A method, system and storage medium for aggregated trusted authentication

Abstract

This invention discloses an aggregated trusted authentication method, system, and storage medium. It involves initiating an authentication request to a target device in a device network, receiving an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request, and then reconstructing the target device's layer n public key based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report. The reconstructed public key is used to perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value, and the trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregated verification result. This invention adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications, performing aggregated authentication on the target device based on the implicit certificate formed by the encrypted values ​​and identity benchmark values ​​of each layer, thus reducing the authentication overhead of the device network.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of power data monitoring technology, and in particular to an aggregated trusted authentication method, system, and storage medium. Background Technology

[0002] Trusted remote authentication is an effective solution for ensuring the security status of remote platforms and can be used to protect the security of embedded devices. During the remote authentication interaction between the verifier and the prover, the prover needs to securely provide the verifier with measured values ​​of its platform component characteristic data. The verifier then matches these values ​​with standard values ​​to determine whether the device is in a secure state. Because embedded devices have limited resources and often form device networks, existing single-device remote authentication methods are difficult to scale to device networks. Therefore, an aggregated trusted authentication method for device networks has been proposed, which allows the verifier to obtain security reports from the device network, thereby determining the security status of the device network.

[0003] Existing aggregated trusted authentication methods propagate authentication requests to online devices through a tree or graph structure, ultimately aggregating the authentication reports from these online devices into a single node and reporting it to the verifier. However, existing aggregation methods are not adapted to embedded devices that meet trusted computing specifications, have unclear device requirements and applicable scenarios, and suffer from high computational overhead due to their reliance on explicit certificate authentication. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, embodiments of the present invention provide an aggregated trusted authentication method, system, and storage medium to solve the technical problem of high computational overhead in aggregated trusted authentication.

[0005] The technical solution proposed in this invention is as follows:

[0006] A first aspect of this invention provides an aggregated trusted authentication method applied to a verification node. The aggregated trusted authentication method includes: initiating an authentication request to a target device in a device network; receiving an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity base values ​​for layers 1 to n of each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate for layer 0, and device signature information for each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0; reconstructing the public key of layer n of the target device based on the explicit certificate for layer 0, the encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, and the preset identity base values ​​for layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report; performing aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key; and determining whether the device network is trusted based on the aggregated verification result.

[0007] Optionally, reconstructing the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report includes: decrypting the encrypted information in the explicit certificate using the public key in the explicit certificate to obtain the public key of the target device's layer 0; and reconstructing the public key of the target device's layer n based on the public key of the target device's layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device.

[0008] Optionally, performing aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key includes: determining whether the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set in the aggregated signature value are all different, and determining whether the length of the first set and the length of the second set are the same; if the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set are all different and the length of the first set and the length of the second set are the same, then using the reconstructed public key to perform aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm.

[0009] A second aspect of this invention provides an aggregated trusted authentication method applied to a target device in a device network. The target device includes a hardware layer, layer 0, layer 1, ..., layer n, where n is an integer greater than 0. The aggregated trusted authentication method includes: receiving an authentication request sent by a verification node; generating an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity reference values ​​for layers 1 to n of each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate for layer 0, and device signature information for each target device; returning the aggregated authentication report to the verification node, so that the verification node reconstructs the public key of layer n of the target device based on the explicit certificate for layer 0 of the target device, the encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, and the preset identity reference values ​​for layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, and performs aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determines whether the device network is trusted based on the aggregated verification result.

[0010] Optionally, generating an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request includes: transmitting the authentication request to neighboring target devices in the device network and receiving device authentication reports returned by the neighboring target devices; and generating an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by the neighboring target devices.

[0011] Optionally, generating an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by neighboring target devices includes: obtaining device parameter information of neighboring target devices from the device authentication reports returned by neighboring target devices, wherein the device parameter information includes the target device's nth layer public key, device signature information, and a signature value generated based on an elliptic curve cryptography algorithm; performing signature verification based on the device parameter information of neighboring target devices and its own device parameter information, and generating an aggregated signature value based on the verification result; and generating an aggregated authentication report based on the aggregated signature value.

[0012] Optionally, the process of generating a device authentication report by a neighboring target device includes: the neighboring target device randomly generating a first random number; constructing device signature information of the neighboring target device based on the first random number; signing the device signature information of the neighboring target device using the public key and private key of the nth layer to obtain a first signature parameter and a second signature parameter; generating a signature value of the neighboring target device based on the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter, and obtaining a device authentication report of the neighboring target device based on the signature value of the neighboring target device.

[0013] Optionally, the step of performing signature verification based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and its own device parameter information, and generating an aggregated signature value based on the verification result, includes: generating an initial aggregated signature value, wherein the initial aggregated signature value includes a first set, a second set, and verification parameters; calculating a parameter verification value based on the second signature parameter in the currently verified device parameter information, the device signature information, and the target device's layer n public key, and determining whether the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter; if the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter, and the device signature information and the target device's layer n public key do not exist in the first set, and the parameter verification value does not exist in the second set, then the device signature information and the target device's layer n public key are added to the first set, the parameter verification value is added to the second set, and the verification parameters are updated based on the second signature parameter; each device parameter information is verified sequentially and the first set, the second set, and the verification parameters are updated based on the verification result, and an aggregated signature value is generated based on the last updated first set, the second set, and the verification parameters.

[0014] Optionally, before receiving the authentication request sent by the verification node, the aggregated trusted authentication method further includes: generating identity benchmark values, key pairs, and encryption values ​​for layers 1 to n sequentially based on the component feature data metric values ​​of each layer.

[0015] Optionally, the step of generating the identity reference value, key pair, and encryption value of layers 1 to n sequentially based on the component feature data metric value of each layer includes: using a method to generate the identity reference value, key pair, and encryption value of layer n based on the identity reference value of layer n-1 and the private key of layer n-1, and recursively generating the identity reference value, key pair, and encryption value of layers 1 to n sequentially based on the identity reference value of layer 0 and the private key of layer 0.

[0016] Optionally, the method for generating the identity reference value, key pair, and encrypted value of layer n based on the identity reference value of layer n-1 and the private key of layer n-1 includes: calculating the identity reference value of layer n using the identity reference value of layer n-1 and the component feature measurement value of layer n; generating a second random number and a third random number, and generating the encrypted value of layer n based on the second random number, the third random number, and a preset elliptic curve base point; calculating a first intermediate parameter based on the encrypted value of layer n and the identity reference value of layer n, and calculating a second intermediate parameter based on the private key of layer n-1, the third random number, and the first intermediate parameter; calculating the private key of layer n based on the first intermediate parameter, the second random number, the second intermediate parameter, and the order of the preset elliptic curve base point, and calculating the public key of layer n based on the private key of layer n, wherein the private key of layer n and the public key of layer n constitute the key pair of layer n.

[0017] A third aspect of this invention provides an aggregated trusted authentication system, comprising: a verification node, a device vendor node, and a device network, wherein the device network includes a plurality of target devices, the target devices comprising a hardware layer, a layer 0, a layer 1, ..., a layer n, where n is an integer greater than 0; the device vendor node is used to issue a layer 0 explicit certificate for the target devices; the verification node is used to initiate an authentication request to the target devices in the device network; the device network is used to generate an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request and return the aggregated authentication report to the verification node, wherein the aggregated authentication... The report includes an aggregated signature value, identity benchmark values ​​for each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate for layer 0, and device signature information for each target device. The verification node is used to reconstruct the public key of layer n of the target device based on the explicit certificate for layer 0 of the target device, the encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​for layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report. Based on the reconstructed public key, the aggregated signature value is aggregated and verified, and the trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregated verification result.

