Anti-misoperation forced relief brake control circuit and control logic thereof

CN117565847BActive Publication Date: 2026-09-25CRRC DALIAN CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202311540716.6
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Patents(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2023-11-17
Publication Date
2026-09-25
Estimated Expiration
2043-11-17

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

[0012](1)由于强迫缓解功能可以缓解除紧急制动外的所有空气制动,在某种特殊情况下可能造成车辆失控的风险

Benefits of technology

[0049]本发明在结合轨道交通车辆实际运用过程中发生的实际问题,结合现有制动系统强迫缓解控制逻辑和电路进行创新和优化,运用创新思维、集思而生的变革式设计,适用于所有轨道交通车辆。

✦ Generated by Eureka AI based on patent content.

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Abstract

The application discloses a false operation prevention forced release brake control system, which comprises a driver's cabin control device and N forced release brake control devices arranged in N carriages respectively, namely, a first forced release brake control device, a second forced release brake control device,..., and an Nth forced release brake control device; the driver's cabin control device is connected with the first forced release brake control device, the second forced release brake control device,..., and the Nth forced release brake control device respectively; the control system independently manages input release of the forced release function, has an electrically isolated shielding brake unit which is not affected by a vehicle state and is not released in a non-braking fault, and is effective no matter the vehicle is in a normal state or an emergency running state.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of fully automated products and relates to a forced release braking control circuit and its control logic to prevent misoperation. Background Technology

[0002] The braking system is one of the most important systems in rail transit vehicles, and its stability and reliability determine the vehicle's safe stopping performance. With the increasing number of rail transit lines both domestically and internationally, braking system failures are leading to more instances of inaccurate vehicle alignment, delays, and the need for emergency repairs. Therefore, vehicle designers must pay close attention to how to quickly handle braking system failures, enabling vehicles to continue operating under special conditions through necessary interventions, minimizing the impact of the failure, and meeting the owner's normal operational requirements.

[0003] When a vehicle is brought to a stop while still under braking, the system determines whether to release the braking force by establishing a traction force and comparing it with the maximum downhill force under the current load. This ensures the vehicle can be towed without rolling back. However, during this process, the braking system may experience a "brake not releasing" fault, preventing the vehicle from being towed and affecting normal operation. The forced release function is designed to quickly resolve this "brake not releasing" fault, allowing the vehicle to be towed normally without disrupting operations. It is also a very practical control function that shortens rescue time and enables rapid rescue during vehicle emergencies.

[0004] Reasonable forced mitigation control logic and circuit design can not only avoid the drawbacks of existing solutions, but also improve the design level and product quality of the overall control strategy for rail transit vehicles.

[0005] Existing technical solution 1

[0006] Currently, the forced-release control circuit of rail transit vehicles is relatively simple. A schematic diagram of a traditional control circuit is shown below. Figure 1 As shown:

[0007] Traditional control circuits consist of an instruction input section and a brake valve execution section. The specific control logic and operation are as follows:

[0008] (1) The forced release function is controlled by activating the forced release button in the driver's cab, which is active at a high level. That is, a DC 110V voltage is output to the brake system control valve through the train line;

[0009] (2) All the forced release solenoid valves in the control valves of the braking system are synchronously energized and perform forced release;

[0010] (3) When the solenoid valve is energized, the air circuit is opened, which drives the pneumatic valve to discharge air from the brake cylinder. After the air is discharged from the brake cylinder of the whole vehicle, the vehicle brake is released, and the forced release control is completed.

[0011] The aforementioned forced release control circuit is designed to basically meet the braking release requirements under special vehicle conditions. However, it has the following drawbacks:

[0012] (1) Since the forced release function can release all air brakes except for emergency braking, it may cause the vehicle to lose control under certain special circumstances. For example, if the vehicle is parked on a slope, the forced release function may be accidentally activated, causing the vehicle to lose control and roll away.

[0013] (2) This uncontrollable human factor increases the driving risk of vehicles during operation and daily maintenance, and poses a great safety hazard.

