Host computer security booting system and method based on smart ring and firmware layer control
By using smart rings and BIOS/UEFI firmware layer collaborative authentication, and by utilizing key fragment splitting and public/private key mechanisms, the vulnerability of traditional host boot authentication to attacks is solved, and full-link security control of host boot is achieved.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Patents(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- DALIAN NINELOCK NETWORKS CO LTD
- Filing Date
- 2026-01-26
- Publication Date
- 2026-07-31
AI Technical Summary
Traditional host power-on authentication is vulnerable to side-channel attacks, cannot prevent devices from starting in unauthorized environments, and cannot bind specific users to specific hosts.
It employs smart ring and BIOS/UEFI firmware layer collaborative authentication, performs firmware layer authentication through split key fragments, and combines public and private key authentication at the operating system layer to ensure the security of host boot.
It effectively prevents unauthorized devices from starting up, prevents cross-machine startup and unauthorized user login, and achieves full-link security control of host startup.
Smart Images
Figure CN121997339B_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the fields of computer information security and firmware security technology, and in particular to a host secure boot system and method based on smart rings and firmware layer control. Background Technology
[0002] Host boot authentication technology is a core component of computer security, ensuring the legitimacy of device boot permissions. Traditional host boot authentication often uses firmware passwords, boot credentials, or only verifies account passwords during operating system login. These methods are vulnerable to side-channel attacks (such as booting from external hard drives, system image copying, and offline hacking). Furthermore, these methods cannot prevent devices from booting in unauthorized environments, nor can they bind specific users to specific hosts at the firmware level. Summary of the Invention
[0003] In view of this, the present invention provides a host secure boot system and method based on smart ring and firmware layer control. By utilizing the collaboration between smart wearable device (smart ring) and host firmware (BIOS / UEFI), the host boot can achieve dual authentication of "firmware layer authentication + operating system layer authentication", which is suitable for scenarios with high host security requirements such as government, finance, and enterprise terminals.
[0004] Therefore, the present invention provides the following technical solution: On one hand, the present invention provides a host secure boot system based on a smart ring and firmware layer control, comprising: A smart ring terminal is used to store the first key fragment and the private key; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module is used to cooperate with the smart ring terminal to perform a first authentication during power-on, and to determine whether to allow system startup based on the first authentication result; the BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module integrates a host security storage module; the host security storage module is used to store a second key fragment, and to generate a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; the first authentication is performed based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; The operating system login authentication module is loaded after the system starts. It is used to store the public key and cooperates with the smart ring terminal to perform a second authentication. Based on the second authentication result, it determines whether the user can enter the system. The second authentication is based on the private key, the public key, and the session key.
[0005] Furthermore, the host secure storage module is implemented through the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) built into the host.
[0006] Furthermore, the first authentication includes: The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module generates the first random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses the first random challenge and the first key fragment to calculate the first verification value; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module calls the host secure storage module and uses the first random challenge and the second key fragment stored in the host secure storage module to calculate the second verification value. The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module concatenates the first and second verification values and performs a hash operation to obtain the third verification value. The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module determines whether the third check value matches the reference check value. If they match, firmware layer authentication is passed, allowing the system to continue booting. The second certification includes: The operating system authentication module generates a second random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses its private key to sign the second random challenge and returns the signature result. The operating system authentication module uses the public key to verify the signature result and confirm the ring's identity; The operating system authentication module generates a random number and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal calls the session key generated by the secure storage module, encrypts the random number with the session key to obtain ciphertext, and returns it to the operating system authentication module; the secure storage module generates a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; The operating system authentication module uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the decrypted random number; If the decrypted random number is the same as the generated random number, the operating system layer authentication is successful, allowing the user to log in to the operating system.
[0007] Furthermore, the smart ring terminal ensures key security through a built-in SE security chip.
