Data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network coding signature in internet of things

Abstract

The application provides a data transmission method based on a non-certificate homomorphic network coding signature in an Internet of Things, and aims to improve the performance of the Internet of Things network, safely transmit data, avoid heavy certificate management and key third-party hosting problems, and the scheme comprises network system initialization: the system has a key generation center KGC, a source node, an intermediate node and a destination node; a public and private key pair of the source node and the destination node is generated; the source node is blinded: when the source node transmits a file, a corresponding file identifier is generated, the file is divided into data packets, and each data packet is blinded; the source node signs the data packet: the source node transmits after signing each data packet; after receiving the data packet, the intermediate node verifies the signature, discards invalid data packets, and forwards newly generated data packets after linear operation on valid data packets; the destination node verifies the signature of the received data packet, collects a certain number of valid data packets, and restores the original file after unblinding processing.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of cryptography and network security, and proposes a data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of IoT technology, it has been widely applied in fields such as smart grids, connected vehicles, and smart cities. Sensors are distributed in different areas to collect data, which is then connected to the IoT network through nearby base stations. The collected data is transmitted to a centralized repository, such as a cloud storage server or a medical data center, enabling the interconnection of things and a high degree of information sharing and exchange, thereby facilitating data processing.

[0003] Given the widespread application of IoT technology, improving network throughput and reliability is imperative. Network coding has been proven to enhance network throughput, robustness, and fault tolerance. Unlike traditional store-and-forward mechanisms, it allows intermediate nodes to encode received data packets into a single packet before forwarding. Encoding received data packets also reduces overhead, and even if some nodes or links fail, the destination node can recover the original message as long as it receives enough data packets. Therefore, network coding technology is of great significance to the Internet of Things.

[0004] However, security is also a crucial issue for the Internet of Things (IoT). The hybrid packet characteristics of network coding make transmission vulnerable to contamination attacks. Malicious nodes can inject invalid packets into the IoT network to prevent the destination node from recovering the original file. Considering that network coding linearly combines data packets, honest intermediate nodes may unintentionally combine invalid and valid packets, resulting in more invalid packets and potentially spreading errors throughout the IoT network. Furthermore, because the hybrid nature of network coding does not truly provide confidentiality, it remains susceptible to eavesdropping attacks. An adversary can recover the original file by collecting enough packets with the same file identifier, potentially leading to the leakage of sensitive information.

[0005] Therefore, in order to solve the above problems, this invention provides a certificateless linear homomorphic signature scheme based on network coding for secure data transmission. This method satisfies the confidentiality of data packets, can actively resist pollution attacks, and eliminates the problems of cumbersome certificate management and third-party key escrow. Summary of the Invention

[0006] This invention provides a certificateless linear homomorphic signature scheme based on network coding. This scheme enables secure data transmission using network coding technology in the Internet of Things (IoT), resisting eavesdropping and spoofing attacks. Furthermore, the scheme eliminates the KGC's dependence on secure channels, and its certificateless cryptographic approach avoids the burdensome issues of certificate management and third-party key escrow.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention employs the following technical means:

[0008] This invention provides a certificateless linear homomorphic signature scheme based on network coding for secure data transmission, comprising the following steps:

[0009] A. Network System Initialization: The system consists of a key generation center (KGC), source node S, intermediate node N, and destination node R. KGC initializes the network system based on the input security parameter λ, generating initialization system parameters params = {λ, q, E, G, P, H1, H2, H3, P...}. pub R1, R2, ..., R n}, and maintain a list {identity ID, partial private key k} for the source node and destination node. ID Public key (Y) ID X ID Let G be a suitable elliptic curve E, where G is a cyclic group of order q on elliptic curve E, q is a large prime number, P is a generator of G, and H1, H2, and H3 are three different secure hash functions. pub It is KGC's public key, and the private key is... in The preceding R represents the integer group. Randomly select an element s from the set. Randomly select n group elements R1, ..., R2. n ∈ R G;

[0010] B. Generation of public and private key pairs for source and destination nodes: The generation of node public and private key pairs adopts a certificateless cryptographic system. That is, part of a node's public and private key is generated by KGC and returned to the node in a secure manner, and the other part is generated by the node itself. These two parts together constitute a node's public and private key pair.