[0014] Technical solution two of the prior art:

[0015] Another control strategy involves adding logical checks to the Train Management and Monitoring System (TCMS) regarding brake failure. When the driver presses the forced release command, the TCMS performs a logical diagnosis and only forces release the brake valve that has experienced a brake failure. The specific logic diagram is shown below. Figure 2 As shown;

[0016] Although the above solution can only alleviate the braking unit that has a braking failure, because the vehicle network system is involved in the logical judgment, when the TCMS system fails or crashes, this control strategy will not be able to meet the purpose of forcibly releasing the vehicle and then towing it away in special circumstances. Summary of the Invention

[0017] To solve the above problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is: a forced release braking control circuit to prevent misoperation, including a driver's cab control device and forced release braking control devices respectively installed in N carriages, that is, N forced release braking control devices, including a first forced release braking control device, a second forced release braking control device, ..., the Nth forced release braking control device;

[0018] The driver's cab control device is connected to the first forced release brake control device, the second forced release brake control device, ... the Nth forced release brake control device, respectively;

[0019] The driver's cab control device includes an occupancy relay, a forced release button, and a diode terminal block;

[0020] The occupancy relay, the forced release button, and the diode terminal block are connected in sequence.

[0021] The first forced release braking control device includes a first brake control valve MV and a second brake control valve AV; each brake valve controls the braking of one bogie, i.e., bogie control;

[0022] The PL2:A and PL3:T terminals of the first brake control valve MV are powered by DC 110V.

[0023] The PL2:B and PL2:M terminals of the first brake control valve MV are grounded.

[0024] The PL2:L terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to the output command line of the driver's cab control device through the normally open contact of the brake non-release relay I.

[0025] The PL3:E terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to the coil of the brake non-release relay I, and is also connected to the train control and monitoring system and the logic control unit through the diode terminal block I to form feedback;

[0026] The PL2:A and PL3:T terminals of the second brake control valve AV are powered by DC 110V.

[0027] The PL2:B and PL2:M terminals of the second brake control valve AV are grounded;

[0028] The PL2:L terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to the output command line of the driver's cab control device through the normally open contact of the brake non-release relay II.

[0029] The PL3:E terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to the coil of the brake non-release relay II, and is also connected to the train control and monitoring system and logic control unit through diode terminal block II to form feedback;

[0030] The function of brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II is to actively identify the control valve that is experiencing brake non-release, so that the specified input can be sent to the control valve with the brake non-release fault after the forced release button is operated, and then brake release can be performed accordingly. The control valve that is not experiencing brake non-release fault does not need to receive this signal, and it releases according to the normal release logic, and does not execute with the forced release operation.

[0031] Furthermore: the operating process of the brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II includes:

[0032] (1) When there is no brake release fault, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV do not output the brake release signal, that is, the brake release relay I and the brake release relay II are not energized and their normally open contacts are open.

[0033] (2) When a brake failure occurs, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV output a brake failure signal, that is, the brake failure relay I and the brake failure relay II are energized and their normally open contacts are closed.

[0034] Furthermore, it also includes the following: after the driver's cab control device is activated, the occupancy relay is energized, and its normally open contact closes; the working process of the brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II includes:

[0035] When there is no brake release fault, the forced release button FRB in the driver's cab is activated. At this time, the brake release relay I and brake release relay II are not energized, and their normally open contacts are open. Therefore, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV do not receive the forced release command, which does not affect the current vehicle status.

[0036] When a brake failure occurs, the forced release button FRB in the driver's cab is activated. At this time, some brake control valves of the vehicle output a brake failure command, and the corresponding brake failure relays I and II are energized, and their normally open contacts close. Therefore, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV can receive the forced release command. The other brake control valves do not need to receive the forced release command because they are not faulty.

[0037] The control method for the forced release braking control circuit to prevent misoperation includes the following steps:

[0038] (1) When the train is activated, the possession relay is energized and its normally open contact closes.

[0039] (2) The vehicle remains braked and stationary, awaiting towing;

[0040] (3) Push the traction handle to establish traction force, thereby relieving the train's braking;

[0041] (4) When the train releases and holds the brake abnormally, that is, when some brake control valves fail to release the brake, other brake control valves can release and hold the brake normally. The first brake control valve MV or the second brake control valve AV outputs a brake not release signal, and then the coil of the brake not release relay I or the brake not release relay II is energized and its normally open contact closes.

