A method for analyzing network reliability of nuclear power instrument control system under real network attack

Abstract

The embodiment of the application provides a nuclear power instrument control system network reliability analysis method under real network attacks, and the method comprises the following steps: obtaining data flow of a nuclear power instrument control network, determining network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power instrument control network, and collecting original data of the key nodes; calculating an initial value of reliability of the nuclear power instrument control network based on the original data; establishing a network model based on the network structure, simulating the attack network model, repairing the failed nodes after the simulation attack, and calculating real-time values of reliability of the network model in the repairing process; comparing the initial value of reliability with the real-time value of reliability, indicating load redistribution when the failed nodes after the simulation attack are repaired according to the comparison result, and stopping until the network model is stable; when the stable network model is detected to encounter a real network attack, comparing reliability value changes before and after the real network attack, evaluating a network state of the current nuclear power instrument control network based on the reliability value changes, and determining a fault node through the reliability value changes.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of nuclear power industry control technology, and in particular to a method for analyzing the network reliability of nuclear power instrumentation and control systems under real network attacks. Background Technology

[0002] Nuclear power plants employ numerous computer-based systems, among which the instrumentation and control system (DCS) is the most critical. Its reliability directly impacts the operation and maintenance of the nuclear power plant. The nuclear power plant's instrumentation and control system (DCS), serving as the information nerve center and control hub, is a typical industrial control system. It monitors and controls the production process within the nuclear power plant. Currently, almost all operating nuclear power plants utilize DCS systems, and all newly built nuclear power plants will adopt DCS systems. It plays a vital role in ensuring the reliability of the nuclear power plant.

[0003] Compared to traditional IT systems, nuclear power plant control systems have emphasized reliability from the outset, but their information security design is relatively lacking. With the integration of traditional nuclear power plant control systems with Internet systems, nuclear power plant control systems, as critical infrastructure, not only have enormous commercial value, but their safe and stable operation also has significant social value. This has led to an increase in attacks on nuclear power plant control systems by illegal attackers, who are constantly attempting to launch targeted cyberattacks. Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems will be in a real cyberattack environment for a long time.

[0004] Traditional reliability analysis methods for instrumentation and control systems primarily focus on the connectivity, capacity, and latency of the communication network itself. However, in nuclear power plants, because the instrumentation and control network bears the burden of production characteristics, the connectivity, capacity, and latency of the communication network alone cannot fully characterize its impact on production activities. Furthermore, the ultimate goal of network attacks is to alter the state of drive mechanisms, thereby disrupting nuclear power production. Therefore, simply assessing the reliability of the communication network is insufficient; a comprehensive assessment of all critical nodes within the network, with safe production as the objective, is necessary. Thus, there is an urgent need for a method for reliability analysis of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system networks under real-world network attack conditions. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the problems existing in the prior art, embodiments of the present invention provide a method and system for analyzing the network reliability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under real network attacks.

[0006] This invention provides a method for network reliability analysis of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems under real-world network attacks. The method includes: Acquire the data stream of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, analyze the data stream, determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes; Based on the raw data, calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network; A network model is established based on the network structure, an attack on the network model is simulated, the failed nodes after the simulated attack are repaired, and the real-time reliability value of the network model is calculated during the repair process. By comparing the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, the load redistribution is performed on the failed nodes after the simulated attack based on the comparison result until the network model is stable. When a stable network model is detected to be subjected to a real network attack, the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack are compared. The network status of the current nuclear power instrumentation and control network is assessed based on the changes in reliability values, and the faulty nodes are identified through the changes in reliability values.

[0007] In one embodiment, the method further includes: Calculate the ratio of key nodes to total nodes in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network to determine the connectivity of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network; Based on the data transmission rate, latency, and packet loss rate in the original data, the availability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated; The stability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated based on the range of performance parameter variations in the original data. Obtain network attack records from the raw data, identify surviving nodes from the network attack records, calculate the ratio of surviving nodes to summary nodes, and determine the resilience of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network. The initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated based on a comprehensive consideration of connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

[0008] In one embodiment, the method further includes: Obtain routine data of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and set initial data for the network model based on the routine data. The initial data includes: node capacity formula, node initial load, and redundancy coefficient. The rationality of the initial data is verified by the connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

[0009] In one embodiment, the method further includes: Node capacity, node status, node importance; The steps for obtaining node capacity, node status, and node importance include: Based on the node capacity formula, initial node load, and redundancy coefficient, calculate the node capacity of the critical node; Real-time acquisition of the node status of the key nodes; The importance of the key nodes is determined based on their topological relationship within the network structure.

