A key management method and related device

Abstract

The specification provides a key management method and related equipment, which is applied to a security hardware as a trusted root of an electronic device carried in the electronic device; the security hardware is respectively connected with a storage medium and a processor CPU in the electronic device, and a first key is stored in the storage medium and the security hardware. The method comprises the following steps: in response to a starting instruction for the electronic device, the CPU is prevented from starting, and the stored first key is used to encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware; the encrypted second key is sent to the storage medium, so that the storage medium uses the first key to decrypt the encrypted second key, and saves the decrypted second key, the second key is saved in a volatile storage space of the storage medium; the second key is used to encrypt data when the data is written into the storage medium, and is used to decrypt the data when the data is read out; and in response to the storage medium successfully saving the second key, the CPU is controlled to start.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This specification relates to the field of key management technology, and in particular to a key management method and related equipment. Background Technology

[0002] To protect data storage security, disk encryption using software is a common encryption method. It allows various software programs to encrypt and manage data on the hard drive. For example, when a user wants to write data to the hard drive, the software program first encrypts the data using a key before actually writing the encrypted data. Conversely, when a user wants to read data from the hard drive, the software program uses the same key to decrypt the data before providing the decrypted data to the user.

[0003] The keys used for data encryption management are usually generated and managed by software. However, software is often subject to security attacks during operation, making the keys very easy to leak and thus failing to guarantee data security. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of this, one or more embodiments of this specification provide a key management method and related equipment.

[0005] Firstly, this specification provides a key management method applied to secure hardware installed in an electronic device, which serves as the trusted root of the electronic device; the secure hardware interfaces with a storage medium and a processor CPU in the electronic device, respectively, and a first key is stored in the storage medium and the secure hardware; the method includes:

[0006] In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the CPU is prevented from booting, and the stored first key is used to encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware; and,

[0007] The encrypted second key is sent to the storage medium, so that the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key. The second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key is used to encrypt data when data is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when data is read from the storage medium.

[0008] In response to the successful storage of the second key on the storage medium, the CPU is controlled to start.

[0009] Secondly, this specification provides a key management method applied to a storage medium in an electronic device; the electronic device is equipped with security hardware serving as a trusted root of the electronic device, the security hardware interfacing with both the storage medium and the CPU in the electronic device, and a first key is stored in both the storage medium and the security hardware; the method includes:

[0010] After the security hardware responds to the boot command for the electronic device, prevents the CPU from booting, and encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key, it receives the encrypted second key sent by the security hardware.

[0011] The encrypted second key is decrypted using the stored first key, and the decrypted second key is saved, so that the security hardware controls the CPU to start in response to the successful saving of the second key on the storage medium; the second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium.

[0012] The data is encrypted when it is written to the storage medium using the saved second key, and decrypted when it is read out of the storage medium.

[0013] Thirdly, this specification provides a key management device applied to secure hardware installed in an electronic device as a trusted root of the electronic device; the secure hardware interfaces with a storage medium and a processor CPU in the electronic device, respectively, and a first key is stored in the storage medium and the secure hardware; the device includes:

[0014] A key encryption unit is configured to, in response to a boot command for the electronic device, prevent the CPU from booting and encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using a stored first key; and,

[0015] A key transmission unit is used to send the encrypted second key to the storage medium, so that the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key. The second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key is used to encrypt data when data is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when data is read from the storage medium.

[0016] The CPU startup unit is used to control the CPU to start up in response to the successful storage of the second key on the storage medium.

[0017] Fourthly, this specification provides a key management device applied to a storage medium in an electronic device; the electronic device is equipped with secure hardware serving as a trusted root of the electronic device, the secure hardware interfacing with both the storage medium and the processor CPU in the electronic device, and a first key is stored in both the storage medium and the secure hardware; the device includes:

[0018] A key receiving unit is configured to receive the encrypted second key sent by the security hardware after the security hardware prevents the CPU from starting in response to a startup command for the electronic device and encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key.

[0019] A key storage unit is used to decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key, so that the security hardware controls the CPU to start in response to the successful saving of the second key by the storage medium; the second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium.

[0020] The data encryption management unit is used to encrypt the data when it is written to the storage medium using the stored second key, and to decrypt the data when it is read out of the storage medium.

[0021] Fifthly, this specification provides a key management system, the system including a storage medium in an electronic device and security hardware serving as a trusted root of the electronic device; the security hardware is respectively connected to the storage medium and the CPU in the electronic device, and a first key is stored in the storage medium and the security hardware;

[0022] The security hardware is configured to, in response to a boot command for the electronic device, prevent the CPU from booting, encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using a stored first key, and send the encrypted second key to the storage medium.

[0023] The storage medium is used to decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key, and to save the decrypted second key, which is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium.

[0024] The security hardware is also used to control the CPU to start up in response to the storage medium successfully saving the second key;

[0025] The storage medium is also used to encrypt the data when it is written to the storage medium using the stored second key, and to decrypt the data when it is read out of the storage medium.

[0026] Accordingly, this specification also provides an electronic device, including: a memory and a processor; the memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor; when the processor executes the computer program, it performs the key management method described in the first aspect above, or performs the key management method described in the second aspect above.

[0027] Accordingly, this specification also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, performs the key management method as described in the first aspect above, or performs the key management method as described in the second aspect above.

