Trusted transmission method and system based on trusted industrial control system

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of based on trusted industrial control system's trusted transmission method and system, sender S generates random number Ns and generates message digest, through TPM_Quote calculation platform integrity measure Ds, then send to R with private key signature, receiver R uses public key certS to verify signature, confirm information is not tampered with, calculate own integrity measure Dr, and generate new asymmetric key pair, public key Pbk signature is sent to S.The signature of receiver R is verified to S, and after confirming that the platform of receiver R is trusted, the symmetric key K1 is encrypted using Pbk, and the data T is encrypted using K1, while the data is signed with its private key to ensure consistency.After receiving the encrypted data, the receiver R decrypts the symmetric key K1 using the private key, decrypts the data T, and verifies the signature to ensure data consistency.The whole process uses random number, asymmetric encryption, TPM secure storage and signature mechanism to ensure the security of data transmission and the trustworthiness of both parties platform.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of communication technology, specifically to a trusted transmission method and system based on a trusted industrial control system. Background Technology

[0002] With the widespread application of industrial control systems, their security issues in open network environments are becoming increasingly prominent. During the migration of business logic through software implementation, the receiving platform faces the risk of attacks from malicious code, which may disrupt the normal operation of the system or even steal sensitive data. Simultaneously, the sender also needs to verify the trustworthiness of the receiving platform to ensure the security and reliability of data transmission.

[0003] To address the aforementioned issues, existing technologies have proposed a novel Trusted Third Party (TTP), namely embedded TTP (Trusted Software Proxy). This approach avoids many inherent problems of dedicated TTP servers, such as single points of failure and performance bottlenecks, by embedding TTP within the receiving platform. However, the embedded TTP solution does not completely resolve the security and trustworthiness issues of the receiving platform. Attackers may bypass TTP protection mechanisms through various means to attack the receiving platform, or impersonate a trusted receiving platform to deceive the sender. Summary of the Invention

[0004] To address the problems existing in the prior art, this invention provides a trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system.

[0005] This invention is achieved through the following technical solution:

[0006] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to the sender S, includes the following steps:

[0007] Step 1: The sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt the message digest of the receiver R's random number Nr and its own random number Ns. The sender then uses the Aikis private key to sign the encrypted message digest and the integrity measure Ds of the trusted platform module to generate signature information. The sender then sends the signature information, the encrypted message digest, and the integrity measure Ds as trusted verification data to the receiver R.

[0008] Step 2: S receives the data, and R verifies the trusted verification data before sending the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns}.

[0009] Where Dr is the integrity measure of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, Pbk is the asymmetric public key, and Ns is the random number of the sender S;

[0010] Step 3: The sender S verifies the signature information using the receiver R's certificate certR to confirm the receiver R's trustworthiness. The sender S uses the public key Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key and then uses the symmetric key to encrypt the data to be sent. The sender S then signs the encrypted data and sends it along with the encrypted symmetric key to the receiver.

[0011] Preferably, the method for determining the integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module in step 1 is as follows:

[0012] Based on the encrypted digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of sender S, determine the integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module of sender S.

[0013] Preferably, the signature verification method for the signature information in step 3 is as follows:

[0014] The receiver certificate certR contains the public key used by receiver R to decrypt and verify the signature, and sender S uses the public key to verify the signature information;

[0015] Determine whether the integrity metric Dr and the random number Ns are consistent with the expected values. If Dr and Ns have not been tampered with, then the receiver R is trustworthy.

[0016] Preferably, the encryption method used by the sender S in step 3 for transmitting data is as follows:

[0017] The sender S uses the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R to encrypt the symmetric key K1;

[0018] The sender S uses a symmetric key K1 to encrypt the data T to be sent, generating encrypted data K1{T};

[0019] The sender S uses the signature verification private key to sign the encrypted data K1{T};

[0020] The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key, encrypted data K1{T}, and signature to the receiver R.

[0021] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to receiver R, includes the following steps:

[0022] Step 10: Receiver R receives the trusted verification data sent by sender S and performs signature verification using sender S's certificate certS. The trusted verification data includes a cryptographic digest, the integrity metric Ds of receiver R's trusted platform module, and signature information.

[0023] Step 20: After the recipient R verifies the signature, the recipient R determines the integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module based on the encrypted digest.

[0024] The receiver R generates an encryption key, signs the integrity measure Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key, and the random number Ns, and sends it to the sender S.