[0010] In one embodiment, the method further includes: When repairing the failed nodes after the simulated attack, the repair order is based on the importance of the critical nodes.

[0011] In one embodiment, the method further includes: By comparing the changes in connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network before and after the actual network attack, the network status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is evaluated based on the comparison results. By comparing the changes in capacity, node status, and node importance of key nodes before and after the actual network attack, the faulty nodes are identified based on the comparison results.

[0012] This invention provides a network reliability analysis system for nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems under real-world network attacks. The system includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire the data stream of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, analyze the data stream, determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes; A calculation module is used to calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the raw data; The simulated attack module is used to establish a network model based on the network structure, simulate attacks on the network model, repair failed nodes after the simulated attack, and calculate the real-time reliability value of the network model during the repair process. The repair module is used to compare the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, and based on the comparison result, instruct the failed nodes after the simulated attack to perform load redistribution during repair until the network model is stable. The evaluation module is used to detect when a stable network model encounters a real network attack, compare the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack, evaluate the network status of the current nuclear power instrumentation and control network based on the changes in reliability values, and identify faulty nodes through the changes in reliability values.

[0013] In one embodiment, the system further includes: The connectivity module is used to calculate the ratio of key nodes to total nodes that communicate with each other in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and to determine the connectivity of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network. The availability module is used to calculate the availability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the data transmission rate, latency, and packet loss rate in the original data. The stability module is used to calculate the stability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the range of variation of performance parameters in the original data. The resilience module is used to acquire network attack records from the raw data, identify surviving nodes in the network attack records, calculate the ratio of surviving nodes to summary nodes, and determine the resilience of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network. The second calculation module is used to calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

[0014] This invention provides an electronic device, including a processor and a memory; The processor is connected to the memory; The memory is used to store executable program code; The processor runs a program corresponding to the executable program code stored in the memory to perform the methods described in one or more embodiments.

[0015] This invention provides a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon. When executed by a processor, the computer program implements the steps of the above-described method for analyzing the network reliability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under real network attacks.

[0016] In view of the above, in one or more embodiments of this specification, the data flow of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is obtained to determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and the raw data of the key nodes is collected; based on the raw data, the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated; a network model is established based on the network structure, the network model is simulated to attack, the failed nodes after the simulated attack are repaired, and the real-time reliability value of the network model is calculated during the repair process; the initial reliability value and the real-time reliability value are compared, and the load reallocation is indicated for the failed nodes after the simulated attack to be repaired according to the comparison result until the network model is stable; when the stable network model encounters a real network attack, the change in reliability value before and after the real network attack is compared, the network status of the current nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is evaluated based on the change in reliability value, and the faulty node is determined by the change in reliability value. In this way, the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is quantitatively evaluated through network model attack simulation, so as to accurately and completely reflect the reliability status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system network when encountering real network attacks. Attached Figure Description

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] Figure 1This is a flowchart illustrating a method for analyzing the network reliability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under a real network attack, as provided in one embodiment of this specification.

[0019] Figure 2 This is a model diagram of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network provided in one embodiment of this specification.

[0020] Figure 3 This is a diagram showing the relationship between key reliability evaluation indicators provided in one embodiment of this specification.

[0021] Figure 4 This specification provides a flowchart for analyzing the network reliability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under a real network attack, as an example of this specification.

[0022] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a network reliability analysis system for a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under a real network attack, provided in one embodiment of this specification.

[0023] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in one embodiment of this specification. Detailed Implementation

[0024] The subject matter described herein will now be discussed with reference to exemplary embodiments. It should be understood that these embodiments are discussed merely to enable those skilled in the art to better understand and implement the subject matter described herein, and are not intended to limit the scope, applicability, or examples set forth in the claims. The function and arrangement of the elements discussed may be changed without departing from the scope of this specification. Various processes or components may be omitted, substituted, or added as needed in the various examples. For example, the described methods may be performed in a different order than described, and steps may be added, omitted, or combined. Furthermore, features described in some examples may be combined in other examples.

