Base station unmanned remote operation method and system based on internet of things perception

Abstract

This invention discloses a method and system for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, relating to the field of unmanned base station operation and maintenance technology. The method includes: S1, acquiring charge fluctuation signals collected by a charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; S2, identifying abnormal charge migration events caused by disturbances in the ionosphere near the ground based on the charge fluctuation signals; S3, determining the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station based on the arrival time difference of the abnormal charge migration event on different sensing electrodes; and S4, executing a physical protection trigger operation for the base station equipment based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and a preset electronic fence area of ​​the base station. By using the trigger timestamps of the same abnormal event on the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes and combining them with a signal strength attenuation factor to estimate the radial distance, the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target relative to the core equipment area of ​​the base station can be located.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of unmanned operation and maintenance technology for base stations, specifically to a method and system for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing. Background Technology

[0002] With the large-scale deployment of mobile communication networks, the number of base station sites has increased dramatically. A large number of base stations are located in remote mountainous areas, on rooftops, or in unattended areas, posing a serious challenge to their perimeter security.

[0003] Traditional base station security mainly relies on technologies such as video surveillance, infrared beam detectors, or microwave radar. However, these methods have significant shortcomings in practical applications: video surveillance is easily affected by lighting conditions and vegetation obstruction, and its recognition capability decreases at night or in inclement weather; infrared beam detectors and microwave radar have high power consumption, making it difficult to maintain stable operation for long periods of time for remote base stations that rely on batteries or solar power; and traditional security systems can only provide alarm functions and cannot actively trigger the physical protection of base station equipment based on the location and movement trend of the intrusion target, resulting in a disconnect between early warning and response. Summary of the Invention

[0004] (a) Technical problems to be solved To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, this invention provides a method and system for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing.

[0005] (II) Technical Solution To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: a method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, specifically including the following steps: S1. Acquire charge fluctuation signals collected by the charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; S2. Based on charge fluctuation signals, identify anomalous charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground; S3. Based on the arrival time difference of abnormal charge migration events on different sensing electrodes, determine the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station; S4. Based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and the preset base station electronic fence area, execute the physical protection trigger operation for the base station equipment. When authorized maintenance personnel enter, the physical protection of the base station is temporarily suspended. When the maintenance is completed, the physical protection of the base station is automatically restored.

[0006] Preferably, in S1, by deploying several deeply buried charge sensing electrodes arranged in a concentric ring around the base station, the charge sensing electrodes buried underground generate induced microcurrents due to the redistribution of surface charges based on the disturbance of the ionization field around the base station by the intruding object. The induced microcurrent is connected to the input terminal of a high-impedance matching circuit through a wire. The high-impedance matching circuit is composed of an operational amplifier with extremely high input impedance. An operational amplifier and a feedback resistor connected between the output and inverting input terminals form a transimpedance amplifier structure. The induced micro-current flows into the feedback resistor through the inverting input terminal, forming a voltage at the output terminal of the operational amplifier. The voltage is proportional to the induced micro-current, thus realizing the conversion from current to voltage. The converted voltage signal is subjected to low-pass filtering to remove high-frequency interference components, resulting in a weak charge fluctuation signal that characterizes the redistribution process of surface charge.

[0007] Preferably, in step S2, based on the weak charge fluctuation signal, it monitors whether a unipolar pulse spike with an amplitude exceeding the background noise threshold appears in the signal. The background noise threshold is pre-calibrated based on the statistical maximum value of the charge fluctuation signal collected over a long period of time under no intrusion disturbance conditions around the base station. When a unipolar pulse spike is detected, the ambient humidity data and air pressure data around the base station at the time corresponding to the pulse spike are acquired simultaneously. The ambient humidity data and air pressure data around the base station are acquired by environmental sensors deployed around the base station. The ambient humidity data and air pressure data are compared with the preset first threshold and the preset second threshold, respectively. If the ambient humidity data does not exceed the preset first threshold and the air pressure data does not exceed the preset second threshold, the possibility that the pulse spike is caused by interference from the movement of lightning clouds or friction of sandstorms is eliminated, and the pulse spike is identified as an abnormal charge migration event caused by the disturbance of the ionization field by an intruding object. The process of monitoring whether a unipolar pulse spike with an amplitude exceeding the background noise threshold appears in the weak charge fluctuation signal specifically includes the following steps: a21. Continuously collect the weak charge fluctuation signal after low-pass filtering, and read the instantaneous voltage value at the current moment at a fixed sampling rate as the basic input data for real-time monitoring; a22. Compare the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage at the current moment with the background noise threshold. If the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage is less than or equal to the background noise threshold, return to a21 to continue monitoring the instantaneous voltage at the next moment. If the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage is greater than the background noise threshold, determine that a suspected pulse spike has appeared at the current moment and record the current moment as the start time of the pulse spike. a23. Starting from the initial moment, continuously monitor the changes in the subsequent instantaneous voltage values. If the instantaneous voltage value continues to increase, record the maximum value during the change process as the peak value of the pulse spike, and determine the polarity of the pulse spike based on the sign of the peak value. When the instantaneous voltage value drops back from the peak value and is less than or equal to the background noise threshold again, record that moment as the end moment of the pulse spike. a24. Verify whether the entire waveform from the start time to the end time always maintains the same polarity and the waveform presents a single pulse shape that rises rapidly and then decays. If the waveform crosses zero or fluctuates multiple times during the duration, it is determined that the waveform does not belong to a unipolar pulse spike, and it is discarded and returned to a21. If the waveform always maintains a single polarity and the shape conforms to the characteristics of a single pulse, it is confirmed that a valid unipolar pulse spike event has been detected, and the start time and peak value of the pulse spike are output.

