Hardware encryption chip cooperative authentication method and system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication

Abstract

The application provides a hardware encryption chip cooperative authentication method and system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, relates to the field of encryption technology, and comprises the following steps: extracting physical characteristic values from a chip physically unclonable function circuit, generating a first key and a second key through two key derivation paths; selecting one key as a main authentication key and the other key as a cross-verification key according to a communication request; encrypting an authentication message by using the main authentication key and performing secondary signature on a main authentication ciphertext digest by using the cross-verification key; and realizing cooperative authentication through verification. The method ensures the consistency of the physical roots of the dual-mode keys, and improves the security and reliability of the vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of encryption technology, and in particular to a hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication method and system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of intelligent connected vehicle technology, the security issues of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication are becoming increasingly prominent. Modern in-vehicle communication systems are typically equipped with multiple communication modes, such as cellular networks (4G / 5G) and Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC), to meet communication needs in different scenarios. While these dual-mode communication systems offer convenience, they also face severe security challenges. The security of in-vehicle communication systems is directly related to the life and property safety of drivers and passengers; therefore, reliable authentication mechanisms need to be designed to ensure the security of in-vehicle communication.

[0003] Currently, vehicle communication security mainly relies on software encryption and certificate-based authentication mechanisms. However, these methods have some shortcomings and deficiencies in practical applications. First, traditional software encryption schemes lack a physical security foundation; keys stored in software are easily obtained by attackers through software vulnerabilities or side-channel attacks, failing to provide sufficient security guarantees. Second, existing vehicle communication authentication schemes are typically designed for a single communication mode, with authentication systems for different communication modes operating independently and lacking effective coordination mechanisms. This necessitates re-performing the entire authentication process when switching communication modes, increasing system latency and resource consumption. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication method and system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, which can solve the problems in the prior art.

[0005] A first aspect of this invention provides a hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication method for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, comprising: The chip physical feature value is extracted from the physical non-clonable functional circuit of the hardware encryption chip. The chip physical feature value is input into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path respectively to generate the first key and the second key. The two key derivation paths share the same chip physical feature value as the entropy source to ensure the consistency of the physical root of the dual-mode key. Select either the first key or the second key as the master authentication key based on the target communication mode identifier corresponding to the current communication request, and use the other key as the cross-validation key. Use the master authentication key to encrypt the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical feature value to generate the master authentication ciphertext. The message digest of the master authentication ciphertext is signed again using the cross-validation key to generate a cross-mode verification signature. The master authentication ciphertext and the cross-mode verification signature are encapsulated into a collaborative authentication data packet and sent to the peer vehicle terminal through the communication interface corresponding to the target communication mode identifier. The system receives the peer collaborative authentication data packet returned by the peer vehicle terminal, performs collaborative authentication on the peer collaborative authentication data packet using the master authentication key and the cross-verification key, and establishes an encrypted communication link with the peer vehicle terminal after successful collaborative authentication.

[0006] The chip's physical characteristic values ​​are input into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path, respectively, to generate the first key and the second key, including: A physical feature value acquisition circuit is activated within the hardware encryption chip. By measuring the frequency deviation of multiple ring oscillator units in the physical unclonable function circuit, the physical feature value of the chip is generated. The physical feature value of the chip is used as a seed input and sent to the first key derivation circuit and the second key derivation circuit of the hardware encryption chip, respectively. In the first key derivation circuit, the chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the DSRC protocol identifier, and then the first key conforming to the DSRC key length specification is generated through iterative calculation using the SHA-256 hash function. In the second key derivation circuit, the chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the WAVE protocol identifier, and then the second key conforming to the WAVE key length specification is generated through iterative calculation using the national cryptographic SM3 hash function. The first key derivation circuit and the second key derivation circuit are physically isolated and executed in parallel within the hardware encryption chip.

[0007] The authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical characteristic value is encrypted using the master authentication key to generate the master authentication ciphertext; the message digest of the master authentication ciphertext is then secondary-signed using the cross-validation key to generate a cross-mode verification signature, including: A hash operation is performed on the chip physical feature value to generate a chip physical feature hash digest. The chip physical feature hash digest is then assembled with the vehicle terminal device identifier, the current timestamp, and a random number into an authentication message payload, wherein the random number is generated in real time by the true random number generator of the hardware encryption chip. The encryption engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked to determine the encryption algorithm type based on the target communication mode identifier. When the target communication mode identifier indicates DSRC communication mode, the AES-GCM algorithm is selected; when the target communication mode identifier indicates WAVE communication mode, the national cryptographic SM4-GCM algorithm is selected. The authentication message payload is authenticated and encrypted using the master authentication key and the encryption algorithm type to generate the master authentication ciphertext and an additional authentication tag. The message digest is calculated by concatenating the main authentication ciphertext and the additional authentication tag to obtain the main authentication digest value; the signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked, and the digital signature operation is performed on the main authentication digest value using the cross-validation key to generate the cross-mode verification signature.

[0008] The signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked, and a digital signature operation is performed on the master authentication digest value using the cross-validation key to generate the cross-mode verification signature, including: The private key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is read from the key storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The private key component is written into the fuse memory and a read protection flag is set during the manufacturing stage of the hardware encryption chip to ensure that the private key component cannot be read externally. Based on the key type identifier of the cross-validation key, the elliptic curve parameters required for the signature operation are determined. Within the signature operation unit of the hardware encryption chip, the private key component and the elliptic curve parameters are used to perform an elliptic curve digital signature operation on the master authentication digest value to generate a signature value containing an r component and an s component. The signature value is then encapsulated with the key type identifier of the cross-validation key to form the cross-mode verification signature. The generation timestamp of the cross-mode verification signature is recorded in the security log area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The generation timestamp is used to verify the timeliness of the cross-mode verification signature in the future. When the difference between the time when the peer vehicle terminal receives the cross-mode verification signature and the generation timestamp exceeds a preset time window, the cross-mode verification signature becomes invalid.

