A privacy protection and traceable identity management method and system for a low-latency vehicle networking environment
By combining pseudo-identity pre-generation with edge computing, the contradiction between privacy protection and traceability in the Internet of Vehicles is resolved. This approach enables low-latency communication and conditional traceability, improves system security and scalability, and avoids single points of failure and data leakage.
Patent Information
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- HUAIYIN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
- Filing Date
- 2026-04-17
- Publication Date
- 2026-07-14
AI Technical Summary
Existing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) identity management technologies suffer from contradictions between privacy protection and traceability, insufficient latency performance, and system architecture defects. They are difficult to achieve conditional traceability while protecting user privacy and meeting low-latency communication requirements, and they also pose risks of single points of failure and data leakage.
An identity management method combining pseudo-identity pre-generation and edge computing is adopted. Pseudo-identities are generated in batches by vehicles during non-real-time stages and cached in roadside units to achieve local fast authentication. A two-layer mapping relationship is constructed, and conditional traceability is achieved through collaboration between independent pseudo-identity management and real identity management agencies, avoiding single-point storage.
It achieves effective privacy protection in low-latency communication environments, prevents trajectory correlation and data leakage, meets millisecond-level authentication latency requirements, has conditional traceability and anti-correlation attack capabilities, and reduces system complexity and single point of failure risk.
Smart Images
Figure CN122394778A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention belongs to the field of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) information security technology, specifically relating to an identity management method, system, and computer-readable storage medium for low-latency V2X communication environments, and in particular a collaborative mechanism that can achieve vehicle identity privacy protection and condition traceability while ensuring low-latency communication performance. Background Technology
[0002] With the rapid development of intelligent connected vehicle technology, Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication has become a crucial technological foundation for realizing intelligent transportation systems and autonomous driving. V2X communication encompasses various communication modes, including vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V), vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I), vehicle-to-pedestrian (V2P), and vehicle-to-network (V2N), providing strong support for traffic safety, improved traffic efficiency, and intelligent mobility. However, while bringing significant social benefits, V2X also faces severe security and privacy challenges.
[0003] In the connected vehicle environment, vehicle authentication is a fundamental step in ensuring communication security. Traditional authentication schemes are primarily based on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems, employing long-term valid digital certificates or fixed identifiers for identity verification. For example, the connected vehicle security system defined by the IEEE 1609.2 standard uses periodically updated digital certificates for authentication. However, such schemes pose significant privacy risks: because certificates remain stable over a certain period, attackers can collect and analyze vehicle broadcast messages to continuously track and correlate vehicle behavior, seriously threatening users' location and identity privacy.
[0004] To address these issues, academia and industry have proposed various privacy protection solutions. Among them, pseudo-identity mechanisms are a relatively common technique. By periodically changing pseudo-identities, the direct link between a vehicle's real identity and communication behavior can be severed to some extent. For example, Chinese invention patent application publication number CN112437108A discloses a "decentralized identity authentication device and method for privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles," which employs a decentralized identity authentication mechanism to protect user privacy by dynamically generating pseudo-identities. However, this solution lacks an efficient conditional traceability mechanism, making it difficult to reconstruct identities in scenarios such as traffic accident accountability and evidence collection for illegal activities, thus failing to meet regulatory requirements.
[0005] In recent years, blockchain technology has been widely applied in the field of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) privacy protection. For example, Chinese invention patent authorization announcement number CN113395167B discloses a "Privacy-Protected Identity Authentication System and Method for Vehicle-to-Everything," which utilizes the distributed ledger characteristics of blockchain to achieve identity management and privacy protection. Furthermore, blockchain authentication schemes based on zero-knowledge proofs have also been proposed, completing identity authentication without disclosing user privacy information through zero-knowledge proof technology. However, blockchain solutions generally suffer from high computational overhead and high consensus latency. In scenarios like V2X where latency requirements are extremely stringent (typically requiring millisecond-level response), the consensus mechanism and distributed storage characteristics of blockchain can lead to significant performance bottlenecks, making it difficult to meet the real-time requirements of V2X communication.