[0018] A fourth aspect of this invention provides a verification node, comprising: a request module, configured to initiate an authentication request to a target device in a device network; a first receiving module, configured to receive an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity base values ​​of layers 1 to n for each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate of layer 0, and device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0; a reconstruction module, configured to reconstruct the public key of layer n of the target device based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, and the identity base values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device obtained from a device vendor node; and a verification module, configured to perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result.

[0019] A fifth aspect of this invention provides a target device in a device network, comprising: a second receiving module for receiving an authentication request sent by a verification node; a response module for generating an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity reference values ​​of layers 1 to n for each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate of layer 0, and device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0; and a return module for returning the aggregated authentication report to the verification node, so that the verification node reconstructs the public key of layer n of the target device based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity reference values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, and performs aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determines whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result.

[0020] A sixth aspect of the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing computer instructions for causing the computer to perform the aggregated trusted authentication method as described in any of the first or second aspects of the present invention.

[0021] As can be seen from the above technical solutions, the embodiments of the present invention have the following advantages:

[0022] This invention provides an aggregated trusted authentication method, system, and storage medium. The method involves initiating an authentication request to a target device in a device network and receiving an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity benchmark values ​​for each target device from layer 1 to layer n, encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate for layer 0, and device signature information for each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. Then, based on the explicit certificate for layer 0, the encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​for layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, the public key for layer n of the target device is reconstructed. The aggregated signature value is then aggregated and verified based on the reconstructed public key. The trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregation verification result. This invention adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications and performs aggregated authentication on target devices based on implicit certificates formed from the encrypted values ​​and identity benchmark values ​​for each layer of the target device, reducing the authentication overhead of the device network. Attached Figure Description

[0023] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0024] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the aggregated trusted authentication system in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0025] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the sequential generation of the identity identifier baseline value DLCV, key pair, and encryption value γ corresponding to the public key of each layer from layer 1 to layer n in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0026] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating the workflow of the aggregated trusted authentication system in this embodiment of the invention.

[0027] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the aggregated trusted authentication method in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0028] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of another aggregated trusted authentication method in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0029] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the verification node in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0030] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the target device in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0031] Figure 8 This is a flowchart illustrating the generation of aggregate signature values ​​in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0032] Figure 9 This is a flowchart illustrating the aggregation verification of aggregated signature values ​​in an embodiment of the present invention;

[0033] Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer-readable storage medium in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0034] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0035] This invention provides an aggregated trusted authentication system, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the system includes: a verification node, a device vendor node, and a device network. The device network includes several target devices, each with a hardware layer, layer 0, layer 1, ..., layer n, where n is a positive integer. The device vendor node issues explicit certificates for layer 0 to the target devices. The verification node initiates authentication requests to the target devices in the device network. The device network generates an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication requests and returns the aggregated authentication report to the verification node. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity base values ​​for layers 1 to n for each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, an explicit certificate for layer 0, and device signature information for each target device. The verification node reconstructs the public key for layer n of the target device based on the explicit certificate for layer 0, the encrypted values ​​for layers 1 to n, and the preset identity base values ​​for layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report. It then performs aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key and determines the trustworthiness of the device network based on the aggregated verification result.

[0036] Specifically, the device network consists of several target devices conforming to trusted computing specifications, where target devices can be embedded devices. Embedded devices mainly consist of several layers, including a hardware layer, layer 0, layer 1, ..., layer n. Control of the CPU in the target device is transferred unidirectionally from the hardware layer to layer n. Each layer of the target device needs to have the ability to measure the components of the next layer and perform unidirectional function calculations. The device vendor nodes include provider nodes representing the various components of the device and device manufacturer nodes. The device manufacturer node needs to issue an explicit certificate for layer 0 of the device during the manufacturing phase. The verification node is the initiator of the verification request and can remotely initiate verification over the network. It sends an authentication request to a random target device in the device network. The target device generates and returns an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request. Upon receiving the aggregated authentication report, the verification node determines whether the report is correct, thereby determining whether the device network is secure.

[0037] The process of the equipment vendor node issuing a Layer 0 explicit certificate for the target device can be understood as the initialization process of the target device. That is, in a controlled and secure environment during the manufacturing phase, the equipment vendor node issues an explicit digital certificate for the Layer 0 of each target device. The specific steps are as follows:

[0038] 1. The hardware layer of the target device contains a unique confidential random number d. The hardware layer measures the feature data of the 0th layer component to obtain the 0th layer measurement value C0. Then, based on the 0th layer measurement value C0 and the random number d, the 0th layer identity reference value DLCV0 is calculated.

[0039] 2. The target device's hardware layer uses a deterministic key derivation function to obtain the layer 0 private key K0 based on the layer 0 identity base value DLCV0. The layer 0 private key K0 is then multiplied by the elliptic curve base point G to obtain the layer 0 public key PK0. The relevant parameters of the elliptic curve cryptography used in this embodiment are described below: q represents the selected finite field, G is the selected base point on the elliptic curve, and x is the order of that base point. Then, the target device's hardware layer sends the public key PK0, the identity base value DLCV0, the device model DM, and the device version DV to the device vendor node. After confirming the information is correct, the device vendor node issues a layer 0 explicit certificate for the target device using its own private key.

[0040] Before authentication, specifically upon startup of each target device, a layer 1 to layer n identity base value DLCV, a key pair, and an encryption value γ corresponding to the public key for each layer are generated sequentially. The key pair includes a public key and a private key. (See [link to documentation]). Figure 2 The generation process is as follows:

[0041] 1. The (n-1)th layer (n>0) uses the identity verification baseline value DLCV of this layer. n-1and the feature data metric C of the nth layer component n DLCVn is calculated. The (n-1)th layer is derived using a deterministic key derivation function based on the identity benchmark value DLCV of the nth layer. n Get a random number a n , will a n A is obtained by dot product with the base point G of the elliptic curve used. n .

[0042] 2. The (n-1)th layer uses a deterministic key derivation function based on the identity benchmark value DLCV of the nth layer. n Get a random number k n And calculate k n G, it should be noted that this key derivation function is different from the key derivation function in step 1. Then calculate γ. n =A n +k n G,e n =Hash(γ) n DLCV n ), s n =e n k n +K n-1 .

[0043] 3. The (n-1)th layer uses s n And calculate the nth layer private key K n =e n a n +s n (mod x), where x is the order of the base point of the elliptic curve, and then the public key PK of the nth layer is calculated. n =e n γ n +PK n-1 Then DLCV n K n and γ n Pass it to the nth layer.

[0044] By using the identity reference value DLCV and encryption value γ sent by each layer to the next layer, which are equivalent to implicit certificates, identity reference values ​​DLCV, key pairs, and encryption values ​​γ corresponding to the public keys of each layer are generated sequentially from layer 1 to layer n. Subsequent verification steps are performed using the identity reference values ​​DLCV, key pairs, and encryption values ​​γ corresponding to the public keys of each layer from layer 1 to layer n. Based on implicit certificate authentication, the target device is adapted for authentication during the authentication process using the identity reference value DLCV and encryption value γ. Implicit certificates are much smaller than explicit certificates, which helps reduce the overhead in the authentication process and ensures the security and trustworthiness of the device network.

