A ground control method and device applied to a single-line railway train control system

Abstract

The application discloses a ground control method and device applied to a single-track railway train control system, and is applied to the technical field of track traffic, wherein the ground control method and device are characterized in that: through receiving multi-source key information such as axle-counting equipment and interlocking equipment, the ground control method and device realize vehicle-ground data interaction by means of 400MHz wireless communication; the ground control method and device divide inter-station separation sections, generate signal authorization and route information packages containing track numbers / branch line numbers, adopt a hierarchical communication mechanism and double-checking to guarantee safety, support multi-vehicle tracking and temporary data real-time updating; meanwhile, the system can identify fault types, enable redundant channels and process according to safety states, realize state monitoring, fault positioning and reporting through a maintenance terminal, and comprehensively improve single-track railway transportation efficiency and driving safety.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of rail transit technology, and in particular to a ground control method and device for a single-track railway train control system. Background Technology

[0002] In single-track railway train control systems, traditional ground control methods have many technical limitations:

[0003] In terms of data interaction and transmission, it relies on a single communication channel, lacks redundancy protection, and is prone to delays or loss of vehicle control data transmission due to equipment communication interruptions; vehicle-to-ground data interaction mostly uses manual assistance (such as IC card transmission of temporary data), which is inefficient and prone to errors, and cannot meet the needs of real-time updates of temporary data.

[0004] In terms of section operation control, the traditional block system is adopted. There is no scientific physical separation of sections between stations, which can only accommodate one train at a time, resulting in low transportation efficiency. Furthermore, there is a lack of priority scheduling mechanism when multiple trains make concurrent requests, which can easily lead to response congestion.

[0005] In terms of safety verification and fault tolerance, vehicle control command transmission is mostly verified through a single channel without a dual verification mechanism, which poses a safety hazard. Fault handling lacks accurate type identification and hierarchical processing logic, making fault location difficult and backtracking poor. Furthermore, there is no complete safety-state handling scheme when the channel is interrupted.

[0006] In terms of cross-station collaboration and information integration, the status information between adjacent stations is isolated and lacks a collaborative control mechanism, which can easily lead to cross-station train operation conflicts; data from multiple sources (axle counting, interlocking, temporary speed limit servers, etc.) have not been effectively integrated, and train control decisions lack comprehensive data support. Summary of the Invention

[0007] To solve the above-mentioned technical problems, the present invention provides the following technical solution:

[0008] A ground control method for a single-track railway train control system includes: receiving section occupancy / idle status information from axle counting equipment, route status information from interlocking equipment, and temporary speed limit dispatching commands from a temporary speed limit server; simultaneously receiving section status information from adjacent STC equipment; sending ground control data including signal authorization and route information to the LKJ (Landing Control Unit) via a 400M wireless communication device, while simultaneously receiving request messages from the onboard LKJ equipment; dividing inter-station separation sections based on axle counting equipment information, and combining the route status from the interlocking equipment. The system generates signal authorization information and route information packets containing track numbers / branch line numbers, and simultaneously converts temporary speed limit scheduling commands sent by the temporary speed limit server into temporary speed limit information packets. It verifies the onboard LKJ request information and transmits relevant information through a request-response or request-response-re-response mechanism. When multiple trains make concurrent requests, they are scheduled according to a three-level priority system. This enables wireless onboard signal authorization for trains within stations and between sections. Trains can operate according to signal authorization within sections, enabling multi-train tracking between stations. Within stations, it supports dual comparison between wireless signal authorization within the station and codes transmitted by existing track circuits, improving the safety of train operation within stations. Simultaneously, based on route status information and temporary speed limit dispatching commands, route data and temporary data are wirelessly uploaded to the vehicle, reducing manual operation and enhancing the overall reliability and safety of the system; it receives fault-related information including external device communication status, its own operating status, and environmental adaptation status; it processes faults according to the safe state based on the fault type, activates redundant channels, and outputs alarm information if all channels are interrupted; it displays the station status, communication status, and alarm information in real time through the maintenance terminal, records the system's working status within the target time period, supports fault location, playback analysis, and reports relevant information to the centralized monitoring system.

[0009] Another aspect of this application discloses a ground control device for a single-track railway train control system. The device includes: a multi-source data receiving module for receiving section occupancy / idle status information from axle counters, route status information from interlocking equipment, temporary speed limit scheduling commands from a temporary speed limit server, and section status information from adjacent STC equipment, thus completing core train control data acquisition; a vehicle-to-ground communication interaction module for sending ground train control data such as signal authorization, route information, and temporary speed limits to a 400MHz wireless communication device, and simultaneously receiving information request messages from onboard LKJ equipment to establish a vehicle-to-ground data transmission link; a train control information generation module for dividing inter-station separation sections based on axle counter information, combining the route status of interlocking equipment, processing temporary speed limit scheduling commands from the temporary speed limit server, and generating signal authorization information, route information packets containing track numbers / branch line numbers, and temporary speed limit information packets to provide a basis for core train control; and a request processing and security verification module for processing onboard LKJ equipment. The system verifies the legality and completeness of requested information, transmits information through a "request-response" or "request-response-re-response" mechanism, schedules multiple trains concurrently according to a three-level priority system, and performs dual verification of wireless signal authorization and track circuit coding information to ensure transmission reliability and train operation safety. The operation control and data update module supports multi-train tracking between stations based on section occupancy status and route information, and uses 400MHz wireless communication to achieve real-time wireless updates of temporary data on trains, improving transportation efficiency. The fault information receiving module receives fault-related information such as external device communication status, its own operating status, and environmental adaptation status, providing data support for fault handling. The fault handling and monitoring reporting module handles faults according to the safety state based on the fault type, enables redundant channels, outputs alarm information when both channels are interrupted, displays station, communication, and alarm status in real time through the maintenance terminal, records system operating status, supports fault location and playback analysis, and reports relevant information to the centralized monitoring system.

[0010] According to another aspect of this application, an electronic device includes: a first processor; and a memory for storing executable instructions of the first processor; wherein the first processor is configured to execute the above-described ground control method for a single-track railway train control system by executing the executable instructions.

[0011] According to another aspect of this application, a computer-readable storage medium is provided having a computer program stored thereon, which, when executed by a second processor, implements the above-described ground control method applied to a single-track railway train control system.

[0012] Its beneficial effects are as follows: This invention provides a ground control method and device for a single-track railway train control system. It acquires information from axle counting, interlocking, and temporary speed limit servers through a multi-source data receiving module. The control information generation module divides the station-to-station separation sections and generates signal authorization and route information packets containing track / branch line numbers. The core equipment STC adopts a two-out-of-two redundancy architecture, meeting SIL4 safety level. It employs a differentiated communication mechanism of "request-response" and "request-response-re-response," coupled with three-level priority scheduling and dual verification within the station to ensure safety. Relying on a standardized three-layer architecture and 400MHz wireless communication, it achieves second-level updates of temporary data and multi-car tracking, completely eliminating the risks of IC card data transmission and replacing manual speed control. In case of faults, redundant channels are activated, and safety-state processing is performed according to quantitative judgment rules and field-level safety side values. Through maintenance terminal monitoring and data recording, board-level / module-level fault location is achieved, ensuring compatibility with existing equipment.

