A waste recycling anti-data falsification method and system based on an IoT automatic weighing device

Abstract

This invention discloses a method and system for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT automatic weighing equipment, relating to the field of IoT weighing technology. The method includes the following steps: Pre-setting a unique device identifier and an asymmetric public-private key pair in the security chip and trusted execution environment of the IoT automatic weighing equipment; verifying the signatures of the BootROM, Bootloader, operating system kernel, and weighing algorithm application at each stage during device startup; refusing startup if verification fails. This invention achieves end-to-end protection of weighing data, solving the problems of easy tampering, difficulty in detecting cheating, and untrustworthy processes in waste recycling weighing from the source. Simultaneously, relying on multimodal sensors and physical environment perception mechanisms, it can identify various cheating behaviors such as tilting, pressing, shaking, zero-point drift, and sudden load changes in real time and automatically record them, achieving identifiable, recordable, and traceable cheating, significantly improving data authenticity and the equipment's resistance to attacks.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of IoT weighing technology, and more specifically, to a method and system for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT automatic weighing equipment. Background Technology

[0002] In the waste recycling industry, weighing data is the core basis for transaction pricing and profit distribution. With the popularization of IoT technology, IoT automatic weighing equipment has become the mainstream transaction tool. However, existing IoT weighing technologies generally lack a sound data security and reliable supervision mechanism. The equipment is mostly deployed at the recycling worker or user end, in an open environment without strong supervision. The entire process of weighing data, from collection and calculation to transmission and storage, is at risk of being tampered with. Malicious individuals can tamper with local data and transmitted messages through physical attacks, firmware rewriting, communication interception, man-in-the-middle attacks, etc., resulting in distorted weighing results and directly harming the legitimate rights and interests of both parties in the transaction.

[0003] Meanwhile, existing technologies suffer from multiple structural defects that severely restrict data credibility and dispute resolution capabilities: the system only reports the final weight without collecting or retaining original sensor data, resulting in untraceable and unverifiable weight results; the weighing process is unilaterally operated by the recycling worker, lacking effective user supervision and a multi-party consensus mechanism, making it difficult for the platform server to determine responsibility when disputes arise; the weighing algorithm and firmware are in a black box state, making them susceptible to backdoor implantation, and the device's local time can be arbitrarily tampered with, data transmission is mostly in plaintext or weakly encrypted, and the device lacks posture and environmental perception capabilities, making it unable to identify physical cheating behaviors such as tilting, pressing, and shaking, ultimately resulting in low credibility of weighing data, frequent transaction disputes, and seriously affecting the digitalization and standardization of the industry.

[0004] No effective solutions have yet been proposed to address the problems in the relevant technologies. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the problems in related technologies, this invention proposes a method and system for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT automatic weighing equipment, in order to overcome the aforementioned technical problems existing in the existing related technologies.

[0006] The technical solution of this invention is implemented as follows:

[0007] One aspect of the present invention:

[0008] A method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT-enabled automatic weighing equipment includes the following steps:

[0009] The device's unique identifier and asymmetric public-private key pair are pre-set in the security chip and trusted execution environment of the IoT automatic weighing device. When the device starts up, the signatures of the BootROM, Bootloader, operating system kernel and weighing algorithm application are verified step by step. If the verification fails, the device will refuse to start and the firmware hash will be stored in the security chip.

[0010] The system simultaneously collects raw weight, attitude, temperature, and anti-tamper status data using a weight sensor, inertial measurement unit, temperature sensor, tilt sensor, and tamper switch to construct a multimodal dataset. Furthermore, it clears sensitive data, locks the device, and records an unerasable log when the tamper is triggered.

[0011] Based on multimodal data, real-time identification of tilt anomalies, pressing anomalies, shaking anomalies, zero-point anomalies, and load change anomalies is performed, and the anomaly type, time, duration and corresponding sensor data segments are recorded.

[0012] In a trusted execution environment, the original weight is fused and corrected using multimodal methods to identify the stable range and obtain the final weight and confidence level. Furthermore, the key data of the entire weighing process are hashed and chained to generate a unique process fingerprint that identifies this weighing.

[0013] A trusted timestamp is obtained by cross-verification of multiple sources, including cellular base station time, NTP time, GPS time, and RTC clock, and then signed with the device's private key to bind the timestamp to the weighing data.

[0014] The IoT automatic weighing device signs the core data with a private key; establishes a TLS / DTLS encrypted two-way authentication channel; the user and the recycler sign the data through the APP respectively; and the core data, third-party signatures, and certificates are assembled, encrypted, and uploaded.