[0025] As used herein, the term "comprising" and its variations are open terms meaning "including but not limited to". The term "based on" means "at least partially based on". The terms "one embodiment" and "an embodiment" mean "at least one embodiment". The term "another embodiment" means "at least one other embodiment". The terms "first", "second", etc., may refer to different or the same objects. Other definitions, whether explicit or implicit, may be included below. Unless explicitly indicated by the context, the definition of a term shall remain consistent throughout the specification.

[0026] like Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment of the invention provides a method for network reliability analysis of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems under real network attacks, including: Step S101: Obtain the data stream of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, analyze the data stream, determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes.

[0027] Specifically, in this embodiment, data flow acquisition of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network (nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system network) can be achieved through various methods. For example, analyzing the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network diagrams can determine the overall network structure and device connections; analyzing the data flow direction within the network, capturing and analyzing data packets of network traffic in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, further determining the network architecture and network layers (network layers can be divided according to their location within the network, such as network boundary, core layer, access layer, etc.), and identifying key nodes at different network layers. These key nodes can be critical instrument nodes in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, such as controllers, instruments, drive mechanisms, and workstations. In this embodiment, key nodes can be: network boundary devices, information security devices, network switching devices, workstations, controllers, instruments, drive mechanisms, etc. The raw data in the key nodes can include: the number of communicating nodes, the total number of network nodes, the number of nodes surviving a network attack, inter-node communication rate, inter-node communication latency, inter-node communication packet loss, inter-node communication data packet count, data packet size, and load capacity value, etc.

[0028] Step S102: Based on the original data, calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network.

[0029] Specifically, after determining the raw data of key nodes, the reliability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated based on the raw data to obtain an initial reliability value for the network. Reliability refers to the indicator that the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network can operate normally, that is, the probability that the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system can complete its predetermined functions within the design specifications. In this embodiment, reliability can be evaluated based on four attributes: connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

[0030] The connectivity of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network can be determined by calculating the ratio of the number of communicating nodes to the total number of nodes. Connectivity reflects the network's coverage and connectivity, and in nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems, it is a crucial indicator of network structural robustness and information flow capacity. A highly connected network ensures that even if some nodes or links fail, other nodes can continue to function normally. By calculating connectivity, potential bottlenecks or isolated nodes in the network can be identified, allowing for subsequent measures to optimize the network structure and improve the overall reliability and resilience of the system.

[0031] The availability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network can be determined based on a comprehensive assessment of data transmission rates (such as bandwidth), latency (such as end-to-end delay), and packet loss rate in the raw data. Availability reflects the operational efficiency of the instrumentation and control system network within a given time period, representing the proportion of effective time during which the instrumentation and control system network can process and transmit information during normal network operation.

[0032] The stability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network can be measured by the difference in the range of performance parameter fluctuations in the original data sample, such as latency fluctuations and packet loss rate changes. Stability reflects the ability of the instrumentation and control system network to maintain a stable operating state under various environmental and conditions, and represents the range of changes in network performance parameters under normal network operation.

[0033] The resilience of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network can be calculated by obtaining network attack records from the raw data and determining the ratio of surviving nodes to the total number of nodes identified in the attack records. Resilience reflects the ability of the instrumentation and control system network to quickly recover its operational status after an attack. By analyzing the proportion of surviving nodes after a network attack, the robustness and resilience of the network in the face of malicious attacks can be assessed.

[0034] Based on the four attributes of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network—connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience—the reliability of the network can be comprehensively assessed from multiple perspectives.

[0035] Step S103: Establish a network model based on the network structure, simulate an attack on the network model, repair the failed nodes after the simulated attack, and calculate the real-time reliability value of the network model during the repair process.

[0036] Specifically, a network model is established based on the network structure data of each unit in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network. When establishing the initial network model, corresponding initial data needs to be set. This initial data can be set using conventional data from the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network. For example, conventional data for corresponding nodes can be determined based on the design parameters of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system, actual operating data, and engineering experience. This includes node capacity formulas, initial node loads, redundancy coefficients, etc. In this embodiment, the initial data settings can be, for example, the node capacity formula: in, It is the capacity of node i. This is the initial load of node i. It is the redundancy factor, representing the additional capacity of a node.