[0028] In summary, the electronic device of this application incorporates secure hardware serving as a root of trust, which interfaces with the storage medium and CPU within the device. Simultaneously, both the security chip and the storage medium store a first key. In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the security hardware can prevent the CPU from booting and encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key, then transmit the encrypted second key to the storage medium. Furthermore, upon receiving the encrypted second key, the storage medium can decrypt it using the stored first key and store the decrypted second key in its volatile storage space. Only after successfully storing the second key in the storage medium will the security hardware control the CPU to boot. The storage medium can then use the stored second key to encrypt data when writing to it and decrypt data when reading it from the storage medium, ensuring data security. Thus, this application utilizes a root of trust security chip to generate encryption keys for data encryption management and securely transmits these keys to the storage medium before CPU boot, achieving more secure key management and protection. Furthermore, since the encryption key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium, once the electronic device is turned off, or if someone maliciously removes the storage medium from the electronic device, the second key will be lost along with the power loss of the storage medium, thus effectively preventing key leakage and ensuring data storage security. Attached Figure Description

[0029] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this specification and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this specification.

[0030] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a key management system provided in an exemplary embodiment.

[0031] Figure 2This is a flowchart illustrating a key management method provided in an exemplary embodiment.

[0032] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of another key management system architecture provided in an exemplary embodiment.

[0033] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the steps of data encryption management provided in an exemplary embodiment.

[0034] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a key management device provided in an exemplary embodiment.

[0035] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of another key management device provided in an exemplary embodiment.

[0036] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an exemplary embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0037] Exemplary embodiments will now be described in detail, examples of which are illustrated in the accompanying drawings. When the following description relates to the drawings, unless otherwise indicated, the same numerals in different drawings denote the same or similar elements. The embodiments described in the following exemplary embodiments do not represent all embodiments consistent with one or more embodiments of this specification. Rather, they are merely examples of apparatuses and methods consistent with some aspects of one or more embodiments of this specification as detailed in the appended claims.

[0038] It should be noted that the steps of the corresponding methods are not necessarily performed in the order shown and described in this specification in other embodiments. In some other embodiments, the methods may include more or fewer steps than described in this specification. Furthermore, a single step described in this specification may be broken down into multiple steps in other embodiments; and multiple steps described in this specification may be combined into a single step in other embodiments.

[0039] It should be noted that "multiple" as used in this application refers to two or more.

[0040] Furthermore, the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, stored data, displayed data, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties. The collection, use and processing of the relevant data must comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of the relevant countries and regions, and corresponding operation portals are provided for users to choose to authorize or refuse.

[0041] First, some terms used in this specification will be explained to facilitate understanding by those skilled in the art.

[0042] (1) Root of Trust (ROT) is the foundation of computer system security, aiming to provide a trusted environment for the computer system. The ROT establishes a chain of trust in which each component of the computer system needs to undergo a trust measurement (or trust verification) before it is allowed to operate. Only components that pass the trust measurement are allowed to perform the corresponding operations, in order to prevent various security threats in the computer system, such as malware, unauthorized access, and tampering with system data.

[0043] Furthermore, the form of a root of trust is usually a security chip (or a root of trust chip), such as a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a security chip based on a Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM), a security chip based on a TPCM (Trusted Platform Control Module), etc. This specification does not make any specific limitations on this.

[0044] As mentioned above, to ensure data storage security, software-based disk encryption can be used to manage and encrypt data on the hard drive. For example, when a user wants to write data to the hard drive, the software program first encrypts the data using a key before actually writing the encrypted data to the hard drive. Similarly, when a user wants to read data from the hard drive, the software program uses the same key to decrypt the data before providing it to the user. However, the keys used for data encryption management are usually generated and managed by the software. Since software is frequently subjected to security attacks during operation, these keys are easily leaked, thus compromising data security.

[0045] Based on this, this specification provides a technical solution in which a secure hardware, acting as a root of trust, generates an encryption key and securely transmits the encryption key to the storage medium before the CPU starts. The CPU will only start after the storage medium successfully saves the encryption key. Subsequently, the storage medium can perform data encryption management on the stored data based on the encryption key, which greatly improves the security of key management and thus ensures the security of data storage.

[0046] In implementation, the electronic device of this application incorporates secure hardware serving as a trusted root of the electronic device. This secure hardware interfaces with both the storage medium and the CPU within the electronic device, and a first key is stored in both the storage medium and the secure hardware. In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the secure hardware prevents the CPU from booting and encrypts a second key corresponding to the secure hardware using the stored first key. Further, the secure hardware sends the encrypted second key to the storage medium. The storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key, which can be stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key can be used to encrypt data when it is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when it is read from the storage medium. Furthermore, in response to the storage medium successfully saving the second key, the secure hardware can control the CPU to boot.

[0047] In the above technical solution, the electronic device of this application is equipped with security hardware serving as the root of trust for the electronic device, and this security hardware interfaces with the storage medium and CPU in the electronic device. Simultaneously, both the security chip and the storage medium store a first key. In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the aforementioned security hardware can prevent the CPU from booting and encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key, then transmit the encrypted second key to the storage medium. Further, after receiving the encrypted second key, the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and store the decrypted second key in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. Only after the storage medium successfully stores the second key will the security hardware control the CPU to boot. Afterwards, the storage medium can use the stored second key to encrypt data when writing data to the storage medium and decrypt data when reading data from the storage medium, thus ensuring data security. In this way, this application generates encryption keys for data encryption management using a root of trust security chip and securely transmits the encryption keys to the storage medium before the CPU boots, achieving more secure key management and protection. Furthermore, since the encryption key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium, once the electronic device is turned off, or if someone maliciously removes the storage medium from the electronic device, the second key will be lost along with the power loss of the storage medium, thus effectively preventing key leakage and ensuring data storage security.

