Authentication methods, systems, terminal devices and storage media

Abstract

This invention discloses an identity authentication method, system, terminal device, and storage medium. The method includes: setting public-private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public-private key pair set, wherein the public-private key pair set includes a card public-private key pair and a terminal public-private key pair; generating a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair; and verifying the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair when a first preset request is received. This invention aims to solve the problem of card-terminal separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of network security technology, and in particular to an identity authentication method, system, terminal device, and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication based on mobile networks faces the security risk of "SIM / USIM card separation," potentially leading to the misuse of SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) / USIM cards used in V2X. Furthermore, "SIM / USIM card separation" also exists on the mobile terminal; this refers to the possibility of the SIM / USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal being removed and used for other purposes. Therefore, a SIM / USIM card binding mechanism is needed to prevent this. At the mobile network level, SIM / USIM card binding relationships can be detected and confirmed through IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) / SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier) ​​and IMEI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) binding settings or signaling analysis methods. At the V2X level, there is currently no corresponding binding relationship detection and confirmation mechanism, nor can the capabilities of the mobile network layer be directly utilized. Indirectly utilizing mobile network layer capabilities requires calling service interfaces, which increases the complexity of the business process to some extent. Summary of the Invention

[0003] The main objective of this invention is to provide an identity authentication method, system, terminal device, and storage medium, aiming to solve the problem of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, embodiments of the present invention provide an identity authentication method, the identity authentication method comprising:

[0005] Set public-private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a set of public-private key pairs, wherein the set of public-private key pairs includes card public-private key pairs and terminal public-private key pairs;

[0006] Based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated;

[0007] When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

[0008] Optionally, the preset business participants include an initiator and a receiver, and the step of verifying the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes:

[0009] Based on the set of public and private keys and the combined public and private key pair, the decision information is obtained by encrypting the first preset request by the initiator.

[0010] Based on the set of public and private keys and the combined public and private key pair, the recipient verifies the identity information corresponding to the decision information.

[0011] Optionally, the step of generating a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair includes:

[0012] When the receiver receives the second preset request, it sends the second preset request to the initiator through the receiver;

[0013] Receive the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and perform the following steps: verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

[0014] Optionally, the recipient includes a first participant and a second participant, and the step of verifying the identity information corresponding to the decision information through the recipient based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes:

[0015] The signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant is verified by the first participant in the decision information.

[0016] If the verification is successful, the decision information will be sent to the second participant through the first participant;

[0017] The decision information is verified by the second participant, which generates the signature information based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant.

[0018] Optionally, the step of obtaining decision information by encrypting the first preset request through the initiator based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes:

[0019] Based on the first preset request, generate a first random number and a second random number;

[0020] Based on the first preset request and the second random number, generate combined information;

[0021] The decision information is obtained based on the first random number, the second random number, the combined information, the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, and the combined public-private key pair.

[0022] Optionally, the step of sending the decision information to the second participant through the first participant includes:

[0023] Based on the decision information, a third random number is generated;

[0024] Based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant, the third random number is encrypted to obtain the first signature;

[0025] The decision information is updated based on the first signature.

[0026] Optionally, the step of generating a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair includes:

[0027] Send the public key of the public-private key pair set to the preset business participant;

[0028] The public key of the combined public-private key pair is sent to the preset participant.

[0029] Furthermore, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides an identity authentication system, the system comprising:

[0030] The key set generation module is used to set public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes card public and private key pairs and terminal public and private key pairs;

[0031] The combined key generation module is used to generate a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair;

[0032] An authentication module is used to verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair when a first preset request is received.

[0033] In addition, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides a terminal device, the terminal device comprising: a memory, a processor, and an authentication method stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the authentication program, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the authentication method as described above.

[0034] In addition, to achieve the above objectives, the present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing an authentication program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the authentication method described above.

[0035] The identity authentication method, system, terminal device, and storage medium proposed in this invention improve the security of information transmission by setting public-private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public-private key pair set. This set is used to encrypt information, including a card public-private key pair and a terminal public-private key pair. A combined public-private key pair is generated based on the card and terminal public-private key pairs to confirm the card-terminal binding relationship and reduce the frequency of card abuse on the terminal device. When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair to confirm the identity information of the first preset request and provide a basis for responding to the first preset request. This invention aims to solve the problem of card-terminal separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes. Attached Figure Description

[0036] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the terminal device to which the identity authentication device of the present invention belongs;

[0037] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the first embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention;

[0038] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the first application scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;

[0039] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the fourth embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention;

[0040] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a second application scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;

[0041] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a third application scenario of the identity authentication method of the present invention;

[0042] Figure 7 This is an interactive diagram illustrating the identity authentication method of the present invention in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) remote control business scenario.

[0043] Figure 8 This is an interactive diagram illustrating a vehicle network service subscription scenario using the identity authentication method of the present invention.

[0044] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the identity authentication system of the present invention.

[0045] The realization of the objective, functional features and advantages of the present invention will be further explained in conjunction with the embodiments and with reference to the accompanying drawings. Detailed Implementation

[0046] It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative of the invention and are not intended to limit the invention.

[0047] The main solution of this invention is as follows: set public-private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public-private key pair set, wherein the public-private key pair set includes card public-private key pairs and terminal public-private key pairs; generate a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pairs and the terminal public-private key pairs; when a first preset request is received, verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

[0048] Technical terms involved in the embodiments of this invention:

[0049] SIM (Subscriber Identity Module) is an IC card held by mobile users in the GSM system. The GSM system uses the SIM card to identify GSM users. The same SIM card can be used in different mobile phones. A GSM mobile phone can only be used on the network after a SIM card is inserted.

[0050] USIM (Universal Subscriber Identity Module), also known as an upgraded SIM, is a component of the UMTS (Universal Mobile Telecommunication System) 3G network. Besides supporting multiple applications, the USIM card features upgraded security algorithms and adds card-to-network authentication, effectively preventing hacker attacks.

[0051] OBU (On-Board Unit) is a microwave device that uses DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communication) technology to communicate with RSU (Road Side Unit). In the ETC system, the OBU is placed on the vehicle, and the RSU is installed on the roadside, communicating with each other via microwave.

[0052] T-BOX (Travel-box) is a complete, portable travel box developed through the accumulation of outdoor living experience and technological innovation.

[0053] IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is a unique identifier used to distinguish different users across cellular networks. The mobile phone stores the IMSI in a 64-bit field and sends it to the network. The IMSI can be used to query user information in the Home Location Register (HLR) or Visitor Location Register (VLR).

[0054] SUPI (Subscription Permanent Identifier) ​​consists of 15 decimal digits, where the first three digits are the country code MCC, the middle 2-3 digits are the operator code MNC, and the remaining 9-10 digits are the mobile subscriber identifier MSIN, which together represent the user and the operator; SUPI is equivalent to the IMSI that uniquely identifies the ME, and is also a 15-digit string.

[0055] IMEI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity) is a unique identifier used to distinguish different users across cellular networks. The mobile phone stores the IMSI in a 64-bit field and sends it to the network. The IMSI can be used to query user information in the Home Location Register (HLR) or Visitor Location Register (VLR).

[0056] ECU (Electronic Control Unit), also known as "vehicle computer" or "on-board computer," is similar to a regular computer. It consists of a microcontroller (MCU), memory (ROM, RAM), input / output interfaces (I / O), analog-to-digital converters (A / D), and large-scale integrated circuits for shaping and driving.

[0057] IVI (In-Vehicle Infotainment) is a comprehensive in-vehicle information processing system that uses a dedicated in-vehicle central processor, based on the vehicle bus system and internet services. IVI can realize a range of applications including 3D navigation, real-time traffic information, IPTV, driver assistance, fault detection, vehicle information, vehicle control, mobile office, wireless communication, online entertainment functions, and TSP services.

[0058] APP (Application, Mobile Software): Mobile software primarily refers to software installed on smartphones to improve upon the shortcomings of the original system and provide personalization. It is the main means of enhancing the functionality of the phone and providing users with a richer user experience. Mobile software requires a corresponding mobile operating system to run. As of June 1, 2017, the main mobile operating systems were: Apple's iOS, Google's Android, Symbian, and Microsoft's platform.

[0059] Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology: Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) technology mainly refers to the use of onboard equipment in vehicles to effectively utilize all dynamic vehicle information on an information network platform through wireless communication technology, providing different functional services during vehicle operation.