[0042] (5) Press the forced release button to send the command to the brake control valve that has a brake failure to release, so that the brake of the whole train can be released, so that the train can be tractioned and started normally. The brake failure event is recorded by hard input of TCMS / LCU.

[0043] A control method for preventing misoperation of a forced release braking control circuit according to any one of the claims includes the following steps:

[0044] (1) When the train is activated, the possession relay is energized and its normally open contact closes.

[0045] (2) The vehicle remains stationary under braking and awaits towing;

[0046] (3) Press the forced relief button;

[0047] (4) Since the vehicle is not in a traction condition and there is no brake failure, the brake control valve does not accept the forced release command, maintains the brake, and prevents the vehicle from rolling down the slope.

[0048] The present invention provides a forced release braking control system and method to prevent misoperation, which has the following advantages:

[0049] This invention addresses practical problems encountered in the actual use of rail transit vehicles, innovates and optimizes existing braking system forced release control logic and circuits, and employs innovative thinking and a transformative design born from collective wisdom, making it applicable to all rail transit vehicles.

[0050] This invention is widely used in the design of rail transit vehicles;

[0051] The logic circuit of this application is constructed using hard wiring and related components, which has a good anti-misoperation function and avoids the safety risk caused by the vehicle rolling away.

[0052] This control circuit is effective regardless of whether the vehicle is in a normal or emergency operating state.

[0053] Modular design facilitates rapid and efficient design of rail transit vehicles.

[0054] Diverse recording methods help improve vehicle information databases, facilitate performance analysis throughout the vehicle lifecycle, and guide vehicle operation, maintenance, and upkeep.

[0055] A forced release braking control system designed to prevent misoperation allows for the application of brake release only to the faulty valve when the forced release button is pressed. The remaining braking units continue to operate according to their original release braking control strategies. When the vehicle has no brake failure, even pressing the forced release button will prevent the braking units from operating due to electrical isolation. This logic circuit, constructed with hard wiring and related components, provides excellent protection against misoperation and prevents vehicle rollover from posing a safety risk.

[0056] This control system independently manages the input relief of the forced relief function, has an electrically isolated shielding braking unit for non-brake-relaxation faults, and is unaffected by vehicle status. This control circuit is effective regardless of whether the vehicle is in normal or emergency operation.

[0057] The control system includes command input components, logic control components, and function execution components. The circuit details are disclosed, and interface functions are locked. Modular design facilitates the rapid and efficient design of rail transit vehicles.

[0058] A forced brake release control method to prevent misoperation is provided. Specifically, if a braking system malfunctions during the transition from a stationary state to traction departure, causing the vehicle to be unable to maintain braking, the driver, with the driver's cab activated and traction enabled, presses the forced release button to forcibly release the malfunctioning braking unit, thus meeting vehicle operation requirements. The method also provides standardized and guiding procedures for forced brake release.

[0059] Three methods for recording brake failure are defined: TCMS communication recording, TCMS hard-wired input recording, and LCU hard-wired input recording. The diversity of recording methods helps to improve the vehicle information database, facilitates performance analysis of the vehicle's life cycle, and guides vehicle operation, maintenance, and upkeep. Attached Figure Description

[0060] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0061] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of a traditional forced relief control circuit;

[0062] Figure 2 This is the logic diagram for TCMS logic diagnosis;

[0063] Figure 3 This is the circuit diagram for the forced relief control of this application;

[0064] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the operation control process;

[0065] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the process to prevent accidental operation. Detailed Implementation

[0066] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features in the embodiments of the present invention can be combined with each other. The present invention will be described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0067] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. The following description of at least one exemplary embodiment is merely illustrative and is in no way intended to limit the present invention or its application or use. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0068] It should be noted that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the scope of exemplary embodiments according to the invention. As used herein, the singular form is intended to include the plural form as well, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. Furthermore, it should be understood that when the terms "comprising" and / or "including" are used in this specification, they indicate the presence of features, steps, operations, devices, components, and / or combinations thereof.

