An anonymous electronic voting method and system based on blind signature qualification certificate

Abstract

The embodiment of the application discloses an anonymous electronic voting method and system based on a blind signature qualification certificate. The method first makes a voter anonymously obtain a unique serial number and blind the serial number, then makes an official sign the blind serial number of a legal voter, the voter deblinds the signature to obtain the signature of the official on the original serial number, and finally the original serial number and the signature thereof constitute a qualification certificate of the voter. Through the blind signature technology, the anonymity of the qualification certificate is realized, the identity of the voter is cut off from the vote by the qualification certificate, meanwhile, the signature authentication of the official makes the qualification certificate have the legality and can represent the legal voting right of the voter. Compared with the prior art, the application solves the contradiction between the legality and the anonymity in the electronic voting by a simple technology, has low calculation complexity, supports various voting forms, is suitable for large-scale voting, can be applied in a short time, and promotes the further development of the electronic voting.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information security technology, specifically to an anonymous electronic voting method and system based on blind signature credentials. Background Technology

[0002] Voting is an important form of democracy. Elections of national leaders, votes on government bills, and resolutions at company shareholder meetings all require voting. With the rapid development of computer technology and the internet, voting has shifted from traditional manual vote counting to electronic voting.

[0003] Electronic voting utilizes information technology and computer equipment, saving significant manpower and resources in organization, ballot collection, and result statistics. Particularly in remote electronic voting, where people participate in decision-making via the internet, it reduces operational costs and further enhances the effectiveness and economy of voting. However, the implementation of remote electronic voting technology involves many complex factors, the biggest being the protection of voter privacy—achieving anonymous voting. Yet, the demand for anonymous voting often conflicts with the requirement to verify voter legitimacy: verifying a voter's identity to ensure their right to vote (legitimacy) is necessary, while simultaneously ensuring that the voter's identity remains hidden during the voting process, preventing others from knowing the content of their ballot (anonymity). "Legitimacy" and "anonymity" thus become a seemingly paradoxical contradiction.

[0004] There are generally two ways to resolve this contradiction: one is to encrypt or hide the ballot, making it impossible for others to know the specific content of the vote; the other is to hide the voter's identity information, making it impossible for others to trace the corresponding voter through the ballot. Currently, the international mainstream adopts the first approach. This approach typically involves voters first verifying their identity through official channels, then using various cryptographic techniques to encrypt the ballot content during voting, and finally performing decryption calculations during vote counting, thereby achieving anonymous voting. However, this approach has several problems: the computational complexity of ballot encryption and decryption is high, making it difficult to guarantee the timeliness of statistics in large-scale voting; there are also limitations on the type of ballot, such as the encryption scheme potentially failing to meet the requirements for write-based voting; anonymous channels and zero-knowledge proofs are usually required to achieve verifiability of the vote, which is technically difficult and costly to implement; furthermore, the process of encrypting the ballot is like a "black box" for voters, making them doubt whether their identity is linked to the ballot. These problems prevent remote electronic voting schemes in theoretical research from being implemented and promoted on a large scale in practice. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention discloses an anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials.

[0006] The anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials includes the following steps: Get temporary variables ; Get the original serial number ; Based on temporary variables and two random numbers , For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. ; Based on blinded serial number and identity information Obtain blinded serial number signature ; Signature of blinded serial number Perform unblinding and obtain the original sequence number signature. ; Based on the original serial number and original serial number signature Obtain a blind signature qualification certificate ; Using blind signature qualification certificate and ballots Conduct a vote; Blind Signature Qualification Certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. And statistics; Count all votes and output the final results along with all votes and their corresponding original serial numbers. To be announced; Based on the original serial number Verify the corresponding ballot content To verify the accuracy of the results, we need to check all the ballots.

[0007] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, temporary variables are obtained. The methods include: Before the official vote, the organizers generated and sent a temporary variable to each voter. It includes the following steps: Select an elliptic curve E A base point G A secure one-way hash function H ;in, G The order is nRandomly select a private key from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. x and using the formula Q = xG Calculated Q ;in, E , G , Q , H , n, x For blind signature parameters; E , G , Q , H , n public ，x Confidential; In the set {1,2,..., n Randomly select a number from 1} Calculate temporary variables and will Send it to the corresponding voter.