[0008] In another aspect, the present invention also provides a secure host boot method based on a smart ring and firmware layer control, applying the aforementioned secure host boot system based on a smart ring and firmware layer control; the method includes: After the host is powered on, the BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module and the smart ring terminal perform the first authentication; the first authentication includes: The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module generates the first random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses the first random challenge and the first key fragment to calculate the first verification value; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module calls the host secure storage module and uses the first random challenge and the second key fragment stored in the host secure storage module to calculate the second verification value. The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module concatenates the first and second verification values and performs a hash operation with the second key fragment to obtain the third verification value; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module determines whether the third check value matches the reference check value. If they match, firmware layer authentication is passed, allowing the system to continue booting. If the first authentication passes, a second authentication is performed by the operating system login authentication module and the smart ring terminal; the second authentication includes: The operating system authentication module generates a second random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses its private key to sign the second random challenge and returns the signature result. The operating system authentication module uses the public key to verify the signature result and confirm the ring's identity; The operating system authentication module generates a random number and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal calls the session key generated by the secure storage module, encrypts the random number with the session key to obtain ciphertext, and returns it to the operating system authentication module; the secure storage module generates a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; The operating system authentication module uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the decrypted random number; If the decrypted random number is the same as the generated random number, the operating system layer authentication is successful, allowing the user to log in to the operating system.
[0009] Further, a first checksum is calculated using the first random challenge and the first key fragment, including: R1' = HMAC - SHA256(R1, Kb1); Where R1' represents the first checksum; R1 represents the first random challenge; Kb1 represents the first key fragment; HMAC-SHA256 is a key-based message authentication algorithm; The second verification value is calculated using the first random challenge and the second key fragment stored in the host secure storage module, including: R1''=HMAC SHA256(R1, Kb2); Where R1'' represents the second check value; R1 represents the first random challenge; and Kb2 represents the second key fragment.
[0010] Further, the first and second check values are concatenated and hashed with the second key fragment to obtain the third check value, which includes: CheckVal=HMAC-SHA256(R1'|| R1'',Kb2); Where || represents byte concatenation operation; CheckVal represents the third check value.
[0011] Further, generating a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment includes: Ky=HKDF(R1_combined,Kb1||Kb2); Where Ky represents the session key, which is generated only at runtime; R1_combined represents the salt value; and HKDF is a key derivation function based on HMAC.
[0012] Furthermore, prior to host security boot authentication, it also includes: binding the user's smart ring to the host device, including: After receiving a binding request from an administrator or user in a trusted environment, the firmware reads and calculates the TPM platform integrity measurement value and returns it to the operating system; the binding request includes the user ID to be bound. The operating system detects new smart rings, reads their serial numbers, and records them in the binding process context; it then generates random challenge values and sends them to the smart ring terminal. After receiving a random challenge value, the smart ring terminal signs the random challenge value using the private key inside the ring; it then calculates the first part of the verification value for the random challenge value using the first key fragment stored inside the ring and returns it to the operating system. On the operating system side, the signature and partial verification value returned by the smart ring are sent to the firmware side, requesting the firmware to participate in the verification; On the firmware side, the second part of the verification value is calculated using the second key fragment, and then combined with the first part of the verification value provided by the ring for verification; if the verification passes, a successful verification result is returned to the operating system side. On the operating system side, after receiving the successful verification result, a binding record is generated and saved locally, while the policy parameters are synchronized to the enterprise / local policy library; the binding-related information is written to the firmware side. After the data is written to the firmware, a binding completion confirmation message is returned to the operating system, which then notifies the administrator / user that the binding was successful.
[0013] Furthermore, unbinding the user's smart ring from the host device includes: After receiving the unbinding ring request from the administrator, the operating system triggers a secondary confirmation; the unbinding ring request includes the user ID to be unbound and the ring serial number. After the second confirmation is successful, the operating system sends an unbinding request to the firmware, specifying the ring serial number to be unbound; Upon receiving the unbinding request, the firmware unbinds the ring serial number to be unbound; clears the reference verification value associated with the ring serial number to be unbound; sets the binding completion flag to False; and returns an unbinding completion message to the operating system. After receiving confirmation of firmware unbinding, the operating system deletes the saved binding relationship between the user ID, the ring serial number to be unbound, and the public key; updates the local binding database and marks the binding status as unregistered; and adds the ring serial number to be unbound to the blacklist to prevent the ring from being misused or rebound. The operating system will return the unbinding result to the administrator and indicate that the unbinding is complete.