[0037] For initial load The initial load of each node can typically be determined based on historical traffic data, node device specifications, node device design data, etc.

[0038] The redundancy factor reflects the system's fault tolerance requirements during design. It is typically set based on the system's reliability needs and cost considerations. For example, a higher redundancy factor is used if high reliability is required, while a lower factor is used if cost is the primary consideration.

[0039] In a simulated attack network model, if a node is successfully attacked and becomes a failed node, that node and its connected edges will be removed from the network. Node failure not only affects itself but also has a cascading effect on other connected nodes, potentially leading to a wider system failure. The specific impact depends on the network model's structure. Network models can be broadly categorized into two types: series and parallel. These two structures visually represent the overall system structure and the dependencies between nodes. In a series structure, all components must function correctly for the system to operate normally; the failure of any single node will cause the entire series path to fail. In a parallel system, the system can continue to operate as long as one component functions correctly. A specific network model for a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system can be shown as follows: Figure 2 As shown.

[0040] When a node fails, the load it was carrying is redistributed to other nodes. This phenomenon is called load redistribution. Load redistribution can lead to an increase in the load on other nodes if the new load exceeds the capacity of those nodes (i.e., ...). If these nodes fail, they may also malfunction, triggering a chain reaction. Therefore, it is necessary to promptly defend against and repair failed nodes. As important nodes are repaired, a new round of load balancing will occur in the network. This process will continue until the entire network reaches a stable state again. During the repair process, the reliability values ​​of the network model can be calculated in real time to provide repair direction for subsequent real-time repair processes, and to prevent new node failures as much as possible. This can include four attributes: connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

[0041] In addition, the initial data of the network model can be validated for reasonableness through four attributes of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network: connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience. If the failure of a node causes a significant decrease in connectivity, it may be necessary to re-evaluate the capacity and redundancy coefficient of that node. If the initial load settings of some nodes are unreasonable, it may lead to a decrease in availability, and the initial load and redundancy coefficient need to be adjusted. If the performance parameters of some nodes fluctuate greatly, it may be necessary to increase the redundancy coefficient to improve the stability of the system. If the failure of a node causes the entire system to fail to operate normally, it may be necessary to redesign the network structure or add redundant nodes.

[0042] Step S104: Compare the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, and based on the comparison result, instruct the failed nodes after the simulated attack to redistribute the load during the repair process until the network model is stable.

[0043] Specifically, during the repair process, the initial reliability value is compared with the real-time reliability value in real time. The real-time comparison results indicate the load redistribution during repair. To prevent new node failures, the comparison results can indicate four aspects: connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience. These include: detecting changes in node connectivity helps identify new critical paths and potential communication bottlenecks; changes in availability after load redistribution can assess whether the overall network performance is affected; load redistribution may increase the load on some nodes, thus affecting their stability. By monitoring stability, these problems can be detected and addressed in a timely manner. When implementing repair strategies, priority is given to repairing nodes that have a significant impact on network resilience to quickly restore the overall functionality of the system.

[0044] Alternatively, the stabilized network model can be simplified to an N×N adjacency matrix, where N is the number of key nodes, and the elements in the adjacency matrix represent the connections between nodes. The evaluation relationships are connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience. Specific adjacency relationships can be defined as follows: Figure 3 As shown.

[0045] Furthermore, determining the reliability of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network involves not only its four attributes—connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience—but also the node capacity, node status, and node importance of key nodes within the network. Among these, node capacity is... The node capacity is calculated using the node capacity formula, initial node load, and redundancy coefficient, reflecting the maximum load a node can withstand under normal operating conditions. Node status is determined through real-time monitoring and data analysis, directly impacting the functionality of its network layer and the overall network performance. Node importance is determined through computational graph theory algorithms and network topology analysis of the entire nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network. The failure of critical nodes has a greater impact on the entire network and therefore requires priority repair and protection. Therefore, when repairing failed nodes, the repair order can be based on the importance of critical nodes, prioritizing the repair of highly important nodes.

[0046] Step S105: When a stable network model is detected to encounter a real network attack, the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack are compared. The network status of the current nuclear power instrumentation and control network is evaluated based on the changes in reliability values, and the faulty node is determined through the changes in reliability values.

