Computer system starting method and device, computer system, medium and product

Abstract

The application relates to a computer system starting method and device, a computer system, a medium and a product. The method comprises the following steps: verifying information in a firmware layer of a computer system according to information in a solidification area in the computer system; if the information verification is passed, verifying a trusted password module firmware in a processor in the computer system according to the information in the firmware layer; if the trusted password module firmware verification is passed, controlling the computer system to start according to the trusted password module firmware. The above method can realize the safe starting of the computer system through the built-in solidification information of the computer system, the method does not need other auxiliary circuits outside the computer system to participate, so that the safe starting process of the computer system becomes simpler, and the complexity of the safe starting process of the computer system is reduced.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of computer technology, and in particular to a computer system startup method, apparatus, computer system, medium, and product. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of communication security technologies, the security of computer system operation is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, ensuring the security of computer system startup is crucial, making security verification of the startup process paramount.

[0003] In related technologies, dedicated circuits are primarily used to perform security checks on the computer system's boot process to ensure a secure startup. However, using these technologies presents the problem of a complex secure boot process for computer systems. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Therefore, it is necessary to provide a computer system booting method, apparatus, computer system, medium, and product to address the aforementioned technical problems and reduce the complexity of the secure booting process of a computer system.

[0005] In a first aspect, embodiments of this application provide a computer system startup method, the method comprising:

[0006] Based on the information in the embedded area of ​​the computer system, verify the information in the firmware layer of the computer system;

[0007] If the information verification passes, the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system is verified based on the information in the firmware layer.

[0008] If the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification passes, the computer system will be started according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware.

[0009] The technical solution in this application embodiment verifies the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on information embedded in the computer system. If the information verification passes, the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system is verified based on the information in the firmware layer. If the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification passes, the computer system is controlled to start based on the trusted cryptographic module firmware. The above method can use information embedded in the computer system that is not easily tampered with or lost as a trusted basis to realize the information verification process before the computer system starts, which can improve the accuracy of information verification and thus improve the security of the computer system after startup. Furthermore, the above method can realize the secure startup of the computer system through the embedded information of the computer system. This method does not require the participation of other auxiliary circuits outside the computer system, thus making the computer system... The secure boot process is simplified, reducing the complexity of the computer system's secure boot process. Furthermore, the method described above utilizes pre-stored information within the computer system to perform pre-boot verification, simplifying the verification process and accelerating its speed, thus further speeding up the secure boot process. Additionally, this method eliminates the need for manual intervention, saving on secure boot costs and improving the accuracy of pre-boot verification, thereby enhancing post-boot security. Moreover, the method leverages pre-stored information to perform layer-by-layer verification throughout the entire boot process, from power-on to system startup, significantly improving post-boot security.

[0010] In one embodiment, the information within the firmware region includes the processor's root public key information, and the information in the firmware layer includes a secure processor bootloader and firmware boot files; based on the information within the firmware region of the computer system, the information in the firmware layer of the computer system is verified, including:

[0011] The secure processor boot program is verified using the processor's root public key information.

[0012] If the security processor bootloader verification passes, the firmware boot file will be verified using the security processor bootloader.

[0013] The technical solution in this application embodiment verifies the secure processor boot program through the processor's root public key information. If the secure processor boot program passes the verification, it then verifies the firmware boot file. The above method can use information that is not easily tampered with or lost and is embedded in the computer system as a trusted basis to perform layer-by-layer verification on the information in the embedded layer. This can improve the accuracy of the verification results in the embedded layer and, on this basis, ensure the secure boot of the computer system's embedded layer.

[0014] In one embodiment, the firmware boot file includes a public key certificate chain and an initialization program in the firmware boot program; the firmware boot file is verified by the security processor boot program, including:

[0015] Controls the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain;

[0016] If the public key certificate chain verification passes, the initialization program is then verified using the public key in the public key certificate chain.

[0017] The technical solution in this application embodiment controls the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain. If the public key certificate chain verification passes, the initialization program in the firmware startup program is verified using the public key in the public key certificate chain. The above method can adopt a chain-like verification method with interlocking links to verify the contents of the firmware startup file layer by layer, which can improve the accuracy of firmware startup file security verification.

[0018] In one embodiment, the public key certificate chain is verified, including:

[0019] Based on the processor's root public key information, the signature value in the public key certificate chain is decrypted to obtain the first hash value;

[0020] Based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, the public key value in the public key certificate chain is hashed to obtain the second hash value;

[0021] If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, the public key certificate chain verification passes.

[0022] The technical solution in this application embodiment decrypts the signature value in the public key certificate chain based on the processor's root public key information to obtain a first hash value. Then, based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, it hashes the public key value in the public key certificate chain to obtain a second hash value. If the first hash value and the second hash value are equal, the public key certificate chain verification passes. This method can perform security verification on the public key certificate chain, providing a valid basis for the next step of accurate security verification of the initialization program in the firmware boot program, thereby further improving the accuracy of the initialization program verification results in the firmware boot program.

[0023] In one embodiment, the information in the firmware layer includes an initialization program in the firmware bootloader; verifying the firmware of the trusted cryptographic module in the processor within the computer system based on the information in the firmware layer includes:

[0024] The control unit executes the initialization program in the firmware boot process, and verifies the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the processor's root public key information.

[0025] The technical solution in this application embodiment controls the initialization program in the firmware startup program to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the processor's root public key information. The above method can control the running of the verified initialization program to verify the trusted certificate, which can make the trusted certificate verification process more secure. At the same time, the above method can use information that is not easily tampered with or lost and is embedded in the computer system as a trusted basis to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware, which can improve the accuracy of the trusted certificate verification result.