[0025] Step 30: Receiver R receives the encrypted file generated after the sender verifies the signature information. Receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted file and verify the signature.

[0026] Preferably, the method for determining the integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module in step 20 is as follows:

[0027] Based on the encrypted digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of receiver R, determine the integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module of receiver R.

[0028] Preferably, the receiver R uses a trusted platform module to generate an asymmetric encryption key, and the private key PiK is stored in the trusted platform module of the receiver R;

[0029] The receiver R uses the private key Aikir of the verification key to sign the integrity measure Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key, and the random number Ns before sending it to the sender S.

[0030] Preferably, the encryption method for the encrypted file in step 30 is as follows:

[0031] The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encryption key of the encrypted file, and uses the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted file.

[0032] Preferably, the receiver R uses a signature verification private key to verify the signature.

[0033] A trusted transmission system based on a trusted industrial control system, wherein the trusted transmission system implements the steps of the trusted transmission method based on the trusted industrial control system during operation.

[0034] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial technical effects:

[0035] This invention provides a trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system. The confidentiality of the migration process is protected by a symmetric encryption algorithm. The symmetric session key is securely transmitted to the receiver under a public encryption key of an asymmetric key pair. This key pair is inseparable from the trusted receiver's TPM (Trusted Execution Machine). In the trusted receiver's TPM, the private session key is securely stored in such a way that only the receiver's TPM can use it, and it is not exposed to the host platform. Therefore, even if an attacker intercepts the encrypted migration process, the attacker cannot gain read access to the migration process unless a hardware-based attack is performed on the receiver's TPM, which requires extracting the private decryption key from the TPM. Secondly, data consistency is guaranteed. The integrity of the migration process during transmission is protected by a signature algorithm; only the software provider can generate a signature using his / her key. Finally, the software provider and the receiver can mutually verify the identity of their respective TPMs and the state of the protected execution environment through a platform verification mechanism. Attached Figure Description

[0036] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0037] The present invention will now be described in further detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. These descriptions are intended to explain the invention and not to limit it.

[0038] Example 1

[0039] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system includes the following steps:

[0040] Step 1: Receiver R uses a trusted chip to generate a random number Nr and sends it to sender S.

[0041] Sending a random number Nr: The receiver R first sends a random number Nr to the sender S. The random number Nr refers to an arbitrary or non-repeating random value that is used only once. Since this random number is used only once, it means that it is generated and used only once in this communication and will not be used again afterward, thereby increasing the security of the communication.

[0042] Both the receiver and sender devices are equipped with a Trusted Computing Device (TPM) chip. The TPM contains the platform identity key AIK and an AIK certificate, which is issued by a trusted third-party organization. The receiver's key pair consists of a public key Aikpr and a private key Aikir, while the sender's key pair consists of a public key Aikps and a private key Aikis. The sender S should have an AIK certificate, and the receiver R should also have an AIK certificate.

[0043] The private keys of both the sender and receiver are used solely for entity authentication, meaning they are used to prove the identity of the sender or receiver during communication. The sender and receiver exchange certificates; that is, both sender S and receiver R must obtain each other's AIK certificates so they can verify the trustworthiness of each other's public keys, thereby ensuring the security of communication.

[0044] Through the above initial setup, both parties can verify each other's identities and establish a secure foundation. The random number Nr, platform identity key AIK, trusted computing chip TPM, and AIK certificate used in this process together constitute a multi-layered secure communication mechanism.

[0045] Step 2: Sender S receives a random number Nr and generates a random number Ns. It then uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt a message digest SM3{Nr,Ns}. Finally, it uses TPM_Quote(SM3{Nr,Ns},Ids), where SM3{Nr,Ns} and Ids are the input parameters to calculate the integrity metric Ds of sender S's platform. Sender S then signs Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds} using the private key of its TPM signing key. Finally, it sends Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}, DS, and SM3{Nr,Ns} to receiver R, as follows:

[0046] S2.1 Receiving a random number Nr: The sender S first receives a random number Nr from the receiver R. This random number is used to ensure the security of each communication because the random number Nr is an arbitrary or non-repeating value that is used only once.

[0047] S2.2 Generating a random number Ns: The sender S generates its own random number Ns, which is used together with the receiver's random number Nr to increase the security of communication.

