A method and system for quantifying the impact of air traffic control and guidance full-service chain failure

Abstract

The application discloses an air traffic control and guidance full-service chain failure influence quantification method and system, the method of the application lays a unified data foundation for cross-layer analysis by acquiring airspace related data and standardizing, divides the airspace into three-dimensional grid units and maps to control sectors, air routes and other objects, constructs an airspace service network structure with three layers of faulty entity nodes, first-level nodes and second-level nodes, the first-level nodes correspond to the three-dimensional grid units, the second-level nodes correspond to the control sectors, air routes and other service objects, when performing fault propagation quantification, the corresponding affected first-level node set is calculated from the faulty entity nodes, the coverage failure degree of each grid unit is accurately quantified, and then the grid state is aggregated to the second-level nodes, compared with directly calculating the second-level nodes from the faulty entity nodes, the spatial heterogeneity of equipment coverage can be captured in the grid intermediate layer, so that the affected degree of the second-level nodes can be quantitatively evaluated more finely, and accurate quantification and evaluation of the fault influence are realized.

Claims

1. A method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure, characterized in that: The method includes the following steps: S1. Obtain spatial domain-related data, and perform cleaning, association, and semantic standardization processing on the obtained data; S2. Divide the target airspace into a three-dimensional grid. Each grid cell has a unique code and a corresponding spatial coordinate range. Determine the set of grid cells corresponding to each airspace business object through spatial geographic calculation. The airspace business objects include terminal control areas, regional control areas, control sectors, airways, and control handover points. S3. Based on the standardized data from step S1, construct a spatial service network including nodes and edges. Edges represent the relationships between nodes. Nodes include faulty entity nodes, first-level faulty nodes, and second-level faulty nodes. Faulty entity nodes include power supply nodes, terminal equipment nodes, and network infrastructure nodes. The first-level fault node corresponds to the three-dimensional unit mesh divided in step S2, and the second-level fault node corresponds to the airspace service object in step S2; the relationship includes the relationship between similar entities and the relationship between dissimilar entities. The initial propagation probability is determined based on the strength of the association and expert experience. Then, the second propagation probability of the association is obtained through a graph neural network model trained on historical data. The initial propagation probability and the second propagation probability are weighted and fused to obtain the final propagation probability of each association, which serves as the failure propagation probability of each edge. S4. Starting with the faulty entity nodes whose health status is considered as faulty, degraded, or alarmed, generate a set of potentially affected nodes by performing differentiated traversal rules according to the association type of the edges in the airspace service network; construct the initial fault network based on the starting node and the potentially affected nodes as network nodes, using the final fault propagation probability of the corresponding association in the airspace service network as the edge value. For all propagation paths from the starting node to potentially affected nodes in the initial fault network, prune them according to a preset propagation pruning threshold to obtain the final fault network; S5. Based on the final fault network and airspace grid, calculate the fault impact quantification index from three spatial granularities: unit grid, sector and route; using a single airspace grid as the calculation unit, calculate the complete no-service coverage rate of the fault and the service coverage rate of a single set of resources of the fault. Using a single controlled sector as the calculation unit, calculate the complete no-service coverage rate and the single-resource service coverage rate for sector failures; using a single airway as the calculation unit, calculate the complete no-service coverage rate and the single-resource service coverage rate for airway failures.

2. The method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 1, characterized in that: In step S3, the relationships between entities of the same type include the power supply relationship between power supply nodes, the adjacency relationship between terminal device nodes, and the networking relationship between network infrastructure nodes; the relationships between entities of different types include the power supply relationship between power supply nodes and terminal device nodes and network infrastructure nodes respectively, the access relationship between terminal device nodes and network infrastructure nodes, the service coverage relationship between terminal device nodes and first-level fault nodes, the data transmission coverage relationship between network infrastructure nodes and first-level fault nodes, and the spatial affiliation relationship between first-level fault nodes and second-level fault nodes.

3. The method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure according to claim 2, characterized in that: In step S4, the process of generating the potentially affected node set is as follows: When the relationship is a power supply relationship, service coverage relationship, access relationship, data transmission coverage relationship or spatial affiliation relationship, the downstream nodes of the corresponding relationship will be included in the potentially affected node set; When the relationship is an adjacency relationship or a network relationship, the preceding and following related nodes of the corresponding relationship will be included in the potentially affected node set.

4. The method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 1, characterized in that: Step S5 further includes: generating a failure list of affected first-level fault nodes based on the final fault network, the list containing the identifiers of all first-level fault nodes that failed due to fault propagation; and outputting the spatial service grid coverage area corresponding to each first-level fault node in the failure list, the coverage area being the set of all cell grids served by the node as determined by the spatial grid modeling in step S2.

5. A method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 4, characterized in that: In step S4, the process of calculating the complete no-service coverage rate and the single-resource service coverage rate is as follows: taking a single spatial grid as the calculation unit, for each grid, first extract the list of all first-level fault nodes associated with it under normal conditions, and then compare it with the list of failed nodes in the final fault network to count the number of remaining available first-level fault nodes in the grid; if the remaining number is 0, it is included in the number of grids with complete no-service coverage; if the remaining number is 1, it is included in the number of grids with only single-resource service coverage; simultaneously, the total number of service grids in the corresponding area is counted, and the complete no-service coverage rate and the single-resource service coverage rate are calculated.

6. A method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 5, characterized in that: In step S5, the process of calculating the sector failure complete no-service coverage rate and the sector failure single-resource service coverage rate is as follows: taking a single controlled sector as the calculation unit, first extract the list of all unit grids contained within the geographical range of the sector, and then compare the judgment results of each unit grid one by one; accumulate the number of completely no-service coverage grids of all unit grids in the sector to obtain the total number of completely no-service coverage grids in the sector; accumulate the number of single-resource service coverage grids of all unit grids in the sector to obtain the total number of single-resource service coverage grids in the sector; simultaneously count the total number of service grids in the sector, and calculate the sector failure complete no-service coverage rate and the sector failure single-resource service coverage rate.

7. A method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 5, characterized in that: In step S5, the process of calculating the complete no-service coverage rate of route failure and the risk ratio of service coverage of a single set of resources for route failure is as follows: taking a single route as the calculation unit, first extract the list of all unit grids contained within the geographical range of the route, and then compare the judgment results of each unit grid one by one. The total length of the route with no service coverage is calculated by summing the number of grid cells with no service coverage across all grid cells within the route and combining this with the geographic length parameter of each individual grid cell. The total length of the route with only a single resource service coverage is calculated by summing the number of grid cells with only a single resource service coverage across all grid cells within the route and combining this with the geographic length parameter of each individual grid cell. Simultaneously, the total service grid length of the route is statistically analyzed, and the risk ratio of complete no-service coverage due to route failure to service coverage risk of a single set of resources due to route failure is calculated.

8. A method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The pruning process is as follows: traverse each propagation path in the initial fault network. If the cumulative propagation probability of a path is less than the preset propagation pruning threshold, terminate the traversal of that path and remove it. After the traversal is completed, the final fault network is formed.

9. A method for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure as described in claim 8, characterized in that: The cumulative propagation probability is obtained by multiplying the effective propagation probabilities of all edges on the path. The effective propagation probability is equal to the product of the fault propagation probability of the edge and the state adjustment factor of the corresponding source node. The state adjustment factor is determined based on the current real-time health status of the source node.

10. A system for quantifying the impact of air traffic control communication and navigation chain failure, characterized in that: The system includes a processor for processing the impact quantification method of the air traffic control communication and navigation full service chain failure as described in any one of claims 1-9.

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