[0006] Regarding traceability, existing technologies also have significant shortcomings. Some solutions employ centralized identity mapping databases, centrally storing the mapping relationship between pseudo-identities and real identities. While this facilitates traceability, it poses single points of failure and data leakage risks. For example, while relationship strength-based location privacy protection methods for connected vehicles achieve traceability of transmitted data, they rely on centralized blockchain nodes to store user data. If these nodes are compromised, it will lead to large-scale privacy leaks. Other solutions completely abandon traceability, adopting absolutely anonymous communication methods. Although this protects user privacy, it makes identity tracing impossible in the event of traffic accidents or illegal activities, failing to meet regulatory requirements.
[0007] Furthermore, existing solutions also have flaws in their system architecture design. Most solutions centralize the authentication process in the cloud or on a central server, resulting in high authentication latency and failing to meet the low-latency communication requirements of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. Although some solutions introduce edge computing concepts to decentralize the authentication task to roadside units (RSUs), they lack effective pseudo-identity pre-generation and caching mechanisms, still requiring frequent access to remote servers for authentication, which affects the real-time performance of the system.
[0008] In summary, existing vehicle-to-everything (V2X) identity management technologies have the following main problems:
[0009] The contradiction between privacy protection and traceability: Existing solutions struggle to achieve conditional traceability while protecting user privacy, either failing to adequately protect privacy or failing to meet regulatory traceability requirements;
[0010] Insufficient latency performance: Blockchain-based solutions suffer from consensus latency, and centralized authentication-based solutions suffer from network round-trip latency, both of which fail to meet the millisecond-level low-latency communication requirements of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication.
[0011] System architecture flaws: lack of effective edge computing optimization mechanisms, authentication process relies on remote servers, resulting in slow system response speed;
[0012] Single point of failure risk: Some solutions use centralized identity mapping storage, which poses a risk of single point of failure and data leakage.
[0013] Therefore, there is an urgent need in this field for an identity management method that can achieve anonymous vehicle identity authentication and conditionally traceable collaboration while ensuring low-latency communication, in order to solve the above-mentioned problems in the existing technology. Summary of the Invention
[0014] (a) Technical problems to be solved
[0015] This invention aims to solve the following technical problems existing in current vehicle network identity management technologies:
[0016] The contradiction between privacy protection and traceability: Existing technologies struggle to achieve conditional traceability while protecting vehicle user privacy. Either insufficient privacy protection allows for the tracking of vehicle trajectories, or complete anonymity fails to meet regulatory requirements such as accountability for traffic accidents and evidence collection for illegal activities.
[0017] Insufficient latency performance: Blockchain-based identity management solutions suffer from high consensus latency and large computational overhead, while centralized authentication solutions suffer from network round-trip latency. Neither can meet the millisecond-level low-latency communication requirements of the Internet of Vehicles.
[0018] System architecture defects: The existing solution lacks an effective edge computing optimization mechanism, and the authentication process relies too much on remote servers, resulting in slow system response speed and inability to adapt to high-density vehicle networking environments;
[0019] Single point of failure risk: Some solutions use a centralized identity mapping and storage mechanism, which poses a risk of single point of failure and data leakage. Once the central node is compromised, it will lead to large-scale privacy leaks.
[0020] (II) Technical Solution
[0021] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this invention provides a method for privacy protection and traceable identity management in low-latency vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environments, comprising the following steps:
[0022] Step S1: Vehicle Registration and Identification Generation
[0023] Vehicles are registered with an Identity Management Authority (IMA) to generate a unique Vehicle Identifier (VID), and the real identity information is bound and stored with the VID;
[0024] Step S2: Pre-generation of pseudo-identities
[0025] During the non-real-time phase, multiple pseudo-identities (PIDs) and their corresponding asymmetric key pairs are pre-generated in batches for vehicles, and the pseudo-identification parameters are synchronized to the Road Side Unit (RSU) for local caching.