[0008] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, based on temporary variables and two random numbers , For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. The methods include: Voters randomly select two numbers from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. , ; calculate ,calculate and The blinding sequence number is calculated. ; in, Indicates a temporary calculation variable. and Representing the points of the elliptic curve The x and y coordinates; The hash value representing the original sequence number; Indicated by the x-axis and The calculated signature parameters; Indicates the signature parameters The blinding sequence number obtained after blinding; , This represents the blinding random factor of the blind signature.

[0009] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, based on a blinded serial number and identity information Obtain blinded serial number signature The methods include: Voters will provide their identity information Blinded serial number The data is sent to a certification authority for verification. If the user is a legitimate voter and this is their first signature request, the certification authority signs the blinded serial number, thus obtaining the blinded serial number signature. The signature will be sent to the voter; otherwise, it will be rejected. Specifically: Voters will provide their identity information and blinded serial number Send it to a certification authority for verification and signature; If identity information If the information pertains to a legitimate voter and this is the voter's first signature application, the authentication authority will use the following method to blind the serial number. Sign: ; Signature Send it to the voters and record that the voters have requested a signature; Otherwise, the signature will be refused.

[0010] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a blinded serial number signature is performed. Perform unblinding and obtain the original sequence number signature. The methods include: Voters use formula Signature of blinded serial number The process involves unblinding the original serial number and obtaining a signature from the certification authority, i.e., the original serial number signature. .

[0011] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a blind signature qualification certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. The statistical methods include: The vote counting agency verifies the blind signature qualification certificate. Whether it is valid includes verifying the original serial number. Is this the first vote and the original serial number signature? Is it a legitimate signature from a certification body? If the original serial number It is the first vote and the original serial number signature. If valid, record the original serial number. Accept the ballot corresponding to the original serial number. And statistics; Otherwise, reject the vote corresponding to the original sequence number.

[0012] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, a blind signature qualification certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. The statistical methods include the following steps: Voters will sign blind signature certificates and ballots After being sent to the vote counting agency, the vote counting agency verifies the original serial number. Is this the first vote? If yes, proceed to the next step; otherwise, verification fails. Verification and inspection by the vote counting agency and Does each element belong to the set {1,2,...,n-1}? If yes, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails. The vote counting agency calculates temporary variables ,like t i If the value is 0, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed to the next step. The vote counting agency calculates the hash value of the original sequence number. Verification points on the elliptic curve ,calculate ,like If the blind signature qualification certificate is valid, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails. The vote counting agency records the original serial number. Accept the ballot corresponding to the original serial number. And statistics.

[0013] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the original serial number is obtained. The method is as follows: Voters anonymously obtain a unique original serial number from a random serial number generation website. ; Based on the original serial number and original serial number signature Obtain a blind signature qualification certificate The method is as follows: From the original serial number and original serial number signature This created a blind signature qualification certificate for voters. .

[0014] The present invention also discloses an anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials.

[0015] This anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials includes: A certification authority, which is used to authenticate voters and sign voter messages; A random serial number generation website, which generates a unique original serial number for each voter; A vote counting agency, which is used to verify the blind signature credentials of voters and to accept and count ballots; The bulletin board is used to publish statistical results and ballot information for verification by all parties. as well as Voting terminal, through which voters obtain temporary variables from the certification authority. Obtain the original serial number from a random serial number generation website. For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. Obtain the unblinding signature from the certification body. And create a blind signature qualification certificate And their blind signature qualification certificate and ballots Send it to the vote counting agency.

[0016] According to a preferred embodiment of the present invention, the random serial number generation website employs a large-period pseudo-random number generator based on the Mason tween algorithm.

[0017] The anonymous electronic voting method and system based on blind signature qualification certificates provided in this invention have at least one of the following technical effects: This invention addresses the contradiction between voter legitimacy and voting anonymity in electronic voting by designing a blind signature-based anonymous voting method and system. This system, independent of voter identity, proves a voter's legitimate voting rights, thus protecting voter privacy and enabling anonymous voting. Compared to various methods of hiding ballot content, this invention hides the voter's identity, eliminating the need for extensive and complex encryption / decryption calculations. This significantly reduces the complexity of the voting system's structure and execution, improving system reliability and preventing vote counting efficiency from being affected by a large number of participants. This invention provides a new approach for the further development of electronic voting and also offers valuable insights for other anonymous voting scenarios.

