Method and apparatus for detecting spoofed satellite positioning data

Abstract

The application relates to a method and device for detecting satellite positioning data forgery, which are applied to a satellite positioning monitoring terminal and include the following steps: randomly determining a detection mode in a plurality of preset satellite positioning data forgery detection modes; sending corresponding instructions to a positioning module according to the determined detection mode; receiving response information returned by the positioning module in response to the corresponding instructions; determining whether the returned response information matches preset response information meeting the requirements of the corresponding instructions; and determining that an abnormal situation of satellite positioning data forgery exists in the case that the returned response information does not match the preset response information meeting the requirements of the corresponding instructions. According to the scheme, preset detection modes are used to identify whether a positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, so that satellite positioning data forgery is prevented.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of computer processing technology, and in particular to a method and apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data. Background Technology

[0002] Satellite positioning, as a core technology for modern navigation, timing, and positioning, is of paramount importance to the transportation sector in terms of accuracy and reliability.

[0003] In the operation of satellite positioning monitoring terminals, various satellite signal interferences and deception attacks are common, among which "satellite data injection attacks" are prevalent. This attack method simulates or replays recorded normal satellite positioning data, using physical interconnected communication lines to "inject" processed location, time, navigation, and other positioning-related information into the satellite positioning monitoring terminal. This causes the terminal to mistakenly believe that the vehicle is operating normally, thus deceiving monitoring departments and disrupting normal business operations. For example, in the driver training industry, some institutions may use this method to simulate students learning to drive, falsifying their training hours.

[0004] In existing technologies, there are two common methods for determining the falsification of satellite positioning data: 1. Check if the "Allow simulated geographic location" option is enabled on the terminal system. If this option is enabled, it is determined that there is falsification of satellite positioning data. 2. It can detect the satellite positioning coordinates of the terminal through base station positioning or WiFi positioning, and determine whether the satellite positioning coordinates have been modified.

[0005] However, both solutions have significant shortcomings. The first solution cannot accurately determine whether satellite positioning data spoofing has occurred. For example, a user may have enabled the "Allow simulated location" option on their device but did not actually spoof location data. The second solution has a larger positioning error, ranging from 500 to 1000 meters in areas with normal signal strength, making it unable to accurately detect vehicle location spoofing within a small area. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the aforementioned problems in existing technologies, this application provides a solution for detecting falsified satellite positioning data, which determines whether satellite positioning data fraud exists by accurately and promptly identifying the satellite navigation receiver.

[0007] According to the first aspect of this application, a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data is provided, applied to a satellite positioning monitoring terminal, characterized in that it includes: One detection method is randomly selected from a set of preset methods for detecting falsified satellite positioning data. Based on the determined detection method, send the corresponding instructions to the positioning module; Receive the response information returned by the positioning module for the corresponding instruction; Determine whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements; and If the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements, it is determined that there is an anomaly of falsified satellite positioning data.

[0008] According to a second aspect of this application, an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data is provided, characterized in that it comprises: The first determining module is used to randomly determine one detection method from a variety of preset satellite positioning data forgery detection methods; The instruction sending module is used to send corresponding instructions to the positioning module according to the determined detection method; An information receiving module is used to receive response information returned by the positioning module to the corresponding instruction; The second determining module is used to determine whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements; and The third determining module is used to determine that there is an abnormal situation of satellite positioning data fraud if the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements.

[0009] According to a third aspect of this application, an electronic device is provided, comprising: Processor; and A memory storing computer instructions that, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to perform the method described in the first aspect.

[0010] According to a fourth aspect of this application, a non-transitory computer storage medium is provided, which stores a computer program that, when executed by a plurality of processors, causes the processors to perform the method described in the first aspect.

[0011] According to the method and apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data provided in this application, a preset detection method is used to identify whether the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, thereby checking the validity of satellite positioning data and preventing falsification of satellite positioning data. Attached Figure Description

[0012] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the accompanying drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings, without exceeding the scope of protection claimed by this application.