[0026] In one embodiment, the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware is verified based on the processor's root public key information, including:

[0027] Based on the root public key information, the signature value in the trusted certificate is decrypted to obtain the third hash value;

[0028] Based on the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate, the public key value in the trusted certificate is hashed to obtain the fourth hash value;

[0029] If the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, the trusted certificate verification passes.

[0030] The technical solution in this application embodiment decrypts the signature value in the trusted certificate based on the root public key information to obtain a third hash value, and hashes the public key value in the trusted certificate based on the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate to obtain a fourth hash value. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value are equal, the trusted certificate verification in the trusted cryptographic module firmware passes. The above method can perform security verification on the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware to prepare for the next step of securely booting the computer system, thereby making the security of the computer system after booting up higher.

[0031] In one embodiment, controlling the computer system startup based on the trusted cryptographic module firmware includes:

[0032] The firmware of the trusted cryptographic module is controlled to perform trusted computation on the target firmware boot file to obtain a trusted root.

[0033] Determine the trusted status of the target firmware boot file based on the root of trust;

[0034] If the trusted status is trusted, then control will run the target firmware boot file to complete the computer system boot.

[0035] The technical solution in this application embodiment controls the execution of the trusted cryptographic module firmware, performs trusted computation on the target firmware startup file to obtain a trusted root, determines the trusted state of the target firmware startup file based on the trusted root, and if the trusted state is trusted, controls the execution of the target firmware startup file to complete the computer system startup; the above method can use the verified trusted cryptographic module firmware to perform trusted measurement on other firmware startup files required during the computer system startup process, i.e., the target firmware startup file, in order to prepare for the secure startup of the computer system and ultimately ensure the security of the entire computer system after startup.

[0036] Secondly, embodiments of this application provide a computer system booting device, the device comprising:

[0037] The first verification module is used to verify the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information in the embedded area of ​​the computer system.

[0038] The second verification module is used to verify the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system based on the information in the firmware layer when the information verification passes.

[0039] The startup module is used to control the computer system to start up based on the trusted cryptographic module firmware when the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification is successful.

[0040] Thirdly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer system, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method in any of the embodiments of the first aspect described above.

[0041] Fourthly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method in any of the embodiments of the first aspect described above.

[0042] Fifthly, embodiments of this application also provide a computer program product, which includes a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method in any of the embodiments of the first aspect described above.

[0043] The above description is only an overview of the technical solution of this application. In order to better understand the technical means of this application and to implement it in accordance with the contents of the specification, and to make the above and other objects, features and advantages of this application more obvious and understandable, the following are specific embodiments of this application. Attached Figure Description

[0044] Figure 1 This is an internal structural diagram of a computer device in one embodiment;

[0045] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method in one embodiment;

[0046] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method in another embodiment;

[0047] Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method in another embodiment;

[0048] Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method in another embodiment;

[0049] Figure 6 This is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method in another embodiment;

[0050] Figure 7 This is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method in another embodiment;

[0051] Figure 8 This is a structural block diagram of a computer system startup device in one embodiment. Detailed Implementation

[0052] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0053] In the field of computer science, the security of computer system operation is becoming increasingly important. To ensure the security of computer system startup, performing security checks on the startup process has become particularly crucial.

[0054] In related technologies, the startup process of a computer system is mainly verified by inserting a dedicated circuit externally to ensure a secure boot. However, this approach can lead to a complex secure boot process. Therefore, this application provides a computer system startup method that reduces the complexity of the secure boot process.

[0055] The computer system startup method provided in this application embodiment is applicable to... Figure 1The computer system shown is optionally a central processing unit (CPU), i.e., a processor. This computer system can be a computer device or a server, etc., wherein the computer device can be, but is not limited to, various personal computers, laptops, smartphones, tablets, etc.; the server can be, but is not limited to, a standalone server or a server cluster composed of multiple servers. This embodiment does not limit the specific form of the computer system. The following embodiment will use the processor in the computer system as the execution entity to describe the specific process of the computer system startup method.

[0056] Figure 2 The diagram shown is a flowchart illustrating a computer system startup method provided in an embodiment of this application. This method can be implemented through the following steps:

[0057] S100. Verify the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information in the embedded area of ​​the computer system.

[0058] In this context, the "fixed area" in a computer system can be understood as a storage area within the processor of a computer system where information is permanently written and cannot be altered. That is, the information within the processor of a computer system is relatively secure; once written to the fixed area, the information is not easily tampered with or lost. Optionally, the information written to the fixed area may include the processor's built-in code and other hardware structure information, etc., which is not limited in this embodiment. In this embodiment, the information within the fixed area can be understood as fixed information.

[0059] Specifically, after the computer system is powered on, the processor in the computer system can obtain information from the firmware area within the processor and then verify the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information from the firmware area.

[0060] In one embodiment, the method for verifying the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information in the firmware region of the processor can be to pre-train an algorithm model, and then input both the information in the firmware region and the information in the firmware layer of the computer system into the algorithm model, which outputs the verification result of the information in the firmware layer.

[0061] In another embodiment, the method of verifying the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information in the firmware region of the processor can also be to decrypt the information in the firmware layer according to the information in the firmware region, and compare the decryption result with the preset decryption value. If the decryption result is equal to the preset decryption value, it is determined that the information in the firmware layer has passed the verification. If the decryption result is not equal to the preset decryption value, the information in the firmware layer has failed the verification.

