A secure encryption method and system for multimodal massive data

Abstract

This invention discloses a secure encryption method and system for multimodal massive data. This application deconstructs the inherent relationship between KDF and HASH, and overcomes the computational isomorphism between KDF's counter block processing and HASH's message block partitioning by proposing a computational flow fusion technology. The core lies in designing a dynamic task binding scheduler, which can dynamically bind KDF and HASH tasks in A5 and A7 at a 2:1 ratio, and schedule their execution in parallel across components. Without changing the original security and functional execution results of SM2, it can effectively improve encryption efficiency; the larger the amount of data to be encrypted, the more significant the effect.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of computer technology, and more specifically, to a secure encryption method and system for multimodal massive data. Background Technology

[0002] Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), as a core pillar of modern public-key cryptography, occupies an irreplaceable strategic position in the global information security field. Its security stems from the computational complexity of the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP), which, under classical computational models, has been proven to have sub-exponential solution difficulty, providing a solid foundation for cryptographic security.

[0003] SM2, a national cryptographic elliptic curve public-key algorithm independently designed in my country, references the ECC architecture and strictly adheres to the GB / T 32918-2016 standard in its encryption process. It achieves end-to-end security through the collaborative use of elliptic curve point operations, symmetric encryption, and hash verification. Currently, national cryptographic algorithms have been widely adopted in various scenarios, particularly suited to the autonomous production needs of the industrial manufacturing sector. However, due to limitations in the underlying computational characteristics of ECC, there is still room for improvement in the encryption efficiency of SM2 when processing massive amounts of multimodal data.

[0004] Current industry optimization techniques for SM2 efficiency primarily focus on five areas: hardware instruction optimization, cryptographic library improvements, data structure innovation, distributed protocol design, and functional integration design. For example, invention patent CN202210846869.2 uses SIMD instructions to achieve message expansion and data rearrangement, improving overall algorithm efficiency through instruction-level parallelism and process simplification; invention patent CN117908835B optimizes large integer splitting using floating-point calculations, reducing the number of representation words and multiplication / addition operations to lower underlying computational complexity; related academic research accelerates core operations at the cryptographic library layer through curve specialization and parallel computing, and adapts to scenario requirements at the protocol functional layer through distributed design and functional integration. However, these technologies offer limited improvement for encrypting multimodal massive data using SM2. Therefore, a method to improve encryption performance while maintaining the correctness and security of execution results is needed. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This invention overcomes the shortcomings of existing technologies in encrypting multimodal massive data, and provides a secure encryption method and apparatus for multimodal massive data, in order to solve the problems existing in the prior art.

[0006] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention provides a secure encryption method for multimodal massive data:

[0007] A secure encryption method for multimodal massive data includes the following steps:

[0008] Random number generation, selecting a cryptographically secure random number k;

[0009] Calculate the elliptic curve point C1=[k]G, where C1 is a temporary public key, which needs to be converted into a bit string and verified that it is not an infinite point;

[0010] Derive the key points, calculate the key point (x2, y2) = [k]PB, and convert the coordinates of the key point into a bit string;

[0011] The execution unit is bound together with the KDF block computation and the HASH block processing to form the atomic execution unit TASK of the task;

[0012] The dynamic task binding scheduler calls the SIMD instruction set to perform parallel computation on the bound atomic execution unit TASK.

[0013] Plaintext obfuscation involves performing a bitwise XOR operation C2 = M ⊕ t on the input plaintext M to encrypt the stream.

[0014] Ciphertext synthesis, output ciphertext C = C1 || C3 || C2.

[0015] The technical principle of this invention is to improve encryption efficiency without changing the execution result of multimodal massive data by binding KDF block calculation and HASH block processing into atomic execution units and using SIMD instructions to achieve parallel execution of the HASH block processing function (HASH-CF).

[0016] A further technical solution is to perform the following steps after calculating the elliptic curve point C1=[k]G:

[0017] Verify the validity of the public key of the receiving user B, and calculate S = [h]PB;

[0018] If S is a point at infinity, it indicates that the public key is invalid, and the process terminates.

[0019] In the parameters recommended by the standard, the cofactor h = 1;

[0020] If S is not at infinity, then proceed with the next steps.

[0021] A further technical solution is that the binding execution unit specifically includes the following steps:

[0022] The dynamic task binding scheduler binds two KDF block computations with one HASH block processing to form the atomic execution unit TASK of a task.