[0048] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the architecture of a key management system provided in an exemplary embodiment. One or more embodiments provided in this description can be used... Figure 1 The specific implementation is within the system architecture shown or a similar system architecture. For example... Figure 1 As shown, the electronic device 10 may include a CPU and a key management system. Specifically, the key management system may include security hardware 101 and storage medium 102. Figure 1 As shown, the security hardware 101 interfaces with both the storage medium 102 and the CPU. Furthermore, the storage medium 102 interfaces with the CPU. It should be understood that when the CPU is running various applications, it can write data to and read data from the storage medium 102.

[0049] In one illustrated embodiment, security hardware 101 can serve as a trusted root of the electronic device 10. In another illustrated embodiment, security hardware 101 can be a trusted root security chip. For example, security hardware 101 may include any of the following security chips: a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), a security chip based on a Trusted Cryptography Module (TCM), a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM), etc., and this specification does not specifically limit it to any particular type.

[0050] In one illustrated embodiment, storage medium 102 may be an encrypted hard disk with data encryption capabilities. For example, storage medium 102 may be a solid-state drive (SSD) with data encryption capabilities, or a removable solid-state drive. For example, storage medium 102 may also be a disk with data encryption capabilities, etc., and this specification does not specifically limit it in this regard.

[0051] In one illustrated embodiment, both the security hardware 101 and the storage medium 102 store the first key. Exemplarily, the security hardware 101 and the storage medium 102 may have the first key pre-installed at the factory. In one illustrated embodiment, the first key may be a key used to encrypt a key, i.e., a key encryption key (KEK).

[0052] KEKs are typically used to protect symmetric keys, such as session keys used in network communications or data encryption keys used on storage devices. Furthermore, the KEK itself is usually a symmetric key. It should be noted that KEKs can use different encryption algorithms and key lengths to implement encryption, and this specification does not impose specific limitations on this. For example, a KEK can use the AES algorithm and a 256-bit key to encrypt another AES key, thereby improving data security. In addition, to ensure the security of the KEK during use and prevent unauthorized access and use, in some possible implementations, the KEK is often used in conjunction with other security measures, such as access control, authentication, and auditing, and this specification does not impose specific limitations on these measures.

[0053] In one illustrated embodiment, in response to a boot command for the electronic device 10, security hardware 101 can prevent the CPU in the electronic device 10 from booting. Exemplarily, the boot command could be a boot command based on a power-on operation or a restart operation.

[0054] Furthermore, the security hardware 101 can generate a second key, which can be used for data encryption management of the data stored in the storage medium 102. It should be noted that this application does not particularly limit the method of generating the second key. In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware 101 can directly generate the second key using a random number algorithm. In another illustrated embodiment, the security hardware 101 can also generate the second key through key derivation. For example, the security hardware 101 can derive the second key based on its stored first key or other keys.

[0055] In one illustrated embodiment, the second key can be a device encryption key (Master Encryption Key, MEK). MEK is an encryption key used to manage the encrypted data stored on an encrypted device (e.g., an encrypted SSD), including encrypting and decrypting data stored on the device (e.g., files, application data, and operating system data) to protect the data from unauthorized access and theft. MEK is typically a symmetric key. It should be noted that, similar to KEK, MEK can also use different encryption algorithms and key lengths for encryption, such as the AES algorithm and a 256-bit key. Similarly, to ensure the security of MEK during use, it is typically used in conjunction with other security measures, such as access control, authentication, and device encryption / decryption modules, etc., which are not specifically limited in this specification.

[0056] Furthermore, after generating the second key, the security hardware 101 can use the first key it stores to encrypt the second key.

[0057] In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware may not store the generated second key, or it may store it in the volatile storage space of the security hardware. Thus, once the electronic device 10 is powered off, the second key in the security hardware 101 will also be lost, effectively preventing key leakage. Correspondingly, in response to each startup command for the electronic device 10, that is, each time the electronic device starts, the security hardware 101 can regenerate the aforementioned second key and encrypt the generated second key using its stored first key. In one illustrated embodiment, the second key generated by the security hardware 101 each time can be the same.

[0058] In one illustrated embodiment, after generating the second key, the security hardware 101 can save the second key, for example, in the non-volatile storage space of the security hardware. Thus, even if the electronic device 10 is subsequently powered off, the second key in the security hardware 101 will not be lost. When the electronic device 10 restarts, the security hardware 101 does not need to regenerate the second key; instead, it can directly use the first key to encrypt the saved second key. For example, when the electronic device 10 first starts up and the security hardware 101 generates the second key for the first time, the security hardware 101 can save the second key to the non-volatile storage space.

[0059] In one illustrated embodiment, the second key may also be pre-stored in the security hardware 101, for example, in the non-volatile storage space of the security hardware. Exemplarily, the security hardware 101 may have the first key pre-installed at the factory. Accordingly, in response to a boot command for the electronic device 10, the security hardware 101 may prevent the CPU in the electronic device 10 from booting and directly encrypt the stored second key using the stored first key.