[0008] Preferably, in step S3, three timestamps are obtained on the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes that trigger the same abnormal charge migration event. The three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes refer to the three electrodes with the earliest trigger time and spatial proximity to each other, selected from multiple deeply buried charge sensing electrodes deployed in a concentric ring around the base station, based on the trigger time of the abnormal charge migration event. Based on the time delay characteristics of electromagnetic field propagation, the planar azimuth angle of the charge disturbance source relative to the core equipment area of ​​the base station is calculated by comparing the order of three timestamps. The calculation steps for the planar azimuth angle are as follows: A Cartesian coordinate system is established with the core equipment area of ​​the base station as the origin. The fixed coordinate values ​​of the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes in the Cartesian coordinate system are recorded. The three electrodes are denoted as the first electrode, the second electrode, and the third electrode, respectively. Their corresponding timestamps are sorted in order of triggering. The electrode with the earliest triggering time is the first electrode, followed by the second electrode, and the latest electrode is the third electrode. The preset propagation speed of the signal in the soil or surface medium is obtained. The first time difference between the second electrode and the first electrode and the second time difference between the third electrode and the first electrode are calculated respectively. The first time difference is multiplied by the preset propagation speed to obtain the first distance difference, which is the difference between the distance from the disturbance source to the second electrode and the distance to the first electrode. The second time difference is multiplied by the preset propagation speed to obtain the second distance difference, which is the difference between the distance from the disturbance source to the third electrode and the distance to the first electrode. Based on the coordinates of the first electrode, the second electrode, and the third electrode, as well as the first distance difference and the second distance difference, the planar coordinates of the disturbance source are determined. Specifically, the distance from the disturbance source to the first electrode is an unknown, but the distance to the second electrode is equal to the unknown plus the first distance difference, and the distance to the third electrode is equal to the unknown plus the second distance difference. With the first and second electrodes as foci and the first distance difference as a fixed length, draw a first hyperbola. With the first and third electrodes as foci and the second distance difference as a fixed length, draw a second hyperbola. The intersection of the two hyperbolas on the plane is the location of the disturbance source. Since the three electrodes are distributed in concentric rings and are adjacent to each other, there is a unique intersection of the two hyperbolas in the region facing the first electrode. The coordinates of this intersection point are the planar coordinates of the disturbance source. Calculate the direction angle of the line connecting the plane coordinates of the disturbance source and the origin. This direction angle is referenced to the preset true north direction as zero degrees. The angle of clockwise or counterclockwise rotation is the plane azimuth angle. By combining the intensity attenuation factor of the disturbance signal, the radial distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is estimated, and the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are determined based on the plane azimuth and radial distance. The specific steps for determining the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are as follows: The peak intensity of the disturbance signal recorded by the first electrode during the abnormal charge migration event is obtained. The peak intensity is the maximum voltage amplitude extracted from the charge fluctuation signal. The intensity attenuation factor, which was pre-calibrated through field testing, is called. The intensity attenuation factor is obtained by simulating intrusion events at different distances around the base station, measuring and recording the peak signal intensity received by the first electrode at each distance, and then fitting an attenuation curve. The peak intensity is compared with the intensity attenuation factor to find the propagation distance corresponding to the peak intensity. Based on the attenuation curve, the distance corresponding to the intensity value is found through the curve. This distance is the radial distance from the disturbance source to the first electrode. Given the coordinates of the first electrode and the azimuth angle of the disturbance source relative to the origin, it can be determined that the disturbance source is located on a ray extending from the origin along this azimuth angle. At the same time, the disturbance source is also located on a circle with the first electrode as the center and this radial distance as the radius. The intersection of this ray and the circle is the unique location of the disturbance source. Solving for this intersection point yields the radial distance of the disturbance source relative to the origin, which is the straight-line distance from the origin to the intersection point.

[0009] Preferably, in S4, a first warning ring and a second warning ring are preset around the base station. The first warning ring is a circular area boundary defined with the base station core equipment area as the center and a first preset radius. The second warning ring is a circular area boundary defined with the same center and a second preset radius smaller than the first preset radius. Based on the movement trajectory of the intrusion target, the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are continuously compared with the boundary of the first warning ring. When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is equal to or less than the first preset radius, it is determined that the movement trajectory has touched the first warning ring. Mechanical locking commands for the windows and vents of the base station equipment room are generated and sent to the electric lock or louver drive mechanism to control the window to be locked and the vent to be closed. When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is further reduced to equal to or less than the second preset radius, it is determined that the movement trajectory has touched the second warning ring. The azimuth angle of the target relative to the base station antenna is calculated based on the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target at the current moment. An attitude adjustment command for the base station antenna is generated and sent to the electric pan-tilt controller to drive the antenna to rotate in the horizontal direction so that the main lobe of the antenna deviates from the location of the intrusion target. After the intrusion target leaves the second warning ring, the antenna is instructed to return to the original preset working direction. When authorized base station maintenance personnel need to enter the base station, the base station's operation and maintenance center will issue an operation and maintenance work order. After the operation and maintenance work order is issued, a dynamic one-time token or temporary key will be generated. The token or key is bound to the maintenance personnel's identity ID and the time window of this inspection. When the maintenance personnel arrive at the perimeter of the base station, they need to send the dynamic one-time token or temporary key through their handheld terminal. The base station's receiver verifies the validity of the token and the time window. After successful verification, the base station will not immediately shut down the protection, but will enter the manned mode and send a log to the operation and maintenance center that personnel have entered and the protection is temporarily suspended. Once the verification is successful, the mechanical lock command for the window and vent will be automatically released, and the window and vent will be able to be opened normally again. When maintenance personnel only need to enter the computer room, the attitude adjustment function of the antenna feeder system should remain enabled. The system detects the disappearance of disturbance signals by detecting the charge induction array, and combines this with the disconnection of the GPS signal on the personnel's handheld terminal or the manual check-out operation to determine that the personnel have left the second warning ring. The base station then enters a preset safety countdown (e.g., five minutes). After confirming that no one is left behind, all suspended protection functions are automatically restored.

[0010] This invention also provides an unmanned remote operation and maintenance system for base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, comprising: Data acquisition module: Acquires charge fluctuation signals collected by the charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; Migration event identification module: Based on charge fluctuation signals, it identifies abnormal charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground. Intrusion detection module: Based on the arrival time difference of abnormal charge migration events on different sensing electrodes, determine the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station; Intrusion prevention module: Based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and the preset base station electronic fence area, it executes physical protection trigger operations for the base station equipment.

[0011] (III) Beneficial Effects This invention provides a method and system for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, which has the following beneficial effects: This invention captures the disturbance of the ionization field around the base station caused by an intruding object by a charge-induction electrode buried underground. It obtains weak charge fluctuation signals by using the principle of electrostatic induction. It consumes only a small amount of power in the signal processing stage, which can effectively reduce the overall power consumption of the base station security system. Simultaneously, it collects the ambient humidity and air pressure data around the base station and combines pulse peak detection with environmental parameter screening. When a pulse peak is detected, it can accurately eliminate background charge disturbances caused by natural weather changes by comparing whether the humidity and air pressure exceed the threshold of lightning or sandstorm interference. This avoids misjudging thundercloud movement or sandstorm friction as an intrusion event, thereby significantly improving the accuracy and reliability of intrusion identification. By utilizing the trigger timestamps of the same abnormal event on the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes, the planar azimuth angle of the disturbance source is calculated based on the time delay characteristics of electromagnetic field propagation, and the radial distance is estimated by combining the signal strength attenuation factor. This enables the location of the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target relative to the core equipment area of ​​the base station without relying on optical or radio frequency imaging. Attached Figure Description

