irrigation district, d is the irrigation quota per unit area, and F T E is the water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal in year T. T This is the water conveyance efficiency of the Dou Nong Canal in year T.

[0035] The water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal and the water conveyance efficiency of the distribution canal in year T are respectively expressed as:

[0036] F T =cρ1(LG T-1 )

[0037] E T =cρ2(LG T-1 )

[0038]

[0039] In the formula, functions cρ1 and cρ2 respectively illustrate the change in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals with the degree of water fee loss, and LG T -1 It represents the extent of water cost loss in year T-1, WA T-1 This is the actual water fee paid by farmers in the irrigation area in year T-1, where qp is the price per cubic meter of water.

[0040] The farmer water intake module is used to simulate the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation activities in year T.

[0041]

[0042]

[0043] gi=gi1(fr)gi2(IrF T-1 )gi3(IrNo T-1)

[0044] mi=mi1(fr)mi2(IrF T-1 )mi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0045] In the formula, IrNo T This represents the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T, and 0 ≤ IrNo T ≤1; gi and mi represent the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; the functions gi1 and mi1 represent the effects of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; gi2 and mi2 represent the degree of irrigation failure IrF in the irrigation district in year T-1, respectively. T-1 Regarding the impact of increasing or decreasing the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, gi3 and mi3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increase and decrease, respectively;

[0046] Wherein, the degree of land fragmentation fr = m / a; m represents the number of plots;

[0047] IrF of irrigation failure in the irrigation district in year T-1 T-1 , represented as:

[0048]

[0049] In the formula, IrNoWM T-1 and IrYesWM T-1 These represent the number of farmers who drew water from the irrigation canals in year T-1 and those who did not participate in the collective irrigation action, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWQ T-1 These are the irrigation quotas for farmers who do not participate in and those who participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWS T-1 These represent the water savings of farmers who did not participate in and those who participated in collective irrigation efforts in year T-1, respectively.

[0050] The farmer water bill payment module is used to simulate the percentage of farmers who do not pay their water bills in year T.

[0051]

[0052]

[0053] gn=gn1(fr)gn2(IrNo T-1 )gn3(CNo T-1 )

[0054] mn=mn1(fr)mn2(IrNo T-1 )mn3(CNo T-1 )

[0055] In the formula, CNo T The percentage of water fees not paid in year T, and 0 ≤ CNo T ≤1; gn and mn represent the increment and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn1 and mn1 represent the impact of the degree of land fragmentation fr on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn2 and mn2 represent the impact of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T-1 on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; gn3 and mn3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increment and decrease, respectively.

[0056] In summary, the above-described technical solutions conceived in this invention can achieve the following beneficial effects:

[0057] This invention is the first to simulate the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior. By simulating field water supply, the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation activities, and the proportion of farmers not paying water fees, it explores the integration of water management and land management. This invention also establishes the dynamic relationship between factor changes and their impact on results, providing an analytical tool for the comprehensive management of water and soil resources in irrigation areas, as well as decision support for relevant management agencies, and contributing to the sustainable development of irrigation. Attached Figure Description

[0058] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior, provided by this invention;

[0059] Figure 2 In this embodiment of the invention, IrNo represents the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation activities. T Water bill non-payment rate (CNo) T The functions related to the increment and decrement are shown, where (a) is the graph of gi1, mi1, gn1 and mn1; (b) is the graph of gi2, mi2, gn2 and mn2; and (c) is the graph of gi3, mi3, gn3 and mn3. Detailed Implementation

[0060] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention. The features, operations, or characteristics described in the specification can be combined in any suitable manner to form various implementations. Furthermore, the steps or actions in the method description can be rearranged or adjusted in a manner readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Therefore, the various orders in the specification and drawings are merely for the clear description of a particular embodiment and do not imply a mandatory order, unless otherwise stated that a particular order must be followed. Moreover, the technical features involved in the various embodiments of the invention described below can be combined with each other as long as they do not conflict with each other.