[0060] Furthermore, the security hardware 101 sends the encrypted second key to the storage medium 102. Accordingly, the storage medium 102 receives the encrypted second key and decrypts it using the first key stored therein, obtaining the plaintext of the second key, which is then saved.

[0061] It should be noted that the root of trust chip typically includes a secure storage area for storing encryption keys and other sensitive data. This secure storage area may include both non-volatile and volatile storage spaces from the aforementioned security hardware. Simultaneously, the storage medium 102 (e.g., an SSD) may also include volatile storage space, such as random access memory (RAM). In this application, the plaintext of the second key can be stored only in the secure storage area of ​​the root of trust chip and the RAM of the storage medium 102. Thus, once the electronic device 10 is powered off, or if someone maliciously removes the storage medium 102 from the electronic device 10, the second key originally stored in the storage medium 102 will be lost along with the power loss, effectively preventing key leakage.

[0062] Furthermore, in response to the storage medium 102 successfully storing the aforementioned second key, the security hardware 101 can control the CPU to start.

[0063] In one illustrated embodiment, after the CPU is started, the CPU can interact with the storage medium 102, at which time the storage medium 102 can perform data encryption management based on the saved second key.

[0064] Alternatively, in one of the illustrated embodiments, the CPU can also interact with the storage medium 102 during the CPU startup process, at which time the storage medium 102 can also perform data encryption management based on the saved second key.

[0065] As described above, the CPU may interact with the storage medium 102 during and after startup. When the CPU interacts with the storage medium 102, the storage medium 102 can perform data encryption management based on the saved second key.

[0066] For example, storage medium 102 can use the second key to encrypt data written by the CPU to storage medium 102, and / or use the second key to decrypt data read by the CPU from storage medium 102, so as to ensure data storage security.

[0067] In one of the illustrated embodiments, the electronic device 10 may be a smartphone, smart wearable device, tablet computer, laptop computer, desktop computer, server, or a server cluster consisting of several servers, etc., equipped with the above-described key management system and CPU. This specification does not specifically limit it in this regard.

[0068] In addition, it should be noted that, Figure 1 The system architecture shown is for illustrative purposes only. In some possible implementations, the key management system may include... Figure 1 This manual does not specify whether there are more or fewer components.

[0069] Please see Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a key management method provided in an exemplary embodiment. This method can be applied to... Figure 1 The key management system shown can specifically be applied to security hardware within the key management system. For example... Figure 2 As shown, the method may specifically include the following steps S201-S203.

[0070] In step S201, in response to a boot command for an electronic device, the CPU is prevented from booting, and the stored first key is used to encrypt the second key corresponding to the security hardware.

[0071] As described above, the electronic device is equipped with security hardware that serves as the trusted root of the electronic device. This security hardware interfaces with the storage medium and the CPU in the electronic device, and both the security hardware and the storage medium store the first key.

[0072] In one illustrated embodiment, in response to a boot command for an electronic device, security hardware can prevent the CPU in the electronic device from booting.

[0073] Furthermore, when the CPU is not running, the security hardware can generate a second key and encrypt it using the stored first key.

[0074] In one illustrated embodiment, after the electronic device is powered on, the storage medium powers on and sends a key acquisition request to the security hardware. Accordingly, the security hardware receives the key acquisition request. In response to the request, the security hardware can generate a second key and encrypt the second key using the stored first key. The specific types of the first and second keys, as well as the method of generating the second key, can be found above. Figure 1 The description of the corresponding embodiments will not be repeated here.

[0075] In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware may also store the second key. For example, the security hardware may have the second key pre-installed at the factory, or the second key may be saved after it is first generated. See the description above for details. Figure 1 The description of the corresponding embodiment will not be repeated here. Thus, after receiving the above-mentioned key acquisition request, the security hardware can directly encrypt the stored second key using the stored first key in response to the request.

[0076] Please see Figure 3 , Figure 3This is a schematic diagram of another key management system architecture provided in an exemplary embodiment. For example... Figure 3 As shown, the key management system may also include a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), which interfaces with both the security hardware and the storage medium. In one illustrated embodiment, Figure 3 The CPU, BMC, security hardware, and storage media shown can all be mounted on the motherboard of the electronic device. In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the motherboard powers on, and correspondingly, the BMC, security hardware, and storage media on the motherboard also power on. Simultaneously, the security hardware can use the TPCM (Through-Time Control Management) function to control the CPU's boot process, preventing the CPU from starting up and keeping it in an inactive state.

[0077] In one of the illustrated embodiments, the power-on voltage of the motherboard is generally 3.3V, but this specification does not specifically limit it.

[0078] In one illustrated embodiment, preventing the CPU from booting via security hardware may specifically include: after the motherboard is powered on, the security hardware generates a boot signal (i.e., a CPU reset signal) for the CPU and blocks the transmission of the boot signal to prevent the CPU from booting. Further, while the security hardware controls the CPU to be in an inactive state, the security hardware can first perform a trusted verification of the firmware installed on the electronic device. Upon successful verification, the firmware can be started and run. At this time, the security hardware can still continuously block the transmission of the boot signal to the CPU to maintain the CPU in an inactive state.

[0079] In one illustrated embodiment, the firmware may include a Basic Input Output System (BIOS) and a BMC, etc., which are not specifically limited in this specification.

[0080] In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware may also respond to the above-mentioned trust verification passing by generating a startup signal for the CPU and blocking the sending process of the startup signal for the CPU to control the CPU to be in an unstarted state, etc. This specification does not specifically limit this.

