A label code-based carrying device access verification method

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of carrying equipment access verification, and particularly relates to a carrying equipment access verification method based on label code, which obtains label identification and access scanning information set by scanning label code, determines equipment identification and generates access verification factor set, then determines expected state transition, expected carrying relationship and expected inspection effective relationship, generates each conflict value through multi-dimensional verification, forms joint dynamic conflict quantity and outputs regulation result for associated storage, the present application associates equipment identification and access scanning information set through label identification, generates access verification factor set and performs multi-dimensional verification, improves equipment state, carrying relationship and inspection effective relationship judgment integrity; the regulation result is outputted through conflict value and joint dynamic conflict quantity and associated storage, improving abnormal identification and tracing ability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of portable device access verification technology, and more specifically, to a portable device access verification method based on tag codes. Background Technology

[0002] In controlled areas such as office areas, experimental areas, production areas, storage areas, and classified areas, when personnel carry detectors, mobile terminals, tools, storage media, or other portable devices into or out of gates, it is usually necessary to verify the identity of the carried devices, the identity of the personnel, and the security check results. Existing methods commonly include affixing tags to the devices, registering device numbers, recording personnel information, saving security check results, and creating entry / exit records at the gate. These methods meet the requirements for device identification and basic access record retention, and are of positive significance for standardizing the daily entry and exit management of carried devices.

[0003] As the management of controlled areas becomes more refined, the verification of devices carried on board no longer only involves whether the device is registered or the tag is valid, but also the current status of the device, the current direction of travel, historical entry and exit closures, the gatekeeper's route, the binding or authorization relationship between the person carrying the device and the device, and the validity of the device inspection results in terms of object, direction, and time. For example, after the device enters the area, there should be a corresponding exit record; when the device leaves the area, the person carrying it may need to be consistent with the previous person carrying it, the bound person carrying it, or the authorized handover person; even if the device inspection result is passed, if the inspection direction, inspection object, or inspection time does not match the current scan, it may affect the current passage judgment.

[0004] Existing access control methods typically record equipment identification information, personnel information, inspection results, or entry / exit directions separately. However, in scenarios where multi-dimensional information is interdependent, relying solely on tag identification results, single-person authorization records, or the most recent inspection result can easily lead to difficulties in timely identifying situations such as incomplete status records, inconsistencies between entry / exit directions and equipment presence, shifts in the relationship between personnel, expired inspection results, or inconsistencies between the inspection direction and the current passage direction. These issues are not caused by a single missing data point, but rather by a lack of unified verification logic between equipment status, personnel relationships, and inspection validity.

[0005] Based on this, the present invention proposes a method for verifying the passage of portable devices based on tag codes. Summary of the Invention

[0006] In view of the shortcomings of the existing technology, the purpose of this invention is to provide a method for verifying the access of portable devices based on tag codes.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, the present invention provides the following technical solution: A method for verifying access to portable devices based on tag codes, comprising: Step 1: The security check terminal scans the tag code of the carried device to obtain the tag identification and collects the set of information for this passage scan; Step 2: Determine the device identifier based on the tag identifier, read the access verification data associated with the device identifier from the device access database, and generate a set of access verification factors including status verification factors, carry relationship verification factors, and valid inspection verification factors; Step 3: Based on the current passage direction, determine: Expected state migration, which is the device's state within / outside the area before passage and the target state after passage; Expected carrying relationship, which is the matching conditions for the binding carrying, authorized carrying, historical carrying, or authorized handover between the carrying personnel and the equipment; Expected check validity relationship, which is the condition that the check result is passed and the object, direction, and time meet the matching and validity conditions of this passage. Step 4: Compare the expected state transition, expected carrying relationship, and expected inspection effective relationship with the pass verification factor set respectively to generate directional state conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result directional timeliness decay value. Step 5: Generate a joint dynamic conflict quantity based on the directional status conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result directional time decay value, and output the results of allowing passage, re-inspecting equipment, verifying carrying relationship, refusing passage, or freezing the current passage status; associate and store tag identifier, equipment identifier, passage scan information set, each conflict value, joint dynamic conflict quantity, and control result.

[0008] In one embodiment, the access scanning information set includes the current person's identification, the current direction of travel, the current gatekeeper's identification, and the current scanning time; wherein, the current direction of travel is either the direction of entry or the direction of exit.

[0009] In one embodiment, the access verification data includes basic equipment information, equipment access status records, personnel carrying relationship records, equipment inspection binding records, and gatekeeper path rule records.

[0010] In one embodiment, in step two, a status verification factor set is generated based on the equipment access status record, gate path rule record, and access scan information set; a carrying relationship verification factor set is generated based on the equipment basic information, personnel carrying relationship record, and equipment access status record; and an inspection valid verification factor set is generated based on the equipment inspection binding record and access scan information set, and then merged into an access verification factor set.

[0011] In one embodiment, the status verification factor set includes a presence status sub-factor, a passage closure sub-factor, and a gate path sub-factor; wherein, the value of the presence status sub-factor includes the status within the area, the status outside the area, or the status is undetermined.

[0012] In one embodiment, the carry relationship verification factor set includes binding carry sub-factors, authorized carry sub-factors, historical carry sub-factors, and authorized handover sub-factors; wherein, the binding carry sub-factors are generated from the basic equipment information, the authorized carry sub-factors and authorized handover sub-factors are generated from the personnel carry relationship records, and the historical carry sub-factors are generated from the equipment passage status records.

[0013] In one embodiment, the set of valid verification factors includes inspection result sub-factors, object consistency sub-factors, direction consistency sub-factors, and timeliness sub-factors; wherein, the inspection result sub-factor is generated from the most recent equipment inspection result in the equipment inspection binding record; the object consistency sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the tag identifier, equipment identifier, current personnel identifier, and current gate identifier; the direction consistency sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the current direction of passage; and the timeliness sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the current scanning time.

