An electric-car-green certificate market mutual recognition coupling and user side flexibility resource coordination method and related device
By using energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits and the Stackelberg-Nash two-layer game model, the strategies of traditional power generators and electricity users are optimized, solving the coordination problem of flexible resources on the user side, realizing efficient utilization and fair allocation of resources, and improving the level of autonomy of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- FOSHAN POWER SUPPLY BUREAU GUANGDONG POWER GRID
- Filing Date
- 2026-04-20
- Publication Date
- 2026-06-12
AI Technical Summary
Existing research has failed to effectively explore and utilize user-side flexibility resources, neglecting their heterogeneity and synergistic potential. This has resulted in insufficient enthusiasm for flexibility resources to participate in the market, difficulty in improving the level of regional power autonomy, and unfair cost sharing and revenue redistribution.
By establishing an energy mutual recognition accounting system for green certificates and carbon rights, and a multi-entity joint market trading decision-making model based on a Stackelberg-Nash two-layer game, the strategy optimization and Nash equilibrium of traditional power generators and electricity users are achieved, forming the optimal trading decision and executing centralized clearing of electricity, carbon rights, and green certificates.
It has enabled efficient collaboration and fair sharing of flexible resources on the user side, improved the level of regional power autonomy, stimulated the enthusiasm of resources to participate in the market, and achieved scientific planning and fair cost sharing and revenue redistribution under the multi-scenario regulation needs.
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Figure CN122199049A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention belongs to the field of energy trading technology, specifically relating to a method and related apparatus for mutual recognition coupling of electricity-carbon-green certificates market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources. Background Technology
[0002] In the field of energy trading technology, with the development of the power energy system, the coordinated operation of multiple energy trading markets has become a key research direction. The electricity market, carbon trading market, and green electricity certificate (green certificate) market each play different roles in the energy system, and their synergistic relationship is of great significance for optimizing energy resource allocation and promoting the sustainable development of the energy industry.
[0003] In recent years, with the advancement of new power system construction and the increasing demand for safe grid operation and low-carbon transformation, user-side flexibility resources have gradually attracted attention. These resources can support the stable operation of the power grid and the low-carbon utilization of energy by flexibly adjusting energy conversion and usage methods in different scenarios. However, how to effectively explore and utilize these resources has become an important issue facing the current energy trading technology field.
[0004] While existing research has explored the coupling of electricity-carbon or electricity-green certificate dual markets and multi-stakeholder game modeling, most studies have not fully considered the heterogeneity and synergistic potential of user-side flexibility resources, nor have they established a centralized shared operation mechanism led by load aggregators. Some studies have attempted to construct a joint framework of three markets, but have neglected the proactive decision-making role of user-side resources and failed to effectively address the fairness issues of cost sharing and revenue redistribution. Furthermore, existing market mechanisms struggle to accurately match multi-scenario adjustment needs with resource supply capacity, resulting in insufficient enthusiasm for flexibility resources to participate in the market and hindering the improvement of regional power autonomy. Summary of the Invention
[0005] In view of this, the present invention provides a method and related apparatus for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources, aiming to achieve efficient coordination, scientific planning and fair sharing of user-side flexibility resources under the adjustment needs of multiple scenarios, and promote the integration of market value of electricity-carbon-green certificates.
[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution provided by the present invention is as follows:
[0007] In a first aspect, the present invention provides a method for coordinating market mutual recognition of electricity, carbon, and green certificates with user-side flexibility resources, comprising the following steps:
[0008] Acquire basic operational data from traditional power generators, renewable energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market;
[0009] Based on basic operational data, energy mutual recognition accounting for green certificates and carbon credits is performed to obtain the green certificate and carbon credit accounting results.
[0010] Based on the calculation results of green certificates and carbon credits, a pre-constructed multi-entity joint market trading decision-making model is used for trading decisions. This model employs a two-level game decision-making framework combining Stackelberg and Nash games. The multiple entities include a trading center, traditional power generators, and electricity users. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, publishes the initial clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon credit market, and green certificate market. The clearing price for the electricity market is the time-of-use price, the clearing price for the carbon credit market is the unit price for carbon emission rights, and the clearing price for the green certificate market is the unit price for renewable energy green electricity certificates. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their strategies based on the initial clearing prices of the three markets: traditional power generators optimize their power generation strategy, and electricity users optimize their electricity purchase strategy. Furthermore, a Nash game is played between traditional power generators and electricity users, leading to a Nash equilibrium.
[0011] The trading decisions made by traditional power generators and electricity users after reaching Nash equilibrium are fed back to the trading center, so that the trading center can adjust the market clearing prices and trigger the adjustment of the lower-level strategies again. This process is iterated until the strategies of each entity no longer change to achieve market equilibrium and obtain the optimal trading decisions of each entity.
[0012] Based on the optimal trading decision, the centralized clearing of electricity, carbon credits and green certificates is carried out to generate the final electricity-carbon-green certificate market clearing price and trading results.
[0013] Furthermore, in the energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits, both green certificates and carbon credits are calculated using energy as the unit. For every unit of green electricity generated by a renewable energy power generator, one unit of green certificate is generated, and the corresponding number of sellable green certificates satisfies the following:
[0014] ;
[0015] ;
[0016] In the formula, and These represent the number of green certificates available for sale by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for new energy power generators. and For photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively, in the [number]th [year]... The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index;
[0017] Traditional power generators purchase green certificates to meet quota requirements or offset carbon emissions, and the corresponding amount of green certificates purchased meets the following criteria:
[0018] ;
[0019] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for traditional power generators. The amount of green certificates purchased by traditional power generation companies;
[0020] After traditional power generators offset part of their carbon emissions through green certificates, the additional number of carbon credits they need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0021] ;
[0022] In the formula, This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The electricity volume corresponding to the free carbon allowances of traditional power generators;
[0023] The number of green certificates that electricity users need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0024] ;
[0025] In the formula, The number of green certificates to purchase for electricity users. For electricity users, the first day Total electricity load during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement factor for electricity users.
[0026] Furthermore, in the Stackelberg game, the trading center publishes the initial clearing price with the goal of maximizing social welfare, which is the sum of the benefits of electricity purchase by power users, the benefits of traditional power generators, and the benefits of new energy power generators.
[0027] In the Nash game, traditional power generators optimize their power generation output and carbon credit and green certificate purchases with the goal of minimizing costs, while electricity users optimize their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase strategies with the goal of minimizing costs.
[0028] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the benefits of traditional power generation companies is as follows:
[0029] ;
[0030] In the formula, For the benefit of traditional power generation companies, The total revenue of traditional power generators participating in the electricity market. This represents the total cost for traditional power generation companies.
[0031] ;
[0032] ;
[0033] ;
[0034] ;
[0035] ;
[0036] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index. Let be the electricity price for time period t. For the power generation costs of traditional power generators, The cost for traditional power generators to participate in the carbon market, The cost for traditional power producers to participate in the green certificate market, and This represents the power generation cost coefficient for traditional power generators. This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The price of carbon credits. For the purchase volume of green certificates by traditional power generation companies. This refers to the price at which green certificates are traded.