[0081] Furthermore, when the security hardware controls the CPU to be in an inactive state, the BMC can begin booting in response to the security hardware's successful verification of the BMC's trustworthiness. In one illustrated embodiment, the storage medium can send a key acquisition request to the BMC after power-on. The BMC receives the key acquisition request and further forwards it to the security hardware. Accordingly, the security hardware receives the key acquisition request and, in response, generates a second key and encrypts the second key using the stored first key. Alternatively, if the security hardware has stored the second key, in response to the request, the security hardware can directly encrypt the stored second key using the stored first key. Figure 3 As shown, the first key can be KEK, and the second key can be MEK.

[0082] Furthermore, it should be noted that this application does not specifically limit the communication method between the BMC and the security hardware and storage medium. In one illustrated embodiment, as... Figure 3 As shown, the BMC can communicate with security hardware and storage media via the Inter-Integrated Circuit (IIC) communication protocol, or it can communicate via any other possible communication protocol, which is not specifically limited in this specification.

[0083] It should be noted that, Figure 3 The system architecture shown is for illustrative purposes only. In some possible implementations, the BMC may also be independent of the key management system, etc. This specification does not specifically limit this.

[0084] Step S202: The encrypted second key is sent to the storage medium so that the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key. The second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key is used to encrypt the data when the data is written to the storage medium and to decrypt the data when the data is read from the storage medium.

[0085] Furthermore, in one illustrated embodiment, after the security hardware encrypts the generated second key using its stored first key, the security hardware can send the encrypted second key to the storage medium, and the storage medium receives the encrypted second key accordingly.

[0086] It is understandable that the communication link between security hardware and storage media (such as the IIC link) may be intercepted by other malicious software. Therefore, this application encrypts the second key with the first key before transmission, which can effectively prevent the leakage of the second key and ensure that the second key can be securely transmitted to the storage medium, thereby ensuring data storage security.

[0087] Furthermore, after receiving the encrypted second key, the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using its stored first key and save the decrypted second key, i.e., save the plaintext of the second key. This second key can be used to encrypt data when it is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when it is read from the storage medium.

[0088] For example, such as Figure 3 As shown, taking KEK as the first key and MEK as the second key as an example, the security hardware can send the MEK encrypted by KEK to the BMC via the IIC communication protocol. The BMC then sends the encrypted MEK to the storage medium via the IIC communication protocol. After receiving the encrypted MEK, the storage medium can use its stored KEK to decrypt the encrypted MEK and save the decrypted MEK.

[0089] In one illustrated embodiment, the storage medium may include volatile storage space, in which the second key may be stored. In another illustrated embodiment, the storage medium may be an SSD, and the volatile storage space may include RAM. In yet another illustrated embodiment, the SSD may include an SSD controller, and further, the volatile storage space may be located within the SSD controller. The SSD controller is the controller chip on the SSD and is one of the core components of the SSD. The SSD controller is primarily responsible for managing data storage and access on the SSD and controlling the SSD's read and write operations. The SSD controller typically includes key components such as a flash memory controller, DRAM cache, data processor, and I / O interface. The flash memory controller manages the flash memory cells on the SSD, the DRAM cache caches data for SSD read and write operations, the data processor encodes and decodes data on the SSD, and the I / O interface communicates with a computer or other devices, etc., which will not be detailed here.

[0090] As mentioned above, since the MEK is stored in the SSD controller RAM, once the electronic device is powered off or the SSD is removed from the electronic device, the SSD will lose power, and the MEK originally stored in RAM will be lost. Only after power is restored and steps 201 and 202 above are completed can the SSD obtain the MEK.

[0091] In one illustrated implementation, the MEK generated by the security hardware can be the same each time the device is powered on, and the true random number ensures the uniqueness of the MEK. Correspondingly, the MEK obtained by SSD decryption each time the device is powered on is also consistent with the MEK before the device was powered off, so that the CPU can start normally.

[0092] In one illustrated implementation, for example, in the case of system reinstallation, the MEK generated by the security hardware after power-on may be different from the previously generated MEK, and this specification does not specifically limit this.

[0093] It is understandable that the storage medium and security hardware in electronic devices are bound to each other to a certain extent. If the storage medium is removed and moved to another device, or if the security hardware in this electronic device is replaced, the storage medium will not be able to obtain the plaintext of MEK, making the data in the storage medium unreadable and unwritable, thereby ensuring data storage security.

[0094] In some possible implementations, the secure hardware can package the MEK encrypted via KEK into a data packet and send it to the storage medium. Furthermore, the secure hardware can further sign the KEK(MEK) data packet using an asymmetric private key, stored within the secure hardware. The corresponding public key can be stored within the storage medium (e.g., the SSD controller). Upon receiving the signed KEK(MEK) data packet, the storage medium can verify the signature using the public key to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the KEK(MEK) data packet, i.e., to ensure that the KEK(MEK) originated from the secure hardware and has not been tampered with.

[0095] In some possible implementations, the BMC can also be connected to an out-of-band network, which may include a Key Management Service (KMS). Thus, this application could also generate the aforementioned second key using the KMS, transmit the KMS-generated second key to the security hardware via the BMC, and then have the security hardware encrypt the second key using its stored first key, and securely transmit the encrypted second key to a storage medium, etc. This specification does not specifically limit the implementation in this way.