[0018] Some additional features of the present invention will be described in the following description. These additional features will become apparent to those skilled in the art upon examination of the following description and the accompanying drawings, or upon understanding the production or operation of the embodiments. The features disclosed in this invention can be implemented and achieved through the practice or use of various methods, means, and combinations thereof with respect to the specific embodiments described below. Attached Figure Description

[0019] The accompanying drawings, which are provided to further illustrate the invention and constitute a part of this invention, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention and are used to explain the invention, but do not constitute a limitation thereof. In the drawings, the same reference numerals denote the same parts. Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating an anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials, according to some embodiments of the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of an anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials, as shown in some embodiments of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0020] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below in conjunction with the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0021] It should be noted that, unless otherwise specified, the embodiments and features described in the present invention can be combined with each other. The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments.

[0022] This invention discloses an anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials.

[0023] This anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials includes a preparation phase, an authentication phase, a credentials verification and voting phase, and a verification result phase.

[0024] Preparation phase: Before the formal vote, the certification body generates and sends a temporary variable to each voter. Specifically, it includes: Signature parameter initialization. The official method selects an elliptic curve. E A base point G ( G The order is n A secure one-way hash functionH The certification authority randomly selects a private key from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. x and calculate Q = xG Official announcement E , G , Q , H , n Blind signature parameters, x Parameters are confidential.

[0025] The certification authority assigns each voter a number from the set {1,2,...,...} n Randomly select a number from 1} Calculate temporary variables and will Send it to the corresponding voter.

[0026] Certification phase: Voters anonymously obtain a unique serial number from a random serial number generation website. Voters select two random numbers. , Using temporary variables Your original serial number Perform a blinding operation to obtain the blinding sequence number. Voters will provide their identity information. Blinded serial number The message is sent to the authentication authority, which verifies the user's identity. If the user is a legitimate voter and this is their first time requesting a signature, the authentication authority signs the blinded serial number. The signature will be sent to the voter; otherwise, it will be rejected. The voter will sign. To remove the blindness, the certification body will verify the original serial number. signature Voters will use the original serial number. And the signature after becoming literate They formed their own blind signature qualification certificate .

[0027] Specifically, it includes: Before the official vote, voters obtain a unique original serial number from a random serial number generation website. .

[0028] Voters randomly select two numbers from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. , ,calculate ,calculate and The blinding sequence number is calculated. ; Voters will provide their identity information and the blinded serial number Send it to a certification authority for verification and signature, if It is the identity information of a legitimate voter, and the voter is applying for a signature for the first time. The authentication agency uses a blinded serial number. Sign: and sign Send it to the voter and record that the voter has requested a signature; otherwise, refuse the signature.

[0029] Voters unblind the signatures: Obtain the signature of the original serial number from the certification authority. From the original serial number and its signature This created a blind signature qualification certificate for voters. .

[0030] Qualification verification and voting stage On voting day, voters will present their blind signature qualification certificates. and ballots Send to the vote counting agency. The vote counting agency verifies the blind signature qualification certificate. Whether it is valid, including verifying the original serial number. Is this the first vote and Is it a legitimate signature from the certification authority? If the original serial number is from the first vote and the signature is legitimate, then record the original serial number and accept the vote. The ballot will be counted; otherwise, it will be rejected.

[0031] Specifically, it includes: Voters will sign blind signature certificates and ballots Send to the vote counting agency, which then verifies the results. Is this the first vote? If so, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification will fail.

[0032] Verification and inspection by the vote counting agency and Check if all elements belong to the set {1,2,...,n-1}. If yes, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails.

[0033] The vote counting agency calculates temporary variables ,like t i If the value is 0, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed to the next step. The vote counting agency calculates the hash value of the original sequence number. Verification points on the elliptic curve ,calculate ,like If the blind signature qualification certificate is valid, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails. The vote counting agency records the original serial number and accept voters' ballots. .

[0034] Verification results stage: The vote counting organization will post the results on a bulletin board, along with all ballot information and their corresponding original serial numbers. Voters will verify the accuracy of their ballot information using the original serial numbers and then verify the final vote count against all the ballot information.

[0035] Specifically, it includes: The vote counting agency will compile the final tally results and all ballots along with their corresponding serial numbers. It was posted on the bulletin board.

[0036] Voters vote according to serial number Verify your corresponding ballot content To verify the accuracy of the results, we need to check all the ballots.