[0014] Advantages and positive effects of this invention: In this invention, through collaborative authentication between the smart ring terminal and the BIOS / UEFI firmware, the first authentication is performed at the firmware layer based on two split key fragments, and the second authentication is achieved by the operating system layer combining public and private keys. This ensures that the host must have a legitimate ring device to complete the firmware layer boot verification, thereby effectively preventing unauthorized device boot. Since the authentication process requires the key fragment stored in the smart ring and the second key fragment in the host's secure storage module to jointly generate a session key, attackers cannot bypass authentication by copying or cracking it offline using a single device. The public and private key authentication mechanism at the operating system layer is bound to the session key, ensuring that the physical binding relationship between the ring device and the host must be verified when logging into the system, preventing cross-machine boot and unauthorized user login, and ultimately achieving full-link security control of the host boot process. Attached Figure Description
[0015] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.
[0016] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the binding process between the smart ring and the host device in this invention. Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the process of unbinding the smart ring from the host device in this invention. Figure 3 This is a structural diagram of the host secure boot system in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4This is a flowchart of the host secure boot process in Embodiment 1 of the present invention; Figure 5 This is a flowchart of the host secure boot process in Embodiment 2 of the present invention; Figure 6 This is a flowchart of the host secure boot process in Embodiment 3 of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0017] Terminology Explanation: HMAC-SHA256 is a key-based message authentication algorithm that uses a shared key and the SHA-256 hash function to generate a fixed-length authentication code to ensure that the message has not been tampered with during transmission and to verify the trustworthiness of the message's source. HKDF is a key derivation function based on HMAC, used to securely generate one or more new keys (such as Ky) from existing initial keys (such as Kb1, Kb2), ensuring that the generated keys have good randomness and unpredictability, while avoiding the security risks of directly using the original keys.
[0018] The TPM platform integrity measurement represents the integrity metric of the host firmware and trusted loaded components recorded by the TPM, used to verify whether the system boot environment has been tampered with.
[0019] "Binding" refers to writing the user ID, ring serial number, TPM platform integrity measurement value, Ka_pub, etc., into secure storage as a unique and trusted combination. During verification, verification will only succeed if this combination matches simultaneously.
[0020] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present invention, the technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present invention.
[0021] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this invention are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of the invention described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover a non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.
[0022] Smart ring devices have built-in security chips and Bluetooth communication capabilities. If they are bound to the firmware layer and a split key and public-private key (PKI) system is added, a dual authentication closed loop of "first confirming whether the device is allowed to start, and then confirming who can enter the system" can be achieved without increasing user interaction costs.
[0023] Before system application, the user's smart ring must first be bound to the host device. The following explains the specific process of binding and unbinding the user and device. The user refers to the smart ring user, and the device refers to the host device, including the operating system and firmware. Binding data includes: user ID, ring serial number (RingSN), public key (Ka_pub), TPM platform integrity measurement value; and policy parameters (allowed OS versions, geographical / time restrictions, etc.). Data storage locations: Smart Ring: Stores the ring's internal private key (Ka_pri) and the first key fragment (Kb1); Firmware (TPM): Stores the ring serial number (RingSN), TPM platform integrity measurement value, reference checksum (used for verification with CheckVal in firmware layer authentication), and a binding completion flag (Boolean); Operating System: Stores the user's identity and device binding relationship, including user ID, ring serial number (RingSN), and public key (Ka_pub); Enterprise / Local Policy Library: Stores policy parameters, including allowed OS versions, geographical / time restrictions, etc.
[0024] like Figure 1 As shown, the user-device binding process specifically includes the following steps: Step S11: The administrator or user initiates a binding request to the operating system in a trusted environment (such as a management console), specifying the user ID to be bound.
