Blood glucose data encryption transmission method and device, equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The application provides a blood glucose data encryption transmission method, device and equipment and a storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: registering a blood glucose meter device on a server side, and allowing transmission after successful registration; performing session key negotiation when a session is established or at a preset time interval, establishing a temporary key pair for identity authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption, and transmitting the temporary key pair and the temporary master key to the server by using an asymmetric encryption mode; the negotiation is completed after transmission and analysis; generating a dynamic seed based on the temporary master key, generating a dynamic encoding table according to the dynamic seed, encoding data blocks formed by encrypting and verifying blood glucose data by using the dynamic encoding table, and transmitting data frames comprising an encoding sequence; and restoring the dynamic encoding table and the plaintext blood glucose data on the server side. The application forms a dynamic encoding scheme to constitute double defense of algorithm encryption and dynamic encoding, realizes a highly confused format appearance, and has high security and practicability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of data security transmission technology, and in particular to a method, apparatus, device and storage medium for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data. Background Technology

[0002] Blood glucose data, as a core vital sign parameter, is highly sensitive medical data that can directly reveal disease status. Furthermore, with the development of mobile healthcare technology, patients' blood glucose data needs to be transmitted to medical institutions or health management platforms via the network. In addition to affecting personal privacy, its exposure or tampering can also easily lead to safety risks that may result from interventional treatments.

[0003] Among related technologies, there are currently few solutions applied to the encrypted transmission of blood glucose data. Block cipher algorithms such as DES and AES, which are commonly used for secure data transmission, have the following drawbacks: they have low security when encrypting private text data, are difficult to effectively deal with increasingly complex network security issues, and once encrypted data is obtained, the original information can be restored by cracking or using known keys. Especially in fields such as medicine where data confidentiality requirements are extremely high, existing encryption technologies are unable to fully guarantee the security of private data during storage and transmission, and there are risks such as data leakage, tampering, and impersonation. They cannot meet the long-term security protection requirements of current high-security scenarios.

[0004] Based on the above analysis of the development status of this technology field, there is a lack of solutions that integrate algorithm encryption and dynamic coding to provide a two-layer defense capability. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method, apparatus, device, and storage medium for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data, in order to solve the aforementioned problems in the prior art.

[0006] According to a first aspect of the present invention, a method for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data is provided, comprising: Register the blood glucose meter device on the server; once registration is successful, data transfer is allowed. Session key negotiation is performed when the session connection is established or at a preset time interval to establish a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption. The key is transmitted to the server using asymmetric encryption. The negotiation is completed after transmission and parsing. A dynamic seed is generated based on the temporary master key, and a dynamic encoding table is generated based on the dynamic seed. The dynamic encoding table is used to encode the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data, and a data frame including the encoded sequence is transmitted. Restore the dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data on the server side.

[0007] According to a second aspect of the present invention, a blood glucose data encryption transmission device is provided, comprising: The initialization module is used to register the blood glucose meter device on the server. Once registration is successful, data transfer is allowed. The key negotiation module is used to negotiate session keys when a session connection is established or at a preset time interval, to establish a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption, and to transmit them to the server using asymmetric encryption. The negotiation is completed after transmission and parsing. The encrypted transmission module is used to generate a dynamic seed based on a temporary master key, generate a dynamic encoding table based on the dynamic seed, encode the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data using the dynamic encoding table, and transmit data frames including the encoded sequence. The decryption and verification module is used to restore the dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data on the server side.

[0008] According to a third aspect of the present invention, an electronic device is provided, comprising: a memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the blood glucose data encrypted transmission method provided in the first aspect of the present disclosure.

[0009] According to a fourth aspect of the present invention, a computer-readable storage medium is provided, on which an information transmission implementation program is stored, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the blood glucose data encryption transmission method provided in the first aspect of the present disclosure.

[0010] The technical solution provided by the embodiments of the present invention has the following beneficial effects: the session key is changed regularly to ensure forward security, and a secure temporary sharing is established between the device and the server to avoid decryption of all past and future communications once leaked; the temporary master key is set not only for data encryption, but also to control the encoding rules, and based on this, a dynamic encoding scheme is formed to form a dual defense of algorithm encryption and dynamic encoding, which achieves a high degree of format obfuscation. The dynamic encoding rules must be deciphered first to obtain the data before attempting to decipher the algorithm encryption, which can effectively resist such attack analysis.