[0015] The platform server constructs a data package for evidence storage and calculates a hash, then stores the hash, timestamp, and order ID on the blockchain for evidence storage; it also provides public traceability interfaces for hash comparison, signature verification, firmware verification, and visual playback.

[0016] The process of generating a unique fingerprint that identifies this weighing includes the following steps:

[0017] Based on the abnormal state identification results, the corrected weight time-series data is generated, represented as follows:

[0018] ;

[0019] Where f is a dynamic correction function implemented in a trusted execution environment;

[0020] For the corrected weight time series data W corr(t) Perform time-series feature analysis to automatically identify stable intervals during the weighing process, and calculate the average weight within that interval as the final weight value W for this weighing. final Simultaneously, the standard deviation σ of the weight data within the stable interval is calculated, and the confidence level C of the weighing result is output. The confidence level calculation formula is:

[0021] ;

[0022] The confidence level ranges from 0 to 1, with the value closer to 1 indicating a more reliable weighing result.

[0023] Hash chain calculations are performed on key data throughout the weighing process to generate a unique process fingerprint that identifies the entire weighing process. The key data includes at least the original weight time-series data, inertial measurement unit time-series data, abnormal state marker sequence, and the corrected final weight value W. final The confidence level C is calculated using the following formula:

[0024] .

[0025] The process of binding timestamps with weighing data includes the following steps:

[0026] IoT automatic weighing equipment obtains the current time through multiple sources, including cellular network base station time as the highest priority, NTP network time synchronization as the second priority, GPS satellite time as an optional configuration, and built-in RTC real-time clock as a backup. The results of different time sources are cross-validated. If the time deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is immediately marked as a time anomaly and an alarm message is pushed to the platform server.

[0027] Device private key SK device For the verified trusted timestamp T timestamp Perform digital signature, generate time signature Sig time This permanently binds the timestamp and time signature to the core data of this weighing.

[0028] The process of encrypting and uploading the core data, third-party signatures, and certificates includes the following steps:

[0029] IoT automatic weighing device uses private key SK device For core data packets Perform digital signature, generate device signature Sig device The entire signing process is completed within a secure chip, and the private key never leaves the secure, isolated environment.

[0030] An end-to-end encrypted communication channel based on the TLS / DTLS protocol is established between the device and the platform server. A two-way authentication mechanism is adopted, in which the device verifies the legitimate identity of the server and the server verifies the unique identity of the device, thus fundamentally preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0031] Users can view the weighing process data, final weight value, abnormal status markers, and confidence score information in real time through the user-side APP. After confirming that everything is correct, they can use their private key SK. user Digitally sign the core data packet (Data) to generate a user signature (Sig). user ;

[0032] After the recycler views and confirms the complete weighing information through the recycler's app, they use the recycler's private key SK. recycler Digitally sign the core data packet (Data) to generate a reclaimer signature (Sig). recycler ;

[0033] The core data packet, third-party digital signatures, and valid digital certificates from each party are assembled into the final transmission data packet, represented as:

[0034] ;

[0035] The final data packet is then uploaded to the platform server through the established encrypted channel to complete the data transmission.

[0036] The platform server constructs the evidence storage data packet and calculates the hash, then stores the hash, timestamp, and order ID on the blockchain for evidence storage, including the following steps:

[0037] Based on the uploaded final data packet, the platform server constructs a standardized evidence data packet, Evidence, which includes metadata such as order ID, device ID, user ID, recycler ID, weighing timestamp, and core data, namely the final weight W. final Confidence level C, process fingerprint F process Exception state markers anomaly Signature data, i.e., Sig device Sig user Sig recycler Firmware information, i.e., firmware hash H firmware Algorithm version V algorithm ;

[0038] The hash value H of the evidence storage data packet is calculated using the SHA256 hash algorithm. evidence =SHA256(Evidence), which will encode H evidence Trusted timestamp T timestampThe order ID is packaged into a notarized transaction and sent to the underlying architecture of the consortium blockchain / judicial blockchain. After the on-chain nodes complete the consensus confirmation, they return a unique transaction ID and block height. The platform server permanently associates the on-chain transaction ID with the order information and stores it in the business database.

[0039] It provides a public entry point for traceability and verification. Third parties can obtain the corresponding evidence storage data and on-chain hash value by entering the order ID. The verification steps include recalculating the hash value of the evidence storage data packet Evidence and comparing it with the hash value stored on the chain. evidence The comparison confirmed that the data had not been tampered with; a PK test was performed using the device's public key. device Verify device signature Sig device Verify the authenticity of the data source; use the user's public key PK. user Public key PK for recyclers recycler Verify the signatures of both parties to confirm their genuine acceptance of the weighing result; verify the firmware hash H. firmware Consistent with the official version, confirming that the device is running on a trusted firmware version.