[0009] The peer collaborative authentication data packet is collaboratively authenticated using the master authentication key and the cross-verification key. After successful collaborative authentication, an encrypted communication link is established with the peer vehicle terminal, including: Parse the peer master authentication ciphertext, peer additional authentication tag, and peer cross-mode verification signature from the peer collaborative authentication data packet; The master authentication key is used to authenticate and decrypt the peer master authentication ciphertext and the peer additional authentication tag, and the validity of the peer additional authentication tag is verified. When the peer additional authentication tag is verified, the peer authentication message payload is decrypted, and the peer chip physical feature hash digest, peer device identifier and peer timestamp are extracted from the peer authentication message payload. The message digest is calculated by concatenating the peer master authentication ciphertext and the peer additional authentication tag to obtain the peer master authentication digest value. The public key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is used to verify the peer cross-mode verification signature. The peer master authentication digest value is used as the verification input. When the verification result is valid, it is confirmed that the peer collaborative authentication data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-validation path. Check whether the time difference between the peer's timestamp and the current time is within a preset time window, and verify whether the hash digest of the peer's chip physical characteristics exists in the pre-stored list of trusted devices; When the peer-to-peer additional authentication label is verified, the peer-to-peer cross-mode verification signature is valid, the peer-to-peer timestamp meets the timeliness requirement, and the peer-to-peer chip physical feature hash digest passes the trusted verification, the collaborative authentication is determined to be successful. The session key is then derived using the master authentication key, and the encrypted communication link is established based on the session key.

[0010] The peer cross-mode authentication signature is verified using the public key component corresponding to the cross-authentication key, with the peer master authentication digest value used as the verification input. When the verification result is valid, confirming that the peer collaborative authentication data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-authentication path includes: Extract the key type identifier, signature r component, and signature s component from the cross-mode verification signature of the peer; The signature verification algorithm type and elliptic curve parameters are determined based on the key type identifier. When the key type identifier indicates the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm, the SM2 public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read from the certificate storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip, and the SM2 public key component is extracted. The recommended SM2 curve parameters are selected to perform the signature verification operation. When the key type identifier indicates the ECDSA algorithm, the ECDSA public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read, and the ECDSA public key component is extracted. The NIST P-256 curve parameters are selected to perform the signature verification operation. Within the signature verification unit of the hardware encryption chip, the public key component, the elliptic curve parameters, the peer master authentication digest value, the signature r component, and the signature s component are used to execute the elliptic curve digital signature verification algorithm. When the signature verification operation outputs a successful verification result, it further checks whether the key type identifier and the key system of the cross-verification key match. If the master authentication key is a DSRC mode key, the key type identifier is required to indicate the WAVE mode signature algorithm. If the master authentication key is a WAVE mode key, the key type identifier is required to indicate the DSRC mode signature algorithm. When the key systems match and the signature verification passes, the cross-mode cross-verification is confirmed to be valid.

[0011] A second aspect of the present invention provides a hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, comprising: The first unit is used to extract chip physical feature values ​​from the physical non-clonable functional circuit of the hardware encryption chip, and input the chip physical feature values ​​into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path respectively to generate the first key and the second key. The two key derivation paths share the same chip physical feature values ​​as an entropy source to ensure the consistency of the physical root of the dual-mode key. The second unit is used to select either the first key or the second key as the master authentication key according to the target communication mode identifier corresponding to the current communication request, and use the other key as the cross-validation key. The master authentication key is used to encrypt the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical feature value to generate the master authentication ciphertext. The third unit is used to perform a secondary signature on the message digest of the master authentication ciphertext using the cross-verification key, generate a cross-mode verification signature, encapsulate the master authentication ciphertext and the cross-mode verification signature into a collaborative authentication data packet, and send it to the peer vehicle terminal through the communication interface corresponding to the target communication mode identifier. The fourth unit is used to receive the peer collaborative authentication data packet returned by the peer vehicle terminal, and to perform collaborative authentication on the peer collaborative authentication data packet by verifying the master authentication key and the cross-verification key. After the collaborative authentication is successful, an encrypted communication link is established with the peer vehicle terminal.

[0012] A third aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, An electronic device is provided, comprising: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to execute the aforementioned method.

[0013] Fourth aspect of the present invention, A computer-readable storage medium is provided, having stored thereon computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the aforementioned method.

[0014] The beneficial effects of this application are as follows: By extracting the chip's physical characteristic values ​​from the physically unclonable functional circuitry of the hardware encryption chip as a shared entropy source, the physical root consistency of the dual-mode key is ensured, enhancing the security and reliability of encrypted communication. By employing a mechanism that combines a master authentication key and a cross-verification key, mutual authentication and verification between the two communication modes are achieved, effectively preventing the risk of a single communication mode being attacked or hijacked. The dynamic key selection mechanism based on the target communication mode enables the system to flexibly respond to the needs of different communication scenarios, while maintaining the consistency and compatibility of the authentication mechanism, thus improving the adaptability of the vehicle communication system. Attached Figure Description

[0015] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication method for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication according to an embodiment of the present invention. Figure 2 A schematic diagram illustrating the process of establishing an encrypted communication link with the peer vehicle terminal. Detailed Implementation

[0016] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0017] The technical solution of the present invention will be described in detail below with reference to specific embodiments. These specific embodiments can be combined with each other, and the same or similar concepts or processes may not be described again in some embodiments.

[0018] refer to Figure 1 and Figure 2 The flowchart of the hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication method for vehicle dual-mode communication according to an embodiment of the present invention is shown below. Figure 1 As shown, the method includes: The chip physical feature value is extracted from the physical non-clonable functional circuit of the hardware encryption chip. The chip physical feature value is input into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path respectively to generate the first key and the second key. The two key derivation paths share the same chip physical feature value as the entropy source to ensure the consistency of the physical root of the dual-mode key. Select either the first key or the second key as the master authentication key based on the target communication mode identifier corresponding to the current communication request, and use the other key as the cross-validation key. Use the master authentication key to encrypt the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical feature value to generate the master authentication ciphertext. The message digest of the master authentication ciphertext is signed again using the cross-validation key to generate a cross-mode verification signature. The master authentication ciphertext and the cross-mode verification signature are encapsulated into a collaborative authentication data packet and sent to the peer vehicle terminal through the communication interface corresponding to the target communication mode identifier. The system receives the peer collaborative authentication data packet returned by the peer vehicle terminal, performs collaborative authentication on the peer collaborative authentication data packet using the master authentication key and the cross-verification key, and establishes an encrypted communication link with the peer vehicle terminal after successful collaborative authentication.