[0013] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to an embodiment of this application.

[0014] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting spoofed satellite positioning data according to an embodiment of this application, using a random NMEA message CAS control command detection method.

[0015] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data under a hardware information query instruction detection method according to an embodiment of this application.

[0016] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to another embodiment of this application.

[0017] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to yet another embodiment of this application.

[0018] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to an embodiment of this application.

[0019] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to another embodiment of this application.

[0020] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to yet another embodiment of this application.

[0021] Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in this application. Detailed Implementation

[0022] The technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of this application. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of this application without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0023] In general, to address the difficulty in accurately identifying spoofed satellite positioning data, this application uses a preset detection method to identify whether the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, thereby determining the validity of the satellite positioning data, preventing spoofed positioning data, identifying injection attacks, and preventing unauthorized users from injecting satellite positioning message data to carry out corresponding illegal activities.

[0024] According to one aspect of this application, a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data is provided. For example... Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps.

[0025] Step S101: Randomly select one detection method from a variety of preset satellite positioning data tampering detection methods.

[0026] The method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data in this application can be executed by a satellite positioning monitoring terminal. This satellite positioning monitoring terminal can be any type of transportation device, such as a vehicle-mounted satellite positioning monitoring terminal, a ship-mounted satellite positioning monitoring terminal, etc., and this application makes no limitations on this. In one embodiment, a satellite navigation receiver is a component of the satellite positioning monitoring terminal. It can receive signals from one or more satellites to calculate information such as position, speed, and time, forming satellite positioning data. The satellite navigation receiver can then transmit the satellite positioning data to the vehicle-mounted satellite positioning monitoring terminal via a serial port.

[0027] In one embodiment, the positioning module is a module capable of outputting positioning data, such as a satellite navigation receiver or a data spoofing machine. Under normal circumstances, the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal should be the satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal. However, for the purpose of falsifying positioning data, the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal may not be the satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, but rather other receivers, or even data spoofing devices such as data spoofing machines.

[0028] In one embodiment, in order to identify whether the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, multiple satellite positioning data spoofing detection methods can be pre-set.

[0029] In one specific embodiment, the preset multiple satellite positioning data spoofing detection methods include generating random NMEA (National Marine Electronics Association protocol) messages and CAS (Course over Ground, used for satellite navigation receivers to perform extended custom commands) control commands. In this detection method, the satellite positioning data returned by the positioning module according to the control commands needs to meet preset requirements. Figure 2 Detailed explanation will follow.

[0030] In one specific embodiment, the preset multiple satellite positioning data spoofing detection methods include generating hardware information query commands. In this detection method, the hardware information returned by the positioning module needs to match the hardware information of the satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal. Figure 3 Detailed explanation will follow.

[0031] It is understood that, inspired by this application, those skilled in the art can also set up other methods for detecting falsified satellite positioning data to identify whether the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, and these are all within the scope of this application.

[0032] In one embodiment, when entering the satellite positioning data spoofing detection state, a random number can be generated to select the spoofing detection method to be executed at that time. For example, a randomly generated random number "0" can represent the generation of a random NMEA message CAS control command, while a random number "1" can represent the generation of a hardware information query command.

[0033] By randomly selecting one detection method from a set of preset satellite positioning data spoofing detection methods, the communication process between the satellite positioning monitoring terminal and the positioning module becomes variable, enhancing the overall reliability of the detection. For example, even if an unauthorized user obtains the hardware information of the satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, they might be able to inject spoofed data under the "generate hardware information query command" method. However, since the spoofing detection method is variable, under the "generate random NMEA message CAS control command" method, it can identify discrepancies in the results returned by the positioning module, thus detecting satellite data spoofing.

[0034] Step S102: Send the corresponding instruction to the positioning module according to the determined detection method.

[0035] In one embodiment, for different detection methods, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal sends corresponding instructions to the positioning module.