[0061] See Figure 1 This invention provides a method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior, comprising the following steps:

[0062] S1: Set the parameter values ​​and initial values ​​of variables, and calculate the corresponding degree of land fragmentation fr = m / a (the larger the fr value, the higher the degree of land fragmentation). Next, set the parameter values ​​for various functions. Finally, set the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation activities, IrNo. 1 Water bill non-payment rate (CNo) 1 The initial values ​​of the variables are determined (T = 1 represents the initial value), and the initial values ​​of other variables are calculated accordingly.

[0063] In this example, the number of consecutive simulation years k is set to 40, the total irrigated area a is set to 10000 ha, and the irrigation quota d is set to 9000 m². 3 / ha, the water price per cubic meter qp is set to 0.05 yuan, the number of plots m can be between 100 and 20000, and the corresponding area of ​​each plot is 100 to 0.5ha, with fr value of 0.01 to 2.

[0064] S2: Field water supply simulation, starting from T=2, simulates the process of annual field water supply changing with the degree of water fee loss in the previous year, where T is an integer greater than or equal to 2.

[0065] Specifically, the change in field water supply with the degree of water fee loss is as follows:

[0066]

[0067] In the formula, FI T is the field water supply in year T, a is the total irrigated area of ​​the irrigation district, d is the irrigation quota per unit area, and F T It refers to the water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal, E T It refers to the water conveyance efficiency of the irrigation canal;

[0068] The water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal and the water conveyance efficiency of the distribution canal in year T are respectively expressed as:

[0069] F T =cρ1(LG T-1 )

[0070] E T =cρ2(LG T-1 )

[0071]

[0072] In the formula, functions cρ1 and cρ2 respectively illustrate the change in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals with the degree of water fee loss, and LG T -1 It represents the extent of water cost loss in year T-1, WA T-1 It represents the actual water fees paid by farmers in the irrigation area in year T-1, where qp is the price per cubic meter of water.

[0073] In this example, for functions cρ1 and cρ2, it is assumed that when there is no water fee revenue in a certain year, the channel is not maintained, and the water conveyance efficiency decreases by a fixed annual value. If there is water fee revenue in a certain year, the rate of decrease in water conveyance efficiency in that year is linearly related to the degree of water fee loss. Therefore, functions cρ1 and cρ2 are calculated using the following formulas:

[0074] cρ1(LG T-1 ) = max(F T-1 -LG T-1 ×e1, e1 T≥2

[0075] cρ2(LG T-1 ) = max(E T-1 -LG T-1 ×e2, e2 T≥2

[0076] In the formula, e1 and e2 are the annual decrease in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals under the condition of no maintenance, respectively. e1 and e2 These are the lower limits of water conveyance efficiency for branch canals and distribution canals, respectively. Based on existing literature and the results of canal system failures under lack of maintenance surveys in this example area, this embodiment sets F... 1 E 1 e1, e2, e1 and e2 The values ​​are 0.85, 0.85, 0.02, 0.03, 0.6 and 0.5 respectively.

[0077] S3: Simulation of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions.

[0078]

[0079] IrYes T =1-IrNo T

[0080] The composition of farmers participating in or not participating in collective irrigation efforts is not fixed. Each year, some farmers leave while others join. Therefore, IrNo T Represented as:

[0081]

[0082] In the formula, IrNo T and IrYes T Let IrNo represent the proportions of farmers who do not participate in and participate in the collective irrigation action in year T, respectively, and 0 ≤ IrNo T ≤1; gi and mi represent the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively, and can be expressed as:

[0083] gi=gi(fr,IrF T-1 ,IrNo T-1 )=gi1(fr)gi2(IrF T-1 )gi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0084] mi = mi(fr, IrF) T-1 ,IrNo T-1 )=mi1(fr)mi2(IrF T-1 )mi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0085] In the formula, gi1 and mi1 represent the effects of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation action (the lower the degree of land fragmentation, the lower the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation action), and gi2 and mi2 represent the degree of irrigation failure IrF in the irrigation district in year T-1. T-1 The effect of increasing or decreasing the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions (the lower the degree of irrigation failure in the irrigation district, the lower the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions), gi3 and mi3 represent the restriction mechanism on the increase and decrease of the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions in year T due to the restriction on the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions in year T-1.