[0012] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the present invention; Figure 2 This is a system block diagram of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0013] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0014] Please see Figure 1 This invention provides a method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, comprising the following steps: S1. Acquire charge fluctuation signals collected by the charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; Furthermore, in S1, by deploying several deeply buried charge sensing electrodes in a concentric ring around the base station, based on the disturbance of the ionization field around the base station by the intruding object, the charge sensing electrodes buried underground generate induced microcurrents due to the redistribution of surface charge. The induced microcurrent is connected to the input terminal of a high-impedance matching circuit through a wire. The high-impedance matching circuit is composed of an operational amplifier with extremely high input impedance. An operational amplifier and a feedback resistor connected between the output and inverting input terminals form a transimpedance amplifier structure. The induced micro-current flows into the feedback resistor through the inverting input terminal, forming a voltage at the output terminal of the operational amplifier. The voltage is proportional to the induced micro-current, thus realizing the conversion from current to voltage. The converted voltage signal is subjected to low-pass filtering to remove high-frequency interference components, resulting in a weak charge fluctuation signal that characterizes the redistribution process of surface charge.

[0015] It should be noted that the environment surrounding a base station contains an ionizing field formed by natural ionizing radiation (such as geomagnetic rays and ultraviolet rays) or a weak electrostatic field applied by humans. This ionizing field partially ionizes air molecules, creating a stable ion distribution in the space around the base station. When an intruding object (such as a human body or a large metal object) enters this area, its conductivity or dielectric properties disrupt the existing ion balance, leading to a redistribution of surface charge. An array of charge-sensing electrodes buried underground can detect these minute changes in surface charge in real time through electrostatic induction and convert them into electrical signals that can be processed later. The purpose of using a concentric ring distribution is to achieve all-round, blind-spot-free perimeter coverage. By using ring-shaped electrode groups with different radii, the distance of the intrusion target from the base station can be distinguished. The deep-buried installation is to place the electrodes at a certain depth underground. On the one hand, the shielding effect of the soil reduces the direct interference of environmental factors such as surface wind, rain, and animal activities on the electrodes. On the other hand, it enables the electrodes to form a stable reference potential with the ground, improving the sensitivity to weak charge changes. Multiple electrodes are arranged in a concentric ring form to ensure that when an intrusion object approaches from any direction, at least one electrode on the ring can sense the charge disturbance, thereby ensuring the reliability of the detection. The redistribution of surface charge caused by an intruding object cutting through the ionization magnetic field lines around the base station is captured by a high-impedance matching circuit. Ionization magnetic field lines refer to the distribution of electric field lines in the ionization field around the base station. During the movement of the intruding object, as a conductor or dielectric, it will cut through these electric field lines, causing distortion of the local electric field, which in turn drives the migration of ions originally adsorbed on the ground or in the air, resulting in a redistribution of surface charge. This redistribution of charge will induce an extremely weak current (usually in the picoampere level) on the buried electrodes. Since the impedance between the electrodes and the ground is extremely high, a high input impedance matching circuit must be used to capture it to prevent the signal from being bypassed and attenuated by the low impedance path. The high impedance matching circuit can effectively extract this weak current signal, while suppressing common-mode interference, ensuring that the original physical phenomenon is truly converted into an electrical quantity. The captured weak current signal is further processed by converting it into a voltage signal and then performing low-pass filtering to obtain the charge fluctuation signal. Since picoampere-level currents are difficult to measure directly, they need to be linearly converted into easily acquired voltage signals by a high-precision current-to-voltage converter (such as a transimpedance amplifier). The converted voltage signal may still contain high-frequency noise caused by lightning, power lines, etc., which can mask the low-frequency charge fluctuation components caused by intrusion. Therefore, a low-pass filter circuit is used to filter out high-frequency interference and retain the low-frequency signal components whose frequency range matches the characteristics of the intrusion event. The voltage signal after filtering is the final usable charge fluctuation signal, which truly reflects the charge redistribution process caused by the intruding object.

[0016] S2. Based on charge fluctuation signals, identify anomalous charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground; Furthermore, in S2, based on the weak charge fluctuation signal, it monitors whether a unipolar pulse spike with an amplitude exceeding the background noise threshold appears in the signal. The background noise threshold is pre-calibrated based on the statistical maximum value of the charge fluctuation signal collected over a long period of time under no intrusion disturbance conditions around the base station. When a unipolar pulse spike is detected, the ambient humidity data and air pressure data around the base station at the corresponding time of the pulse spike are acquired simultaneously. The ambient humidity data and air pressure data around the base station are acquired through environmental sensors deployed around the base station. The ambient humidity data and air pressure data are compared with the preset first threshold and the preset second threshold, respectively. If the ambient humidity data does not exceed the preset first threshold and the air pressure data does not exceed the preset second threshold, the possibility that the pulse spike is caused by interference from the movement of lightning clouds or friction of sandstorms is eliminated, and the pulse spike is identified as an abnormal charge migration event caused by the disturbance of the ionization field by an intruding object. The process of monitoring whether a unipolar pulse spike with an amplitude exceeding the background noise threshold appears in the weak charge fluctuation signal specifically includes the following steps: a21. Continuously collect the weak charge fluctuation signal after low-pass filtering, and read the instantaneous voltage value at the current moment at a fixed sampling rate as the basic input data for real-time monitoring; a22. Compare the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage at the current moment with the background noise threshold. If the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage is less than or equal to the background noise threshold, return to a21 to continue monitoring the instantaneous voltage at the next moment. If the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage is greater than the background noise threshold, determine that a suspected pulse spike has appeared at the current moment and record the current moment as the start time of the pulse spike. a23. Starting from the initial moment, continuously monitor the changes in the subsequent instantaneous voltage value. If the instantaneous voltage value continues to increase, record the maximum value during the change process as the peak value of the pulse spike, and determine the polarity (positive or negative polarity) of the pulse spike based on the sign of the peak value. When the instantaneous voltage value drops from the peak value and is less than or equal to the background noise threshold again, record that moment as the end moment of the pulse spike. a24. Verify whether the entire waveform from the start time to the end time always maintains the same polarity (all positive or all negative values), and whether the waveform presents a single pulse shape that rises rapidly and then decays. If the waveform crosses zero or fluctuates multiple times during the duration, it is determined that the waveform does not belong to a unipolar pulse spike, and it is discarded and returned to a21. If the waveform always maintains a single polarity and the shape conforms to the characteristics of a single pulse, it is confirmed that a valid unipolar pulse spike event has been detected, and the start time and peak value of the pulse spike are output.