[0069] Unless otherwise specifically stated, the relative arrangement, numerical expressions, and values ​​of the components and steps described in these embodiments do not limit the scope of the invention. It should also be understood that, for ease of description, the dimensions of the various parts shown in the drawings are not drawn to actual scale. Techniques, methods, and devices known to those skilled in the art may not be discussed in detail, but where appropriate, such techniques, methods, and devices should be considered part of the specification. In all examples shown and discussed herein, any specific values ​​should be interpreted as merely exemplary and not as limitations. Therefore, other examples of exemplary embodiments may have different values. It should be noted that similar reference numerals and letters in the following figures denote similar items; therefore, once an item is defined in one figure, it need not be further discussed in subsequent figures.

[0070] In the description of this invention, it should be understood that the orientation or positional relationship indicated by directional terms such as "front, back, up, down, left, right", "horizontal, vertical, horizontal" and "top, bottom" is generally based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the accompanying drawings, and is only for the convenience of describing this invention and simplifying the description. Unless otherwise stated, these directional terms do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation, and therefore should not be construed as a limitation on the scope of protection of this invention. The directional terms "inner" and "outer" refer to the inner and outer contours relative to the outline of each component itself.

[0071] For ease of description, spatial relative terms such as "above," "over," "on the upper surface of," "above," etc., are used herein to describe the spatial positional relationship of a device or feature as shown in the figures to other devices or features. It should be understood that spatial relative terms are intended to encompass different orientations in use or operation besides the orientation of the device as described in the figures. For example, if the device in the figures is inverted, a device described as "above" or "above" other devices or structures would subsequently be positioned as "below" or "under" other devices or structures. Thus, the exemplary term "above" can include both "above" and "below." The device may also be positioned in other different ways (rotated 90 degrees or in other orientations), and the spatial relative descriptions used herein will be interpreted accordingly.

[0072] Furthermore, it should be noted that the use of terms such as "first" and "second" to define components is merely for the purpose of distinguishing the corresponding components. Unless otherwise stated, the above terms have no special meaning and therefore should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of this invention.

[0073] Figure 3 This is the circuit diagram for the forced relief control of this application;

[0074] The component designations shown in the diagram are listed in the table below:

[0075] 1 COR Driver's cab has a relay 2 FRB Forced relief button 3 HDT / RDT Diode terminal block 4 MV / AV Brake control valve Built-in forced relief solenoid valve 5 BNRR Brake release relay 6 CC Control connector 7 TC / MP / M Vehicle formation T stands for trailer, M stands for motor vehicle. 8 TCMS Train control and monitoring system 9 LCU Logic control unit

[0076] A forced release braking control system to prevent misoperation includes a driver's cab control device and forced release braking control devices respectively installed in N carriages, i.e., N forced release braking control devices, including a first forced release braking control device, a second forced release braking control device, ..., the Nth forced release braking control device;

[0077] The driver's cab control device is connected to the first forced release brake control device, the second forced release brake control device, ... the Nth forced release brake control device, respectively;

[0078] The driver's cab control device includes an occupancy relay, a forced release button, and a diode terminal block;

[0079] The occupancy relay, the forced release button, and the diode terminal block are connected in sequence.

[0080] The first forced release braking control device includes a first brake control valve MV and a second brake control valve AV; both the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV are used for the braking control of the bogie, i.e., bogie control.

[0081] The PL2:A terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to DC 110V and the PL3:T terminal;

[0082] The PL2:B terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to the PL2:M terminal and ground.

[0083] The PL2:L terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to the driver's cab control device through the normally open contact of the brake non-release relay IBNRR1.

[0084] The PL3:E terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to ground through the normally closed contact of the brake non-release relay I, and is connected to the train control and monitoring system and logic control unit through the diode terminal block I;

[0085] The PL2:A terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to DC 110V and the PL3:T terminal;

[0086] The second brake control valve AV has its PL2:B terminal connected to its PL2:M terminal and ground.