[0011] It should be understood that the above general description and the following detailed description are exemplary and explanatory only, and are not intended to limit this disclosure. Attached Figure Description

[0012] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in one or more embodiments of this specification or in the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments recorded in this specification. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0013] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a blood glucose data encryption transmission method according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of whitelist database registration according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating device registration and initialization according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of per-session key negotiation according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the dynamic DNA encoding formation according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a single encrypted transmission according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the receiving end decryption and verification in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the overall architecture for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of a blood glucose data encryption transmission device according to an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0014] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the technical solutions in one or more embodiments of this specification, the technical solutions in one or more embodiments of this specification will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only a part of the embodiments of this specification, and not all of the embodiments. Based on one or more embodiments of this specification, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the protection scope of this document.

[0015] Method Implementation Examples According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method is provided. Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a blood glucose data encryption transmission method according to an embodiment of the present invention, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the blood glucose data encryption transmission method according to an embodiment of the present invention specifically includes: In step S110, the blood glucose meter device is registered on the server. Successful registration allows data transmission. Specifically, this includes: At the blood glucose meter device, an ECC key pair including the private key Priv_d and the public key Pub_d is generated. The ECC uses the standard ECC P-256 model. ECC P-256 public key binding typically refers to associating a public key with a specific entity such as a device, user, or service to ensure its uniqueness and trustworthiness. Device authentication: In the Internet of Things (IoT) or mobile devices, an ECC P-256 public key can be bound to a device's hardware identifier, such as IMEI or serial number, for device authentication. The private key Priv_d is stored on the blood glucose meter device. The private key Priv_d is absolutely private. The unique device ID is bound to the public key Pub_d to form a registration request, which is then sent to the server. The registration request is recorded in the whitelist database on the server side to complete the registration, so that the server can clearly know which device the data comes from and needs to use the public key Pub_d to verify its authenticity.

[0016] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of whitelist database registration according to an embodiment of the present invention, such as... Figure 2 The image shows the design of the whitelist database header. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of device registration and initialization according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 3 The image shows the process of making a registration request between the blood glucose meter device and the server.

[0017] In step S120, session key negotiation is performed when the session connection is established or at a preset time interval to establish a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption. These are then transmitted to the server using asymmetric encryption. The negotiation is complete after transmission and parsing. Specifically, this includes: This step does not need to be performed for every transmission. It is performed once the connection is established or periodically, such as once an hour. If the current transmission does not involve session key negotiation, the result of the last update is used. At the blood glucose meter device, an RSA key pair including an RSA private key and an RSA public key is generated as a temporary key pair. In this embodiment of the invention, preferably, the RSA key pair is optimized using CRT and a temporary master key K_master is generated. During the initial registration process, an ECC key pair is also set for the server; the device's key pair is (Priv_d, Pub_d), which is mainly used for signing and verification, and the server's key pair is (Priv_s, Pub_s), which is mainly used for encryption and decryption. The RSA public key and temporary master key K_master are encrypted using the public key Pub_s in the server-side ECC key pair and sent to the server. They are then decrypted using the private key Priv_s in the server-side ECC key pair to obtain the RSA public key and temporary master key K_master.

[0018] Session key negotiation is the handshake relief of the entire secure communication. Its core objective is to securely establish a shared secret, namely a temporary master key K_master, between the device and the server on an insecure channel. If the device directly uses a long-term ECC private key to encrypt all data, once it is leaked, all past and future communications can be decrypted. By generating a temporary K_master for each session, even if the past sessions are leaked in the long term, they cannot be decrypted because different K_masters are used. Furthermore, in order to reduce the use of core keys, such as setting long-term ECC private keys which are prone to exposure risks, their use should be minimized and only used at the most critical moments, such as session negotiation, to effectively reduce risks. From a performance perspective, asymmetric encryption such as ECC and RSA are slow to compute, while symmetric encryption such as AES is fast. This step utilizes the security features of asymmetric encryption to securely transmit the symmetric key K_master. Subsequent large amounts of blood glucose data are then encrypted using the highly efficient AES, thereby improving overall performance.

[0019] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of per-session key negotiation according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 4 The diagram illustrates the key negotiation process between a blood glucose meter device and a server. The device utilizes the server's long-term trusted identity to securely transmit a temporary session keybook (K_master) and a temporary authenticator's RSA public key to the server. This establishes a secure, efficient, and independent confidential communication channel for the session. This process perfectly combines the efficiency of ECC in key negotiation with the flexibility of RSA in signature / encryption, while also achieving the crucial security property of forward security.