[0037] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the benefits of new energy power generators is as follows:
[0038] ;
[0039] ;
[0040] In the formula, and The benefits for photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators are respectively. and These represent the total revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. and These represent the electricity sales revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators in the electricity market, respectively. and These represent the revenue from the sale of green certificates by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively;
[0041] ;
[0042] ;
[0043] ;
[0044] ;
[0045] In the formula, For photovoltaic power generators in Actual power generation during the period The electricity market clearing price for time period t. This refers to the number of green certificates that photovoltaic power generators can sell. The price of green certificates. For wind power generators in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the number of green certificates available for sale by wind power generators.
[0046] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the electricity purchase benefits for electricity users is as follows:
[0047] ;
[0048] In the formula, For the benefit of electricity users purchasing electricity, As a comprehensive technical level constant, For electricity users in the first Total electricity load during the period The number of green certificates purchased by electricity users during the trading period. and Both are the output elasticity coefficients of labor. This is random interference;
[0049] ;
[0050] ;
[0051] In the formula, For electricity users in the first Rigid electrical loads during a given time period For electricity users in the first Flexible electrical loads during the time period This refers to the renewable energy quota coefficient for electricity users.
[0052] Furthermore, the electricity-carbon-green certificate market operates on a 24-hour trading cycle, with centralized clearing of carbon rights and green certificates during the 24th session. The trading center implements unified price clearing for carbon rights and green certificates, forming carbon price and green certificate price signals. Moreover, the clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon rights market, and green certificate market each meet their respective upper and lower limit constraints.
[0053] Secondly, the present invention provides a device for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and for coordinating user-side flexibility resources, comprising:
[0054] The data acquisition module is used to acquire basic operational data from traditional power generators, new energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market.
[0055] The Green Certificate Carbon Credit Energy Mutual Recognition Calculation Module is used to perform energy mutual recognition calculation of green certificates and carbon credits based on basic operational data, and obtain the calculation results of green certificates and carbon credits;
[0056] The two-level game-theoretic multi-entity trading decision module is used to make trading decisions based on the calculation results of green certificates and carbon credits, utilizing a pre-built multi-entity joint market trading decision model. The multi-entity joint market trading decision model adopts a two-level game-theoretic framework of Stackelberg and Nash games. The multiple entities include the trading center, traditional power generators, and electricity users. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, publishes the initial clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon credit market, and green certificate market. The clearing price for the electricity market is the time-of-use price, the clearing price for the carbon credit market is the unit price for carbon emission rights, and the clearing price for the green certificate market is the unit price for renewable energy green electricity certificates. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their strategies according to the initial clearing prices of the three markets: traditional power generators optimize their power generation strategy, and electricity users optimize their electricity purchase strategy. Furthermore, a Nash game is played between traditional power generators and electricity users to reach a Nash equilibrium.
[0057] The decision feedback iterative equilibrium optimization module is used to feed back the trading decision results after the traditional power generators and power users have formed a Nash equilibrium to the trading center, so that the trading center can correct the market clearing prices and trigger the adjustment of the lower-level strategies again. The process iterates until the strategies of each subject no longer change to achieve market equilibrium and obtain the optimal trading decision of each subject.
[0058] The centralized clearing and result generation module for electricity, carbon rights, and green certificates is used to execute centralized clearing of electricity, carbon rights, and green certificates based on optimal trading decisions, and to generate the final market clearing price and trading results for electricity-carbon-green certificates.
[0059] Furthermore, in the energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits, both green certificates and carbon credits are calculated using energy as the unit. For every unit of green electricity generated by a renewable energy power generator, one unit of green certificate is generated, and the corresponding number of sellable green certificates satisfies the following:
[0060] ;
[0061] ;
[0062] In the formula, and These represent the number of green certificates available for sale by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for new energy power generators. and For photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively, in the [number]th [year]... The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index;
[0063] Traditional power generators purchase green certificates to meet quota requirements or offset carbon emissions, and the corresponding amount of green certificates purchased meets the following criteria:
[0064] ;
[0065] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for traditional power generators. The amount of green certificates purchased by traditional power generation companies;
[0066] After traditional power generators offset part of their carbon emissions through green certificates, the additional number of carbon credits they need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0067] ;
[0068] In the formula, This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The electricity volume corresponding to the free carbon allowances of traditional power generators;
[0069] The number of green certificates that electricity users need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0070] ;
[0071] In the formula, The number of green certificates to purchase for electricity users. For electricity users, the first day Total electricity load during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement factor for electricity users.
[0072] Furthermore, in the Stackelberg game, the trading center publishes the initial clearing price with the goal of maximizing social welfare, which is the sum of the benefits of electricity purchase by power users, the benefits of traditional power generators, and the benefits of new energy power generators.
[0073] In the Nash game, traditional power generators optimize their power generation output and carbon credit and green certificate purchases with the goal of minimizing costs, while electricity users optimize their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase strategies with the goal of minimizing costs.
[0074] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the benefits of traditional power generation companies is as follows:
[0075] ;
[0076] In the formula, For the benefit of traditional power generation companies, The total revenue of traditional power generators participating in the electricity market. This represents the total cost for traditional power generation companies.
[0077] ;
[0078] ;
[0079] ;
[0080] ;
[0081] ;
[0082] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index. Let be the electricity price for time period t. For the power generation costs of traditional power generators, The cost for traditional power generators to participate in the carbon market, The cost for traditional power producers to participate in the green certificate market, and This represents the power generation cost coefficient for traditional power generators. This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The price of carbon credits. For the purchase volume of green certificates by traditional power generation companies. This refers to the price at which green certificates are traded.
[0083] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the benefits of new energy power generators is as follows:
[0084] ;
[0085] ;
[0086] In the formula, and The benefits for photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators are respectively. and These represent the total revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. and These represent the electricity sales revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators in the electricity market, respectively. and These represent the revenue from the sale of green certificates by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively;
[0087] ;
[0088] ;
[0089] ;
[0090] ;
[0091] In the formula, For photovoltaic power generators in Actual power generation during the period The electricity market clearing price for time period t. This refers to the number of green certificates that photovoltaic power generators can sell. The price of green certificates. For wind power generators in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the number of green certificates available for sale by wind power generators.
[0092] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the electricity purchase benefits for electricity users is as follows:
[0093] ;
[0094] In the formula, For the benefit of electricity users purchasing electricity, As a comprehensive technical level constant, For electricity users in the first Total electricity load during the period The number of green certificates purchased by electricity users during the trading period. and Both are the output elasticity coefficients of labor. This is random interference;
[0095] ;
[0096] ;
[0097] In the formula, For electricity users in the first Rigid electrical loads during a given time period For electricity users in the first Flexible electrical loads during the time period This refers to the renewable energy quota coefficient for electricity users.
[0098] Furthermore, the electricity-carbon-green certificate market operates on a 24-hour trading cycle, with centralized clearing of carbon rights and green certificates during the 24th session. The trading center implements unified price clearing for carbon rights and green certificates, forming carbon price and green certificate price signals. Moreover, the clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon rights market, and green certificate market each meet their respective upper and lower limit constraints.
