An improved method of TCM chip trust system
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202310544334.4
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2023-05-16
- Publication Date
- 2026-09-15
- Estimated Expiration
- 2043-05-16
AI Technical Summary
”文中提到的是对TCM芯片信任体系安全性能改进的理想化表述,上述过程的不足主要表现为:(1)依赖EFI对核心文件的可靠性进行检查,缺少认证硬件驱动的过程,在启动过程中存在安全风险,从而无法对核心文件起到全面的安全保护作用;(2)在对核心文件的可靠性进行检查过程中,核心文件单一的密钥使核心文件存在被攻击或出现漏洞的风险;(3)在通过软件直接调用运行态服务来调用TCM芯片提供的各类服务步骤中,不可靠的软件可能导致TCM芯片的工作环境不安全
本发明无需借助于 CPU和操作系统软件进行信任传递的信任体系改进,实现了整盘加密和整机的信任度量,改善TCM芯片工作环境的安全性,使TCM芯片在可信状态下完成各种安全操作,进一步提升了TCM芯片的安全性能。
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Figure CN116644431B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to an improved method for enhancing the security of a TCM chip trust system, belonging to the field of data security technology. Background Technology
[0002] TCM chips are crucial modules for achieving secure and reliable computing, but they also pose certain risks related to the trustworthiness of the operating system. In the current operating environment, the security of mainstream CPUs and operating systems is difficult to guarantee. Completely rebuilding an operating system would not only require significant resources, but the ecosystem of the new system would also be a concern. Therefore, relying on a completely trustworthy operating system for the reliability of the trust chain carries risks both technically and practically.
[0003] In the article "A Preliminary Exploration of Next-Generation TCM Specifications and Chip Design" written by Li Jianhang et al., an improvement idea for the trust system of TCM chips was proposed, namely: "Use domestic EFI to check the reliability of the core files of domestic security systems, and provide runtime EFI background services under the OS. Domestic security software can directly call the various services provided by the TCM chip by calling the runtime services to complete various security operations." The article mentions an idealized description of the security performance improvement of the trust system of TCM chips. The shortcomings of the above process are mainly manifested in: (1) relying on EFI to check the reliability of the core files, lacking the process of authenticating hardware drivers, there are security risks during the startup process, so it is impossible to play a comprehensive security protection role for the core files; (2) in the process of checking the reliability of the core files, the single key of the core files makes the core files vulnerable to attack or vulnerabilities; (3) in the step of calling the various services provided by the TCM chip by directly calling the runtime services through software, unreliable software may lead to an insecure working environment for the TCM chip. Summary of the Invention
[0004] The purpose of this invention is to improve the trust system by changing the connection method of the TCM chip hardware interface, without relying on the CPU and operating system software for trust transfer.
[0005] This invention is achieved through the following technical solution: An improved trust system for TCM chips is proposed. By changing the connection method of the TCM chip's hardware I / O interface, a more secure trust system capable of bypassing the CPU and operating system software for trust transfer is constructed. The specific implementation steps are as follows: Step 1: Improve the hardware I / O interface of the TCM chip. After the firmware inside the TCM chip completes the routine checks, use the domestic UEFI certified hardware driver to perform secure boot. Step 2: Perform key checks on the core files of the security system via UEFI and regenerate a new set of file keys; Step 3: Provide a runtime UEFI background service under the OS; Step 4: Input security commands through the domestic operation port to directly call various services provided by the TCM chip by calling the runtime services, and complete various security operations.
[0006] Furthermore, the process of improving the TCM chip hardware structure in step 1 includes: 1-1 Change the TCM chip so that the CPU sends addressing information to find the self-test program; 1-2 Addressing information is sent to the Northbridge chip via the front-side bus. After receiving the addressing information, the Northbridge sends it to the Southbridge chip. After receiving the addressing information, the Southbridge sends it to the ISA bus via the PCI bus. Then, the ISA bus controller and decoder transmit the 16-bit address signal to the UEFI-BIOS chip.