[0019] In one optional implementation, the chip physical feature values ​​are respectively input into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path to generate the first key and the second key, including: A physical feature value acquisition circuit is activated within the hardware encryption chip. By measuring the frequency deviation of multiple ring oscillator units in the physical unclonable function circuit, the physical feature value of the chip is generated. The physical feature value of the chip is used as a seed input and sent to the first key derivation circuit and the second key derivation circuit of the hardware encryption chip, respectively. In the first key derivation circuit, the chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the DSRC protocol identifier, and then the first key conforming to the DSRC key length specification is generated through iterative calculation using the SHA-256 hash function. In the second key derivation circuit, the chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the WAVE protocol identifier, and then the second key conforming to the WAVE key length specification is generated through iterative calculation using the national cryptographic SM3 hash function. The first key derivation circuit and the second key derivation circuit are physically isolated and executed in parallel within the hardware encryption chip.

[0020] In one specific embodiment of the present invention, a method for generating multi-protocol keys based on the physical unclonable function is provided. The method generates uncopyable keys through the physical characteristics built into the hardware encryption chip, which is used for security protection of vehicle network communication.

[0021] A physical feature acquisition circuit is initiated within the hardware encryption chip. This circuit contains multiple ring oscillator units, each consisting of an odd number of inverters connected in series to form a ring structure. Due to slight differences in the manufacturing process, these inverters have different delay characteristics, causing each ring oscillator to generate an oscillation signal at a different frequency.

[0022] After the chip is powered on, the control logic module sends a sampling signal to activate all ring oscillator units to operate simultaneously. Each ring oscillator unit contains 15-31 inverters, forming a closed-loop structure to generate stable oscillations. The sampling circuit simultaneously measures the frequency of 64 ring oscillators, with each oscillator running for 1 millisecond, and the number of oscillations recorded by a counter. The frequency comparison result of adjacent oscillators forms a 1-bit binary value: if the frequency of the i-th oscillator is higher than that of the (i+1)-th oscillator, the output is 1; otherwise, the output is 0. In this way, the 64 oscillators ultimately generate a 32-bit binary physical characteristic value.

[0023] To improve the stability of eigenvalues, a multiple sampling and averaging method is used. Ten consecutive samplings are performed, and a majority vote is conducted for each bit position, selecting the value that appears most frequently as the final result. This process effectively eliminates instability caused by environmental factors such as temperature fluctuations and power supply noise, ensuring the reliability of the chip's physical eigenvalues.

[0024] The generated 32-bit chip physical characteristic value is used as a seed input and simultaneously fed into the first and second key derivation circuits inside the hardware encryption chip. The two key derivation paths are physically isolated within the chip, achieving electromagnetic isolation through independent power domains, ground networks, and shielding layers to prevent key information leakage due to side-channel attacks.

[0025] In the first key derivation circuit, the 32-bit chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the DSRC protocol identifier "DSRC_PROTO" (a 10-byte string encoded in ASCII) to form the initial input data block. This data block is then input to the SHA-256 hash function circuit for processing. The SHA-256 hash function first pads the input message to make its length a multiple of 512 bits, then divides the padded message into 512-bit blocks, processes each data block sequentially, and finally outputs a 256-bit hash value.

[0026] According to the DSRC protocol key length specification, a 128-bit key needs to be generated. Therefore, the first 128 bits are taken from the 256-bit result output by the SHA-256 hash function as the first key. This process is completed in a dedicated hardware module of the first key derivation circuit, ensuring processing speed and security.

[0027] Simultaneously, in the second key derivation circuit, the same 32-bit chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the WAVE protocol identifier "C_V2X_ID" (an 8-byte string encoded in ASCII) to form another initial input data block. This data block is input to the national cryptographic SM3 hash function circuit for processing. The SM3 hash function also pads the input message to make its length an integer multiple of 512 bits, then processes it in blocks, iteratively calculates through a compression function, and finally generates a 256-bit output.

[0028] According to the WAVE key length specification, a 256-bit key needs to be generated. Since the output of the SM3 hash function is exactly 256 bits, the output of the SM3 hash function is directly used as the second key. This process is completed in a dedicated hardware module for the second key derivation circuit.

[0029] The two key derivation paths are designed in parallel and executed simultaneously within the chip, greatly improving processing efficiency. When the chip receives a key generation request, the control logic module activates both key derivation paths simultaneously, executing hash operations in parallel. For the SHA-256 and SM3 hash functions, a pipelined design is adopted, dividing the hash calculation into three stages: message preprocessing, block processing, and result output, further optimizing computational efficiency.

[0030] The entire key generation process is completed within the hardware encryption chip, requiring no external input and without transmitting intermediate data outside the chip, effectively preventing the risk of key leakage. The two generated keys are stored separately in a secure storage area within the chip, accessible only through the chip's secure interface; the original key values ​​cannot be read directly.

[0031] This method of generating keys based on physically unclonable functionality fully utilizes the unavoidable randomness in chip manufacturing. The generated keys are unique and unpredictable, which can meet the security requirements of multi-protocol communication in vehicle networks and effectively support secure communication under both DSRC and WAVE protocol standards.

[0032] In one optional implementation, the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical characteristic value is encrypted using the master authentication key to generate master authentication ciphertext; the message digest of the master authentication ciphertext is then secondary-signed using the cross-validation key to generate a cross-mode verification signature, including: A hash operation is performed on the chip physical feature value to generate a chip physical feature hash digest. The chip physical feature hash digest is then assembled with the vehicle terminal device identifier, the current timestamp, and a random number into an authentication message payload, wherein the random number is generated in real time by the true random number generator of the hardware encryption chip. The encryption engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked to determine the encryption algorithm type based on the target communication mode identifier. When the target communication mode identifier indicates DSRC communication mode, the AES-GCM algorithm is selected; when the target communication mode identifier indicates WAVE communication mode, the national cryptographic SM4-GCM algorithm is selected. The authentication message payload is authenticated and encrypted using the master authentication key and the encryption algorithm type to generate the master authentication ciphertext and an additional authentication tag. The message digest is calculated by concatenating the main authentication ciphertext and the additional authentication tag to obtain the main authentication digest value; the signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked, and the digital signature operation is performed on the main authentication digest value using the cross-validation key to generate the cross-mode verification signature.