[0086] Among them, the degree of irrigation failure in the irrigation district in year T-1 is IrF T-1 (Referring to the extent that water intake from channels cannot meet water demand), can be expressed as:

[0087]

[0088] In the formula, IrNoWM T-1 and IrYesWM T-1 These represent the number of farmers who drew water from the irrigation canals in year T-1 and those who did not participate in the collective irrigation action, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWQ T-1 These are the irrigation quotas for farmers who do not participate in and those who participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWS T-1 These figures represent the water savings of farmers who did not participate in and those who participated in the collective irrigation action in year T-1. It is worth noting that the farmers who did not participate in the collective irrigation action drew water from the canals earlier than those who did.

[0089] S4: Simulation of the number of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions and draw water from canals.

[0090] Specifically, the amount of water drawn from the irrigation canal by farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T is expressed as:

[0091] IrNoWM T =min(FI) T ,IrNoWQ T -IrNoWS T )

[0092] Among them, the irrigation quota and water saving amount for farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T are respectively expressed as:

[0093] IrNoWQ T =d×a×IrNo T

[0094] IrNoWS T =IrNoWQ T ×cJ(fr)

[0095] Similarly, the amount of water taken from the irrigation canal, the irrigation quota, and the water saved by farmers participating in the collective irrigation action in year T (farmers who can only take water from the canal after farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action have taken water) can be expressed as follows:

[0096] IrYesWM T =min(FA) T -IrNoWM T ,IrYesWQ T -IrYesWS T )

[0097] IrYesWQ T =d×a×IrYes T

[0098] IrYesWS T =IrYesWQ T ×cJ(fr)

[0099] In the formula, the smaller of the following values ​​is taken: the amount of water taken from the irrigation canal by farmers participating in the collective irrigation action in year T, the amount of water supplied to the field, the amount of water taken from the irrigation canal by farmers not participating in the collective irrigation action, and the difference between the irrigation quota and the water saving amount of farmers participating in the collective irrigation action.

[0100] In this example, regarding the function cJ (which describes the change in water-saving ratio with the degree of land fragmentation), existing literature indicates that a reduction in land fragmentation promotes the adoption of water-saving measures. Land fragmentation has a significant negative impact on water-saving technologies for farmers with plots smaller than 0.67 hectares, and a significant positive impact for farmers with plots larger than 0.67 hectares. The positive impact is greatest for farmers with plots between 0.67 and 1.33 hectares. Therefore, this example assumes water-saving ratio values ​​for plots of different sizes, and the function cJ adopts the step function form shown below:

[0101]

[0102] In the formula, a fr value of 1.4925 corresponds to a plot area of ​​0.67 ha, and a fr value of 0.7519 corresponds to a plot area of ​​1.33 ha.

[0103] S5: Simulation of Payment Base Actions.

[0104] Simulation of water bill non-payment rates:

[0105]

[0106]

[0107] gn = gn(fr, IrNo) T-1 ,CNo T-1 )=gn1(fr)gn2(IrNo T-1 )gn3(CNo T-1 )

[0108] mn=mn(fr,IrNo T-1 ,CNo T-1 )=mn1(fr)mn2(IrNo T-1 )mn3(CNo T-1 )

[0109] In the formula, CNo T The percentage of water fees not paid in year T, and 0 ≤ CNo T≤1; gn and mn represent the increment and decrement of the proportion of water fee non-payment, respectively; functions gn1 and mn1 represent the impact of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease of the proportion of water fee non-payment (the higher the degree of land fragmentation, the higher the proportion of water fee non-payment); functions gn2 and mn2 represent the impact of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1 on the increase and decrease of the proportion of water fee non-payment (theoretically, the higher the proportion of farmers who participate in collective irrigation action, the lower the proportion of water fee non-payment should be); gn3 and mn3 represent the restriction mechanism on the increment and decrement of the proportion of water fee non-payment in year T caused by the restriction on the proportion of water fee non-payment in year T-1.