[0048] S2.3 Message Digest Encryption: The sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt the message digest of two random numbers Nr and Ns, obtaining SM3{Nr,Ns}. SM3 is a cryptographic hash algorithm, similar to the internationally widely used SHA series algorithms, but SM3 is the national standard algorithm used in China.

[0049] The sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to hash the two random numbers Nr and Ns, generating a hash value SM3{Nr,Ns}. Note that the "message digest encryption" mentioned here actually refers to hashing using the SM3 algorithm, not encryption, because hashing is a one-way function, unlike reversible encryption.

[0050] S2.4 Calculate the Integrity Metric: The sender S uses the trusted system's API, taking SM3{Nr,Ns} and the sender's ID (Ids) as input parameters, to calculate the integrity metric Ds of the sender S platform. This metric is an encrypted representation of the sender platform's current state, proving the platform's integrity and lack of tampering.

[0051] Compared to SHA-like algorithms, the SM3 hash algorithm accounts for only 31% of the total steps in terms of collisions and only 58% in terms of distinguishing attacks. These analytical results demonstrate the high security of the SM3 cryptographic hash algorithm. SM3{Nr,Ns} uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt Nr and Ns.

[0052] S2.5 Signature: The sender S uses its private key Aikis from its TPM to sign the hash value SM3{Nr,Ns} and the integrity measure Ds, obtaining the signature credential Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}. This signature proves the identity of the sender S and ensures the integrity and non-repudiation of the message.

[0053] S2.6 Sending Credentials: Sender S sends the signed credentials Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}, along with the integrity metric Ds and the hash value SM3{Nr,Ns}, to receiver R. In this way, receiver R can verify sender S's signing credentials, ensuring the trustworthiness of the sender's platform.

[0054] The sender S not only proves its identity but also ensures the security and integrity of the transmitted data during transmission. The receiver R can verify the trustworthiness of the sender's platform by confirming the sender S's signature credentials and integrity metrics, thereby establishing a secure communication process.

[0055] Step 3: The receiver R uses certificate certS to verify the signature of the signature credential {SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}. After verification, it compares the integrity metric Ds with the random number Nr to determine if the signature has been tampered with. The details are as follows:

[0056] S3.1 The receiver R first receives a series of security information sent by the sender S, including the information Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds} signed with the sender S's private key, as well as the integrity measure Ds and the hash value SM3{Nr,Ns}.

[0057] The receiver R uses the sender S's public key certificate certS to verify the signature of Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds}. This certificate contains the sender S's public key and authentication information from a Certificate Authority (CA).

[0058] Verify the validity of the signature to ensure that the signature credential Aikis{SM3{Nr,Ns},Ds} is indeed a signature generated by the sender S's private key.

[0059] Verify the identity of the sender S, because only the sender S, who holds the corresponding private key, can generate a valid signature.

[0060] S3.2 Comparing the Integrity Measure Ds and the Random Number Nr: The receiver R compares the integrity measure Ds of the sender S platform in the signature with its own calculated Ds value to verify their consistency. Simultaneously, the receiver R also checks whether the received random number Nr is consistent with the Nr initially sent to S.

[0061] Determine if the data has been tampered with:

[0062] If the values ​​of the integrity metric Ds and the random number Nr are consistent with those expected by the receiver R, then the sender S's platform can be considered trustworthy and the data has not been tampered with during transmission. If the values ​​of Ds or Nr are inconsistent, this may indicate that the data has been tampered with during transmission, or that the sender S's platform may have security issues.

[0063] In this way, the receiver R not only verifies the identity of the sender S but also ensures the integrity and consistency of the transmitted data. This mechanism is used to defend against various potential attacks, such as man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks or data tampering attacks. Once the validity of the signature and the integrity of the data are verified, the receiver R can securely continue subsequent communication or data exchange processes. This process is a crucial link in secure communication protocols, ensuring the security and reliability of data transmission and providing safeguards for establishing trust and preventing unauthorized access.

[0064] Step 4: If the data has not been tampered with, then the sender S platform is trustworthy. The receiver R calculates the integrity metric Dr using TPM_Quote{SM3{Nr,Ns},Idr}, where SM3{Nr,Ns} and Idr are input parameters, and Idr is the receiver R's ID number. The receiver R uses TPM_CreateWrapKey to generate an asymmetric public key Pbk and a private key PiK. The private key PiK is stored in the receiver R's TPM. The public key is signed by the receiver R using the private key Aikir{Dr,Pbk,Ns} of the TPM's signing key and then sent to the sender S. Details are as follows:

[0065] S4.1 Confirm the credibility of the sender's platform: If the receiver R confirms that the data provided by the sender S has not been tampered with, then the sender S's platform is credible.