[0025] Step S12: After receiving the binding request, the firmware (TPM) reads and calculates the TPM platform integrity measurement value and returns it to the operating system.
[0026] Step S13: The operating system detects the new smart ring access, reads its serial number RingSN, and records it in the binding process context.
[0027] Step S14: On the operating system side, generate a random challenge value R0 and send R0 to the smart ring.
[0028] Step S15: After receiving R0, the smart ring performs the following operations: Use the private key Ka_pri inside the ring to sign R0, and get Sig(R0); Calculate a partial checksum R0' using the first key fragment Kb1 stored inside the ring: R0' = HMAC - SHA256(R0, Kb1); returns {Sig(R0), R0'} to the operating system.
[0029] Step S16: On the operating system side, the {Sig(R0), R0'} returned by the smart ring is sent to the firmware side (TPM) to request the firmware to participate in the verification.
[0030] Step S17: On the firmware side, calculate a partial verification value R0'' using the split key fragment Kb2, and combine it with the R0' provided by the ring for verification; if the verification passes, return a successful verification result to the operating system side.
[0031] Step S18: On the operating system side, after receiving the successful verification result, a binding record is generated, which includes: {User ID, Ring Serial Number (RingSN), Public Key (Ka_pub), and TPM Platform Integrity Measurement Value}; and the binding record is saved locally, while the policy parameters are synchronized to the enterprise / local policy library.
[0032] Write the binding-related information into the firmware (TPM), including: Ring Serial Number (RingSN); TPM platform integrity measurement value, reference check value, and binding completion flag Boolean=True.
[0033] Step S19: After writing the data to the firmware (TPM), return a binding completion confirmation message to the operating system. The operating system will then notify the administrator / user that the binding was successful.
[0034] If the user wants to unbind the device, such as Figure 2 As shown, the corresponding unbinding process includes the following steps: Step S21: In the operating system management console, the administrator selects the unbind ring operation and specifies the user ID and ring serial number (RingSN) to be unbound. The system triggers secondary confirmation (e.g., entering the management key).
[0035] Step S22: After the second confirmation is successful, the operating system sends an unbinding request to the firmware (TPM), specifying the ring serial number (RingSN) to be unbound.
[0036] Step S23: On the firmware side (TPM), after receiving the unbinding request, perform the following operations: Unbind from RingSN; Clear the check value associated with this RingSN; Set the binding completion flag to False; and return a message indicating unbinding completion to the operating system.
[0037] Step S24: On the operating system side, after receiving the firmware unbinding confirmation, perform the following operations: The operating system deletes the saved binding relationship between the user ID, ring serial number RingSN, and public key Ka_pub. Update the local database binding and mark the binding status as unregistered.
[0038] Step S25: On the operating system side, add the RingSN to the blacklist to prevent the ring from being misused or re-bound.
[0039] Step S26: On the operating system side, the unbinding result is returned to the administrator, and a message is displayed indicating that the unbinding is complete.
[0040] After binding the user's smart ring to the host device, the smart ring can be used to perform dual authentication at the firmware and operating system levels when the host is powered on, thus enabling secure boot of the host.
[0041] like Figure 3 As shown, a host secure power-on system based on a smart ring and firmware layer control includes: A smart ring terminal is used to store the first key fragment and the private key; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module is used to cooperate with the smart ring terminal to perform a first authentication during power-on, and to determine whether to allow system startup based on the first authentication result; the BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module integrates a host security storage module; the host security storage module is used to store a second key fragment, and to generate a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; the first authentication is performed based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; The operating system login authentication module is loaded after the system starts. It is used to store the public key and cooperates with the smart ring terminal to perform a second authentication. Based on the second authentication result, it determines whether the user can enter the system. The second authentication is based on the private key, the public key, and the session key.
[0042] Example 1: The user wears the bound smart ring, presses the power button, and initiates a power-on request to the host.
[0043] like Figure 4 As shown, a secure host power-on method based on a smart ring and firmware layer control specifically includes: S11: The firmware layer (BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module) generates the first random challenge R1 and sends it to the smart ring to start firmware layer authentication.