[0047] Specifically, the reliability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network model under real network attacks is quantitatively calculated using reliability indicators such as connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience. The changes in reliability values ​​before and after the actual network attack are compared. That is, the reliability value under stable conditions without a network attack is used as the baseline, and the recalculated reliability value after the attack is used as the comparison value. By comparing the changes in indicators before and after the attack, the extent of network damage is assessed, and faulty nodes are identified.

[0048] The detailed quantitative calculation process for the reliability of real-world cyberattacks can further include: Taking a parallel network layer containing a certain switch as an example, calculate the connectivity of that network layer. ; in, It is the total number of nodes in the network. It represents the number of node pairs with a path.

[0049] Taking the parallel network layer where a certain switch is located as an example, calculate the availability NA of that network layer; Where R is the network speed and T is the latency. This is the total number of data packets. D is the number of lost data packets, and D is the total data packet size.

[0050] Taking the parallel network layer containing a certain switch as an example, calculate the stability of this network layer. ; Where N is the number of samples, This is the i-th sample data. It is the mean of the sample data. It is the standard deviation of the sample data. Taking the parallel network layer where a certain switch is located as an example, the following is adopted: This reflects the extent of damage caused by a network attack, i.e., the network's resilience. The smaller the value, the less damage the network suffers and the stronger its resilience. in, The network connectivity before the attack. This represents the network connectivity after an attack.

[0051] Finally, taking the parallel network layer where a certain switch is located as an example, its network reliability evaluation index K is calculated; in, NA represents connectivity, and NA represents availability. For stability, For survivability, , , , The importance of adjusting different indicators according to the specific system requirements.

[0052] After obtaining the quantitative calculation results, the current network status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network can be assessed based on these results. The flowchart for the reliability analysis of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system network under real network attacks is as follows: Figure 4 As shown, in Figure 4 In this context, attacks on parallel nodes and serial links have different processes. For example, when the reliability of a certain parallel network layer is 0, it can be considered that a component of the serial system of the entire instrumentation and control system network is not working properly, and the entire instrumentation and control network cannot operate normally.

[0053] Faulty nodes can also be identified by changes in reliability metrics. By comparing changes in the capacity, status, and importance of critical nodes before and after a real network attack, faulty nodes can be determined based on the comparison results. This invention provides a method for network reliability analysis of a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under real network attacks. The method involves acquiring the data flow of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network to determine its network structure and key nodes, and collecting raw data from these key nodes. Based on this raw data, an initial reliability value for the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated. A network model is established based on the network structure, and an attack network model is simulated. Failed nodes after the simulated attack are repaired, and the real-time reliability value of the network model is calculated during the repair process. The initial reliability value and the real-time reliability value are compared, and the comparison results indicate the load reallocation during the repair of failed nodes after the simulated attack until the network model stabilizes. When a stable network model encounters a real network attack, the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack are compared. The current network state of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is assessed based on these changes, and the faulty nodes are identified through these reliability value changes. This method uses network model attack simulation to quantitatively evaluate the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, thereby accurately and completely reflecting the reliability status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system network when encountering real network attacks.

[0054] Please see Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a network reliability analysis system for a nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system under a real network attack, provided in an embodiment of this application. Figure 5 As shown, the system includes: The acquisition module S501 is used to acquire the data stream of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, analyze the data stream, determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes; The calculation module S502 is used to calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the original data; The simulated attack module S503 is used to establish a network model based on the network structure, simulate an attack on the network model, repair the failed nodes after the simulated attack, and calculate the real-time reliability value of the network model during the repair process. The repair module S504 is used to compare the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, and based on the comparison result, instruct the failed nodes after the simulated attack to perform load redistribution during the repair process until the network model is stable. The evaluation module S505 is used to detect when a stable network model encounters a real network attack, compare the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack, evaluate the current network status of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network based on the changes in reliability values, and determine the faulty node through the changes in reliability values.

[0055] In one embodiment, the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control system network reliability analysis system under real network attacks further includes: The connectivity module is used to calculate the ratio of key nodes to total nodes that communicate with each other in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and to determine the connectivity of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network. The availability module is used to calculate the availability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the data transmission rate, latency, and packet loss rate in the original data. The stability module is used to calculate the stability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the range of variation of performance parameters in the original data. The resilience module is used to acquire network attack records from the raw data, identify surviving nodes in the network attack records, calculate the ratio of surviving nodes to summary nodes, and determine the resilience of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network. The second calculation module is used to calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

[0056] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application can be implemented by means of software and / or hardware. In this specification, "unit" and "module" refer to software and / or hardware that can independently complete or cooperate with other components to complete a specific function, wherein the hardware may be, for example, a field-programmable gate array (FPGA), an integrated circuit (IC), etc.