[0099] Thirdly, the present invention provides a computer device, the device including a processor and a memory:
[0100] The memory is used to store computer programs and send the instructions of the computer programs to the processor;
[0101] The processor executes instructions from the computer program, such as the first aspect, a method for coordinating mutual recognition of electricity, carbon, and green certificates in the market and for user-side flexibility resources.
[0102] Fourthly, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, which, when executed by a processor, implements a method for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in the first aspect.
[0103] In summary, this invention provides a method and related apparatus for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources. The method includes the following steps: acquiring basic operational data from traditional power generators, renewable energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market; performing energy mutual recognition accounting for green certificates and carbon rights based on the basic operational data to obtain the green certificate and carbon rights accounting results; and making trading decisions based on the green certificate and carbon rights accounting results using a pre-constructed multi-entity joint market trading decision model. The multi-entity joint market trading decision model adopts a two-layer game decision framework combining Stackelberg and Nash games. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center acts as... The upper-level leaders publish the initial clearing prices for each market. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their power output or purchase strategies based on the initial clearing prices. Traditional power generators and electricity users engage in Nash game to reach a Nash equilibrium. The trading decisions made by traditional power generators and electricity users after reaching the Nash equilibrium are fed back to the trading center, which then adjusts the clearing prices of each market and triggers further adjustments to the lower-level strategies. This process iterates until the strategies of each entity no longer change, achieving market equilibrium and obtaining the optimal trading decisions for each entity. Based on the optimal trading decisions, centralized clearing of electricity, carbon credits, and green certificates is executed, generating the final electricity-carbon-green certificate market clearing price and trading results. This invention establishes an energy mutual recognition accounting system for green certificates and carbon credits, and a multi-entity joint market transaction decision-making model based on a Stackelberg-Nash two-layer game. This effectively establishes the proactive decision-making position of user-side flexible resources, matches multi-scenario adjustment needs with resource supply capacity, and achieves fairness in cost sharing and revenue redistribution. In turn, it achieves efficient coordination, scientific planning, and fair sharing of user-side flexible resources under multi-scenario adjustment needs, promotes the integration of electricity-carbon-green certificate market value, and enhances the level of regional power autonomy and stimulates the enthusiasm of flexible resources to participate in the market. Attached Figure Description
[0104] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.
[0105] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the electricity-carbon-green certificate coupled market trading framework provided in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0106] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a two-layer game framework for a joint market provided in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0107] Figure 3 A block diagram illustrating the composition of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market mutual recognition coupling and user-side flexibility resource coordination device provided in this embodiment of the invention;
[0108] Figure 4 This is a block diagram of a computer device provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0109] To make the objectives, features, and advantages of this invention more apparent and understandable, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the embodiments described below are only some embodiments of this invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this invention.
[0110] It should be noted that the user information (including but not limited to user images, user portrait information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved in this application are all information and data authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties, and the collection, use and processing of related data must comply with relevant regulations.
[0111] This invention provides a method for coordinating market mutual recognition of electricity, carbon, and green certificates with user-side flexibility resources, comprising the following steps:
[0112] S1: Obtain basic operational data from traditional power generators, new energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market.
[0113] It should be noted that the electricity-carbon-green certificate market is an integrated market combining the electricity market, carbon trading market, and green certificate trading market, covering three types of trading instruments: electricity, carbon emission rights (CEA), and renewable energy green certificates (REC). Traditional power generators are market entities that use fossil fuels such as thermal power as fuel for power generation and are required to bear carbon emission responsibilities and renewable energy quota obligations. New energy power generators are market entities that use renewable energy sources such as photovoltaic and wind power as fuel for power generation, with almost no carbon emissions during the power generation process, and can generate green certificates. Electricity users are electricity consumers that include both rigid and flexible loads, and are required to meet renewable energy quota obligations and can adjust their electricity consumption strategies through demand response. Basic operational data refers to data such as the historical / real-time power generation capacity, electricity load, quota requirements, and price expectations of each entity.
[0114] S2: Based on basic operational data, perform energy mutual recognition accounting for green certificates and carbon credits to obtain the accounting results for green certificates and carbon credits.
[0115] It should be noted that a Renewable Energy Certificate (REC) is a certificate generated for every 1 MWh of green electricity generated by a renewable energy power generator. It serves as proof of the environmental value of renewable energy electricity and can fulfill the generator's renewable energy quota obligations. Carbon Emission Allowance (CEA) is a carbon emission allowance allocated to traditional power generators. Generators exceeding emission limits must purchase additional carbon allowances to offset their shortfall, while low-carbon generators can sell surplus carbon allowances for profit. Energy mutual recognition accounting refers to unifying the calculation unit for both green certificates and carbon allowances using electrical energy (MWh) as the accounting unit, clarifying the carbon offset value of green certificates (1 unit of green certificate is equivalent to the carbon emissions of 1 unit of thermal power), and achieving value interoperability between the two types of environmental rights.
[0116] In this step, through the energy mutual recognition and accounting of green certificates and carbon credits, the green certificates of renewable energy generators can be directly offset against the carbon emissions of traditional generators without having to be traded repeatedly in multiple markets; the renewable energy quota obligations of traditional generators and electricity users can be fulfilled directly through green certificate trading, while the carbon offset value of green certificates further reduces the carbon costs of traditional generators.
[0117] S3: Based on the calculation results of green certificates and carbon credits, a pre-constructed multi-entity joint market trading decision-making model is used for trading decisions. The multi-entity joint market trading decision-making model adopts a two-level game decision-making framework of Stackelberg game and Nash game. Among them, the multiple entities include the trading center, traditional power generators, and electricity users. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, publishes the initial clearing prices of the electricity market, carbon credit market, and green certificate market. The clearing price of the electricity market is the time-of-use electricity price, the clearing price of the carbon credit market is the unit carbon emission right trading price, and the clearing price of the green certificate market is the unit renewable energy green electricity certificate trading price. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their own strategies according to the initial clearing prices of the three types of markets: traditional power generators optimize their own power generation output strategy, and electricity users optimize their own electricity purchase strategy. Furthermore, traditional power generators and electricity users engage in Nash game to form a Nash equilibrium.
[0118] It should be noted that the multi-stakeholder joint market trading decision-making model is a multi-asset trading decision-making model that integrates the electricity market, carbon trading market, and green certificate trading market. It is used to balance the overall social welfare and individual interests of each stakeholder under multi-market coupling, achieving collaborative decision-making among multiple stakeholders. The Stackelberg game (leader-follower game) is a hierarchical game model characterized by upper-level stakeholders issuing decision instructions first, and lower-level stakeholders optimizing their own decisions based on these instructions, reflecting a "guide-response" decision-making logic. The Nash game (Nash equilibrium) is the stable state of the game among lower-level stakeholders; when any stakeholder unilaterally changes its strategy, it cannot improve its own efficiency or reduce its own costs, at which point the game reaches stability. Multiple stakeholders refer to the market participants involved in trading decisions, including the trading center responsible for coordinating the market and issuing prices, traditional power generators bearing carbon emission responsibilities, and electricity users required to fulfill quota obligations. The initial clearing price is a supply and demand reference price determined by the trading center based on a specific objective (such as maximizing social welfare) in the initial stage of the market. Time-of-use pricing is the price of electricity traded according to different time periods; the unit carbon emission right trading price is the trading price per unit of carbon credit (CEA); and the unit green certificate trading price is the trading price per unit of green certificate (REC). Generation output strategy refers to the adjustment and planning of traditional power generators' own power generation or output capacity, while power purchase strategy refers to the optimization planning of electricity users' own electricity purchase volume and purchase time.