[0044] S12: After receiving R1, the smart ring terminal uses the first key fragment Kb1 to calculate a partial verification value R1' and returns it to the BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module.
[0045] R1' = HMAC - SHA256(R1, Kb1); Where R1' represents the first checksum; R1 represents the first random challenge; Kb1 represents the first key fragment; HMAC-SHA256 is a key-based message authentication algorithm; In the formula for calculating the checksum R1' of the ring, if |Kb1|>64, K0=SHA256(Kb1); if |Kb1|≤64, K0=Kb1 and padding to 64 bytes; ipad=0x36×64; opad=0x5c×64; R1'=SHA256((K0⊕opad)||SHA256((K0⊕ipad)||R1)).
[0046] S13: The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module calls the host secure storage module, uses the local second key fragment Kb2 to calculate a partial check value R1'', concatenates R1' and R1'' and performs a hash operation to obtain CheckVal; and determines whether CheckVal is consistent with the reference value stored during binding.
[0047] R1''=HMAC SHA256(R1, Kb2); Where R1'' represents the second check value; R1 represents the first random challenge; and Kb2 represents the second key fragment.
[0048] In the formula for calculating the checksum R1'' in the firmware, if |Kb2|>64, K0=SHA256(Kb2); if |Kb2|≤64, K0=Kb2 padded to 64 bytes; ipad=0x36×64; opad=0x5c×64; R1''=SHA256((K0⊕opad)||SHA256((K0⊕ipad)||R1)).
[0049] CheckVal=HMAC-SHA256(R1'|| R1'',Kb2); Where || represents byte concatenation operation; CheckVal represents the third check value.
[0050] In the formula for calculating the overall check value CheckVal, M = R1'||R1''; if |Kb2|>64, K0 = SHA256(Kb2); if |Kb2|≤64, K0 = Kb2 padded to 64 bytes, ipad = 0x36×64, opad = 0x5c×64, CheckVal = SHA256((K0⊕opad)||SHA256((K0⊕ipad)||M)).
[0051] S14: The operating system layer (operating system login authentication module) generates the second random challenge R2 and sends it to the smart ring terminal to start operating system layer authentication.
[0052] S15: The smart ring terminal uses the private key Ka_pri to sign R2 to generate Sig(R2) and returns it to the operating system login authentication module.
[0053] S16: The operating system login authentication module uses Ka_pub to verify Sig(R2) and confirm the ring's identity.
[0054] S17: The operating system login authentication module generates a random number T1 and sends it to the smart ring. The ring and firmware work together to derive the symmetric key Ky. Ky=HKDF(R1_combined,Kb1||Kb2); Where Ky represents the session key, which is generated only at runtime; R1_combined represents the salt value; and HKDF is a key derivation function based on HMAC.
[0055] In the derivation formula of the session key Ky, IKM=Kb1||Kb2; salt=R1'||R1''; PRK=HMAC-SHA256(salt,IKM); T1=HMAC-SHA256(PRK,T0||info||0x01); Ky=the first 32 bytes of T1.
[0056] S18: The smart ring terminal uses Ky to encrypt T1 to generate ciphertext T1' and returns it to the operating system login authentication module.
[0057] S19: The operating system login authentication module uses Ky to decrypt T1' to obtain T2; if T2=T1, then the authentication is successful, and the user is allowed to log in to the operating system.
[0058] Example 2: When a user presses the power button without wearing or carrying the bound smart ring, a power-on request is sent to the host.
[0059] like Figure 5 As shown, a secure host power-on method based on a smart ring and firmware layer control specifically includes: S21: The firmware layer generates the first random challenge R1 and attempts to send the challenge to the smart ring.
[0060] S22: The firmware layer did not receive a ring response or the received checksum did not match. The first authentication failed, and power-on is prohibited.
[0061] Example 3: When a user reports that their ring has been lost, the administrator initiates an emergency restart request in the operating system management console, which requires the provision of a management key.