[0011] C. Source node file blinding: When the source node needs to transfer a file, it generates a file identifier, splits the file into multiple vector forms (a data packet is a multi-dimensional vector), correctly augments the data packets, and calculates a hash mask to blind multiple data packets;

[0012] D. Source node signs data packets: The source node digitally signs the data packets using its private key and forwards the data packets and signatures to intermediate nodes;

[0013] E. Intermediate Node Linear Operation and Forwarding of Data Packets: After receiving data packets and signatures from upstream nodes (including the source node and other intermediate nodes), intermediate nodes verify the validity of the data packets based on the signatures and discard invalid data packets. A new data packet is generated by performing linear operations on multiple valid data packets from the same file. The coefficients of linear operations in Z q * The data packet is randomly selected from the data source. Because it is a homomorphic signature, the new data packet... The signature is the result of a linear combination of the signatures of multiple data packets, and finally, a new data packet is sent to downstream nodes (the destination node and other intermediate nodes). And a new signature;

[0014] F. Destination Node File Recovery: The destination node verifies the validity of data packets through signatures and discards invalid packets. To recover the original file sent by the source node, the destination node needs to collect a certain number of valid data packets, calculate a hash mask, and then perform unblinding processing on the data packets before recovering the original file.

[0015] In the above technical solution, step A includes:

[0016] A1. Given a security parameter λ, KGC initializes the network system and generates system parameters for the corresponding security level;

[0017] A2.KGC selects three secure hash functions H1, H2, and H3. Each hash function:

[0018] A3.KGC randomly selects s∈Z q * Used as the system's master private key, and P is calculated. pub =sP as the system public key;

[0019] A4.KGC maintains an identity list {identity ID, partial private key k} for source and destination nodes within this IoT area. ID Public key (Y) ID X ID )};

[0020] A5. KGC randomly selects n group elements R1, ..., R2. n ∈G;

[0021] A6.KGC publishes system parameters (λ, q, E, G, P, H1, H2, H3, P) within the network system. pub R1, R2, ..., R n ).

[0022] In the above technical solution, step B includes: generating a partial public key X from the source node or destination node ID. ID Send a registration request to KGC {identity ID, user-generated partial public key X}. ID KGC generates a partial public key Y for the node ID. ID and part of the private key k ID Using a user-generated partial public key X ID Calculate the hash mask H1(sX) ID ), and transmit a portion of the private key k with a hash mask via a public channel. ID and part of the public key Y ID Return the node ID. After receiving the node ID, calculate the hash mask H1(x). ID P pub After removing the mask, a portion of the private key k is obtained. ID And verify it; after successful verification, save part of the private key k. ID .

[0023] In the above technical solution, step C includes: when the source node sends the initial file, generating a file identifier id, splitting the initial file into m n-dimensional vectors and correctly augmenting them to obtain... Calculate the hash mask H1(x) ID X des_ID Y des_ID The m augmented vectors are blinded by id, i), where i∈[1,m] and des_ID represents the identity of the destination node.

[0024] In the above technical solution, step D includes: using the private key SK to generate the source node ID. ID For each data packet Signature generation σ i , where i∈[1,m], sends the data packet and the corresponding signature.

[0025] In the above technical solution, step E includes: intermediate node N receiving data packets sent by the upstream node. And signature σ i Then, where i∈[1, l], the signature is verified, and data packets that fail verification are discarded. Intermediate node N randomly selects combination coefficients c. i Where i∈[1,l], a linear combination of data packets with the same file identifier and their signatures is performed, and the linearly combined data packets are forwarded. And σ.