[0066] S4.2 Calculate the receiver's integrity metric: Receiver R uses the API of the Trusted Platform Module TPM_Quote, with input parameters including the previously calculated hash value SM3{Nr,Ns} and receiver R's ID number Idr, to calculate its own integrity metric Dr. This step is similar to the process by which sender S previously calculated the integrity metric Ds.

[0067] S4.3 Generating an Asymmetric Key Pair: The receiver R uses the Trusted Platform Module (TPM)_CreateWrapKey API to generate an asymmetric key pair, consisting of a public key Pbk and a private key PiK. This step ensures key security because the private key PiK is stored in the receiver R's TPM, which provides a secure storage environment to prevent unauthorized access to the private key.

[0068] S4.4 Storing the private key: The private key PiK is stored in the TPM of the receiver R, so that only the TPM of the receiver R can use this private key.

[0069] S4.5 Signing Public Key and Integrity Metric: The receiver R uses its signing private key Aikir in its TPM to sign the data consisting of Dr (the receiver's integrity metric), Pbk (the newly generated public key), and Ns (a random number generated by the sender), generating Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns}.

[0070] S4.6 Sending Signed Information: Receiver R sends the signed information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns} to sender S. This step allows sender S to verify the trustworthiness of receiver R and ensure that receiver R has committed to its public key Pbk, which will be used for subsequent encrypted communication.

[0071] By verifying each other's signatures and integrity metrics, both sender S and receiver R can confirm the trustworthiness of each other's platforms. The asymmetric key pair generated by receiver R, especially the exchange of the public key Pbk, provides the foundation for subsequent encrypted communication, ensuring the security of data transmission. Once sender S verifies receiver R's signature information, both parties can use each other's public key for encrypted communication, thereby ensuring the confidentiality and integrity of the data. This process is a crucial step in establishing a secure communication channel; it not only verifies the identities of both parties and the integrity of the platforms but also provides a secure way for both parties to exchange information, preventing potential eavesdropping and tampering.

[0072] Step 5: The sender S uses certificate certR to verify the signature of {Dr, Pbk, Ns} to determine whether Dr and Ns have been tampered with. If they have not been tampered with, it indicates that the receiver R platform is trustworthy. The sender S uses Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key K1, Pbk{K1}, and uses K1 to encrypt the sent content T into K1{T}. S then uses its private key to sign {T} to ensure data consistency, as detailed below:

[0073] S5.1 Verifying the Signature Using a Certificate: The sender S uses the certificate certR provided by the receiver R to verify the signature information Aikir{Dr,Pbk,Ns} generated by the receiver R. This certificate contains the receiver R's public key, which is used to decrypt and verify the signature.

[0074] S5.2 Verify Integrity Metric and Random Number: The sender S checks whether the integrity metric Dr and the random number Ns in the signature are consistent with the expected values, in order to determine whether this information has been tampered with during transmission.

[0075] If Dr and Ns have not been tampered with, then the platform of the receiver R can be considered trustworthy.

[0076] S5.3 Encrypting the symmetric key: The sender S uses the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R to encrypt a symmetric key K1. This encrypted symmetric key Pbk{K1} is then sent to the receiver R.

[0077] S5.4 Data Encryption: The sender S uses a symmetric key K1 to encrypt the data T to be sent, generating encrypted data K1{T}. Symmetric encryption is generally faster than asymmetric encryption, therefore it is suitable for encrypting large amounts of data.

[0078] S5.5 Signature Data: To ensure data consistency and prevent repudiation, the sender S signs the encrypted data K1{T} using its private key. This signature proves that the data was sent by the sender S and has not been tampered with since the signature.

[0079] S5.6 Sending encrypted and signed data: The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key Pbk{K1}, the encrypted data K1{T}, and the signature to the receiver R.

[0080] S5.7 Preparation for receiver decryption: Receiver R first uses its private key to decrypt the symmetric key K1. Then, it uses the decrypted symmetric key K1 to decrypt the encrypted data K1{T}, recovering the original data T. Finally, receiver R verifies the sender S's signature to ensure data consistency and integrity.