[0119] In this step, the multi-stakeholder joint market transaction decision-making model implements transaction decisions through a two-layer game framework: In the upper-layer Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the leader, releases the initial clearing prices for the three types of markets with the goal of maximizing social welfare, providing a basis for decision-making for the lower-layer stakeholders; in the lower-layer game, traditional power generators and electricity users, as followers, optimize their strategies based on their own interests, taking into account the three types of initial clearing prices. Traditional power generators focus on minimizing their own costs, optimizing power generation output and related carbon credit and green certificate purchase plans, while electricity users focus on minimizing their own costs, optimizing their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase plans. Simultaneously, a Nash game is formed between traditional power generators and electricity users, with mutual influence and constraints. When both sides' strategies reach a stable state where "unilateral adjustment yields no benefit," a Nash equilibrium is formed. At this point, the decisions of the lower-layer stakeholders tend to stabilize, achieving an initial balance between overall market guidance and individual interest optimization.
[0120] S4: Feed the trading decisions of traditional power generators and electricity users after reaching Nash equilibrium back to the trading center, so that the trading center can adjust the market clearing prices and trigger the adjustment of the lower-level strategies again. Iterate until the strategies of each subject no longer change to achieve market equilibrium and obtain the optimal trading decisions of each subject.
[0121] It should be noted that market equilibrium refers to the stable state of the market when all players' strategies no longer change and it is impossible to improve efficiency or reduce costs through unilateral adjustments. Iterative optimization refers to continuously adjusting the clearing price and player strategies through a cycle of "decision-feedback-correction" until market equilibrium is reached.
[0122] In this step, the Nash equilibrium result of the lower-level entities is fed back to the trading center, which then adjusts the clearing prices of each market based on this result. The new price triggers the strategy adjustment of the lower-level entities again, and the process is repeated iteratively until the strategies of all entities are stable, ultimately obtaining the optimal trading decision for each entity, thus avoiding the lag and inefficiency of static decision-making.
[0123] S5: Based on the optimal trading decision, execute centralized clearing of electricity, carbon credits and green certificates, and generate the final electricity-carbon-green certificate market clearing price and trading results.
[0124] It should be noted that centralized clearing refers to the unified settlement of trading assets and funds for electricity, carbon rights, and green certificates at the end of the trading cycle, generating the final trading results and clearing price. The clearing price refers to the final trading price at which supply and demand in each market are balanced after iterative optimization, and serves as a price signal for subsequent market operations.
[0125] In this step, unified settlement across multiple markets is achieved through centralized clearing, and the resulting final clearing price provides a price reference for decision-making in the next trading cycle, forming a closed-loop market operation mechanism.
[0126] The method provided in this embodiment effectively establishes the proactive decision-making status of user-side flexible resources by establishing an energy mutual recognition accounting system for green certificates and carbon rights and a multi-entity joint market transaction decision-making model based on a Stackelberg-Nash two-layer game. It matches the adjustment needs and resource supply capabilities of multiple scenarios, achieves fairness in cost sharing and revenue redistribution, and thus achieves efficient coordination, scientific planning and fair sharing of user-side flexible resources under the adjustment needs of multiple scenarios. This promotes the integration of market value of electricity, carbon and green certificates, while improving the level of regional power autonomy and stimulating the enthusiasm of flexible resources to participate in the market.
[0127] Please see Figure 1 , Figure 1 A market trading framework for electricity-carbon-green certificates is presented: it includes an electricity market layer, a multi-entity trading execution layer, and a carbon-green certificate equity trading layer, and achieves cross-market linkage through the flow of three types of underlying assets: energy flow, green certificate flow, and carbon rights flow. In the electricity market layer, the trading center, as the core dispatch and price clearing node, is responsible for publishing electricity market clearing prices, driving the power generation plans of traditional power generators and renewable energy power generators, as well as the electricity purchasing behavior of power users. The flow of electricity is completed across entities at this layer. The multi-entity trading execution layer includes three types of entities: power users, traditional power generators, and renewable energy power generators. The total electricity load of power users must meet the renewable energy quota constraints, and they fulfill their obligations by purchasing green certificates through the green certificate market. The thermal power generation process of traditional power generators generates carbon emissions corresponding to the amount of electricity generated, and they need to purchase carbon rights through the carbon market to offset excess emissions. At the same time, they can purchase green certificates through the green certificate market to meet renewable energy quotas and offset some carbon emissions. The zero-carbon power generation process of renewable energy power generators (photovoltaic and wind power) generates green certificates corresponding to the amount of electricity generated. After deducting their own quotas, they sell the surplus green certificates in the green certificate market. In the carbon-green certificate equity trading layer, the carbon market carries the carbon rights trading of traditional power generators, and the green certificate market carries the buying and selling of green certificates. Both types of equity targets are calculated in electricity (MWh), realizing the mutual recognition of the value of green certificates and carbon rights.
[0128] In one embodiment of the present invention, the electricity-carbon-green certificate market operates on a 24-hour trading cycle, with centralized clearing of carbon rights and green certificates during the 24th time period; the trading center implements unified price clearing for carbon rights and green certificates, forming carbon price and green certificate price signals, and the clearing prices of the electricity market, carbon rights market, and green certificate market respectively meet their respective upper and lower limit constraints.
[0129] Specifically, the trading framework operates on a 24-hour cycle, divided into continuous time periods by hour. At the beginning of each time period, the trading center releases the cleared electricity trading price, driving thermal power units and renewable energy units to optimize their power generation strategies, and power users to adjust their electricity demand. Renewable energy units generate green certificates simultaneously during power generation, while thermal power units bear the burden of accumulated carbon emissions for the time period. Their carbon footprint and quota responsibilities are continuously and dynamically calculated, laying the foundation for the settlement of green certificate / carbon emission environmental rights products at the end of the cycle.
[0130] At the end of the cycle, in the 24th session, the carbon emission rights and green certificate markets open simultaneously and are centrally cleared. Conventional generating units participate in CEA trading based on the difference between their cumulative carbon emissions and free allowances during the cycle: entities with excessive emissions must purchase CEA to offset their shortfall to fulfill their carbon obligations, while low-carbon entities sell surplus CEA to generate revenue. Conventional generating units and electricity users, bound by the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), purchase sufficient REC to fulfill their obligations. The trading center implements a unified price clearing for CEA and REC, forming carbon price and green certificate price signals.