[0036] In one specific embodiment, for the detection method of generating random NMEA message CAS control commands, the random NMEA message CAS control commands are sent to the positioning module via a serial port. In another specific embodiment, for the detection method of generating hardware information query commands, the hardware information query commands are sent to the positioning module via a serial port. Correspondingly, for other detection methods, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal sends other corresponding commands to the positioning module.

[0037] Step S103: Receive the response information returned by the positioning module for the corresponding instruction.

[0038] In one embodiment, after receiving an instruction from a satellite positioning and monitoring terminal, the positioning module returns response information according to the instruction. In a specific embodiment, the returned response information may be a message data.

[0039] In one specific embodiment, for the detection method that generates random NMEA message CAS control commands, the positioning module can generate corresponding message data or other response information.

[0040] In one specific embodiment, for the detection method that generates hardware information query instructions, the positioning module can generate corresponding hardware information. This hardware information may include information such as manufacturer name, chip model, software name, software version, and customer number.

[0041] Step S104: Determine whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements.

[0042] In one embodiment, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal sets or stores preset response information according to the detection method. After receiving the response information returned by the positioning module, it determines whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements.

[0043] In one specific embodiment, for the detection method of generating random NMEA message CAS control commands, it is necessary to determine whether the returned message data meets the data output requirements in the NMEA message CAS control command. For command parameters controlling NMEA output, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal can generate a random number, and determine whether to output a specific NMEA message field based on each bit of this random number (e.g., 0 or 1). For example, in $XXXXX,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1,0,0,,,1,1,,,,1*33, "1" indicates that the corresponding field of the NMEA message needs to be output, and "0" indicates that it is not output. After sending the command, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal can check whether all fields with flag bits set to 1 in subsequent NMEA output messages are output normally, and whether fields with flag bits set to 0 are not output at all. If the detection result is consistent with the previously issued command requirements, it indicates that the response information returned by the positioning module is normal; otherwise, data forgery may exist. For example, if the injected falsified satellite positioning data does not originate from a satellite navigation receiver bound to a satellite positioning monitoring terminal, it does not meet the data output requirements in the NMEA message CAS control command.

[0044] In one specific embodiment, the detection method for generating hardware information query instructions needs to determine whether the hardware information returned by the positioning module matches the hardware information bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal.

[0045] Understandably, for other detection methods, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal needs to determine whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that meets the command requirements of the other detection methods.

[0046] Step S105: If the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements, it is determined that there is an abnormal situation of falsified satellite positioning data.

[0047] In one embodiment, if the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements, it is determined that the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is not a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, and an abnormal situation of satellite positioning data forgery is identified.

[0048] In one specific embodiment, regarding the detection method for generating random NMEA message CAS control commands, if the returned message data does not meet the data output requirements in the NMEA message CAS control command, an anomaly of satellite positioning data forgery is determined. In another specific embodiment, regarding the detection method for generating hardware information query commands, if the hardware information returned by the positioning module does not match the hardware information bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, an anomaly of satellite positioning data forgery is determined.

[0049] Understandably, for other detection methods, if the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the command requirements of the other detection method, it is determined that there is an anomaly of falsified satellite positioning data.

[0050] Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting spoofed satellite positioning data according to an embodiment of this application, using a random NMEA message CAS control command detection method. Figure 2 As shown, the method includes the following steps: Step S201: Send a random NMEA message CAS control command to the positioning module via serial port; Step S202: Receive the message data returned by the positioning module; Step S203: Determine whether the returned message data meets the data output requirements in the NMEA message CAS control command.

[0051] Under the CAS control command detection method that generates random NMEA messages, on the one hand, the positioning module can be identified by sending commands to specific satellite navigation receivers and checking whether the returned information matches; on the other hand, the randomly generated commands and corresponding random return result messages effectively prevent the possibility of reverse analysis and cracking, and can prevent analysis and cracking by capturing serial port data, thereby improving the reliability of data forgery detection.