[0045] like Figure 3 As shown, the overall authentication process of the aggregated trusted authentication system in this embodiment of the invention is as follows:

[0046] The authentication node sends a request to any target device in the device network. This target device then forwards the authentication request to its neighboring target devices, which in turn forward the request to their own neighboring target devices. Upon receiving the authentication request, each target device generates a random number dNum at layer n and uses its layer n private key K. n The device model (DM), device version number (DV), device configuration information (DCI), and random number (dNum) are signed to generate their respective device authentication reports. Each device authentication report includes the device model (DM), device version number (DV), device configuration information (DCI), random number (dNum), signature value (σ), layer 1 to layer n identity base values ​​(DLCV) and encryption value (γ), and layer 0 explicit certificate (Cert0). The target device sends its device authentication report to neighboring target devices that forwarded the authentication request. The neighboring target devices aggregate all received device authentication reports and the signature value (σ) from their own device authentication report to obtain an aggregated signature. They then send their device authentication report (without the signature value) and the aggregated signature to the neighboring node that forwarded the authentication request. Finally, the target device that initially received the authentication request generates an aggregated authentication report for the device network, which contains the final aggregated signature value. This information is then sent to the verification nodes. The verification nodes perform aggregated verification to determine whether the device network is trustworthy.

[0047] The aggregated trusted authentication system of this invention initiates an authentication request to a target device in a device network through a verification node, and receives an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity base values ​​from layer 1 to layer n for each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, an explicit certificate from layer 0, and device signature information for each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. Then, based on the explicit certificate from layer 0, the encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, and the preset identity base values ​​from layer 1 to layer n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, the public key of layer n of the target device is reconstructed. The aggregated signature value is then aggregated and verified based on the reconstructed public key. The trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregated verification result. This aggregated trusted authentication system of this invention adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications, and performs aggregated authentication on the target device based on the implicit certificate formed by the encrypted values ​​and identity base values ​​of each layer, reducing the authentication overhead of the device network.

[0048] This invention also provides an aggregated trusted authentication method, applied to the verification node in the above system embodiments, such as... Figure 4 As shown, the aggregated trusted authentication method includes:

[0049] Step S110: Initiate an authentication request to the target device in the device network.

[0050] Specifically, the authentication node remotely initiates an authentication request to any target device in the device network. The target device then forwards the authentication request to its neighboring target devices, which in turn forward the authentication request to their own neighboring target devices.

[0051] Step S120: Receive the aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity base values ​​of each target device in the device network from Layer 1 to Layer n, the encrypted values ​​from Layer 1 to Layer n, the explicit certificate at Layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. Specifically, the target device sends the authentication request to its neighboring target devices, and the neighboring target devices forward the authentication request to their own neighboring target devices.

[0052] Specifically, the target device receiving the authentication request forwards the request to its neighboring target devices, which then forward the authentication request to their own neighboring target devices. Each target device, upon receiving the authentication request, generates a random number dNum at layer n and uses the layer n private key K. n The device signature information is signed to obtain a signature value σ. Based on the signature value σ, a device authentication report is generated. The device signature information includes the device model DM, device version number DV, device configuration information DCI, and a random number dNum. The device authentication report includes the device model DM, device version number DV, device configuration information DCI, random number dNum, signature value σ, layer 1 to layer n identity base value DLCV, encryption value γ, and layer 0 explicit certificate Cert0. The target device sends its device authentication report to the neighboring target devices that forwarded the authentication request to it. The neighboring target devices aggregate all received device authentication reports and the signature value σ from their own device authentication report to obtain an aggregate signature. Then, they send the device authentication report without the signature value and the aggregate signature to the neighboring node that forwarded the authentication request to them. Finally, the target device that initially received the authentication request generates an aggregate authentication report for the device network, which contains the final aggregate signature value. This information is then returned to the verification node. The verification node then receives the aggregated authentication report generated based on the authentication request.

[0053] Step S130: Based on the explicit certificate of the target device at layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity base values ​​of the target device at layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report, reconstruct the public key of the target device at layer n.

[0054] Specifically, the equipment vendor node pre-stores the device model (DM), device version number (DV), device configuration information (DCI), and corresponding Layer 1 to Layer n identity base values ​​for each target device. The verification node obtains the pre-set Layer 1 to Layer n identity base values ​​for the target device in the network from the equipment vendor node based on the device model (DM), device version number (DV), and device configuration information (DCI). Combining these with the explicit certificate of the target device's Layer 0 and the encrypted values ​​of Layers 1 to n, the public key of the target device's Layer n is reconstructed. During the public key reconstruction process, the implicit certificate of the identity base value (DLCV) and encrypted value (γ) sent by each layer to the next layer is used to reconstruct the public key of the target device's Layer n, which helps reduce the overhead of the authentication process.

[0055] Step S140: Perform aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregate verification result.

[0056] Specifically, if the aggregated signature value is successfully verified, the device network is considered trustworthy; if the aggregated signature value fails to be verified, the device network is considered untrustworthy. By authenticating the aggregated signature value, the trustworthiness of the device network can be determined. Compared with conventional verification methods, it is not necessary to verify the signature value of each target device individually, thus reducing the amount of verification computation.

[0057] The aggregated trusted authentication method of this invention initiates an authentication request to a target device in a device network and receives an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity base values ​​from layer 1 to layer n for each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, an explicit certificate from layer 0, and device signature information for each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. Then, based on the explicit certificate from layer 0, the encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, and the preset identity base values ​​from layer 1 to layer n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, the public key of layer n of the target device is reconstructed. The aggregated signature value is then aggregated and verified based on the reconstructed public key. The trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregated verification result. This aggregated trusted authentication system of this invention adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications. It performs aggregated authentication on the target device based on the implicit certificate formed by the encrypted values ​​and identity base values ​​of each layer, reducing the authentication overhead of the device network while ensuring its security and trustworthiness.

[0058] In one embodiment, step S130, reconstructing the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device, includes:

[0059] Step S131: Use the public key in the explicit certificate to decrypt the encrypted information in the explicit certificate to obtain the public key of layer 0 of the target device;

[0060] Step S132: Reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the public key of layer 0 of the target device, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity base values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device.

[0061] Specifically, after receiving the aggregated authentication report, the verification node first verifies each target device D. i Explicit certificate Cert at level 0 i0 The device manufacturer's public key is used to verify the device manufacturer's signature in the explicit certificate. If the device manufacturer's signature is correct, the device ID contained in the explicit certificate is used. i Public key PK at layer 0 i0 Decrypting the encrypted information in the certificate yields D i Layer 0 Identity Baseline Value DLCV i0 Then DM according to the device model. i Device version number DV i Equipment Configuration Information (DCI) i Obtain the target device D from the equipment supplier node. i The identity benchmark value of the nth layer DLCV in Combined with the encrypted value γ corresponding to the nth layer public key in Reconstruct the target device D i The public key PK at layer n in =e in γ in +Q iCA , where e in =Hash(γ) in DLCV in ),Q iCA For device D i The public key of layer n-1 is also constructed accordingly, resulting in n such public key computation equations. The last equation will use the public key PK of layer 0. i0 , and PK i0 It has been extracted from the explicit certificate and substituted into the last equation PK. i1 =e i1 γ i1 +PK i0 Can be used to obtain PKi1 Substituting these values ​​into the other equations sequentially will yield the public key PK at layer n. in The public key is also denoted as P. i .