[0040] Another aspect of the present invention:

[0041] A waste recycling anti-data tampering system based on IoT automatic weighing equipment, used in the above-mentioned waste recycling anti-data tampering method based on IoT automatic weighing equipment, is characterized by comprising: a trusted weighing equipment terminal, a user terminal APP, a recycler terminal APP, a platform server, a blockchain evidence storage module, and a traceability verification module;

[0042] Among them, the trusted weighing device is equipped with a multimodal sensor unit, a security chip and trusted execution environment, an anti-tamper detection module and a communication module to generate trusted weighing data packets;

[0043] The user-side APP is used to display the weighing process and results, obtain the user's digital signature, and send it back.

[0044] The recycler's app is used to initiate weighing, display the process, obtain and send back the recycler's digital signature;

[0045] The platform server is used to receive data packets, verify third-party signatures, perform remote proofs, construct evidence storage data, and associate orders with on-chain transaction IDs.

[0046] The blockchain evidence storage module is used to upload the evidence hash to the blockchain to form an immutable record;

[0047] The traceability verification module provides a public verification entry point, performs hash comparison, signature verification, firmware verification, and provides a visual replay of the weighing process.

[0048] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0049] 1. This invention constructs a trusted end-to-end system encompassing trusted acquisition, trusted processing, trusted transmission, and trusted evidence storage, achieving end-to-end protection of weighing data and addressing the problems of easy tampering, difficulty in detecting cheating, and unreliable processes in waste recycling weighing at the source. Simultaneously, relying on multimodal sensors and physical environment sensing mechanisms, it can identify and automatically record various cheating behaviors such as tilting, pressing, shaking, zero-point drift, and sudden load changes in real time. Combined with trusted boot and remote firmware verification, it completely eliminates malicious tampering behaviors such as firmware flashing, hardware disassembly, and algorithm backdoors. The multi-source trusted timestamp and time signature mechanism effectively prevents cheating methods such as time falsification and historical data replay, making cheating identifiable, recordable, and traceable, significantly improving data authenticity and equipment anti-attack capabilities.

[0050] 2. This invention employs a triple mechanism of process fingerprinting, multi-party signatures, and blockchain notarization to ensure that weighing data is verifiable, non-repudiable, and legally valid. The process fingerprint provides a unique summary of the entire data process, allowing for rapid verification of integrity without storing the full dataset. Digital signatures from the equipment, user, and recycler form a multi-party consensus, ensuring the transaction result is irrefutable. Once the data is stored on the blockchain, it cannot be tampered with, supports third-party verification and visual playback, and can directly provide legally recognized evidence in dispute resolution, significantly reducing dispute rates and arbitration costs. Simultaneously, the system supports tiered trust strategies and offline security processing, balancing security, deployment costs, and ease of use. It is fully adaptable to various waste recycling scenarios, significantly enhancing the platform's credibility and user trust. Attached Figure Description

[0051] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0052] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on an IoT-based automatic weighing device, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0053] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. All other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments of the present invention are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0054] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on an IoT-based automatic weighing device is provided.

[0055] like Figure 1 As shown, the waste recycling anti-data tampering method based on IoT automatic weighing equipment according to an embodiment of the present invention includes the following steps:

[0056] Step S1: A unique device identifier and an asymmetric public-private key pair are pre-configured in the security chip and trusted execution environment of the IoT automatic weighing device. When the device starts up, the signatures of the BootROM, Bootloader, operating system kernel, and weighing algorithm application are verified step by step. If the verification fails, the device will refuse to start and the firmware hash will be stored in the security chip, as follows:

[0057] Before leaving the factory, IoT automatic weighing equipment has a unique device identification ID pre-installed in the security chip and trusted execution environment (TEE). device Asymmetric public-private key pairs (PK) device SK device ), private key SK device It is embedded within a security chip and will never be released to the external environment;

[0058] Each time the device starts up, it performs a step-by-step trusted verification process, including: BootROM verifying the Bootloader signature → Bootloader verifying the operating system kernel signature → Kernel verifying the weighing algorithm application signature. If any step fails to verify, the device will immediately refuse to start up to prevent the firmware from running after being tampered with.

[0059] The hash value H of the currently running firmware firmware The hash value is encrypted and stored in a secure chip. Each time the weight is measured, the hash value is synchronously reported to the platform server as part of the evidence data for subsequent audit and verification by the platform server.