[0037] If serial number The votes corresponding to oneself If the content is correct, then that voter's vote is correct. If all votes are correct, then the total vote count is correct.

[0038] Specifically, such as Figure 1 As shown, the anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials in this embodiment specifically includes the following steps: Step S1: Obtain temporary variables .

[0039] Step S2: Obtain the original serial number .

[0040] Step S3: Based on temporary variables and two random numbers , For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. .

[0041] Step S4: Based on the blinded serial number and identity information Obtain blinded serial number signature .

[0042] Step S5: Sign the blinded serial number Perform unblinding and obtain the original sequence number signature. .

[0043] Step S6: Based on the original serial number and original serial number signature Obtain a blind signature qualification certificate .

[0044] Step S7: Utilize blind signature qualification certificate and ballots To conduct a vote.

[0045] Step S8: Blind Signature Qualification Certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. And statistics.

[0046] Step S9: Count all votes and output the final count results along with all votes and their corresponding original sequence numbers. It will be announced.

[0047] Step S10: Based on the original serial number Verify the corresponding ballot content To verify the accuracy of the results, we need to check all the ballots.

[0048] Among them, obtaining temporary variables The methods include: Before the official vote, the organizers generated and sent a temporary variable to each voter. It includes the following steps: Select an elliptic curve E A base point G A secure one-way hash function H .in, G The order is n Choose a private key. x and using the formula Q = xG Calculated Q .in, E , G , Q , H , n, x These are parameters for blind signatures. E , G , Q , H , n public ，x Keep it confidential.

[0049] In the set {1,2,..., n Randomly select a number from 1} Calculate temporary variables and will Send it to the corresponding voter.

[0050] Among them, based on temporary variables and two random numbers , For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. The methods include: Voters are in the set {1,2,..., n Two numbers are randomly selected from 1. , .

[0051] Voters randomly select two numbers from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. , ,calculate ,calculate and The blinding sequence number is calculated. ; in, Indicates a temporary calculation variable. and Representing the points of the elliptic curve The x and y coordinates; The hash value representing the original sequence number; Indicated by the x-axis and The calculated signature parameters; Indicates the signature parameters The blinding sequence number obtained after blinding; , This represents the blinding random factor of the blind signature.

[0052] Among them, based on blinded serial number and identity information Obtain blinded serial number signature The methods include: Voters will provide their identity information Blinded serial number The data is sent to a certification authority for verification. If the user is a legitimate voter and this is their first signature request, the certification authority signs the blinded serial number, resulting in a blinded serial number signature. The signature will be sent to the voters. Otherwise, the signature will be rejected.

[0053] Specifically: Voters will provide their identity information and blinded serial number Send it to a certification authority for verification and signature.

[0054] If identity information If the information pertains to a legitimate voter and this is the voter's first signature application, the authentication authority will use the following method to blind the serial number. Sign: .

[0055] Signature Send it to the voters and record that the voters have requested a signature.

[0056] Otherwise, the signature will be refused.

[0057] Among them, blinded sequence number signature Perform unblinding and obtain the original sequence number signature. The methods include: Voters use formula Signature of blinded serial number The process involves unblinding the original serial number and obtaining a signature from the certification authority, i.e., the original serial number signature. .

[0058] From the original serial number and original serial number signature This created a blind signature qualification certificate for voters. .

[0059] Among them, the blind signature qualification certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. The statistical methods include: The vote counting agency verifies the blind signature qualification certificate. Whether it is valid includes verifying the original serial number. Is this the first vote and the original serial number signature? Is it a legitimate signature from a certification body?

[0060] If the original serial number It is the first vote and the original serial number signature. If valid, record the original serial number. Accept the ballot corresponding to the original serial number. And statistics.

[0061] Otherwise, reject the vote corresponding to the original sequence number.

[0062] Among them, the blind signature qualification certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. The statistical methods include the following steps: Voters will sign blind signature certificates and ballots After being sent to the vote counting agency, the vote counting agency verifies the original serial number. Is this the first vote? If so, proceed to the next step. Otherwise, the verification fails.

[0063] Verification and inspection by the vote counting agency and Check if all elements belong to the set {1, 2, ..., n-1}. If so, proceed to the next step. Otherwise, the verification fails.