[0062] Optionally, the computer system described above may include a hardware layer, a firmware layer, and a system layer; the information in the firmware layer may include the low-level code that connects the hardware layer and the system layer when the computer system starts up.

[0063] S200. If the information verification passes, the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system is verified based on the information in the firmware layer.

[0064] In practical applications, if the information verification in the firmware layer passes, the processor in the computer system can obtain the Trusted Cryptographic Module (TCM) firmware from the processor's flash memory. Based on the information in the firmware layer, the processor uses an information verification algorithm to perform security verification on the TCM firmware in the processor of the computer system.

[0065] The aforementioned information verification algorithm can be a cyclic redundancy check, a parity check, a Hamming code check, etc., and this application does not limit the specific algorithm used in the embodiments.

[0066] It should be noted that, in this embodiment of the application, the aforementioned trusted cryptographic module firmware can be the firmware of trusted cryptographic module version 2.0.

[0067] S300. If the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification passes, the computer system will be started according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware.

[0068] Based on the results obtained in the preceding steps, if the trusted cryptographic module firmware security verification passes, the processor in the computer system can use the trusted cryptographic module firmware to detect whether the computer system meets the secure boot conditions. If it does, it controls the secure boot of the computer system. Optionally, the boot conditions can be determined based on empirical values, and these conditions may include information such as the minimum interval between the computer system power-on time and the secure boot time, the maximum temperature of the computer system, and the minimum remaining memory space of the computer system.

[0069] The technical solution in this application embodiment verifies the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on information embedded in the computer system. If the information verification passes, the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system is verified based on the information in the firmware layer. If the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification passes, the computer system is controlled to start based on the trusted cryptographic module firmware. The above method can use information embedded in the computer system that is not easily tampered with or lost as a trusted basis to realize the information verification process before the computer system starts, which can improve the accuracy of information verification and thus improve the security of the computer system after startup. Furthermore, the above method can realize the secure startup of the computer system through the embedded information of the computer system. This method does not require the participation of other auxiliary circuits outside the computer system, thus making the computer system... The secure boot process is simplified, reducing the complexity of the computer system's secure boot process. Furthermore, the method described above utilizes pre-stored information within the computer system to perform pre-boot verification, simplifying the verification process and accelerating its speed, thus further speeding up the secure boot process. Additionally, this method eliminates the need for manual intervention, saving on secure boot costs and improving the accuracy of pre-boot verification, thereby enhancing post-boot security. Moreover, the method leverages pre-stored information to perform layer-by-layer verification throughout the entire boot process, from power-on to system startup, significantly improving post-boot security.

[0070] In some scenarios, to improve the accuracy of information verification in the firmware layer of a computer system, embedded information within the computer system can be used for security verification. The process of verifying information in the firmware layer of a computer system based on information within the embedded area of ​​the computer system is described below. In one embodiment, the information within the embedded area includes the processor's root public key information, and the information in the firmware layer includes a secure processor boot program and firmware boot files; such as... Figure 3 As shown, the steps in S100 above can be implemented in the following ways:

[0071] S110. Verify the secure processor startup program using the processor's root public key information.

[0072] In this embodiment of the application, the information in the aforementioned solidified area may include the processor's root public key (i.e., RootPubkey) information; the information in the aforementioned firmware layer includes the secure processor boot program and firmware boot file.

[0073] In a computer system, a security processor can be understood as a security coprocessor. In practical applications, the security processor cannot run initially if its startup program is not loaded. Naturally, the security processor needs to load its startup program before it can start running. Therefore, to ensure the secure operation of the security processor, a security verification can be performed on the security processor startup program before it is loaded into the security processor.

[0074] In this embodiment, the processor in the computer system can use the processor's root public key information and an information verification algorithm to perform security verification on the security processor boot program. In this application, the security processor boot program is also known as the Platform Security Processor Boot Loader (PSP BootLoader).

[0075] In this embodiment of the application, the processor in the computer system can decrypt the signature value in the secure processor startup program using the processor's root public key information to obtain a hash value. Then, it uses the hash algorithm in the secure processor startup program to perform hash calculation on the public key in the secure processor startup program to obtain another hash value. After that, the two hash values ​​are compared. If the two hash values ​​are equal, it is determined that the security verification of the secure processor startup program has passed.

[0076] S120. If the security processor boot program verification passes, the firmware boot file is verified through the security processor boot program.

[0077] After the security processor boot program verification is confirmed to be successful, the processor in the computer system can use an information verification algorithm to verify the firmware boot file of the computer system.

[0078] In practical applications, the boot firmware in a computer system may include Extensible Firmware Interface (EFI) and Unified Extensible Firmware Interface (UEFI), etc. However, in this embodiment, the boot firmware is described as a Basic Input Output System (BIOS).

[0079] The technical solution in this application embodiment verifies the secure processor boot program through the processor's root public key information. If the secure processor boot program passes the verification, it then verifies the firmware boot file. The above method can use information that is not easily tampered with or lost and is embedded in the computer system as a trusted basis to perform layer-by-layer verification on the information in the embedded layer. This can improve the accuracy of the verification results in the embedded layer and, on this basis, ensure the secure boot of the computer system's embedded layer.

[0080] The process of verifying the firmware boot file through the security processor boot program is described below. In one embodiment, the firmware boot file includes a public key certificate chain and an initialization program in the firmware boot program; such as Figure 4 As shown, the step in S120 above, which verifies the firmware boot file through the security processor boot program, can be implemented in the following way:

[0081] S121. Control the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain.