[0007] Furthermore, step 2 involves performing a key check on the core files of the security system via UEFI and regenerating a new set of file keys. The specific process is as follows: 2-1 Use the secure boot function of domestic UEFI to check the integrity of the system core file key and load the certified hardware driver; 2-2 The system detected that core files had been checked and automatically regenerated a new set of file keys; Furthermore, step 3 provides a runtime UEFI background service under the OS as follows: 3-1 Based on the trust chain transmission process, the system's boot process will become a trusted boot process, establishing a trust chain transmission relationship based on the isolation and verification relationship of space, time, and trust root; 3-2 Based on the bootstrapping process of the root of trust and chain of trust, the background service is invoked using the security commands input through the domestic operation port.
[0008] Furthermore, step 4 involves inputting security commands through a domestically produced operating port and utilizing various services provided by the TCM chip to complete various security operations. 4-1 Starting from the root of trust, the system control is passed sequentially from the trusted domestic UEFI to the trusted boot, skipping the CPU, the trusted operating system loader, and then from the trusted operating system loader. 4-2 The domestic UEFI uses domestic software to transmit commands to a trusted application, and begins to attempt to read commands from the trusted domestic operation port to proceed with the next operation; 4-3 The system invokes runtime services by reading security instructions and completes various security operations. Its key feature is that it invokes runtime services by reading security instructions input from a domestically produced operating port, rather than entering runtime through the operating system.
[0009] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: This invention improves the trust system without relying on CPU and operating system software for trust transfer, realizes whole-disk encryption and whole-machine trust measurement, improves the security of the TCM chip's working environment, enables the TCM chip to complete various secure operations in a trusted state, and further enhances the security performance of the TCM chip. Attached Figure Description
[0010] Figure 1 This is a diagram illustrating the transmission process of the trust chain. Figure 2 This is a diagram illustrating the process of transmitting addressing information. Detailed Implementation
[0011] The invention will now be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings.
[0012] This invention improves the trust system of TCM by skipping the CPU and operating system during the trust chain transmission process, providing a more secure and reliable TCM chip.
[0013] This invention provides an improved method for a TCM chip trust system, which improves the TCM chip hardware I / O interface and constructs a trust system capable of bypassing the CPU and operating system software for trust transfer. Figure 1 As shown, the process of transferring the trust chain includes the following steps: Step 1: Improve the hardware I / O interface of the TCM chip. After the firmware inside the TCM chip completes the routine checks, use the domestic UEFI certified hardware driver to perform secure boot. Step 2: Perform key checks on the core files of the security system via UEFI and regenerate a new set of file keys; Step 3: Provide a runtime UEFI background service under the OS; Step 4: Input security commands through the domestic operation port, and call various services provided by the TCM chip by calling the runtime service to complete various security operations.
[0014] The methods for improving the TCM chip hardware I / O interface in step 1 include: 1-1 Change the TCM chip so that the CPU sends addressing information to find the self-test program; Addressing information 1-2 is sent to the Northbridge chip via the front-side bus. Upon receiving the addressing information, the Northbridge chip then forwards it to the Southbridge chip. The Southbridge chip, upon receiving the addressing information, transmits it to the ISA bus via the PCI bus. The ISA bus controller and decoder then transmit the 16-bit address signal to the UEFI-BIOS chip. The specific transmission process is as follows: Figure 2 As shown.
[0015] Step 2 involves performing a key check on the core files of the security system via UEFI and regenerating a new set of file keys. The specific process is as follows: 2-1 Use the secure boot function of domestic UEFI to check the integrity of the system core file key and load the certified hardware driver; 2-2 The system detected that core files had been checked and automatically regenerated a new set of file keys; Step 3, providing a runtime UEFI background service under the OS, specifically involves: 3-1 Based on the trust chain transmission process, the system's boot process will become a trusted boot process, establishing a trust chain transmission relationship based on the isolation and verification relationship of space, time, and trust root; 3-2 Based on the bootstrapping process of the root of trust and chain of trust, the background service is invoked using the security commands input through the domestic operation port.