[0131] In one embodiment of the present invention, in the energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits, both green certificates and carbon credits are calculated using energy as the unit of measurement. Specifically, the unit of a green certificate is its corresponding electrical energy unit (MWh), and the same applies to carbon credits. A baseline value for carbon dioxide emissions per unit of output is set for various types of generating units, and the total amount of free allowances to be obtained is calculated based on their actual power generation. Since renewable energy generators generate almost no carbon emissions during their power generation process, the carbon credit amount for the number of green certificates generated per unit of electricity can be set to be equivalent to the carbon emissions per unit of electricity generated by thermal power plants. For every unit of green electricity generated, a renewable energy generator will generate one unit of green certificate, and it can sell any excess green certificates it holds after deducting its own renewable energy allowances on the market.
[0132] Furthermore, the number of green certificates available for sale by new energy power generators meets the following requirements:
[0133] (1)
[0134] (2)
[0135] In the formula, and These represent the number of green certificates available for sale by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for new energy power generators. and For photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively, in the [number]th [year]... The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index;
[0136] For traditional power generators, they offset carbon emissions by purchasing carbon credits and meet renewable energy quotas by purchasing green certificates, which can also offset a portion of carbon emissions.
[0137] Traditional power generators purchase green certificates to meet quota requirements or offset carbon emissions, and the corresponding amount of green certificates purchased meets the following criteria:
[0138] (3)
[0139] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for traditional power generators. The amount of green certificates purchased by traditional power generators (calculated in units of energy).
[0140] After traditional power generators offset part of their carbon emissions through green certificates, the additional number of carbon credits they need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0141] (4)
[0142] In the formula, This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. This refers to the electricity volume corresponding to the free carbon allowances provided by traditional power generators. The total electricity generated (sold) within a trading cycle is represented by the carbon emissions, which are also the corresponding amount of electricity generated. ;
[0143] A certain amount of renewable energy quotas are set for electricity users, therefore they need to purchase a certain number of green certificates to meet this quota. The number of green certificates they need to purchase is as follows:
[0144] (5)
[0145] In the formula, The number of green certificates to purchase for electricity users. For electricity users, the first day Total electricity load during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement factor for electricity users.
[0146] In one embodiment of the present invention, in the Stackelberg game, the trading center publishes the initial clearing price with the goal of maximizing social welfare, where social welfare is the sum of the benefits of electricity purchase by power users, the benefits of traditional power generators, and the benefits of new energy power generators;
[0147] In the Nash game, traditional power generators optimize their power generation output and carbon credit and green certificate purchases with the goal of minimizing costs, while electricity users optimize their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase strategies with the goal of minimizing costs.
[0148] Specifically, in the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, releases the initial clearing price of each market in the early stages of iteration based on expectations of generator and user behavior and historical data, with the goal of maximizing social welfare. Traditional generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, make decisions based on the initial price released by the trading center. Traditional generators optimize power generation output with the goal of minimizing costs and balance the purchase of carbon credits and green certificates. Electricity users optimize their electricity purchase strategy with the goal of minimizing costs. A Nash equilibrium is formed between the two.
[0149] In the Nash game, traditional power generators participate in the electricity market, carbon market, and green certificate market. They need to balance the supply and demand of electricity, and comprehensively consider the cost of power generation, the cost of purchasing green certificates, and the cost of carbon. They meet the renewable energy quota requirements and offset some carbon emissions by purchasing green certificates, and offset some carbon emissions by purchasing carbon credits. Their power generation decisions are affected by both demand and price.
[0150] In a further embodiment of the present invention, the calculation expression for the benefits of traditional generators is as follows:
[0151] (6)
[0152] In the formula, For the benefit of traditional power generation companies, The total revenue of traditional power generators participating in the electricity market. This represents the total cost for traditional power generation companies.
[0153] (7)
[0154] (8)
[0155] (9)
[0156] (10)
[0157] (11)
[0158] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index. Let be the electricity price for time period t. For the power generation costs of traditional power generators, The cost for traditional power generators to participate in the carbon market, The cost for traditional power producers to participate in the green certificate market, and The power generation cost coefficients for traditional power generators are all greater than zero. This refers to the amount of carbon credits (calculated in units of energy) that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The price of carbon credits (calculated in units of energy). For the purchase volume of green certificates by traditional power generation companies. This refers to the price at which green certificates are traded.
[0159] In addition, traditional power generators face the following operational and quota constraints:
[0160] a. Green certificate trading constraints: Since traditional power generators can use green certificates to meet quota requirements or offset carbon emissions, their green certificate purchases should be at least greater than the quota requirements, as shown in equation (3).
[0161] b. Carbon trading constraints: The total amount of electricity generated by a traditional power generator is the sum of the electricity corresponding to the additional carbon rights purchased, the electricity deducted by green certificates, and the free carbon rights, as shown in formula (4).
[0162] c. Power generation restrictions:
[0163] (12)
[0164] In the formula, , For thermal power units The maximum and minimum power generation limits for each time period, the aforementioned power generation strategy refers to optimizing the power generation for each time period, and the power generation limits constrain the power generation output of the unit in each time period.
[0165] d. Climbing constraint:
[0166] (13)
[0167] (14)
[0168] In the formula, , These refer to the upward and downward ramp rates of the thermal power unit, respectively.
[0169] In a further embodiment of the present invention, the benefits of photovoltaic power generators participating in the market... For its revenue from selling electricity in the electricity market Rather than the profits from selling green certificates in the green certificate market The sum of the benefits of wind power generators participating in the market For its revenue from selling electricity in the electricity market Rather than the profits from selling green certificates in the green certificate market The sum of these costs. Since almost no costs are incurred during the power generation process, they are negligible. The formula for calculating the benefits of renewable energy power generators is:
[0170] (15)
[0171] (16)
[0172] In the formula, and The benefits for photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators are respectively. and These represent the total revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. and These represent the electricity sales revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators in the electricity market, respectively. and These represent the revenue from the sale of green certificates by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively;
[0173] (17)
[0174] (18)
[0175] (19)
[0176] (20)
[0177] In the formula, For photovoltaic power generators in The actual amount of electricity generated (sold) during the period. The electricity market clearing price for time period t. This refers to the number of green certificates that photovoltaic power generators can sell. The price of green certificates. For wind power generators in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the number of green certificates available for sale by wind power generators.
[0178] In addition, renewable energy power generators face the following operational constraints:
[0179] a. Constraints on green certificate trading: Since renewable energy generators have renewable energy quotas, the number of green certificates they can sell is affected by the quota ratio. Therefore, the constraints on the sale of green certificates by renewable energy generators are as shown in equations (1) and (2).
[0180] b. Output restrictions for renewable energy generators:
[0181] (twenty one)
[0182] (twenty two)
[0183] In the formula, , Solar and wind power respectively The lower limit of actual output during a given time period; , In order to be in The actual upper limit of output during a given period is considered the maximum predicted power.