[0081] Through this process, both the sender (S) and receiver (R) can ensure the security of communication and prevent data tampering during transmission. This process is the encryption and authentication step in a secure communication protocol, which not only guarantees the security of data transmission but also ensures the trustworthiness of both parties. By exchanging symmetric keys using asymmetric encryption, then encrypting the data using symmetric encryption, and finally ensuring data integrity and non-repudiation through digital signatures, this process achieves a communication mechanism that is both efficient and secure.

[0082] Step 6: Receiver R receives the message, uses the private key Pik to decrypt Pbk{K1} to obtain the symmetric key K1, and uses the symmetric key to decrypt K1{T} to obtain T. R verifies the signature of {T} and compares the data of T to ensure consistency.

[0083] Receiving encrypted messages: Receiver R receives a series of encrypted and signed messages from sender S, including a symmetric key Pbk{K1} encrypted with receiver's public key Pbk, data K1{T} encrypted with symmetric key K1, and sender S's signature on data T.

[0084] Decrypting the symmetric key: The receiver R uses its private key Aikir to decrypt the encrypted symmetric key Pbk{K1} to obtain the symmetric key K1. This step is necessary because data encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted using the private key.

[0085] Decrypting the data: Once the symmetric key K1 is obtained, the receiver R then uses this key to decrypt the encrypted data K1{T}, recovering the original data T. The symmetric key K1 plays a crucial role in this process because symmetric encryption algorithms are generally faster than asymmetric encryption algorithms and are suitable for encrypting large amounts of data.

[0086] Signature Verification: To ensure that data T has not been tampered with during transmission and to verify that the data indeed originated from sender S, receiver R verifies the signature of sender S. This step typically involves using sender S's public key to decrypt the signature and comparing it with the original data T.

[0087] Data consistency verification: By verifying the signature, the receiver R can confirm the consistency of the data T. If the signature verification is successful, it indicates that the data T has not been altered since it was signed by the sender S, and that the sender S is trustworthy.

[0088] After completing the above steps, the receiver R can be confident that the received data T is secure, has not been tampered with by an unauthorized third party, and that the sender S's identity has been verified. By verifying the signature and decrypting the data, a trust relationship is established between the receiver R and the sender S. This mechanism is a core part of modern network security protocols, ensuring the security and reliability of data transmission. Having confirmed the security and integrity of the data, the receiver R can securely continue communication with the sender S or perform further processing on the data.

[0089] This process is a crucial step in secure communication protocols, ensuring the security and integrity of data transmission, as well as the sender's authentication. By using asymmetric encryption to securely exchange symmetric keys, then using symmetric encryption to encrypt the data, and finally using digital signatures to guarantee data consistency and non-repudiation, this process achieves a communication mechanism that is both efficient and secure.

[0090] Example 2

[0091] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system includes the following steps:

[0092] Step 1: The sender S encrypts the message digest of the random number Nr received from the receiver R and its own random number Ns, and uses the signature private key PikS to sign the encrypted digest and the integrity measure Ds of the trusted platform module to generate signature information. The signature information, encrypted digest and integrity measure Ds are then sent to the receiver R as trusted verification data.

[0093] The SM3 algorithm is used to encrypt random numbers and generate encrypted digests.

[0094] The integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module is determined as follows:

[0095] Based on the encrypted digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of sender S, determine the integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module of sender S.

[0096] Step 2: S receives the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns} sent by S after the receiver R verifies the trusted verification data;

[0097] Where Dr is the integrity measure of the trusted platform module of the receiver R, Pbk is the encryption public key, and Ns is the random number of the sender S;

[0098] Step 3: The sender S verifies the signature information using the receiver R's certificate certR to confirm the receiver R's trustworthiness. The sender S uses the public key Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key and then uses the symmetric key to encrypt the data to be sent. The sender S then signs the encrypted data and sends it along with the encrypted symmetric key to the receiver.

[0099] The method for verifying the signature information is as follows:

[0100] The receiver certificate certR contains the public key used by receiver R to decrypt and verify the signature, and sender S uses the public key to verify the signature information;

[0101] Determine whether the integrity metric Dr and the random number Ns are consistent with the expected values. If Dr and Ns have not been modified, then the receiver R is trustworthy.

[0102] The encryption method used by the sender S to transmit data is as follows:

[0103] The sender S uses the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R to encrypt the symmetric key K1;

[0104] The sender S uses a symmetric key K1 to encrypt the data T to be sent, generating encrypted data K1{T};

[0105] The sender S uses the signature verification private key to sign the encrypted data K1{T};

[0106] The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key, encrypted data K1{T}, and signature to the receiver R.