[0017] It should be noted that, based on the acquired weak charge fluctuation signals, abnormal charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground are identified. When an intruding object (such as a human body or a large metal object) enters the ionization field around the base station, it will cut or distort the local electric field lines, driving the air ions to migrate in a specific direction. This migration process presents specific transient change characteristics in the charge fluctuation signal. However, the charge fluctuation signal is also mixed with charge disturbance components caused by changes in the natural environment (such as lightning activity and sandstorm weather). Therefore, it is necessary to accurately identify the abnormal events that are actually caused by intrusion from the signal and eliminate environmental interference in order to ensure the reliability of subsequent positioning and early warning. Background noise threshold refers to the statistical maximum value of charge fluctuation signal caused by environmental background radiation, wind, and other factors when there is no intrusion disturbance around the base station. The background noise threshold is pre-calibrated and stored through long-term monitoring. Unipolar pulse spike refers to a signal waveform that rises rapidly to a peak value and then decays in a short period of time, and the waveform direction is unidirectional (such as positive or negative). This waveform characteristic corresponds to the physical process of an intruding object cutting the electric field line in one go and causing charge redistribution. When the amplitude of the charge fluctuation signal exceeds the background noise threshold, the system determines that a suspected event has been detected and marks it as a candidate pulse spike for further confirmation. The pulse spikes are filtered based on environmental humidity and air pressure data to eliminate background charge interference caused by the movement of lightning clouds or friction from sandstorms. These are identified as abnormal events caused by intrusion. The acquired humidity and air pressure data are compared with multiple preset environmental interference characteristic thresholds. For example, if the environmental humidity exceeds the first preset threshold (indicating the proximity of lightning clouds) or the air pressure change rate exceeds the second preset threshold (indicating the passage of sandstorms) at the same time as the pulse spike is detected, the pulse spike is determined to be caused by a natural phenomenon and is eliminated. Conversely, if both humidity and air pressure are within the normal fluctuation range, the pulse spike is determined to be caused by the disturbance of the ionization field by the intruding object and is identified as an abnormal event caused by intrusion. The first preset threshold is a preset humidity judgment benchmark used to determine whether there are interference conditions of nearby lightning clouds in the current environment. When the ambient humidity around the base station exceeds the first preset threshold, it indicates that the water vapor content in the air has reached the typical humidity range for the formation or proximity of lightning clouds. At this time, the detected pulse spike is very likely to be caused by ionization field disturbance caused by cloud movement, rather than by an intruding object. The first preset threshold is in relative Dolby units and is a dimensionless fixed value. The second preset threshold is a preset air pressure judgment benchmark used to determine whether there is interference from sandstorm friction in the current environment. When the air pressure change rate (the amount of change in air pressure per unit time) around the base station exceeds the second preset threshold, it indicates that the atmospheric pressure fluctuates violently, which is consistent with the typical characteristics of a sudden change in air pressure when a sandstorm passes by. At this time, the detected pulse peak is very likely to be caused by charge disturbance caused by the friction of sand particles, rather than by an intruding object. The second preset threshold is in Pascals per second (Pa / s), which is a fixed value with dimensions. The first and second preset thresholds are obtained through: Before the base station is completed and put into operation, temperature and humidity sensors and barometric pressure sensors are deployed around the base station, and the system is set to calibration mode. The calibration phase lasts for a preset time period (e.g., 30 consecutive calendar days) to ensure coverage of various meteorological conditions. During the calibration phase, ensure that no personnel or large objects enter the vicinity of the base station, and only record changes in the natural environment. Collect ambient humidity and air pressure data continuously daily to create historical humidity and air pressure datasets, respectively. From the historical humidity dataset, humidity data corresponding to the periods of thunderstorms confirmed by meteorological records were selected. The minimum, maximum, and fluctuation range of humidity during these thunderstorm periods were statistically analyzed, and the lower limit of humidity for all thunderstorm periods was used as the humidity critical point for lightning interference. From the historical air pressure dataset, air pressure data corresponding to the periods of dust storms confirmed by meteorological records were selected. The rate of change of air pressure per unit time during the dust storm period was calculated, and the minimum, maximum, and distribution range of these rates of change were statistically analyzed. The lower limit of the rate of change of air pressure during all dust storm periods was taken as the air pressure critical point for dust disturbance. The lower limit of humidity during thunderstorms is set as the first preset threshold; when humidity exceeds this value, it is determined that there is a possibility of thunderstorm interference. The lower limit of air pressure change rate during dust storms is set as the second preset threshold; when air pressure change rate exceeds this value, it is determined that there is a possibility of dust storm interference. After calibration, these two thresholds are stored in the system for real-time judgment in subsequent operation phases.

[0018] S3. Based on the arrival time difference of abnormal charge migration events on different sensing electrodes, determine the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station; Furthermore, in S3, three timestamps are obtained on the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes that trigger the same abnormal charge migration event. The three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes refer to the three electrodes with the earliest trigger time and spatial proximity to each other, selected from multiple deeply buried charge sensing electrodes deployed in a concentric ring around the base station, based on the trigger time of the abnormal charge migration event. Based on the time delay characteristics of electromagnetic field propagation, the planar azimuth angle of the charge disturbance source relative to the core equipment area of ​​the base station is calculated by comparing the order of three timestamps. The calculation steps for the planar azimuth angle are as follows: A Cartesian coordinate system is established with the core equipment area of ​​the base station as the origin. The fixed coordinate values ​​of the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes in the Cartesian coordinate system are recorded. The three electrodes are denoted as the first electrode, the second electrode, and the third electrode, respectively. Their corresponding timestamps are sorted in order of triggering. The electrode with the earliest triggering time is the first electrode, followed by the second electrode, and the latest electrode is the third electrode. The preset propagation speed of the signal in the soil or surface medium is obtained. The preset propagation speed is a constant calibrated in advance through field testing. The first time difference between the second electrode and the first electrode and the second time difference between the third electrode and the first electrode are calculated respectively. The first time difference is multiplied by the preset propagation speed to obtain the first distance difference, which is the difference between the distance from the disturbance source to the second electrode and the distance to the first electrode. The second time difference is multiplied by the preset propagation speed to obtain the second distance difference, which is the difference between the distance from the disturbance source to the third electrode and the distance to the first electrode. Based on the coordinates of the first electrode, the second electrode, and the third electrode, as well as the first distance difference and the second distance difference, the planar coordinates of the disturbance source are determined. Specifically, the distance from the disturbance source to the first electrode is an unknown, but the distance to the second electrode is equal to the unknown plus the first distance difference, and the distance to the third electrode is equal to the unknown plus the second distance difference. With the first and second electrodes as foci and the first distance difference as a fixed length, draw a first hyperbola. With the first and third electrodes as foci and the second distance difference as a fixed length, draw a second hyperbola. The intersection of the two hyperbolas on the plane is the location of the disturbance source. Since the three electrodes are distributed in concentric rings and are adjacent to each other, there is a unique intersection of the two hyperbolas in the region facing the first electrode. The coordinates of this intersection point are the planar coordinates of the disturbance source. Calculate the direction angle of the line connecting the plane coordinates of the disturbance source and the origin. This direction angle is referenced to the preset true north direction as zero degrees. The angle of clockwise or counterclockwise rotation is the plane azimuth angle. By combining the intensity attenuation factor of the disturbance signal, the radial distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is estimated, and the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are determined based on the plane azimuth and radial distance. The specific steps for determining the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are as follows: The peak intensity of the disturbance signal recorded by the first electrode during the abnormal charge migration event is obtained. The peak intensity is the maximum voltage amplitude extracted from the charge fluctuation signal. The intensity attenuation factor, which has been pre-calibrated through field testing, is called. The intensity attenuation factor is established by simulating intrusion events at different distances around the base station, measuring and recording the peak signal intensity received by the first electrode at each distance, thereby establishing a one-to-one correspondence between distance and intensity, or fitting an attenuation curve. The peak intensity is compared with the intensity attenuation factor to find the propagation distance corresponding to the peak intensity. Based on the attenuation curve, the distance corresponding to the intensity value is found through the curve. This distance is the radial distance from the disturbance source to the first electrode. Given the coordinates of the first electrode and the azimuth angle of the disturbance source relative to the origin, it can be determined that the disturbance source is located on a ray extending from the origin along this azimuth angle. At the same time, the disturbance source is also located on a circle with the first electrode as the center and this radial distance as the radius. The intersection of this ray and the circle is the unique location of the disturbance source. Solving for this intersection point yields the radial distance of the disturbance source relative to the origin, which is the straight-line distance from the origin to the intersection point.