[0087] The PL2:L terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to the driver's cab control device through the normally open contact of the brake non-release relay IIBNRR2;

[0088] The PL3:E terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to ground through the normally closed contact of the brake non-release relay II, and is connected to the train control and monitoring system and logic control unit through the diode terminal block II to form feedback;

[0089] The function of brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II is to actively identify the control valve that is experiencing brake non-release, so that the specified input can be sent to the control valve with the brake non-release fault after the forced release button is operated, and then brake release can be performed accordingly. The control valve that is not experiencing brake non-release fault does not need to receive this signal, and it releases according to the normal release logic, and does not execute with the forced release operation.

[0090] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the operation control process;

[0091] A control method for a forced release braking control circuit to prevent misoperation includes the following steps:

[0092] (1) When the train is activated, the possession relay is energized and its normally open contact closes.

[0093] (2) The vehicle remains braked and stationary, awaiting towing;

[0094] (3) Push the traction handle to establish traction force, thereby relieving the train's braking;

[0095] (4) When the train releases and holds the brake abnormally, that is, when some brake control valves fail to release the brake, other brake control valves can release and hold the brake normally. The first brake control valve MV or the second brake control valve AV outputs a brake not release signal, and then the coil of the brake not release relay I or the brake not release relay II is energized and its normally open contact closes.

[0096] (5) Press the forced release button to send the command to the brake control valve that has a brake failure to release, so that the brake of the whole train can be released, so that the train can be tractioned and started normally. The brake failure event is recorded by hard input of TCMS / LCU.

[0097] Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating the process to prevent accidental operation.

[0098] A control method for preventing misoperation of a forced release braking control circuit includes the following steps:

[0099] (1) When the train is activated, the possession relay is energized and its normally open contact closes.

[0100] (2) The vehicle remains stationary under braking and awaits towing;

[0101] (3) Press the forced relief button;

[0102] (4) Since the vehicle is not in a traction condition and there is no brake failure, the brake control valve does not accept the forced release command, maintains the brake, and prevents the vehicle from rolling down the slope.

[0103] Without the control strategy described in this article, the vehicle would be at risk of rolling back on the slope if it received a forced relief command under all conditions.

[0104] The control logic of a forced release braking control system to prevent misoperation mainly includes:

[0105] (1) When the forced release brake control device has no brake release fault, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV do not output brake release signal, that is, the brake release relay I and brake release relay II are not energized and their normally open contacts are open.

[0106] (2) When the forced release brake control device fails to release the brake, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV output a brake release signal, that is, the brake release relay I and brake release relay II are energized and their normally open contacts are closed.

[0107] (3) After the driver's cab control device is activated, the occupancy relay is energized and its normally open contact closes;

[0108] (4) When the forced release brake control device has no brake release fault, the forced release button FRB is operated in the driver's cab. At this time, the brake release relay I and brake release relay II are not energized and their normally open contacts are open. Therefore, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV do not receive the forced release command and do not affect the current vehicle status.

[0109] (5) When the forced release brake control device produces a brake non-release fault, the forced release button FRB in the driver's cab is activated. At this time, some brake control valves of the vehicle output a brake non-release command, and the corresponding brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II are energized and their normally open contacts are closed. Therefore, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV can receive the forced release command; the other brake control valves do not need to receive the forced release command because they are not faulty.

[0110] As shown in (4) and (5), the forced release operation is only performed in the activated driver's cab and only applies to the brake control valve that has experienced a brake non-release fault. This electrical isolation and screening function serves to prevent misoperation.

[0111] This circuit uses hardwired control logic and is not limited by the health status of the vehicle's TCMS system. That is, whether the vehicle is in normal operation or enters emergency mode due to a network failure, the forced mitigation function remains operational and functional.

[0112] The forced release brake control system, which prevents misoperation, has a communication protocol with the TCMS system and exchanges information through the vehicle network bus. At the same time, from the circuit perspective, the brake non-release state of the vehicle's braking system can also be recorded synchronously by the TCMS and LCU, realizing redundant recording of different systems such as network and hard wiring.