[0096] Step S203: In response to the successful saving of the second key on the storage medium, control the CPU to start.

[0097] Furthermore, in response to the successful storage of the second key on the storage medium, the security hardware can control the CPU to boot. For example, in response to the successful storage of the second key on the storage medium, the security hardware can send the aforementioned boot signal to the CPU, i.e., release the CPU reset signal, thereby booting the CPU.

[0098] Furthermore, during or after CPU startup, the storage medium can interact with the CPU, at which point it can perform data encryption management based on the stored second key. For example, the storage medium can use the second key to encrypt data written by the CPU to the storage medium, and / or use the second key to decrypt data read by the CPU from the storage medium, etc., etc., which are not specifically limited in this specification.

[0099] Please see Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating steps for data encryption management as provided in an exemplary embodiment. Figure 4 As shown, the SSD can communicate with the CPU via the PCIe bus. After the CPU boots up, the PCIe bus is powered on. For example, when the CPU is running a corresponding application, it can write data to the SSD via the PCIe bus. The SSD controller can encrypt the data to be written using the MEK stored in RAM, and the encrypted data can be stored in the SSD's storage chips. In one illustrated embodiment, the storage chip can be a NAND flash memory chip, which contains numerous storage cells. It should be understood that NAND flash memory is a non-volatile semiconductor memory device that retains its stored data even when power is off; this will not be elaborated further here. Correspondingly, the CPU can read corresponding data from the SSD's storage chips via the PCIe bus. The SSD controller can decrypt the read data using the MEK stored in RAM and transmit the decrypted data to the CPU via the PCIe bus.

[0100] As described above, since the generation, encryption, transmission, decryption, and storage of the second key are all completed before the CPU starts, the upper-level systems such as the BIOS and OS, as well as various applications, are unaware of whether the underlying storage medium is encrypted after startup. In fact, to the CPU, the storage medium can be a regular hard drive without encryption. Therefore, the key management based on the root of trust in this application is not only secure and reliable but also very simple, requiring minimal changes to the entire computer system. No modifications are needed to the BIOS and OS, making it highly adaptable.

[0101] In summary, the electronic device of this application incorporates secure hardware serving as a root of trust, which interfaces with the storage medium and CPU within the device. Simultaneously, both the security chip and the storage medium store a first key. In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the security hardware can prevent the CPU from booting and encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key, then transmit the encrypted second key to the storage medium. Furthermore, upon receiving the encrypted second key, the storage medium can decrypt it using the stored first key and store the decrypted second key in its volatile storage space. Only after successfully storing the second key in the storage medium will the security hardware control the CPU to boot. The storage medium can then use the stored second key to encrypt data when writing to it and decrypt data when reading it from the storage medium, ensuring data security. Thus, this application utilizes a root of trust security chip to generate encryption keys for data encryption management and securely transmits these keys to the storage medium before CPU boot, achieving more secure key management and protection. Furthermore, since the encryption key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium, once the electronic device is turned off, or if someone maliciously removes the storage medium from the electronic device, the second key will be lost along with the power loss of the storage medium, thus effectively preventing key leakage and ensuring data storage security.

[0102] Corresponding to the above-described method and flow, embodiments of this specification also provide a key management device. Please refer to... Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a key management device provided in an exemplary embodiment. The device 50 can be applied to security hardware integrated into an electronic device, serving as the trusted root of the electronic device. This security hardware interfaces with both a storage medium and a processor CPU within the electronic device, and the storage medium and the security hardware store a first key. Figure 5 As shown, the device 50 includes:

[0103] The key encryption unit 501 is configured to, in response to a boot command for the electronic device, prevent the CPU from booting and encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using the first key stored therein; and,

[0104] The key transmission unit 502 is used to send the encrypted second key to the storage medium, so that the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the first key stored therein, and save the decrypted second key. The second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key is used to encrypt data when data is written to the storage medium, and to decrypt data when data is read from the storage medium.

[0105] CPU startup unit 503 is used to control the CPU to start up in response to the successful saving of the second key on the storage medium.

[0106] In one illustrated embodiment, the first key is a key encryption key KEK, and the second key is a device encryption key MEK.

[0107] In one illustrated embodiment, the key encryption unit 501 is specifically used to: generate a second key corresponding to the security hardware, and encrypt the generated second key using the stored first key.

[0108] In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware also stores a second key corresponding to the security hardware; the key encryption unit 501 is specifically used to: encrypt the second key stored in the security hardware using the stored first key.

[0109] In one illustrated embodiment, the second key stored in the security hardware is a key pre-stored in the security hardware; or, the second key stored in the security hardware is a key generated and saved by the security hardware in response to a startup command for the electronic device.

[0110] In one illustrated embodiment, the key encryption unit 501 is specifically used to: block the transmission process of the startup signal for the CPU; the CPU startup unit 503 is specifically used to: send the startup signal to the CPU.

[0111] In one illustrated embodiment, before blocking the transmission of the boot signal for the CPU, the device 50 further includes a trusted verification unit 504, configured to:

[0112] The firmware installed on the electronic device is subjected to a trusted verification, and in response to the successful trusted verification, a boot signal is generated for the CPU.

[0113] In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware interfaces with the storage medium via a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC).

[0114] The key encryption unit 501 is specifically used for:

[0115] The storage medium receives a key acquisition request sent via the BMC, and in response to the request, encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key.