[0060] Device fingerprint: A device fingerprint is a device feature or unique identifier that can be used to uniquely identify a device.

[0061] Asymmetric encryption: Symmetric encryption algorithms use the same key for both encryption and decryption; while asymmetric encryption algorithms require two keys for encryption and decryption, namely a public key and a private key.

[0062] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is a public-key cryptography algorithm, also known as asymmetric encryption. Similar algorithms include RSA and ElGamal. ECC is widely recognized as the most secure asymmetric encryption algorithm for a given key length.

[0063] The Chinese national standard public key cryptography algorithm SM2: Both the Chinese national standard public key cryptography algorithm SM2 and RSA are public key cryptography algorithms. The SM2 algorithm is a more advanced and secure algorithm and has been used to replace the RSA algorithm in China's commercial cryptography system.

[0064] With the development of cryptography and computer technology, the commonly used 1024-bit RSA algorithm is facing serious security threats. After research, our country's cryptography management department decided to replace the RSA algorithm with the SM2 elliptic curve algorithm.

[0065] Identity-Based Cryptograph (IBC) is an asymmetric public-key cryptosystem. The core principle of IBC is that the system does not require certificates; instead, it uses user identifiers such as name, IP address, email address, or mobile phone number as the public key. The user's private key is calculated by the Key Generate Center (KGC) based on the system master key and the user identifier. Since the user's public key is uniquely identified by their identifier, no third party is required to verify the authenticity of the public key.

[0066] Combination Public Key (CPK): In the field of information security, CPK is an abbreviation for "Combined Public Key," a cryptographic algorithm that generates large-scale keys with very few resources. Combination Public Key (CPK) is based on identity-based digital signature protocols and key exchange protocols.

[0067] Message digest algorithms: Message digest algorithms are a very important branch of cryptographic algorithms. They extract fingerprint information from all data to achieve functions such as data signing and data integrity verification. Due to their irreversibility, they are sometimes used for encrypting sensitive information. Message digest algorithms are also known as hash algorithms, hash algorithms, or hashing algorithms.

[0068] Message digest algorithms do not have the problem of key management and distribution, and are mainly used in the field of "digital signatures" as a digest algorithm for plaintext.

[0069] The SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm is a Chinese commercial cryptographic hash algorithm standard published by the State Cryptography Administration in 2010. It was released as a cryptographic industry standard (GM / T 0004-2012) in 2012 and as a national cryptographic hash algorithm standard (GB / T32905-2016) in 2016.

[0070] SM3 is suitable for digital signatures and verification in commercial cryptographic applications. It is an improved version of SHA-256, with comparable security. SM3's iteration process is similar to MD5, and it also uses the Merkle-Damgard structure. The message block length is 512 bits, and the digest value length is 256 bits.

[0071] Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication based on mobile networks faces the security risk of "SIM / USIM card separation," potentially leading to the misuse of SIM / USIM cards used for V2X. Furthermore, "SIM / USIM card separation" also exists on the mobile end; this refers to the possibility that the SIM / USIM card in the onboard unit (OBU / T-BOX) could be removed and used for other purposes. Therefore, a SIM / USIM card binding mechanism is needed to prevent this. At the mobile network level, SIM / USIM card binding relationships can be detected and confirmed through IMSI / SUPI and IMEI binding settings or signaling analysis methods. At the V2X level, there is currently no corresponding binding relationship detection and confirmation mechanism, nor can the capabilities of the mobile network layer be directly utilized. Indirectly utilizing mobile network layer capabilities requires calling service interfaces, which increases the complexity of the business process to some extent.

[0072] This invention provides a solution aimed at addressing the issue of terminal card separation, improving the security of business processes, and reducing the complexity of business processes.

[0073] Specifically, refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a functional module diagram of the terminal device to which the identity authentication device of this invention belongs. The identity authentication device can be an independent device capable of image processing and network model training, and can be implemented on the terminal device in hardware or software form. The terminal device can be a smart mobile terminal with data processing capabilities, such as a mobile phone or tablet computer, or a fixed terminal device or server with data processing capabilities.

[0074] In this embodiment, the terminal device to which the identity authentication device belongs includes at least an output module 110, a processor 120, a memory 130, and a communication module 140.

[0075] The memory 130 stores the operation method and authentication program; the output module 110 may be a display screen, etc. The communication module 140 may include a WIFI module, a mobile communication module, and a Bluetooth module, etc., and communicates with external devices or servers through the communication module 140.

[0076] When the identity authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it performs the following steps: setting public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a set of public and private key pairs, wherein the set of public and private key pairs includes card public and private key pairs and terminal public and private key pairs;

[0077] Based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated;

[0078] When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

[0079] Furthermore, when the authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0080] Based on the set of public and private keys and the combined public and private key pair, the decision information is obtained by encrypting the first preset request by the initiator.

[0081] Based on the set of public and private keys and the combined public and private key pair, the recipient verifies the identity information corresponding to the decision information.

[0082] Furthermore, when the authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0083] When the receiver receives the second preset request, it sends the second preset request to the initiator through the receiver;

[0084] Receive the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and perform the following steps: verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

[0085] Furthermore, when the authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0086] The signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant is verified by the first participant in the decision information.

[0087] If the verification is successful, the decision information will be sent to the second participant through the first participant;

[0088] The decision information is verified by the second participant, which generates the signature information based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant.

[0089] Furthermore, when the authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0090] Based on the first preset request, generate a first random number and a second random number;

[0091] Based on the first preset request and the second random number, generate combined information;

[0092] The decision information is obtained based on the first random number, the second random number, the combined information, the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, and the combined public-private key pair.

[0093] Furthermore, when the authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0094] Based on the decision information, a third random number is generated;

[0095] Based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant, the third random number is encrypted to obtain the first signature;

[0096] The decision information is updated based on the first signature.

[0097] Furthermore, when the authentication program in memory 130 is executed by the processor, it also performs the following steps:

[0098] Send the public key of the public-private key pair set to the preset business participant;

[0099] The public key of the combined public-private key pair is sent to the preset participant.

[0100] This embodiment, through the above-described scheme, specifically obtains a public-private key pair set by setting public-private key pairs for preset business participants. The public-private key pair set includes a card public-private key pair and an end-user public-private key pair. Based on the card public-private key pair and the end-user public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated. When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. This invention aims to solve the problem of end-user card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.

[0101] Based on, but not limited to, the terminal device architecture described above, embodiments of the method of the present invention are proposed.

[0102] Reference Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a first embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention. The identity authentication method includes:

[0103] Step S101: Set public-private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public-private key pair set, wherein the public-private key pair set includes card public-private key pairs and terminal public-private key pairs.

[0104] The execution subject of the method in this embodiment can be an identity authentication system, an identity authentication terminal device, or a server. This embodiment uses an identity authentication system as an example. The identity authentication system includes preset business participants, which include an initiator and a receiver; the receiver includes a first participant and a second participant.

[0105] To address the issue of terminal card separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce their complexity, it is necessary to establish public-private key pairs for pre-defined business participants, resulting in a public-private key pair set. In this embodiment, vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services are used as the aforementioned pre-defined business.

[0106] Specifically, firstly, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, public-private key pairs based on identifiers are generated for all participants in the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) business. For terminal devices with mobile communication capabilities, public-private key pairs based on identifiers for cards and terminals are generated. The public-private key pairs, card public-private key pairs, and terminal public-private key pairs constitute a public-private key pair set. The public keys of each participant are sent to the relevant participants, and the keys are distributed to the corresponding participants.

[0107] For example, participants in connected vehicle services include connected vehicle service platforms, vehicle manufacturer service platforms, and connected vehicle devices (including in-vehicle and mobile devices). The mobile device is considered the initiator, while the connected vehicle service platform, vehicle manufacturer service platform, and in-vehicle device are considered the recipients.

[0108] Based on the elliptic curve algorithm, public-private key pairs are generated for the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) service platform, the vehicle manufacturer's service platform, and V2X end devices (including vehicle-side and mobile devices), and the public key is distributed. Each participant has its associated public key. For end devices with mobile communication capabilities, it is necessary to generate separate public-private key pairs for the identifier-based card (SIM / USIM card) and end devices (vehicle-side / mobile device).