[0062] The public key reconstruction process uses an implicit certificate consisting of the identity base value DLCV and the encryption value γ sent by each layer to the next layer to reconstruct the public key of the target device at layer n, which helps to reduce the overhead of the authentication process.

[0063] In one embodiment, step S140, which involves performing aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, includes:

[0064] Step S141: Determine whether the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set in the aggregate signature value are all different, and determine whether the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same;

[0065] Step S142: If the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set are all different and the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same, then the reconstructed public key is used to perform aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm.

[0066] Specifically, the verification node uses the reconstructed public key P of layer n for each target device. i For the received aggregate signature value Perform aggregate verification; if the verification passes, the device network is confirmed to be trustworthy.

[0067] Otherwise, the device network is untrusted. For example... Figure 9 As shown, the aggregation verification process is as follows:

[0068] ① The parameter for aggregation verification is the aggregation signature value obtained from the aggregation signature. Represents the first set, Let t represent the second set, and t represent the validation parameters. The first set... This includes device signature information for all target devices in the device network. i and the target device's layer n public key P i Aggregate signature value The generation process is described in the aggregated trusted authentication method applied to the target device in the embodiments of the present invention.

[0069] ②If the first set If all elements in the second set are distinct, the verification fails; if the second set... If all elements in the set are distinct, the verification fails, meaning the first set is required. Elements in the second set All elements in the first set are distinct; if the first set The length of the second set If the lengths are different, the verification fails. Only if the first set... The elements and the second set All elements are distinct and the first set Length and Second Set Only when the lengths are the same will the next step of the verification process be performed, which can be done by aggregating signature values. If elements are duplicated or the quantity is inconsistent, the verification will fail in advance, reducing the amount of verification computation.

[0070] ③ Order j ranges from 1 to n′, calculate b j =Hash(E j ), w j =Hash(P j ,m j ). And when a single verification is performed, there are Then there is E j b j =t j G+w j P j , i.e. t j G+w j P j -jE j =∞. If If the value is not equal to ∞, the verification fails; otherwise, the verification succeeds.

[0071] This invention authenticates aggregated signature values ​​to determine the trustworthiness of a device network. Compared to conventional verification methods, it eliminates the need to verify the signature value of each target device individually, reducing computational complexity. Furthermore, it employs aggregated signatures based on general elliptic curves for verification. This shortens the signature length, effectively reducing storage space and network traffic costs during verification. Compared to aggregated signatures based on bilinear mappings, the general elliptic curve aggregated signatures used in this invention are simpler to compute, thus shortening the signature verification computation time.

[0072] This invention also provides an aggregated trusted authentication method, applied to a target device in a device network. The target device includes a hardware layer, layer 0, layer 1, ..., layer n, where n is an integer greater than 0. Figure 5 As shown, the aggregated trusted authentication method includes:

[0073] Step S210: Receive the authentication request sent by the verification node.

[0074] Step S220: Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, the encryption value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device.

[0075] Step S230: Return the aggregated authentication report to the verification node so that the verification node can reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of the target device's layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of the target device's layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report, and perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result.

[0076] Specifically, the first target device to receive the authentication request is any target device in the device network. This target device forwards the authentication request to its neighboring target devices, which then forward the authentication request to their own neighboring target devices. After receiving the authentication request, each target device randomly generates a random number dNum at layer n and uses the layer n private key K. n The device signature information is signed to obtain a signature value σ. Based on the signature value σ, a device authentication report is generated. The device signature information includes the device model DM, device version number DV, device configuration information DCI, and a random number dNum. The device authentication report includes the device model DM, device version number DV, device configuration information DCI, random number dNum, signature value σ, identity base values ​​DLCV from layer 1 to layer n, encryption value γ, and explicit certificate Cert0 from layer 0. The target device sends its device authentication report to the neighboring target devices that forwarded the authentication request to it. The neighboring target devices aggregate all received device authentication reports and the signature value σ from their own device authentication report to obtain an aggregate signature. Then, they send the device authentication report without the signature value and the aggregate signature to the neighboring node that forwarded the authentication request to them. Finally, the target device that initially received the authentication request generates an aggregate authentication report for the device network and returns the aggregate authentication report to the verification node for verification. The trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregate verification result.

[0077] The aggregated trusted authentication method of this invention receives an authentication request sent by a verification node, generates an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request, and then returns the aggregated authentication report to the verification node. The verification node then reconstructs the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report. Based on the reconstructed public key, the verification node performs aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value and determines whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result. The aggregated trusted authentication system of this invention adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications, performs aggregated authentication on the target device based on the implicit certificate formed by the encrypted values ​​and identity benchmark values ​​of each layer of the target device, and reduces the authentication overhead of the device network.

[0078] In one embodiment, step S220, generating an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request, includes:

[0079] Step S221: Pass the authentication request to the neighboring target device in the device network, and receive the device authentication report returned by the neighboring target device;

[0080] Step S222: Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by the adjacent target devices.

[0081] Specifically, each target device that receives the authentication request forwards the authentication request to its neighboring target devices in the device network. The neighboring target devices then forward the authentication request to their own neighboring target devices. In this way, the authentication request is sent to each target device in the device network in sequence. Then, each device generates its own device authentication report. Finally, the target device that initially received the authentication request generates the aggregated authentication report of the device network.

[0082] Specifically, in step S221 above, the process of generating a device authentication report for adjacent target devices includes:

[0083] Step S301: Randomly generate a first random number for adjacent target devices;

[0084] Step S302: Construct device signature information for adjacent target devices based on the first random number;

[0085] Step S303: Use the public key and private key of the nth layer to sign the device signature information of the adjacent target device to obtain the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter;

[0086] Step S304: Generate the signature value of the adjacent target device based on the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter, and obtain the device authentication report of the adjacent target device based on the signature value of the adjacent target device.

[0087] Specifically, any target device D i Upon receiving the authentication request, use the public key at level n (PK) n For P i Private key K n For p i A random number dNum is randomly generated for the nth layer. i Using the nth-level private key p i For equipment model DM i Device version number DV i Equipment Configuration Information (DCI) i and random number dNum i Perform the signing to obtain the first signature parameter b i Second signature parameter t i Based on the first signature parameter b i Second signature parameter t i Generate signature values ​​σ for adjacent target devices i =(b i , t i ).

[0088] Based on equipment model DM i Device version number DV i Equipment Configuration Information (DCI) i and random number dNum i For device signature information m i The signing process is as follows:

[0089] 1. The parameter is (P) i p i m i ),from A random number r is selected from the given data. It is a set of positive integers that are less than q and relatively prime to q;

[0090] 2. Let E=rG, b=Hash(E), f=H(P i ,m i ), t = rb - fp i modq;

[0091] 3. Return the signature value σ i =(b i , t i ).

[0092] Generate signature value σ i Then, based on the signature value σ of the adjacent target device i Obtain the equipment certification report of the adjacent target device, which includes the device model DM. i Device version number DV i Equipment Configuration Information (DCI)i Random number dNum i Signature value σ i DLCV values ​​and γ values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, and the explicit certificate Cert for layer 0. i0 .