[0184] In the scenario of electricity users purchasing electricity, the utility they gain from buying electricity and green certificates perfectly matches the characteristics of the Cobb-Douglas function, which describes multiple input factors, a fixed share of expenditure, and diminishing marginal returns. Therefore, the utility of electricity users can be represented using the Cobb-Douglas utility function, whose mathematical form is:
[0185] (twenty three)
[0186] In the formula, For the benefit of electricity users purchasing electricity, As a comprehensive technical level constant, For electricity users in the first Total electricity load during the time period The number of green certificates purchased by electricity users during the trading period. and Both are output elasticity coefficients of labor, reflecting the utility elasticity of actual electricity consumption and green certificate consumption, and their contribution to utility. This is random interference.
[0187] Electricity users can adjust their electricity load through demand response. The electricity load in the t-th time period of a day can be expressed as:
[0188] (twenty four)
[0189] In the formula, For electricity users in the first Rigid electrical loads during a given time period For electricity users in the first Flexible electrical loads during the specified time period.
[0190] Electricity users participate in the electricity market and the green certificate market. In the lower-level game, they optimize the cost of purchasing electricity and green certificates with the goal of minimizing the cost. The mathematical form of their cost is as follows:
[0191] (25)
[0192] (26)
[0193] In the formula, For electricity users' costs, For electricity users, the renewable energy quota factor To reduce the cost of flexible load adjustment, This represents the corresponding cost coefficient.
[0194] The following operational and quota constraints apply to load adjustments by electricity users:
[0195] a. Adjustable proportional constraint for flexible electrical load per time period:
[0196] (27)
[0197] in, For electricity users in the first Adjusted load over a period of time; The adjustable proportion of flexible electrical load for each time period.
[0198] b. Green certificate purchase constraints: see equation (5).
[0199] Based on the design of the above embodiments, it can be seen that the trading center aims to maximize social welfare f. To improve the benefits of electricity purchases for power users, This indicates the benefits of traditional power producers participating in the market; using This indicates the benefits of photovoltaic power generators participating in the market; using This represents the benefits of wind power generators participating in the market. Social welfare is a component of the objective function. The sum of benefits for electricity users and power generators is expressed mathematically as follows:
[0200] (28)
[0201] The trading center's decision-making process also faces the following supply and demand constraints for energy / equity products:
[0202] a. Electricity market equilibrium constraints:
[0203] (29)
[0204] in, For electricity users Electricity demand during different time periods.
[0205] b. Supply and demand constraints in the green certificate market:
[0206] (30)
[0207] c. Upper and lower limits of clearing prices for each energy / equity product:
[0208] (31)
[0209] (32)
[0210] (33)
[0211] in, , For electricity prices Upper and lower limits of the time period; , These represent the upper and lower limits of the price of green certificates; , These represent the upper and lower limits of carbon credit prices.
[0212] Please see Figure 2 , Figure 2 The framework illustrates a two-layer game theory model for a joint market: This model employs a two-layer decision-making architecture combining Stackelberg and Nash games. The upper layer is the trading center decision-making layer, with the optimization objective of maximizing social welfare. The constraint is the supply and demand balance of each energy and equity market, and it is responsible for publishing the initial clearing prices of each market. The lower layer is the Nash game layer between traditional power generators and electricity users. Traditional power generators optimize their output and carbon credit / green certificate purchase strategies with the objective of minimizing their own costs, while electricity users optimize their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase strategies with the objective of minimizing their own costs. The constraints include output constraints for each power generator and quota constraints for each entity. When the strategies of both parties reach Nash equilibrium, the decision results are fed back to the upper-layer trading center. The trading center adjusts the clearing prices of each market based on the feedback and triggers the lower-layer strategy adjustment again. Through iteration until market equilibrium is reached, the clearing prices of each energy / equity product, as well as the output plans of traditional power generators and the electricity purchase plans of electricity users are finally output.
[0213] As can be seen from the above embodiments, the Nash-Stackelberg game-based market mechanism for mutual recognition and coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates, along with the collaborative market mechanism for user-side flexible resources, proposed in this invention can solve the problem of market fragmentation between electricity, carbon, and green certificates. By establishing a green certificate-carbon rights mutual recognition mechanism, it opens up the channel for transmitting environmental value, fully reflecting the environmental benefits of user-side flexible resources and incentivizing the low-carbon transformation of resources. It also establishes a fair and reasonable cost-sharing and benefit-distribution mechanism, taking into account the interests of all participating entities, enhancing the enthusiasm of user-side flexible resources and load aggregators to participate in the market, and ensuring the sustainable operation of the mechanism. Furthermore, it achieves efficient collaboration among multiple types of user-side flexible resources, fully exploring the potential for resource complementarity through an energy conversion collaboration model and integrated planning methods, thereby improving the level of regional power autonomy and power supply reliability.
[0214] Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides an apparatus for implementing the above-mentioned method of mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources. The solution provided by this apparatus is similar to the solution described in the above method. Therefore, the specific limitations in the embodiments of the apparatus provided below can be found in the limitations of the method of mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources described above, and will not be repeated here.
[0215] Please see Figure 3 This invention also provides a device for coordinating market mutual recognition of electricity, carbon, and green certificates with user-side flexibility resources, comprising:
[0216] The data acquisition module is used to acquire basic operational data from traditional power generators, new energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market.
[0217] The Green Certificate Carbon Credit Energy Mutual Recognition Calculation Module is used to perform energy mutual recognition calculation of green certificates and carbon credits based on basic operational data, and obtain the calculation results of green certificates and carbon credits;
[0218] The two-level game-theoretic multi-entity trading decision module is used to make trading decisions based on the calculation results of green certificates and carbon credits, utilizing a pre-built multi-entity joint market trading decision model. The multi-entity joint market trading decision model adopts a two-level game-theoretic framework of Stackelberg and Nash games. The multiple entities include the trading center, traditional power generators, and electricity users. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, publishes the initial clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon credit market, and green certificate market. The clearing price for the electricity market is the time-of-use price, the clearing price for the carbon credit market is the unit price for carbon emission rights, and the clearing price for the green certificate market is the unit price for renewable energy green electricity certificates. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their strategies according to the initial clearing prices of the three markets: traditional power generators optimize their power generation strategy, and electricity users optimize their electricity purchase strategy. Furthermore, a Nash game is played between traditional power generators and electricity users to reach a Nash equilibrium.
[0219] The decision feedback iterative equilibrium optimization module is used to feed back the trading decision results after the traditional power generators and power users have formed a Nash equilibrium to the trading center, so that the trading center can correct the market clearing prices and trigger the adjustment of the lower-level strategies again. The process iterates until the strategies of each subject no longer change to achieve market equilibrium and obtain the optimal trading decision of each subject.
[0220] The centralized clearing and result generation module for electricity, carbon rights, and green certificates is used to execute centralized clearing of electricity, carbon rights, and green certificates based on optimal trading decisions, and to generate the final market clearing price and trading results for electricity-carbon-green certificates.