[0013] This invention aims to eliminate the risks associated with IC card data, employing dual verification and fault-safe mechanisms to mitigate single-channel failures, ensuring zero-error transmission of critical information, supporting multi-car tracking within axle-counting sections, reducing reliance on passing stations, and significantly improving line throughput capacity. The integrated STC equipment simplifies trackside configuration, reduces construction and maintenance costs, is compatible with existing assets without requiring large-scale modifications, and reserves interfaces for future evolution to higher-level train control systems. Real-time monitoring, fault traceability, and multi-level reporting functions enable rapid fault location and improved handling efficiency, making it particularly suitable for single-track railways in harsh environments such as plateaus and deserts, as well as local railways and dedicated lines for coal and mineral transportation. Attached Figure Description

[0014] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a ground control method for a single-track railway train control system provided in this embodiment of the invention;

[0015] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of a ground control device for a single-track railway train control system, provided as an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0016] The preferred embodiments of the present invention will be described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. It should be understood that the preferred embodiments described herein are for illustration and explanation only and are not intended to limit the present invention. Figure 1 This application describes a ground control method and apparatus for a single-track railway train control system according to exemplary embodiments thereof.

[0017] In this application embodiment, a ground control method and device applied to a single-track railway train control system, such as... Figure 1 As shown:

[0018] S101 receives section occupancy / idle status information sent by the axle counting device, route status information sent by the interlocking device, and temporary speed limit scheduling command sent by the temporary speed limit server. It also receives section status information sent by adjacent STC devices.

[0019] In one implementation, the axle counting device receives section occupancy / idle status information transmitted via Ethernet. Data transmission uses UDP and the RSSP-I secure communication protocol specified in TB / T3528.1. It sends reset commands, section direction, and other information to the axle counting device, while simultaneously receiving related data such as the axle counting section reset status. Communication channels are configured with redundancy. If a channel cannot receive complete and verified data, it automatically switches to a redundant channel to obtain data. The axle counting communication interruption is determined when either channel fails to receive valid master system data for 3 consecutive seconds, ensuring information continuity. This information is used to accurately determine the occupancy status of each section's dividing segment, providing a basis for subsequent division of inter-station dividing segments and generation of signal authorization information.

[0020] Communication with the interlocking equipment is established via Ethernet, using UDP transmission and the RSSP-I secure communication protocol. Information such as axle counting status is sent to the interlocking system, while key data such as station train route status, section direction information, and track occupancy status are received. The communication channels are redundantly configured. Interlocking communication interruption is determined when either channel fails to receive valid master system data for more than 6 seconds. The route status information clearly defines the specific route configuration for train arrival and departure, while the section direction information defines the permitted direction of train operation. This data is the core basis for generating route information packets containing track / branch line numbers and determining signal authorization ranges, ensuring the orderly entry and exit of trains and the operation of sections.

[0021] The system receives temporary data files, such as temporary speed limit dispatch commands, from the temporary speed limit server. This data contains key information such as the speed limit section, speed limit value, and effective time, and is the core data source for real-time wireless vehicle-to-vehicle updates of temporary data. By receiving this information in real time, it can synchronously update the ground vehicle control data pool, ensuring that the onboard LKJ equipment can obtain the latest speed limit requirements in a timely manner, avoiding the lag and error risks caused by manual transmission via IC card.

[0022] Communicating with STC equipment at adjacent stations via Ethernet, using UDP transmission and the RSSP-I secure communication protocol, the system receives status information from adjacent sections, including the occupancy / idle status and signal authorization status of the separating sections. The communication channel is redundantly configured. This information is used to achieve inter-station collaborative control, ensuring safe train tracking operations under multi-station linkage, avoiding train collisions caused by isolated section information, and providing cross-station data support for signal authorization generation for cross-station train operations.

[0023] S102, to the 400MHz wireless communication equipment, STC sends ground vehicle control data including signal authorization, route information, and temporary speed limit information to LKJ, and receives information request messages sent by the vehicle-mounted LKJ equipment.

[0024] In one implementation, a connection is established with a 400MHz wireless communication device via Ethernet. Data transmission uses UDP and a dedicated secure communication protocol. The communication channel is configured with redundancy to ensure transmission reliability. The 400MHz wireless communication adopts a three-layer architecture of application layer-security layer-communication transmission layer, which complies with the requirements of GB / T24339-2023 and GB / T32659-2016 standards. The transmitted ground control data includes two core types of content: first, signal authorization information, generated based on the occupancy / idle status of the section separation area fed back by the axle counting equipment and the route status of the interlocking equipment, clarifying the permission / prohibition instructions for the train to pass through key nodes such as signal separation points and station departure signals; second, route information, covering data such as the track number of the receiving route and the branch line number of the departure route, framed according to a preset format to form a route information packet; and third, temporary speed limit information, generated based on the temporary speed limit command issued by the temporary speed limit server, covering data such as the speed limit start point, end kilometer marker, and speed limit value, framed according to a preset format to form a temporary speed limit information packet. These data are transmitted to the train's onboard equipment via a 400MHz wireless communication network, providing core control information for train operation and supporting multi-train tracking between stations and precise entry and exit scheduling. The QoS indicators of the 400MHz wireless communication meet the following requirements: data transmission rate ≥ 1.2kbps, average latency 1320ms, packet loss rate ≤ 5%, and minimum available receive level ≥ -92dBm (95%).

[0025] The system receives information request messages sent by the onboard LKJ device via a 400MHz wireless communication channel, employing a point-to-point request-response bidirectional communication mechanism. The onboard LKJ device initiates the communication, and the STC responds. The core content of the request message includes train location information and the request type (such as signal authorization request, route information request, temporary data update request, etc.). After receiving the message, the STC first performs a preliminary verification of the message's legality and completeness, confirming the validity of the train location and the compliance of the request permissions, ensuring that the request information conforms to the vehicle-to-ground interaction specifications, and providing a foundation for subsequent data verification and response. During communication, the maximum number of retransmissions is ≤3, and the single timeout threshold is ≤7s. If a redundant channel cannot receive a complete and verified message, it will automatically switch to another channel to ensure the continuity and stability of request message reception.

[0026] S103 divides the station separation sections based on the axle counting equipment information, generates signal authorization information and route information packets containing track numbers / branch numbers by combining the route status of the interlocking equipment, and at the same time converts the temporary speed limit scheduling command information sent by the temporary speed limit server into temporary speed limit information packets.

[0027] In one implementation, axle counting equipment collects real-time data on the occupancy or vacancy status of each track section within the station interval. Based on standards such as track length and train safety interval requirements, a process for dividing the station intervals into physical isolation sections is executed. The STC, as the core equipment of the single-track railway high-efficiency train control system (HETC), adopts a 2x2 redundancy architecture to meet the SIL4 safety level. It achieves precise separation of station intervals through secure communication with the axle counting equipment. The specific implementation process is as follows:

[0028] STC establishes a stable communication link with the axle counting equipment via an Ethernet interface, employing UDP transmission and the RSSP-I secure communication protocol specified in TB / T3528.1. It collects real-time occupancy / idle status data for each track section within the inter-station interval, and simultaneously transmits related control data, such as section reset commands issued by the interlocking system, to the axle counting agent. The communication channels are designed with redundancy; when a channel cannot receive complete and verified data, the system automatically switches to a redundant channel to obtain data, ensuring the continuity and reliability of section status information and providing an accurate data input basis for the division of separated sections.