[0060] The platform server periodically initiates remote proof challenges to IoT automated weighing devices, using the device's private key SK. device For the current firmware hash value H firmware After digital signature, the data is returned to the platform server, which verifies the signature validity and confirms whether the device is running the official expected firmware version.

[0061] Step S2 involves simultaneously collecting raw weight, attitude, temperature, and tamper status data using a weight sensor, inertial measurement unit, temperature sensor, tilt sensor, and tamper switch to construct a multimodal dataset. Furthermore, upon tamper triggering, sensitive data is cleared, the device is locked, and an undeletable log is recorded, as detailed below:

[0062] The IoT-enabled automatic weighing equipment uses weight sensors, inertial measurement units, temperature sensors, tilt sensors, and tamper-proof switches to synchronously collect raw weight data in real time. raw(t), inertial measurement data A(t) / G(t), ambient temperature data T(t), and equipment attitude angle data θ(t), i.e., pitch angle θ pitch Roll angle θ roll Equipment anti-tamper status data, constructing a multi-dimensional, multi-modal sensor dataset;

[0063] The tamper switch and photosensitive sensor monitor the physical state of the device casing in real time. If the casing is detected to have been illegally opened, the security mechanism is immediately triggered to clear the sensitive key data in the security chip or lock the device. At the same time, an unerasable tamper event log is generated. This log is included as abnormal data in the subsequent weighing data packet for auditing by the platform server.

[0064] Based on multimodal data, real-time identification of tilt anomalies, pressing anomalies, shaking anomalies, zero-point anomalies, and load change anomalies is performed, and the anomaly type, time, duration, and corresponding sensor data segments are recorded.

[0065] Step S3: Based on the multimodal sensing data collected in step S2, abnormal physical states of the IoT automatic weighing device are identified in real time using a preset algorithm model. Abnormal types are marked and complete abnormal information is recorded. The abnormal states include at least tilting abnormalities, pressing abnormalities, shaking abnormalities, zero-point abnormalities, and load change abnormalities. Specific identification rules are as follows:

[0066] Among them, tilt anomaly refers to the pitch angle θ of the real-time monitoring equipment. pitch and roll angle θ roll If any angle exceeds the preset threshold, such as 5°, and the duration exceeds the set time, it will be immediately marked as an abnormal tilt.

[0067] Among them, abnormal pressing refers to the vertical acceleration A of the monitoring device. z The instantaneous change value, when a positive spike exceeding the threshold appears, is immediately marked as an abnormal pressure;

[0068] Among them, swaying abnormality means that the acceleration variance and angular velocity energy are calculated in real time. When the values ​​of both are continuously higher than the preset threshold, it is marked as swaying abnormality.

[0069] Among them, zero-point anomaly means that when the zero point of the weight sensor is continuously monitored in the initial state of no load on the equipment, it is marked as zero-point anomaly when the zero-point offset exceeds the set threshold.

[0070] Among them, load mutation anomaly is calculated as the real-time weight change rate dW / dt. When the change rate exceeds the normal physical limit of natural waste disposal, it is marked as mutation anomaly.

[0071] This technical solution records the anomaly type, occurrence time, duration, and corresponding original sensor data segment in detail each time an abnormal state is detected. The anomaly record is reported to the platform server as a core component of the weighing data, providing a basis for subsequent dispute resolution.

[0072] Step S4: Perform multimodal fusion correction on the original weight in a trusted execution environment, identify the stable interval to obtain the final weight and confidence level. In this step, hash chain calculation is performed on the key data of the entire weighing process to generate a process fingerprint that uniquely identifies this weighing.

[0073] All weighing calculations are performed within a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) to ensure the fairness of algorithm execution, the integrity of data processing, and the immutability of the process. The specific steps are as follows:

[0074] Step S401: Based on the abnormal state identification results of step S3, a dynamic correction algorithm is used to compensate for environmental interference in the original weight data, eliminating the influence of factors such as equipment posture, temperature, and vibration on the weighing results, and generating corrected weight time-series data, as follows:

[0075] ;

[0076] Where f is a dynamic correction function implemented in a trusted execution environment, which includes sub-algorithm modules such as tilt compensation, acceleration compensation, temperature compensation, and abnormal state correction.

[0077] Step S402, for the corrected weight time series data W corr (t) Perform time-series feature analysis to automatically identify stable intervals during the weighing process, and calculate the average weight within that interval as the final weight value W for this weighing. final Simultaneously, the standard deviation σ of the weight data within the stable interval is calculated, and the confidence level C of the weighing result is output. The confidence level calculation formula is:

[0078] ;

[0079] The confidence level ranges from 0 to 1, with the value closer to 1 indicating a more reliable weighing result.