[0019] It should be noted that the charge disturbance caused by the intruding object propagates in the soil or surface medium in the form of an approximately spherical wave. Due to the different propagation path lengths, charge sensing electrodes located at different spatial positions will sense the disturbance signal at different times. By recording the triggering time of the same event on each electrode and combining it with the fixed geometric position of the electrode, the spatial coordinates of the disturbance source can be deduced. At the same time, by tracking the coordinates at multiple consecutive moments, the movement trajectory of the intruding target can be obtained. The system obtains the timestamps of the three nearest-neighbor charge-sensing electrodes that triggered the same abnormal charge migration event. "Nearest neighbor" refers to the three electrodes that were the first to sense the event and are spatially closest to the event location, based on the event trigger time. Specifically, after confirming an abnormal event, the system iterates through the real-time signals of all electrodes, finds the electrode with the earliest trigger time (designated as the first electrode), and then finds the electrode adjacent to the first electrode with the second earliest trigger time (designated as the second electrode). The third electrode is found in the same way. For these three electrodes, their trigger times are recorded, forming three timestamps. This ensures that the electrode group used for localization is the electrode closest to the disturbance source. By comparing the order of the three timestamps, the planar azimuth of the charge disturbance source is calculated. Here, the time delay characteristic of electromagnetic field propagation means that the propagation speed of the charge disturbance signal in the medium is constant and known. Therefore, the time difference of the signal arriving at different electrodes is proportional to the distance difference between the electrodes and the disturbance source. The specific calculation method is as follows: establish a planar coordinate system with the geometric center of the three electrodes as the origin. Based on the coordinates of the three electrodes and their respective timestamps, establish a hyperbolic equation system about the coordinates of the disturbance source. The electrode with the smallest timestamp indicates that the disturbance source is closest to that electrode, and the electrode with the largest timestamp indicates that the disturbance source is farthest from that electrode. By solving this equation system, the direction angle of the disturbance source relative to the origin of the coordinate system is obtained, that is, the planar azimuth. The planar azimuth represents the direction of the intrusion target at the current moment. S4. Based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and the preset base station electronic fence area, execute the physical protection trigger operation for the base station equipment. When authorized maintenance personnel enter, the physical protection of the base station is temporarily suspended. When the maintenance is completed, the physical protection of the base station is automatically restored.