[0023] A further technical solution is that the parallel computation of the TASK specifically includes the following steps: calculating the shared key using KDF blocks, and generating a key stream t = KDF(x2 || y2, klen) of the same length as the plaintext using KDF;

[0024] KDF constructs an iterative counter mode based on the SM3 algorithm. If the output t is all zero, the random number k in step A1 needs to be reselected to avoid weak keys.

[0025] HASH block processing performs integrity authentication, calculating the integrity label C3 = SM3(x2 || M || y2). SM3, a hash that binds messages and coordinates, provides tamper resistance to the ciphertext.

[0026] A further technical solution is that the SIMD instruction set includes: SSE, AVX2, and AVX512.

[0027] A further technical solution involves performing parallel computation on the bound atomic execution unit TASK and then executing the following steps:

[0028] Continue executing the CF function to process the remaining message blocks in the integrity label C3;

[0029] Another aspect of the present invention provides a secure encryption system for multimodal massive data.

[0030] A secure encryption system for multimodal massive data includes a plaintext input module, a high-efficiency encryption module, and a ciphertext output module;

[0031] The plaintext input module is used to input massive amounts of multimodal data that need to be encrypted;

[0032] The high-efficiency encryption module is used to perform the security encryption method described above on the input multimodal massive data;

[0033] The ciphertext output module refers to the module used to output the encrypted content. Compared with the prior art, the present invention has at least the following beneficial effects: This application deconstructs the inherent relationship between KDF and HASH, and by proposing a computational flow fusion technology, it overcomes the computational isomorphism between the counter block processing of KDF and the message block division of HASH. The core lies in designing a dynamic task binding scheduler, which can dynamically bind KDF and HASH tasks in A5 and A7 in a 2:1 ratio, and schedule them for parallel execution across components. Without changing the original security and functional execution results of SM2, it can effectively improve encryption efficiency. The larger the amount of data to be encrypted, the more obvious the effect. Attached Figure Description

[0034] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the standard encryption process for SM2;

[0035] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the information processing and module architecture of Example 1. Detailed Implementation

[0036] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the invention.

[0037] Before explaining the embodiments, the full names and Chinese translations of the abbreviations used in the embodiments will be explained.

[0038] Explanation of abbreviations:

[0039] SIMD (Single Instruction, Multiple Data): Single Instruction Multiple Data Stream;

[0040] SSE (Streaming SIMD Extensions): Streaming SIMD extensions;

[0041] KDF (Key Derivation Function): Key derivation function;

[0042] HASHSecure Hash Algorithm 3): Secure hash algorithm 3 (the hash function in SM2 is specified as SM3);

[0043] CF (Component Function): Block processing function in the HASH algorithm (including EXT and COMP);

[0044] EXT (Message Extension function): Message extension function (one of the computational units that make up CF);

[0045] COMP (Compression function): Compression function (one of the computational units that make up CF);

[0046] Block processing (the basic unit in the computation process);

[0047] Example 1

[0048] A secure encryption method for multimodal massive data, see [link to relevant documentation]. Figure 1 , Figure 2 This includes the following steps:

[0049] Step 1 (i.e., standard encryption procedure A1): Random number generation, selecting a cryptographically secure random number k;

[0050] Step 2 (i.e., standard encryption procedure A2): Calculate the elliptic curve point C1 = [k]G. Here, C1 serves as a temporary public key, which needs to be converted into a bit string and verified to be not at infinity.

[0051] Step 3 (i.e., standard encryption procedure A3): Verify the validity of the public key of the receiving user B, and calculate S = [h]PB. If S is at infinity, it indicates that the public key is invalid, and the procedure terminates.

[0052] In the parameters recommended by the standard, the cofactor h = 1;

[0053] If S is not at infinity, proceed with the next steps.

[0054] Step 4 (i.e., standard encryption process A4): Derive the key point, calculate the key point (x2, y2) = [k] PB, and convert the coordinates of this point into a bit string;

[0055] Step 5 (refer to the standard encryption process A5+A7): Use the dynamic task binding scheduler to bind the calculation of the two KDF blocks in A5 with the processing of the one HASH block in A7 to form the atomic execution unit TASK of the task.

[0056] It is understandable that the ratio of KDF block calculation to HASH block processing can be selected according to the actual situation. In this embodiment, the KDF block calculation in A5 and the HASH block processing in A7 are bound together in a 2:1 ratio.

[0057] The parallel computation of the TASK specifically includes the following steps:

[0058] The KDF block calculates the shared key, and a key stream t = KDF(x2 || y2,klen) of the same length as the plaintext is generated through KDF.

[0059] KDF constructs an iterative counter mode based on the SM3 algorithm. If the output t is all zero, the random number k in step A1 needs to be reselected to avoid weak keys.