[0080] Step S403: Perform hash chain calculation on the key data of the entire weighing process to generate a process fingerprint that uniquely identifies this weighing process. The key data includes at least the original weight time-series data, inertial measurement unit time-series data, abnormal state marker sequence, and the corrected final weight value W. final The confidence level C is calculated using the following formula:

[0081] ;

[0082] In this process, any modification to key data will cause a change in the process fingerprint, enabling rapid verification of data integrity.

[0083] Step S404: Synchronously record the algorithm version number V used for this weighing. algorithm Core correction parameters, such as correction coefficients and anomaly detection thresholds, are reported along with the weighing data for subsequent auditing and algorithm consistency verification.

[0084] Step S5: Perform multi-source cross-verification using cellular base station time, NTP time, GPS time, and RTC clock to obtain a trusted timestamp, and sign it with the device private key to bind the timestamp to the weighing data;

[0085] Among these measures, multi-source time cross-validation technology is used to obtain reliable weighing times, preventing cheating caused by tampering with the device's local time. Specific steps include:

[0086] Step S501: The IoT automatic weighing device obtains the current time through multiple sources, including cellular network base station time as the highest priority, NTP network time synchronization as the second priority, GPS satellite time as an optional configuration, and the built-in RTC real-time clock as a backup. The results from different time sources are cross-validated. If the time deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is immediately marked as a time anomaly and an alarm message is pushed to the platform server.

[0087] Step S502, the device uses the private key SK device For the verified trusted timestamp T timestamp Perform digital signature, generate time signature Sig time The timestamp and time signature are permanently bound to the core data of this weighing;

[0088] Specifically, during implementation, it can also connect with the trusted timestamp service of the National Time Service Center to synchronize the weighing time to an authoritative national time source, further enhancing the credibility and legal validity of the timestamp.

[0089] Step S6: The device signs the core data with its private key; a TLS / DTLS encrypted two-way authentication channel is established; the user and the recycler sign the data through the APP respectively; the core data, third-party signatures, and certificates are assembled, encrypted, and uploaded.

[0090] The core weighing data is digitally signed by the device, user, and recycler, and end-to-end transmission from the IoT automatic weighing device to the platform server is achieved through an encrypted communication channel, ensuring data transmission security and transaction non-repudiation. Specific steps include:

[0091] Step S601, the IoT automatic weighing device uses the private key SK device For core data packets Perform digital signature, generate device signature Sig device The entire signing process is completed within a secure chip, and the private key never leaves the secure, isolated environment.

[0092] Step S602: An end-to-end encrypted communication channel based on the TLS / DTLS protocol is established between the device and the platform server. A two-way authentication mechanism is adopted, in which the device verifies the legitimate identity of the server and the server verifies the unique identity of the device, thereby fundamentally preventing man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0093] Step S603: The user views the weighing process data, final weight value, abnormal status markers, confidence score, and other information in real time through the user-end APP. After confirming that everything is correct, the user uses their private key SK. user Digitally sign the core data packet (Data) to generate a user signature (Sig). user ;

[0094] Step S604: After the recycler views and confirms the complete information of this weighing through the recycler's mobile app, they use the recycler's private key SK. recycler Digitally sign the core data packet (Data) to generate a reclaimer signature (Sig). recycler ;

[0095] Step S605: Assemble the core data packet, third-party digital signatures, and legitimate digital certificates of all parties into the final transmission data packet, represented as:

[0096] ;

[0097] The final data packet is then uploaded to the platform server through the established encrypted channel to complete the data transmission.

[0098] Step S7: The platform server constructs the evidence storage data package and calculates the hash, and stores the hash, timestamp, and order ID on the blockchain for evidence storage; it provides public traceability interfaces for hash comparison, signature verification, firmware verification, and visual playback.

[0099] The platform's server-side interface connects to a blockchain evidence storage module, storing core weighing data on the blockchain to form an immutable chain of evidence. It also provides a public traceability verification interface for verification by both parties to the transaction and third-party institutions. Specific steps include:

[0100] Step S701: Based on the uploaded final data packet, the platform server constructs a standardized evidence data packet, Evidence, which includes metadata such as order ID, device ID, user ID, recycler ID, weighing timestamp, and core data, namely the final weight W. final Confidence level C, process fingerprint F process Exception state markers anomalySignature data, i.e., Sig device Sig user Sig recycler Firmware information, i.e., firmware hash H firmware Algorithm version V algorithm ;

[0101] Step S702: Calculate the hash value H of the evidence storage data packet using the SHA256 hash algorithm. evidence =SHA256(Evidence), which will encode H evidence Trusted timestamp T timestamp The order ID is packaged into a notarized transaction and sent to the underlying architecture of the consortium blockchain / judicial blockchain. After the on-chain nodes complete the consensus confirmation, they return a unique transaction ID and block height. The platform server permanently associates the on-chain transaction ID with the order information and stores it in the business database.