[0052] Figure 3 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data under a hardware information query instruction detection method according to an embodiment of this application. Figure 3 As shown, the method includes the following steps: Step S301: Send a hardware information query command to the positioning module via serial port; Step S302: Receive hardware information returned by the positioning module; Step S303: Determine whether the hardware information returned by the positioning module matches the hardware information bound to the satellite positioning and monitoring terminal.

[0053] Under the hardware information query command detection method, the hardware information such as the hardware model and ID of the built-in satellite navigation receiver of the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is used. Through comparison (e.g., encrypted comparison), a strong relationship check between the satellite positioning monitoring terminal and the satellite navigation receiver is realized.

[0054] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to another embodiment of this application. Figure 1 compared to, Figure 4Steps S401 to S405 in the method shown are Figure 1 Steps S101 to S105 are the same, except that... Figure 4 The method shown also includes: Step S406: In response to the existence of the abnormal situation, update the statistical value of the abnormal situation according to a preset range; Step S407: If the statistical value reaches a preset value, an alarm message is issued; and Step S408: If the statistical value does not reach the preset value, it is determined that the satellite positioning data from the positioning module is unreliable.

[0055] In one embodiment, under the satellite positioning data spoofing detection state, an anomaly statistics value can be set, for example, the initial statistics value can be 0. When an anomaly is detected, the anomaly statistics value can be updated by a preset increment, which can be 1, that is, the statistics value is incremented by 1 for each anomaly detected.

[0056] In one embodiment, when the statistical value reaches a preset value, such as 3, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal can issue an alarm message or instruct other devices to issue an alarm message. In a specific embodiment, the alarm message can be in the form of voice reminders, alarms, visual reminders, etc.

[0057] In one embodiment, if the statistical value does not reach a preset value, although an alarm may not be triggered at present, it cannot be determined that the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, and the satellite positioning data from that positioning module can be determined to be unreliable. In one embodiment, the satellite positioning monitoring terminal may choose not to use the satellite positioning data from that positioning module.

[0058] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of a method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to yet another embodiment of this application. Figure 1 compared to, Figure 5 Steps S501 to S505 in the method shown are Figure 1 Steps S101 to S105 are the same, except that... Figure 5 The method shown also includes: Step S506: In response to the absence of the aforementioned abnormal situation, confirm that the positioning module is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal.

[0059] In one embodiment, if no anomaly is detected, the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal can be considered to be a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal.

[0060] In one embodiment, if no anomaly is detected, the anomaly statistics value can be set to zero or not, depending on actual needs.

[0061] According to the method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data provided in this application, a preset detection method is used to identify whether the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, thereby checking the validity of satellite positioning data and preventing falsification of satellite positioning data.

[0062] According to another aspect of this application, an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data is provided. For example... Figure 6 As shown, the device includes a first determining module 601, an instruction sending module 602, an information receiving module 603, a second determining module 604, and a third determining module 605. The first determining module 601 is used to randomly determine one detection method from a set of preset satellite positioning data spoofing detection methods. The instruction sending module 602 is used to send a corresponding instruction to the positioning module according to the determined detection method. The information receiving module 603 is used to receive the response information returned by the positioning module to the corresponding instruction. The second determining module 604 is used to determine whether the returned response information matches a preset response information that meets the requirements of the corresponding instruction. The third determining module 605 is used to determine that there is an anomaly of satellite positioning data spoofing if the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the requirements of the corresponding instruction.

[0063] In an optional embodiment, when the determined detection method is to generate a random NMEA message CAS control command, the command sending module 602 can be used to send the random NMEA message CAS control command to the positioning module via a serial port; the information receiving module 603 can be used to receive the message data returned by the positioning module; and the second determining module 604 can be used to determine whether the returned message data meets the data output requirements in the NMEA message CAS control command.