[0026] In the above technical solution, step F includes: the destination node ID receiving m independent data packets with the same file identifier id. And signature σ iThen, where i∈[1,m], the signature is verified, and packets that fail verification are discarded. Then, the hash mask H1(x) is calculated. ID X s_ID Y s_ID After id, i) for the data packet The process of unblinding is then performed, where s_ID represents the identity of the source node. Subsequently, the linear equations are solved to recover the original file. At this point, secure data transmission is complete.

[0027] Because this invention employs the above-described technical solution, the certificate-free linear homomorphic signature scheme based on network coding offers the following advantages for secure data transmission in the Internet of Things:

[0028] (1) Internet of Things (IoT) network data transmission adopts network coding technology, which improves network throughput, robustness and load balancing.

[0029] (2) A certificateless cryptographic system is adopted. The signing private key is generated by KGC and the node in collaboration, which avoids the problems of heavy certificate management and third-party key custody. At the same time, the hash mask eliminates the dependence of some private key distribution on the secure channel.

[0030] (3) By utilizing the characteristics of network coding hybridization, the augmented vector is blinded by hash masking. The scheme can resist eavesdropping attacks and provide confidentiality for data transmission.

[0031] (4) The certificateless linear homomorphic signature algorithm is adopted to enable nodes to actively resist pollution attacks, filter out polluted data packets, and realize secure data packet transmission. Attached Figure Description

[0032] Figure 1 This is the system architecture and flowchart of the present invention.

[0033] Explanation of reference numerals in the attached figures:

[0034] 1- Based on the initialization system parameters, the node sends registration information.

[0035] 2. Send the generated masked partial public / private key pair to the node.

[0036] 3- Generate file identifiers, segment the original file and generate augmented vectors (data packets), calculate hash masks to blind the data packets, and generate a signature for each data packet.

[0037] The 4-node verifies the signature of the data packet, discards invalid data packets, performs a linear operation on the received data packets with the same file identifier and their signatures, and forwards the new data packet and its signature.

[0038] The five nodes verify the signature of the data packets, discard invalid data packets, collect a certain number of valid data packets, calculate a hash mask to unblind the data packets, and solve a series of linear equations to recover the original file. Detailed Implementation

[0039] The embodiments of the present invention will be described in detail below. Although the present invention will be described and illustrated in conjunction with some specific embodiments, it should be noted that the present invention is not limited to these embodiments. On the contrary, any modifications or equivalent substitutions made to the present invention should be covered within the scope of the claims of the present invention.

[0040] Furthermore, to better illustrate the present invention, numerous specific details are set forth in the following detailed embodiments. Those skilled in the art will understand that the present invention can be practiced without these specific details.

[0041] In the Internet of Things (IoT), a certificate-free linear homomorphic signature scheme based on network coding is used for secure data transmission. The detailed algorithm flow is as follows:

[0042] Step A: System Initialization

[0043] A1. Given a security parameter λ, KGC initializes the network system and generates system parameters for the corresponding security level. G is a cyclic group of order q on the elliptic curve E, where q is a large prime number, and P is a generator of G.

[0044] A2.KGC selects three secure hash functions H1, H2, and H3. Each hash function: This represents a string of 0 and 1 bits of unlimited length.

[0045] A3.KGC randomly selects s∈Z q * Used as the system's master private key, and P is calculated. pub =sP as the system public key;

[0046] A4.KGC maintains an identity list {identity ID, partial private key k} for source and destination nodes within this IoT area. ID Public key (Y) ID X ID )};

[0047] A5. KGC randomly selects n group elements R1, ..., R2. n ∈G;

[0048] A6.KGC publishes system parameters (λ, q, E, G, P, H1, H2, H3, P) within the network system. pub R1, R2, ..., R n ).

[0049] Step B: Generating the public / private key pair for the source and destination nodes:

[0050] B1. Source or destination node ID is randomly selected. Generate partial public key X ID =x ID P sends a registration request to KGC {identity ID, user-generated partial public key X}. ID};

[0051] After receiving the registration information from node D, B2.KGC randomly selects... For node D, calculate part of the public key Y. ID =y ID P and part of the private key k ID =y ID +H2(,D,X ID Y ID )s, calculate the hash mask H1(sX) ID ), and transmit {partial private key k with hash mask} through a public channel ID +H1(sX ID ), partial public key Y ID Returns the node ID.