[0093] In one embodiment, step S222, generating an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by adjacent target devices, includes:

[0094] Step S401: Obtain the device parameter information of the neighboring target devices from the device authentication reports returned by the neighboring target devices. The device parameter information includes the target device's nth-layer public key, device signature information, and a signature value generated based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm. Specifically, each target device has a device nth-layer public key P. i Device signature information m i Signature value σ i Given y devices, the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, σ1), ..., (P... y m y , σ y )}, where σ i =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter.

[0095] Step S402: Perform signature verification based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and its own device parameter information, and generate an aggregated signature value based on the verification result.

[0096] Step S403: Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the aggregated signature value. Specifically, the aggregated signature value, the identity base value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n in the device network, the encrypted value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device are packaged together to generate an aggregated authentication report.

[0097] This invention shortens the signature length by aggregating signature values, which effectively reduces storage space and network traffic costs during the verification process.

[0098] In one embodiment, step S402 involves performing signature verification based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and the device parameter information of the device itself, and generating an aggregated signature value based on the verification result, including:

[0099] Step S4021: Generate an initial aggregate signature value, wherein the initial aggregate signature value includes a first set, a second set, and verification parameters;

[0100] Step S4022: Calculate the parameter verification value based on the second signature parameter in the currently verified device parameter information, the device signature information, and the nth layer public key of the target device, and determine whether the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter;

[0101] Step S4023: If the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter, and the device signature information and the target device's nth layer public key do not exist in the first set, and the parameter verification value does not exist in the second set, then add the device signature information and the target device's nth layer public key to the first set, add the parameter verification value to the second set, and update the verification parameter according to the second signature parameter;

[0102] Step S4024: Verify each device parameter information sequentially and update the first set, the second set, and the verification parameters based on the verification results. Generate an aggregate signature value based on the last updated first set, the second set, and the verification parameters.

[0103] Specifically, such as Figure 8 As shown, the process of generating the aggregate signature value is as follows:

[0104] Each target device has a device-level n public key P. i Device signature information m i Signature value σ i Given y devices, the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, σ1), ..., (P... y m y ,

[0105] σ y )}, where σ i =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter.

[0106] initialization t=0, through the first set Second set Generate the initial aggregate signature value by verifying parameter t. Let i range from 1 to y, and sequentially process (P) i m i , σ i Perform signature verification and calculate the parameter verification value E. i The calculation formula is: w i =Hash(P i m i ), If Hash(E) i ) and the first signature parameter bi Equal and (P) i m i (Does not belong to the first set) And the parameter verification value E i Not belonging to the second set Then (P) i m i Add to collection In the middle, the parameter verification value E i Add to collection In the middle, update t = t + t i mod q, where q is a prime number, is used to determine the range of the finite field.

[0107] All (P) i m i , σ i After verification, the aggregate signature will be returned.

[0108] In this embodiment of the invention, aggregated signatures based on general elliptic curves are used for aggregated verification. Aggregated signatures shorten the signature length, which can effectively reduce storage space and network traffic costs during the verification process. Moreover, compared with aggregated signatures based on bilinear mappings, the general elliptic curve aggregated signatures used in this embodiment of the invention are simpler to calculate, thus shortening the calculation time for signature verification.

[0109] In one embodiment, before receiving the authentication request sent by the verification node in step S210, the aggregated trusted authentication method further includes:

[0110] Step S200: Generate the identity reference value, key pair and encryption value of layer 1 to layer n sequentially based on the component feature data measurement value of each layer.

[0111] Specifically, the component feature data metric is obtained by measuring the component feature data of each layer. Since the component feature data of each layer is unique, the generated identity benchmark value, key pair and encryption value have good security and confidentiality, thus ensuring the security and trustworthiness of the device network.

[0112] In one embodiment, step S200, generating identity reference values, key pairs, and encryption values ​​for layers 1 to n sequentially based on the component feature data metric values ​​of each layer, includes:

[0113] The method of generating the identity base value, key pair and encryption value of the nth layer based on the identity base value of the (n-1)th layer and the private key of the (n-1)th layer is adopted. The identity base value, key pair and encryption value of the 1st to nth layers are generated in a recursive manner based on the identity base value of the 0th layer and the private key of the 0th layer.

[0114] Using a recursive approach, only the identity base value and the private key of layer 0 are needed to generate the identity base values, key pairs, and encryption values ​​of layers 1 to n in sequence, which is convenient for calculation.

[0115] In one embodiment, the aggregated trusted authentication method of the present invention, which generates an identity base value, a key pair, and an encrypted value for layer n based on the identity base value of layer n-1 and the private key of layer n-1, includes:

[0116] Step S201: Calculate the identity reference value of the nth layer using the identity reference value of the (n-1)th layer and the component feature measurement value of the nth layer.

[0117] Step S202: Generate a second random number and a third random number, and generate the encryption value of the nth layer based on the second random number, the third random number and the preset elliptic curve base point;

[0118] Step S203: Calculate the first intermediate parameter based on the encryption value of the nth layer and the identity reference value of the nth layer, and calculate the second intermediate parameter based on the private key of the (n-1)th layer, the third random number and the first intermediate parameter;

[0119] Step S204: Calculate the private key of the nth layer based on the first intermediate parameter, the second random number, the second intermediate parameter and the order of the preset elliptic curve base point, and calculate the public key of the nth layer based on the private key of the nth layer, wherein the private key of the nth layer and the public key of the nth layer form the key pair of the nth layer.

[0120] Specifically, such as Figure 2 As shown, firstly, the (n-1)th layer (n>0) uses the identity benchmark value DLCV of this layer. n-1 and the feature data metric C of the nth layer component n Calculate the identity benchmark value DLCV for the nth layer. n Then, the (n-1)th layer uses a deterministic key derivation function based on the identity benchmark value DLCV of the nth layer. n Get the second random number a n , and the second random number a n A is obtained by dot product with the base point G of the elliptic curve used. n The (n-1)th layer is derived using a deterministic key derivation function based on the identity benchmark value DLCV of the nth layer. n Obtain the third random number k n And calculate k n G, and generates the encryption value γ of the nth layer based on the second random number, the third random number, and the preset elliptic curve base point. n The calculation formula is: γ n =A n +kn G; Calculate the first intermediate parameter e based on the encryption value of the nth layer and the identity benchmark value of the nth layer. n And based on the private key of the (n-1)th layer and the third random number k n and the first intermediate parameter e n Calculate the second intermediate parameter s n The calculation formula is: e n =Hash(γ) n DLCV n ), s n =e n k n +K n-1 Finally, the (n-1)th layer uses the first intermediate parameter e. n The second intermediate parameter s n Second random number a n Calculate the private key K at layer n n =e n a n +s n (mod x), where x is the order of the base point of the elliptic curve, and then the public key PK of the nth layer is calculated. n =e n γ n +PK n-1 Then, the DLCV (Digital Identity Verification Baseline) value for the nth layer is used. n Private key K n and encryption value γ n Pass it to the nth layer.