[0029] The division process is based on the actual length of the line, combined with parameters such as train braking performance and maximum operating speed to calculate the minimum safe headway requirement. It also takes into account practical factors such as signal equipment layout, terrain conditions, and transportation organization needs, and formulates standardized rules for physical separation between stations. Specifically, the safe headway must ensure that trains can safely stop within the maximum braking distance, avoiding the risk of collisions when multiple trains are running, and ensuring that the length design of the separated sections has sufficient safety redundancy.

[0030] Based on established division standards and rules, a single station section under the traditional block signaling system is divided into multiple independent physical separation sections. Using pre-set track data (such as mileage markers and track node locations), the specific mileage location of each signal separation point, the start and end range of the section boundary, and the judgment rules are clearly marked—using the detection nodes of the axle counting equipment as the section boundary benchmark, ensuring that the boundary of each separation section is clearly identifiable, unique, and traceable. The setting of signal separation points must cover key locations within the section, including the approaching section start point, key nodes in the middle of the section, and the exit section end point, forming a complete section separation network.

[0031] This segmentation method completely breaks the limitation of traditional automatic or semi-automatic block signaling systems, which only allow one train to pass between stations, enabling multiple trains to operate in parallel between stations. Each segment can independently monitor its occupancy / idle status, providing a foundation for STC to dynamically track the positions of multiple trains and generate precise signal authorization. Combined with the "first-come, first-served, safe interval" permission allocation principle, it achieves continuous multi-train tracking between stations, significantly improving the throughput capacity of single-track railways and reducing the need for passing loops. This segmentation scheme is also compatible with existing track circuit equipment, eliminating the need for large-scale modifications to the track infrastructure and reducing system upgrade costs.

[0032] Based on the occupancy status of the separated sections and the interlocking route configuration data, permission / prohibition authorization information for signal points in each section is generated according to safety logic, and the signal authorization results are dynamically matched in conjunction with train position requests. Combining the occupancy / idle status data of the separated sections fed back by the axle counting equipment and the route configuration data issued by the interlocking equipment, permission or prohibition authorization information for each section's signal points is generated according to the safety logic of "idle permitted, occupancy prohibited." When the onboard equipment sends a train position request, it queries the occupancy status and route configuration of the corresponding section based on the real-time train position data included in the request, and dynamically matches the appropriate signal authorization results to ensure that the train can only obtain the legal signal authorization corresponding to its current position, thus guaranteeing safe train operation in the section.

[0033] From the route status information transmitted by the interlocking equipment, core data such as the track number corresponding to the receiving route and the branch line number corresponding to the departure route are extracted. This data is then framed according to a preset data format to generate standardized receiving or departure route information packets. The STC establishes an Ethernet communication link with the interlocking equipment through an independently configured signaling equipment communication interface unit, using UDP transmission and the RSSP-I secure communication protocol specified in TB / T3528.1 to ensure the security and reliability of data transmission. The communication channels are designed with redundancy. When a channel cannot receive complete and verified data, the system automatically switches to a redundant channel to obtain data. If both redundant channels are interrupted, the STC processes the data in a safe state (i.e., as if no train route has been established and the section has no direction) and outputs an alarm message. Through this communication link, the STC stably receives station train route status information (including the opening, locking, and unlocking status of receiving and departure routes), section running direction information (clearly defining the permitted direction of train operation within the section), and track reset commands for inter-station separation sections, providing core data input for the association between routes and separation sections.

[0034] Based on the division of physical separation sections between stations, STC establishes a one-to-one correspondence between route information and separation sections for each receiving / departure route. Specifically, based on attributes such as the route's start and end mileage, direction of travel, and track nodes passed through, the sequence and boundaries of passable separation sections corresponding to each route are defined—for example, a receiving route corresponds to all continuous separation sections traversed from the starting separation point of the approach section outside the station's entry signal to the designated track within the station; a departure route corresponds to the separation sections involved from the track within the station to the ending separation point of the section outside the exit signal. The mapping relationship synchronously records the adaptation rules between routes and separation sections, including the separation sections required when the route is opened and the state reset logic of the separation sections after the route is unlocked.

[0035] Through the association mapping relationship, the STC can coordinate and match the route configuration status issued by the interlocking equipment, the temporary speed limit information issued by the temporary speed limit server, and the occupancy / idle status of each segment in real time. When the interlocking equipment opens a route, the STC can quickly locate all segments corresponding to that route, and combine the segment occupancy status fed back by the axle counting equipment with the temporary speed limit segment matching results to determine whether the train passage conditions are met (such as all segments corresponding to the route being idle, and the temporary speed limit information having been framed and ready for issuance). If the conditions are met, it provides a clear logical basis for the subsequent signal authorization generation—only issuing passage authorization for the corresponding segment to the train requesting the route, and simultaneously packaging the temporary speed limit information of the associated segments of the route, wirelessly uploading it to the onboard LKJ equipment along with the passage authorization via the 400MHz wireless communication channel, ensuring that the train can only operate within the authorized range and travel safely according to the real-time speed limit requirements. Meanwhile, when a certain segment is occupied, the STC can lock the associated route through the mapping relationship and simultaneously lock the temporary speed limit issuance permission corresponding to the segment. This avoids the interlocking equipment from repeatedly opening routes involving the occupied segment and avoids invalid temporary speed limit data from being wirelessly uploaded to the vehicle. It achieves dynamic coordination of route configuration, segment occupancy status and real-time update and issuance of temporary speed limit data, and ensures the safety and orderliness of multi-vehicle tracking operation from a logical level.

[0036] The generated signal authorization information is fused with the framed route information packet data to establish a correlation mapping between the two, ensuring the consistency of signal authorization and route information. Simultaneously, the existing track circuit's code transmission information is correlated to construct a dual verification correlation of "wireless signal authorization + track circuit code transmission," providing data support for subsequent safety verification during train operation within the station. This dual verification further enhances the redundancy of train operation safety.

[0037] S104 verifies the LKJ request information on the vehicle and transmits relevant information through a request-response or request-response-re-response mechanism. When multiple vehicles make concurrent requests, they are scheduled according to a three-level priority. At the same time, the wireless signal authorization and track circuit code transmission information are double-verified.

[0038] In one implementation, after receiving the information request message sent by the vehicle-mounted LKJ device, the STC performs a comprehensive verification of the message's legality and completeness. The STC receives the information request message from the vehicle-mounted LKJ device via a 400MHz wireless communication device, employing a "request-response" bidirectional communication mechanism. It first performs preliminary format parsing and verification of the message, filtering out invalid messages that clearly do not conform to the communication protocol format (such as messages with missing frame headers or tails, or incorrect checksums). Only messages with compliant formats are included in the subsequent verification process, reducing the overhead of invalid data processing. During communication, a redundant channel design is used; if a message received on one channel has an abnormal format, the system automatically switches to another channel to obtain the message, ensuring the continuity and reliability of message reception.

[0039] Based on its stored station and section track data (including section boundary demarcation, mileage markers, and signal separation point locations), and combined with real-time section occupancy status feedback from axle counting equipment, the STC accurately verifies the train position data carried in the message. By comparing the train's current section identifier with the target section corresponding to the request (e.g., when requesting receiving route information, the train must be in the station's approach section; when requesting section signal authorization, the train must be in the corresponding section), the STC confirms consistency, preventing invalid cross-section requests. For example, if a train is in a section within the middle of a section but requests receiving route information from another station, the STC determines the requested position is invalid and directly refuses to respond.