[0052] B3. After receiving the reply from KGC, Node ID calculates the hash mask H1(x). ID P pub After removing the mask, verify equation k. ID P = Y ID +H2(ID, X) ID Y ID )P pub Does it hold true? If the verification equation holds true, the node ID stores the private key SK. ID ={x ID k ID}, Public Key PK ID ={X ID Y ID Otherwise, resend the request to KGC.

[0053] Step C: Blinden source node files:

[0054] C1. When the source node, D, sends the original file, it generates a file identifier id and splits the original file into m n-dimensional vectors. Perform proper augmentation generation in Set the value of the (n+i)th dimension to 1, where i∈[1,m];

[0055] C2. For each augmented vector The source node ID is randomly selected to determine the blinding coefficient. Calculate the hash mask H1(x) ID X des_ID Y des_ID ,id,i), As a data packet that has been blinded, des_ID represents the identity of the destination node.

[0056] Step D: The source node signs the data packet.

[0057] D1. After correctly blinding the data packets with the source node ID, for each data packet... Random selection Calculate W i Where i∈[1,m], v i，j express The value of the j-th dimension, z i =f i H1(x ID X des_ID Y des_ID ,id,i);

[0058] D2. Calculate the source node ID: h2 = H3(W1, ..., W...). m id, P pub X ID Y ID Using the private key SK ID ={x ID k ID} to sign, δ i =u i (h2× ID +k ID ) -1 mod q. σ i = (W1, ..., W) m δ i (as data packet) The signature;

[0059] D3. The source node ID will contain the data packet. and signature σ i issue.

[0060] Step E: Intermediate Node Linear Operation Data Packet

[0061] E1. Intermediate node N receives a data packet sent by the upstream node. And signature σ i Verify the signature of the data packet. Calculate h1 = H2(ID, X). s_ID Y s_ID h2 = H3(W1, ..., W) m id, P pubX s_ID Y s_ID Verify the equation The condition is determined by whether the condition is true or false, where s_ID represents the identity of the source node. If true, the data packet is retained for linear computation; otherwise, the data packet and its signature are discarded. Let's assume that intermediate node N receives l valid data packets, all with file identifiers id, i.e., i∈[1,l].

[0062] E2. The intermediate node N is randomly selected to obtain the combination coefficient. Where i∈[1, l], a linear combination of data packets and their signatures for the same file identifier is performed. Calculate Then, intermediate node N will combine the linearly linked data packets. Forward it out with σ.

[0063] Step F: Recover files from the destination node.

[0064] F1. Destination Node ID receives m independent data packets with the same file identifier id. And signature σ i Next, the signature of the data packet is verified. Calculate h1 = H2(ID, X) s_ID Y s_ID h2 = H3(W1, ..., W) m id, P pub x s_ID Y s_ID Verify the equation The determination of whether the condition is met, where s_ID represents the identity of the source node. If met, the data packet is retained; otherwise, the data packet and its signature are discarded. Let's assume the destination node ID receives m valid data packets, and all file identifiers are id, i.e., i∈[1,m];

[0065] F2. The destination node ID performs unblinding processing on the received valid data packets. Calculate H1(x) ID X s_ID Y s_ID (id, j), for each packet The updated m-dimensional value, v i，n+j =v i，n+j / H1(x ID x s_ID Y ID The original data packets are obtained by solving simultaneous linear equations after unblinding, thus yielding the original file. This completes the secure data transmission.