[0121] By using the identity reference value DLCV and encryption value γ sent by each layer to the next layer, which are equivalent to implicit certificates, identity reference values ​​DLCV, key pairs, and encryption values ​​γ corresponding to the public keys of each layer are generated sequentially from layer 1 to layer n. Subsequent verification steps are performed using the identity reference values ​​DLCV, key pairs, and encryption values ​​γ corresponding to the public keys of each layer from layer 1 to layer n. Based on implicit certificate authentication, the target device is adapted for authentication during the authentication process using the identity reference value DLCV and encryption value γ. Implicit certificates are much smaller than explicit certificates, which helps reduce the overhead in the authentication process and ensures the security and trustworthiness of the device network.

[0122] This invention adapts to embedded devices that meet trusted computing specifications, exhibiting good device compatibility. Furthermore, it uses lightweight implicit certificates instead of explicit certificates during the authentication process. Since implicit certificates do not contain digital signatures, they require less storage and communication overhead compared to explicit certificates. Additionally, it uses aggregate signatures based on general elliptic curves, which are simpler to compute and more secure than aggregate signatures based on bilinear mappings, thus reducing computational overhead during the authentication process.

[0123] This invention also provides a verification node, such as... Figure 6 As shown, it includes:

[0124] The request module 601 is used to initiate an authentication request to the target device in the device network; for details, please refer to the description of step S110 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0125] The first receiving module 602 is used to receive the aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity identification base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, the encryption value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. For details, please refer to the description of step S120 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0126] The reconstruction module 603 is used to reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of the target device's layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n obtained from the device vendor node in the aggregated authentication report; for details, please refer to the description of step S130 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0127] Verification module 604 is used to perform aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result. For details, please refer to the description of step S140 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0128] The verification node in this embodiment of the invention initiates an authentication request to a target device in the device network and receives an aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, identity base values ​​from layer 1 to layer n for each target device in the device network, encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, an explicit certificate from layer 0, and device signature information for each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. Then, based on the explicit certificate from layer 0, the encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, and the preset identity base values ​​from layer 1 to layer n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, the public key of layer n of the target device is reconstructed. The aggregated signature value is then aggregated and verified based on the reconstructed public key. The trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregated verification result. This aggregated trusted authentication system adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications. It performs aggregated authentication on the target device based on the implicit certificate formed by the encrypted values ​​and identity base values ​​of each layer, reducing the authentication overhead of the device network while ensuring its security and trustworthiness.

[0129] This invention also provides a target device in a device network, such as... Figure 7 As shown, it includes:

[0130] The second receiving module 701 is used to receive authentication requests sent by the verification node; for details, please refer to the description of step S210 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0131] The response module 702 is used to generate an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, the encryption value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. For details, please refer to the description of step S220 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0132] The return module 703 is used to return the aggregated authentication report to the verification node, so that the verification node can reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0 of the target device, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report, and perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result. For details, please refer to the description of step S230 in the above method embodiment, which will not be repeated here.

[0133] In this embodiment of the invention, a target device in a device network receives an authentication request sent by a verification node, generates an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request, and then returns the aggregated authentication report to the verification node. The verification node then reconstructs the target device's public key at layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​from layer 1 to layer n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report. Based on the reconstructed public key, the verification node performs aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value and determines whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result. This aggregated trusted authentication system adapts to target devices that meet trusted computing specifications, performs aggregated authentication on the target device based on the implicit certificate formed by the encrypted values ​​and identity benchmark values ​​of each layer, and reduces the authentication overhead of the device network.

[0134] This invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium, such as... Figure 10 As shown, a computer program 510 is stored on the storage medium. When executed by a processor, this program implements the steps of the aggregated trusted authentication method in the above embodiments. The storage medium also stores audio and video stream data, feature frame data, interactive request signaling, encrypted data, and a preset data size. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), flash memory, hard disk drive (HDD), or solid-state drive (SSD), etc.; the storage medium can also include combinations of the above types of memory. Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program 13 can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. The storage medium can be a magnetic disk, optical disk, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), flash memory, hard disk drive (HDD), or solid-state drive (SSD), etc.; the storage medium can also include a combination of the above types of memory.

[0135] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for aggregated trusted authentication, characterized in that, Applied to verification nodes, aggregated trusted authentication methods include: Initiate an authentication request to the target device in the device network; Receive the aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity identification base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, the encryption value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0; Based on the explicit certificate of the target device at layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of the target device at layers 1 to n as described in the aggregated authentication report, the public key of the target device at layer n is reconstructed. The aggregated signature value is aggregated and verified based on the reconstructed public key, and the trustworthiness of the device network is determined based on the aggregated verification result. The step of reconstructing the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device as described in the aggregated authentication report, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device includes: Use the public key in the explicit certificate to decrypt the encrypted information in the explicit certificate to obtain the public key of layer 0 of the target device; Based on the public key of layer 0 of the target device, the encryption values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity identification base values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device, reconstruct the public key of layer n of the target device; Upon receiving the aggregated authentication report, the process first verifies the explicit certificate at layer 0 for each target device. The device manufacturer's public key is used to verify the device manufacturer's signature in the explicit certificate. If the signature is correct, the encrypted information in the certificate is decrypted using the target device's layer 0 public key contained in the explicit certificate to obtain the layer 0 identity base value. Then, based on the device model, version number, and configuration information, the target device's layer n identity base value is obtained from the device vendor node. Combined with the encrypted value corresponding to the layer n public key, the target device's layer n public key PK is reconstructed. in =e in +Q iCA , where e in =Hash( DLCV in ), Q iCA For the public key of layer n-1 of the target device, The encrypted value corresponding to the public key at layer n, DLCV in Using the identity base value of the nth layer, construct the public key calculation equation for each layer in turn. The last equation will use the public key of the 0th layer that has been extracted from the explicit certificate. Substitute the public key into the calculation equation for each public key in ascending order of the layer number to obtain the public key of the nth layer. Aggregate verification of the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key includes: Determine whether the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set in the aggregated signature value are all different, and determine whether the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same; If the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set are all different and the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same, then the aggregated signature value is aggregated and verified using the reconstructed public key based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm. The aggregate signature value is ( , ,t), Represents the first set, Let t represent the second set, and t represent the verification parameters. Each target device has the device's layer n public key P. i Device signature information m i signature value Let there be y devices. Then the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, ..., ...}}. ), ..., (P y m y , )},in =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter, initialized. = , = t=0, through the first set The second set Generate the initial aggregate signature value with the verification parameter t. , Let i range from 1 to y, and sequentially process (P... i m i , Perform signature verification and calculate the parameter verification value E. i The calculation formula is: w i =Hash(P i m i E i =t i G+ w i P i G is the chosen base point on the elliptic curve, if Hash(E) i ) and the first signature parameter b i Equal and (P) i m i (Does not belong to the first set) And the parameter verification value E i Not belonging to the second set Then (P) i m i Add to collection In the middle, the parameter verification value E i Add to collection In the middle, update t=t+t i mod q, where q is a prime number, is used to determine the range of the finite field.