[0040] STC (Standard Train Control) pre-defines request permission rules for different train operation scenarios, clearly defining the types of requests a train can initiate at different locations and operating stages. During verification, it combines train identification (such as train number, train number), current operating status (such as receiving, departing, or running in a section) and location information to verify whether the train possesses the corresponding permission for the current request type. For example, a train only has the permission to initiate a departure route information request (including branch line number) when it occupies a track within a station; and it is only allowed to initiate a section signal authorization request when it is within a section separation segment, preventing trains from initiating invalid requests beyond their authority.

[0041] Based on the vehicle-to-ground interaction specifications, the STC (Site Control Center) defines the key fields that information request messages must include, including request type (such as signal authorization request, route information request, temporary data update request), train identifier (a unique identifier for the train number / train number), train position data (accurate to the section and mileage offset), request timestamp, message checksum, and nearest relevant transponder group (LRBG). During verification, each of the above key fields in the message is checked to ensure that it is complete, that the field format conforms to preset standards (such as position data format and timestamp accuracy), and that there are no logical errors in the field content (such as timestamps exceeding a reasonable range or invalid train identifiers). If any fields are missing, formatted incorrectly, or the content is logically contradictory, the message is deemed incomplete, the response is rejected, and relevant abnormal information is recorded. This ensures that only request messages with complete fields and valid content are received, providing a reliable data foundation for subsequent data transmission and processing.

[0042] Based on the type of requested information, the corresponding communication mechanism is flexibly selected to ensure transmission reliability. The STC flexibly adapts to different communication mechanisms based on the type and importance of the requested information from the onboard LKJ, with the core principle being "efficient interaction of routine information and double confirmation of critical information." While route information (including track numbers and branch line numbers) is necessary for train entry and exit from stations, its data stability requirements are relatively lower than those for signal authorization. Therefore, a "request-response" two-way interaction mechanism is adopted to balance efficiency and reliability, with a request-response time interval of ≤3s for route information requests. Signal authorization is directly related to train operating permissions (such as whether passage through signal separation points, entry / exit from stations), and is considered safety-critical information. A "request-response-re-response" double confirmation mechanism is required to avoid risks such as packet loss and bit errors, ensuring zero-error information transmission. The interval between the re-response and the first response to signal authorization is ≤1s, and the identifiers and check codes of the two messages must match. The onboard LKJ must double confirm before determining validity.

[0043] When a train enters a station approach section (receiving a train) or occupies a track within the station (departure scenario), the onboard LKJ automatically sends a route information request message to the STC. The message includes core fields such as train identifier, current location, request type (receiving / departure), request timestamp, and most recent related transponder group (LRBG). After receiving the message and verifying its legality and integrity, the STC, based on the route-separation section association mapping relationship established with the interlocking equipment, extracts the track number of the corresponding receiving route or the branch line number of the departure route, and assembles it into a route information packet according to a preset format.

[0044] The route information packet is fed back to the onboard LKJ via a 400MHz wireless communication channel. After receiving the packet, the onboard LKJ verifies the integrity and validity of the data (such as whether the track number / branch line number is within the preset legal range). Once the verification is successful, a complete data exchange is completed, supporting the train's accurate entry and exit from the station. The entire interaction process strictly follows QoS requirements, with a request-response time interval of ≤3s, ensuring timely delivery of route information.

[0045] When a train approaches a signal separation point, entry signal, or exit signal, the onboard LKJ sends a signal authorization request message to the STC, specifying the location of the requested signal point and the train's current operating status. After verification, the STC generates signal authorization information (allow / prohibit passage) based on the separation section occupancy status and interlocking route configuration data, and first sends an initial response message; after an interval of ≤1 second, it sends a second response message with the same content. Both messages carry the same authorization identifier and checksum. The onboard LKJ needs to receive both response messages consecutively, first verifying the integrity and validity of the individual message, then comparing the core authorization content of the two messages (such as authorization status and signal point location) to ensure consistency. Simultaneously, 10 seconds of periodic checks are performed 100 meters before reaching the signal separation point to ensure the preceding separation section remains vacant. The signal authorization is only confirmed as valid and the corresponding operation (such as L code to continue running, HU code to stop and wait) is executed when the two received messages are completely identical, the verification passes, and the periodic check result of the forward separation section is idle. If no two messages are received, the content is inconsistent, or the periodic check finds that the forward separation section is not idle, the on-board LKJ determines that the authorization is invalid and triggers safety protection actions (such as deceleration and stopping). This mechanism, combined with the packet loss resistance design of 400MHz wireless communication (maximum retransmission times ≤ 3 times), can effectively resist wireless transmission interference, ensure the reliability of critical information transmission such as signal authorization, and meet the "SIL4" safety level requirements.

[0046] When multiple trains simultaneously enter the STC's jurisdiction and initiate requests, communication channels are allocated according to a three-tiered communication priority rule. The highest priority is for emergency braking-related requests, such as those where the train's direction of travel is inconsistent with the section's direction. These requests can immediately preempt the channel, interrupting lower-priority transmissions and ensuring a response delay of no more than 300ms. The second priority is for section signal authorization requests, and the third priority is for route authorization requests. These two types of requests are allowed to queue and are handled using a polling + priority insertion scheduling method to ensure a response within 900ms, avoiding response delays caused by request congestion and ensuring that the critical needs of each train are met in a timely manner.

[0047] Within the station area, the signal authorization information transmitted via the 400MHz wireless channel and the code information transmitted by the existing track circuits are double-verified. This double verification is triggered only when the train is within the station area (including inside the entry signal, on the station track, and inside the exit signal), covering key train operation scenarios such as train entry, exit, and track switching. The wireless signal authorization information is generated by the STC based on the occupancy status of the separated sections and interlocking route configuration data, and transmitted to the onboard LKJ via the 400MHz wireless communication channel. It includes core instructions such as permission / prohibition of passage and target track / branch line. The existing track circuit code information is generated by the track circuit equipment and transmitted to the onboard receiving equipment through the track circuit, reflecting the track section occupancy status and corresponding train operation permission instructions. Both are core control bases for train operation within the station.

[0048] While sending radio signal authorization information to the onboard LKJ (Landing Kilometer), the STC (Standard Track Control Center) simultaneously obtains the code transmission information for the corresponding track section within the station through its interface with the track circuit equipment. This ensures the time synchronization of the two types of information and avoids verification deviations caused by data transmission delays. The STC performs a consistency comparison of the core instructions of both types of information according to preset verification rules. If the radio signal authorization is "Allow entry," the track circuit code should correspond to the entry permission code (such as the allowable occupancy code for the corresponding track); if the radio signal authorization is "Prohibit exit," the track circuit code should correspond to the prohibition code (such as the parking code), ensuring complete consistency between the two in key dimensions such as "allow / prohibit" permissions and target paths.