[0102] Step S703 provides a public traceability verification entry point. Third parties can obtain the corresponding evidence storage data and on-chain hash value by entering the order ID. The verification steps include recalculating the hash value of the evidence storage data packet Evidence and comparing it with the hash value stored on the chain. evidence The comparison confirmed that the data had not been tampered with; a PK test was performed using the device's public key. device Verify device signature Sig device Verify the authenticity of the data source; use the user's public key PK. user Public key PK for recyclers recycler Verify the signatures of both parties to confirm their genuine acceptance of the weighing result; verify the firmware hash H. firmware Consistent with the official version, confirming that the device is running on a trusted firmware version;

[0103] Step S704 provides a visual playback interface to reproduce the sensor data curves, abnormal state marker locations, and stable interval identification results of the entire weighing process based on the stored sensor data, thereby achieving intuitive and traceable verification of the weighing process.

[0104] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a waste recycling anti-data tampering system based on an IoT-enabled automatic weighing device is provided.

[0105] According to an embodiment of the present invention, a waste recycling anti-data tampering system based on IoT automatic weighing equipment is provided. The system uses IoT automatic weighing equipment as its physical carrier and includes: a trusted weighing device terminal, a user-side APP, a recycler-side APP, a platform server, a blockchain evidence storage module, and a traceability verification module. The trusted weighing device terminal achieves bidirectional data transmission with the platform server via a TLS / DTLS encrypted communication link. The user-side APP and the recycler-side APP achieve bidirectional communication with the platform server via the mobile internet. The platform server and the blockchain evidence storage module achieve bidirectional data transmission via a dedicated encrypted link, completing the push of evidence storage transactions and the acquisition of on-chain information. The traceability verification module achieves unidirectional data access with both the platform server and the blockchain evidence storage module, acquiring all the data required for traceability verification without writing any data to either end, ensuring data security.

[0106] Specifically, the trusted weighing device, i.e., the IoT automatic weighing device, serves as the physical carrier and data acquisition terminal, and is used to execute steps S1-S6 of the aforementioned anti-data tampering method to generate a trusted final weighing data packet. Its hardware components include a multimodal sensor unit, a security chip and trusted execution environment, an anti-tamper detection module, a communication module, a main control computing module, and a storage module. It is used to complete real-time acquisition of multimodal sensor data, perception of the device's physical environment and identification of cheating behavior, trusted weighing calculation and process fingerprint generation, trusted timestamp acquisition and binding, and device digital signature generation. It establishes an encrypted connection with the platform server through the communication module and uploads the weighing data packet, receives remote proof challenges from the platform server and completes the response, and also supports encrypted storage of weighing data in offline mode.

[0107] The user-side app is deployed on the user's mobile terminal and enables two-way communication with the platform server via the mobile network. It is used to receive the full weighing process data pushed by the platform server, display a visual weighing interface, and allow users to view and confirm the weighing results in real time. After the user confirms that there are no errors, a digital signature is generated and sent back to the platform server. Users can query the weighing certificate data by order ID, initiate traceability verification requests, and view the visual playback results.

[0108] The recycler's mobile app is deployed on the recycler's mobile terminal and enables two-way communication with the platform server via the mobile network. It is used to initiate weighing requests, control the IoT automatic weighing equipment to start / stop weighing, and receive weighing results and full-process data pushed by the platform server. After the recycler confirms the weighing result, a digital signature of the recycler is generated and sent back to the platform server. The app also allows recyclers to view the operating status, historical weighing records, and abnormal alarm information of their IoT automatic weighing equipment, and can receive device firmware upgrade prompts from the platform server.

[0109] The platform server acts as a control and data processing node, enabling bidirectional communication with trusted weighing devices, user apps, recycler apps, and the blockchain evidence storage module via wired / wireless networks. It receives and encrypts the final data packet uploaded by the trusted weighing device; verifies the validity of the digital signatures of the device, user, and recycler; periodically initiates remote proof challenges to the trusted weighing device; monitors the device firmware's operating status; and blacklists abnormal devices. Based on the final data packet, it constructs a standardized evidence data packet (Evidence) and pushes it to the blockchain evidence storage module. It manages the relationship between order data and on-chain evidence data; and provides full data support for the traceability verification module. The platform server also includes a built-in remote proof module and a device management module. The remote proof module enables remote verification of the device firmware, while the device management module manages the entire lifecycle of the IoT automatic weighing device, including identity binding, firmware upgrades, status monitoring, and anomaly alerts.