[0014] In one embodiment, in step three, the desired state transition is determined according to the current travel direction; When the current travel direction is the inbound direction, the expected state transition includes an initial state that is outside the area and a target state that is inside the area; when the current travel direction is the outbound direction, the expected state transition includes an initial state that is inside the area and a target state that is outside the area; the expected carrying relationship is determined according to the current travel direction; When the current direction of travel is inbound, the expected carrying relationship includes matching the current carrying personnel identifier with the bound carrying sub-factor or authorized carrying sub-factor; when the current direction of travel is outbound, the expected carrying relationship includes matching the current carrying personnel identifier with at least one of the historical carrying sub-factor, the bound carrying sub-factor, or the authorized handover sub-factor. The expected valid relationship for inspection includes the following: the inspection result sub-factor is passed, the object consistency sub-factor matches the current scan, the direction consistency sub-factor matches the current passage direction, and the timeliness sub-factor is valid relative to the current scanning time.

[0015] In one embodiment, step four involves generating directional state conflict values ​​based on a preset conflict mapping rule base, including: A state deviation component is generated based on the degree of deviation between the present state sub-factor and the initial state defined by the desired state transition; a closure anomaly component is generated based on the passage closure sub-factor; a path anomaly component is generated based on the gate path sub-factor; and a direction state gain coefficient is generated based on the current passage direction. The state deviation component, closure anomaly component, and path anomaly component are normalized and fused, and the gain is processed according to the directional state gain coefficient to obtain the directional state conflict value.

[0016] In one embodiment, step four involves generating personnel-equipment relationship drift values ​​based on a preset conflict mapping rule base, including: generating binding deviation components, authorization deviation components, historical continuity deviation components, and handover deviation components based on the matching results of the current carrying personnel identifier with the bound carrying sub-factor, authorized carrying sub-factor, historical carrying sub-factor, and authorized handover sub-factor, respectively. Based on the current travel direction, the binding deviation component, authorization deviation component, historical continuity deviation component, and handover deviation component are directionally fused to obtain the personnel and equipment relationship drift value.

[0017] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects: This invention scans the tag code corresponding to the carried device by the security inspection terminal, obtains the tag identification and collects the set of access scanning information associated with this scan, and further determines the device identification based on the tag identification, so that the device identification and the on-site access information collection form a corresponding relationship, which improves the integrity and consistency of the initial data for the verification of carried devices; By reading access verification data associated with equipment identifiers from the equipment access database and generating a set of access verification factors in combination with the access scanning information set, the expected state migration, expected carrying relationship and expected inspection validity relationship are determined accordingly. This enables the current access status of equipment, personnel carrying relationship and inspection result validity to be comprehensively judged in the same verification process, thereby improving the access verification's ability to identify abnormal status, abnormal relationship and abnormal inspection. By generating directional status conflict values, personnel and equipment relationship drift values, and inspection result directional time-lapse values ​​through multi-dimensional verification, and further generating joint dynamic conflict quantities, the system outputs the following results based on at least one of the joint dynamic conflict quantities, directional status conflict values, and inspection result directional time-lapse values: allow passage, re-inspection of equipment, verification of carrying relationships, denial of passage, or freezing of the current passage status. This ensures that the control results match the specific source of the conflict. At the same time, the system associates and stores the tag identifier, equipment identifier, passage scanning information set, each conflict value, joint dynamic conflict quantity, and control results, improving the traceability and record closure of the passage verification process. Attached Figure Description

[0018] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the overall process of a tag-based method for verifying the access of portable devices according to the present invention. Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the generation of the universal verification factor set of this invention; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the multi-dimensional verification and conflict value generation of the expected state transition, expected carrying relationship, and expected valid relationship checking of the present invention. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the combined dynamic conflict quantity, control results, and associated storage of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] Reference Figure 1 A method for verifying access to portable devices based on tag codes, comprising: Step one: The security checkpoint scans the tag code corresponding to the carried device to obtain the tag identifier and collects a set of access scanning information associated with this scan. The tag code serves as the identification entry point for the carried device in the access scenario. The security checkpoint obtains the tag identifier by scanning the tag code and establishes a correspondence between this scan and the carried device. The access scanning information set records the on-site access information at the time of this scan, giving this verification a clear context of personnel, direction, gate, and time, avoiding isolated judgments based solely on tag identifiers. When the security check terminal scans the tag code corresponding to the carried device, the security check terminal reads the encoded content in the tag code at the current gate position and performs integrity verification, format verification, and duplicate scan verification on the encoded content. After the verification is passed, the encoded content is parsed into the tag identifier, and this reading action is bound to the gate where the security check terminal is located, the time of the scan, and the data collection results of the person carrying the device on site as the same passage scan event. For example, at the entrance gate of the office area, staff members enter the area carrying portable detectors with labels attached. The security terminal reads the label code to obtain the label identification, and at the same time reads the identification of the current person carrying the device formed by the staff member swiping their card, recognizing their ID, or confirming manually, and records the current gate identification corresponding to the security terminal. The security check terminal collects a set of access scanning information associated with this access scanning event. The access scanning information set includes the current person's identification, current direction of passage, current gate identification, and current scanning time. The current direction of passage is determined as either the entry or exit direction based on the access attributes of the channel where the security check terminal is located, the positional relationship between the inner and outer sides of the gate, or the on-site selection result. The current scanning time is generated by the security check terminal when the tag code is successfully read and the event binding is completed. For example, when the same portable detector is scanned at the entrance gate, the current direction of passage is recorded as the direction of entry, the current gate identifier is recorded as the entrance gate number, the current scanning time is recorded as the time when the scan was successful, and the current person carrying the portable detector is recorded as the identity identifier of the staff member carrying the portable detector on site. This forms a unique set of passage scanning information corresponding to this scan.