[0221] Furthermore, in the energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits, both green certificates and carbon credits are calculated using energy as the unit. For every unit of green electricity generated by a renewable energy power generator, one unit of green certificate is generated, and the corresponding number of sellable green certificates satisfies the following:
[0222] ;
[0223] ;
[0224] In the formula, and These represent the number of green certificates available for sale by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for new energy power generators. and For photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively, in the [number]th [year] The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index;
[0225] Traditional power generators purchase green certificates to meet quota requirements or offset carbon emissions, and the corresponding amount of green certificates purchased meets the following criteria:
[0226] ;
[0227] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for traditional power generators. The amount of green certificates purchased by traditional power generation companies;
[0228] After traditional power generators offset part of their carbon emissions through green certificates, the additional number of carbon credits they need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0229] ;
[0230] In the formula, This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The electricity volume corresponding to the free carbon allowances of traditional power generators;
[0231] The number of green certificates that electricity users need to purchase must meet the following requirements:
[0232] ;
[0233] In the formula, The number of green certificates purchased for electricity users. For electricity users, the first day Total electricity load during the time period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement factor for electricity users.
[0234] Furthermore, in the Stackelberg game, the trading center publishes the initial clearing price with the goal of maximizing social welfare, which is the sum of the benefits of electricity purchase by power users, the benefits of traditional power generators, and the benefits of new energy power generators.
[0235] In the Nash game, traditional power generators optimize their power generation output and carbon credit and green certificate purchases with the goal of minimizing costs, while electricity users optimize their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase strategies with the goal of minimizing costs.
[0236] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the benefits of traditional power generation companies is as follows:
[0237] ;
[0238] In the formula, For the benefit of traditional power generation companies, The total revenue of traditional power generators participating in the electricity market. This represents the total cost for traditional power generation companies.
[0239] ;
[0240] ;
[0241] ;
[0242] ;
[0243] ;
[0244] In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index. Let be the electricity price for time period t. For the power generation costs of traditional power generators, The cost for traditional power generators to participate in the carbon market, The cost for traditional power producers to participate in the green certificate market, and This represents the power generation cost coefficient for traditional power generators. This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The price of carbon credits. For the purchase volume of green certificates by traditional power generation companies. This refers to the price at which green certificates are traded.
[0245] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the benefits of new energy power generators is as follows:
[0246] ;
[0247] ;
[0248] In the formula, and The benefits for photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators are respectively. and These represent the total revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. and These represent the electricity sales revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators in the electricity market, respectively. and These represent the revenue from the sale of green certificates by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively;
[0249] ;
[0250] ;
[0251] ;
[0252] ;
[0253] In the formula, For photovoltaic power generators in Actual power generation during the period The electricity market clearing price for time period t. This refers to the number of green certificates that photovoltaic power generators can sell. The price of green certificates. For wind power generators in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the number of green certificates available for sale by wind power generators.
[0254] Furthermore, the formula for calculating the electricity purchase benefits for electricity users is as follows:
[0255] ;
[0256] In the formula, For the benefit of electricity users purchasing electricity, As a comprehensive technical level constant, For electricity users in the first Total electricity load during the time period The number of green certificates purchased by electricity users during the trading period. and Both are the output elasticity coefficients of labor. This is random interference;
[0257] ;
[0258] ;
[0259] In the formula, For electricity users in the first Rigid electrical loads during a given time period For electricity users in the first Flexible electrical loads during the time period This refers to the renewable energy quota coefficient for electricity users.
[0260] Furthermore, the electricity-carbon-green certificate market operates on a 24-hour trading cycle, with centralized clearing of carbon rights and green certificates during the 24th session. The trading center implements unified price clearing for carbon rights and green certificates, forming carbon price and green certificate price signals. Moreover, the clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon rights market, and green certificate market each meet their respective upper and lower limit constraints.
[0261] Those skilled in the art will clearly understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the above-described division of functional units and modules is merely an example. In practical applications, the above functions can be assigned to different functional units and modules as needed, that is, the internal structure of the system can be divided into different functional units or modules to complete all or part of the functions described above. The functional units and modules in the embodiments can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit. Furthermore, the specific names of the functional units and modules are only for easy differentiation and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. The specific working process of the units and modules in the above system can be referred to the corresponding process in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.
[0262] Reference Figure 4 The present invention also provides a computer device, including: a memory and a processor, and a computer program stored in the memory. When the computer program is executed on the processor, it implements the method of mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in any of the above methods.
[0263] The computer device may be a desktop computer, laptop, handheld computer, or cloud server, etc. This computer device may include, but is not limited to, a processor and memory. Those skilled in the art will understand that... Figure 4The examples of computer devices are merely examples and do not constitute a limitation on computer devices. They may include more or fewer components than shown in the illustration, or combinations of certain components, or different components. For example, they may also include input / output devices, network access devices, etc.
[0264] The processor referred to can be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), but it can also be other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. A general-purpose processor can be a microprocessor or any conventional processor.
[0265] In some embodiments, the memory may be an internal storage unit of the computer device, such as a hard drive or RAM. In other embodiments, the memory may be an external storage device of the computer device, such as a plug-in hard drive, Smart Media Card (SMC), Secure Digital (SD) card, or Flash Card. Furthermore, the memory may include both internal and external storage units of the computer device. The memory is used to store the operating system, applications, boot loader, data, and other programs, such as the program code of the computer program. The memory can also be used to temporarily store data that has been output or will be output.
[0266] This invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in any of the above methods.
[0267] In this embodiment, if the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, all or part of the processes in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a computer program instructing related hardware. The computer program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, and when executed by a processor, it can implement the steps of the various method embodiments described above. The computer program includes computer program code, which can be in the form of source code, object code, executable files, or certain intermediate forms. The computer-readable medium can include at least: any entity or device capable of carrying computer program code to a photographing device / terminal device, a recording medium, a computer memory, a read-only memory (ROM), a random access memory (RAM), an electrical carrier signal, a telecommunication signal, and a software distribution medium. Examples include USB flash drives, portable hard drives, magnetic disks, or optical disks. In some jurisdictions, according to legislation and patent practice, computer-readable media cannot be electrical carrier signals or telecommunication signals.
[0268] This invention provides a computer program product, including a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in any of the above methods.
[0269] In the above embodiments, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts that are not described in detail or recorded in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.
[0270] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.
[0271] In the embodiments disclosed in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed devices / terminal equipment and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the device / terminal equipment embodiments described above are merely illustrative. For instance, the division of modules or units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the displayed or discussed mutual coupling or direct coupling or communication connection may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between devices or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.
[0272] The above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and are not intended to limit it. Although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features. Such modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for coordinating market mutual recognition of electricity, carbon, and green certificates with user-side flexibility resources, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Acquire basic operational data from traditional power generators, renewable energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market; Based on the aforementioned basic operational data, energy mutual recognition accounting for green certificates and carbon credits is performed to obtain the green certificate and carbon credit accounting results. Based on the calculation results of the green certificates and carbon credits, a pre-constructed multi-entity joint market trading decision-making model is used for trading decisions. This model employs a two-layer game decision-making framework combining Stackelberg and Nash games. The multiple entities include a trading center, traditional power generators, and electricity users. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, publishes the initial clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon credit market, and green certificate market. The clearing price for the electricity market is the time-of-use price, the clearing price for the carbon credit market is the unit price for carbon emission rights, and the clearing price for the green certificate market is the unit price for renewable energy green electricity certificates. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their strategies according to the initial clearing prices of the three markets: traditional power generators optimize their power generation strategy, and electricity users optimize their electricity purchase strategy. Furthermore, a Nash game is played between the traditional power generators and the electricity users, forming a Nash equilibrium. The trading decisions made by the traditional power generators and electricity users after reaching Nash equilibrium are fed back to the trading center, so that the trading center can adjust the market clearing prices and trigger the adjustment of the lower-level strategies again. This process is iterated until the strategies of each entity no longer change to achieve market equilibrium and obtain the optimal trading decisions of each entity. Based on the optimal trading decision, centralized clearing of electricity, carbon credits, and green certificates is executed to generate the final electricity-carbon-green certificate market clearing price and trading results.