[0109] Therefore, based on the elliptic curve algorithm, public-private key pairs are generated for the preset business participants to improve the security of data transmission. Furthermore, terminal public-private key pairs and card public-private key pairs are generated for terminal devices with mobile communication capabilities to confirm the binding relationship between the terminal and the card, preventing the SIM / USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal (OBU / T-BOX) from being removed and used for other purposes.

[0110] Step S102: Generate a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair.

[0111] Step S103: When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

[0112] Based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated using the elliptic curve algorithm.

[0113] Specifically, by utilizing the key combination characteristics of the elliptic curve algorithm, the public-private key pair of the card and the public-private key pair of the terminal are combined to generate a new combined public-private key pair for the terminal device. The binding relationship between the terminal card (vehicle terminal and corresponding SIM / USIM card and mobile terminal and corresponding SIM / USIM card) is confirmed through the combined key, and the public key is distributed to the device associated with the terminal device.

[0114] Therefore, based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated through the elliptic curve algorithm. The combined key pair is used to directly determine the binding relationship between the terminal card (vehicle terminal and SIM / USIM card and mobile terminal and SIM / USIM card), preventing the SIM / USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal (OBU / T-BOX) from being removed and used for other purposes.

[0115] Furthermore, upon receiving a first preset request, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. The first preset request may include requests such as starting the engine / air conditioning, remotely unlocking / locking the doors, or remotely locating the vehicle.

[0116] Specifically, during the interaction of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) services, when a first preset request is received, an identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified by using an identification key, digital signature, and corresponding encryption technology. This is based on a public-private key pair set and a combination of public-private key pairs to establish an identity authentication that satisfies the mutual trust relationship among multiple parties (assuming N parties), as well as the security requirements for data confidentiality, integrity, replay resistance, and behavior non-repudiation related to business processing. The number of identity authentication processes is kept on the order of N, where N is N×(N-1) / 2.

[0117] Furthermore, when the receiver receives the second preset request, it sends the second preset request to the initiator; the receiver receives the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and executes step S103: verifying the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. The second preset request includes subscription information services such as traffic information subscription and on-demand audio / video services.

[0118] Specifically, when the receiver receives the second preset request, it sends the second preset request to the initiator; the initiator displays the second preset request to the user, the user responds, the user's response information is used as the first preset request, and step S103 is executed: based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified.

[0119] Therefore, by using identification keys, digital signatures, and corresponding encryption technologies, the security requirements of identity authentication and confidentiality, integrity, replay resistance, and behavior non-repudiation of related data in a multi-participant (assuming N parties) mutual trust relationship can be met.

[0120] This embodiment, through the above-described scheme, specifically obtains a public-private key pair set by setting public-private key pairs for preset business participants. The public-private key pair set includes a card public-private key pair and an end-user public-private key pair. Based on the card public-private key pair and the end-user public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated. When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. This invention generates end-user public-private key pairs and card public-private key pairs for end devices with mobile communication capabilities, thereby confirming the binding relationship between the end device and the card. This prevents the SIM / USIM card in the vehicle-mounted communication terminal (OBU / T-BOX) from being removed and misused, improving the security of the business process and reducing its complexity.

[0121] Based on the above Figure 2 The illustrated embodiment presents a second embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention. In this embodiment, as shown... Figure 3 As shown, the participants in the connected vehicle service include decision-makers, relayers, and executors. It is necessary to generate public-private key pairs for all participants, distribute these pairs to the corresponding participants, and distribute each party's public key to other participants (either publicly or through key exchange with relevant participants). Specifically, the decision-maker decides whether to perform a certain operation in a given business interaction and records the execution result; the relayer's role is to forward decision information (through the next relayer) to the executor, and forward the execution result returned by the executor (through the next relayer) to the decision-maker, recording the forwarding process; the executor completes the operation specified by the decision information, returns the execution result, and records the decision information.

[0122] In different application scenarios, the decision-makers, relayers, and executors are not entirely the same. For example, in the application example of remote control of connected vehicles, the decision-maker is the mobile terminal (car owner), the relayers are the connected vehicle service platform and the vehicle manufacturer's service platform, and the executor is the vehicle (ECU). The car owner sends operation commands to the vehicle via the mobile terminal, and the connected vehicle service platform and the vehicle manufacturer's service platform forward the operation commands to the vehicle, where the ECU executes the operation commands. In the application example of connected vehicle service subscription, the decision-maker is the mobile terminal (car owner), the relayers are the vehicle (IVI) and the vehicle manufacturer's service platform, and the executor is the connected vehicle service platform. The car owner sends decision information regarding the service subscription to the vehicle via the mobile terminal, and the vehicle's IVI and the vehicle manufacturer's service platform forward the decision information to the connected vehicle service platform (specific business processes may allow the driver / passenger to intervene, such as directly terminating the service subscription). The connected vehicle service platform processes the service subscription based on the decision information (e.g., confirming or canceling the subscription).

[0123] In this embodiment, an elliptic curve algorithm is used. Based on specific parameter definitions (e.g., referring to the parameter definitions of SM2), public-private key pairs are generated according to the identifiers of each participant. Key distribution is completed through an existing key management system, enabling each participant to obtain their own public and private keys and to learn (be aware of) the public keys of other participants. The private key must be kept strictly confidential and can be securely stored using hardware cryptographic modules (e.g., encryption chips) or software cryptographic modules (e.g., software shields). Assuming k is the private key and K is the public key, the public-private key pair obtained by the decision-maker is (k... d ,K d The public-private key pair obtained by the forwarder is (k f ,K f The public-private key pair obtained by the executor is (k e ,K e ).

[0124] Specifically, this embodiment involves four participants in the connected vehicle business: the connected vehicle service platform (platform cloud), the vehicle enterprise service platform (vehicle enterprise cloud), the vehicle terminal (driver and passengers), and the mobile terminal (vehicle owner).

[0125] A connected vehicle service platform can act as both a relayer and an executor. A public-private key pair can be generated based on the platform's identifier (e.g., operator code). For example, the public-private key pair obtained by the connected vehicle service platform might be (k... 01 k 01 ).

[0126] The vehicle manufacturer's service platform acts as a relayer. It can generate public-private key pairs based on the platform's identifier (e.g., company code). For example, the public-private key pair obtained by the vehicle networking service platform is (k... 02 K 02 ).

[0127] The vehicle-mounted device can act as either a relayer or an executor. It is a terminal device with mobile communication capabilities, containing a removable SIM / USIM card in its communication module. It can generate public-private key pairs based on the card identifier and the terminal (vehicle) identifier. The card identifier can be a unique identifier such as ICCID, while the terminal identifier can be OBU / T-BOX system characteristic information, vehicle identification number (VIN), or a vehicle-mounted device fingerprint generated based on multi-dimensional information. For example, the public-private key pair obtained by the vehicle-mounted device based on the card identifier is (k... 11 K 11 ), public-private key pairs based on endpoint identifiers (k 12 K 12 ).

[0128] The mobile device plays a decision-making role. It is a terminal device with mobile communication capabilities, and its SIM / USIM card is removable. Public-private key pairs can be generated based on the card identifier and the terminal (mobile device / phone) identifier. The card identifier can be a unique identifier such as ICCID, and the terminal identifier can be a Device ID, MAC address, or a mobile device fingerprint generated based on multi-dimensional information. For example, the public-private key pair obtained by the mobile device based on the card identifier is (k... 21 K 21 ), public-private key pairs based on endpoint identifiers (k 22 K 22 ).

[0129] Therefore, an elliptic curve algorithm is employed, based on specific parameter definitions (e.g., referring to the parameter definitions of SM2), to generate public-private key pairs based on the identifiers of each participant. Key distribution is then completed through the existing key management system, enabling each participant to obtain their own public and private keys and to acquire (be aware of) the public keys of other participants. This enhances the security of information transmission by authenticating identity information through the key pairs.

[0130] In connected vehicle services, terminal devices typically require terminal card binding. Based on the above... Figure 2 The illustrated embodiment presents a third embodiment of the authentication method of the present invention. In this embodiment, an elliptic curve algorithm is used to generate two public-private key pairs for the end devices (vehicle end and mobile end), namely a public-private key pair based on the card identifier and a public-private key pair based on the end identifier.