[0116] The key transmission unit 502 is specifically used for:

[0117] The encrypted second key is sent to the BMC, so that the encrypted second key can be further sent to the storage medium via the BMC.

[0118] In one illustrated embodiment, the storage medium is a solid-state drive (SSD).

[0119] In one illustrated embodiment, the volatile storage space includes random access memory (RAM).

[0120] In one illustrated embodiment, the security hardware includes any of the following security chips: a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM), a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or a security chip based on a Trusted Cryptographic Module (TCM).

[0121] Accordingly, please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a key management device provided in an exemplary embodiment. The device 60 can be applied to a storage medium in an electronic device; the electronic device carries security hardware that serves as a trusted root of the electronic device. The security hardware can interface with both the storage medium and the CPU in the electronic device, and the storage medium and the security hardware store a first key. Figure 6 As shown, the device 60 includes:

[0122] The key receiving unit 601 is configured to receive the encrypted second key sent by the security hardware after the security hardware prevents the CPU from starting in response to a startup command for the electronic device and encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key.

[0123] The key storage unit 602 is used to decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key, so that the security hardware controls the CPU to start in response to the successful saving of the second key by the storage medium; the second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium.

[0124] The data encryption management unit 603 is used to encrypt the data when it is written to the storage medium using the stored second key, and to decrypt the data when it is read out of the storage medium.

[0125] For details on the implementation process of the functions and roles of each unit in the aforementioned devices 50 and 60, please refer to the above. Figures 1-4 The description of the corresponding embodiments will not be repeated here. It should be understood that the above-described devices 50 and 60 can be implemented in software, hardware, or a combination of both. Taking software implementation as an example, as a logical device, it is formed by the processor (CPU) of the device loading the corresponding computer program instructions into memory and running them. From a hardware perspective, in addition to the CPU and memory, the device typically includes other hardware such as chips for wireless signal transmission and reception, and / or other hardware such as boards for implementing network communication functions.

[0126] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical modules; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network modules. Some or all of the units or modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of the solution described in this specification, depending on actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without any inventive effort.

[0127] The devices, units, and modules described in the above embodiments can be implemented by computer chips or physical entities, or by products with certain functions. A typical implementation device is a computer, which can take the form of a personal computer, laptop computer, cellular phone, camera phone, smartphone, personal digital assistant, media player, navigation device, email sending and receiving device, game console, tablet computer, wearable device, in-vehicle computer, or any combination of these devices.

[0128] Corresponding to the above method embodiments, embodiments of this specification also provide an electronic device. Please refer to... Figure 7 , Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an exemplary embodiment. Figure 7 The electronic device shown can be Figure 1 or Figure 3The illustrated electronic device 10 incorporates secure hardware serving as a root of trust for the device. This secure hardware interfaces with both the storage medium and the CPU within the electronic device, and a first key is stored in both the storage medium and the secure hardware. This electronic device can specifically be a smartphone, smart wearable device, tablet computer, laptop computer, desktop computer, server, or server cluster, etc., and this specification does not specify a particular type. Figure 7 As shown, the electronic device includes a processor 1001 and a memory 1002, and may further include an input device 1004 (e.g., a keyboard) and an output device 1005 (e.g., a display). The processor 1001, memory 1002, input device 1004, and output device 1005 can be connected via a bus or other means. Figure 7 As shown, memory 1002 includes a computer-readable storage medium 1003 storing a computer program executable by processor 1001. Processor 1001 may be a CPU, a microprocessor, or an integrated circuit for controlling the execution of the above method embodiments. Processor 1001 may be a processor in security hardware. When running the stored computer program, processor 1001 can execute various steps of the key management method in the embodiments of this specification, including: preventing the CPU from starting in response to a startup instruction for the electronic device, and encrypting a second key corresponding to the security hardware using a stored first key; sending the encrypted second key to the storage medium so that the storage medium decrypts the encrypted second key using the stored first key, and saving the decrypted second key, which is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium; the second key is used to encrypt data when data is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when data is read from the storage medium; controlling the CPU to start in response to the storage medium successfully saving the second key, etc.

[0129] For a detailed description of each step of the above key management method, please refer to the previous content, which will not be repeated here.

[0130] Corresponding to the above-described method embodiments, embodiments of this specification also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing computer programs that, when run by a processor, execute the various steps of the key management method described in this specification. Please refer to the above for details. Figures 1-4 The description of the corresponding embodiments will not be repeated here.

[0131] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of this specification and is not intended to limit this specification. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of this specification should be included within the scope of protection of this specification.

[0132] In a typical configuration, a terminal device includes one or more CPUs, input / output interfaces, network interfaces, and memory.

[0133] Memory may include non-persistent storage in computer-readable media, such as random access memory (RAM) and / or non-volatile memory, such as read-only memory (ROM) or flash RAM. Memory is an example of computer-readable media.

[0134] Computer-readable media, including both permanent and non-permanent, removable and non-removable media, can store information using any method or technology. Information can be computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data.

[0135] Examples of computer storage media include, but are not limited to, phase-change memory (PRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), other types of random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile optical disc (DVD) or other optical storage, magnetic tape, magnetic magnetic disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other non-transferable medium that can be used to store information that can be accessed by a computing device. As defined herein, computer-readable media does not include transient media, such as modulated data signals and carrier waves.