[0064] In an optional embodiment, when the determined detection method is to generate a hardware information query command, the command sending module 602 can be used to send the hardware information query command to the positioning module via a serial port; the information receiving module 603 can be used to receive the hardware information returned by the positioning module; and the second determining module 604 can determine whether the hardware information returned by the positioning module matches the hardware information bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal.

[0065] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to another embodiment of this application. Figure 6 compared to, Figure 7 Modules 701 to 705 in the device shown are Figure 6 Modules 601 to 605 are the same, except that, Figure 7 The device shown also includes: The update module 706 is used to update the statistical value of the abnormal situation according to a preset range in response to the existence of the abnormal situation; Alarm issuing module 707 is used to issue an alarm message when the statistical value reaches a preset value; and The fourth determining module 708 is used to determine that the satellite positioning data from the positioning module is unreliable if the statistical value does not reach the preset value.

[0066] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of an apparatus for detecting falsified satellite positioning data according to yet another embodiment of this application. Figure 6 compared to, Figure 8 Modules 801 to 805 in the device shown are Figure 6 Modules 601 to 605 are the same, except that, Figure 8 The device shown also includes: The fifth determining module 806 is used to confirm, in response to the absence of the abnormal situation, that the positioning module is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal.

[0067] According to the device for detecting falsified satellite positioning data provided in this application, a preset detection method is used to identify whether the positioning module currently communicating with the satellite positioning monitoring terminal is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal, thereby checking the validity of satellite positioning data and preventing falsification of satellite positioning data.

[0068] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions in other embodiments.

[0069] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity, the foregoing method embodiments are all described as a series of actions. However, those skilled in the art should understand that this application is not limited to the described order of actions, as some steps may be performed in other orders or simultaneously according to this application. Furthermore, those skilled in the art should also understand that the embodiments described in the specification are all optional embodiments, and the actions and modules involved are not necessarily essential to this application.

[0070] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed apparatus can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be an electrical connection or other forms.

[0071] See Figure 9 , Figure 9 An electronic device is provided, including a processor and a memory. The memory stores computer instructions or one or more programs, which, when executed by the processor, cause the processor to execute the computer instructions to achieve the following: Figures 1 to 5 The method and its detailed scheme are shown.

[0072] It should be understood that the above-described device embodiments are merely illustrative, and the device disclosed in this invention can be implemented in other ways. For example, the division of units / modules described in the above embodiments is only a logical functional division, and there may be other division methods in actual implementation. For example, multiple units, modules, or components may be combined, integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed.

[0073] Furthermore, unless otherwise specified, the functional units / modules in the various embodiments of the present invention can be integrated into one unit / module, or each unit / module can exist physically separately, or two or more units / modules can be integrated together. The integrated units / modules described above can be implemented in hardware or as software program modules.

[0074] When the integrated unit / module is implemented in hardware, the hardware can be digital circuits, analog circuits, etc. The physical implementation of the hardware structure includes, but is not limited to, transistors, memristors, etc. Unless otherwise specified, the processor or chip can be any suitable hardware processor, such as a CPU, GPU, FPGA, DSP, and ASIC, etc. Unless otherwise specified, the on-chip cache, off-chip memory, and storage can be any suitable magnetic or magneto-optical storage medium, such as resistive random access memory (RRAM), dynamic random access memory (DRAM), static random access memory (SRAM), enhanced dynamic random access memory (EDRAM), high-bandwidth memory (HBM), hybrid memory cube (HMC), etc.

[0075] If the integrated unit / module is implemented as a software program module and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage device (CMD). Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this invention, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a memory and includes several instructions to cause a computer electronic device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network electronic device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this disclosure. The aforementioned memory includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0076] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing one or more computer programs, which, when executed by multiple processors, cause the processors to perform the following actions: Figures 1 to 5 The method and its detailed scheme are shown.

[0077] This application also provides a computer program product, which includes a computer program that, when run on a computer, causes the computer to perform the methods of any of the above embodiments.