[0110] Simulated water bill payment:

[0111] WA T =(1-CNo) T )×(IrYesWM T +IrNoWM T )×qp

[0112] In the simulation system, gi1, mi1, gn1, mn1, gi2, mi2, gn2, mn2, gi3, mi3, gn3, and mn3 are the main simulation functions of this invention. Based on the actual application scenario of this invention, relevant parameters in the fitting function are assigned values ​​to obtain the independent variables fr and IrF. T-1 、IrNo T-1 CNo T-1 For the dependent variable FI T 、IrNo T CNo T This will provide analytical tools for the comprehensive management of water and soil resources in irrigation areas and provide decision support for relevant management agencies.

[0113] In this example, this embodiment assumes a linear correlation between the degree of farmer participation in collective irrigation actions and the degree of land fragmentation. Therefore, the functions gi1, mi1, gn1, and mn1 all take the form of the following equations:

[0114]

[0115] In the formula, a1, b1, c1, and d1 are the coefficients of the linear equation. The threshold for classifying (high) and (low) land fragmentation. This embodiment is set (Corresponding to a plot area of ​​10 ha) is the threshold for classifying high and low land fragmentation. (That is, when fr is below 0.1, it is considered low land fragmentation, and when it is above 0.1, it is considered high land fragmentation). Let gi1(0.1) = mi1(0.1) and gni1(0.1) = mni1(0.1). (The threshold setting refers to the results in existing literature on the distribution of cultivated land plot area, where 2.56ha is considered high land fragmentation and 16ha is considered low land fragmentation).

[0116] Assuming a linear correlation between farmers' participation in collective irrigation efforts and the degree of irrigation failure, as well as farmers' willingness to pay water fees, then the functions gi2, mi2, gn2, and mn2 all take the form of the following equations:

[0117]

[0118] In the formula, x represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrF. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 a², b², c², d², and e² are the coefficients of the equation, and 0 < a < b < c < d. <e2<1。

[0119] Assuming that the constraint mechanisms gi3 and mi3, gn3 and mn3 are also linear, the functions gi3 and gn3 take the form of the following equations:

[0120]

[0121] In the formula, y represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrNo. T -1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is CNo. T-1 a3 is the coefficient of the equation and 0 <a3<1;

[0122] The functions mi3 and mn3 are expressed in the following equation form:

[0123]

[0124] In the formula, z represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrNo. T -1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is CNo. T-1 a4 is the coefficient of the equation and 0 <a4<1。

[0125] After setting the coefficient values ​​for the functions f1 to f4, the graphs of the corresponding functions are shown below. Figure 2 The coordinates of the endpoints of each line segment are marked in the diagram. Figure 2(a) represents the proportion of farmers participating in collective irrigation actions that could decrease to 0 or increase to 1 within 10 (=1 / 0.1) years due to land fragmentation. Figure 2 (b) represents the rate of change in the level of collective action of farmers caused by land fragmentation, which can be magnified by a maximum of 2 times or reduced by a minimum of 0.8 times. Figure 2 (c) indicates that when the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions is higher than 0.5, the growth rate decreases; when it is lower than 0.5, the rate of decline decreases.

[0126] The proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions. T Water bill non-payment rate (CNo) T The functions related to increment and decrement, gi1, mi1, gi2, mi2, gn1, mn1, gn2 and mn2, gi3 and mi3, gn3 and mn3, are the core functions of the simulation system.

[0127] The simulation system provided by this invention can reflect the differences in collective irrigation actions of farmers in different regions by changing the parameter values ​​of these twelve functions and setting different initial values, and generate simulation results for each test scenario accordingly. It is worth noting that since the parameter values ​​of each function reflect the changing relationships between variables, their set values ​​are not the actual values. Therefore, the changing trends of each variable are more meaningful than their absolute values.

[0128] Another aspect of the present invention provides a dynamic simulation system for the relationship between land fragmentation and collective behavior of farmers, comprising the following modules:

[0129] The field water supply module is used to simulate the field water supply in year T:

[0130]

[0131] In the formula, T is an integer greater than or equal to 2, and FI T is the field water supply in year T, a is the total irrigated area of ​​the irrigation district, d is the irrigation quota per unit area, and F T E is the water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal in year T. T This is the water conveyance efficiency of the Dou Nong Canal in year T.