[0049] When the comparison is successful, the STC sends a verification confirmation message to the onboard LKJ, allowing the train to perform the corresponding operations (such as stopping at the station, departing from the station, or switching tracks). If the comparison results are inconsistent (e.g., the wireless authorization allows passage but the track circuit code prohibits passage, or vice versa), the STC immediately triggers a safety-state process, sending a prohibition command to the onboard LKJ. Simultaneously, it outputs an alarm message through the maintenance terminal, clearly indicating "inconsistency between wireless authorization and track circuit code" along with key information such as the corresponding track section and train identification, reminding staff to promptly investigate the fault. This dual verification mechanism constructs a dual safety barrier of "wireless transmission + track conduction," effectively mitigating the risk of a single transmission channel failure. For example, if interference with 400MHz wireless communication leads to mis-transmission of authorization information, the true state of the track circuit code can be corrected promptly through verification. If a partial fault in the track circuit causes abnormal code transmission, the wireless authorization information can provide a valid reference, preventing safety accidents such as speeding and collisions caused by erroneous commands from a single channel. Furthermore, the verification process is fully automated, requiring no manual intervention, conforming to the "fail-safe" design principle, further enhancing the safety of train operation within the station and the reliability of the system.

[0050] S105 supports multi-vehicle tracking between stations based on the occupancy status of the interval separation section, and also realizes real-time wireless on-vehicle updates of route information and temporary data.

[0051] In one implementation, based on the occupancy / idle status of the segment feedback from the axle counter, the system dynamically tracks the position information of multiple trains and generates a segment train operation status mapping table to provide position support for multi-train parallel operation. The system continuously receives occupancy / idle status data for each segment from the axle counter, and dynamically tracks the real-time position information of multiple trains based on segment boundary rules and train direction of travel, clearly identifying the specific segment where each train is located. The STC establishes a redundant communication link with the axle counter via Ethernet, using UDP transmission and the RSSP-I secure communication protocol specified in TB / T3528.1 to continuously receive occupancy / idle status data for each segment, while simultaneously acquiring associated control data such as axle counter reset commands. The data acquisition cycle is consistent with the axle counter status update cycle, and the mapping table is dynamically updated at a cycle not exceeding 1 second to ensure that the STC can capture segment status changes in real time (such as occupancy status switching caused by trains entering / leaving a segment). During communication, if a channel cannot receive complete and verified data, the system automatically switches to a redundant channel to ensure the continuity and reliability of segment status information, providing accurate data input for train position tracking.

[0052] STC constructs a train position tracking algorithm based on preset section boundary rules (such as the start and end mileage of the separated section and the location of the signal separation point) and the train running direction (section direction information obtained from the interlocking equipment). When the axle counting equipment reports that a separated section changes from "idle" to "occupied", the algorithm combines the state change sequence of adjacent sections, the train running direction, and the tracked train position information to determine the train identifier entering the section. When the section changes from "occupied" to "idle", the algorithm confirms that the corresponding train has left the section and updates its position to the next adjacent section. For scenarios where multiple trains run in parallel, they are distinguished by train identifiers (unique train number / number), and the position changes of each train are tracked separately to ensure that the position updates of each train are independent and accurate, avoiding confusion between the positions of different trains.

[0053] The STC integrates key data from multiple tracked trains to generate a structured section train operation status mapping table. Core fields in the table include: unique train identifier (train number / serial number), real-time section number, mileage offset within the section, direction of travel (up / down), section occupancy status (occupied / pending / cleared), currently requested route type, and signal authorization status. This mapping table is dynamically updated at fixed intervals (no more than 1 second), clearly presenting the distribution, operation status, and associated control information of each train within the section. On one hand, the mapping table provides data support for the allocation of section passage rights based on a "first-come, first-served, safe interval" principle. The STC can quickly determine whether a target section is already occupied and whether the safe interval between subsequent trains and the preceding train is met by querying the mapping table. On the other hand, it provides a basis for predicting multi-train conflicts. If the trajectories of two trains intersect and the safe interval is insufficient, the STC can adjust the signal authorization in advance to avoid traffic conflicts, providing a solid position management foundation for parallel tracking operation of multiple trains.

[0054] By combining route opening status data from interlocking equipment with train position data within the section, passage permissions are allocated according to the principle of "first-come, first-served, and safe intervals," supporting continuous multi-train tracking between stations. Route information includes track number, branch line number, and wireless boarding authorization via ground signals within stations and sections. Trains within sections can operate based on signal authorization, enabling multi-train tracking between stations. Within stations, dual comparison of wireless signal authorization and existing track circuit codes enhances the safety of train operation. The system obtains route opening status data from interlocking equipment and combines it with train position information in the section's train operation status mapping table, allocating passage permissions according to the principle of "first-come, first-served, and safe intervals." For trains that initiate route requests first and whose positions meet safety requirements, priority is given to granting passage permissions for the corresponding separation section; subsequent trains must maintain a safe interval with the preceding train before obtaining passage authorization. This ensures that multiple trains can track and run continuously within the station section in sequence, breaking the limitation of only one train being allowed between stations under the traditional block system and improving line throughput capacity.

[0055] The system receives temporary speed limit dispatch commands from the temporary speed limit server in real time. These commands include key information such as the speed limit section, speed limit value, effective time, and expiration time. This temporary data is then synchronously updated to the ground control train data pool and linked to the section train operation status mapping table to match the temporary data with the corresponding train and section. This ensures that the temporary data corresponds to the current train operation status in real time, preventing discrepancies between train operation and actual requirements due to data lag. Furthermore, based on route status information and temporary speed limit dispatch commands, route data and temporary data are wirelessly uploaded to the train, reducing manual operation and enhancing the overall reliability and security of the system.

[0056] Based on a 400MHz wireless communication channel and a "request-response" two-way communication mechanism, when the vehicle-mounted LKJ device sends a temporary data update request, or when the temporary data in the ground vehicle control data pool is updated, the STC automatically encapsulates the updated temporary data into a standardized message and pushes it to the corresponding vehicle-mounted LKJ device. This enables vehicle-to-ground transmission of temporary data without manual intervention, replacing the traditional manual IC card transmission method and improving the convenience and timeliness of data transmission.

[0057] Based on QoS indicators for 400MHz wireless communication, data transmission timeliness is guaranteed. The communication process meets requirements such as data transmission rate ≥1.2kbps, average transmission latency 1320ms, and data packet loss rate ≤5%, ensuring that temporary data can be transmitted quickly and reliably to onboard equipment. By optimizing the communication mechanism and data encapsulation format, temporary data can be updated wirelessly onboard within seconds, allowing onboard LKJ equipment to obtain the latest temporary speed limits and other critical information in a timely manner, ensuring train operation safety.

[0058] S106 receives fault-related information including the communication status of external devices, its own operating status, and environmental adaptation status.

[0059] In one implementation, the communication link status with external devices is continuously monitored, and information related to communication faults of various external devices is received. Specifically, this includes communication status information with axle counting devices, such as whether the communication channel is interrupted, whether data packets are lost, or whether verification fails; communication status information with interlocking devices, including whether route data transmission is abnormal and whether interval direction information feedback is interrupted; communication status information with adjacent STC devices, such as whether interval status data interaction is smooth and whether redundant channels are switched normally; communication status information with 400MHz wireless communication devices, including whether wireless signal transmission is interrupted and whether data transmission / reception times out; and also includes abnormal communication feedback with devices such as temporary speed limiting servers, comprehensively capturing potential faults at the communication level of external devices.