[0131] Because the public-private key pairs generated by the elliptic curve algorithm have a combinatorial characteristic, that is, m public-private key pairs (k1, K1), ..., (k...) generated by the elliptic curve algorithm... i ,K i ),…,(k m ,K m ) can be combined to generate new public-private key pairs (k c K c The calculation method for generating a combined public-private key pair is as follows:

[0132] k c = (k1+…+k i +…+k m mod(n)

[0133]

[0134] Where: n is the order of the base point G, and both n and G are predefined elliptic curve algorithm parameters. The calculation methods of kc and Kc are not exactly the same.

[0135] Based on the combinatorial characteristics of the elliptic curve algorithm, the card identifier public-private key pair and the terminal identifier public-private key pair of the terminal device can be combined to generate a combined public-private key pair of the terminal device. The combined key pair can be used to prove the terminal-card binding relationship of the terminal device. When the combined public-private key pair is generated, the terminal-card binding relationship of the terminal device is proven.

[0136] For the vehicle side, assume the combined public and private key pair is (k 13 K 13 ),but:

[0137] k 13 =(k 11 +k 12 mod(n)

[0138]

[0139] For mobile devices, assume the combined public and private key pair is (k 23 K 23 ),but:

[0140] k 23 =(k 21 +k 22 mod(n)

[0141]

[0142] Using the existing key management system, the vehicle will combine the public key K. 13 Distributed to connected vehicle service platforms, vehicle manufacturer service platforms, and mobile devices, the mobile devices will combine the public key K. 23 Distributed to vehicle networking service platforms, car manufacturer service platforms, and vehicle terminals.

[0143] Therefore, by setting a combined public-private key pair for the terminal device, the binding relationship between the terminal card (vehicle terminal and SIM / USIM card and mobile terminal and SIM / USIM card) can be directly determined using the combined key pair, preventing the SIM / USIM card in the vehicle communication terminal (OBU / T-BOX) from being removed and used for other purposes.

[0144] Reference Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the fourth embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention. Based on the above... Figure 2 In the embodiment shown, the preset business participants include the initiator and the receiver. Step S103: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, verifying the identity information corresponding to the first preset request includes:

[0145] Step S1031: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain decision information.

[0146] As one implementation method, in this embodiment, decision information is obtained by encrypting a first preset request through the initiator based on a public-private key pair set and combining public-private key pairs.

[0147] Specifically, based on the first preset request, a first random number and a second random number are generated; based on the first preset request and the second random number, combined information is generated; based on the first random number, the second random number, the combined information, the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, and the combined public-private key pair, decision information is obtained.

[0148] For example, the recipient includes a first participant and a second participant. The first random number is encrypted using the public key of the first participant's public-private key pair to obtain a first signature; the first random number is encrypted using the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to obtain a second signature; the first preset request and the second random number are encrypted using the public key of the second participant's combined public-private key pair to obtain a third signature and a fourth signature; combined information is obtained based on the first preset request and the second random number; the message digest of the combined information is encrypted using the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to obtain a fifth signature; the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth signatures are used as the aforementioned decision information.

[0149] Therefore, based on the public-private key pair set and by combining public-private key pairs, the first preset request is encrypted using the public key of each participant, generating corresponding signature information. This signature information can then be verified using the private keys of the participants, improving data security. Furthermore, the validity of the decision information is determined using random numbers.

[0150] Step S1032: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the recipient verifies the identity information corresponding to the decision information.

[0151] In this embodiment, based on the public-private key pair set and the combination of public-private key pairs, the identity information corresponding to the decision information is verified by the receiver.

[0152] Specifically, the first participant verifies the signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant in the decision information; if the verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information is rejected; if the verification passes, the first participant sends the decision information to the second participant; the second participant verifies the signature information generated based on the combined public-private key pair of the second participant in the decision information; if the verification passes, the request corresponding to the decision information is executed; if the verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information is rejected.

[0153] For example, the decision information is decrypted using the private key of the first participant's public-private key pair to obtain a first random number; the decision information is then verified using the public key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair; if verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information is rejected; if verification succeeds, the decision information is sent to the second participant through the first participant. Similarly, the decision information is decrypted using the private key of the second participant's combined public-private key pair, and verified using the public key of the first participant's public-private key pair; if verification succeeds, the request corresponding to the decision information is executed; if verification fails, the request corresponding to the decision information is rejected.

[0154] Before the decision information is sent from the first participant to the second participant, a third random number is generated based on the decision information; the third random number is encrypted based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant to obtain a first signature; and the decision information is updated based on the first signature.

[0155] For example, based on the decision information, a third random number is generated; the third random number is encrypted using the public key of the second participant's public-private key pair to obtain a fifth signature; the message digest of the third random number is encrypted using the private key of the first participant's public-private key pair to obtain a sixth signature. The decision information is then updated based on the fifth and sixth signatures.

[0156] Therefore, participants use their own public and private keys to decrypt, judge, and update decision information, thereby improving the efficiency of the encryption and decryption process and enhancing the security of information transmission.

[0157] This embodiment, through the above-described scheme, specifically obtains a public-private key pair set by setting public-private key pairs for preset business participants. The public-private key pair set includes a card public-private key pair and an end-user public-private key pair. Based on the card public-private key pair and the end-user public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated. When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. This invention aims to solve the problem of end-user card separation by encrypting each participant's public key to generate corresponding signature information, which can then be verified using the participant's private key, thereby improving data security and reducing the complexity of business processes.

[0158] Based on the above Figure 4The illustrated embodiment presents a fifth embodiment of the identity authentication method of the present invention. In this embodiment, a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) collaborative identity authentication method based on elliptic curve cryptography is provided. During V2X business interaction, an identifier key, digital signature, and corresponding encryption technology are used to satisfy the identity authentication requirements for establishing mutual trust relationships among multiple participants (assuming N parties), as well as the security requirements for data confidentiality, integrity, replay resistance, and behavior non-repudiation related to business processing. The number of identity authentication processes remains on the order of N, and the end-card binding relationship of the terminal device is proven using a combined key.

[0159] like Figure 5 As shown, the actual connected vehicle business scenarios may involve a decision-maker, an executor, and zero, one or more (e.g., m) forwarders.

[0160] The vehicle-to-everything (V2X) collaborative identity authentication method proposed in this embodiment uses an elliptic curve algorithm to encrypt and decrypt relevant information (decision information: REQ; execution result: RES; random number: RAND) transmitted between various business participants, satisfying security requirements such as identity authentication (signature / verification), data confidentiality, anti-replay, and behavior non-repudiation. E is preset as encryption processing, and D as decryption processing. A message digest algorithm is used to satisfy data integrity requirements, with H preset as the message digest algorithm. Specific message digest algorithms can be selected as needed, such as SHA or SM3. The combined key of the terminal device is used to satisfy the terminal card binding requirements.

[0161] like Figure 6 As shown below, the business participants involved include one decision-maker (remote control and service ordering: mobile terminal / car owner), one executor (remote control: vehicle terminal; service ordering: vehicle-to-everything service platform), and two forwarders (remote control: vehicle-to-everything service platform and vehicle manufacturer service platform; service ordering: vehicle terminal and vehicle manufacturer service platform).

[0162] After processing by the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) collaborative identity authentication method, the decision information sent by the decision-maker to forwarder #1 is transformed into:

[0163] {E(K f1 ,RAND f1 ),E(k d ,H(RAND f1 )),E(K e ,RAND e ),E(K e ,REQ),E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e ))}

[0164] Among them, K f1 It is the public key of forwarder #1, RAND. f1It is a random number generated by the decision-maker for forwarder #1, RAND. e This is a random number generated by the decision-maker for the executor. Because the decision-maker is on a mobile device, k... d It is a combined key (private key); if the forwarder #1 is a vehicle-side device, then K f1 It is a combined key (public key); if the executor is the vehicle, then K e It is a combined key (public key).

[0165] After receiving the decision message, forwarder #1 uses its private key k f1 Decryption yields RAND f1 Using the decision-maker's public key K d If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0166] H(D(k f1 ,E(K f1 ,RAND f1 )))=D(K d ,E(k d ,H(RAND f1 ))

[0167] Then, forwarder #1 can authenticate the decision-maker's identity and confirm that the decision information comes from the decision-maker. Forwarder #1 does not need to know the specific content of the decision information, but can record the encrypted decision information as evidence.