2. An aggregated trusted authentication method, characterized in that, The target device in the device network includes a hardware layer, layer 0, layer 1, ..., layer n, where n is an integer greater than 0. The aggregated trusted authentication method includes: Receive authentication requests sent by the verification node; An aggregated authentication report is generated based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, an identity base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, an encrypted value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, an explicit certificate of layer 0, and device signature information of each target device; The aggregated authentication report is returned to the verification node, so that the verification node can reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of the target device's layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity identification base values ​​of the target device's layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report, and perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result; The process of generating an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request includes: The authentication request is transmitted to neighboring target devices in the device network, and the device authentication report returned by the neighboring target devices is received. Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by adjacent target devices; The step of generating an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by adjacent target devices includes: Obtain device parameter information of neighboring target devices from the device authentication report returned by neighboring target devices, wherein the device parameter information includes the target device's nth layer public key, device signature information, and signature value generated based on elliptic curve cryptography algorithm; Signature verification is performed based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and its own device parameter information, and an aggregated signature value is generated based on the verification result; Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the aggregated signature value; The process of generating a device authentication report for adjacent target devices includes: The adjacent target devices randomly generate a first random number; Based on the first random number, construct the device signature information of the adjacent target devices; The device signature information of the adjacent target device is signed using the public key and private key of the nth layer to obtain the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter. The signature value of the adjacent target device is generated based on the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter, and the device authentication report of the adjacent target device is obtained based on the signature value of the adjacent target device. The step of performing signature verification based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and its own device parameter information, and generating an aggregated signature value based on the verification result, includes: Generate an initial aggregate signature value, wherein the initial aggregate signature value includes a first set, a second set, and verification parameters; Based on the second signature parameter in the currently verified device parameter information, the device signature information, and the target device's nth layer public key, calculate the parameter verification value and determine whether the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter. If the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter, and the device signature information and the target device's layer n public key do not exist in the first set, and the parameter verification value does not exist in the second set, then the device signature information and the target device's layer n public key are added to the first set, the parameter verification value is added to the second set, and the verification parameter is updated according to the second signature parameter; Each device parameter information is verified sequentially, and the first set, the second set, and the verification parameters are updated based on the verification results. An aggregate signature value is generated based on the last updated first set, the second set, and the verification parameters. The aggregate signature value is ( , ,t), Represents the first set, Let t represent the second set, and t represent the verification parameters. Each target device has the device's layer n public key P. i Device signature information m i signature value Let there be y devices. Then the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, ..., ...}}. ), ..., (P y m y , )},in =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter, initialized. = , = t=0, through the first set The second set Generate the initial aggregate signature value with the verification parameter t. , Let i range from 1 to y, and sequentially process (P... i m i , Perform signature verification and calculate the parameter verification value E. i The calculation formula is: w i =Hash(P i m i E i =t i G+ w i P i G is the chosen base point on the elliptic curve, if Hash(E) i ) and the first signature parameter b i Equal and (P) i m i (Does not belong to the first set) And the parameter verification value E i Not belonging to the second set Then (P) i m i Add to collection In the middle, the parameter verification value E i Add to collection In the middle, update t=t+t i mod q, where q is a prime number, is used to determine the range of the finite field.

3. The aggregated trusted authentication method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Before receiving the authentication request sent by the verification node, it also includes: Based on the component feature data metric values ​​of each layer, the identity base value, key pair and encryption value of layers 1 to n are generated sequentially.

4. The aggregated trusted authentication method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The process of generating identity reference values, key pairs, and encryption values ​​for layers 1 to n sequentially based on the component feature data metrics of each layer includes: The method of generating the identity base value, key pair and encryption value of the nth layer based on the identity base value of the (n-1)th layer and the private key of the (n-1)th layer is adopted. The identity base value, key pair and encryption value of the 1st to nth layers are generated in a recursive manner based on the identity base value of the 0th layer and the private key of the 0th layer.

5. The aggregated trusted authentication method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method for generating the identity base value, key pair, and encrypted value of layer n based on the identity base value of layer n-1 and the private key of layer n-1 includes: The identity benchmark value of the nth layer is calculated using the identity benchmark value of the (n-1)th layer and the component feature metric value of the nth layer. Generate a second random number and a third random number, and generate the encryption value of the nth layer based on the second random number, the third random number and the preset elliptic curve base point; The first intermediate parameter is calculated based on the encrypted value of the nth layer and the identity reference value of the nth layer, and the second intermediate parameter is calculated based on the private key of the (n-1)th layer, the third random number, and the first intermediate parameter; The private key of the nth layer is calculated based on the first intermediate parameter, the second random number, the second intermediate parameter, and the order of the preset elliptic curve base point. The public key of the nth layer is calculated based on the private key of the nth layer. The private key of the nth layer and the public key of the nth layer form the key pair of the nth layer. Wherein, the first intermediate parameter e n Second intermediate parameter s n The calculation formula is: e n =Hash( DLCV n ), s n =e n k n +K n-1 In the formula, For the encryption value of the nth layer, DLCV n Let k be the baseline value for identity identification at level n. n K is the third random number. n-1 Let K be the private key of layer n-1, and K be the private key of layer n. n PK with public key n The calculation formula is: K n =e n a n +s n (mod x), PK n =e n +PK n-1 Where x is the order of the base point of the elliptic curve, and a n This is the second random number.

6. An aggregated trusted authentication system, characterized in that, include: Verification nodes, equipment supplier nodes, and a device network, wherein the device network includes a plurality of target devices, and the target devices include a hardware layer, a layer 0, a layer 1, ..., a layer n, where n is an integer greater than 0; The equipment supplier node is used to issue a Level 0 explicit certificate for the target device; The verification node is used to initiate an authentication request to the target device in the device network; The device network is used to generate an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request and return the aggregated authentication report to the verification node. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, an identity base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, an encrypted value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, an explicit certificate of layer 0, and device signature information of each target device. The verification node is used to reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device in the aggregated authentication report; perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result; The step of reconstructing the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device as described in the aggregated authentication report, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device includes: Use the public key in the explicit certificate to decrypt the encrypted information in the explicit certificate to obtain the public key of layer 0 of the target device; Based on the public key of layer 0 of the target device, the encryption values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity identification base values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device, reconstruct the public key of layer n of the target device; Upon receiving the aggregated authentication report, the process first verifies the explicit certificate at layer 0 for each target device. The device manufacturer's public key is used to verify the device manufacturer's signature in the explicit certificate. If the signature is correct, the encrypted information in the certificate is decrypted using the target device's layer 0 public key contained in the explicit certificate to obtain the layer 0 identity base value. Then, based on the device model, version number, and configuration information, the target device's layer n identity base value is obtained from the device vendor node. Combined with the encrypted value corresponding to the layer n public key, the target device's layer n public key PK is reconstructed. in =e in +Q iCA , where e in =Hash( DLCV in ), Q iCA For the public key of layer n-1 of the target device, The encrypted value corresponding to the public key at layer n, DLCV in Using the identity base value of the nth layer, construct the public key calculation equation for each layer in turn. The last equation will use the public key of the 0th layer that has been extracted from the explicit certificate. Substitute the public key into the calculation equation for each public key in ascending order of the layer number to obtain the public key of the nth layer. Aggregate verification of the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key includes: Determine whether the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set in the aggregated signature value are all different, and determine whether the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same; If the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set are all different and the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same, then the aggregated signature value is aggregated and verified using the reconstructed public key based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm. The aggregate signature value is ( , ,t), Represents the first set, Let t represent the second set, and t represent the verification parameters. Each target device has the device's layer n public key P. i Device signature information m i signature value Let there be y devices. Then the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, ..., ...}}. ), ..., (P y m y , )},in =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter, initialized. = , = t=0, through the first set The second set Generate the initial aggregate signature value with the verification parameter t. , Let i range from 1 to y, and sequentially process (P... i m i , Perform signature verification and calculate the parameter verification value E. i The calculation formula is: w i =Hash(P i m i E i =t i G+ w i P i G is the chosen base point on the elliptic curve, if Hash(E) i ) and the first signature parameter b i Equal and (P) i m i (Does not belong to the first set) And the parameter verification value E i Not belonging to the second set Then (P) i m i Add to collection In the middle, the parameter verification value E i Add to collection In the middle, update t=t+t i mod q, where q is a prime number, is used to determine the range of the finite field.