[0033] The physical feature generation module of the hardware encryption chip obtains the chip's internal physical, non-clonable characteristic values. These characteristics originate from random physical differences generated during chip manufacturing, such as the initial state in SRAM boot mode and frequency differences in the delay loop oscillator. These physical characteristic values ​​are unique and cannot be copied, and can serve as the basis for device authentication.

[0034] After obtaining the chip's physical characteristic values, a hash operation is performed to generate a hash digest of the chip's physical characteristics. Specifically, the SHA-256 or SM3 hash algorithm can be used to convert physical characteristic values ​​of varying lengths into fixed-length hash values. For example, for 64-byte SRAM initial state characteristics, a 32-byte hash digest is calculated using the SHA-256 algorithm.

[0035] The chip's physical characteristic hash digest, along with the vehicle terminal device identifier (such as DSRC device ID or WAVE terminal identifier), the current timestamp (accurate to milliseconds), and a random number, are assembled into the authentication message payload. The random number is generated in real-time by the hardware encryption chip's true random number generator, typically 16 or 32 bytes in length, to prevent replay attacks. This information is serialized according to a fixed format to form the authentication message payload.

[0036] The encryption algorithm type is determined based on the target communication mode identifier. When the target communication mode identifier indicates DSRC communication mode, the AES-GCM algorithm is selected; when the target communication mode identifier indicates WAVE communication mode, the national standard SM4-GCM algorithm is selected. This algorithm selection mechanism ensures compatibility between dual-mode communication and meets the security standard requirements of different regions.

[0037] The encryption engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked to authenticate and encrypt the authentication message payload using the master authentication key and a defined encryption algorithm. For AES-GCM, a 128-bit or 256-bit master authentication key and a 12-byte initialization vector are used; for SM4-GCM, a 128-bit master authentication key and a 16-byte initialization vector are used. The encryption process generates the master authentication ciphertext and a 16-byte additional authentication tag. The additional authentication tag is used to verify the integrity and authenticity of the ciphertext.

[0038] The main authentication ciphertext and the additional authentication tag are concatenated to form the complete authentication ciphertext. The concatenation method typically involves appending the additional authentication tag directly to the main authentication ciphertext. Subsequently, the message digest of the concatenated data is calculated to obtain the main authentication digest value. Hash algorithms such as SHA-256 and SM3 can be used to generate the digest.

[0039] The signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked to perform a digital signature operation on the master authentication digest value using the cross-validation key, generating a cross-mode verification signature. When the target mode is DSRC, the ECDSA signature algorithm can be used; when the target mode is WAVE, the SM2 signature algorithm can be used. The cross-validation key used in the signing process is the private key corresponding to the target communication mode, ensuring the security of cross-mode verification.

[0040] In practical applications, when a vehicle moves from the DSRC coverage area into the WAVE coverage area, the onboard terminal can automatically execute the above authentication process to ensure seamless communication switching. For example, when a vehicle approaches an intersection, the system detects the need to switch from DSRC to WAVE communication mode and immediately triggers the authentication process. The system first obtains the chip's physical characteristic value and calculates a hash digest. Then, it assembles this digest with the vehicle ID "VEH2023101500123", the timestamp "1634567890123", and a random number to form an authentication message payload. Next, it encrypts the payload using the SM4-GCM algorithm and a preset master authentication key to generate ciphertext and an authentication tag. Finally, it calculates a digest of the ciphertext and authentication tag and performs an SM2 signature using a cross-validation key to complete the entire authentication process.

[0041] Through the above mechanisms, dual-mode authentication based on a hardware encryption chip is achieved, ensuring the security and reliability of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication when switching between different modes. This solution utilizes the physical characteristics of the chip and cryptographic methods to effectively prevent forgery and replay attacks, thereby improving the overall security level of the V2X system.

[0042] In one optional implementation, the signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked, and a digital signature operation is performed on the master authentication digest value using the cross-validation key to generate the cross-mode verification signature, including: The private key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is read from the key storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The private key component is written into the fuse memory and a read protection flag is set during the manufacturing stage of the hardware encryption chip to ensure that the private key component cannot be read externally. Based on the key type identifier of the cross-validation key, the elliptic curve parameters required for the signature operation are determined. Within the signature operation unit of the hardware encryption chip, the private key component and the elliptic curve parameters are used to perform an elliptic curve digital signature operation on the master authentication digest value to generate a signature value containing an r component and an s component. The signature value is then encapsulated with the key type identifier of the cross-validation key to form the cross-mode verification signature. The generation timestamp of the cross-mode verification signature is recorded in the security log area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The generation timestamp is used to verify the timeliness of the cross-mode verification signature in the future. When the difference between the time when the peer vehicle terminal receives the cross-mode verification signature and the generation timestamp exceeds a preset time window, the cross-mode verification signature becomes invalid.

[0043] In vehicle-to-everything (V2X) security authentication systems, the security of hardware encryption chips is paramount. This implementation details how to invoke the signature engine of the hardware encryption chip, perform digital signature operations on the master authentication digest value using a cross-validation key, and generate a cross-mode verification signature.

[0044] The private key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is read from the key storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. This private key component is written into the fuse memory (eFuse) and a read protection flag is set during the hardware encryption chip manufacturing stage to ensure that the private key component cannot be read externally. The read operation is performed through the internal bus of the hardware encryption chip, and the command is initiated by the secure microcontroller to access the dedicated key storage area. The key storage area adopts multiple layers of physical protection measures, including tamper-proof grids, voltage monitoring, and temperature monitoring circuits. When a physical intrusion attempt is detected, the stored key material is immediately erased.

[0045] When reading the private key component, the hardware encryption chip first verifies access permissions, checking whether the current execution environment has a sufficient security level. The chip only allows internal access to the private key component when the in-vehicle terminal is in a secure boot state and the current application has the appropriate permissions. The private key component never leaves the chip's security boundary; all cryptographic operations are performed internally within the chip.