[0082] After the security processor boot program verification is confirmed to be successful, the processor in the computer system can load the security processor boot program into the security processor to control the execution of the security processor boot program, so that the security processor can start. The security processor, which is then securely booted, retrieves the public key certificate chain from the processor's flash memory in the computer system, and then uses an information verification algorithm to verify the public key certificate chain in the firmware boot file.

[0083] Meanwhile, the computer system can also process the public key certificate chain in the firmware boot file to obtain a first verification value, then compare the first verification value with a preset first verification threshold, and determine whether the public key certificate chain has passed verification based on the comparison result.

[0084] Specifically, if the first verification value is equal to the preset first verification threshold, the public key certificate chain is determined to have passed verification; if the first verification value is equal to the preset first verification threshold, the public key certificate chain is determined to have failed verification. Optionally, the preset first verification threshold can be custom-determined or determined based on historical experience values; this embodiment of the application does not limit this.

[0085] In this embodiment of the application, the firmware boot file is a signed BIOS file, which is a bin file generated by compiling BIOS code, i.e., a BIOS ROM file. The BIOS ROM file may include a public key certificate chain, a BIOS public key, a signature value of the BIOS public key, a signature algorithm, a hash value, a hash algorithm, vendor information, the validity period of the certificate issuance, etc.

[0086] It should be noted that the firmware boot file can be generated by the BIOS vendor's server without the need for developer involvement. Therefore, if the firmware boot file includes a public key certificate chain, the developer's access to the public key certificate chain can be reduced during the firmware boot file generation process, thereby reducing the possibility of the public key certificate chain being tampered with or lost.

[0087] Optionally, the BIOS vendor server can generate a BIOS public key (i.e., BIOS vendor public key, OEM_Pubkey) and a private key using a signing tool, and send the BIOS public key and BIOS user information to the CPU vendor server. The CPU vendor server authenticates the BIOS vendor server using the BIOS user information to determine whether the BIOS vendor server is in its vendor list. If it is found, the identity verification is successful. The CPU vendor server then generates a public key certificate chain based on the BIOS public key, and sends the public key certificate chain to the corresponding BIOS vendor server based on the BIOS user information.

[0088] Correspondingly, the BIOS vendor's server can use a signing tool to read the compiled BIOS code file, parse it to obtain key BIOS information, calculate its hash value, and then sign it using a private key. This signature value, along with the public key certificate chain, is then written into the compiled BIOS code file to obtain the signed BIOS file. Optionally, the compiled BIOS code file can be understood as the BIOS file to be signed.

[0089] The storage module of the aforementioned BIOS vendor may include the file identification information of the compiled BIOS code file, the corresponding public key certificate chain, the private key, and the correspondence between the three.

[0090] In this embodiment, the aforementioned public key certificate chain can be understood as a BIOS public key certificate chain. This chain may include information such as the BIOS public key, public key length, signature algorithm, hash algorithm, and signature value. The signature value in the public key certificate chain can be generated by signing the public key in the chain using the processor's root public key information and a signature algorithm corresponding to the signature algorithm in the public key certificate chain. The signature value in the aforementioned public key certificate chain can be understood as an encrypted signature value.

[0091] In addition, the computer system can pre-train an algorithm model, and then input the processor's root public key information, the public key in the public key certificate chain, and the signature value in the public key certificate chain into the algorithm model to verify the public key certificate chain. The algorithm model outputs the verification result of the public key certificate chain.

[0092] Optionally, the computer system can also verify the public key certificate chain using an asymmetric decryption algorithm based on the processor's root public key information, the public key in the public key certificate chain, and the signature value in the public key certificate chain. Optionally, the asymmetric decryption algorithm can be a decryption algorithm corresponding to an asymmetric encryption algorithm, wherein the aforementioned asymmetric encryption algorithm can be a public key cryptography algorithm (i.e., RSA algorithm), a national standard digital signature algorithm (i.e., DSA algorithm), an elliptic cryptography algorithm (i.e., ECC algorithm), or a key exchange algorithm (i.e., DH algorithm), etc.

[0093] S122. If the public key certificate chain verification passes, the initialization program in the firmware boot program is verified using the public key in the public key certificate chain.

[0094] Based on the results of the preceding steps, once the public key certificate chain verification is successful, the processor in the computer system can use the public key in the public key certificate chain to perform verification on the initialization program in the firmware boot program using an information verification algorithm.

[0095] Alternatively, when the public key certificate chain verification is successful, the computer system can also use the public key in the public key certificate chain to process the initialization program in the firmware boot program to obtain a second verification value, then compare the second verification value with a preset second verification threshold, and determine whether the initialization program in the firmware boot program has passed the verification based on the comparison result.

[0096] If the second verification value is equal to the preset second verification threshold, the initialization program in the firmware startup program is determined to have passed the verification; if the second verification value is equal to the preset second verification threshold, the initialization program in the firmware startup program is determined to have failed the verification.

[0097] In this embodiment, the firmware boot program can be BIOS boot code, which includes information such as the BIOS boot code signature value, hash value, hash algorithm, and public key. The signature value in the BIOS boot code can be calculated by signing the BIOS boot code using the BIOS private key information.

[0098] It should be noted that the firmware boot program may include the initialization program (i.e., the FV_BB segment code) and the driver program (i.e., the FV_MAIN segment code) from the BIOS boot code. Correspondingly, the signature value in the firmware boot program may include the signature value of the FV_BB segment code and the signature value of the FV_MAIN segment code.

[0099] Optionally, the signature value of the FV_BB segment code can be obtained by signing the FV_BB segment code based on the BIOS private key information; the signature value of the FV_MAIN segment code can be obtained by signing the FV_MAIN segment code based on the BIOS private key information.