[0168] After processing the decision information using the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) collaborative identity authentication method, forwarder #1 forwards the decision information to forwarder #2. The decision information is then transformed into:

[0169] {E(K f2 ,RAND f2 ),E(k f1 ,H(RAND f2 )),E(K e ,RAND e ),E(K e ,REQ),E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e ))}

[0170] Where K is f2 RAND, the public key of forwarder #2 f2 This is a random number generated by forwarder #1 for forwarder #2. If forwarder #1 is a vehicle user, then k... f1 It is a combined key (private key).

[0171] After receiving the decision message, forwarder #2 uses its private key k f2 Decryption

[0172] RAND f2 Using the public key K of forwarder #1 f1 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0173] H(D(k f2 E(K) f2 RAND f2 )))=D(K f1 E(k) f1 H(RAND) f2 ))

[0174] Then, forwarder #2 can authenticate forwarder #1's identity and confirm that the decision information comes from forwarder #1. Forwarder #2 does not need to know the specific content of the decision information, but can record the encrypted decision information as evidence.

[0175] After processing the decision information using the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) collaborative identity authentication method proposed in this application, forwarder #2 forwards the decision information to the executor. The decision information is transformed into:

[0176] {E(K e ,RAND fe ),E(k f2 ,H(RAND fe )),E(K e ,RAND e ),E(K e ,REQ),E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e ))}

[0177] Among them, RAND fe This is a random number generated by forwarder #2 for the executor. If the executor is a vehicle, then K... e It is a combined key (public key).

[0178] After receiving the decision message, the executor uses its private key K. e Decryption yields RAND fe Using the public key K of forwarder #2 f2 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0179] H(D(k e ,E(K e ,RAND fe )))=D(K f2 ,E(k f2 ,H(RAND fe ))

[0180] The executor can then complete the identity verification of forwarder #2, confirming that the decision information comes from forwarder #2.

[0181] The executor uses its own private key k e Decryption yields RAND e And REQ, using the decision-maker's public key K d If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0182] H(D(k e ,E(K e ,REQ)),D(k e ,E(K e ,RAND e )))=D(K d ,E(k d ,H(REQ,RAND e )))

[0183] Then the executor can complete the authentication of the decision-maker's identity, confirm that the original decision information REQ came from the decision-maker and has not been tampered with or replayed.

[0184] After the executor completes the relevant operations according to the requirements of the decision information REQ, the original execution result RES can be reported to the decision-maker through the response processing flow. The execution result is transmitted from the executor to the decision-maker along the reverse path of decision information transmission. Except for the corresponding parameter replacement, its processing method is the same as that of decision information transmission, and will not be described in detail here.

[0185] During the reverse transmission of execution results, the identity authentication of forwarder #2 to executor, forwarder #1 to forwarder #2, decision-maker to forwarder #1, and decision-maker to executor is completed in sequence. This completes all the two-way identity authentication processes required in this business interaction, ensuring mutual trust among the four parties. At the same time, forwarder #1 and forwarder #2 are required to store the execution results, and the confidentiality, integrity, and replay resistance of the original execution result information RES are guaranteed.

[0186] In summary, the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) collaborative identity authentication method based on elliptic curve algorithm satisfies the security requirements of identity authentication for establishing mutual trust relationships among multiple participants, as well as the confidentiality, integrity, replay resistance, and behavior non-repudiation of related data, while keeping the number of identity authentication processes on the order of N. Furthermore, it utilizes combined keys to prove the end-card binding relationship of the end devices.

[0187] Reference Figure 7 , Figure 7 This is an interactive diagram illustrating the identity authentication method of the present invention in a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) remote control business scenario. In this embodiment, the terminal device has a combined public-private key pair, and the V2X remote control application allows vehicle owners to remotely operate and control their vehicles using a remote control APP, enabling functions such as remotely starting the engine / air conditioning, remotely unlocking / locking the doors, and remotely locating the vehicle.

[0188] Suppose a car owner registers for remote control services on a connected vehicle service platform and downloads and installs a remote control app on their mobile phone. The connected vehicle service platform provides unified service management, but may not provide specific remote control services; instead, it connects to the corresponding vehicle manufacturer's service platform to deliver the service. In this example of a connected vehicle remote control business scenario, the mobile device (car owner) is the decision-maker, the connected vehicle service platform (platform cloud) and the vehicle manufacturer's service platform (vehicle manufacturer cloud) are the forwarders, and the vehicle (ECU) is the executor. The application flow is as follows:

[0189] First, the car owner launches the remote control APP on their mobile phone, selects the desired operation, such as turning on the air conditioner, starting the engine, or remotely unlocking / locking the car doors, as the operation command, and confirms and sends the operation command.

[0190] Furthermore, the mobile phone uses a collaborative identity authentication method to process the operation commands, generating two...

[0191] Random numbers RAND1 and RAND2 are generated using the public key K of the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) service platform (platform cloud). 01 Encrypting RAND1 yields E(K) 01 ,RAND1), using mobile devices (phones).

[0192] Private key k 23 The message digest of RAND1 is encrypted using a combined key, and the result is given to the platform by the mobile phone.

[0193] Cloud signature E(k) 23 H(RAND1)); using the vehicle-side public key K 13 (The combined key) is used to encrypt RAND2 and the decision information REQ (operation instructions) respectively, resulting in E(K) 13 ,RAND2) and E(K 13 REQ), using the phone's private key k 23 Encrypt the message digest of the combined REQ and RAND2 information to obtain the signature E(k) from the mobile phone to the vehicle's ECU. 23 H(REQ,RAND2)).

[0194] Therefore, the operation commands are transformed via the mobile phone to obtain the transformed operation command information, which is then sent to the platform cloud; the transformed operation command information is as follows:

[0195] {E(K 01 ,RAND1),E(k 23 H(RAND1)), E(K) 13 ,RAND2),E(K 13 REQ), E(k) 23Secondly, the platform cloud processes the transformation information of the received operation instructions.

[0196] Specifically, using the platform cloud's private key k 01 The transformed information of the operation command is decrypted to obtain RAND1, which is then used with the mobile phone public key K. 23 (The combined key) verifies the transformation information of the operation command. If...

[0197] H(D(k 01 E(K) 01 ,RAND1)))=D(K 23 E(k) 23， H(RAND1))

[0198] The platform cloud then completes the identity authentication of the mobile phone, confirming that the operation command originated from the mobile phone. If the identity authentication fails, the operation command is rejected. Therefore, the platform cloud does not need to know the specific content of the operation command, but can record information including E(K). 13 Information including REQ is used as evidence.

[0199] Furthermore, based on the transformation information of the operation instructions, a random number RAND3 is generated, which is then used by the car manufacturer.

[0200] Public key K of the service platform (car enterprise cloud) 02 Encrypting RAND3 yields E(K) 02 (RAND3), using the platform cloud private key k 01 Encrypt the RAND3 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the platform cloud to the vehicle enterprise cloud. 01 ,H(RAND3)).

[0201] Therefore, the initiator of the operation command can be verified by using random numbers without parsing the internal information, thus improving efficiency.

[0202] Furthermore, the platform cloud updates the change information of the operation commands and sends it to the vehicle manufacturer's cloud. The updated change information of the operation commands is as follows:

[0203] {E(K 02 ,RAND3),E(k 01 H(RAND3)), E(K) 13 ,RAND2),E(K 13 REQ), E(k) 23 H(REQ, RAND2))}

[0204] Next, the vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform processes the received operation commands. This is done using the vehicle manufacturer's cloud private key k. 02 Decrypt to obtain RAND3, then use the platform cloud public key K.01 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0205] H(D(k 02 E(K) 02 ,RAND3)))=D(K 01 E(k) 01， H(RAND3))

[0206] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud then completes the identity authentication of the platform cloud, confirming that the operation command originates from the platform cloud. If the identity authentication fails, the operation command is rejected. Therefore, the vehicle manufacturer's cloud does not need to know the specific content of the operation command, but can record information including E(K). 13 Information including REQ is used as evidence. Based on the transformation information of the operation command, a random number RAND4 is generated, and the vehicle-side public key K is used. 13 Encrypting RAND4 yields E(K) 13 (RAND4), using the car manufacturer's cloud private key k 02 Encrypt the RAND4 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle manufacturer's cloud to the vehicle. 02 ,H(RAND4)).