[0062] like Figure 6 As shown, a secure host power-on method based on a smart ring and firmware layer control specifically includes: Step S31: The operating system sends a trust revocation request to the firmware, specifying the lost RingSN.
[0063] Step S32: The firmware revokes trust in the lost ring's serial number RingSN, clears the reference verification value, and sets the binding completion flag to False; it then returns confirmation to the operating system.
[0064] Step S33: The operating system cancels the mapping relationship between the user ID, serial number RingSN, and public key Ka_pub, and updates the local database.
[0065] Step S34: The administrator issues a one-time recovery code to the user. The recovery code is used to temporarily generate a session key in a restricted operating system environment to ensure that the authentication loop can be restored.
[0066] Step S35: The user performs rebinding using the spare / new ring, and the normal policy is restored after completion; the original lost ring is added to the blacklist.
[0067] Example 4: The attacker removes the hard drive containing this system and inserts it into another host.
[0068] The new host firmware attempted to perform the first authentication, but it was missing the Kb2 key bound to the original hardware, so it failed the verification and was prevented from booting.
[0069] Example 5: An attacker attempts to replace the BIOS firmware to bypass verification.
[0070] The firmware checks the Kb2 archive status and TPM platform integrity measurement values and finds inconsistencies; the firmware prevents booting and records abnormal firmware events to the security audit log.
[0071] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A host computer security booting system based on smart ring and firmware layer control, characterized in that, include: A smart ring terminal is used to store the first key fragment and the private key; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module is used to cooperate with the smart ring terminal to perform the first authentication during power-on, and to determine whether to allow the system to start based on the first authentication result; the BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module integrates a host security storage module; The host secure storage module is used to store the second key fragment and generate a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; the first authentication is performed based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment. The operating system login authentication module is loaded after the system starts. It is used to store the public key and cooperates with the smart ring terminal to perform a second authentication. Based on the second authentication result, it determines whether the user can enter the system. The second authentication is performed based on the private key, the public key, and the session key; The first authentication includes: The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module generates the first random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses the first random challenge and the first key fragment to calculate the first verification value; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module calls the host secure storage module and uses the first random challenge and the second key fragment stored in the host secure storage module to calculate the second verification value. The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module concatenates the first and second verification values and performs a hash operation to obtain the third verification value. The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module determines whether the third check value matches the reference check value. If they match, firmware layer authentication is passed, allowing the system to continue booting. The second certification includes: The operating system authentication module generates a second random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses its private key to sign the second random challenge and returns the signature result. The operating system authentication module uses the public key to verify the signature result and confirm the ring's identity; The operating system authentication module generates a random number and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal calls the session key generated by the secure storage module, encrypts the random number with the session key to obtain ciphertext, and returns it to the operating system authentication module; the secure storage module generates a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; The operating system authentication module uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the decrypted random number; If the decrypted random number is the same as the generated random number, the operating system layer authentication is successful, allowing the user to log in to the operating system.
2. The host security booting system based on the smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 1, characterized in that, The host secure storage module is implemented through the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) built into the host.
3. The host security booting system based on the smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 1, characterized in that, The smart ring terminal ensures key security through a built-in SE security chip.
4. A host computer security booting method based on smart ring and firmware layer control, characterized in that, The system utilizes a host secure boot system based on a smart ring and firmware layer control as described in any one of claims 1 to 3; the method includes: After the host is powered on, the BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module and the smart ring terminal perform the first authentication; the first authentication includes: The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module generates the first random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses the first random challenge and the first key fragment to calculate the first verification value; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module calls the host secure storage module and uses the first random challenge and the second key fragment stored in the host secure storage module to calculate the second verification value. The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module concatenates the first and second verification values and performs a hash operation with the second key fragment to obtain the third verification value; The BIOS / UEFI firmware authentication module determines whether the third check value matches the reference check value. If they match, firmware layer authentication is passed, allowing the system to continue booting. If the first authentication passes, a second authentication is performed by the operating system login authentication module and the smart ring terminal; the second authentication includes: The operating system authentication module generates a second random challenge and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal uses its private key to sign the second random challenge and returns the signature result. The operating system authentication module uses the public key to verify the signature result and confirm the ring's identity; The operating system authentication module generates a random number and sends it to the smart ring terminal; The smart ring terminal calls the session key generated by the secure storage module, encrypts the random number with the session key to obtain ciphertext, and returns it to the operating system authentication module; the secure storage module generates a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment; The operating system authentication module uses the session key to decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the decrypted random number; If the decrypted random number is the same as the generated random number, the operating system layer authentication is successful, allowing the user to log in to the operating system.