[0132] The water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal and the water conveyance efficiency of the distribution canal in year T are respectively expressed as:

[0133] F T =cρ1(LG T-1 )

[0134] E T =cρ2(LG T-1 )

[0135]

[0136] In the formula, functions cρ1 and cρ2 respectively illustrate the change in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals with the degree of water fee loss, and LG T -1 It represents the extent of water cost loss in year T-1, WA T-1 This is the actual water fee paid by farmers in the irrigation area in year T-1, where qp is the price per cubic meter of water.

[0137] The farmer water intake module is used to simulate the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation activities in year T.

[0138]

[0139]

[0140] gi=gi1(fr)gi2(IrF T-1 )gi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0141] mi=mi1(fr)mi2(IrF T-1 )mi3(IrNo T-1 )

[0142] In the formula, IrNo T This represents the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T, and 0 ≤ IrNo T ≤1; gi and mi represent the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; the functions gi1 and mi1 represent the effects of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; gi2 and mi2 represent the degree of irrigation failure IrF in the irrigation district in year T-1, respectively. T-1 Regarding the impact of increasing or decreasing the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, gi3 and mi3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increase and decrease, respectively;

[0143] Among them, the degree of land fragmentation fr = m / a;

[0144] IrF of irrigation failure in the irrigation district in year T-1 T-1 , represented as:

[0145]

[0146] In the formula, IrNoWM T-1 and IrYesWM T-1 These represent the number of farmers who drew water from the irrigation canals in year T-1 and those who did not participate in the collective irrigation action, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWQ T-1 These are the irrigation quotas for farmers who do not participate in and those who participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1, respectively.T-1 and IrYesWS T-1 These represent the water savings of farmers who did not participate in and those who participated in collective irrigation efforts in year T-1, respectively.

[0147] The farmer water bill payment module is used to simulate the percentage of farmers who do not pay their water bills in year T.

[0148]

[0149]

[0150] gn=gn1(fr)gn2(IrNo T-1 )gn3(CNo T-1 )

[0151] mn=mn1(fr)mn2(IrNo T-1 )mn3(CNo T-1 )

[0152] In the formula, CNo T The percentage of water fees not paid in year T, and 0 ≤ CNo T ≤1; gn and mn represent the increment and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn1 and mn1 represent the impact of the degree of land fragmentation fr on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn2 and mn2 represent the impact of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T-1 on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; gn3 and mn3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increment and decrease, respectively.

[0153] The division of modules in the above-described simulation system of the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior is for illustrative purposes only. In other embodiments, the simulation system of the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior can be divided into different modules as needed to complete all or part of the functions of the above system.

[0154] It will be readily understood by those skilled in the art that the above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is only intended to help understand the present invention, and is not intended to limit the present invention. For those skilled in the art to which the present invention pertains, based on the ideas of the present invention, several simple deductions, modifications or substitutions can be made. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1, simulating field water supply in year T: In the formula, T is an integer greater than or equal to 2, and FI T is the field water supply in year T, a is the total irrigated area of ​​the irrigation district, d is the irrigation quota per unit area, and F T E is the water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal in year T. T This is the water conveyance efficiency of the Dou Nong Canal in year T. The water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal and the water conveyance efficiency of the distribution canal in year T are respectively expressed as: F T =cρ1(LG T-1 ) E T <cρ2(LG T-1 ) In the formula, functions cρ1 and cρ2 respectively illustrate the change in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals with the degree of water fee loss, and LG T-1 It represents the extent of water cost loss in year T-1, WA T-1 This is the actual water fee paid by farmers in the irrigation area in year T-1, where qp is the price per cubic meter of water. S2, simulating the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T: gi<gi1(fr)gi2(IrF T-1 )gi3(IrNo T-1 ) E=E1(fr)E2(IrF T-1 )mi3(IrNo T-1 ) In the formula, IrNo T This represents the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T, and 0 ≤ IrNo T ≤1; gi and mi represent the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; the functions gi1 and mi1 represent the effects of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; gi2 and mi2 represent the degree of irrigation failure IrF in the irrigation district in year T-1, respectively. T-1 Regarding the impact of increasing or decreasing the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, gi3 and mi3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increase and decrease, respectively; Wherein, the degree of land fragmentation fr = m / a; m represents the number of plots; IrF of irrigation failure in the irrigation district in year T-1 T-1 , represented as: In the formula, IrNoWM T-1 and IrYesWM T-1 These represent the number of farmers who drew water from the irrigation canals in year T-1 and those who did not participate in the collective irrigation action, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWQ T-1 These are the irrigation quotas for farmers who do not participate in and those who participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWS T-1 These represent the water savings of farmers who did not participate in and those who participated in collective irrigation efforts in year T-1, respectively. S3, simulating the percentage of water bills not paid in year T: gn=gn1(fr)gn2(IrNo T-1 )gn3(CNo T-1 ) mn=mn1(fr)mn2(IrNo T-1 mn3(CNo T-1 ) In the formula, CNo T The percentage of water fees not paid in year T, and 0 ≤ CNo T ≤1; gn and mn represent the increment and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn1 and mn1 represent the impact of the degree of land fragmentation fr on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn2 and mn2 represent the impact of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T-1 on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; gn3 and mn3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increment and decrease, respectively.