[0046] Based on the key type identifier of the cross-validation key, the elliptic curve parameters required for the signature operation are determined. The key type identifier is an 8-bit value that indicates the type of elliptic curve used. For example, a value of 0x01 might represent the NIST P-256 curve, and a value of 0x02 might represent the SM2 curve. Based on this identifier, the corresponding elliptic curve parameters, including curve equation parameters, base point coordinates, order, and cofactor, are read from the parameter storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip.

[0047] After determining the elliptic curve parameters, the signature processing unit of the hardware encryption chip performs elliptic curve digital signature operations on the master authentication digest value using the private key component and the elliptic curve parameters. The signature process follows ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm) or the SM2 signature algorithm (if using the national cryptographic standard), generating a signature value containing r and s components. Specifically, the signature processing unit first generates a random number k, which is generated by the chip's built-in true random number generator to ensure the unpredictability of the signature; then, it calculates the x-coordinate of point kG (G is the base point) as the r component; finally, it calculates s = (H(m) + r·d) / k mod n, where H(m) is the master authentication digest value, d is the private key component, and n is the curve order.

[0048] After the signature operation is completed, the signature value (r component and s component) is encapsulated with the key type identifier of the cross-validation key to form a cross-mode verified signature. The encapsulation format can be an ASN.1 structure, containing the signature algorithm identifier, key type identifier, r component, and s component. This structured format facilitates correct parsing and verification of the signature by the receiver.

[0049] The timestamp of cross-mode signature verification is recorded in the security log area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The timestamp is generated based on the chip's internal security clock, accurate to the millisecond, and recorded in UTC time format. The security log area employs a circular write mechanism to ensure that the most recent security events are recorded even during long-term operation. Each log entry contains information such as event type, timestamp, operation type, and result status. These logs are encrypted and accessible only to authorized system components.

[0050] The generated timestamp is used for subsequent verification of the cross-mode verification signature's timeliness. When the peer vehicle terminal receives the cross-mode verification signature, it extracts the timestamp contained in the signature and compares it with the current time. If the difference between the two exceeds a preset time window (e.g., 30 seconds), the cross-mode verification signature is deemed invalid, and the verification result is rejected. This mechanism effectively prevents replay attacks and ensures the timeliness of the authentication process.

[0051] In practical applications, when one vehicle needs to establish secure communication with another, a master authentication digest value is first generated, and then the above process is invoked to generate a cross-mode verification signature. The receiving vehicle uses the sender's public key to verify the signature and checks the validity of the timestamp to ensure the authenticity and timeliness of the communication. This mechanism is particularly suitable for scenarios requiring high security, such as vehicle platooning and traffic information sharing.

[0052] Through the detailed technical implementation described above, the security, unforgeability, and timeliness of cross-mode verification signatures in the vehicle-to-everything (V2X) environment are ensured, effectively supporting the secure communication and identity authentication needs between vehicle terminals.

[0053] In one optional implementation, the peer collaborative authentication data packet is collaboratively authenticated using the master authentication key and the cross-verification key. After successful collaborative authentication, an encrypted communication link is established with the peer vehicle terminal, including: Parse the peer master authentication ciphertext, peer additional authentication tag, and peer cross-mode verification signature from the peer collaborative authentication data packet; The master authentication key is used to authenticate and decrypt the peer master authentication ciphertext and the peer additional authentication tag, and the validity of the peer additional authentication tag is verified. When the peer additional authentication tag is verified, the peer authentication message payload is decrypted, and the peer chip physical feature hash digest, peer device identifier and peer timestamp are extracted from the peer authentication message payload. The message digest is calculated by concatenating the peer master authentication ciphertext and the peer additional authentication tag to obtain the peer master authentication digest value. The public key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is used to verify the peer cross-mode verification signature. The peer master authentication digest value is used as the verification input. When the verification result is valid, it is confirmed that the peer collaborative authentication data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-validation path. Check whether the time difference between the peer's timestamp and the current time is within a preset time window, and verify whether the hash digest of the peer's chip physical characteristics exists in the pre-stored list of trusted devices; When the peer-to-peer additional authentication label is verified, the peer-to-peer cross-mode verification signature is valid, the peer-to-peer timestamp meets the timeliness requirement, and the peer-to-peer chip physical feature hash digest passes the trusted verification, the collaborative authentication is determined to be successful. The session key is then derived using the master authentication key, and the encrypted communication link is established based on the session key.

[0054] The peer-to-peer collaborative authentication data packet is parsed to extract the peer-to-peer main authentication ciphertext, the peer-to-peer additional authentication tag, and the peer-to-peer cross-mode verification signature. The collaborative authentication data packet has a specific structure containing multiple fields. The main authentication ciphertext contains the encrypted authentication message payload, the additional authentication tag ensures the integrity of the ciphertext, and the cross-mode verification signature provides additional authentication guarantees. The parsing process separates these three key components for subsequent processing by reading field values ​​at different locations within the data packet according to a predetermined protocol format.

[0055] The primary authentication key is used to authenticate and decrypt the peer's primary authentication ciphertext and the peer's additional authentication tag, verifying the validity of the peer's additional authentication tag. This step employs an authentication encryption algorithm (such as AES-GCM or ChaCha20-Poly1305), taking the primary authentication key as input and processing both the ciphertext and the authentication tag. If the authentication tag verification fails, the collaborative authentication process is immediately terminated, indicating that the data packet may have been tampered with or corrupted. When the peer's additional authentication tag verification succeeds, the decryption operation continues, thus obtaining the peer's authentication message payload.

[0056] Extract the peer chip physical feature hash digest, peer device identifier, and peer timestamp from the peer authentication message payload. The authentication message payload has a predetermined format, containing multiple fields arranged in the order and size specified by the protocol. The extraction process requires accurately reading each piece of information according to the field boundaries to ensure correct data parsing. The chip physical feature hash digest is typically a unique identifier obtained by hashing the output of the device's Physically Unclonable Function (PUF). The device identifier is a unique number for the vehicle terminal, and the timestamp records the time the data packet was created.

[0057] The message digest is calculated by concatenating the peer's primary authentication ciphertext and the peer's additional authentication tag to obtain the peer's primary authentication digest value. The concatenation operation combines the primary authentication ciphertext and the additional authentication tag into a single data block in a specific order, and then uses a secure hash algorithm (such as SHA-256 or SHA-3) to calculate the digest value of that data block. This process creates a compact representation of the original authentication data, facilitating subsequent signature verification operations.