[0207] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform updates the operation command change information and sends it to the vehicle. The updated operation command change information is as follows:

[0208] {E(K 13 ,RAND4),E(k 02 H(RAND4)), E(K) 13 ,RAND2),E(K 13 REQ).E(k 23 H(REQ, RAND2))}

[0209] Finally, the vehicle processes the received operation commands using the vehicle's private key k. 13 (Combined Key)

[0210] Decryption yields RAND4, which is then used with the car manufacturer's cloud public key K. 02 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0211] H(D(k 13 E(K) 13 ,RAND4)))=D(K 02 E(k) 02， H(RAND4))

[0212] The vehicle then completes identity authentication with the OEM cloud, confirming that the decision information originates from the OEM cloud. If authentication fails, the above operation command is rejected. The vehicle's private key k is then used. 13Decryption yields RAND2 and REQ, using the phone's public key K. 23 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0213] H(D(k 13 E(K) 13 ,REQ)),D(k 13 E(K) 13 ,RAND2)))=D(K 23 E(k) 23 If H(REQ, RAND2) is executed, the vehicle verifies the phone's identity, confirming that the original operation command REQ originated from the phone and has not been tampered with or replayed. If authentication fails, the operation command is rejected. The vehicle then forwards the operation command to the ECU for execution, such as turning on the air conditioning, starting the engine, or remotely unlocking / locking the doors.

[0214] After the vehicle completes the relevant operations according to the operation command REQ, it can notify the mobile terminal (phone / car owner) of the execution result RES through the response processing flow. Two random numbers RAND5 and RAND6 are generated, and the vehicle manufacturer's cloud public key K is used. 02 Encrypting RAND5 yields E(K) 02 (RAND5), using the vehicle-side private key k 13 Encrypt the RAND5 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle to the vehicle manufacturer's cloud. 13 H(RAND5)); using the mobile phone public key K 23 Encrypt RAND6 and the execution result RES separately to obtain E(K) 23 ,RAND6) and E(K 23 ,RES), using the vehicle-side private key k 13 Encrypt the message digest of the combined RES and RAND6 information to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle to the mobile phone. 13 H(REQ,RAND6)).

[0215] Furthermore, the vehicle sends the transformed execution result information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the vehicle manufacturer's cloud. The transformed execution result information is as follows:

[0216] {E(K 02 ,RAND5),E(k 13 H(FAND5)), E(K) 23 ,RAND6),E(K 23 ,RES),E(k) 13 H(RES,RAND6))}

[0217] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform processes the received execution results. It uses the vehicle manufacturer's cloud private key k. 02 Decryption

[0218] RAND5, using the vehicle-side public key K 13 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0219] H(D(k 02 E(K) 02 ,RAND5)))=D(K 13 E(k) 13 H(RAND5))

[0220] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform then completes the identity authentication of the vehicle, confirming that the execution result originates from the vehicle. If the identity authentication fails, the above operation instruction is rejected. The vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform does not need to know the specific content of the execution result, but can record information including E(K). 23 Information including RES is used as evidence. A random number RAND7 is generated using the platform cloud public key K. 01 Encrypting RAND7 yields E(K) 01 (RAND7), using the car manufacturer's cloud private key k 02 Encrypt the message digest of RAND7 to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle manufacturer's cloud to the platform cloud. 02 ,H(RAND7)).

[0221] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud will send the transformed execution result information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the platform cloud. The transformed execution result information will then be updated as follows:

[0222] {E(K 01 ,RAND7),E(k 02 H(RAND7)), E(K) 23 ,RAND6),E(K 23 ,RES),E(k) 13 H(RES, RAND6))} Further, the platform cloud processes the received execution result. Using the platform cloud private key k 01 Decryption yields RAND7, which is then used with the vehicle manufacturer's cloud public key K. 02 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0223] H(D(k 01 E(K) 01 ,RAND7)))=D(K 02 E(k) 02 H(RAND7))

[0224] The platform cloud then completes the identity authentication of the vehicle manufacturer's cloud, confirming that the execution result originates from the vehicle manufacturer's cloud. The platform cloud does not need to know the specific content of the execution result, but can record information including E(K). 23Information including RES is stored as evidence. If authentication fails, the above operation instructions are rejected. A random number RAND8 is generated based on the execution result, and the mobile phone public key K is used. 23 For RAND B Encryption is performed to obtain E(K) 23 (RAND8), using the platform cloud private key k 01 The message digest of RAND8 is encrypted to obtain the signature E(k) from the platform cloud to the mobile phone. 01 ,H(RAND8)).

[0225] Furthermore, the platform cloud sends the transformed execution result information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the mobile phone, updating the transformed execution result information as follows:

[0226] {E(K 23 ,RAND8),E(k 01 H(RAND8)), E(K) 23 ,RAND6),E(K 23 ,RES),E(k) 13 The mobile phone processes the received execution result using the mobile phone's private key k. 23 Decrypt to obtain RAND8, then use the platform cloud public key K. 01 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0227] H(D(k 23 E(K) 23 ,RAND8)))=D(K 01 E(k) 01 H(RAND8))

[0228] The phone then completes identity authentication with the platform cloud, confirming that the execution result originates from the platform cloud. If authentication fails, the above operation command is rejected. The phone's private key k is then used. 23 Decryption yields RAND6 and RES, using the vehicle's public key K. 13 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0229] H(D(k 23 E(K) 23 ,RES)),D(k 23 E(K) 23 ,RAND6)))=D(K 13 E(k) 13 H(RES,RAND6)))

[0230] The mobile phone then completes the identity authentication of the vehicle, confirming that the original execution result RES originated from the vehicle and has not been tampered with or replayed. The mobile phone can record the execution result and / or display the execution result to the vehicle owner.

[0231] Thus, through the transmission of operation commands and execution results, the four-way identity authentication processes required in the remote control business interaction are completed, ensuring mutual trust among the four parties. Simultaneously, the platform cloud and the vehicle manufacturer's cloud store evidence of this remote control behavior, guaranteeing the confidentiality, integrity, and replay resistance of the original operation commands and execution results. For the mobile terminal (phone) and the vehicle terminal, a combined key is used to prove their terminal card binding relationship.

[0232] Since the remote control application of vehicle networking must ensure the secure trust between relevant business participants, this embodiment adopts a vehicle networking collaborative identity authentication method based on elliptic curve algorithm. This method can meet the security requirements of identity authentication for establishing mutual trust relationships among relevant business participants, as well as the confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, and behavior non-repudiation of relevant data, and keep the number of identity authentication processes on the order of N. At the same time, the combined key is used to prove the end card binding relationship of the end device.

[0233] Reference Figure 8 , Figure 8 This is an interactive diagram illustrating a vehicle-to-everything (V2X) service subscription scenario using the identity authentication method of this invention. In this embodiment, through the in-vehicle infotainment system (IVI), drivers and passengers can subscribe to information services on the vehicle manufacturer's service platform, or subscribe to information services on the V2X service platform through the vehicle manufacturer's service platform, such as traffic information subscriptions and on-demand audio and video services. The driver or passenger actually performing the service subscription operation may not be the vehicle owner (e.g., a child riding in the car or a friend borrowing the car), therefore, service subscriptions (especially paid service subscriptions) should be confirmed by the vehicle owner.

[0234] When drivers and passengers use IVI to browse and purchase infotainment services on the vehicle manufacturer's service platform (vehicle manufacturer cloud), if the services they browse or select are not provided by the vehicle manufacturer cloud but by the vehicle connectivity service platform (platform cloud), the vehicle manufacturer cloud will redirect the drivers and passengers to the platform cloud to perform the corresponding operations. Because the drivers and passengers may not be the vehicle owners, certain operations (such as subscribing to paid services) must be confirmed by the vehicle owner.

[0235] In the service order confirmation process of the connected vehicle service subscription application example, the mobile terminal (vehicle owner) is the decision-maker, the vehicle terminal (IVI) and the vehicle manufacturer's service platform (vehicle manufacturer cloud) are the forwarders, and the connected vehicle service platform (platform cloud) is the executor. Although the driver and passengers are the initiators of the service order, they cannot interfere with the normal service order confirmation process (although the actual service order process allows the driver and passengers to terminate the service order at any time), therefore they are not considered in the flowchart. A brief description of the application process is as follows:

[0236] First, drivers and passengers interact with the vehicle manufacturer's cloud and the platform cloud through the vehicle's IVI (Internet Interface) to browse and purchase infotainment services. Assuming a driver or passenger chooses to subscribe to an audio-visual on-demand service provided by the platform cloud, when the platform cloud asks the driver or passenger to confirm the subscription, the driver or passenger confirms the subscription (of course, they can also refuse and terminate the subscription).