[0064] The vote counting agency calculates temporary variables ,like t i If the value is 0, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed to the next step. The vote counting agency calculates the hash value of the original sequence number. Verification points on the elliptic curve ,calculate ,like If so, the blind signature qualification certificate is valid, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails. The vote counting agency records the original serial number. Accept the ballot corresponding to the original serial number. And statistics.

[0065] Among them, obtaining the original serial number The method is as follows: Voters anonymously obtain a unique original serial number from a random serial number generation website. .

[0066] Among them, based on the original serial number and original serial number signature Obtain a blind signature qualification certificate The method is as follows: From the original serial number and original serial number signature This created a blind signature qualification certificate for voters. .

[0067] This invention also discloses an anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials.

[0068] This anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials includes: A certification authority, which is used to authenticate voters and sign voter messages.

[0069] A random serial number generation website generates a unique original serial number for each voter.

[0070] A vote counting agency, which verifies the blind signature credentials of voters and accepts and counts ballots.

[0071] The bulletin board is used to publish statistical results and ballot information for verification by all parties.

[0072] as well as Voting terminal, through which voters obtain temporary variables from the certification authority. Obtain the original serial number from a random serial number generation website. For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. Obtain the unblinding signature from the certification body. And create a blind signature qualification certificate And their blind signature qualification certificate and ballots Send it to the vote counting agency.

[0073] The random serial number generation website uses a large-period pseudo-random number generator based on the Mason twitch algorithm.

[0074] The anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials in this invention mainly includes a voting terminal, a random sequence number generation website, an authentication authority, a vote counting agency, and a bulletin board. The random sequence number generation website uses a large-period pseudo-random number generator based on the Mason swivel algorithm, ensuring that a unique original sequence number is generated for each voter in large-scale voting. The authentication authority verifies the voter's identity and signs the voter's message. The vote counting agency verifies the voter's blind signature credentials and accepts and counts the votes. The bulletin board publishes the statistical results and vote information for verification by all. The blind signature used in this scheme is based on the SM2 blind signature algorithm, and the blinding and unblinding operations of the blind signature are performed by the voter themselves.

[0075] The anonymous electronic voting method and system based on blind signature credentials provided in this invention achieves anonymous voting by masking the voter's identity information with a credentials certificate. First, the voter anonymously obtains a unique original serial number and blinds it. Then, an official signs the blinded serial number of a legitimate voter. The voter then unblinds this signature to obtain the official signature on the original serial number (original serial number signature). Finally, the original serial number and its signature (original serial number signature) constitute the voter's credentials certificate. Through blind signature technology, the anonymity of the credentials certificate is achieved, severing the link between the voter's identity and their vote. Simultaneously, the official signature authentication gives the credentials certificate legitimacy, enabling it to represent the voter's legitimate voting rights. Compared to existing technologies, this invention resolves the contradiction between legitimacy and anonymity in electronic voting with a simple technique. It has low computational complexity, supports multiple voting formats, and is suitable for large-scale voting, and is expected to be widely adopted in a short period, promoting the further development of electronic voting.

[0076] Specifically, the above-mentioned one or more technical solutions in the anonymous electronic voting method and system based on blind signature qualification certificates provided in the embodiments of the present invention have at least one of the following technical effects: This invention addresses the contradiction between voter legitimacy and voting anonymity in electronic voting by designing a qualification certificate that is not linked to the voter's identity but still proves the voter's legitimate voting rights. This protects the voter's privacy and enables anonymous voting. Compared to traditional methods that use various methods to hide ballot content, this invention hides the voter's identity, eliminating the need for extensive and complex encryption and decryption calculations on the ballots. This significantly reduces the complexity of the voting system's structure and execution process, thereby improving system reliability and preventing vote counting efficiency from being affected by a large number of participants. This invention provides a new approach for the further development of electronic voting and also offers valuable insights for other anonymous voting applications.

[0077] Its safety and efficiency are specifically manifested in: 1) Anonymity of Voting. In this invention, the authentication authority is the only institution with access to the voter's true identity. The authentication authority obtains the voter's real identity information and the corresponding blinded serial number, but because blind signatures are used, it cannot know the corresponding original serial number. Therefore, the authentication authority cannot link the voter and the ballot. The vote counting agency, on the other hand, only knows the original serial number and the corresponding ballot, but not the real identity of the voter corresponding to the original serial number, and cannot link the voter and the ballot, thus ensuring the anonymity of voting. Even if the authentication authority and the vote counting agency collude, they cannot break the anonymity of voting, demonstrating its ability to resist collusion and cheating.