[0026] Step S3: Low-latency local authentication
[0027] During vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, the vehicle selects an unused PID from the pseudo-identity pool, generates a digital signature using the corresponding private key, generates a one-time token, and sends a communication request containing the PID, signature, and token to the RSU. The RSU performs signature verification and token verification based on locally cached verification parameters and returns the authentication result.
[0028] Step S4: Constructing the two-level mapping relationship
[0029] A two-layer mapping relationship is constructed from PID to VID to real identity. The mapping relationship between PID and VID is managed by the Pseudonym Management Authority (PMA), while the mapping relationship between VID and real identity is managed by the IMA.
[0030] Step S5: Conditional Traceability Mechanism
[0031] When a traffic accident or illegal act requires identity tracing, the regulatory agency submits the PID to be traced to the PMA. After the PMA parses the corresponding VID, the regulatory agency then requests a query from the IMA. The IMA returns the real identity information, thus achieving identity tracing through collaboration between the two agencies.
[0032] Furthermore, in step S2, the pseudo-identity becomes invalid immediately after use to prevent association attacks; the size of the pseudo-identity pool is 10²~10 4 Each item is valid for 1 second to 5 minutes.
[0033] Furthermore, in step S3, the local authentication latency of the RSU is less than 10 milliseconds, and the token validity period is less than 1 second, which meets the millisecond-level low-latency communication requirements of the Internet of Vehicles.
[0034] Furthermore, in step S4, the PMA and IMA store the mapping relationship independently, so that no single organization can grasp the complete identity chain, thus preventing the misuse of identity information.
[0035] This invention also provides a privacy protection and traceable identity management system for low-latency vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environments, comprising:
[0036] The on-board unit (OBU) is used to generate a false identity and initiate communication.
[0037] Roadside Units (RSUs) are used to perform local fast authentication;
[0038] The Identity Management Authority (IMA) is used to manage the mapping relationship between a vehicle's real identity and its VID.
[0039] The Pseudo-Identity Management Authority (PMA) is used to manage the mapping relationship between PID and VID;
[0040] The audit module is used to record and analyze communication behavior.
[0041] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any of the preceding claims.
[0042] Compared with existing technologies, this invention has the following significant advantages: Significant privacy protection: Communication anonymity is achieved through a pseudo-identity mechanism. Vehicles use dynamically changing PIDs during communication, severing the direct link between real identity and communication behavior, effectively preventing trajectory tracking and privacy leaks; Excellent low-latency performance: Through a "non-real-time pseudo-identity pre-generation + edge caching" mechanism, the RSU can independently complete local authentication without accessing a remote server, with authentication latency less than 10 milliseconds, meeting the millisecond-level low-latency communication requirements of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication; Improved conditional traceability mechanism: Controllable traceability without single points of failure is achieved through a dual-mechanism weighted mapping structure. Demapping is only performed under authorized conditions via PMA and IMA, balancing privacy protection and regulatory needs; Optimized system architecture: No reliance on blockchain technology is required, reducing system complexity and computational overhead, and improving system scalability and engineering feasibility; Enhanced security: Separate storage of mapping relationships by dual mechanisms avoids single-point control of the complete identity chain, preventing identity information abuse and data leakage risks; Strong resistance to association attacks: Pseudo-identities become invalid immediately after use, and with a dynamic update mechanism, effectively preventing time-series-based association attacks. This invention achieves an effective balance between privacy protection and identity traceability in the Internet of Vehicles environment without the need for blockchain by introducing a pseudo-identity pre-generation mechanism, an edge computing authentication mechanism, and a decentralized traceability architecture. It has good engineering application value and promotion prospects. Attached Figure Description
[0043] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the present invention will be further described below in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. The drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort:
[0044] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall architecture of the vehicle network privacy protection and traceable identity management system provided in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0045] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the low-latency local authentication and pseudo-identity pre-generation process provided in an embodiment of the present invention;
[0046] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the conditional traceable identity reconstruction process provided in an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation
[0047] The specific embodiments of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are for illustrative purposes only and should not be construed as limiting the invention.