[0237] After the driver or passenger selects to confirm the service subscription, the vehicle's internal display (IVI) sends a confirmation request to the vehicle owner's mobile phone (mobile device) because the subscription requires the owner's confirmation. The mobile phone displays the confirmation request to the vehicle owner; the vehicle owner then makes a decision regarding the confirmation request (e.g., agree or decline), which serves as the subscription decision.

[0238] Secondly, the mobile phone uses a collaborative identity authentication method to process the car owner's order decision. Two random numbers, RAND1 and RAND2, are generated, and the vehicle's public key K is used... 13 Encrypt RAND1 using the combined key to obtain E(K) 13 RAND1), using the mobile device (phone) private key k 23 The message digest of RAND1 is encrypted using a combined key to obtain the signature E(k) from the mobile phone to the vehicle. 23 H(RAND1)); using the platform public key K 01 Encrypt RAND2 and the decision information REQ (ordering decision) separately to obtain E(K) 01 ,RAND2) and E(K 01 REQ), using the phone's private key k 23 Encrypt the message digest of the combined REQ and RAND2 information to obtain the signature E(k) from the mobile phone to the platform cloud. 23 H(REQ,RAND2)).

[0239] Furthermore, the mobile phone sends the changed order decision information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the vehicle. The changed order decision information is then updated as follows:

[0240] {E(K 13 ,RAND1),E(k 23 H(RAND1)), E(K) 01,RAND2),E(K 01 REQ), E(k) 23 H(REQ, RAND2))}

[0241] The vehicle processes the received order decision using the vehicle's private key k. 13 (Combined key) Decryption yields RAND1, which is then used with the mobile phone public key K. 23 (Combined key) is used for signature verification. If...

[0242] H(D(k 13 E(K) 13 ,RAND1)))=D(K 23 E(k) 23 H(RAND1))

[0243] The vehicle then completes the identity authentication of the mobile phone, confirming that the order decision originated from the mobile phone. If the identity authentication fails, the order decision is rejected. The vehicle does not need to know the specific content of the order decision, but can record information including E(K). 01 Information including REQ is used as evidence. A random number RAND3 is generated using the public key K of the car manufacturer service platform (car manufacturer cloud). 02 Encrypting RAND3 yields E(K) 02 (RAND3), using the vehicle-side private key k 13 Encrypt the RAND3 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle to the vehicle manufacturer's cloud. 13 ,H(RAND3)).

[0244] Furthermore, the vehicle sends the changed order decision information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the vehicle manufacturer's cloud, updating the changed order decision information as follows:

[0245] {E(K 02 ,RAND3),E(k 13 H(RAND3)), E(K) 01， RAND2), E(K) 01 REQ), E(k) 23 H(REQ, RAND2))}

[0246] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform processes the received order decisions using the vehicle manufacturer's cloud private key k. 02 Decrypt to obtain RAND3, then use the vehicle's public key K. 13 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0247] H(D(k 02 E(K) 02 ,RAND3)))=D(K 13 E(k) 13H(RAND3))

[0248] The vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform then completes the identity verification of the vehicle, confirming that the order decision originated from the vehicle. If the identity verification fails, the order decision is rejected. Therefore, the vehicle manufacturer's cloud platform does not need to know the specific details of the order decision, but can record information including E(K). 01 Information including REQ is used as evidence. A random number RAND4 is generated using the platform cloud public key K. 01 Encrypting RAND4 yields E(K) 01 (RAND4), using the car manufacturer's cloud private key k 02 Encrypt the RAND4 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle manufacturer's cloud to the platform cloud. 02 ,H(RAND4)).

[0249] Furthermore, the vehicle manufacturer's cloud will send the changed order decision information, processed through the collaborative identity authentication method, to the platform cloud, updating the changed order decision information as follows:

[0250] {E(K 01 ,RAND4),E(k 02 H(RAND4)), E(K) 01 ,RAND2),E(K 01 REQ), E(k) 23 The platform cloud processes the received order decision using the platform cloud private key k. 01 Decryption yields RAND4, which is then used with the car manufacturer's cloud public key K. 02 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0251] H(D(k 01 E(K) 01 ,RAND4)))=D(K 02 E(k) 02 H(RAND4))

[0252] The platform cloud then completes identity verification with the OEM cloud, confirming that the order decision originates from the OEM cloud. If identity verification fails, the order decision is rejected. This is done using the platform cloud's private key k. 01 Decryption yields RAND2 and REQ, using the phone's public key K. 23 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0253] H(D(k 01 E(K) 01 ,REQ)),D(k 01 E(K) 01 ,RAND2)))=D(K 23 E(k) 23H(REQ,RAND2)))

[0254] The platform cloud will then complete the identity authentication of the mobile phone, confirming that the original subscription decision (REQ) originated from the mobile phone and has not been tampered with or replayed. If the identity authentication fails, the subscription decision will be rejected. The platform cloud will then process the service subscription according to the subscription decision, such as confirming the subscription and activating it.

[0255] After the platform cloud completes the relevant operations based on the order decision REQ, it can notify the order result RES to the mobile terminal (phone / car owner) through the response processing flow. Two random numbers, RAND5 and RAND6, are generated using the car manufacturer's cloud public key K. 02 Encrypting RAND5 yields E(K) 02 (RAND5), using the platform cloud private key k 01 Encrypt the RAND5 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the platform cloud to the vehicle enterprise cloud. 01 H(RAND5)); using the mobile phone public key K 23 Encrypt RAND6 and the order result RES separately to obtain E(K) 23 ,RAND6) and E(K 23 ,RES), using the platform cloud private key K 01 Encrypt the message digest of the combined RES and RAND6 information to obtain the signature E(k) from the platform cloud to the mobile phone. 01 H(REQ,RAND6)).

[0256] Furthermore, the platform cloud sends the order result transformation information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the vehicle manufacturer's cloud, and the execution result transformation information is updated as follows:

[0257] {E(K 02 ,RAND5),E(k 01 H(RAND5)), E(K) 23 ,RAND6),E(K 23 ,RES),E(k) 01 The car manufacturer cloud processes the received order results using the car manufacturer cloud private key k. 02 Decrypt to obtain RAND5, then use the platform cloud public key K. 01 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0258] H(D(k 02 E(K) 02 ,RAND5)))=D(K 01 E(k) 01 H(RAND5))

[0259] The automaker's cloud platform then completes identity verification with the platform cloud, confirming that the order result originates from the platform cloud. If identity verification fails, the order decision is rejected. The automaker's cloud platform does not need to know the specific content of the order result, but can record information including E(K). 23 Information including RES is used as evidence. A random number RAND7 is generated using the vehicle's public key K. 13 Encrypting RAND7 yields E(K) 13 (RAND7), using the car manufacturer's cloud private key k 02 Encrypt the message digest of RAND7 to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle manufacturer's cloud to the vehicle. 02 ,H(RAND7)).

[0260] Furthermore, the vehicle manufacturer's cloud will send the changed order result information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the vehicle's terminal, updating the changed execution result information as follows:

[0261] {E(K 13 ,RAND7),E(k 02 H(RAND7)), E(K) 23 ,RAND6),E(K 23 ,RES),E(k) 01 H(RES,RAND6))}

[0262] The vehicle-side system processes the received order result using the vehicle-side private key k. 13 Decryption yields RAND7, which is then used with the vehicle manufacturer's cloud public key K. 02 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0263] H(D(k 13 E(K) 13 ,RAND7)))=D(K 02 E(k) 02 H(RAND7))

[0264] The vehicle then completes identity authentication with the OEM cloud, confirming that the order result originates from the OEM cloud. If identity authentication fails, the order decision is rejected. The vehicle does not need to know the specific content of the order result, but can record information including E(K). 23 Information including RES is used as evidence. A random number RAND8 is generated using the mobile phone's public key K. 23 Encrypting RAND8 yields E(K) 23 (RAND8), using the vehicle-side private key k 13 Encrypt the RAND8 message digest to obtain the signature E(k) from the vehicle to the mobile phone. 13 H(RAND8))

[0265] The vehicle will send the modified order result information, processed by the collaborative identity authentication method, to the mobile phone. The modified order result information is as follows:

[0266] {E(K 23 ,RAND8),E(k 13 H(RAND8)), E(K) 23 ,RAND6),E(K 23 ,RES),E(k) 01 H(RES,RAND6))}

[0267] Furthermore, the mobile phone processes the received order result using the mobile phone's private key k. 23 Decrypt to obtain RAND8, then use the vehicle's public key K. 13 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0268] H(D(k 23 E(K) 23 ,RAND8)))=D(K 13 E(k) 13 H(RAND8))

[0269] The mobile phone then completes the identity authentication with the vehicle, confirming that the order originated from the vehicle. If the identity authentication fails, the order decision is rejected. This is done using the mobile phone's private key k. 23 Decryption yields RAND6 and RES, which are then used with the platform's cloud public key K. 01 If the signature verification process is carried out,

[0270] H(D(k 23 E(K) 23 ,RES)),D(k 23 E(K) 23 ,RAND6)))=D(K 01 E(k) 01 H(RES,RAND6)))

[0271] The mobile phone then completes identity authentication with the platform cloud, confirming that the original order result RES came from the platform cloud and has not been tampered with or replayed. The mobile phone can then record and process the order result.