[0078] References to features, advantages, or similar language in this specification do not imply that all features and advantages achievable with this solution should be included or included in any single implementation thereof. Rather, references to features and advantages are understood to mean that a particular feature, advantage, or characteristic described in connection with an embodiment is included in at least one embodiment of this solution. Therefore, discussions of features, advantages, and similar language throughout this specification may, but do not necessarily, refer to the same embodiments.

[0079] Furthermore, the features, advantages, and characteristics described herein can be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments. Based on the description herein, those skilled in the art will recognize that this solution can be implemented without one or more specific features or advantages of a particular embodiment. In other instances, additional features and advantages can be appreciated in specific embodiments not presented in all embodiments of this solution.

[0080] The embodiments of this application have been described in detail above. Specific examples have been used to illustrate the principles and implementation methods of this application. The descriptions of the embodiments above are only for the purpose of helping to understand the method and core ideas of this application. Furthermore, any changes or modifications made by those skilled in the art based on the ideas of this application, and on the specific implementation methods and application scope of this application, are all within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the content of this specification should not be construed as a limitation of this application.

Claims

1. A method for detecting falsified satellite positioning data, applied to a satellite positioning monitoring terminal, characterized in that, include: One detection method is randomly selected from a set of preset methods for detecting falsified satellite positioning data. Based on the determined detection method, send the corresponding instructions to the positioning module; Receive the response information returned by the positioning module for the corresponding instruction; Determine whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements; and If the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements, it is determined that there is an anomaly of falsified satellite positioning data. Among them, the preset multiple satellite positioning data forgery detection methods include generating random NMEA message CAS control commands and generating hardware information query commands.

2. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The determined detection method is to generate random NMEA message CAS control commands. The step of sending corresponding instructions to the positioning module according to the determined detection method includes: Send random NMEA message CAS control command to the positioning module via serial port; Furthermore, receiving the response information returned by the positioning module for the corresponding instruction includes: Receive message data returned by the positioning module; Furthermore, determining whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements includes: Determine whether the returned message data meets the data output requirements in the NMEA message CAS control command.

3. The method as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The determined detection method is to generate hardware information query commands. The step of sending corresponding instructions to the positioning module according to the determined detection method includes: Send a hardware information query command to the positioning module via serial port; Furthermore, receiving the response information returned by the positioning module for the corresponding instruction includes: Receive hardware information returned by the positioning module; Furthermore, determining whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements includes: Determine whether the hardware information returned by the positioning module matches the hardware information bound to the satellite positioning and monitoring terminal.

4. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, Also includes: In response to the existence of the aforementioned abnormal situation, the statistical value of the abnormal situation is updated according to a preset range; An alarm message will be issued if the statistical value reaches a preset value.

5. The method as described in claim 4, characterized in that, Also includes: If the statistical value does not reach the preset value, the satellite positioning data from the positioning module is determined to be unreliable.

6. The method according to any one of claims 1 to 3, characterized in that, Also includes: In response to the absence of the aforementioned abnormal situation, it is confirmed that the positioning module is a satellite navigation receiver bound to the satellite positioning monitoring terminal.

7. A device for detecting falsified satellite positioning data, characterized in that, include: The first determining module is used to randomly determine one detection method from a variety of preset satellite positioning data forgery detection methods; The instruction sending module is used to send corresponding instructions to the positioning module according to the determined detection method; An information receiving module is used to receive response information returned by the positioning module to the corresponding instruction; The second determining module is used to determine whether the returned response information matches the preset response information that satisfies the corresponding instruction requirements; as well as The third determining module is used to determine that there is an abnormal situation of falsified satellite positioning data when the returned response information does not match the preset response information that meets the corresponding instruction requirements. Among them, the preset multiple satellite positioning data forgery detection methods include generating random NMEA message CAS control commands and generating hardware information query commands.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, The device includes a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor, when executing the computer program in the memory, implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 6.

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