[0020] In step S130, a dynamic seed is generated based on the temporary master key, and a dynamic encoding table is generated according to the dynamic seed. The dynamic encoding table is used to encode the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data, and a data frame including the encoded sequence is transmitted. Specifically, this includes: In this embodiment of the invention, the blood glucose data D=(Timestamp, Glucose_Value, Trend_Arrow), where Glucose_Value represents the blood glucose value and Trend_Arrow represents the blood glucose trend; The dynamic seed Seed = SHA-256(K_master ||Timestamp || Sequence_Number) is calculated based on blood glucose data and a temporary master key. Here, SHA-256 means calculating a fixed-length 256-bit hash value, K_master means temporary master key, Timestamp means data time, and Sequence_Number means data sequence number. Because the seed is dynamically generated based on the master key, time, and sequence number, it ensures that it is different for each transmission; Obtain the initial coding table that maps the binary representation of the transmitted information to DNA bases; The initial encoding table is a pre-defined fixed mapping. Different meanings can be extended at different positions of the encoding according to actual needs, such as 00->A, 01->T, 10->C, 11->G. The mapping relationship of the initial encoding table is randomly permuted using a dynamic seed as a pseudo-random number. The correspondence of the above four letters is shuffled using a random seed to generate a dynamic encoding table. The mapping of this transmission may become 00->C, 01->G, 10->T, 11->A. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the dynamic DNA encoding formation according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 5 The diagram shows a code example of shuffling the correspondence using a dynamic seed. Preferably, in this embodiment of the invention, the Fisher-Yates shuffling algorithm is used, the core of which is to swap the current element with an element at a random position from the back to the front. Even the same plaintext bit 00 can be encoded into different bases at different times, greatly increasing the confusion and diffusion of the cipher. Even if a large amount of data is intercepted and it is found that the transmitted data is A, T, C, G, it is impossible to decipher any meaningful information because the encoding rules change each time.

[0021] Based on the temporary master key K_master, the AES-GCM encryption algorithm is executed to encrypt the blood glucose data to obtain ciphertext C and authentication tag Auth_Tag; ciphertext C ensures confidentiality, and Auth_Tag ensures integrity. If the data is tampered with during transmission, it can be verified by the receiver. K_master serves as the cipher for AES-GCM encryption of plaintext. If it does not conform to the required form, it will be adaptively adjusted. In symmetric encryption algorithms, the encryption and decryption keys are the same, which is equivalent to both parties co-producing it. Preferably, a temporary number Nonce can be set as a parameter of the encryption algorithm to ensure that the encryption result is different each time. Nonce = the first 12 bytes of SHA256(K_master ||Timestamp || Sequence), or the first 12 bytes can be directly obtained by using the seed. The encryption process can be represented as (C, Auth_Tag) = AES-256-GCM(K_master, Nonce,D), where K_master, Nonce, and D are all parameters of the encryption algorithm.

[0022] Calculate the hash H = SHA-256(Timestamp || Sequence_Number || C || Auth_Tag); The hash H is signed using the RSA private key in the temporary key pair to obtain the signature Sig, which is easy for the receiver to verify and the behavior cannot be denied. This forms a data block in binary form (Sig || C || Auth_Tag), which is a sequence of 0s and 1s; The data blocks are encoded using a dynamic coding table to obtain coding sequences in the form of DNA bases. The coding format is not the traditional 0s and 1s, but rather the sequence of base gene fragments, such as "ATCGGTACAATT...", to achieve a high degree of format obfuscation. Extending existing single-algorithm encryption to integrate algorithm encryption with dynamic encoding is equivalent to adding a dynamic obfuscation layer; The transmission includes a data frame containing the device ID, timestamp, sequence_number, and encoding sequence. That is, the transmitted data frame is [device ID, timestamp, sequence_number, encoding sequence]. The device ID, timestamp, and other header information are not encoded or use fixed encoding for the convenience of routing or subsequent parsing.

[0023] Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of a single encrypted transmission according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 6 As shown, this demonstrates the process of encrypted transmission of a single blood glucose data. Even if all network traffic is intercepted, it is not dealing with a traditional analyzable binary stream, but rather with gene sequences whose encoding rules are constantly changing. The dynamic encoding rules must be cracked first to obtain standard binary data before attempting to crack AES encryption and RSA signature, providing an extremely powerful defense-in-depth capability.