[0060] The system collects real-time operational status data from each subsystem of the STC and receives information related to its own operational faults. In the logic processing subsystem, it receives information such as the operational status of systems A and B, whether data calculation comparison results are consistent, and whether a single system has experienced a fault. Systems A and B serve as backups for each other, and automatic failover occurs immediately upon failure of either system. In the communication interface unit, it receives information such as the port operating status of the signal equipment interface unit and the communication equipment interface unit, and whether data forwarding is abnormal. In the maintenance terminal subsystem, it receives information such as whether the terminal display is faulty and whether data recording is abnormal. In the power supply subsystem, it receives information such as the power supply status of redundant power modules and voltage / current anomalies from power monitoring. A single power module failure does not affect the normal operation of the equipment, and the system promptly detects faults at both the hardware and software operational levels.

[0061] The system monitors the STC equipment's environmental adaptability in real time and receives environment-related fault information. Regarding environmental adaptability, it receives information such as whether the ambient temperature exceeds the range of 0℃~50℃, whether the atmospheric pressure deviates from the standard of 70kPa~106kPa, and whether the relative humidity exceeds the range of 5%~90% (room temperature +25℃). For electromagnetic compatibility and lightning protection, it receives information such as the electromagnetic interference protection status of the power input and data communication cable interfaces, whether the lightning protection device has triggered protection, and whether the grounding resistance is greater than 1Ω. The equipment insulation resistance must be ≥25MΩ, and different voltage ports must meet the corresponding insulation withstand voltage requirements. It also includes feedback on whether the equipment room complies with GB / T2887-2011 and TB10007 regulations, and whether there are any abnormal environmental conditions such as corrosive or explosive harmful gases in the surrounding environment. This ensures a comprehensive understanding of fault risks at the environmental adaptability level, especially for harsh operating environments such as high altitudes and deserts.

[0062] S107 handles faults in a safe state based on fault type, enables redundant channels, and outputs alarm information if all channels are interrupted. The maintenance terminal displays the station status, communication status, and alarm information in real time, records the system's working status within the target time period, supports fault location and playback analysis, and reports relevant information to the centralized monitoring system.

[0063] In one implementation, the STC (Signal Control Center) collects fault-related information in real time through its self-diagnostic function and communication status monitoring with external devices. This information covers data such as communication anomalies with external devices, hardware / software malfunctions, and environmental adaptation anomalies. A two-dimensional identification mechanism of "type classification + level division" is adopted. First, faults are classified into core faults, secondary faults, and minor faults based on their impact scope and severity. The focus is on three core faults: communication interruption of axle counting equipment, communication interruption of interlocking equipment, and wireless channel interruption (directly affecting driving safety and transportation continuity). Secondary faults include communication anomalies between adjacent STCs and data transmission delays of temporary speed limit servers. Minor faults include abnormal display on maintenance terminals and communication fluctuations on non-critical ports. For core faults, further details such as communication protocol verification results, data transmission interruption characteristics, and equipment feedback codes are used to accurately distinguish specific fault types, providing a basis for differentiated handling.

[0064] If either the STC or the axle counting device fails to receive complete and verified master system data from the other for 3 consecutive seconds, communication is deemed completely interrupted. The STC processes the situation in a safe state, setting the reserved information, pre-reset status, and axle occupancy status command fields of the section status information to 00000000b. This indicates that the section is not in the pre-reset state and is in an abnormal occupancy state. Simultaneously, the section direction information is set to no direction, prohibiting subsequent trains from entering the relevant section to avoid the risk of collision due to the unknown occupancy status of the section.

[0065] If either the STC or the interlocking equipment (CBI) fails to receive complete and verified master system data for more than 6 seconds, the channel is considered completely interrupted. If both channels are interrupted, a safety state is triggered. The STC treats the situation as if no train route has been established. The status of the relays and JGs in each inner section of the station is treated as abnormal. No pre-reset commands are issued for each axle counting section. At the same time, all departure direction information of all sections is redirected to a no-direction state, and no new route information packets or signal authorizations are generated to prevent trains from entering / leaving the station in an disorderly manner.

[0066] When the redundant channels of the STC and the 400MHz wireless communication equipment fail to receive complete and verified data, the wireless channel is deemed to be interrupted. The STC immediately stops the vehicle-to-ground wireless data transmission and ceases to send signal authorization, route information, and other data to the onboard LKJ. At the same time, it triggers a safety state output, prohibiting the train from performing operations that rely on wireless data, such as entering or leaving the station and inter-station tracking, to ensure that the train remains safely stationary or at low speed when there is no effective train control data.

[0067] The communication channels between the STC and core external equipment such as axle counting equipment, interlocking equipment, and 400MHz wireless communication equipment are all designed with redundancy. When a single channel fails (such as data verification failure, transmission timeout, or link interruption), the system automatically switches to a redundant channel to continue receiving or sending data without manual intervention. Simultaneously, it generates channel switching feedback information, recording details such as the switching time and the faulty channel number, and synchronizes this information to the maintenance terminal. If both redundant channels are interrupted, the STC immediately triggers the corresponding safety-state handling action for the fault type. At the same time, it outputs audible and visual alarm information through the maintenance terminal, clearly indicating the fault type (e.g., "Dual-channel interruption of interlocking equipment"), the time of the fault, and the scope of impact (e.g., "All routes at this station cannot be generated"), and reports the fault information to the centralized signal monitoring system in real time. Alarm information can be viewed by maintenance personnel in real time and supports historical tracing, providing precise guidance for rapid fault diagnosis and ensuring that fault handling complies with the "fault-safety" principle, minimizing the impact of faults on driving safety.

[0068] The STC maintenance terminal receives key station status data in real time through the communication interface unit of the logic processing subsystem. The data collection scope covers three core dimensions: First, the station and section occupancy status, including the occupancy / clearance status of each section and track section within the station, accurately reflecting the real-time distribution of trains; second, equipment communication status, covering the communication link status (normal / interrupted / redundant switching) between the STC and external equipment such as interlocking equipment, axle counting equipment, 400MHz wireless communication equipment, adjacent STCs, and temporary speed limit servers, and synchronously displaying the communication protocol verification results; third, basic system operation information, including the section running direction, route opening status, signal authorization, track number, temporary speed limit issuance status, and various fault alarm information (such as channel interruption, data verification failure, equipment failure, etc.). The terminal transforms the collected raw data into visual charts and status indicators, presenting them in intuitive forms such as station simulation diagrams, status indicator lights, and data lists. For example, different colors are used to mark the occupancy status of sections (green for free, red for occupied, and yellow for abnormal), and icons are used to distinguish the status of communication links (green lines indicate normal, and red lines indicate interruption). Fault alarm information is highlighted in the form of pop-up windows and audio-visual prompts, ensuring that staff can quickly grasp the overall operation of the system, immediately detect the location, type, and scope of the fault, and provide first-hand reference for rapid fault handling.

[0069] The maintenance terminal continuously records all system operational status data in timestamp order. The records comprehensively cover equipment operating parameters (such as the operating status of logic processing units A / B series, power module voltage and current, and communication interface unit port status), communication interaction data (request / response messages for vehicle-to-ground wireless communication, interaction data with external devices, and verification results), fault-related data (fault occurrence time, fault type, fault-triggered safety-state actions, and redundant channel switching records), and business operation data (route generation records, signal authorization issuance records, and temporary data update records). Data storage strictly adheres to a minimum one-month requirement, retaining the latest valid data through a cyclical overwrite mechanism to form a structured historical operational database. This database supports multi-dimensional searching by time range, data type, and device name, providing a complete data chain for fault backtracking. This facilitates staff in reconstructing the system's operational scenario before and after the fault, accurately locating the fault's cause.