[0048] Example 1: Overall system architecture, such as Figure 1 As shown in the figure, the vehicle network privacy protection and traceable identity management system provided by the embodiment of the present invention includes an on-board unit (OBU), a roadside unit (RSU), an identity management authority (IMA), and a pseudo-identity management authority (PMA).
[0049] The On-Board Unit (OBU) is installed inside the vehicle and is used to generate pseudo-identities, perform local signature operations, and communicate with the Roadside Unit (RSU) via V2X. The Roadside Unit (RSU) is deployed at key road nodes and is used to perform local fast authentication and cache pseudo-identity parameters. The Identity Management Authority (IMA) is a trusted third-party organization that manages the mapping relationship between the vehicle's real identity and the Vehicle Identifier (VID). The Pseudo-Identity Management Authority (PMA) is an independent trusted third-party organization that manages the mapping relationship between pseudo-identities (PIDs) and the Vehicle Identifier (VID).
[0050] The Identity Management Authority (IMA) and the Pseudo-Identity Management Authority (PMA) operate independently, each storing different mapping relationships. No single authority can possess the complete identity chain, effectively preventing the misuse of identity information and the risk of data leakage. Preferably, no direct communication link is established between the IMA and PMA to further enhance system security.
[0051] Example 2: Low-latency local authentication and pseudo-identity pre-generation process, such as Figure 2 As shown, the low-latency local authentication and pseudo-identity pre-generation process provided in this embodiment of the invention includes the following steps:
[0052] Step S201: Batch Pre-generation of Pseudo-Identities: During the non-real-time phase, the vehicle pre-generates multiple pseudo-identities (PIDs) and their corresponding asymmetric key pairs in batches through the on-board unit, and stores the pseudo-identity authentication parameters in a local pseudo-identity pool. Preferably, the number of pseudo-identities is 100 to 10,000, and the validity period is 1 second to 5 minutes.
[0053] Step S202: Synchronization of pseudo-identity parameters: The vehicle synchronizes pseudo-identity parameters to the local cache module of a nearby roadside unit via V2I communication. The pseudo-identity parameters include the PID, corresponding public key, validity period, and digital signature. Preferably, the synchronization employs an incremental update mechanism, transmitting only newly added or updated parameters.
[0054] Step S203: Pseudo-identity selection and use: During vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication, the vehicle selects an unused PID from the local pseudo-identity pool, generates a digital signature using the corresponding private key, and generates a one-time token. Preferably, the token is valid for less than 1 second.
[0055] Step S204: Local authentication request: The vehicle sends an authentication request containing the PID, signature, and token to the roadside unit.
[0056] Step S205: Local fast verification: The roadside unit performs signature verification and token verification based on the locally cached verification parameters. After successful verification, it returns a successful authentication response. The entire authentication process has a latency of less than 10 milliseconds.
[0057] Step S206: Fake Identity Expiration Handling: After successful authentication, the PID is immediately marked as used and removed from the fake identity pool to prevent reuse and association attacks. Preferably, the roadside unit also adds the PID to its local blacklist to prevent replay attacks.
[0058] Example 3: Condition-traceable identity reconstruction process, such as Figure 3 As shown, the condition-traceable identity reconstruction process provided in this embodiment of the invention includes the following steps:
[0059] Step S301: Submission of Tracing Request: When a traffic accident or illegal act requires identity tracing, the regulatory agency submits the pseudo-identity (PID) to be traced and its authorization certificate to the pseudo-identity management agency. Preferably, the authorization certificate is issued by a judicial or traffic management department with legal authority.
[0060] Step S302: First-level mapping resolution: After verifying the validity of the authorization certificate, the pseudo-identity management agency queries the locally stored PID and VID mapping relationship to obtain the corresponding vehicle identifier (VID).
[0061] Step S303: Second-level mapping query: After obtaining the VID, the regulatory agency submits an identity query request and authorization certificate to the identity management agency.
[0062] Step S304: Return of Real Identity: After verifying the validity of the authorization certificate, the identity management agency queries the mapping relationship between VID and real identity stored locally and returns the real identity information of the vehicle.