[0020] Reference Figure 2Step two involves determining the device identifier based on the tag identifier, retrieving the access verification data associated with the device identifier from the device access database, and generating a set of access verification factors based on the access verification data and the access scanning information set. After establishing the correspondence between the tag identifier and the device identifier, the access verification data associated with that device identifier in the device access database is retrieved, and the access scanning information set collected on-site is matched and organized with the existing access verification data. The set of access verification factors reflects the status, relationship, and inspection-related information required for this verification, transforming the scattered database records into the verification basis for this access decision. Based on the tag obtained in step one, the security terminal retrieves the device identifiers that are bound to the tag identifiers in the device access database, and reads the access verification data associated with the device identifiers. The access verification data includes basic device information, device access status records, personnel carrying relationship records, device inspection binding records, and gate path rule records. The collection of information from this pass scan is denoted as The device access database includes at least tag device mapping records, basic device information, device access status records, personnel carrying relationship records, device inspection binding records, gate access path rule records, and parameter configuration records. Tag device mapping records are denoted as A, basic device information as E, device access status records as G, personnel carrying relationship records as U, device inspection binding records as I, gate access path rule records as L, and parameter configuration records as […]. The empty set is denoted as The above records satisfy:

[0021] in, This is the collection of information from this pass scan. For the current personnel identification, This is the current direction of travel. This is the current gatekeeper sign. This is the current scanning time. For label identification, For equipment identification, For tag device mapping status, For equipment category, To bind the person carrying the item, For the device name, For recording the direction of passage, For access control and gate signage, For the passage record time, For the identification of the person carrying the pass, The status is the pass record. For the set of authorized personnel identification, For the collection of identification marks of authorized personnel, To record the effective start time, To record the effective expiration time, For the inspection items, For identifying personnel within the inspection targets, To check the gate sign, To check the direction, For equipment inspection time, For equipment inspection results, For gate control level, To allow the gatekeepers to assemble, For the gatekeeper's route sequence, Configure indexes for parameters. Configure a set of parameters. This refers to the parameter version number. Tag device mapping status. The possible values ​​include valid, disabled, or unbound; access record status. The values ​​include formal status transition records, records pending review, or invalidated records; equipment inspection results. The possible values ​​are: pass, fail, or not checked; For example, a label corresponds to a portable detector. The basic equipment information records the equipment name, registration number, bound personnel identification and equipment category of the portable detector. The equipment access status record records the access record of the portable detector in the direction of entry or exit most recently. The personnel carrying relationship record records the authorized personnel carrying the equipment and the authorized personnel handing over the equipment. The equipment inspection binding record records the most recent equipment inspection result, inspection object, inspection gate, inspection direction and inspection time. The gate path rule record records the gate range and path order that the portable detector is allowed to pass through. A status verification factor set is generated based on the equipment access status record, gate access path rule record, and access scan information set. The status verification factor set includes the presence status sub-factor, access closure sub-factor, and gate access path sub-factor. The values ​​of the presence status sub-factor include the status within the area, the status outside the area, or the status is undetermined. The security check terminal filters data from the equipment access status records that match the equipment identifier. Corresponding and recording status Formal state transition record and pass record time No later than the current scanning time The passage records are used to obtain a set of valid passage records. Valid pass record set The longest recorded passage time is recorded as The direction of passage recorded in this record is denoted as The access record gate identification is recorded as follows: The corresponding person's identification for this record is recorded as follows: . , Presence state factor and historical carrier factors satisfy:

[0022] in, Representing records The device identifier field in Representing records The pass record status field, Representing records The passage record time field, For the presence state factor, For historical carry-sub-factors. If If the passage record direction is the inbound direction, then the device was within the area before this scan; if If the passage record indicates a departure direction, then the device was outside the area before this scan; if no valid passage record set exists... If the present state sub-factor is undetermined, the history-carrying sub-factor is an empty set; Passage closure sub-factor denoted as The security check terminal uses the set of valid passage records. Filter the set of records by direction of entry and departure direction record set and according to the passage record time Establish closed pairings between entry direction records and exit direction records. , and satisfy:

[0023] in, For the passable closure sub-factor, For the set of entry directions The number of records in Set of records for departure direction The number of records in the record. The entry direction record is the one that appears later than the exit direction record, referring to the same device identifier. In the following case, the passage time of the entry direction record is less than the passage time of its paired exit direction record. When a closure conflict exists or cannot be confirmed, the passage closure sub-factor participates in the value of the closure anomalous component. Gatekeeper path sub-factor denoted as Key gatekeepers are marked as Gatekeeper route rule record The permitted gathering of gatekeepers is denoted as The gatekeeper's route sequence is recorded as follows: The gate control level is recorded as follows: The access control identifier corresponding to the last formal state migration record on the equipment is recorded as follows: . and Determine using the following formula:

[0024] in, The current gatekeeper identifier in the pass scan information set. For gatekeeper path sub-factors, Mark key gates, Allowed device categories in the gatekeeper path rule record Meet at the designated gate. To allow gatekeepers to assemble The order of passage within, Current gatekeeper sign The corresponding gate control level. An empty set indicates that there is no record of the previous formal state transition. When the value is 1, the gate gain coefficient Take duty at key gates; When the value is 0, the gatekeeper gain coefficient Take the duty roster as a regular gatekeeper; For example, if the device access status record shows that the last official access record of the portable detector is in the direction of entry and there is no matching record in the direction of exit, the presence status sub-factor takes the status within the area. If the current access direction in the current access scan information set is still in the direction of entry, the access closure sub-factor reflects the abnormal situation of the entry record not being closed. If the current gate identifier does not match the gate path rule record, the gate path sub-factor reflects the path deviation. A set of verification factors for carrying relationships is generated based on basic equipment information, personnel carrying relationship records, and equipment access status records. A set of valid verification factors for inspection is generated based on equipment inspection binding records and access scanning information. The set of status verification factors, carrying relationship verification factors, and valid inspection verification factors are then combined into a set of access verification factors. The set of carrying relationship verification factors includes binding carrying sub-factors, authorized carrying sub-factors, historical carrying sub-factors, and authorized handover sub-factors. Binding carrying sub-factors are generated from basic equipment information, authorized carrying sub-factors and authorized handover sub-factors are generated from personnel carrying relationship records, and historical carrying sub-factors are generated from equipment access status records. The binding of the sub-factor is denoted as Authorization to carry sub-factors is denoted as The authorization handover sub-factor is denoted as The historical sub-factor matching state is denoted as Personnel carrying relationship record The set of authorized personnel identifiers in the middle is denoted as The set of authorized handover personnel identifiers is denoted as The effective start time of the record is recorded as The effective date of the record is recorded as follows: . , , and Determine using the following formula:

[0025] in, For the current personnel identification, To bind the person carrying the item, For history to carry sub-factors, This is the current scanning time. An empty set indicates that there are no records of authorized personnel carrying the item. An empty set indicates that there are no records of authorized personnel handing over tasks. , , and The value can be a match, a non-match, or a missing value, and it participates in the values ​​of the binding deviation component, the authorization deviation component, the handover deviation component, and the historical continuity deviation component. The valid verification factor set includes inspection result sub-factors, object consistency sub-factors, direction consistency sub-factors, and timeliness sub-factors. The inspection result sub-factor is generated from the most recent equipment inspection result in the equipment inspection binding record. The object consistency sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the tag identifier, equipment identifier, current personnel identifier, and current gate identifier. The direction consistency sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the current passage direction. The timeliness sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the current scanning time. The security inspection terminal filters for devices with the correct identification from the device inspection and binding records. and label Correspondence, equipment inspection time No later than the current scanning time The inspection records are used to obtain a candidate inspection record set. Candidate inspection record set The inspection record with the longest inspection time is recorded as . The inspection results are recorded as follows The personnel identification of the inspection targets is recorded as follows: Check the gatekeeper sign and record it as follows The direction of inspection is recorded as The most recent equipment inspection time is recorded as Candidate inspection record set and satisfy:

[0026] The sub-factor of the inspection result is denoted as The consistent sub-factor of the object is denoted as The direction-consistent sub-factor is denoted as Time factor is denoted as The above sub-factors are determined by the following formula:

[0027] in, Representing records The device identifier field in Representing records The label identifier field in Representing records The equipment inspection time field in the data. To examine the result sub-factors, For object consistency sub-factors, For direction-consistent sub-factors, As a time-dependent factor, This is the preset effective duration. and These are the current person's identification, the current gatekeeper's identification, the current direction of travel, and the current scanning time; For example, if the most recent equipment inspection result is passed, but the inspection direction is the inbound direction and the current passage direction is the outbound direction, the direction consistency sub-factor record is a mismatch. If the time between the most recent equipment inspection and the current scanning time exceeds the preset valid time, the timeliness sub-factor record is invalid. All of the above sub-factors together constitute the set of passage verification factors for this passage.

[0028] Step 3: Based on the tag identifier, device identifier, access scan information set, and access verification factor set, determine the expected state transition, expected carrying relationship, and expected inspection validity relationship. Expected state transition reflects the state change relationship that the carried device should meet under the current passage direction; expected carrying relationship reflects the personnel-equipment relationship that should be met between the current carrying personnel identifier and the carried device; and expected inspection validity relationship reflects the object, direction, and time validity relationship that should be met between the most recent device inspection result and this scan. Through this step, this scan is no longer just a tag reading, but is incorporated into a comprehensive verification scenario of device status, personnel relationship, and inspection validity. Based on the tag identifier, device identifier, and current travel direction in the access scanning information set, combined with the presence status sub-factor, access closure sub-factor, and gate path sub-factor in the access verification factor set, the expected state transition corresponding to this scan is determined. When the current travel direction is an inbound direction, the expected state transition includes an initial state of being outside the area and a target state of being inside the area, indicating that the carried device should be in an outside-area state before this scan and should enter the area state after this scan is completed. When the current travel direction is a outbound direction, the expected state transition includes an initial state of being inside the area and a target state of being outside the area, indicating that the carried device should be in an area state before this scan and should leave the area after this scan is completed. For example, when a portable detector is scanned at the entrance gate and the current passage direction is the inbound direction, if the presence state sub-factor in the passage verification factor set is an out-of-area state, then the presence state sub-factor is consistent with the initial state in the expected state transition. If the presence state sub-factor is an in-area state, it indicates that the current inbound direction scan deviates from the existing passage state. Based on the tag identifier, device identifier, current personnel identifier, and the binding carrying sub-factor, authorized carrying sub-factor, historical carrying sub-factor, authorized handover sub-factor, inspection result sub-factor, object consistency sub-factor, direction consistency sub-factor, and timeliness sub-factor in the access verification factor set, the expected carrying relationship and expected inspection validity relationship are determined. When the current passage direction is the inbound direction, the expected carrying relationship includes the current personnel identifier matching the binding carrying sub-factor or authorized carrying sub-factor, indicating that the device should be carried by a registered or authorized personnel when entering the area. When the current passage direction is the outbound direction, the expected carrying relationship includes the current personnel identifier matching at least one of the historical carrying sub-factor, binding carrying sub-factor, or authorized handover sub-factor, indicating that the device's historical carrying record, registration binding relationship, and authorized handover relationship within the area are taken into account when leaving the area. The expected inspection validity relationship includes the inspection result sub-factor being passed, the object consistency sub-factor matching the current scan, the direction consistency sub-factor matching the current passage direction, and the timeliness sub-factor being valid relative to the current scanning time. For example, if a portable detector is registered and bound by staff member A, and staff member B has an authorized carrying record for the entry direction, when staff member B carries the portable detector to the entrance gate and scans the code, if the current carrying personnel identifier matches the authorized carrying sub-factor, and the most recent equipment inspection result is passed, the inspection object matches the label identifier and equipment identifier, the inspection gate identifier matches the current gate identifier, the inspection direction matches the entry direction, and the inspection time has not exceeded the validity period, then the expected carrying relationship and expected inspection validity relationship corresponding to this scan both meet the verification requirements.

[0029] Reference Figure 3Step four involves performing multi-dimensional verification of the expected state transition, expected carry-over relationship, and expected inspection validity relationship against the pass verification factor set. Based on a preset conflict mapping rule base, directional state conflict values, personnel / equipment relationship drift values, and inspection result directional timeliness decay values ​​are generated. The expected state transition, expected carry-over relationship, and expected inspection validity relationship serve as reference relationships that should be satisfied for this pass. The pass verification factor set provides the actual verification basis, and deviations between the two are identified through multi-dimensional verification.