[0272] Finally, the phone displays the order result to the car owner. If the car owner agrees to subscribe to the service, and the platform cloud successfully completes the service order processing and activation, the driver and passengers can begin using the service, such as starting to play on-demand audio and video programs.

[0273] By transmitting the order decision and order result, the necessary vehicle owner confirmation process for the business ordering interaction was completed. Four-way two-way authentication processes ensured mutual trust among the four parties. Simultaneously, the vehicle manufacturer's cloud and the vehicle's terminal stored evidence of the order confirmation, guaranteeing the confidentiality, integrity, and replay resistance of the original order decision and result information. For the mobile terminal (phone) and the vehicle terminal, a combined key was used to prove their terminal card binding relationship.

[0274] Since the remote control application of vehicle networking must ensure the secure trust between relevant business participants, this embodiment adopts a vehicle networking collaborative identity authentication method based on elliptic curve algorithm. This method can meet the security requirements of identity authentication for establishing mutual trust relationships among relevant business participants, as well as the confidentiality, integrity, anti-replay, and behavior non-repudiation of relevant data, and keep the number of identity authentication processes on the order of N. At the same time, the combined key is used to prove the end card binding relationship of the end device.

[0275] Reference Figure 9 , Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the functional modules of the identity authentication system of the present invention. The identity authentication system includes:

[0276] The key set generation module 10 is used to set public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes card public and private key pairs and terminal public and private key pairs;

[0277] The combined key generation module 20 is used to generate a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair;

[0278] The identity verification module 30 is used to verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair when a first preset request is received.

[0279] The principle and implementation process of identity authentication in this embodiment are explained in the above embodiments and will not be repeated here.

[0280] Furthermore, this embodiment of the invention also proposes a terminal device, which includes a memory, a processor, and an authentication program stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the authentication program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the authentication method described above.

[0281] Since this identity authentication program employs all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments when executed by the processor, it has at least all the beneficial effects brought about by all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments, which will not be elaborated here.

[0282] Furthermore, embodiments of the present invention also propose a computer-readable storage medium storing an authentication program, wherein the authentication program, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the authentication method described above.

[0283] Since this identity authentication program employs all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments when executed by the processor, it has at least all the beneficial effects brought about by all the technical solutions of all the foregoing embodiments, which will not be elaborated here.

[0284] Compared to existing technologies, this invention provides an identity authentication method, system, terminal device, and storage medium. By setting public-private key pairs for preset business participants, a set of public-private key pairs is obtained, wherein the set includes a card public-private key pair and a terminal public-private key pair. Based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated. When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the set of public-private key pairs and the combined public-private key pair. This invention aims to solve the problem of card-terminal separation, improve the security of business processes, and reduce the complexity of business processes.

[0285] It should be noted that, in this document, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or approach that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or approach. Unless otherwise specified, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or approach that includes that element.

[0286] The sequence numbers of the above embodiments of the present invention are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0287] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms. Of course, they can also be implemented by hardware, but in many cases the former is a better implementation method. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of the present invention, or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium (such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk) as described above, and includes several instructions to cause a terminal device (which may be a mobile phone, computer, server, controlled terminal, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods of each embodiment of the present invention.

[0288] The above are merely preferred embodiments of the present invention and do not limit the scope of the patent. Any equivalent structural or procedural transformations made based on the description and drawings of the present invention, or direct or indirect applications in other related technical fields, are similarly included within the scope of patent protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. An identity authentication method, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: Set public-private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a set of public-private key pairs, wherein the set of public-private key pairs includes card public-private key pairs and terminal public-private key pairs; Based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair, a combined public-private key pair is generated; When a first preset request is received, the identity information corresponding to the first preset request is verified based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair. The preset business participants include an initiator and a receiver, with the receiver including a first participant and a second participant. The step of verifying the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain decision information. Specifically, the first random number is encrypted using the public key of the first participant's public-private key pair to obtain a first signature; the first random number is encrypted using the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to obtain a second signature; the first preset request is encrypted using the public key of the second participant's combined public-private key pair to obtain a third signature; the second random number is encrypted using the public key of the second participant's combined public-private key pair to obtain a fourth signature; combined information is obtained based on the first preset request and the second random number; the message digest of the combined information is encrypted using the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to obtain a fifth signature; and the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth signatures are used as decision information. Based on the set of public and private keys and the combined public and private key pair, the recipient verifies the identity information corresponding to the decision information.

2. The identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair includes: When the receiver receives the second preset request, it sends the second preset request to the initiator through the receiver; Receive the first preset request generated by the initiator based on the second preset request, and perform the following steps: verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair.

3. The identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The recipient includes a first participant and a second participant. The step of verifying the identity information corresponding to the decision information through the recipient based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes: The signature information generated based on the public-private key pair of the first participant is verified by the first participant in the decision information. If the verification is successful, the decision information will be sent to the second participant through the first participant; The decision information is verified by the second participant, which generates the signature information based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant.

4. The identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of obtaining decision information by encrypting the first preset request through the initiator based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair includes: Based on the first preset request, generate a first random number and a second random number; Based on the first preset request and the second random number, generate combined information; The decision information is obtained based on the first random number, the second random number, the combined information, the first preset request, the public-private key pair set, and the combined public-private key pair.

5. The identity authentication method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Prior to the step of sending the decision information to the second participant through the first participant, the following steps are included: Based on the decision information, a third random number is generated; Based on the combined public and private key pair of the second participant, the third random number is encrypted to obtain the first signature; The decision information is updated based on the first signature.

6. The identity authentication method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair includes: Send the public key of the public-private key pair set to the preset business participant; The public key of the combined public and private key pair is sent to the preset business participant.

7. An identity authentication system, characterized in that, include: The key set generation module is used to set public and private key pairs for preset business participants to obtain a public and private key pair set, wherein the public and private key pair set includes card public and private key pairs and terminal public and private key pairs; The combined key generation module is used to generate a combined public-private key pair based on the card public-private key pair and the terminal public-private key pair; An identity verification module is used to verify the identity information corresponding to the first preset request based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair when a first preset request is received. The preset business participants include an initiator and a receiver, with the receiver including a first participant and a second participant. The identity verification module is further used for: Based on the public-private key pair set and the combined public-private key pair, the initiator encrypts the first preset request to obtain decision information. Specifically, the first random number is encrypted using the public key of the first participant's public-private key pair to obtain a first signature; the first random number is encrypted using the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to obtain a second signature; the first preset request is encrypted using the public key of the second participant's combined public-private key pair to obtain a third signature; the second random number is encrypted using the public key of the second participant's combined public-private key pair to obtain a fourth signature; combined information is obtained based on the first preset request and the second random number; the message digest of the combined information is encrypted using the private key of the initiator's combined public-private key pair to obtain a fifth signature; and the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth signatures are used as decision information. Based on the set of public and private keys and the combined public and private key pair, the recipient verifies the identity information corresponding to the decision information.

8. A terminal device, characterized in that, The terminal device includes a memory, a processor, and an authentication method stored in the memory and executable on the processor. When the authentication program is executed by the processor, it implements the steps of the authentication method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores an authentication program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the authentication method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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