[0100] In addition, the computer system can also decrypt the signature value of the initialization program in the firmware startup program using the public key in the public key certificate chain to obtain a hash value. Then, it can perform a hash operation on the initialization program in the firmware startup program using the hash algorithm in the firmware startup program to obtain another hash value. After that, the two hash values ​​are compared. If the two hash values ​​are equal, it is determined that the initialization program in the firmware startup program has passed the verification; otherwise, it is determined that the initialization program in the firmware startup program has failed the verification.

[0101] The technical solution in this application embodiment controls the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain. If the public key certificate chain verification passes, the initialization program in the firmware startup program is verified using the public key in the public key certificate chain. The above method can adopt a chain-like verification method with interlocking links to verify the contents of the firmware startup file layer by layer, which can improve the accuracy of firmware startup file security verification.

[0102] In some scenarios, the asymmetric decryption algorithm corresponding to the RSA algorithm can be used to verify the public key certificate chain. The process of verifying the public key certificate chain described above is explained below. In one embodiment, as... Figure 5 As shown, the step of verifying the public key certificate chain in S121 above can be implemented in the following way:

[0103] S1211. Based on the processor's root public key information, decrypt the signature value in the public key certificate chain to obtain the first hash value.

[0104] In this embodiment of the application, the processor in the computer system can use the processor's root public key information to decrypt the signature value in the public key certificate chain using an asymmetric public key decryption algorithm to obtain the first hash value.

[0105] S1212. Based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, hash the public key value in the public key certificate chain to obtain the second hash value.

[0106] This involves obtaining the hash algorithm from the public key certificate chain, hashing the public key value in the public key certificate chain according to the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, and obtaining the second hash value.

[0107] Optionally, the hash algorithm in the above public key certificate chain can be an irreversible encryption algorithm (such as the MD5 algorithm), a data verification algorithm (such as the CRC algorithm), or a secure hash algorithm (such as the SHA-1 algorithm, the international SHA1 algorithm, the SHA256 algorithm, the SHA284 algorithm, the SHA512 algorithm, the national cryptographic SM3 algorithm), etc., and this application embodiment does not limit it.

[0108] S1213. If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, the public key certificate chain verification passes.

[0109] Based on the first and second hash values ​​obtained in the previous steps, we can continue to determine whether the first hash value and the second hash value are equal. If the first hash value and the second hash value are equal, it is determined that the public key certificate chain verification has passed.

[0110] The technical solution in this application embodiment decrypts the signature value in the public key certificate chain based on the processor's root public key information to obtain a first hash value. Then, based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, it hashes the public key value in the public key certificate chain to obtain a second hash value. If the first hash value and the second hash value are equal, the public key certificate chain verification passes. This method can perform security verification on the public key certificate chain, providing a valid basis for the next step of accurate security verification of the initialization program in the firmware boot program, thereby further improving the accuracy of the initialization program verification results in the firmware boot program.

[0111] The process of verifying the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system based on the information in the firmware layer is described below. In one embodiment, the information in the firmware layer includes the initialization program in the firmware startup program; the step of verifying the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system based on the information in the firmware layer in S200 may include: controlling the execution of the initialization program in the firmware startup program, and verifying the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the root public key information of the processor.

[0112] Specifically, the processor in the computer system can control the execution of the initialization program in the verified firmware boot program, obtain the trusted cryptographic module firmware from the processor's flash memory, and then verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware according to the processor's root public key information.

[0113] In one implementation, the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware is verified based on the processor's root public key information by using an information verification algorithm to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware.

[0114] In another implementation, the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware can be verified based on the processor's root public key information by processing the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware to obtain a verification value, and then comparing the verification value with the standard verification value of the trusted certificate. If the verification value is equal to the standard verification value of the trusted certificate, the trusted certificate is determined to have passed the verification.

[0115] The technical solution in this application embodiment controls the initialization program in the firmware startup program to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the processor's root public key information. The above method can control the running of the verified initialization program to verify the trusted certificate, which can make the trusted certificate verification process more secure. At the same time, the above method can use information that is not easily tampered with or lost and is embedded in the computer system as a trusted basis to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware, which can improve the accuracy of the trusted certificate verification result.

[0116] In one embodiment, such as Figure 6 As shown, the steps described above for verifying the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the processor's root public key information can be implemented in the following way:

[0117] S210. Based on the root public key information, decrypt the signature value in the trusted certificate to obtain the third hash value.

[0118] The trusted certificate may include information such as the signature value, hash algorithm, and public key value.

[0119] In this embodiment of the application, the processor in the computer system can use the processor's root public key information to decrypt the signature value in the trusted certificate using an asymmetric public key decryption algorithm to obtain a third hash value.

[0120] S220. Based on the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate, hash the public key value in the trusted certificate to obtain the fourth hash value.

[0121] Among these methods, the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate can be obtained, and the public key value in the trusted certificate can be hashed according to the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate to obtain the fourth hash value.

[0122] Optionally, the hash algorithm in the aforementioned trusted certificate can be an irreversible encryption algorithm (such as the MD5 algorithm), a data verification algorithm (such as the CRC algorithm), or a secure hash algorithm (such as the SHA-1 algorithm, the international SHA1 algorithm, the SHA256 algorithm, the SHA284 algorithm, the SHA512 algorithm, the national cryptographic SM3 algorithm), etc. This application embodiment does not limit this.

[0123] S230. If the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, the trusted certificate verification passes.