5. A host secure power-on method based on a smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 4, characterized in that, The first checksum is calculated using the first random challenge and the first key fragment, including: R1' = HMAC - SHA256(R1, Kb1); Where R1' represents the first checksum; R1 represents the first random challenge; Kb1 represents the first key fragment; HMAC-SHA256 is a key-based message authentication algorithm; The second verification value is calculated using the first random challenge and the second key fragment stored in the host secure storage module, including: R1'' = HMAC SHA256(R1, Kb2); Where R1'' represents the second check value; R1 represents the first random challenge; and Kb2 represents the second key fragment.
6. The host computer security booting method based on the smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 5, characterized in that, The first and second check values are concatenated and hashed together with the second key fragment to obtain the third check value, which includes: CheckVal=HMAC-SHA256(R1'|| R1'',Kb2); Where || represents byte concatenation operation; CheckVal represents the third check value.
7. The host computer security booting method based on the smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 6, characterized in that, Generating a session key based on the first key fragment and the second key fragment includes: Ky=HKDF(R1_combined,Kb1||Kb2); Where Ky represents the session key, which is generated only at runtime; R1_combined represents the salt value; and HKDF is a key derivation function based on HMAC.
8. The host computer security booting method based on the smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 4, characterized in that, Prior to host security boot authentication, it also includes: binding the user's smart ring to the host device, including: After receiving a binding request from an administrator or user in a trusted environment, the firmware reads and calculates the TPM platform integrity measurement value and returns it to the operating system; the binding request includes the user ID to be bound. The operating system detects new smart rings, reads their serial numbers, and records them in the binding process context; it then generates random challenge values and sends them to the smart ring terminal. After receiving a random challenge value, the smart ring terminal signs the random challenge value using the private key inside the ring; it then calculates the first part of the verification value for the random challenge value using the first key fragment stored inside the ring and returns it to the operating system. On the operating system side, the signature and partial verification value returned by the smart ring are sent to the firmware side, requesting the firmware to participate in the verification; On the firmware side, the second part of the verification value is calculated using the second key fragment, and then combined with the first part of the verification value provided by the ring for verification; if the verification passes, a successful verification result is returned to the operating system side. On the operating system side, after receiving the successful verification result, a binding record is generated and saved locally, while the policy parameters are synchronized to the enterprise / local policy library; the binding-related information is written to the firmware side. After the data is written to the firmware, a binding completion confirmation message is returned to the operating system, which then notifies the administrator / user that the binding was successful.
9. The host computer security booting method based on the smart ring and firmware layer control according to claim 8, characterized in that, Unbind the user's smart ring from the host device, including: After receiving the unbinding ring request from the administrator, the operating system triggers a secondary confirmation; the unbinding ring request includes the user ID to be unbound and the ring serial number. After the second confirmation is successful, the operating system sends an unbinding request to the firmware, specifying the ring serial number to be unbound; Upon receiving the unbinding request, the firmware unbinds the ring serial number to be unbound; clears the reference verification value associated with the ring serial number to be unbound; sets the binding completion flag to False; and returns an unbinding completion message to the operating system. After receiving confirmation of firmware unbinding, the operating system deletes the saved binding relationship between the user ID, the ring serial number to be unbound, and the public key; updates the local binding database and marks the binding status as unregistered; and adds the ring serial number to be unbound to the blacklist to prevent the ring from being misused or rebound. The operating system will return the unbinding result to the administrator and indicate that the unbinding is complete.