[0110] The blockchain evidence storage module establishes bidirectional communication with the platform server, employing a consortium blockchain, such as Hyperledger Fabric or a judicial blockchain, as its underlying blockchain technology architecture. It receives evidence transaction data sent by the platform server; completes the on-chain storage of evidence data through the consensus mechanism of on-chain nodes, generating immutable and undeletable blockchain evidence records; returns a unique on-chain transaction ID and block height to the platform server; and supports the legal retrieval and verification of data by authoritative third-party institutions such as judicial organs and notary offices, ensuring the legal evidentiary validity of the evidence data. The evidence data stored in this module must at least include the order ID and the final weight W. final Process fingerprint F process Device signature Sig device User signature Sig user Recycler's Signature (Sig) recycler Firmware hash H firmware .

[0111] The traceability verification module establishes one-way communication with the platform server and the blockchain evidence storage module, providing a public and convenient traceability verification entry point for users, recyclers, platform server operators, and third-party authoritative institutions. Its core functions include: receiving verification requests (order IDs), retrieving the corresponding evidence data package (Evidence) from the platform server, and retrieving the on-chain hash value H from the blockchain evidence storage module. evidence It automatically performs traceability steps such as hash comparison, digital signature verification, and firmware hash verification; generates standardized traceability verification reports; provides a visual playback interface to reproduce the sensor data curves, abnormal state marker locations, and stable interval identification results of the weighing process, enabling intuitive traceability of the weighing process; this module supports access from multiple terminals, including web pages and mobile apps, and the verification report can be viewed and downloaded online.

[0112] The above description is merely a preferred embodiment of the present invention and is not intended to limit the invention. Those skilled in the art, upon considering the disclosure in the specification and embodiments, will readily conceive of other embodiments of this disclosure. This application is intended to cover any variations, uses, or adaptations of this disclosure that follow the general principles of this disclosure and include common knowledge or customary techniques in the art not disclosed herein. The specification and embodiments are to be considered exemplary only, and the true scope and spirit of this disclosure are indicated by the claims.

[0113] It should be understood that this disclosure is not limited to the precise structures described above and shown in the accompanying drawings, and various modifications and changes can be made without departing from its scope. The scope of this disclosure is limited only by the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT-based automatic weighing equipment, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: The device's unique identifier and asymmetric public-private key pair are pre-set in the security chip and trusted execution environment of the IoT automatic weighing device. When the device starts up, the signatures of the BootROM, Bootloader, operating system kernel and weighing algorithm application are verified step by step. If the verification fails, the device will refuse to start and the firmware hash will be stored in the security chip. The system simultaneously collects raw weight, attitude, temperature, and anti-tamper status data using a weight sensor, inertial measurement unit, temperature sensor, tilt sensor, and tamper switch to construct a multimodal dataset. Furthermore, it clears sensitive data, locks the device, and records an unerasable log when the tamper is triggered. Based on multimodal data, real-time identification of tilt anomalies, pressing anomalies, shaking anomalies, zero-point anomalies, and load change anomalies is performed, and the anomaly type, time, duration and corresponding sensor data segments are recorded. In a trusted execution environment, the original weight is fused and corrected using multimodal methods to identify the stable range and obtain the final weight and confidence level. Furthermore, the key data of the entire weighing process are hashed and chained to generate a unique process fingerprint that identifies this weighing. A trusted timestamp is obtained by cross-verification of multiple sources, including cellular base station time, NTP time, GPS time, and RTC clock, and then signed with the device's private key to bind the timestamp to the weighing data. The IoT automatic weighing device signs the core data with a private key; establishes a TLS / DTLS encrypted two-way authentication channel; the user and the recycler sign the data through the APP respectively; and the core data, third-party signatures, and certificates are assembled, encrypted, and uploaded. The platform server constructs a data package for evidence storage and calculates a hash, then stores the hash, timestamp, and order ID on the blockchain for evidence storage. It also provides public traceability interfaces for hash comparison, signature verification, firmware verification, and visual playback.