2. The method for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... In the energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits, both green certificates and carbon credits are calculated using energy as the unit of measurement. For every unit of green electricity generated by a new energy power generator, one unit of green certificate is generated, and the corresponding number of sellable green certificates satisfies the following conditions: ; ; In the formula, and These represent the number of green certificates available for sale by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for new energy power generators. and For photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively, in the [number]th [year]... The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index; Traditional power generators purchase green certificates to meet quota requirements or offset carbon emissions, and the corresponding amount of green certificates purchased meets the following criteria: ; In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement coefficient for traditional power generators. The amount of green certificates purchased by traditional power generation companies; After traditional power generators offset part of their carbon emissions through green certificates, the additional number of carbon credits they need to purchase must meet the following requirements: ; In the formula, This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The electricity volume corresponding to the free carbon allowances of traditional power generators; The number of green certificates that electricity users need to purchase must meet the following requirements: ; In the formula, The number of green certificates purchased for electricity users. For electricity users, the first day Total electricity load during the time period This refers to the renewable energy quota requirement factor for electricity users.
3. The method for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... In the Stackelberg game, the trading center publishes an initial clearing price with the goal of maximizing social welfare, which is the sum of the benefits of electricity purchases by power users, the benefits of traditional power generators, and the benefits of new energy power generators. In the Nash game, traditional power generators optimize their power generation output and carbon credit and green certificate purchases with the goal of minimizing costs, while electricity users optimize their electricity purchase and green certificate purchase strategies with the goal of minimizing costs.
4. The method for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in claim 3, is characterized in that... The formula for calculating the benefits of traditional power generators is as follows: ; In the formula, For the benefit of traditional power generation companies, The total revenue of traditional power generators participating in the electricity market. This represents the total cost for traditional power generation companies. ; ; ; ; ; In the formula, For traditional power producers in the first The actual power generation during the time period, where t is the time period index. Let be the electricity price for time period t. For the power generation costs of traditional power generators, The cost for traditional power generators to participate in the carbon market, The cost for traditional power producers to participate in the green certificate market, and This represents the power generation cost coefficient for traditional power generators. This refers to the amount of carbon credits that traditional power generators need to purchase additionally. The price of carbon credits. For the purchase volume of green certificates by traditional power generation companies This refers to the price at which green certificates are traded.
5. The method for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in claim 3, is characterized in that... The formula for calculating the benefits of the new energy power generator is as follows: ; ; In the formula, and The benefits for photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators are respectively. and These represent the total revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively. and These represent the electricity sales revenue of photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators in the electricity market, respectively. and These represent the revenue from the sale of green certificates by photovoltaic power generators and wind power generators, respectively; ; ; ; ; In the formula, For photovoltaic power generators in Actual power generation during the period The electricity market clearing price for time period t. This refers to the number of green certificates that photovoltaic power generators can sell. The price of green certificates. For wind power generators in the first Actual power generation during the period This refers to the number of green certificates available for sale by wind power generators.
6. The method for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in claim 3, is characterized in that... The formula for calculating the electricity purchase benefits for the electricity users is as follows: ; In the formula, For the benefit of electricity users purchasing electricity, As a comprehensive technical level constant, For electricity users in the first Total electricity load during the time period The number of green certificates purchased by electricity users during the trading period. and Both are the output elasticity coefficients of labor. This is random interference; ; ; In the formula, For electricity users in the first Rigid electrical loads during a given time period For electricity users in the first Flexible electrical loads during the time period This refers to the renewable energy quota coefficient for electricity users.
7. The method for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and the coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in claim 1, is characterized in that... The electricity-carbon-green certificate market operates on a 24-hour trading cycle, with centralized clearing of carbon rights and green certificates during the 24th period. The trading center implements unified price clearing for carbon rights and green certificates, forming carbon price and green certificate price signals. The clearing prices of the electricity market, carbon rights market, and green certificate market each meet their respective upper and lower limits.
8. A device for market mutual recognition coupling of electricity, carbon, and green certificates and for coordinating user-side flexibility resources, characterized in that, include: The data acquisition module is used to acquire basic operational data from traditional power generators, new energy power generators, and electricity users within the electricity-carbon-green certificate market. The green certificate carbon credit energy mutual recognition accounting module is used to perform energy mutual recognition accounting of green certificates and carbon credits based on the basic operation data, and obtain the green certificate and carbon credit accounting results; A two-layer game-theoretic multi-entity trading decision module is used to make trading decisions based on the calculation results of green certificates and carbon rights, using a pre-constructed multi-entity joint market trading decision model. The multi-entity joint market trading decision model adopts a two-layer game-theoretic framework of Stackelberg and Nash games. The multiple entities include a trading center, traditional power generators, and electricity users. In the Stackelberg game, the trading center, as the upper-level leader, publishes the initial clearing prices for the electricity market, carbon rights market, and green certificate market. The clearing price for the electricity market is the time-of-use electricity price, the clearing price for the carbon rights market is the unit carbon emission right trading price, and the clearing price for the green certificate market is the unit renewable energy green electricity certificate trading price. Traditional power generators and electricity users, as lower-level followers, optimize their own strategies according to the initial clearing prices of the three markets: traditional power generators optimize their power generation strategy, and electricity users optimize their electricity purchase strategy. Furthermore, a Nash game is played between the traditional power generators and the electricity users to form a Nash equilibrium. The decision feedback iterative equilibrium optimization module is used to feed back the trading decision results after the traditional power generators and power users have formed a Nash equilibrium to the trading center, so that the trading center can correct the market clearing prices and trigger the lower-level strategy adjustment again. The process iterates until the strategies of each subject no longer change to achieve market equilibrium and obtain the optimal trading decision of each subject. The centralized clearing and result generation module for electricity, carbon rights and green certificates is used to perform centralized clearing of electricity, carbon rights and green certificates based on the optimal trading decision, and generate the final electricity-carbon-green certificate market clearing price and trading results.
9. A computer device, characterized in that, The device includes a processor and a memory: The memory is used to store computer programs and send the instructions of the computer programs to the processor; The processor executes, according to the instructions of the computer program, a method for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and resource coordination for user-side flexibility as described in any one of claims 1-7.
10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements a method for mutual recognition coupling of the electricity-carbon-green certificate market and coordination of user-side flexibility resources as described in any one of claims 1-7.