[0124] Based on the third and fourth hash values ​​obtained in the previous steps, we can continue to determine whether the third and fourth hash values ​​are equal. If the third and fourth hash values ​​are equal, the trusted certificate verification is confirmed to be successful.

[0125] The technical solution in this application embodiment decrypts the signature value in the trusted certificate based on the root public key information to obtain a third hash value, and hashes the public key value in the trusted certificate based on the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate to obtain a fourth hash value. If the third hash value and the fourth hash value are equal, the trusted certificate verification in the trusted cryptographic module firmware passes. The above method can perform security verification on the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware to prepare for the next step of securely booting the computer system, thereby making the security of the computer system after booting up higher.

[0126] The process of controlling the computer system startup based on the trusted cryptographic module firmware is described below. In one embodiment, as... Figure 7 As shown, the step in S300 above, which controls the computer system startup based on the trusted cryptographic module firmware, can be implemented in the following way:

[0127] S310: Control the execution of the trusted cryptographic module firmware, perform trusted calculations on the target firmware startup file, and obtain a trusted root.

[0128] The trusted cryptographic module is built into the processor of the computer system. In practical applications, the processor of the computer system can load the verified trusted cryptographic module firmware into the trusted cryptographic module, control the execution of the trusted cryptographic module firmware, and start the trusted cryptographic module. Furthermore, the trusted cryptographic module performs trusted computation on the target firmware startup file through a secure trusted cryptographic module to obtain a trusted root.

[0129] Optionally, the target firmware boot file may include, but is not limited to, drivers (i.e., FV_MAIN segment code) in the firmware boot program, boot files of the operating system in the computer system, initialization programs of various hardware devices in the computer system, and kernel boot programs of the operating system in the computer system.

[0130] S320. Determine the trusted status of the target firmware boot file based on the trusted root.

[0131] Specifically, the trusted cryptographic module in the computer system can compare the trusted root of the target firmware boot file with the standard trusted root based on the trusted root of the target firmware boot file obtained in the previous steps, and determine the trusted status of the target firmware boot file based on the comparison result.

[0132] Specifically, if the root of trust of the target firmware boot file is equal to the standard root of trust, the trust status of the target firmware boot file can be determined to be trustworthy; if the root of trust of the target firmware boot file is not equal to the standard root of trust, the trust status of the target firmware boot file can be determined to be untrustworthy.

[0133] In this embodiment, each of the following can have its own corresponding standard root of trust: the driver program in the target firmware boot file, the boot file of the operating system, the initialization program of each hardware device in the computer system, and the kernel boot program of the operating system. Furthermore, in practical applications, the aforementioned root of trust can include a root of trust measurement, a root of trust report, and a root of trust storage. Correspondingly, the standard root of trust can include a standard root of trust measurement, a standard root of trust report, and a standard root of trust storage.

[0134] Taking the driver in the target firmware boot file as an example, a trust calculation can be performed on the driver to obtain the driver's trust metric root, trust report root, and trust storage root. The driver's trust metric root, trust report root, and trust storage root are then compared with the driver's standard trust metric root, the driver's trust report root, and the driver's trust storage root. If the driver's trust metric root, trust report root, and trust storage root are equal to the driver's standard trust metric root, the driver's trust status is determined to be trustworthy; otherwise, the driver's trust status is determined to be untrustworthy.

[0135] Simultaneously, trusted calculations can be performed on the operating system's boot files, the initialization programs of various hardware devices in the computer system, and the operating system's kernel boot program in the target firmware boot file, and their respective trusted states can be determined. If the trusted states of the drivers, operating system's boot files, the initialization programs of various hardware devices in the computer system, and the operating system's kernel boot program in the target firmware boot file are all trusted, the trusted state of the target firmware boot file is determined to be trusted; otherwise, the trusted state of the target firmware boot file is determined to be untrusted.

[0136] It should be noted that the trusted computation of the operating system's startup files, the initialization programs of various hardware devices in the computer system, and the operating system's kernel startup program is similar to the method of trusted computation of drivers, and will not be described again in this embodiment. At the same time, the trusted state of the operating system's startup files, the initialization programs of various hardware devices in the computer system, and the operating system's kernel startup program is similar to the method of determining the trusted state of drivers, and will not be described again in this embodiment.

[0137] S330. If the trusted state is trusted, then control the execution of the target firmware boot file to complete the computer system boot.

[0138] Based on the results obtained in the preceding steps, if the target firmware boot file is determined to be trustworthy, the processor in the computer system can control the execution of the target firmware boot file to complete the computer system boot process.

[0139] The technical solution in this application embodiment controls the execution of a trusted cryptographic module firmware, performs trusted computation on the target firmware startup file to obtain a trusted root, determines the trusted state of the target firmware startup file based on the trusted root, and if the trusted state is trusted, controls the execution of the target firmware startup file to complete the computer system startup. The above method can use the verified trusted cryptographic module firmware to perform trusted measurement on other firmware startup files required during the computer system startup process, i.e., the target firmware startup file, to prepare for the secure startup of the computer system and ultimately ensure the security of the entire computer system after startup. Furthermore, the above method can use the solidified information in the computer system to perform layer-by-layer verification of the entire link from the start of the computer system power-on to the startup of the computer system, which greatly improves the security of the computer system after startup.

[0140] In one embodiment, this application also provides a computer system startup method, which includes the following processes:

[0141] (1) Verify the security processor boot program in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the root public key information of the processor in the firmware area of ​​the computer system.

[0142] (2) If the security processor startup program verification is successful, control the execution of the security processor startup program, and decrypt the signature value in the public key certificate chain according to the root public key information of the processor to obtain the first hash value.