[0078] 2) Legality and Compliance of Voting. The random sequence number generation website uses a large-cycle pseudo-random number generator based on the Mason swivel algorithm. In large-scale scenarios, it generates a large number of unique original sequence numbers with high efficiency, ensuring the uniqueness of each original sequence number. Each unique original sequence number corresponds to a unique blind signature certificate, and each voter can only apply for a signature once, ensuring that each blind signature certificate can only be used to vote once, thus guaranteeing "one person, one vote." Furthermore, with current computing power, SM2 blind signatures are considered impossible to forge in a short period, ensuring the anti-counterfeiting properties of the blind signature certificate. This avoids illegal activities such as multiple votes by one person or forged certificates.

[0079] 3) Verifiability of Voting. Voters' identities are hidden during voting, and ballot content does not require encryption; instead, the ballot is accompanied by the voter's original serial number. After voting concludes, all ballots are published on an official bulletin board. Individual voters can check the validity of their ballots using their original serial numbers, and anyone can accumulate all ballots to verify the statistical results. This achieves both individual and public verifiability of electronic voting.

[0080] 4) Computational Efficiency. The computation of this invention mainly targets the blind signature encryption and decryption process of the blind signature certificate. SM2 blind signatures have a relatively small computational load, and the generation and verification of the blind signature certificate are carried out before voting. During the formal voting, no complex encryption and decryption calculations are required for the ballots. This avoids getting bogged down in excessive computation during large-scale voting, ensuring computational efficiency.

[0081] 5) Supports multiple voting formats. Since there is no need to encrypt the ballots, there are no restrictions on the format of the ballots; for example, write-based voting can also be implemented.

[0082] 6) Integrability. This invention can be combined with other encrypted ballot electronic voting systems to further enhance the system's privacy and security.

[0083] It should be noted that all features disclosed in this specification, or all steps in all methods or processes disclosed, may be combined in any way, except for mutually exclusive features and / or steps.

[0084] Furthermore, the specific embodiments described above are exemplary. Those skilled in the art can devise various solutions inspired by the disclosure of this invention, and these solutions all fall within the scope of this invention and its protection. Those skilled in the art should understand that this specification and its accompanying drawings are illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of the claims. The scope of protection of this invention is defined by the claims and their equivalents.

Claims

1. An anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature credentials, characterized in that, It includes the following steps: Get temporary variables ; Get temporary variables The methods include: Before the official vote, the organizers generated and sent a temporary variable to each voter. It includes the following steps: Select an elliptic curve E A base point G A secure one-way hash function H ;in, G The order is n Randomly select a private key from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. x and using the formula Q = xG Calculated Q ;in, E , G , Q , H , n, x For blind signature parameters; E , G , Q , H , n public ，x Confidential; In the set {1,2,..., n Randomly select a number from 1} Calculate temporary variables and will Send to the corresponding voters; Get the original serial number ; Based on temporary variables and two random numbers , For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. ; Specific methods include: Voters are in the set {1,2,..., n Two numbers are randomly selected from 1. , ; calculate ; calculate and Calculate the blinding sequence number ; in, Indicates a temporary calculation variable. and Representing the points of the elliptic curve The x and y coordinates; The hash value representing the original sequence number; Indicated by the x-axis and The calculated signature parameters; Indicates the signature parameters The blinding sequence number obtained after blinding; , The randomization factor representing the blind signature; Based on blinded serial number and identity information Obtain blinded serial number signature ; Signature of blinded serial number Perform unblinding and obtain the original sequence number signature. ; Based on the original serial number and original serial number signature Obtain a blind signature qualification certificate ; Using blind signature qualification certificate and ballots Conduct a vote; Blind Signature Qualification Certificate Perform verification; if verification passes, record the original serial number. Accept the ballot And statistics; Count all votes and output the final results along with all votes and their corresponding original serial numbers. To be announced; Based on the original serial number Verify the corresponding ballot content To verify the accuracy of the results, we need to check all the ballots.