[0136] It should also be noted that the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitation, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0137] Those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments of this specification can be provided as methods, systems, or computer program products. Therefore, the embodiments of this specification can take the form of entirely hardware embodiments, entirely software embodiments, or embodiments combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the embodiments of this specification can take the form of computer program products implemented on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

Claims

1. A key management method, characterized in that, A secure hardware device installed in an electronic device, serving as a trusted root of the electronic device; the secure hardware interface with a storage medium and a processor CPU in the electronic device, respectively, and a first key is stored in the storage medium and the secure hardware; the method includes: In response to a boot command for the electronic device, the CPU is prevented from booting, and the stored first key is used to encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware; and, The encrypted second key is sent to the storage medium, so that the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key. The second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key is used to encrypt data when data is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when data is read from the storage medium. In response to the successful storage of the second key on the storage medium, the CPU is controlled to start.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of encrypting the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key includes: A second key corresponding to the security hardware is generated, and the generated second key is encrypted using the stored first key.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security hardware also stores the second key corresponding to the security hardware; The step of encrypting the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key includes: The second key stored in the security hardware is encrypted using the first key stored in the storage.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The second key stored in the security hardware is a key pre-stored in the security hardware; or, the second key stored in the security hardware is a key generated and saved by the security hardware in response to a startup command for the electronic device.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first key is the key encryption key KEK, and the second key is the device encryption key MEK.

6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Preventing the CPU from starting up includes: blocking the transmission process of the startup signal to the CPU; controlling the CPU to start up includes: sending the startup signal to the CPU.

7. The method according to claim 6, characterized in that, Before blocking the transmission of the startup signal for the CPU, the method further includes: The firmware installed on the electronic device is subjected to a trusted verification, and in response to the successful trusted verification, a boot signal is generated for the CPU.

8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The security hardware and the storage medium are connected via a Baseboard Management Controller (BMC). The step of encrypting the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key includes: The storage medium receives a key acquisition request sent via the BMC, and in response to the request, encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key. Sending the encrypted second key to the storage medium includes: The encrypted second key is sent to the BMC, so that the encrypted second key can be further sent to the storage medium via the BMC.

9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The storage medium is a solid-state drive (SSD).

10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The volatile storage space includes random access memory (RAM).

11. The method according to any one of claims 1-10, characterized in that, The security hardware includes any of the following security chips: a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Control Module (TPCM), a security chip based on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or a security chip based on a Trusted Cryptographic Module (TCM).

12. A key management method, characterized in that, A storage medium used in an electronic device; the electronic device is equipped with security hardware serving as a root of trust for the electronic device, the security hardware interface with both the storage medium and the CPU of the electronic device, and the storage medium and the security hardware store a first key; the method includes: After the security hardware responds to the boot command for the electronic device, prevents the CPU from booting, and encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key, it receives the encrypted second key sent by the security hardware. The encrypted second key is decrypted using the stored first key, and the decrypted second key is saved, so that the security hardware controls the CPU to start in response to the successful saving of the second key on the storage medium; the second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The data is encrypted when it is written to the storage medium using the saved second key, and decrypted when it is read out of the storage medium.

13. A key management system, characterized in that, The system includes a storage medium in an electronic device and security hardware that serves as a trusted root of the electronic device; the security hardware interfaces with the storage medium and the processor CPU in the electronic device, respectively, and the storage medium and the security hardware store a first key; The security hardware is configured to prevent the CPU from starting in response to a startup command for the electronic device, and to encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key; And, the encrypted second key is sent to the storage medium; The storage medium is used to decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key, and to save the decrypted second key, which is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The security hardware is also used to control the CPU to start up in response to the storage medium successfully saving the second key; The storage medium is also used to encrypt the data when it is written to the storage medium using the stored second key, and to decrypt the data when it is read out of the storage medium.

14. A key management device, characterized in that, A security hardware device installed in an electronic device as a trusted root of the electronic device; the security hardware interface with a storage medium and a processor CPU in the electronic device, respectively, and a first key is stored in the storage medium and the security hardware; the device includes: A key encryption unit is configured to, in response to a boot command for the electronic device, prevent the CPU from booting and encrypt a second key corresponding to the security hardware using a stored first key; and, A key transmission unit is used to send the encrypted second key to the storage medium, so that the storage medium can decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key. The second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The second key is used to encrypt data when data is written to the storage medium and to decrypt data when data is read from the storage medium. The CPU startup unit is used to control the CPU to start up in response to the successful storage of the second key on the storage medium.

15. A key management device, characterized in that, A storage medium used in an electronic device; the electronic device is equipped with security hardware serving as a root of trust for the electronic device, the security hardware interface with both the storage medium and the CPU of the electronic device, and the storage medium and the security hardware store a first key; the device includes: A key receiving unit is configured to receive the encrypted second key sent by the security hardware after the security hardware prevents the CPU from starting in response to a startup command for the electronic device and encrypts the second key corresponding to the security hardware using the stored first key. A key storage unit is used to decrypt the encrypted second key using the stored first key and save the decrypted second key, so that the security hardware controls the CPU to start in response to the successful saving of the second key by the storage medium; the second key is stored in the volatile storage space of the storage medium. The data encryption management unit is used to encrypt the data when it is written to the storage medium using the stored second key, and to decrypt the data when it is read out of the storage medium.

16. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: Memory and processor; The memory stores computer programs that can be executed by the processor; When the processor runs the computer program, it performs the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 11, or performs the method as described in claim 12.

17. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, It stores a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 11, or performs the method as described in claim 12.

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