[0057] Each processing unit and / or module in the embodiments of this application can be implemented by an analog circuit that implements the functions described in the embodiments of this application, or by software that executes the functions described in the embodiments of this application.

[0058] See Figure 6 It shows a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application, which can be used to implement... Figure 1 The method in the illustrated embodiment. (As shown) Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device 600 may include: at least one processor 601, at least one network interface 604, user interface 603, memory 605, and at least one communication bus 602.

[0059] The communication bus 602 is used to enable communication between these components.

[0060] The user interface 603 may include a display screen and a camera. Optionally, the user interface 603 may also include a standard wired interface and a wireless interface.

[0061] The network interface 604 may optionally include a standard wired interface or a wireless interface (such as a Wi-Fi interface).

[0062] The processor 601 may include one or more processing cores. The processor 601 connects to various parts within the electronic device 600 using various interfaces and lines, and executes various functions and processes data of the terminal 600 by running or executing instructions, programs, code sets, or instruction sets stored in the memory 605, and by calling data stored in the memory 605. Optionally, the processor 601 may be implemented using at least one hardware form of Digital Signal Processing (DSP), Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA), or Programmable Logic Array (PLA). The processor 601 may integrate one or a combination of several of the following: a Central Processing Unit (CPU), a Graphics Processing Unit (GPU), and a modem. The CPU primarily handles the operating system, user interface, and applications; the GPU is responsible for rendering and drawing the content required for display; and the modem handles wireless communication. It is understood that the modem may also not be integrated into the processor 601 and may be implemented as a separate chip.

[0063] The memory 605 may include random access memory (RAM) or read-only memory. Optionally, the memory 605 may include a non-transitory computer-readable storage medium. The memory 605 may be used to store instructions, programs, code, code sets, or instruction sets. The memory 605 may include a program storage area and a data storage area, wherein the program storage area may store instructions for implementing an operating system, instructions for at least one function (such as touch function, sound playback function, image playback function, etc.), instructions for implementing the above-described method embodiments, etc.; the data storage area may store data involved in the above-described method embodiments, etc. Optionally, the memory 605 may also be at least one storage device located remotely from the aforementioned processor 601. Figure 6 As shown, the memory 605, which serves as a computer storage medium, may include an operating system, a network communication module, a user interface module, and program instructions.

[0064] exist Figure 6 In the illustrated electronic device 600, the user interface 603 is mainly used to provide an input interface for the user and acquire user input data; while the processor 601 can be used to call the image-based interactive application stored in the memory 605 and specifically perform the following operations: acquire the data stream of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network to determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes; calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the raw data; establish a network model based on the network structure, simulate an attack on the network model, repair the failed nodes after the simulated attack, and calculate the real-time reliability value of the network model during the repair process; compare the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, and instruct the failed nodes after the simulated attack to perform load redistribution during repair according to the comparison result until the network model is stable; when a stable network model encounters a real network attack, compare the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack, evaluate the current network status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the changes in reliability values, and determine the faulty nodes through the changes in reliability values.

[0065] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the above-described method. The computer-readable storage medium may include, but is not limited to, any type of disk, including floppy disks, optical disks, DVDs, CD-ROMs, microdrives, as well as magneto-optical disks, ROMs, RAMs, EPROMs, EEPROMs, DRAMs, VRAMs, flash memory devices, magnetic cards or optical cards, nanosystems (including molecular memory ICs), or any type of medium or device suitable for storing instructions and / or data.

[0066] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the foregoing method embodiments are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that this application is not limited to the described order of actions, as some steps may be performed in other orders or simultaneously according to this application. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are preferred embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily essential to this application.

[0067] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.

[0068] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some service interface; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical or other forms.

[0069] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0070] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0071] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage device (CMD). Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a memory and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned memory includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0072] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the various methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing related hardware. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which may include: a flash drive, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), a magnetic disk, or an optical disk, etc.