[0060] HASH block processing performs integrity authentication, calculating the integrity label C3 = SM3(x2 || M || y2). SM3, a hash that binds messages and coordinates, provides tamper resistance to the ciphertext.

[0061] Step 6 (SIMD): The dynamic task binding scheduler calls the SIMD instruction set to perform parallel computation on the bound atomic execution unit TASK;

[0062] It should be noted that the SIMD instruction set includes, but is not limited to, SSE, AVX2, and AVX512;

[0063] By designing a dynamic task binding scheduler, the KDF block computation in A5 and the HASH block processing in A7 are bound together in a 2:1 ratio. This task is then scheduled for parallel computation across components (at the A5 and A7 component levels). Without altering the original security and functional execution results of SM2, this effectively improves encryption efficiency; the larger the amount of data to be encrypted, the more significant the effect.

[0064] Step 7: After step 6 is completed, continue executing the CF function to process the remaining message blocks in C3;

[0065] Step 8 (i.e., standard encryption procedure A6): Plaintext obfuscation, perform bitwise XOR C2 = M ⊕t on the input plaintext M to perform stream encryption;

[0066] Step 9 (i.e., standard encryption process A8): Ciphertext synthesis, output ciphertext;

[0067] For example, the ciphertext C = C1 || C3 || C2.

[0068] Example 2

[0069] A secure encryption system for multimodal massive data includes a plaintext input module, a high-efficiency encryption module, and a ciphertext output module;

[0070] The plaintext input module is used to input massive amounts of multimodal data that need to be encrypted;

[0071] The high-efficiency encryption module is used to perform the security encryption method described above on the input multimodal massive data;

[0072] The ciphertext output module is used to output the encrypted content.

[0073] Although the invention has been described herein with reference to illustrative embodiments, it should be understood that many other modifications and implementations can be devised by those skilled in the art, which will fall within the scope and spirit of the principles disclosed herein. More specifically, various variations and modifications can be made to the components and / or layout of the subject matter combination within the scope of this disclosure. Besides variations and modifications to the components and / or layout, other uses will be apparent to those skilled in the art.

Claims

1. A secure encryption method for multimodal massive data, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Random number generation, selecting a cryptographically secure random number k; Calculate the elliptic curve point C1=[k]G, where C1 is a temporary public key, which needs to be converted into a bit string and verified that it is not an infinite point; Derive the key points, calculate the key point (x2, y2) = [k]PB, and convert the coordinates of the key point into a bit string; The execution unit is bound together with the KDF block computation and the HASH block processing to form the atomic execution unit TASK of the task; the binding execution unit specifically includes the following steps: the dynamic task binding scheduler binds two KDF block computations with one HASH block processing to form the atomic execution unit TASK of the task; The dynamic task binding scheduler invokes the SIMD instruction set to perform parallel computation on the bound atomic execution units (TASKs); the parallel computation of the TASKs specifically includes the following steps: The KDF block calculates the shared key, and a key stream t = KDF(x2 || y2,klen) of the same length as the plaintext is generated through KDF. KDF constructs an iterative counter mode based on the SM3 algorithm. If the output t is all zero, a cryptographically secure random number k needs to be reselected to avoid weak keys. HASH blocks are used for integrity authentication. The integrity label C3 = SM3(x2 || M || y2) is calculated. SM3 is a hash that binds messages and coordinates to provide tamper resistance to the ciphertext. After performing parallel computation on the bound atomic execution unit TASK, the following steps are executed: Continue executing the CF function to process the remaining message blocks in C3; Plaintext obfuscation involves performing a bitwise XOR operation C2 = M ⊕ t on the input plaintext M to encrypt the stream. Ciphertext synthesis, output ciphertext C = C1 || C3 || C2.

2. The secure encryption method for multimodal massive data as described in claim 1, characterized in that, After calculating the elliptic curve point C1=[k]G, perform the following steps: Verify the validity of user B's public key and calculate S = [h]PB; If S is a point at infinity, it indicates that the public key is invalid, and the process terminates. In the parameters recommended by the standard, the cofactor h = 1; If S is not at infinity, then proceed with the next steps.

3. The secure encryption method for multimodal massive data as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The SIMD instruction set includes: SSE, AVX2, and AVX512.

4. A secure encryption system for multimodal massive data, characterized in that, include: Plaintext input module, high-efficiency encryption module, ciphertext output module; The plaintext input module is used to input massive amounts of multimodal data that need to be encrypted; The high-efficiency encryption module is used to perform the secure encryption method as described in any one of claims 1-3 on the input multimodal massive data; The ciphertext output module is used to output the encrypted content.

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