[0024] In step S140, the dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data are restored on the server side, specifically including: Since K_master, Timestamp, and Sequence_Number already exist on the server side, the dynamic seed can be restored on the server side, and the dynamic encoding table can be restored through the dynamic seed. As the first step of restoration verification, if the failure is caused by the tampering of the timestamp or sequence number, the subsequent restoration process will fail, thus constituting a preliminary integrity check. The received encoded sequence is converted back into a binary data block (Sig', C', Auth_Tag'). Sig' is verified using the RSA public key in the temporary key pair to confirm the data source and accuracy. During transmission, the data is concatenated using ||. However, the parameters need to be verified separately during the verification phase. Using the temporary master key K_master and AES-GCM to decrypt C' and verify Auth_Tag', the final plaintext blood glucose data D is obtained. Verifying Auth_Tag' proves the integrity of the data, and successful decryption ensures the confidentiality of the data.

[0025] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of the decryption and verification process at the receiving end according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 7 As shown, a closed-loop verification chain is formed on the server. Even if the data is tampered with, it may be able to pass DNA decoding, but it is almost impossible to pass the subsequent signature and authentication tag verification. Or, at the decryption stage, any modification to the ciphertext may be detected by the Auth_Tag. Therefore, only when the above-mentioned strict chain is passed will the server decrypt the blood glucose data and store it in the database or display it to the user, ensuring the security of blood glucose data throughout the entire transmission lifecycle from the device to the cloud with extremely high reliability.

[0026] The above technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be illustrated with reference to the following accompanying drawings.

[0027] Figure 8 This is a schematic diagram of the overall architecture for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 8 As shown, a blood glucose data transmission architecture based on dynamic DNA encoding and hybrid authentication encryption protocol is presented, including a four-layer structure of device registration and initialization, per-session key negotiation, single-time data encryption transmission, and receiver decryption verification.

[0028] In summary, addressing the existing problems, this invention provides a method for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data. It ensures forward security by periodically changing the session key and establishing a secure temporary shared key between the device and server to prevent decryption of past and future communications should a leak occur. ECC is used for long-term authentication, RSA for in-session signatures to provide double protection, and AES-GCM provides confidentiality and integrity. The temporary master key not only encrypts data but also controls the encoding rules, forming a dynamic encoding scheme that constitutes a dual defense of algorithm encryption and dynamic encoding. This achieves a high degree of format obfuscation, requiring the dynamic encoding rules to be deciphered first before attempting to decipher the algorithm encryption, effectively resisting such attacks. Overall, it provides a solution with extremely high security and practicality, deeply optimized from the underlying algorithm to the top-level protocol design.

[0029] Device Examples According to an embodiment of the present invention, a blood glucose data encryption transmission device is provided. Figure 9 This is a schematic diagram of a blood glucose data encryption transmission device according to an embodiment of the present invention, as shown below. Figure 9 As shown, the blood glucose data encryption transmission device according to an embodiment of the present invention specifically includes: Initialization module 90 is used to register the blood glucose meter device on the server. Successful registration allows data transfer. Specifically, it is used for: On the blood glucose meter device side, an ECC key pair including a private key Priv_d and a public key Pub_d is generated, the private key Priv_d is stored, the unique device ID is bound to the public key Pub_d to form a registration request, and the registration request is sent to the server side; The registration request is recorded in the whitelist database on the server side to complete the registration.

[0030] The key negotiation module 92 is used to negotiate session keys when a session connection is established or at a preset time interval, to establish a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption, and to transmit them to the server using asymmetric encryption. The negotiation is completed after transmission and parsing. Specifically, it is used for: At the blood glucose meter device, an RSA key pair including an RSA private key and an RSA public key is generated as a temporary key pair, and a temporary master key K_master is generated. The RSA public key and temporary master key K_master are encrypted using the public key Pub_s in the server-side ECC key pair and sent to the server. They are then decrypted using the private key Priv_s in the server-side ECC key pair to obtain the RSA public key and temporary master key K_master.

[0031] The encrypted transmission module 94 is used to generate a dynamic seed based on the temporary master key, and to generate a dynamic encoding table based on the dynamic seed. The dynamic encoding table is used to encode the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data, and to transmit a data frame including the encoded sequence. Specifically, it is used for: The dynamic seed Seed = SHA-256(K_master ||Timestamp || Sequence_Number) is calculated based on blood glucose data and a temporary master key, where K_master represents the temporary master key, Timestamp represents the data time, and Sequence_Number represents the data sequence number.

[0032] Obtain the initial coding table that maps the binary representation of the transmitted information to DNA bases; A dynamic encoding table is generated by randomly permuting the mapping relationship of the initial encoding table using a dynamic seed as a pseudo-random number.