[0058] The cross-validation signature of the peer is verified using the public key component corresponding to the cross-validation key, with the peer's master authentication digest value as the verification input. This step utilizes asymmetric encryption techniques, such as ECDSA or RSA signature algorithms, to verify the validity of the cross-validation signature. The verification process takes the public key, signature, and master authentication digest value as input and checks whether the signature matches the master authentication digest value. When the verification result is valid, it confirms that the peer's collaborative authentication data packet has passed dual verification through both the master authentication path and the cross-validation path, enhancing authentication security and preventing attackers from cracking a single verification path.

[0059] Check if the time difference between the peer's timestamp and the current time is within a preset time window. Obtain the current system time and compare it with the peer's timestamp extracted from the authentication payload, calculating the time difference between the two. If the time difference exceeds the preset time window (e.g., a few seconds or minutes), the authentication packet is considered to be part of a replay attack, or the packet transmission delay is too long; in this case, the authentication request should be rejected. This mechanism effectively prevents attackers from capturing valid packets and retransmitting them at a future point in time to gain unauthorized access.

[0060] The verification process verifies whether the peer chip's physical feature hash digest exists in a pre-stored list of trusted devices. During verification, the chip's physical feature hash digest extracted from the authentication message payload is compared with a pre-stored list of trusted devices in the vehicle safety system. This list contains the chip feature hash values ​​of all devices authorized to communicate with the current vehicle terminal. By searching the list and comparing the hash values, it can be determined whether the communication request originates from an approved secure device.

[0061] The collaborative authentication is considered successful when the peer's attached authentication tag verification passes, the peer's cross-mode verification signature is valid, the peer's timestamp meets the timeliness requirements, and the peer's chip physical feature hash digest passes trusted verification. These four conditions form a comprehensive security verification mechanism that jointly ensures the authenticity of the identities of both communicating parties, message integrity, and prevents replay attacks. Only when all conditions are met can the collaborative authentication be considered successfully completed.

[0062] After successful authentication, a session key is derived using the master authentication key. The key derivation process uses a key derivation function (such as HKDF) to generate a temporary session key for encrypted communication, taking the master authentication key, random numbers or nonce values ​​from both parties, and possible context information as input. This method ensures that the encryption key for each session is unique, even if the master authentication key is used for an extended period, thus enhancing communication security.

[0063] Finally, an encrypted communication link is established based on the session key. By configuring an encrypted communication protocol (such as TLS or a custom security protocol) using the derived session key, a secure channel is established between the two parties. The encrypted communication link ensures that subsequent data exchanges are protected by encryption, preventing data from being eavesdropped on, tampered with, or forged. It also provides functions such as data integrity verification and message source authentication, meeting the high requirements for secure communication in the connected vehicle environment.

[0064] The above collaborative authentication mechanism combines symmetric encryption (master authentication key), asymmetric encryption (cross-validation key) and physical non-cloning feature verification to build a multi-layered security authentication system, which is suitable for high-security scenarios such as the Internet of Vehicles.

[0065] In one optional implementation, the public key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is used to verify the peer cross-mode verification signature, with the peer master authentication digest value used as the verification input. When the verification result is valid, confirming that the peer collaborative authentication data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-validation path includes: Extract the key type identifier, signature r component, and signature s component from the cross-mode verification signature of the peer; The signature verification algorithm type and elliptic curve parameters are determined based on the key type identifier. When the key type identifier indicates the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm, the SM2 public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read from the certificate storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip, and the SM2 public key component is extracted. The recommended SM2 curve parameters are selected to perform the signature verification operation. When the key type identifier indicates the ECDSA algorithm, the ECDSA public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read, and the ECDSA public key component is extracted. The NIST P-256 curve parameters are selected to perform the signature verification operation. Within the signature verification unit of the hardware encryption chip, the public key component, the elliptic curve parameters, the peer master authentication digest value, the signature r component, and the signature s component are used to execute the elliptic curve digital signature verification algorithm. When the signature verification operation outputs a successful verification result, it further checks whether the key type identifier and the key system of the cross-verification key match. If the master authentication key is a DSRC mode key, the key type identifier is required to indicate the WAVE mode signature algorithm. If the master authentication key is a WAVE mode key, the key type identifier is required to indicate the DSRC mode signature algorithm. When the key systems match and the signature verification passes, the cross-mode cross-verification is confirmed to be valid.

[0066] In a dual-mode vehicle-to-everything (V2X) security authentication system, dual verification of peer-to-peer collaborative authentication data packets is crucial to ensure communication security. First, the received peer cross-mode authentication signature needs to be verified using the corresponding public key, while simultaneously using the peer's master authentication digest value as the verification input. Only when the verification result is valid can it be confirmed that the data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-authentication path.

[0067] At the start of the verification process, key information is extracted from the peer's cross-modal signature verification, including the key type identifier and signature components. The key type identifier determines the algorithm and parameters used for subsequent verification. Specifically, the signature verification process needs to extract the r-component and s-component of the signature, which together constitute the complete elliptic curve digital signature.

[0068] Based on the extracted key type identifier, the corresponding signature verification algorithm type and elliptic curve parameters are determined. When the key type identifier points to the national standard SM2 algorithm, the SM2 public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read from the certificate storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip, and the SM2 public key component is extracted from it. The verification process will use the recommended SM2 curve parameters to perform the signature verification operation. These parameters include standard-defined parameters such as the elliptic curve equation, base point G, and order n.

[0069] If the key type identifier points to the ECDSA algorithm, then it is necessary to read the ECDSA public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal and extract its public key component. In this case, the verification process uses the NIST P-256 curve parameter to perform the signature verification operation. This curve is an elliptic curve recommended by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and is widely used in digital signature verification.

[0070] The signature verification process is performed within a dedicated signature verification unit on the hardware encryption chip to ensure computational security and efficiency. The verification operation requires inputs including the public key component, elliptic curve parameters, the peer master authentication digest value, and the r and s components of the signature. The elliptic curve digital signature verification algorithm calculates specific points based on these inputs and checks whether the calculation result meets the signature verification conditions.