[0143] (3) Hash the public key value in the public key certificate chain according to the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain to obtain the second hash value.

[0144] (4) If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, the public key certificate chain verification is successful.

[0145] (5) If the public key certificate chain verification passes, the firmware boot program is verified using the public key in the public key certificate chain.

[0146] (6) If the information verification is successful, control the execution of the firmware boot program, and decrypt the signature value in the trusted certificate according to the root public key information to obtain the third hash value.

[0147] (7) Hash the public key value in the trusted certificate according to the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate to obtain the fourth hash value.

[0148] (8) If the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, the trusted certificate verification is successful.

[0149] (9) If the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification passes, control the computer system to start according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware.

[0150] The specific execution process of (1) to (9) above can be found in the description of the above embodiments. The implementation principle and technical effect are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0151] It should be understood that although the steps in the flowcharts of the above embodiments are shown sequentially according to the arrows, these steps are not necessarily executed in the order indicated by the arrows. Unless explicitly stated herein, there is no strict order restriction on the execution of these steps, and they can be executed in other orders. Moreover, at least some steps in the flowcharts of the above embodiments may include multiple steps or multiple stages. These steps or stages are not necessarily completed at the same time, but can be executed at different times. The execution order of these steps or stages is not necessarily sequential, but can be performed alternately or in turn with other steps or at least some of the steps or stages of other steps.

[0152] Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides a computer system booting apparatus for implementing the computer system booting method described above. The solution provided by this apparatus is similar to the implementation described in the above method; therefore, the specific limitations in one or more computer system booting apparatus embodiments provided below can be found in the limitations of the computer system booting method described above, and will not be repeated here.

[0153] In one embodiment, Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a computer system boot device in one embodiment of this application. The computer system boot device provided in this embodiment can be applied to a computer system. Figure 8 As shown, the computer system startup device of this application embodiment may include: a first verification module 11, a second verification module 12, and a startup module 13, wherein:

[0154] The first verification module 11 is used to verify the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information in the embedded area of ​​the computer system.

[0155] The second verification module 12 is used to verify the firmware of the trusted cryptographic module in the processor of the computer system based on the information in the firmware layer when the information verification passes.

[0156] The startup module 13 is used to control the computer system to start up according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware when the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification is passed.

[0157] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0158] In one embodiment, the information within the firmware region includes the processor's root public key information, and the information in the firmware layer includes the secure processor boot program and firmware boot file; the first verification module 11 includes: a first verification unit and a second verification unit, wherein:

[0159] The first verification unit is used to verify the secure processor startup program using the processor's root public key information.

[0160] The second verification unit is used to verify the firmware boot file through the security processor boot program when the security processor boot program verification passes.

[0161] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0162] In one embodiment, the firmware boot file includes a public key certificate chain and an initialization program in the firmware boot program; the second verification unit includes: a certificate chain verification subunit and a program verification subunit, wherein:

[0163] The certificate chain verification subunit is used to control the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain;

[0164] The program verification subunit is used to verify the initialization program using the public key in the public key certificate chain when the public key certificate chain verification passes.

[0165] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0166] In one embodiment, the certificate chain verification subunit is specifically used for:

[0167] Based on the processor's root public key information, the signature value in the public key certificate chain is decrypted to obtain the first hash value;

[0168] Based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, the public key value in the public key certificate chain is hashed to obtain the second hash value;

[0169] If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, the public key certificate chain verification passes.

[0170] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0171] In one embodiment, the information in the firmware layer includes an initialization program in the firmware bootloader; the second verification module 12 includes: a trusted certificate verification unit, wherein:

[0172] The trusted certificate verification unit is used to control the initialization program in the firmware startup program and verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the processor's root public key information.

[0173] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0174] In one embodiment, the trusted certificate verification unit is specifically used for:

[0175] Based on the root public key information, the signature value in the trusted certificate is decrypted to obtain the third hash value;

[0176] Based on the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate, the public key value in the trusted certificate is hashed to obtain the fourth hash value;

[0177] If the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, the trusted certificate verification passes.

[0178] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0179] In one embodiment, the startup module 13 is specifically used for:

[0180] The firmware of the trusted cryptographic module is controlled to perform trusted computation on the target firmware boot file to obtain a trusted root.

[0181] Determine the trusted status of the target firmware boot file based on the root of trust;

[0182] If the trusted status is trusted, then control will run the target firmware boot file to complete the computer system boot.

[0183] The computer system booting device provided in this application embodiment can be used to execute the technical solutions in the above-described computer system booting method embodiments of this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0184] For specific limitations regarding the computer system boot device, please refer to the limitations on the computer system boot method above, which will not be repeated here. Each module in the aforementioned computer system boot device can be implemented entirely or partially through software, hardware, or a combination thereof. These modules can be embedded in the processor of the computer system in hardware form or independent of it, or stored in the memory of the computer system in software form, so that the processor can call and execute the operations corresponding to each module.

[0185] In one embodiment, a computer system is provided, which may be a server, and its internal structure diagram can be found [reference needed]. Figure 1 As shown, the computer system includes a processor, memory, and a network interface connected via a system bus. The processor provides processing power. The memory includes non-volatile storage media and internal memory. The non-volatile storage media stores the operating system, computer programs, and a database. The internal memory provides an environment for the operation of the operating system and computer programs stored in the non-volatile storage media. The database stores trusted cryptographic module firmware and information within the firmware layer. The network interface communicates with external endpoints via a network connection. When executed by the processor, the computer program implements a computer system boot method.