[0033] Based on the temporary master key K_master, the AES-GCM encryption algorithm is executed to encrypt the blood glucose data to obtain ciphertext C and authentication tag Auth_Tag; Calculate the hash H = SHA-256(Timestamp || Sequence_Number || C || Auth_Tag); The hash H is signed using the RSA private key in the temporary key pair to obtain the signature Sig; Form a data block in binary form (Sig || C || Auth_Tag); The data blocks are encoded using a dynamic encoding table to obtain a coding sequence in the form of DNA bases, and a data frame including the device ID, timestamp, sequence number, and coding sequence is transmitted.

[0034] Decryption and verification module 96 is used to restore the dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data on the server side, specifically for: Restore the dynamic seed on the server side, and then restore the dynamic encoding table using the dynamic seed; The received encoded sequence is converted back into a binary data block (Sig', C', Auth_Tag'). Sig' is verified using the RSA public key in the temporary key pair. C' is decrypted and Auth_Tag' is verified using the temporary master key K_master and AES-GCM to obtain the final plaintext blood glucose data.

[0035] In summary, addressing the existing problems, this invention provides a blood glucose data encryption transmission device. It ensures forward security by periodically changing the session key and establishing a secure temporary share between the device and the server, preventing the decryption of all past and future communications should a leak occur. ECC is used for long-term authentication, RSA for in-session signatures to create double protection, and AES-GCM provides confidentiality and integrity. The temporary master key not only encrypts data but also controls the encoding rules, forming a dynamic encoding scheme that provides dual defense against algorithm encryption and dynamic encoding. This achieves a high degree of format obfuscation, requiring the dynamic encoding rules to be deciphered first before attempting to decipher the algorithm encryption, effectively resisting such attacks. Overall, it provides a solution with extremely high security and practicality, deeply optimized from the underlying algorithm to the top-level protocol design.

[0036] Electronic device examples Figure 10 This is a schematic diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of the present invention. The electronic device 1000 may include at least one processor 1010 and a memory 1020. The processor 1010 can execute instructions stored in the memory 1020. The processor 1010 is communicatively connected to the memory 1020 via a data bus. In addition to the memory 1020, the processor 1010 can also be communicatively connected to an input device 1030, an output device 1040, and a communication device 1050 via the data bus.

[0037] The processor 1010 can be any conventional processor, such as a commercially available CPU. The processor may also include graphics processing units (GPUs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), systems on chips (SoCs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), or combinations thereof.

[0038] The memory 1020 can be implemented by any type of volatile or non-volatile storage device or a combination thereof, such as static random access memory (SRAM), electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM), programmable read-only memory (PROM), read-only memory (ROM), magnetic storage, flash memory, magnetic disk or optical disk.

[0039] In this embodiment of the present disclosure, the memory 1020 stores executable instructions, and the processor 1010 can read the executable instructions from the memory 1020 and execute the instructions to implement all or part of the steps of any of the above exemplary embodiments of the blood glucose data encryption transmission method.

[0040] Computer-readable storage medium embodiments In addition to the methods and apparatus described above, exemplary embodiments of this disclosure may also be a computer program product or a computer-readable storage medium storing the computer program product, wherein the computer program product includes computer program instructions that can be executed by a processor to implement all or part of the steps described in any of the blood glucose data encryption transmission methods in the exemplary embodiments described above.

[0041] Computer program products can be written in any combination of one or more programming languages ​​to perform the operations of the embodiments of this application. Programming languages ​​include object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java and C++, as well as conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as C or similar languages, and scripting languages ​​(e.g., Python). The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computing device, partially on the user's device, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computing device and partially on a remote computing device, or entirely on a remote computing device or server.

[0042] Computer-readable storage media may be any combination of one or more readable media. A readable medium may be a readable signal medium or a readable storage medium. A readable storage medium may be, for example,, an electrical, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared, or semiconductor system, apparatus, or device, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of readable storage media include: static random access memory (SRAM) having one or more electrically connected wires; electrically erasable programmable read-only memory (EEPROM); erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM); programmable read-only memory (PROM); read-only memory (ROM); magnetic storage; flash memory; magnetic disk or optical disk; or any suitable combination thereof.