[0020] Furthermore, in S4, a first warning ring and a second warning ring are preset around the base station. The first warning ring is a circular area boundary defined with the base station core equipment area as the center and a first preset radius. The second warning ring is a circular area boundary defined with the same center and a second preset radius smaller than the first preset radius. Based on the movement trajectory of the intrusion target, the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are continuously compared with the boundary of the first warning ring. When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is equal to or less than the first preset radius, it is determined that the movement trajectory has touched the first warning ring. Mechanical locking commands for the windows and vents of the base station equipment room are generated and sent to the electric lock or louver drive mechanism to control the window to be locked and the vent to be closed. When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is further reduced to equal to or less than the second preset radius, it is determined that the movement trajectory has touched the second warning ring. The azimuth angle of the target relative to the base station antenna is calculated based on the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target at the current moment. An attitude adjustment command for the base station antenna is generated and sent to the electric pan-tilt controller to drive the antenna to rotate in the horizontal direction so that the main lobe of the antenna deviates from the location of the intrusion target. After the intrusion target leaves the second warning ring, the antenna is instructed to return to the original preset working direction. When authorized base station maintenance personnel need to enter the base station, the base station's operation and maintenance center will issue an operation and maintenance work order. After the operation and maintenance work order is issued, a dynamic one-time token or temporary key will be generated. The token or key is bound to the maintenance personnel's identity ID and the time window of this inspection (for example, setting 14:00-16:00 as the operation and maintenance inspection time). When the maintenance personnel arrive at the perimeter of the base station (before they are about to reach the first warning ring), they need to send the dynamic one-time token or temporary key through a handheld terminal (such as a dedicated inspection PDA or mobile APP). The base station's receiver verifies the validity of the token and the time window. After successful verification, the base station will not immediately shut down the protection, but will enter the manned mode and send a log to the operation and maintenance center that personnel have entered and the protection is temporarily suspended. Once the verification is successful, the mechanical lock command for the window and vent will be automatically released, and the window and vent will be restored to a normal openable state so that maintenance personnel can enter the computer room for ventilation or to move equipment. When maintenance personnel only need to enter the equipment room, the attitude adjustment function of the antenna feeder system should remain enabled. When personnel are detected approaching the antenna, antenna deviation will be triggered. When authorized personnel are detected, only an alarm should be generated for the maintenance personnel, but no actual mechanical rotation of the antenna should be performed to avoid injury to engineers working nearby or interruption of ongoing network optimization tests. When the work order is clearly for antenna maintenance, the maintenance personnel must confirm the entry into the antenna operation mode through the terminal before climbing the tower. At this time, the automatic attitude adjustment of the antenna feeder system will be suspended, and control will be temporarily transferred to the on-site maintenance personnel. During manual inspections, human movement generates continuous charge disturbances, which may be misjudged as continuous intrusion events. During personnel entry, the background noise threshold is dynamically adjusted based on the characteristics of the currently received authorized personnel signals, and the normal activities of authorized personnel are regarded as acceptable background to avoid frequently triggering unnecessary alarms. In the data record, the charge fluctuation signal of this period is marked as the manual inspection period. The system detects the disappearance of disturbance signals by monitoring the charge induction array, and combines this with the disconnection of the GPS signal on the personnel's handheld terminal or the manual check-out operation to determine that the personnel have left the second warning ring. The base station enters a preset safety countdown (e.g., five minutes). After confirming that no one is left behind, it automatically restores all suspended protection functions, such as relocking window locks, automatically returning the antenna to the preset working direction, restoring the identification threshold to the original sensitive state, and sending a status report to the operation and maintenance center that the protection has been reset and the area is safe. When authorized maintenance personnel need to enter the base station area to perform on-site work, they must send a dynamic token to the base station via a handheld terminal. The base station verifies the validity of the token and the time window. The verification process follows the specific logical steps below: The base station receives token data packets sent by maintenance personnel's handheld terminals via near-field wireless communication (such as Bluetooth, NFC, or dedicated radio frequency channels). The token data packets are generated and distributed by the operation and maintenance center and contain the following information fields: maintenance personnel identification, planned inspection start time, planned inspection end time, and a digital signature generated by the operation and maintenance center using its private key to calculate the above fields. The base station parses the digital signature and plaintext information from the received token data packet. The plaintext information includes the maintenance personnel's identification, the planned inspection start time, and the planned inspection end time. The base station uses the public key of the operation and maintenance center stored locally to decrypt the digital signature and obtain the original hash value. At the same time, the base station uses the same hash algorithm as the operation and maintenance center to recalculate the hash value of the parsed plaintext information (i.e., identity identifier, start time, and end time). The base station compares the original hash value obtained from decryption with the recalculated hash value: if the two are consistent, it proves that the token data packet was indeed issued by the operation and maintenance center holding the corresponding private key and has not been tampered with during transmission, and the digital signature verification is successful; if they are inconsistent, the verification fails and the access is rejected. The base station receiving module checks whether the current time is within the planned inspection time window. It obtains the current timestamp from the built-in precise clock source (such as a real-time clock synchronized with the network) and compares the current timestamp with the planned inspection start time and planned inspection end time parsed from the token. If the current timestamp is greater than or equal to the planned inspection start time and less than or equal to the planned inspection end time, the time window verification passes. If the current timestamp is earlier than the start time or later than the end time, the verification fails and the access is rejected.

[0021] The base station compares the parsed maintenance personnel identity with the list of authorized personnel located in the trusted storage area. If the identity exists in the list and is not marked as canceled or expired, the identity verification is successful; if it does not exist or has expired, the verification fails and the access is denied. If all the above verification steps (digital signature, time window, identity identifier) ​​pass, the base station determines that the current token is valid. To prevent the same token from being reused (even within the time window), the base station stores the unique identifier of the token (such as the last few bytes of the digital signature or the overall hash of the token) in the used token cache area and records the current usage time. Subsequently, the base station returns a verification success response to the handheld terminal and enters the corresponding protection pause or personnel inspection mode. If any verification step fails, the base station returns a verification failure response and records this abnormal access attempt.

[0022] The first preset radius is the spatial reference for defining the first warning ring, used to achieve early warning and primary physical protection. The first preset radius is centered on the geometric center of the base station core equipment area (such as the equipment room and antenna feeder base), and the radius value is used to define the boundary of the circular area, forming the first protective ring around the base station. When the distance between the intrusion target and the base station core equipment area is equal to or less than the first preset radius for the first time, it is determined that the target has touched the first warning ring. At this time, the intruder has entered the sensitive outer area of ​​the base station perimeter and may pose a potential threat to the physical security of the base station. Therefore, mechanical locking commands are triggered for the equipment room windows and ventilation openings to prevent the intruder from entering the equipment room by physical means. The first preset radius is in meters. The second preset radius is the spatial reference for defining the second warning ring, used to achieve a high level of security protection. The second preset radius is the boundary of the circular area defined by the same center as the first warning ring, and the second preset radius value is the distance to form the second protection ring inside the base station. The value of the second preset radius is smaller than the first preset radius, which represents an emergency warning area that is closer to the core equipment of the base station. When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is further reduced to equal to or less than this radius, it is determined that the target has touched the second warning ring. At this time, the intruder is extremely close to the core equipment and may use directional equipment to intercept or interfere with the base station communication signal. Therefore, the attitude adjustment command for the base station antenna feeder system is triggered, so that the antenna main lobe direction is temporarily deviated from the location of the intruder. After the intruder leaves, the original working direction is restored. Both the first and second preset radii are obtained through pre-calibration, specifically by following these steps: Before the base station is completed and put into operation, an on-site survey of the surrounding environment is conducted to map the precise geometric center coordinates of the core equipment area (equipment room, antenna feeder base) of the base station, and to measure the spatial distribution of key physical facilities (such as walls, equipment room windows, ventilation openings, antenna supports) within the perimeter of the base station, so as to form a three-dimensional electronic map of the physical layout of the base station. Based on the physical layout of the base station, we analyzed possible intrusion paths and the types of threats that intruders might pose to base station equipment at different distances. The perimeter of the base station was divided into multiple areas from far to near: the outer area mainly faces physical intrusion threats (such as breaking windows and ventilation openings to enter the equipment room), while the core area faces communication signal interception or interference threats in addition to physical intrusion threats. Based on the security level requirements of the area where the base station is located, the values ​​of the first and second preset radii are initially determined. For example, for high-security base stations, the first preset radius can be set to 80 to 100 meters, and the second preset radius can be set to 30 to 50 meters. For ordinary base stations, the radius can be appropriately reduced. The initial values ​​must ensure that the first warning ring can cover all windows and vents that may be used for physical intrusion, and that the second warning ring can cover sensitive areas where the antenna main lobe may be intercepted. Intrusion tests were simulated around the base station. The response time of mechanical locking commands, the coverage area of ​​antenna attitude adjustments, and the reliability of command execution were tested at initially determined first and second preset radii. Based on the test results, the radius values ​​were optimized to ensure that the first warning ring effectively blocks the physical intrusion path, and that the antenna adjustment completely avoids the intruder's location when the second warning ring is triggered. The preset working direction serves as the reference for antenna beam pointing under normal communication conditions. It ensures that the base station can provide stable signal coverage to the designated area according to the design coverage requirements when there is no intrusion. It also serves as the target state that needs to be restored after the antenna deviates from the intrusion target when the second level of protection is triggered. When the intruder leaves the second warning ring, the antenna is realigned with the original coverage area according to this direction, thereby quickly restoring normal communication services and avoiding coverage blind spots or communication interruptions caused by long-term antenna deviation. The preset working direction refers to the fixed spatial orientation of the main lobe of the antenna feeder system under normal operating conditions. It is usually characterized by two parameters: horizontal azimuth angle and downtilt angle. The horizontal azimuth angle represents the deflection angle of the antenna main lobe relative to due north in the horizontal plane, and the downtilt angle represents the downward tilt angle of the antenna main lobe relative to the horizontal plane in the vertical plane. The preset working direction is the ideal orientation determined based on the geographical location of the target area covered by the base station, user distribution, and network planning requirements. Under this direction, the base station can achieve the best coverage effect and communication quality.