2. The method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S1, cρ1(LG T-1 )=max(F T-1 -LG T-1 ×e1, e1 ) T≥2 cρ2(LG T-1 )<max(E T-1 -LG T-1 ×e2, e2 ) T≥2 In the formula, e1 and e2 are the annual decrease in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals, respectively, when the canals are not maintained. e1 and e2 These are the lower limits of water conveyance efficiency for branch canals and irrigation canals, respectively.

3. The method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S2, The amount of water drawn from the canal by farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation efforts in year T is represented as follows: IrNoWM T =min(FI T IrNoWQ T -IrNoWS T ) Among them, the irrigation quota and water saving amount for farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T are respectively expressed as: IrNoWQ T =d×a×IrNo T IrNoWS T =IrNoWQ T ×cJ(fr) The function cJ(fr) is expressed as: In the formula, a fr value of 1.4925 corresponds to a plot area of ​​0.67 ha, and a fr value of 0.7519 corresponds to a plot area of ​​1.33 ha.

4. The method for simulating the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior according to claim 1, characterized in that, The functions gi1, mi1, gn1, and mn1 all take the form of the following equations: In the formula, a1, b1, c1, and d1 are the coefficients of the linear equation. The threshold for classifying the degree of land fragmentation. The functions gi2, mi2, gn2, and mn2 all take the form of the following equations: In the formula, x represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrF. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 a², b², c², d², and e² are the coefficients of the equation, and 0 < a < b < c < d. <e2<1; The functions gi3 and gn3 are expressed in the following equation form: In the formula, y represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is CNo. T-1 a3 is the coefficient of the equation and 0 <a3<1; The functions mi3 and mn3 are expressed in the following equation form: In the formula, z represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is CNo. T-1 a4 is the coefficient of the equation and 0 <a4<1。 5. A simulation system for the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior, characterized in that, Includes the following modules: The field water supply module is used to simulate the field water supply in year T: In the formula, T is an integer greater than or equal to 2, and FI T is the field water supply in year T, a is the total irrigated area of ​​the irrigation district, d is the irrigation quota per unit area, and F T E is the water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal in year T. T This is the water conveyance efficiency of the Dou Nong Canal in year T. The water conveyance efficiency of the branch canal and the water conveyance efficiency of the distribution canal in year T are respectively expressed as: F T =cρ1(LG T-1 ) E T <cρ2(LG T-1 ) In the formula, functions cρ1 and cρ2 respectively illustrate the change in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals with the degree of water fee loss, and LG T-1 It represents the extent of water cost loss in year T-1, WA T-1 This is the actual water fee paid by farmers in the irrigation area in year T-1, where qp is the price per cubic meter of water. The farmer water intake module is used to simulate the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation activities in year T. gi<gi1(fr)gi2(IrF T-1 )gi3(IrNo T-1 ) E=E1(fr)E2(IrF T-1 )mi3(IrNo T-1 ) In the formula, IrNo T This represents the proportion of farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation actions in year T, and 0 ≤ IrNo T ≤1; gi and mi represent the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; the functions gi1 and mi1 represent the effects of land fragmentation degree fr on the increase and decrease in the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, respectively; gi2 and mi2 represent the degree of irrigation failure IrF in the irrigation district in year T-1, respectively. T-1 Regarding the impact of increasing or decreasing the proportion of farmers not participating in collective irrigation actions, gi3 and mi3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increase