[0071] After the signature verification operation outputs a successful verification result, the system needs to further check whether the key type identifier matches the key system of the cross-verification key. This is a crucial step to ensure the validity of cross-mode cross-verification. The specific matching rule is as follows: if the master authentication key is a DSRC mode key, then the key type identifier must indicate the WAVE mode signature algorithm; conversely, if the master authentication key is a WAVE mode key, then the key type identifier must indicate the DSRC mode signature algorithm.

[0072] For example, when a vehicle uses DSRC mode for primary authentication communication, upon receiving a message from the peer, it first verifies the message's validity through the DSRC mode's primary authentication path. Simultaneously, to ensure higher security, it also cross-verifies the message using the peer's WAVE mode signature algorithm. Only when both verifications pass is the message considered completely trustworthy. This dual-verification mechanism effectively prevents security risks caused by attacks on a single mode.

[0073] In practical applications, when a connected vehicle equipped with dual-mode communication devices receives a security message from a roadside unit, it first extracts the cross-mode verification signature information from the message. Assuming the primary authentication uses DSRC mode and cross-verification uses the SM2 algorithm in WAVE mode, the verification process first confirms that the key type identifier points to the SM2 algorithm, then retrieves the corresponding public key certificate from the certificate store, extracts the public key, and performs signature verification using the recommended SM2 parameters.

[0074] After successful signature verification, the system will also check the key matching to confirm that the DSRC mode key used for primary authentication and the WAVE mode SM2 algorithm used for cross-validation are indeed different modes. Only when signature verification is successful and the key matching is achieved is the message finally confirmed to have passed dual authentication and can be trusted and processed by the vehicle safety system.

[0075] This design ensures that even if an attacker successfully breaches the security mechanism of one communication mode, they cannot bypass the verification of another mode, thus significantly improving the overall security and reliability of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication. This is crucial for ensuring the safety of autonomous driving and intelligent transportation systems.

[0076] This invention provides a hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, comprising: The first unit is used to extract chip physical feature values ​​from the physical non-clonable functional circuit of the hardware encryption chip, and input the chip physical feature values ​​into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path respectively to generate the first key and the second key. The two key derivation paths share the same chip physical feature values ​​as an entropy source to ensure the consistency of the physical root of the dual-mode key. The second unit is used to select either the first key or the second key as the master authentication key according to the target communication mode identifier corresponding to the current communication request, and use the other key as the cross-validation key. The master authentication key is used to encrypt the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical feature value to generate the master authentication ciphertext. The third unit is used to perform a secondary signature on the message digest of the master authentication ciphertext using the cross-verification key, generate a cross-mode verification signature, encapsulate the master authentication ciphertext and the cross-mode verification signature into a collaborative authentication data packet, and send it to the peer vehicle terminal through the communication interface corresponding to the target communication mode identifier. The fourth unit is used to receive the peer collaborative authentication data packet returned by the peer vehicle terminal, and to perform collaborative authentication on the peer collaborative authentication data packet by verifying the master authentication key and the cross-verification key. After the collaborative authentication is successful, an encrypted communication link is established with the peer vehicle terminal.

[0077] A third aspect of the embodiments of the present invention, An electronic device is provided, comprising: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to execute the aforementioned method.

[0078] Fourth aspect of the present invention, A computer-readable storage medium is provided, having stored thereon computer program instructions that, when executed by a processor, implement the aforementioned method.

[0079] This invention can be a method, apparatus, system, and / or computer program product. The computer program product may include a computer-readable storage medium having computer-readable program instructions loaded thereon for performing various aspects of the invention.

[0080] Finally, it should be noted that the above embodiments are only used to illustrate the technical solutions of the present invention, and not to limit them; although the present invention has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some or all of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention.

Claims

1. A hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication method for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, characterized in that, include: The chip physical feature value is extracted from the physical non-clonable functional circuit of the hardware encryption chip. The chip physical feature value is input into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path respectively to generate the first key and the second key. The two key derivation paths share the same chip physical feature value as the entropy source to ensure the consistency of the physical root of the dual-mode key. Select either the first key or the second key as the master authentication key based on the target communication mode identifier corresponding to the current communication request, and use the other key as the cross-validation key. Use the master authentication key to encrypt the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical feature value to generate the master authentication ciphertext. The message digest of the master authentication ciphertext is signed again using the cross-validation key to generate a cross-mode verification signature. The master authentication ciphertext and the cross-mode verification signature are encapsulated into a collaborative authentication data packet and sent to the peer vehicle terminal through the communication interface corresponding to the target communication mode identifier. The system receives the peer collaborative authentication data packet returned by the peer vehicle terminal, performs collaborative authentication on the peer collaborative authentication data packet using the master authentication key and the cross-verification key, and establishes an encrypted communication link with the peer vehicle terminal after successful collaborative authentication.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The chip's physical characteristic values ​​are input into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path, respectively, to generate the first key and the second key, including: A physical feature value acquisition circuit is activated within the hardware encryption chip. By measuring the frequency deviation of multiple ring oscillator units in the physical unclonable function circuit, the physical feature value of the chip is generated. The physical feature value of the chip is used as a seed input and sent to the first key derivation circuit and the second key derivation circuit of the hardware encryption chip, respectively. In the first key derivation circuit, the chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the DSRC protocol identifier, and then the first key conforming to the DSRC key length specification is generated through iterative calculation using the SHA-256 hash function. In the second key derivation circuit, the chip physical characteristic value is concatenated with the WAVE protocol identifier, and then the second key conforming to the WAVE key length specification is generated through iterative calculation using the national cryptographic SM3 hash function. The first key derivation circuit and the second key derivation circuit are physically isolated and executed in parallel within the hardware encryption chip.