[0023] Please see Figure 2 This invention also provides an unmanned remote operation and maintenance system for base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, including: Data acquisition module: Acquires charge fluctuation signals collected by the charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; Migration event identification module: Based on charge fluctuation signals, it identifies abnormal charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground. Intrusion detection module: Based on the arrival time difference of abnormal charge migration events on different sensing electrodes, determine the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station; Intrusion prevention module: Based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and the preset base station electronic fence area, it executes physical protection trigger operations for the base station equipment.

[0024] Those skilled in the art will recognize that the units and algorithm steps of the various examples described in conjunction with the embodiments disclosed herein can be implemented in electronic hardware, or a combination of computer software and electronic hardware. Whether these functions are implemented in hardware or software depends on the specific application and design constraints of the technical solution. Those skilled in the art can use different methods to implement the described functions for each specific application, but such implementation should not be considered beyond the scope of this application.

[0025] Those skilled in the art will understand that, for the sake of convenience and brevity, the specific working processes of the systems, devices, and units described above can be referred to the corresponding processes in the foregoing method embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0026] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the coupling or direct coupling or communication connection shown or discussed may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between apparatuses or units may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0027] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0028] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, characterized in that: Includes the following steps: S1. Acquire charge fluctuation signals collected by the charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; S2. Based on charge fluctuation signals, identify anomalous charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground; S3. Based on the arrival time difference of abnormal charge migration events on different sensing electrodes, determine the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station; S4. Based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and the preset base station electronic fence area, execute the physical protection trigger operation for the base station equipment. When authorized maintenance personnel enter, the physical protection of the base station is temporarily suspended. When the maintenance is completed, the physical protection of the base station is automatically restored.

2. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on IoT sensing according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S1, several deeply buried charge sensing electrodes are deployed in a concentric ring around the base station. Based on the disturbance of the ionization field around the base station by the intruding object, the charge sensing electrodes buried underground generate induced microcurrents due to the redistribution of surface charge. The induced microcurrent is connected to the input terminal of a high-impedance matching circuit through a wire. The high-impedance matching circuit is composed of an operational amplifier with extremely high input impedance. An operational amplifier and a feedback resistor connected between the output and inverting input terminals form a transimpedance amplifier structure. The induced micro-current flows into the feedback resistor through the inverting input terminal, forming a voltage at the output terminal of the operational amplifier. The voltage is proportional to the induced micro-current, thus realizing the conversion from current to voltage. The converted voltage signal is subjected to low-pass filtering to remove high-frequency interference components, resulting in a weak charge fluctuation signal that characterizes the redistribution process of surface charge.

3. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on IoT sensing according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S2, based on the weak charge fluctuation signal, it monitors whether a unipolar pulse spike with an amplitude exceeding the background noise threshold appears in the signal. The background noise threshold is pre-calibrated based on the statistical maximum value of the charge fluctuation signal collected over a long period of time under no intrusion disturbance conditions around the base station. When a unipolar pulse spike is detected, the ambient humidity data and air pressure data around the base station at the time corresponding to the pulse spike are acquired simultaneously. The ambient humidity data and air pressure data around the base station are acquired by environmental sensors deployed around the base station. The ambient humidity data and air pressure data are compared with the preset first threshold and the preset second threshold, respectively. If the ambient humidity data does not exceed the preset first threshold and the air pressure data does not exceed the preset second threshold, the possibility that the pulse spike is caused by interference from lightning cloud movement or sandstorm friction is eliminated, and the pulse spike is confirmed as an abnormal charge migration event caused by the disturbance of the ionization field by the intruding object.

4. The unmanned remote operation and maintenance method for base stations based on IoT sensing according to claim 3, characterized in that, The process of monitoring whether a unipolar pulse spike with an amplitude exceeding the background noise threshold appears in the weak charge fluctuation signal specifically includes the following steps: a21. Continuously collect the weak charge fluctuation signal after low-pass filtering, and read the instantaneous voltage value at the current moment at a fixed sampling rate as the basic input data for real-time monitoring; a22. Compare the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage at the current moment with the background noise threshold. If the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage is less than or equal to the background noise threshold, return to a21 to continue monitoring the instantaneous voltage at the next moment. If the absolute value of the instantaneous voltage is greater than the background noise threshold, determine that a suspected pulse spike has appeared at the current moment and record the current moment as the start time of the pulse spike. a23. Starting from the initial moment, continuously monitor the changes in the subsequent instantaneous voltage values. If the instantaneous voltage value continues to increase, record the maximum value during the change process as the peak value of the pulse spike, and determine the polarity of the pulse spike based on the sign of the peak value. When the instantaneous voltage value drops back from the peak value and is less than or equal to the background noise threshold again, record that moment as the end moment of the pulse spike. a24. Verify whether the entire waveform from the start time to the end time always maintains the same polarity and the waveform presents a single pulse shape that rises rapidly and then decays. If the waveform crosses zero or fluctuates multiple times during the duration, it is determined that the waveform does not belong to a unipolar pulse spike, and it is discarded and returned to a21. If the waveform always maintains a single polarity and the shape conforms to the characteristics of a single pulse, it is confirmed that a valid unipolar pulse spike event has been detected, and the start time and peak value of the pulse spike are output.

5. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things sensing according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S3, three timestamps are obtained on the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes that trigger the same abnormal charge migration event. The three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes refer to the three electrodes with the earliest trigger time and spatial proximity to each other from multiple deep-buried charge sensing electrodes deployed in a concentric ring around the base station, based on the trigger time of the abnormal charge migration event. Based on the time delay characteristics of electromagnetic field propagation, the planar azimuth angle of the charge disturbance source relative to the core equipment area of ​​the base station is calculated by comparing the order of the three timestamps.

6. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things sensing according to claim 5, characterized in that, The steps for calculating the plane azimuth angle are as follows: A Cartesian coordinate system is established with the core equipment area of ​​the base station as the origin. The fixed coordinate values ​​of the three nearest neighbor charge sensing electrodes in the Cartesian coordinate system are recorded. The three electrodes are denoted as the first electrode, the second electrode, and the third electrode, respectively. Their corresponding timestamps are sorted in order of triggering. The electrode with the earliest triggering time is the first electrode, followed by the second electrode, and the latest electrode is the third electrode. The preset propagation speed of the signal in the soil or surface medium is obtained. The first time difference between the second electrode and the first electrode and the second time difference between the third electrode and the first electrode are calculated respectively. The first time difference is multiplied by the preset propagation speed to obtain the first distance difference, which is the difference between the distance from the disturbance source to the second electrode and the distance to the first electrode. The second time difference is multiplied by the preset propagation speed to obtain the second distance difference, which is the difference between the distance from the disturbance source to the third electrode and the distance to the first electrode. Based on the coordinates of the first electrode, the second electrode, and the third electrode, as well as the first distance difference and the second distance difference, the planar coordinates of the disturbance source are determined. Specifically, the distance from the disturbance source to the first electrode is an unknown, but the distance to the second electrode is equal to the unknown plus the first distance difference, and the distance to the third electrode is equal to the unknown plus the second distance difference. With the first and second electrodes as foci and the first distance difference as a fixed length, draw a first hyperbola. With the first and third electrodes as foci and the second distance difference as a fixed length, draw a second hyperbola. The intersection of the two hyperbolas on the plane is the location of the disturbance source. Since the three electrodes are distributed in concentric rings and are adjacent to each other, there is a unique intersection of the two hyperbolas in the region facing the first electrode. The coordinates of this intersection point are the planar coordinates of the disturbance source. Calculate the direction angle of the line connecting the plane coordinates of the disturbance source and the origin. This direction angle is referenced to the preset true north direction as zero degrees. The angle of clockwise or counterclockwise rotation is the plane azimuth angle. By combining the intensity attenuation factor of the disturbance signal, the radial distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is estimated, and the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are determined based on the plane azimuth and radial distance.

7. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things sensing according to claim 6, characterized in that, The specific steps for determining the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are as follows: The peak intensity of the disturbance signal recorded by the first electrode during the abnormal charge migration event is obtained. The peak intensity is the maximum voltage amplitude extracted from the charge fluctuation signal. The intensity attenuation factor, which was pre-calibrated through field testing, is called. The intensity attenuation factor is obtained by simulating intrusion events at different distances around the base station, measuring and recording the peak signal intensity received by the first electrode at each distance, and then fitting an attenuation curve. The peak intensity is compared with the intensity attenuation factor to find the propagation distance corresponding to the peak intensity. Based on the attenuation curve, the distance corresponding to the intensity value is found through the curve. This distance is the radial distance from the disturbance source to the first electrode. Given the coordinates of the first electrode and the azimuth angle of the disturbance source relative to the origin, it can be determined that the disturbance source is located on a ray extending from the origin along this azimuth angle. At the same time, the disturbance source is also located on a circle with the first electrode as the center and this radial distance as the radius. The intersection of this ray and the circle is the unique location of the disturbance source. Solving for this intersection point yields the radial distance of the disturbance source relative to the origin, which is the straight-line distance from the origin to the intersection point.

8. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things sensing according to claim 1, characterized in that, In S4, a first warning ring and a second warning ring are preset around the base station. The first warning ring is a circular area boundary defined with the base station core equipment area as the center and a first preset radius. The second warning ring is a circular area boundary defined with the same center and a second preset radius smaller than the first preset radius. Based on the movement trajectory of the intrusion target, the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target are continuously compared with the boundary of the first warning ring. When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is equal to or less than the first preset radius, it is determined that the movement trajectory has touched the first warning ring. Mechanical locking commands for the windows and vents of the base station equipment room are generated and sent to the electric lock or louver drive mechanism to control the window to be locked and the vent to be closed.

9. The method for unmanned remote operation and maintenance of base stations based on Internet of Things sensing according to claim 8, characterized in that, When the distance between the intrusion target and the core equipment area of ​​the base station is further reduced to equal to or less than the second preset radius, it is determined that the movement trajectory has touched the second warning ring. The azimuth angle of the target relative to the base station antenna is calculated based on the instantaneous coordinates of the intrusion target at the current moment. An attitude adjustment command for the base station antenna is generated and sent to the electric pan-tilt controller to drive the antenna to rotate in the horizontal direction so that the main lobe of the antenna deviates from the location of the intrusion target. After the intrusion target leaves the second warning ring, the antenna is instructed to return to the original preset working direction. When authorized base station maintenance personnel need to enter the base station, the base station's operation and maintenance center will issue an operation and maintenance work order. After the operation and maintenance work order is issued, a dynamic one-time token or temporary key will be generated. The token or key is bound to the maintenance personnel's identity ID and the time window of this inspection. When the maintenance personnel arrive at the perimeter of the base station, they need to send the dynamic one-time token or temporary key through their handheld terminal. The base station's receiver verifies the validity of the token and the time window. After successful verification, the base station will not immediately shut down the protection, but will enter the manned mode and send a log to the operation and maintenance center that personnel have entered and the protection is temporarily suspended. Once the verification is successful, the mechanical lock command for the window and vent will be automatically released, and the window and vent will be able to be opened normally again. When maintenance personnel only need to enter the computer room, the attitude adjustment function of the antenna feeder system should remain enabled. The system detects the disappearance of disturbance signals by detecting the charge induction array, and combines this with the disconnection of the GPS signal on the personnel's handheld terminal or the manual check-out operation to determine that the personnel have left the second warning ring. The base station then enters a preset safety countdown (e.g., five minutes). After confirming that no one is left behind, all suspended protection functions are automatically restored.

10. An unmanned remote operation and maintenance system for base stations based on Internet of Things (IoT) sensing, applied to the unmanned remote operation and maintenance method for base stations based on IoT sensing as described in any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, include: Data acquisition module: Acquires charge fluctuation signals collected by the charge sensing electrode array buried underground around the base station boundary; Migration event identification module: Based on charge fluctuation signals, it identifies abnormal charge migration events caused by disturbances in the air ionosphere near the ground. Intrusion detection module: Based on the arrival time difference of abnormal charge migration events on different sensing electrodes, determine the position coordinates and movement trajectory of the intrusion target relative to the base station; Intrusion prevention module: Based on the relative positional relationship between the movement trajectory and the preset base station electronic fence area, it executes physical protection trigger operations for the base station equipment.

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