[0113] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A forced release braking control circuit to prevent misoperation, characterized in that: It includes a driver's cab control device and forced release braking control devices installed in N carriages, i.e., N forced release braking control devices, including a first forced release braking control device, a second forced release braking control device, ..., the Nth forced release braking control device; The driver's cab control device is connected to the first forced release brake control device, the second forced release brake control device, ... the Nth forced release brake control device, respectively; The driver's cab control device includes an occupancy relay, a forced release button, and a diode terminal block; The occupancy relay, the forced release button, and the diode terminal block are connected in sequence. The first forced release braking control device includes a first brake control valve MV and a second brake control valve AV; each brake valve controls the braking of one bogie, i.e., bogie control; The PL2:A and PL3:T terminals of the first brake control valve MV are powered by DC 110V. The PL2:B and PL2:M terminals of the first brake control valve MV are grounded. The PL2:L terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to the output command line of the driver's cab control device through the normally open contact of the brake non-release relay I. The PL3:E terminal of the first brake control valve MV is connected to the coil of the brake non-release relay I, and is also connected to the train control and monitoring system and the logic control unit through the diode terminal block I to form feedback; The PL2:A and PL3:T terminals of the second brake control valve AV are powered by DC 110V. The PL2:B and PL2:M terminals of the second brake control valve AV are grounded; The PL2:L terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to the output command line of the driver's cab control device through the normally open contact of the brake non-release relay II. The PL3:E terminal of the second brake control valve AV is connected to the coil of the brake non-release relay II, and is also connected to the train control and monitoring system and logic control unit through the diode terminal block II to form feedback; The function of brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II is to actively identify the control valve that has brake non-release, so that the specified input can be sent to the control valve with brake non-release fault after the forced release button is operated, and then brake release can be performed accordingly. The control valve that has not brake non-release fault does not need to receive this signal, and it releases according to the normal release logic, and does not execute with the forced release operation. The operating process of the brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II includes: (1) When there is no brake release fault, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV do not output the brake release signal, that is, the brake release relay I and the brake release relay II are not energized and their normally open contacts are open. (2) When a brake failure occurs, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV output a brake failure signal, that is, the brake failure relay I and brake failure relay II are energized and their normally open contacts are closed.

2. The forced release braking control circuit for preventing misoperation according to claim 1, characterized in that: It also includes the energization of the occupancy relay after the driver's cab control device is activated, causing its normally open contacts to close. The operating process of the brake non-release relay I and brake non-release relay II includes: When there is no brake release fault, the forced release button FRB in the driver's cab is activated. At this time, the brake release relay I and brake release relay II are not energized, and their normally open contacts are open. Therefore, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV do not receive the forced release command and do not affect the current vehicle status. When a brake failure occurs, the forced release button FRB in the driver's cab is activated. At this time, some brake control valves of the vehicle output a brake failure command, and the corresponding brake failure relays I and II are energized, and their normally open contacts close. Therefore, the first brake control valve MV and the second brake control valve AV can receive the forced release command. The other brake control valves do not need to receive the forced release command because they are not faulty.

3. The control method for a forced release braking control circuit to prevent misoperation according to any one of claims 1-2, characterized in that: Includes the following steps: (1) When the train is activated, the possession relay is energized and its normally open contact closes; (2) The vehicle remains braked and stationary, awaiting towing; (3) Push the traction handle to establish traction, thereby relieving the train's braking force; (4) When the train releases and holds the brake abnormally, that is, when some brake control valves fail to release the brake, other brake control valves can release and hold the brake normally. The first brake control valve MV or the second brake control valve AV outputs a brake not release signal, and then the coil of the brake not release relay I or the brake not release relay II is energized and its normally open contact closes. (5) Press the forced release button to send the command to the brake control valve that has a brake failure to release, so that the brake of the whole train can be released, so that the train can be tractioned and started normally. The brake failure event is recorded by hard input of TCMS / LCU.

4. The control method for preventing misoperation of the forced release braking control circuit according to any one of claims 1-2, characterized in that: Includes the following steps: (1) When the train is activated, the possession relay is energized and its normally open contact closes; (2) The vehicle remains stationary under braking and awaits towing; (3) Press the forced relief button; (4) Since the vehicle is not in a traction condition and there is no brake failure, the brake control valve does not accept the forced release command, maintains the brake, and prevents the vehicle from rolling down the slope.

Citation Information

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