[0073] The foregoing has described specific embodiments of this specification. Other embodiments are within the scope of the appended claims. In some cases, the actions or steps recited in the claims may be performed in a different order than that shown in the embodiments and may still achieve the desired result. Furthermore, the processes depicted in the drawings do not necessarily require the specific or sequential order shown to achieve the desired result. In some embodiments, multitasking and parallel processing are possible or may be advantageous.

Claims

1. A method for network reliability analysis of nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems under real-world network attacks, the method comprising: Acquire the data stream of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, analyze the data stream, determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes; Based on the raw data, calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network; A network model is established based on the network structure, an attack on the network model is simulated, the failed nodes after the simulated attack are repaired, and the real-time reliability value of the network model is calculated during the repair process. By comparing the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, the load redistribution is performed on the failed nodes after the simulated attack based on the comparison result until the network model is stable. When a stable network model is detected to be subjected to a real network attack, the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack are compared. The network status of the current nuclear power instrumentation and control network is assessed based on the changes in reliability values, and the faulty node is identified through the changes in reliability values.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The calculation of the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the original data includes: Calculate the ratio of key nodes to total nodes in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network to determine the connectivity of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network; Based on the data transmission rate, latency, and packet loss rate in the original data, the availability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated; The stability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated based on the range of performance parameter variations in the original data. Obtain network attack records from the raw data, identify surviving nodes in the network attack records, calculate the ratio of surviving nodes to summary nodes, and determine the resilience of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network. The initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is calculated based on a comprehensive consideration of connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, The establishment of a network model based on the network structure includes: Obtain the routine data of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and set the initial data of the network model based on the routine data. The initial data includes: node capacity formula, node initial load and redundancy coefficient. The rationality of the initial data is verified by the connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The initial reliability value also includes: Node capacity, node status, node importance; The steps for obtaining node capacity, node status, and node importance include: Based on the node capacity formula, initial node load, and redundancy coefficient, calculate the node capacity of the critical node; Real-time acquisition of the node status of the key nodes; The importance of the key nodes is determined based on their topological relationship within the network structure.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The method further includes: When repairing the failed nodes after the simulated attack, the repair order is based on the importance of the critical nodes.

6. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The process of assessing the network status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the changes in reliability values, and identifying faulty nodes through these changes, includes: By comparing the changes in connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network before and after the actual network attack, the network status of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network is evaluated based on the comparison results. By comparing the changes in capacity, node status, and node importance of key nodes before and after the actual network attack, the faulty nodes are identified based on the comparison results.

7. A network reliability analysis system for nuclear power plant instrumentation and control systems under real network attacks, characterized in that, The system includes: The acquisition module is used to acquire the data stream of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, analyze the data stream, determine the network structure and key nodes of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network, and collect the raw data of the key nodes; A calculation module is used to calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the raw data; The simulated attack module is used to establish a network model based on the network structure, simulate attacks on the network model, repair failed nodes after the simulated attack, and calculate the real-time reliability value of the network model during the repair process. The repair module is used to compare the initial reliability value with the real-time reliability value, and based on the comparison result, instruct the failed nodes after the simulated attack to perform load redistribution during repair until the network model is stable. The evaluation module is used to detect when a stable network model encounters a real network attack, compare the changes in reliability values ​​before and after the real network attack, evaluate the network status of the current nuclear power instrumentation and control network based on the changes in reliability values, and identify faulty nodes through the changes in reliability values.

8. The system according to claim 7, characterized in that, The system also includes: The connectivity module is used to calculate the ratio of key nodes to total nodes that communicate with each other in the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network, and to determine the connectivity of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network. The availability module is used to calculate the availability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the data transmission rate, latency, and packet loss rate in the original data. The stability module is used to calculate the stability of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the range of variation of performance parameters in the original data. The resilience module is used to acquire network attack records from the raw data, identify surviving nodes in the network attack records, calculate the ratio of surviving nodes to summary nodes, and determine the resilience of the nuclear power instrumentation and control network. The second calculation module is used to calculate the initial reliability value of the nuclear power plant instrumentation and control network based on the connectivity, availability, stability, and resilience.

9. An electronic device, comprising a processor and a memory; The processor is connected to the memory; The memory is used to store executable program code; The processor runs a program corresponding to the executable program code stored in the memory to perform the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

10. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method as described in any one of claims 1-6.

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