[0070] STC integrates a self-diagnostic fault function. Through a 2x2 redundancy structure in its logic processing unit, it monitors its own hardware (such as processors and communication interface modules), software operation (such as data processing consistency and protocol parsing correctness), and external device interaction data in real time, accurately locating faults to the board or module level (such as a communication interface board fault or a power module anomaly). When a fault occurs, the system automatically correlates the corresponding time period data in the historical operation database to completely replay the fault occurrence process—restoring the equipment status before the fault, the data interaction process, the fault triggering node, and subsequent safety-state handling actions, clearly presenting the fault evolution trajectory. Based on the replay analysis results, a standardized fault diagnosis report is generated. The report includes the fault type (such as interlocking communication interruption or wireless channel packet loss), fault location results (such as the specific fault module number), the scope of fault impact (such as the affected sections and trains), a speculation on the cause of the fault, and targeted handling suggestions. Simultaneously, the maintenance terminal reports the current equipment operating status and detailed fault information (including the core content of the diagnosis report) to the centralized signal monitoring system in real time, realizing the sharing of fault information at multiple management levels such as stations and sections, facilitating the overall coordination of resources for fault handling, and improving fault handling efficiency.

[0071] Once a faulty channel or device is restored to normal operation, if the receiver receives a complete and verified data message from that connection channel / device, the connection can be considered restored. The system will automatically exit the safe mode and re-collect data and generate train control information according to the normal procedure. During the restoration process, priority will be given to ensuring train safety, and passage permissions will be gradually released to avoid train operation conflicts caused by sudden restoration. For core equipment such as axle counters and interlocking systems, after restoration, the section status must be reset and route information synchronized before sending normal signal authorization, route information, and temporary speed limit information to the onboard LKJ.

[0072] like Figure 2 As shown, a ground control device for a single-track railway train control system includes:

[0073] The multi-source data receiving module 201 is used to receive the section occupancy / idle status information of the axle counting equipment, the route status information of the interlocking equipment, the temporary speed limit scheduling command of the temporary speed limit server, and the section status information of adjacent STC equipment, so as to complete the core vehicle control data acquisition.

[0074] The vehicle-to-ground communication module 202 is used to send ground vehicle control data, including signal authorization, route information, and temporary speed limit information, from the STC to the LKJ via a 400M wireless communication device, and at the same time receive request message information sent by the vehicle-mounted LKJ device.

[0075] The train control information generation module 203 is used to divide the inter-station separation section based on the axle counting equipment information, combine the route status of the interlocking equipment, generate signal authorization information and route information package containing track number / branch number, and at the same time convert the temporary speed limit dispatching command information sent by the temporary speed limit server into a temporary speed limit information package to provide the core basis for train control.

[0076] The request processing and security verification module 204 is used to verify the legality and integrity of the vehicle-mounted LKJ request information. It transmits information through a request-response or request-response-re-response mechanism. When multiple vehicles are connected concurrently, they are scheduled according to a three-level priority. At the same time, the wireless signal authorization and track circuit code transmission information are double-verified to ensure transmission reliability and driving safety.

[0077] The operation control and data update module 205 is used to support inter-station multi-vehicle tracking operation based on the occupancy status of the interval separation section, and at the same time realize the real-time wireless on-vehicle update of route information and temporary data;

[0078] The fault information receiving module 206 is used to receive fault-related information such as the communication status of external devices, its own operating status, and environmental adaptation status, so as to provide data support for fault handling.

[0079] The fault handling and monitoring reporting module 207 is used to handle faults in a safe state based on fault type, enable redundant channels, output alarm information when both channels are interrupted, display the station, communication and alarm status in real time through the maintenance terminal, record the system working status, support fault location and playback analysis, and report relevant information to the centralized monitoring system.

[0080] A computing device includes a memory for storing computer program instructions and a processor for executing the computer program instructions, wherein when the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, the device is triggered to execute any ground control method applied to a single-track railway train control system.

[0081] The methods and / or embodiments in this application can be implemented as computer software programs. For example, embodiments of this disclosure include a computer program product comprising a computer program carried on a computer-readable medium, the computer program containing program code for performing the methods shown in the flowchart. When the computer program is executed by a processing unit, it performs the functions defined in the methods of this application.

[0082] It should be noted that the computer-readable medium described in this application can be a computer-readable signal medium or a computer-readable storage medium, or any combination thereof. More specific examples of a computer-readable storage medium may include, but are not limited to: an electrical connection having one or more wires, a portable computer disk, a hard disk, random access memory (RAM), read-only memory (ROM), erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROM or flash memory), optical fiber, portable compact disk read-only memory (CD-ROM), optical storage device, magnetic storage device, or any suitable combination thereof. In this application, a computer-readable medium can be any tangible medium that contains or stores a program that can be used by or in conjunction with an instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.

[0083] Computer program code for performing the operations of this application can be written in one or more programming languages ​​or a combination thereof, including object-oriented programming languages ​​such as Java, Smalltalk, and C++, and conventional procedural programming languages ​​such as the "C" language or similar programming languages. The program code can be executed entirely on the user's computer, partially on the user's computer, as a standalone software package, partially on the user's computer and partially on a remote computer, or entirely on a remote computer or server. In cases involving remote computers, the remote computer can be connected to the user's computer via any type of network—including a local area network (LAN) or a wide area network (WAN)—or can be connected to an external computer (e.g., via the Internet using an Internet service provider).

[0084] It will be apparent to those skilled in the art that this application is not limited to the details of the exemplary embodiments described above, and that this application can be implemented in other specific forms without departing from the spirit or essential characteristics of this application. Therefore, the embodiments should be regarded as exemplary and non-limiting in all respects, and the scope of this application is defined by the appended claims rather than the foregoing description. Thus, all variations falling within the meaning and scope of equivalents of the claims are intended to be embraced within this application.

Claims

1. A ground control method applied to a single-track railway train control system, characterized in that, include: It receives section occupancy / idle status information sent by the axle counting device, route status information sent by the interlocking device, and temporary speed limit scheduling command sent by the temporary speed limit server, and also receives section status information sent by adjacent STC devices. Through a 400M wireless communication device, the STC sends ground vehicle control data, including signal authorization, route information, and temporary speed limit information, to the LKJ, while simultaneously receiving request messages from the onboard LKJ device. Based on the information from the axle counting equipment, the station-to-station separation sections are divided. Signal authorization information and route information packets containing track numbers / branch numbers are generated by combining the route status of the interlocking equipment. At the same time, the temporary speed limit scheduling command information sent by the temporary speed limit server is converted into temporary speed limit information packets. The vehicle-mounted LKJ request information is verified, and relevant information is transmitted through a request-response or request-response-re-response mechanism. When multiple vehicles make concurrent requests, they are scheduled according to a three-level priority. At the same time, the wireless signal authorization and track circuit code transmission information are double-verified. Based on the occupancy status of the interval separation section, it supports multi-vehicle tracking operation between stations, and at the same time realizes real-time wireless on-vehicle updates of route information and temporary data; Receive fault-related information including external device communication status, its own operating status, and environmental adaptation status; Based on the fault type, it is handled in a safe state, and redundant channels are enabled. If all channels are interrupted, alarm information is output. The station status, communication status and alarm information are displayed in real time through the maintenance terminal. The system working status within the target time period is recorded, fault location and playback analysis are supported, and relevant information is reported to the centralized monitoring system.