[0063] Step S305: Identity tracing completed: The regulatory agency obtains the vehicle's true identity information and completes the traceable identity reconstruction process.
[0064] As can be seen from the above three embodiments, the present invention achieves this through... Figure 1 The system architecture shown Figure 2 The low-latency local authentication process shown and Figure 3 The conditional traceability process shown achieves an effective balance between privacy protection and identity traceability in the connected vehicle environment. The system does not rely on blockchain technology and meets the millisecond-level low-latency communication requirements of the connected vehicle network through a "pseudo-identity pre-generation + edge caching" mechanism. At the same time, the dual-mechanism weighted mapping structure ensures the security and controllability of conditional traceability.
[0065] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Various modifications and variations can be made to the present invention by those skilled in the art. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the present invention should be included within the scope of protection of the present invention.
Claims
1. A method for privacy protection and traceable identity management in a low-latency vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environment, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Vehicles register with an Identity Management Authority (IMA) and obtain a unique Vehicle Identifier (VID). The VID is bound to the vehicle's real identity information and stored in the IMA. Multiple pseudo-identities (PIDs) and their corresponding asymmetric key pairs are pre-generated in batches, and the verification parameters of the PIDs are synchronized to the Roadside Unit (RSU) for local caching. During communication, the vehicle selects an unused PID from the pseudo-identities, generates a digital signature and a one-time token using the corresponding private key, and sends an authentication request containing the PID, signature, and token to the RSU. The RSU performs signature verification and token verification based on the locally cached verification parameters to complete local authentication. A two-layer mapping relationship is constructed, where the mapping between PID and VID is managed by the PMA, and the mapping between VID and real identity is managed by the IMA. When identity traceability is required, the regulatory agency submits the PID to be traced to the PMA, the PMA returns the corresponding VID, the regulatory agency then queries the IMA, and the IMA returns the real identity information, achieving conditional traceability.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The pseudo-identity expires immediately after use, and each PID can only be used once to prevent replay attacks and correlation tracking.
3. The method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that, The number of pre-generated pseudo-identities is between 100 and 10,000, with a validity period of 1 second to 5 minutes; the validity period of the token is less than 1 second; and the local authentication delay of the RSU is less than 10 milliseconds.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The verification parameters include the PID, the corresponding public key, the validity period, and the digital signature generated using the VID private key; the RSU checks the token's validity, the signature's validity, and whether the PID has been used during verification.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The PMA and IMA are independent of each other and do not share a complete identity chain. No single institution can complete the mapping from PID to real identity on its own. Identity tracing can only be completed collaboratively when a regulatory agency provides legal authorization credentials.
6. A privacy protection and traceable identity management system for low-latency vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environments, characterized in that, include: The on-board unit (OBU) is used to generate a false identity, perform signature operations, and initiate V2X communication. Roadside Units (RSUs) are used to locally cache pseudo-authentication parameters and perform fast authentication; The Identity Management Authority (IMA) manages the mapping relationship between VID and real identity; the Pseudo-Identity Management Authority (PMA) manages the mapping relationship between PID and VID; wherein, the OBU and RSU communicate via a wireless link, and the RSU does not need to access a remote server during the authentication process.
7. The system according to claim 6, characterized in that, The RSU's local cache module uses an incremental update mechanism to receive pseudo authentication parameters synchronized by the OBU. The authentication processing module completes the verification and returns the result within 10 milliseconds.
8. The system according to claim 6, characterized in that, The IMA and PMA are deployed in different security domains, each holding independent encryption keys, and only respond to identity tracing requests with valid authorization credentials.
9. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the program is executed by the processor, it implements the method as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.
10. A vehicle-mounted device integrating a memory and a processor, characterized in that, The memory stores instructions that, when executed by the processor, control the vehicle-mounted device to perform vehicle-mounted operations as described in any one of claims 1 to 5, including pseudo-identity generation, signature calculation, and authentication interaction with the RSU.