[0030] Preset valid duration By equipment category Inspection items and gate control level Determined jointly. Inspection items. The inspection item field is obtained from the equipment inspection binding record; if the equipment inspection binding record does not contain the inspection item field, it is obtained from the equipment inspection binding record. Retrieve general inspection items. The preset effective duration configuration record is recorded as follows. satisfy:

[0031] in, Configure records for preset valid durations. For this equipment category Inspection items and gate control level The minimum valid duration that can be configured below. To allow the maximum valid duration of the configuration, Configure a value for the effective duration written to the database. The preset effective duration is used to calculate the directional time decay value of the inspection results. and All times are greater than 0, and the time unit is the current scanning time. And the time of the most recent equipment inspection The time difference remains consistent. The preset valid duration configuration record was not hit. hour, Take 30 minutes. Take 1440 minutes, Take 240 minutes; The pre-defined conflict mapping rule base converts different types of deviations into directional state conflict values, personnel and equipment relationship drift values, and inspection result directional timeliness decay values, so that state abnormalities, carrying relationship abnormalities, and inspection result abnormalities in direction and timeliness each have numerical results that can participate in comprehensive judgment. The default conflict mapping rule base establishes a set of rule entries based on the current pass scan event. This set of rule entries is denoted as... The rule entries are denoted as ,satisfy:

[0032] in, To pre-define the conflict mapping rule base, For the first One rule entry, For the rule entry number, The total number of rule entries. The current travel direction adapted to the rule entry. The current gatekeeper identifier adapted to the rule entry. For the input sub-factor condition set, For the set of values ​​of conflicting components, For the set of weights and gain coefficients, For the threshold set, Prioritize the regulation results. Input sub-factor condition set. It includes at least one or more of the following sub-factors: presence status, passage closure, gate path, binding and carrying, authorized carrying, historical carrying, authorized handover, inspection result, object consistency, direction consistency, and timeliness. The security terminal, in this scanning event, follows the current passage direction. and current gate sign Match the rule entries and determine the conflict components, weights, gain coefficients, thresholds, and priority of the control results according to the matched rule entries; When performing multi-dimensional verification of expected state transition, expected carrying relationship, and expected inspection validity relationship with the set of access verification factors, the security terminal reads the presence status sub-factor, access closure sub-factor, gate path sub-factor, binding carrying sub-factor, authorized carrying sub-factor, historical carrying sub-factor, authorized handover sub-factor, inspection result sub-factor, object consistency sub-factor, direction consistency sub-factor, and timeliness sub-factor according to the current passage direction, and classifies the above sub-factors into the three verification dimensions of status verification, carrying relationship verification, and inspection validity verification. For example, if a portable detector is scanned at an exit gate and the current direction of passage is the departure direction, the expected state transition requires the initial state to be the state within the area and the target state to be the state outside the area. If the presence state sub-factor is the state outside the area and the passage closure sub-factor shows that there is no corresponding entry direction record, then the scanning event has a significant deviation in the state verification dimension. When generating directional state conflict values ​​based on a preset conflict mapping rule base, a state deviation component is generated according to the degree of deviation between the present state sub-factor and the initial state defined by the desired state transition; a closure anomaly component is generated according to the passage closure sub-factor; a path anomaly component is generated according to the gate path sub-factor; and a directional state gain coefficient is generated according to the current passage direction. In one value method, complete consistency corresponds to a lower component, undetermined state corresponds to an intermediate component, and opposite direction or missing record corresponds to a higher component. The entry direction and exit direction are assigned different directional state gain coefficients according to the gate management requirements. The state deviation component, closure anomaly component, and path anomaly component are normalized and fused, and gain processing is performed according to the directional state gain coefficient to obtain the directional state conflict value. The initial state defined by the expected state transition is denoted as The direction state conflict value is recorded as The state deviation component is denoted as The closed abnormal component is denoted as Path anomaly components are denoted as The directional state gain coefficient is denoted as The weight of the state deviation component is denoted as The weights of the closed outlier components are denoted as The weight of the path anomaly component is denoted as . and Determine using the following formula:

[0033]

[0034] in, The initial state is defined by the desired state transition. For the presence state factor, For the passable closure sub-factor, For gatekeeper path sub-factors, and The values ​​range from 0 to 1. Within a default value, Take 0.40, Take 0.35, Set the value to 0.25. Parameter configuration set. If a corresponding value exists, configure the set according to the parameters. Read ; For example, when the portable detector is scanning in the departure direction, if the on-site state sub-factor is in the outside state, the passage closure sub-factor has an unclosed anomaly, and the gate path sub-factor does not conform to the exit gate path rule, then the direction state conflict value is in the high range. When generating personnel and equipment relationship drift values ​​based on the preset conflict mapping rule base, according to the matching results of the current carrying personnel identifier with the bound carrying sub-factor, authorized carrying sub-factor, historical carrying sub-factor and authorized handover sub-factor, the binding deviation component, authorized deviation component, historical continuity deviation component and handover deviation component are generated respectively, and the above components are directionally fused according to the current passage direction to obtain the personnel and equipment relationship drift value; The personnel and equipment relationship drift value is denoted as The binding deviation component is denoted as The authorized deviation component is denoted as Historical continuity deviation component is denoted as The handover deviation component is denoted as . and Determine using the following formula:

[0035]