and decrease, respectively; Wherein, the degree of land fragmentation fr = m / a; m represents the number of plots; IrF of irrigation failure in the irrigation district in year T-1 T-1 , represented as: In the formula, IrNoWM T-1 and IrYesWM T-1 These represent the number of farmers who drew water from the irrigation canals in year T-1 and those who did not participate in the collective irrigation action, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWQ T-1 These are the irrigation quotas for farmers who do not participate in and those who participate in collective irrigation action in year T-1, respectively. T-1 and IrYesWS T-1 These represent the water savings of farmers who did not participate in and those who participated in collective irrigation efforts in year T-1, respectively. The farmer water bill payment module is used to simulate the percentage of farmers who do not pay their water bills in year T. gn=gn1(fr)gn2(IrNo T-1 )gn3(CNo T-1 ) mn=mn1(fr)mn2(IrNo T-1 mn3(CNo T-1 ) In the formula, CNo T The percentage of water fees not paid in year T, and 0 ≤ CNo T ≤1; gn and mn represent the increment and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn1 and mn1 represent the impact of the degree of land fragmentation fr on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; functions gn2 and mn2 represent the impact of the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T-1 on the increase and decrease of the proportion of non-payment of water fees, respectively; gn3 and mn3 represent the restriction mechanisms on the increment and decrease, respectively.

6. The simulation system for the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior according to claim 5, characterized in that, cρ1(LG T-1 )=max(F T-1 -LG T-1 ×e1, e1 )T≥2 cρ2(LG T-1 )<max(E T-1 -LG T-1 ×e2, e2 )T≥2 In the formula, e1 and e2 are the annual decrease in water conveyance efficiency of branch canals and distribution canals, respectively, when the canals are not maintained. e1 and e2 These are the lower limits of water conveyance efficiency for branch canals and irrigation canals, respectively.

7. The simulation system for the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior according to claim 5, characterized in that, The amount of water drawn from the canal by farmers who do not participate in collective irrigation efforts in year T is represented as follows: IrNoWM T =min(FI T IrNoWQ T -IrNoWS T ) Among them, the irrigation quota and water saving amount for farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action in year T are respectively expressed as: IrNoWQ T =d×a×IrNo T IrNoWS T =IrNoWQ T ×cJ(fr) The function cJ(fr) is expressed as: In the formula, a fr value of 1.4925 corresponds to a plot area of ​​0.67 ha, and a fr value of 0.7519 corresponds to a plot area of ​​1.33 ha.

8. The simulation system for the dynamic relationship between land fragmentation and collective farmer behavior according to claim 5, characterized in that, The functions gi1, mi1, gn1, and mn1 all take the form of the following equations: In the formula, a1, b1, c1, and d1 are the coefficients of the linear equation. The threshold for classifying the degree of land fragmentation. The functions gi2, mi2, gn2, and mn2 all take the form of the following equations: In the formula, x represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrF. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 a², b², c², d², and e² are the coefficients of the equation, and 0 < a < b < c < d. <e2<1; The functions gi3 and gn3 are expressed in the following equation form: In the formula, y represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is CNo. T-1 a3 is the coefficient of the equation and 0 <a3<1; The functions mi3 and mn3 are expressed in the following equation form: In the formula, z represents the independent variable. When the dependent variable is the proportion of farmers who do not participate in the collective irrigation action, the independent variable is IrNo. T-1 When the dependent variable is the proportion of water bills not paid, the independent variable is CNo. T-1 a4 is the coefficient of the equation and 0 <a4<1。

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