7. A verification node, characterized in that, include: The request module is used to initiate authentication requests to target devices in the device network; The first receiving module is used to receive the aggregated authentication report generated by the target device based on the authentication request, wherein the aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity identification base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, the encryption value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0; The reconstruction module is used to reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of the target device's layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n as described in the aggregated authentication report, and the identity benchmark values ​​of the target device's layers 1 to n obtained from the device vendor node; The verification module is used to perform aggregate verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result; The process of generating an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request includes: The authentication request is transmitted to neighboring target devices in the device network, and the device authentication report returned by the neighboring target devices is received. Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by adjacent target devices; The step of generating an aggregated authentication report based on the device authentication reports returned by adjacent target devices includes: Obtain device parameter information of neighboring target devices from the device authentication report returned by neighboring target devices, wherein the device parameter information includes the target device's nth layer public key, device signature information, and signature value generated based on elliptic curve cryptography algorithm; Signature verification is performed based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and its own device parameter information, and an aggregated signature value is generated based on the verification result; Generate an aggregated authentication report based on the aggregated signature value; The process of generating a device authentication report for adjacent target devices includes: The adjacent target devices randomly generate a first random number; Based on the first random number, construct the device signature information of the adjacent target devices; The device signature information of the adjacent target device is signed using the public key and private key of the nth layer to obtain the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter. The signature value of the adjacent target device is generated based on the first signature parameter and the second signature parameter, and the device authentication report of the adjacent target device is obtained based on the signature value of the adjacent target device. The step of performing signature verification based on the device parameter information of adjacent target devices and its own device parameter information, and generating an aggregated signature value based on the verification result, includes: Generate an initial aggregate signature value, wherein the initial aggregate signature value includes a first set, a second set, and verification parameters; Based on the second signature parameter in the currently verified device parameter information, the device signature information, and the target device's nth layer public key, calculate the parameter verification value and determine whether the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter. If the hash value of the parameter verification value is equal to the corresponding first signature parameter, and the device signature information and the target device's layer n public key do not exist in the first set, and the parameter verification value does not exist in the second set, then the device signature information and the target device's layer n public key are added to the first set, the parameter verification value is added to the second set, and the verification parameter is updated according to the second signature parameter; Each device parameter information is verified sequentially, and the first set, the second set, and the verification parameters are updated based on the verification results. An aggregate signature value is generated based on the last updated first set, the second set, and the verification parameters. The aggregate signature value is ( , ,t), Represents the first set, Let t represent the second set, and t represent the verification parameters. Each target device has the device's layer n public key P. i Device signature information m i signature value Let there be y devices. Then the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, ..., ...}}. ), ..., (P y m y , )},in =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter, initialized. = , = t=0, through the first set The second set Generate the initial aggregate signature value with the verification parameter t. , Let i range from 1 to y, and sequentially process (P... i m i , Perform signature verification and calculate the parameter verification value E. i The calculation formula is: w i =Hash(P i m i E i =t i G+ w i P i G is the chosen base point on the elliptic curve, if Hash(E) i ) and the first signature parameter b i Equal and (P) i m i (Does not belong to the first set) And the parameter verification value E i Not belonging to the second set Then (P) i m i Add to collection In the middle, the parameter verification value E i Add to collection In the middle, update t=t+t i mod q, where q is a prime number, is used to determine the range of the finite field.

8. A target device in a device network, characterized in that, include: The second receiving module is used to receive authentication requests sent by the verification node; The response module is used to generate an aggregated authentication report based on the authentication request. The aggregated authentication report includes an aggregated signature value, the identity base value of each target device in the device network from layer 1 to layer n, the encryption value of each target device from layer 1 to layer n, the explicit certificate of layer 0, and the device signature information of each target device, where n is an integer greater than 0. The return module is used to return the aggregated authentication report to the verification node, so that the verification node can reconstruct the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of the target device's layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity identification base values ​​of the target device's layers 1 to n in the aggregated authentication report, and perform aggregated verification on the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key, and determine whether the device network is trustworthy based on the aggregated verification result; The step of reconstructing the public key of the target device's layer n based on the explicit certificate of layer 0, the encrypted values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device as described in the aggregated authentication report, and the preset identity benchmark values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device includes: Use the public key in the explicit certificate to decrypt the encrypted information in the explicit certificate to obtain the public key of layer 0 of the target device; Based on the public key of layer 0 of the target device, the encryption values ​​of layers 1 to n, and the preset identity identification base values ​​of layers 1 to n of the target device, reconstruct the public key of layer n of the target device; Upon receiving the aggregated authentication report, the process first verifies the explicit certificate at layer 0 for each target device. The device manufacturer's public key is used to verify the device manufacturer's signature in the explicit certificate. If the signature is correct, the encrypted information in the certificate is decrypted using the target device's layer 0 public key contained in the explicit certificate to obtain the layer 0 identity base value. Then, based on the device model, version number, and configuration information, the target device's layer n identity base value is obtained from the device vendor node. Combined with the encrypted value corresponding to the layer n public key, the target device's layer n public key PK is reconstructed. in =e in +Q iCA , where e in =Hash( DLCV in ), Q iCA For the public key of layer n-1 of the target device, The encrypted value corresponding to the public key at layer n, DLCV in Using the identity base value of the nth layer, construct the public key calculation equation for each layer in turn. The last equation will use the public key of the 0th layer that has been extracted from the explicit certificate. Substitute the public key into the calculation equation for each public key in ascending order of the layer number to obtain the public key of the nth layer. Aggregate verification of the aggregated signature value based on the reconstructed public key includes: Determine whether the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set in the aggregated signature value are all different, and determine whether the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same; If the elements of the first set and the elements of the second set are all different and the lengths of the first set and the second set are the same, then the aggregated signature value is aggregated and verified using the reconstructed public key based on the elliptic curve cryptography algorithm. The aggregate signature value is ( , ,t), Represents the first set, Let t represent the second set, and t represent the verification parameters. Each target device has the device's layer n public key P. i Device signature information m i signature value Let there be y devices. Then the device parameter information for each target device is {(P1, m1, ..., ...}}. ), ..., (P y m y , )},in =(b i , t i ), b i Indicates the first signature parameter, t i This represents the second signature parameter, initialized. = , = t=0, through the first set The second set Generate the initial aggregate signature value with the verification parameter t. , Let i range from 1 to y, and sequentially process (P... i m i , Perform signature verification and calculate the parameter verification value E. i The calculation formula is: w i =Hash(P i m i E i =t i G+ w i P i G is the chosen base point on the elliptic curve, if Hash(E) i ) and the first signature parameter b i Equal and (P) i m i (Does not belong to the first set) And the parameter verification value E i Not belonging to the second set Then (P) i m i Add to collection In the middle, the parameter verification value E i Add to collection In the middle, update t=t+t i mod q, where q is a prime number, is used to determine the range of the finite field.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores computer instructions for causing the computer to perform the aggregated trusted authentication method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

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