[0043] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features therein. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for encrypted transmission of blood glucose data, characterized in that, include: Register the blood glucose meter device on the server; once registration is successful, data transfer is allowed. Session key negotiation is performed when the session connection is established or at a preset time interval to establish a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption. The key is transmitted to the server using asymmetric encryption. The negotiation is completed after transmission and parsing. A dynamic seed is generated based on the temporary master key, and a dynamic encoding table is generated according to the dynamic seed. The dynamic encoding table is used to encode the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data. The data block is (Sig|| C || Auth_Tag), where Sig represents the signature, C represents the ciphertext, and Auth_Tag represents the authentication tag. The transmission of a data frame including the encoded sequence specifically includes: Obtain the initial coding table that maps the binary representation of the transmitted information to DNA bases; The dynamic seed is used as a pseudo-random number to randomly permutate the mapping relationship of the initial encoding table, thereby generating the dynamic encoding table; The dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data are restored on the server side.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of registering the blood glucose meter device on the server, and allowing transmission upon successful registration, specifically includes: On the blood glucose meter device side, an ECC key pair including a private key Priv_d and a public key Pub_d is generated, the private key Priv_d is stored, a unique device ID is bound to the public key Pub_d to form a registration request, and the registration request is sent to the server side; The registration request is recorded in the whitelist database on the server side to complete the registration.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of establishing a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption, transmitting them to the server using asymmetric encryption, and completing the negotiation after transmission and parsing specifically includes: At the blood glucose meter device, an RSA key pair including an RSA private key and an RSA public key is generated as a temporary key pair, and a temporary master key K_master is generated. The RSA public key and the temporary master key K_master are encrypted using the public key Pub_s in the server-side ECC key pair and sent to the server. They are then decrypted using the private key Priv_s in the server-side ECC key pair to obtain the RSA public key and the temporary master key K_master.

4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of a dynamic seed based on the temporary master key specifically includes: The dynamic seed Seed = SHA-256(K_master ||Timestamp || Sequence_Number) is calculated based on the blood glucose data and the temporary master key, where K_master represents the temporary master key, Timestamp represents the data time, and Sequence_Number represents the data sequence number.

5. The method according to claim 4, characterized in that, The step of encoding the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data using the dynamic encoding table, and transmitting the data frame including the encoded sequence, specifically includes: Based on the temporary master key K_master, the AES-GCM encryption algorithm is executed to encrypt the blood glucose data to obtain ciphertext C and authentication tag Auth_Tag; Calculate the hash H = SHA-256(Timestamp || Sequence_Number || C || Auth_Tag); The hash H is signed using the RSA private key in the temporary key pair to obtain the signature Sig; A data block in binary form (Sig || C || Auth_Tag) is formed; the data block is encoded using the dynamic encoding table to obtain a coding sequence in the form of DNA bases, and a data frame including device ID, timestamp, sequence_number and the coding sequence is transmitted.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The process of restoring the dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data on the server side specifically includes: The dynamic seed is restored on the server side, and the dynamic encoding table is restored using the dynamic seed. The received encoded sequence is converted back into a binary data block (Sig', C', Auth_Tag'). Sig' is verified using the RSA public key in the temporary key pair. C' is decrypted and Auth_Tag' is verified using the temporary master key K_master and AES-GCM to obtain the final plaintext blood glucose data.

7. A blood glucose data encryption transmission device, characterized in that, include: The initialization module is used to register the blood glucose meter device on the server. Once registration is successful, data transfer is allowed. The key negotiation module is used to negotiate session keys when a session connection is established or at a preset time interval, to establish a temporary key pair for authentication and a temporary master key for data encryption, and to transmit them to the server using asymmetric encryption. The negotiation is completed after transmission and parsing. An encrypted transmission module is used to generate a dynamic seed based on the temporary master key, and to generate a dynamic encoding table according to the dynamic seed. The dynamic encoding table is used to encode the data block formed after encrypting and verifying the blood glucose data. The data block is (Sig || C || Auth_Tag), where Sig represents the signature, C represents the ciphertext, and Auth_Tag represents the authentication tag. The transmission of data frames including the encoded sequence specifically includes: Obtain the initial coding table that maps the binary representation of the transmitted information to DNA bases; The dynamic seed is used as a pseudo-random number to randomly permutate the mapping relationship of the initial encoding table, thereby generating the dynamic encoding table; The decryption and verification module is used to restore the dynamic encoding table and plaintext blood glucose data on the server side.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: A memory, a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory and executable on the processor, wherein the computer program, when executed by the processor, implements the steps of the blood glucose data encryption transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores an implementation program for information transmission, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the blood glucose data encryption transmission method as described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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