2. The anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature authentication as described in claim 1, characterized in that, Based on blinded serial number and identity information Obtain blinded serial number signature The methods include: Voters will provide their identity information Blinded serial number The data is sent to a certification authority for verification. If the user is a legitimate voter and this is their first signature request, the certification authority signs the blinded serial number, thus obtaining the blinded serial number signature. The signature will be sent to the voter; otherwise, it will be rejected. Specifically: Voters will provide their identity information and blinded serial number Send it to a certification authority for verification and signature; If identity information If the information pertains to a legitimate voter and this is the voter's first signature application, the authentication authority will use the following method to blind the serial number. Sign: ; Signature Send it to the voters and record that the voters have requested a signature; Otherwise, the signature will be refused.

3. The anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature authentication as described in claim 2, characterized in that, Signature of blinded serial number Perform unblinding and obtain the original sequence number signature. The methods include: Voters use formula Signature of blinded serial number The process involves unblinding the original serial number and obtaining a signature from the certification authority, i.e., the original serial number signature. .

4. The anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature authentication according to claim 3, characterized in that, Blind Signature Qualification Certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. The statistical methods include: The vote counting agency verifies the blind signature qualification certificate. Whether it is valid includes verifying the original serial number. Is this the first vote and the original serial number signature? Is it a legitimate signature from a certification body? If the original serial number It is the first vote and the original serial number signature. If valid, record the original serial number. Accept the ballot corresponding to the original serial number. And statistics; Otherwise, reject the vote corresponding to the original sequence number.

5. The anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature authentication according to claim 4, characterized in that, Blind Signature Qualification Certificate Verification is performed; if verification passes, the original serial number is recorded and the ballot is accepted. The statistical methods include the following steps: Voters will sign blind signature certificates and ballots After being sent to the vote counting agency, the vote counting agency verifies the original serial number. Is this the first vote? If yes, proceed to the next step; otherwise, verification fails. Verification and inspection by the vote counting agency and Does each element belong to the set {1,2,...,n-1}? If yes, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails. The vote counting agency calculates temporary variables ,like t i If the value is 0, the verification fails; otherwise, proceed to the next step. The vote counting agency calculates the hash value of the original sequence number. Verification points on the elliptic curve ,calculate ,like If the blind signature qualification certificate is valid, proceed to the next step; otherwise, the verification fails. The vote counting agency records the original serial number. Accept the ballot corresponding to the original serial number. And statistics.

6. The anonymous electronic voting method based on blind signature authentication according to claim 1, characterized in that, Get the original serial number The method is as follows: Voters anonymously obtain a unique original serial number from a random serial number generation website. ; Based on the original serial number and original serial number signature Obtain a blind signature qualification certificate The method is as follows: From the original serial number and original serial number signature This created a blind signature qualification certificate for voters. .

7. An anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature credentials, characterized in that, It includes: A certification authority, which is used to authenticate voters and sign voter messages; A random serial number generation website, which generates a unique original serial number for each voter; A vote counting agency, which is used to verify the blind signature credentials of voters and to accept and count ballots; The bulletin board is used to publish statistical results and ballot information for verification by all parties. as well as Voting terminal, through which voters obtain temporary variables from the certification authority. Obtain the original serial number from a random serial number generation website. For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. Obtain the unblinding signature from the certification body. And create a blind signature qualification certificate And their blind signature qualification certificate and ballots Send to the vote counting agency; Get temporary variables The methods include: Before the official vote, the organizers generated and sent a temporary variable to each voter. It includes the following steps: Select an elliptic curve E A base point G A secure one-way hash function H ;in, G The order is n Randomly select a private key from the set {1,2,...,n-1}. x and using the formula Q = xG Calculated Q ;in, E , G , Q , H , n, x For blind signature parameters; E , G , Q , H , n public ，x Confidential; In the set {1,2,..., n Randomly select a number from 1} Calculate temporary variables and will Send to the corresponding voters; Based on temporary variables and two random numbers , For the original serial number Perform a blinding operation and obtain the blinding sequence number. The methods include: Voters are in the set {1,2,..., n Two numbers are randomly selected from 1. , ; calculate ; calculate and Calculate the blinding sequence number ; in, Indicates a temporary calculation variable. and Representing the points of the elliptic curve The x and y coordinates; The hash value representing the original sequence number; Indicated by the x-axis and The calculated signature parameters; Indicates the signature parameters The blinding sequence number obtained after blinding; , This represents the blinding random factor of the blind signature.

8. The anonymous electronic voting system based on blind signature authentication according to claim 7, characterized in that, The random serial number generation website uses a large-period pseudo-random number generator based on the Mason twitch algorithm.

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