[0016] Step 4 involves inputting security commands through the domestically produced operating port and utilizing the various services provided by the TCM chip to complete various security operations. The specific method is as follows: 4-1 Starting from the root of trust, the system control is passed sequentially from the trusted domestic UEFI to the trusted boot, skipping the CPU, the trusted operating system loader, and then from the trusted operating system loader. 4-2 The domestic UEFI uses domestic software to transmit commands to a trusted application, and begins to attempt to read commands from the trusted domestic operation port to proceed with the next operation; 4-3 The system invokes runtime services by reading security instructions and completes various security operations. Its key feature is that it invokes runtime services by reading security instructions input from a domestically produced operating port, rather than entering runtime through the operating system.
[0017] This invention, by enabling various operations to be performed across the CPU and operating system, further enhances the security of the trust system by using a UEFI-certified hardware driver to ensure secure boot.
[0018] Upon detecting that the core file key has been inspected, the file key is automatically updated to prevent key leakage and data exposure, thus providing security for the core file. The domestically developed operation port directly invokes various services provided by the TCM chip through runtime services, reducing reliance on foreign technologies and ensuring privacy. In the context of increasingly prominent information security issues, this invention enhances the security of the TCM chip's trust system, solves data security problems, and is highly practical, widely applicable, and easy to promote.
Claims
1. An improved method of TCM chip trust architecture, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: Change the connection method of the TCM chip's hardware I / O interface. After the firmware inside the TCM chip completes the routine check, use the domestic UEFI certified hardware driver to perform secure boot. Step 2: Perform key checks on the core files of the security system via UEFI and regenerate a new set of file keys; Step 3: Provide a runtime UEFI background service under the OS; Step 4: Input security commands through the domestic operation port, and call various services provided by the TCM chip by calling the runtime service to complete various security operations; Step 1, which improves the connection method of the TCM chip hardware I / O interface, includes: 1-1 Change the TCM chip so that the CPU sends addressing information to find the self-test program; 1-2 Addressing information is sent to the Northbridge chip via the front-side bus. After receiving the addressing information, the Northbridge chip sends it to the Southbridge chip. After receiving the addressing information, the Southbridge chip sends it to the ISA bus via the PCI bus. Then, the ISA bus controller and decoder transmit the 16-bit address signal to the UEFI-BIOS chip.
2. The improved method for a TCM chip trust system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Step 2 involves performing a key check on the core files of the security system via UEFI and regenerating a new set of file keys. The specific process is as follows: 2-1 Use the secure boot function of domestic UEFI to check the integrity of the system core file key and load the certified hardware driver; 2-2 The system detected that the core file was being checked and automatically regenerated a new round of file keys.
3. The improved method for a TCM chip trust system according to claim 2, characterized in that, Step 3, providing a runtime UEFI background service under the OS, specifically involves: 3-1 Based on the trust chain transmission process, the system's boot process will become a trusted boot process, establishing a trust chain transmission relationship based on the isolation and verification relationship of space, time, and trust root; 3-2 Based on the bootstrapping process of the root of trust and chain of trust, the background service is invoked using the security commands input through the domestic operation port.
4. An improved method for a TCM chip trust system according to claim 3, characterized in that, Step 4 involves inputting security commands through the domestically produced operating port and utilizing the various services provided by the TCM chip to complete various security operations. 4-1 Starting from the root of trust, the system control is passed in sequence from the trusted domestic UEFI to the trusted boot, skipping the CPU, the trusted operating system loader, and the trusted operating system. 4-2 The domestic UEFI uses domestic software to transmit commands to a trusted application, and begins to attempt to read commands from the trusted domestic operation port to proceed with the next operation; 4-3 The security instructions read in call the runtime service and complete various security operations. The runtime is called by reading the security instructions input from the domestic operation port, rather than entering the runtime through the operating system.
Citation Information
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