[0036] in, To bind and carry sub-factors, To authorize the carrying of sub-factors, For historical sub-factor matching status, For the authorization handover sub-factor, and The values ​​range from 0 to 1. In the inbound direction, the personnel-equipment relationship drift value decreases when either the binding-carrying sub-factor or the authorized-carrying sub-factor is satisfied; in the outbound direction, the personnel-equipment relationship drift value decreases when either the historical-carrying sub-factor, the binding-carrying sub-factor, or the authorized-handover sub-factor is satisfied. For example, in the "entering" direction, if the current personnel identifier does not match the bound sub-factor but matches the authorized sub-factor, the binding deviation component is high and the authorization deviation component is low, and the personnel-equipment relationship drift value remains within the verifiable range. In the "leaving" direction, if the current personnel identifier does not match either the historical sub-factor or the authorized handover sub-factor, even if it has a historical authorization relationship with the authorized sub-factor, the influence weight of the historical continuity deviation component and the handover deviation component is still increased during directional fusion, resulting in a higher personnel-equipment relationship drift value. In the same multi-dimensional verification process, the inspection result sub-factor, object consistency sub-factor, direction consistency sub-factor, and timeliness sub-factor are also compared with the expected valid inspection relationship. If the most recent equipment inspection result fails, the inspection object does not match the current scan, the inspection direction does not match the current passage direction, or the inspection time is invalid relative to the current scanning time, the inspection result direction timeliness decay value is formed according to the preset conflict mapping rule library. The directional aging decay value of the inspection result is recorded as follows: The deviation of the inspection result from the component is recorded as The deviation of the object from the component is denoted as The directional deviation component is denoted as The time-degradation component is denoted as The deviation of the inspection result from the component weight is recorded as The deviation of the object from the component weight is denoted as The weight of the component deviating from the direction is denoted as The weight of the time-deterioration component is denoted as . and Determine using the following formula:

[0037] in, To examine the result sub-factors, For object consistency sub-factors, For direction-consistent sub-factors, The most recent equipment inspection time. To preset the effective duration, and The values ​​range from 0 to 1. Within a default value, Take 0.35, Take 0.25, Take 0.20, Set the value to 0.20. Parameter configuration set. If a corresponding value exists, configure the set according to the parameters. Read and .

[0038] Reference Figure 4 Step 5: Generate a joint dynamic conflict quantity based on the pass scan information set, pass verification factor set, direction status conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result direction timeliness decay value. The joint dynamic conflict quantity is denoted as The direction state conflict value is recorded as The personnel and equipment relationship drift value is recorded as The directional aging decay value of the inspection result is recorded as follows: The direction state conflict value is in the current travel direction. The combined weights are denoted as The personnel and equipment relationship drift value in the current travel direction The combined weights are denoted as The inspection results show that the directional time decay value is in the current travel direction. The combined weights are denoted as Joint dynamic conflict quantity Calculate using the following formula:

[0039] Not from parameter configuration set Read or When the default value is determined by the following formula:

[0040] in, The value range is 0 to 1. In the entering direction, the composite weight of the inspection result direction time-depletion value is higher than the direction state conflict value and the personnel / equipment relationship drift value; in the leaving direction, the composite weight of the direction state conflict value is higher than the personnel / equipment relationship drift value and the inspection result direction time-depletion value. The system outputs a control result based on at least one of the following: joint dynamic conflict quantity, directional status conflict value, and inspection result directional time-lapse value. The control result includes: permission to pass, re-inspection of equipment, verification of carrying relationship, refusal to pass, or freezing of the current passage status. The joint dynamic conflict quantity aggregates the passage scan information set, the passage verification factor set, the directional status conflict value, the personnel-equipment relationship drift value, and the inspection result directional time-lapse value, reflecting the overall conflict level in this passage event. The control result is based on at least one of the following: joint dynamic conflict quantity, directional status conflict value, and inspection result directional time-lapse value. Different levels of anomalies correspond to different handling methods, covering both normal passage permission results and re-inspection results, carrying relationship verification results, refusal to pass results, and freezing of the current passage status, maintaining the correspondence between passage verification and on-site handling. The parameter configuration index is denoted as The parameter configuration set is denoted as The parameter version number is recorded as . and parameter configuration records satisfy:

[0041] in, Obtained from the equipment category field in the equipment basic information. It is obtained from the gate control level field in the gate path rule record. Obtained from the current direction of travel in the pass scan information set. In These are the weights for state deviation components, closure anomaly components, and path anomaly components, respectively. These are the component weights for deviation of inspection results, deviation of objects, deviation of direction, and decay of time, respectively. This is the directional state gain coefficient. This is the gatekeeper gain coefficient. These are the directional status conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result directional time decay value in the current travel direction. The combined weights under the following conditions To preset the effective duration, The threshold for allowing passage. To check the threshold, For relation threshold, The rejection threshold, The high-risk threshold Record parameter version. The historical access record set is denoted as... The historical record number is recorded as , No. The historical directional state conflict value, historical personnel and equipment relationship drift value, historical inspection result directional timeliness decay value, and historical handling label of each historical record are respectively recorded as follows: and Historical Disposal Labels The value can be either a normal record or an abnormal record. The set of normal records, the set of abnormal records, the number of normal records, and the number of abnormal records are denoted as follows: and .when At that time, the mean values ​​of the historical state deviation component, the historical closure anomaly component, the historical path anomaly component, the historical inspection result deviation component, the historical object deviation component, the historical direction deviation component, and the historical timeliness decay component are respectively denoted as: and And generate the weights and thresholds according to the following formula:

[0042]

[0043] in, The first Historical state deviation components, historical closure anomaly components, and historical path anomaly components of historical records. The first The historical inspection results deviation component, historical object deviation component, historical direction deviation component, and historical timeliness decay component are included in the historical record. The mean is low risk. This is a high-risk average. and These are the average values ​​of individual conflicts in the abnormal records. If or Then use the parameter configuration set The default value in; The directional state gain coefficient is denoted as The gatekeeper gain coefficient is denoted as Current direction of travel The directional risk level is recorded as Current gate sign The risk level of the gate is recorded as . and The values ​​range from 0 to 2, where 0 represents low risk, 1 represents medium risk, and 2 represents high risk. (Not from the parameter configuration set) Read or hour, and Determine using the following formula:

[0044] in, This is the current direction of travel. For gate control level, This is the current gatekeeper sign. Marking key gatehouses. If the gatehouse control level... If missing, then Take 1; if the key gate marker is marked If missing, then Take 0. and All calculation results are rounded to two decimal places. The device access status record prior to this scanning event is recorded as follows: The device access status record after handling this scanning incident is recorded as follows: The freeze marker is denoted as The associated storage record is denoted as , and Determine using the following formula:

[0045] in, This is a record of the device access status prior to this scanning event. This is a record of the device access status after the handling of this scanning incident. For freezing, To associate and store records, This is the collection of information from this pass scan. To allow passage and When entering a direction, the device access status record is updated to the status within the area and written to the access record for the entering direction; To allow passage and When leaving the area, the device's passage status record is updated to the outside status, and the current departure passage record is associated with the matching entry passage record to form a closed record. When the current passage status is frozen, Keep as , If the value is 1, this scan event will be written to the pending review record, but not to the formal state migration record; The system associates and stores the following information: tag identifier, equipment identifier, access scan information set, directional status conflict value, personnel-equipment relationship drift value, inspection result directional time-lapse value, combined dynamic conflict amount, and control result. The tag identifier, equipment identifier, and access scan information set record the basic information of this access event; the directional status conflict value, personnel-equipment relationship drift value, inspection result directional time-lapse value, and combined dynamic conflict amount record the judgment process of this verification; and the control result records the on-site handling conclusion. After the above information is associated and stored, a consistent traceability chain is maintained for the access records, anomaly judgments, and handling results of the same carrying equipment. Based on the set of access scanning information, the set of access verification factors, the direction status conflict value, the personnel and equipment relationship drift value, and the inspection result direction timeliness decay value, a joint dynamic conflict quantity is generated. During generation, the current access direction, the current gate sign, and the current scanning time are used as on-site constraints for this access event. The on-site status sub-factor, access closure sub-factor, gate path sub-factor, binding and carrying sub-factor, authorized carrying sub-factor, historical carrying sub-factor, authorized handover sub-factor, inspection result sub-factor, object consistency sub-factor, direction consistency sub-factor, and timeliness sub-factor are used as verification constraints. Different conflict synthesis weights are set according to the entry direction and the exit direction. For example, when a portable detector scans the departure direction at an exit gate, if the direction status conflict value is high and the inspection result direction time decay value is high, even if the personnel and equipment relationship drift value is in a low range, the joint dynamic conflict amount is still increased to the abnormal range to reflect the risk of the equipment passage status and the effective inspection relationship deviating at the same time. The control result is output based on at least one of the joint dynamic conflict quantity, directional status conflict value, and inspection result directional time-lapse value. The tag identifier, equipment identifier, passage scan information set, directional status conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, inspection result directional time-lapse value, joint dynamic conflict quantity, and control result are associated and stored. In one judgment method, when the joint dynamic conflict quantity is in the low range and both the directional status conflict value and the inspection result directional time-lapse value meet the release conditions, the passage is allowed. Missing data processing is marked as Time anomaly marker is recorded as The abnormal label is marked as The comprehensive anomaly marker is denoted as The freeze determination mark is recorded as The maximum conflict value is denoted as The regulation result is recorded as . Determine using the following formula:

[0046] in, Mark missing data for processing. Mark time anomalies. Mark the label as abnormal. For comprehensive anomaly labeling, This is a marker for determining whether the item is frozen. This is the maximum conflict value. Not from the parameter configuration set. When the threshold is read, the default threshold is determined by the following formula:

[0047] Regulation results Match by column order:

[0048] in, The threshold for allowing passage. To check the threshold, For relation threshold, The rejection threshold, This is a high-risk threshold. The priority of the current passage status freeze result is higher than the passage denial result, and the passage denial result has a higher priority than the passage permission result, the re-equipment check result, and the carry-over relationship verification result. When the directional time decay value of the inspection result is higher than the inspection threshold, the equipment inspection result is re-inspected; when the personnel-equipment relationship drift value is higher than the relationship threshold, the relationship verification result is output; when the directional status conflict value reaches the rejection threshold or the joint dynamic conflict amount reaches the high-risk range, the passage is rejected; when there are mutual conflicts in status records, serious inconsistencies between the current passage direction and the on-site status, or the passage closure relationship cannot be confirmed, the passage status freeze result is output, and all information generated in this scan is associated and saved according to the same label and the same equipment identifier to form a complete passage verification record.