2. The ground control method for a single-track railway train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on axle counting equipment information, inter-station separation sections are divided. Signal authorization information and route information packets containing track / branch numbers are generated by combining the route status of interlocking equipment. Simultaneously, temporary speed limit scheduling commands sent by the temporary speed limit server are converted into temporary speed limit information packets, including: By collecting real-time data on the occupancy / idle status of sections through axle counting equipment, executing the process of dividing sections into physical isolation zones between stations, marking the location of signal separation points and section boundary rules, and realizing the physical foundation for multi-vehicle operation in the section; The Ethernet communication interface of the interlocking equipment is used to receive route status and section direction information using the RSSP-I security communication protocol based on UDP transmission mode, and to establish the association mapping relationship between route information and separation sections. Based on the occupancy status of the separated sections and the interlocking route configuration data, allow / disallow authorization information for the section signal points is generated according to safety logic, and the signal authorization results are dynamically matched in combination with the train position request. It receives temporary speed limit commands from the temporary speed limit server, assembles them into temporary speed limit information packets according to a preset format, and transmits the data in real time through the request-response mechanism of the 400MHz wireless communication channel. Extract the core data of track number and branch line number from the interlocking route, frame them according to the preset format to generate train reception / departure route information packets, and realize the real-time data transmission through the request-response mechanism of the 400MHz wireless communication channel; By integrating signal authorization information and route information packet data, a dual verification relationship is established, and the existing track circuit code transmission information is synchronously linked.

3. The ground control method for a single-track railway train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, The vehicle-mounted LKJ request information is verified, and relevant information is transmitted through a request-response or request-response-re-response mechanism. When multiple vehicles send concurrent requests, they are scheduled according to a three-level priority system. At the same time, the radio signal authorization and track circuit code transmission information are double-verified, including: The legality and integrity of the information request messages sent by the vehicle-mounted LKJ are checked. The verification includes the validity of the train position and the compliance of the request permissions to ensure that the request information conforms to the interaction specifications. The appropriate communication mechanism is selected based on the type of request information. A two-way interactive mechanism of request-response is used for route information and temporary speed limit requests, and a dual confirmation mechanism of request-response-re-response is used for signal authorization requests to ensure the reliability of critical information transmission. For scenarios with concurrent requests from multiple vehicles, communication channels are allocated according to a three-level priority scheduling rule. Emergency braking-related requests are given priority in preempting channels, while section signal authorization and route authorization requests are scheduled using a polling + priority insertion method to ensure timely response. Within the station area, the authorization information of the signal transmitted through the 400MHz wireless channel is double-verified with the code information transmitted by the existing track circuit. Only after the verification is consistent can the train be allowed to perform the relevant operations.

4. The ground control method for a single-track railway train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the occupancy status of interval-separated sections, it supports multi-train tracking operation between stations, and simultaneously enables real-time wireless updates of route information and temporary data on trains, including: Based on the occupancy / idle status of the segmented section fed back by the axle counting equipment, the location information of multiple trains is dynamically tracked to generate a section train operation status mapping table, providing position support for the parallel operation of multiple trains. Based on the route opening status and train location data issued by the interlocking equipment, the passage permissions of the section are allocated according to the principle of first-come, first-served and safe interval, supporting continuous operation of multiple trains tracking between stations; It receives dispatch commands from the temporary speed limit server in real time and updates them synchronously to the ground control data pool to ensure that the temporary data matches the train operation status in real time. The updated temporary data is automatically pushed to the vehicle-mounted LKJ device through the request-response mechanism of the 400MHz wireless communication channel; Based on wireless communication QoS indicators, the timeliness of data transmission is guaranteed, and temporary data can be updated wirelessly on the vehicle in seconds.

5. The ground control method for a single-track railway train control system according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the fault type, it is handled in a safe state, and redundant channels are activated. If all channels are interrupted, an alarm message is output. The station status, communication status, and alarm information are displayed in real time through the maintenance terminal. The system operating status within the target time period is recorded, fault location and playback analysis are supported, and relevant information is reported to the centralized monitoring system, including: The fault-related information is identified and classified, and fault handling instructions are generated. Among them, the fault types of communication interruption of axle counting equipment, communication interruption of interlocking equipment, and wireless channel interruption are distinguished, and the corresponding safety side values ​​and handling actions are determined according to the preset safety state rules. Enable redundant communication channels for data transmission backup and generate channel switching feedback information. When a single channel fails, automatically switch to the redundant channel to receive data. When both channels are interrupted, trigger a safety state output and generate alarm information. The station occupancy status, equipment communication status, section running direction and fault alarm information are collected and displayed in real time by the maintenance terminal, and visualized monitoring data is generated to ensure that the operating status is visible in real time. Record system operating status data over time, with a storage period of no less than one month, and generate a historical operation database to provide data support for fault backtracking; The fault self-diagnosis function locates the faulty module, combines historical data to realize fault playback and analysis, generates a fault diagnosis report, and synchronously reports the equipment status and fault information to the centralized monitoring system.

6. A ground control device for a single-track railway train control system, characterized in that, The device includes: The multi-source data receiving module is used to receive the section occupancy / idle status information of the axle counting equipment, the route status information of the interlocking equipment, the temporary speed limit scheduling command of the temporary speed limit server, and the section status information of adjacent STC equipment, so as to complete the core vehicle control data acquisition. The vehicle-to-ground communication module is used to send ground vehicle control data such as signal authorization, route information, and temporary speed limits to the 400MHz wireless communication equipment, and at the same time receive information request messages sent by the vehicle-mounted LKJ equipment to establish a vehicle-to-ground data transmission link. The train control information generation module is used to divide the inter-station separation sections based on the axle counting equipment information, combine the route status of the interlocking equipment, process the temporary speed limit dispatching command of the temporary speed limit server, and generate signal authorization information, route information package containing track number / branch number and temporary speed limit information package to provide core train control basis; The request processing and security verification module is used to verify the legality and integrity of the LKJ request information on the vehicle. It transmits information through a request-response or request-response-re-response mechanism. When multiple vehicles are connected concurrently, they are scheduled according to a three-level priority. At the same time, the wireless signal authorization and track circuit code transmission information are double-verified to ensure transmission reliability and driving safety. The operation control and data update module is used to support multi-vehicle tracking between stations based on the section occupancy status and route information. It also enables real-time wireless onboard updates of temporary data via 400MHz wireless communication, thereby improving transportation efficiency. The fault information receiving module is used to receive fault-related information such as the communication status of external devices, its own operating status, and environmental adaptation status, providing data support for fault handling. The fault handling and monitoring reporting module is used to handle faults in a safe state based on fault type, enable redundant channels, output alarm information when both channels are interrupted, display the station, communication and alarm status in real time through the maintenance terminal, record the system working status, support fault location and playback analysis, and report relevant information to the centralized monitoring system.

7. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: First processor; and memory for storing executable instructions of the first processor; The first processor is configured to execute the ground control method for a single-track railway train control system as described in any one of claims 1 to 5 by executing the executable instructions.

8. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by the second processor, it implements the ground control method for a single-track railway train control system as described in any one of claims 1 to 5.

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