[0107] Example 3

[0108] A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system includes the following steps:

[0109] Step 10: Receiver R receives the trusted verification data sent by sender S and performs signature verification using sender S's certificate certS. The trusted verification data includes a cryptographic digest, the integrity metric Ds of receiver R's trusted platform module, and signature information.

[0110] Step 20: After the recipient R verifies the signature, the recipient R determines the integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module based on the encrypted digest.

[0111] The receiver R generates an encryption key, signs the integrity measure Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key, and the random number Ns, and sends it to the sender S.

[0112] The integrity metric Dr of the trusted platform module is determined as follows:

[0113] Based on the encrypted digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of receiver R, determine the integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module of receiver R.

[0114] The receiver R uses the trusted platform module to generate an asymmetric encryption key, and the private key PiK is stored in the trusted platform module of the receiver R.

[0115] The receiver R uses the private key Aikir of the verification key to sign the integrity measure Dr, the public key Pbk of the encryption key, and the random number Ns before sending it to the sender S.

[0116] Step 30: Receiver R receives the encrypted file generated after the sender verifies the signature information. Receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encrypted file and verify the signature.

[0117] The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encryption key of the encrypted file, and uses the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted file. The receiver R uses the signature verification private key to verify the signature.

[0118] The above content is only for illustrating the technical concept of the present invention and should not be construed as limiting the scope of protection of the present invention. Any modifications made to the technical solution based on the technical concept proposed in this invention shall fall within the scope of protection of the claims of this invention.

Claims

1. A trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system, applied to a sender S configured with a trusted platform module and a receiver R configured with a trusted platform module, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Step 1: The sender S uses the SM3 algorithm to encrypt the message digest of the receiver R's random number Nr and its own random number Ns. The sender then uses the Aikis private key to sign the encrypted message digest and the integrity measure Ds of the trusted platform module to generate signature information. The sender then sends the signature information, the encrypted message digest, and the integrity measure Ds as trusted verification data to the receiver R. The integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module is determined as follows: Based on the encrypted digest and the ID number of the trusted platform module of sender S, determine the integrity metric Ds of the trusted platform module of sender S; Step 2: The receiver R uses the sender S's public key certificate certS to verify the signature information. After confirming that the integrity measure Ds and random number Nr in the signature information are correct, the receiver R determines that the sender S is trustworthy. The receiver R uses the trusted platform module to generate an asymmetric public key Pbk and a private key Pik. The private key Pik is stored in the trusted platform module. Then, the receiver R sends the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns} to the sender. Where Dr is the integrity metric of the trusted platform module of receiver R, used to verify the integrity of the receiver platform; Pbk is the asymmetric public key, and Ns is the random number of sender S. Step 3: The sender S verifies the signature information using the receiver R's certificate certR. The verification method is as follows: The receiver certificate certR is used to verify the signature information Aikir{Dr, Pbk, Ns}. The sender S uses the certificate to verify the signature information and determines that the integrity metric Dr and the random number Ns in the signature information are consistent with the expected values, thereby determining that the receiver R is trustworthy and obtaining Pbk at the same time. Step 4: After confirming that both the sender S and the receiver R are trustworthy, use the asymmetric public key Pbk to encrypt the symmetric key, and use the symmetric key to encrypt the data to be sent. After signing the encrypted data, send the signature and the encrypted symmetric key to the receiver. The encryption method for sending data is as follows: The sender S uses the public key Pbk provided by the receiver R to encrypt the symmetric key K1, and obtains Pbk{K1}. The sender S uses a symmetric key K1 to encrypt the data T to be sent, generating encrypted data K1{T}; The sender S uses the signature verification private key to sign the encrypted data K1{T}; The sender S sends the encrypted symmetric key, encrypted data K1{T}, and signature to the receiver R; The receiver uses the private key Pik to decrypt Pbk{K1} to obtain the symmetric key K1; the receiver uses the symmetric key K1 to decrypt K1{T} to obtain the sent data T; the receiver verifies the signature to confirm data consistency.

2. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method for decrypting the encrypted data is as follows: The receiver R uses the private key Pik of the encryption key to decrypt the encryption key of the encrypted file, and uses the decryption key to decrypt the encrypted file.

3. The trusted transmission method based on a trusted industrial control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The recipient R uses a signature verification private key to verify the signature.

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