3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical characteristic value is encrypted using the master authentication key to generate the master authentication ciphertext; the message digest of the master authentication ciphertext is then secondary-signed using the cross-validation key to generate a cross-mode verification signature, including: A hash operation is performed on the chip physical feature value to generate a chip physical feature hash digest. The chip physical feature hash digest is then assembled with the vehicle terminal device identifier, the current timestamp, and a random number into an authentication message payload, wherein the random number is generated in real time by the true random number generator of the hardware encryption chip. The encryption engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked to determine the encryption algorithm type based on the target communication mode identifier. When the target communication mode identifier indicates DSRC communication mode, the AES-GCM algorithm is selected; when the target communication mode identifier indicates WAVE communication mode, the national cryptographic SM4-GCM algorithm is selected. The authentication message payload is authenticated and encrypted using the master authentication key and the encryption algorithm type to generate the master authentication ciphertext and an additional authentication tag. The message digest is calculated by concatenating the main authentication ciphertext and the additional authentication tag to obtain the main authentication digest value; the signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked, and the digital signature operation is performed on the main authentication digest value using the cross-validation key to generate the cross-mode verification signature.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, The signature engine of the hardware encryption chip is invoked, and a digital signature operation is performed on the master authentication digest value using the cross-validation key to generate the cross-mode verification signature, including: The private key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is read from the key storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The private key component is written into the fuse memory and a read protection flag is set during the manufacturing stage of the hardware encryption chip to ensure that the private key component cannot be read externally. Based on the key type identifier of the cross-validation key, the elliptic curve parameters required for the signature operation are determined. Within the signature operation unit of the hardware encryption chip, the private key component and the elliptic curve parameters are used to perform an elliptic curve digital signature operation on the master authentication digest value to generate a signature value containing an r component and an s component. The signature value is then encapsulated with the key type identifier of the cross-validation key to form the cross-mode verification signature. The generation timestamp of the cross-mode verification signature is recorded in the security log area of ​​the hardware encryption chip. The generation timestamp is used to verify the timeliness of the cross-mode verification signature in the future. When the difference between the time when the peer vehicle terminal receives the cross-mode verification signature and the generation timestamp exceeds a preset time window, the cross-mode verification signature becomes invalid.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The peer collaborative authentication data packet is collaboratively authenticated using the master authentication key and the cross-verification key. After successful collaborative authentication, an encrypted communication link is established with the peer vehicle terminal, including: Parse the peer master authentication ciphertext, peer additional authentication tag, and peer cross-mode verification signature from the peer collaborative authentication data packet; The master authentication key is used to authenticate and decrypt the peer master authentication ciphertext and the peer additional authentication tag, and the validity of the peer additional authentication tag is verified. When the peer additional authentication tag is verified, the peer authentication message payload is decrypted, and the peer chip physical feature hash digest, peer device identifier and peer timestamp are extracted from the peer authentication message payload. The message digest is calculated by concatenating the peer master authentication ciphertext and the peer additional authentication tag to obtain the peer master authentication digest value. The public key component corresponding to the cross-validation key is used to verify the peer cross-mode verification signature. The peer master authentication digest value is used as the verification input. When the verification result is valid, it is confirmed that the peer collaborative authentication data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-validation path. Check whether the time difference between the peer's timestamp and the current time is within a preset time window, and verify whether the hash digest of the peer's chip physical characteristics exists in the pre-stored list of trusted devices; When the peer-to-peer additional authentication label is verified, the peer-to-peer cross-mode verification signature is valid, the peer-to-peer timestamp meets the timeliness requirement, and the peer-to-peer chip physical feature hash digest passes the trusted verification, the collaborative authentication is determined to be successful. The session key is then derived using the master authentication key, and the encrypted communication link is established based on the session key.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The peer cross-mode authentication signature is verified using the public key component corresponding to the cross-authentication key, with the peer master authentication digest value used as the verification input. When the verification result is valid, confirming that the peer collaborative authentication data packet has passed the dual verification of the master authentication path and the cross-authentication path includes: Extract the key type identifier, signature r component, and signature s component from the cross-mode verification signature of the peer; The signature verification algorithm type and elliptic curve parameters are determined based on the key type identifier. When the key type identifier indicates the national cryptographic SM2 algorithm, the SM2 public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read from the certificate storage area of ​​the hardware encryption chip, and the SM2 public key component is extracted. The recommended SM2 curve parameters are selected to perform the signature verification operation. When the key type identifier indicates the ECDSA algorithm, the ECDSA public key certificate corresponding to the peer vehicle terminal is read, and the ECDSA public key component is extracted. The NIST P-256 curve parameters are selected to perform the signature verification operation. Within the signature verification unit of the hardware encryption chip, the public key component, the elliptic curve parameters, the peer master authentication digest value, the signature r component, and the signature s component are used to execute the elliptic curve digital signature verification algorithm. When the signature verification operation outputs a successful verification result, it further checks whether the key type identifier and the key system of the cross-verification key match. If the master authentication key is a DSRC mode key, the key type identifier is required to indicate the WAVE mode signature algorithm. If the master authentication key is a WAVE mode key, the key type identifier is required to indicate the DSRC mode signature algorithm. When the key systems match and the signature verification passes, the cross-mode cross-verification is confirmed to be valid.

7. A hardware encryption chip collaborative authentication system for vehicle-mounted dual-mode communication, used to implement the method as described in any one of claims 1-6, characterized in that, include: The first unit is used to extract chip physical feature values ​​from the physical non-clonable functional circuit of the hardware encryption chip, and input the chip physical feature values ​​into the first key derivation path and the second key derivation path respectively to generate the first key and the second key. The two key derivation paths share the same chip physical feature values ​​as an entropy source to ensure the consistency of the physical root of the dual-mode key. The second unit is used to select either the first key or the second key as the master authentication key according to the target communication mode identifier corresponding to the current communication request, and use the other key as the cross-validation key. The master authentication key is used to encrypt the authentication message containing the hash digest of the chip's physical feature value to generate the master authentication ciphertext. The third unit is used to perform secondary signing on the message digest of the master authentication ciphertext using the cross-verification key, generate a cross-mode verification signature, encapsulate the master authentication ciphertext and the cross-mode verification signature into a collaborative authentication data packet, and send it to the peer vehicle terminal through the communication interface corresponding to the target communication mode identifier. The fourth unit is used to receive the peer collaborative authentication data packet returned by the peer vehicle terminal, and to perform collaborative authentication on the peer collaborative authentication data packet by verifying the master authentication key and the cross-verification key. After the collaborative authentication is successful, an encrypted communication link is established with the peer vehicle terminal.

8. An electronic device, characterized in that, include: processor; Memory used to store processor-executable instructions; The processor is configured to invoke instructions stored in the memory to execute the method according to any one of claims 1 to 6.

9. A computer-readable storage medium having computer program instructions stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program instructions are executed by the processor, they implement the method described in any one of claims 1 to 6.

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