[0186] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 1 The structure shown is merely a block diagram of a portion of the structure related to the present application and does not constitute a limitation on the computer system to which the present application is applied. A specific computer system may include more or fewer components than those shown in the figure, or combine certain components, or have different component arrangements.

[0187] In one embodiment, a computer system is also provided, including a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the technical solution in the above-described computer system startup method embodiment of this application. The implementation principle and technical effect are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0188] In one embodiment, a computer-readable storage medium is also provided, on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the technical solution of the computer system startup method described in this application. Its implementation principle and technical effect are similar, and will not be repeated here.

[0189] In one embodiment, a computer program product is also provided, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the technical solution of the computer system startup method described above in this application. Its implementation principle and technical effects are similar and will not be repeated here.

[0190] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a non-volatile computer-readable storage medium, and when executed, it can include the processes of the embodiments of the above methods. Any references to memory, storage, databases, or other media used in the embodiments provided in this application can include at least one of non-volatile and volatile memory. Non-volatile memory can include read-only memory (ROM), magnetic tape, floppy disk, flash memory, or optical storage, etc. Volatile memory can include random access memory (RAM) or external cache memory. By way of illustration and not limitation, RAM can be in various forms, such as static random access memory (SRAM) or dynamic random access memory (DRAM), etc.

[0191] The technical features of the above embodiments can be combined in any way. For the sake of brevity, not all possible combinations of the technical features in the above embodiments are described. However, as long as there is no contradiction in the combination of these technical features, they should be considered to be within the scope of this specification.

[0192] The embodiments described above are merely illustrative of several implementation methods of this application, and while the descriptions are relatively specific and detailed, they should not be construed as limiting the scope of the invention patent. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various modifications and improvements without departing from the concept of this application, and these all fall within the protection scope of this application. Therefore, the protection scope of this patent application should be determined by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A computer system startup method, characterized in that, The method includes: The information in the firmware layer of the computer system is verified based on the information in the embedded area of ​​the computer system; the information in the embedded area includes the root public key information of the processor in the computer system, and the information in the firmware layer includes the security processor boot program, the firmware boot file, and the initialization program in the firmware boot program; If the information verification passes, the initialization program in the firmware startup program is executed to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the root public key information of the processor. If the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification passes, the computer system is controlled to start according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware; The step of verifying the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on information within the firmware region of the computer system includes: The security processor startup program is verified using the processor's root public key information. If the security processor startup program passes the verification, the firmware startup file is then verified using the security processor startup program.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The firmware boot file includes a public key certificate chain and an initialization program in the firmware boot program; The step of verifying the firmware boot file through the security processor boot program includes: The system controls the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain. If the public key certificate chain verification passes, the initialization program is then verified using the public key in the public key certificate chain.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The verification of the public key certificate chain includes: Based on the processor's root public key information, the signature value in the public key certificate chain is decrypted to obtain the first hash value; Based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, the public key value in the public key certificate chain is hashed to obtain a second hash value; If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, then the public key certificate chain verification passes.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The step of verifying the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the processor's root public key information includes: Based on the root public key information, the signature value in the trusted certificate is decrypted to obtain the third hash value; The public key value in the trusted certificate is hashed according to the hash algorithm in the trusted certificate to obtain the fourth hash value; If the third hash value is equal to the fourth hash value, then the trusted certificate verification passes.

5. The method according to any one of claims 1-3, characterized in that, The step of controlling the computer system to start according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware includes: The trusted cryptographic module firmware is executed by controlling the trusted computation of the target firmware startup file to obtain a trusted root. The trusted state of the target firmware boot file is determined based on the trusted root. If the trusted state is trusted, then control the execution of the target firmware boot file to complete the computer system boot.

6. A computer system startup device, characterized in that, The device includes: The first verification module is used to verify the information in the firmware layer of the computer system based on the information in the embedded area of ​​the computer system; the information in the embedded area includes the root public key information of the processor in the computer system, and the information in the firmware layer includes the security processor boot program, the firmware boot file, and the initialization program in the firmware boot program. The second verification module is used to verify the trusted cryptographic module firmware in the processor of the computer system based on the information in the firmware layer when the information verification passes. A startup module is used to control the computer system to start according to the trusted cryptographic module firmware when the trusted cryptographic module firmware verification is passed. The first verification module includes: The first verification unit is used to verify the security processor startup program using the root public key information of the processor. The second verification unit is used to verify the firmware boot file through the security processor boot program when the security processor boot program passes the verification. The second verification module includes: The trusted certificate verification unit is used to control the execution of the initialization program in the firmware startup program and to verify the trusted certificate in the trusted cryptographic module firmware based on the root public key information of the processor.

7. The apparatus according to claim 6, characterized in that, The firmware boot file includes a public key certificate chain and an initialization program in the firmware boot program; the second verification unit includes: The certificate chain verification subunit is used to control the execution of the security processor startup program to verify the public key certificate chain; The program verification subunit is used to verify the initialization program using the public key in the public key certificate chain when the public key certificate chain verification passes.

8. The apparatus according to claim 7, characterized in that, The certificate chain verification subunit is specifically used for: Based on the processor's root public key information, the signature value in the public key certificate chain is decrypted to obtain the first hash value; Based on the hash algorithm in the public key certificate chain, the public key value in the public key certificate chain is hashed to obtain a second hash value; If the first hash value is equal to the second hash value, then the public key certificate chain verification passes.

9. A computer system comprising a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, characterized in that, When the processor executes the computer program, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-5.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the steps of the method according to any one of claims 1-5.

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