[0049] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A method for verifying the access of portable devices based on tag codes, characterized in that, include: Step 1: The security check terminal scans the tag code of the carried device to obtain the tag identification and collects the current passage scan information set; the passage scan information set includes the current person identification, current passage direction, current gate identification, and current scanning time; among which, the current passage direction is the entry direction or the exit direction; The security terminal reads the tag code at the current gate location and performs integrity, format, and duplicate scan checks on the encoded content. After the checks are passed, the code is parsed into a tag identifier, and the reading action is bound to the current gate location, the current scanning time, and the data collection results of the person carrying the item as the same passage scan event. Step 2: Determine the equipment identifier based on the tag identifier, read the access verification data associated with the equipment identifier from the equipment access database, and generate a set of access verification factors including status verification factors, carrying relationship verification factors, and inspection validity verification factors; the access verification data includes basic equipment information, equipment access status records, personnel carrying relationship records, equipment inspection binding records, and gate access path rule records; In step two, a set of status verification factors is generated based on the equipment access status record, gate path rule record, and access scan information set; a set of carrying relationship verification factors is generated based on the equipment basic information, personnel carrying relationship record, and equipment access status record; and a set of valid inspection verification factors is generated based on the equipment inspection binding record and access scan information set, and then merged into a set of access verification factors. The status verification factor set includes presence status sub-factors, access closure sub-factors, and gatekeeper path sub-factors; Specifically, the security terminal filters passage records from the device passage status records that correspond to the device identifier, are in the formal state transition record, and whose passage record time is no later than the current scanning time, to obtain a set of valid passage records; the passage record with the longest passage record time in the set of valid passage records is determined as the previous formal state transition record; if the passage record direction of the previous formal state transition record is the entering direction, the presence status sub-factor takes the state within the area; if the passage record direction of the previous formal state transition record is the leaving direction, the presence status sub-factor takes the state outside the area; if the set of valid passage records does not exist, the presence status sub-factor takes the state undetermined. The security check terminal filters the entry and exit record sets from the valid passage record set, and establishes closed pairings between entry and exit record sets according to the passage record time. If the valid passage record set is not empty, the number of entry records is equal to the number of exit records, and each entry record has an exit record with a later time, then the passage closure sub-factor is closed. If the number of entry records is greater than the number of exit records, then the passage closure sub-factor is not closed. If the number of exit records is greater than the number of entry records, or if there is an exit record earlier than the corresponding entry record, then the passage closure sub-factor is closed and conflicted. If the valid passage record set is empty or there are missing passage record times, then the passage closure sub-factor is unconfirmed. The security check terminal generates gate path sub-factors based on the allowed gate set, gate path order, and current gate identifier in the gate path rule record, combined with the access record gate identifier corresponding to the previous formal state transition record. If the current gate identifier belongs to the allowed gate set, and the access record gate identifier corresponding to the previous formal state transition record matches the current gate identifier in the gate path order, then the gate path sub-factor takes path matching. If the current gate identifier belongs to the allowed gate set and there is no previous formal state transition record, then the gate path sub-factor takes gate matching path unconfirmed. If the current gate identifier does not belong to the allowed gate set, or the access record gate identifier corresponding to the previous formal state transition record does not match the current gate identifier in the gate path order, then the gate path sub-factor takes path mismatch. The set of carry-over relationship verification factors includes binding carry-over sub-factors, authorized carry-over sub-factors, historical carry-over sub-factors, and authorized handover sub-factors; among them, the binding carry-over sub-factors are generated from the basic equipment information, the authorized carry-over sub-factors and authorized handover sub-factors are generated from the personnel carry-over relationship records, and the historical carry-over sub-factors are generated from the equipment access status records; The valid verification factor set includes inspection result sub-factors, object consistency sub-factors, direction consistency sub-factors, and timeliness sub-factors. Among them, the inspection result sub-factor is generated from the most recent equipment inspection result in the equipment inspection binding record; the object consistency sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the tag identifier, equipment identifier, current personnel identifier, and current gate identifier; the direction consistency sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the current direction of passage; and the timeliness sub-factor is generated from the equipment inspection binding record combined with the current scanning time. Step 3: Based on the current passage direction, determine: Expected state migration, which is the device's state within / outside the area before passage and the target state after passage; Expected carrying relationship, which is the matching conditions for the binding carrying, authorized carrying, historical carrying, or authorized handover between the carrying personnel and the equipment; Expected check validity relationship, which is the condition that the check result is passed and the object, direction, and time meet the matching and validity conditions of this passage. Step four involves comparing the expected state transition, expected carrying relationship, and expected valid inspection relationship with the set of access verification factors to generate directional state conflict values, personnel-equipment relationship drift values, and inspection result directional timeliness decay values. Specifically, generating the personnel-equipment relationship drift value includes: generating binding deviation components, authorization deviation components, historical continuity deviation components, and handover deviation components based on the matching results of the current carrying personnel identifier with the binding carrying sub-factor, authorized carrying sub-factor, historical carrying sub-factor, and authorized handover sub-factor. When the current travel direction is an inbound direction, the lower value of the binding deviation component and the authorized deviation component is used to determine the personnel-equipment relationship drift value; when the current travel direction is a outbound direction, the lower value of the historical continuity deviation component, the binding deviation component, and the handover deviation component is used to determine the personnel-equipment relationship drift value. Step 5: Generate a joint dynamic conflict quantity based on the directional status conflict value, personnel / equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result directional time-lapse value. The joint dynamic conflict quantity is generated by weighting the directional status conflict value, personnel / equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result directional time-lapse value according to the composite weights corresponding to the current travel direction, with the sum of each composite weight being 1. When the current travel direction is an entering direction, the composite weight of the inspection result directional time-lapse value is greater than the composite weight of the directional status conflict value and the personnel / equipment relationship drift value. When the current travel direction is a leaving direction, the composite weight of the directional status conflict value is greater than the composite weight of the personnel / equipment relationship drift value and the inspection result directional time-lapse value. Based on the combined dynamic conflict amount, directional state conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, inspection result directional time-lapse value, and the threshold set in the preset conflict mapping rule base, the system outputs the following results according to the priority of the control results: allow passage, re-inspect equipment, carry relationship verification, refuse passage, or freeze the current passage status. Specifically, when there are conflicting status records, the current passage direction is inconsistent with the on-site status, or the passage closure relationship cannot be confirmed, the current passage status is frozen. When the directional state conflict value reaches the refusal threshold or the combined dynamic conflict amount reaches the high-risk threshold, the passage is refused. When the inspection result directional time-lapse value reaches the inspection threshold, the equipment re-inspection result is output. When the personnel and equipment relationship drift value reaches the relationship threshold, the carry relationship verification result is output. When the combined dynamic conflict amount, directional state conflict value, personnel and equipment relationship drift value, and inspection result directional time-lapse value are all lower than the corresponding release conditions, the passage is allowed.

2. The method for verifying the access of portable devices based on tag codes according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step three, the desired state transition is determined according to the current travel direction; When the current travel direction is the inbound direction, the expected state transition includes an initial state that is outside the area and a target state that is inside the area; when the current travel direction is the outbound direction, the expected state transition includes an initial state that is inside the area and a target state that is outside the area; the expected carrying relationship is determined according to the current travel direction; When the current direction of travel is inbound, the expected carrying relationship includes matching the current carrying personnel identifier with the bound carrying sub-factor or authorized carrying sub-factor; when the current direction of travel is outbound, the expected carrying relationship includes matching the current carrying personnel identifier with at least one of the historical carrying sub-factor, the bound carrying sub-factor, or the authorized handover sub-factor. The expected valid relationship for inspection includes the following: the inspection result sub-factor is passed, the object consistency sub-factor matches the current scan, the direction consistency sub-factor matches the current passage direction, and the timeliness sub-factor is valid relative to the current scanning time.

3. The method for verifying the access of portable devices based on tag codes according to claim 1, characterized in that, In step four, direction state conflict values ​​are generated based on a preset conflict mapping rule base, including: A state deviation component is generated based on the degree of deviation between the present state sub-factor and the initial state defined by the desired state transition; a closure anomaly component is generated based on the passage closure sub-factor; a path anomaly component is generated based on the gate path sub-factor; and a direction state gain coefficient is generated based on the current passage direction. The state deviation component, closure anomaly component, and path anomaly component are normalized and fused, and the gain is processed according to the directional state gain coefficient to obtain the directional state conflict value.

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