Claims

1. A data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: A. Network system initialization: including the key generation center Source node S, intermediate node N, and destination node R; Key generation center Based on the input security parameters Initialize the network system and generate initialization system parameters. And maintain a list {identity ID, partial private key} for the source node S and the destination node R. Public key ( , Choose a suitable elliptic curve. ,in It is on an elliptic curve The upper level is cyclic group It is a large prime number, P is generator, and These are three different secure hash functions. It is a key generation center The public key and the private key are ,in The preceding subscript Represents the group of integers Randomly select an element Randomly select n group elements ; B. Generation of public-private key pairs for source and destination nodes: The generation of public-private key pairs for source and destination nodes adopts a certificateless cryptographic scheme, that is, part of the public and private key of a node is generated by the key generation center. One part is generated and returned to the node in a secure manner, while the other part is generated by the node itself. Together, these two parts form a node's public-private key pair. Step B includes: According to the source node or destination node Generate a partial public key to the key generation center Send registration request {identity} User-generated partial public key }; Key Generation Center For the source node or destination node Generate a partial public key and part of the private key Generated using nodes Calculate hash mask Distribute a portion of the private key with a hash mask via a public channel. and part of the public key Return to node ; node Upon receipt, calculate the hash mask. Remove the mask to obtain part of the private key. It is then verified, and a portion of the private key is saved upon successful verification. ,in ; C. Source node file blinding: When the source node needs to transfer a file, it generates a file identifier, splits the file into multiple vector-like data packets, correctly augments the data packets, and calculates a hash mask to blind the multiple data packets; D. Source node signs data packets: The source node digitally signs the data packets with its private key and forwards the data packets and signatures to intermediate node N; E. Intermediate Node Linear Operation and Forwarding of Data Packets: After receiving the data packet and signature sent by the upstream node, intermediate node N verifies the validity of the data packet based on the signature, discards invalid data packets, and performs linear operations on multiple valid data packets from the same file to generate a new data packet. The coefficients of linear operations are in The data packet is randomly selected from the data source. Because it is a homomorphic signature, the new data packet... The signature is the result of a linear combination of the signatures of multiple data packets, and finally, a new data packet is sent to the downstream node. And a new signature; F. Destination Node File Recovery: The destination node verifies the validity of data packets by signature and discards invalid data packets. In order to recover the original file sent by the source node, the destination node needs to collect a certain number of valid data packets, calculate the hash mask, and then perform unblinding processing on the data packets before recovering the original file.

2. The data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Step A includes: A1. Given security parameters Key generation center Initialize the network system and generate system parameters for the corresponding security level; A2. Key Generation Center Select three secure hash functions Each hash function: ; A3. Key Generation Center Random selection As the system's master private key, and calculate As the system public key; A4. Key Generation Center Maintain an identity list {identity ID, partial private key} for the source node S and destination node R within this IoT area. Public key ( , )}; A5. Key Generation Center Random selection Individual elements ; A6. Key Generation Center Publish system parameters within the network system. ).

3. The data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things as described in claim 2, characterized in that, Step C includes: generating a file identifier when the source node sends the initial file. Split the initial file into indivual A dimensional vector and correctly augmented to obtain Calculate the hash mask right Each augmented vector is blinded, where , Indicates the identity of the destination node, From the destination node generate, The destination node Part of the public key.

4. A data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things as described in claim 3, characterized in that, Step D includes: source node Use private key For each data packet Signature generation ,in , will data packet and corresponding signature issue.

5. A data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things as described in claim 4, characterized in that, Step E includes: intermediate nodes Received data packets from upstream node and signature Afterwards, among them The signature is verified, and packets that fail to be verified are discarded. (Intermediate node) Randomly select combination coefficients ,in The system linearly combines data packets with the same file identifier and their signatures, and then forwards the linearly combined data packets. and corresponding signature .

6. A data transmission method based on certificateless homomorphic network encoding signature in the Internet of Things as described in claim 5, characterized in that, Step F includes: destination node take over Each independent file identifier Same data packet and signature Afterwards, among them The signature is verified, and packets that fail to be verified are discarded. Then, the hash mask is calculated. Then the data packet The process of de-blinding was carried out, including This indicates the identity of the source node. After collecting m valid data packets, the linear equation is solved to recover the original file. At this point, secure data transmission ends. It is by generate, yes Part of the public key.

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