2. The method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT-based automatic weighing equipment according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of generating a unique fingerprint that identifies this weighing includes the following steps: Based on the abnormal state identification results, the corrected weight time-series data is generated, represented as follows: ； Where f is a dynamic correction function implemented in a trusted execution environment; For the corrected weight time series data W corr (t) Perform time-series feature analysis to automatically identify stable intervals during the weighing process, and calculate the average weight within that interval as the final weight value W for this weighing. final Simultaneously, the standard deviation σ of the weight data within the stable interval is calculated, and the confidence level C of the weighing result is output. The confidence level calculation formula is: ； The confidence level ranges from 0 to 1, with the value closer to 1 indicating a more reliable weighing result. Hash chain calculations are performed on key data throughout the weighing process to generate a unique process fingerprint that identifies the entire weighing process. The key data includes at least the original weight time series data, inertial measurement unit time series data, abnormal state marker sequence, and the corrected final weight value W. final The confidence level C is calculated using the following formula: 。 3. The method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT-based automatic weighing equipment according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of binding timestamps with weighing data includes the following steps: IoT automatic weighing equipment obtains the current time through multiple sources, including cellular network base station time as the highest priority, NTP network time synchronization as the second priority, GPS satellite time as an optional configuration, and built-in RTC real-time clock as a backup. The results of different time sources are cross-validated. If the time deviation exceeds the preset threshold, it is immediately marked as a time anomaly and an alarm message is pushed to the platform server. Device private key SK device For the verified trusted timestamp T timestamp Perform digital signature, generate time signature Sig time This permanently binds the timestamp and time signature to the core data of this weighing.

4. The method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT-based automatic weighing equipment according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of assembling and encrypting the core data, third-party signatures, and certificates before uploading includes the following steps: IoT automatic weighing device uses private key SK device For core data packets Perform digital signature, generate device signature Sig device The entire signing process is completed within a secure chip, and the private key never leaves the secure, isolated environment. An end-to-end encrypted communication channel based on the TLS / DTLS protocol is established between the device and the platform server. A two-way authentication mechanism is adopted, in which the device verifies the legitimate identity of the server and the server verifies the unique identity of the device, thus fundamentally preventing man-in-the-middle attacks. Users can view the weighing process data, final weight value, abnormal status markers, and confidence score information in real time through the user-side APP. After confirming that everything is correct, they can use their private key SK. user Digitally sign the core data packet (Data) to generate a user signature (Sig). user ; After the recycler views and confirms the complete weighing information through the recycler's app, they use the recycler's private key SK. recycler Digitally sign the core data packet (Data) to generate a reclaimer signature (Sig). recycler ; The core data packet, third-party digital signatures, and valid digital certificates from each party are assembled into the final transmission data packet, represented as: ； The final data packet is then uploaded to the platform server through the established encrypted channel to complete the data transmission.

5. The method for preventing data tampering in waste recycling based on IoT-based automatic weighing equipment according to claim 1, characterized in that, The platform server constructs a data packet for evidence storage and calculates a hash. It then stores the hash, timestamp, and order ID on the blockchain for evidence storage, including the following steps: Based on the uploaded final data packet, the platform server constructs a standardized evidence data packet, Evidence, which includes metadata such as order ID, device ID, user ID, recycler ID, weighing timestamp, and core data, namely the final weight W. final Confidence level C, process fingerprint F process Exception state markers anomaly Signature data, i.e., Sig device Sig user Sig recycler Firmware information, i.e., firmware hash H firmware Algorithm version V algorithm ; The hash value H of the evidence storage data packet is calculated using the SHA256 hash algorithm. evidence =SHA256(Evidence), which will encode H evidence Trusted timestamp T timestamp The order ID is packaged into a notarized transaction and sent to the underlying architecture of the consortium blockchain / judicial blockchain. After the on-chain nodes complete the consensus confirmation, they return a unique transaction ID and block height. The platform server permanently associates the on-chain transaction ID with the order information and stores it in the business database. It provides a public entry point for traceability and verification. Third parties can obtain the corresponding evidence storage data and on-chain hash value by entering the order ID. The verification steps include recalculating the hash value of the evidence storage data packet Evidence and comparing it with the hash value stored on the chain. evidence The comparison confirmed that the data had not been tampered with; a PK test was performed using the device's public key. device Verify device signature Sig device Verify the authenticity of the data source; use the user's public key PK. user Public key PK for recyclers recycler Verify the signatures of both parties to confirm their genuine acceptance of the weighing result; verify the firmware hash H. firmware Consistent with the official version, confirming that the device is running on a trusted firmware version.

6. A waste recycling anti-data tampering system based on IoT automatic weighing equipment, used in the system of the waste recycling anti-data tampering method based on IoT automatic weighing equipment as described in any one of claims 1-5, characterized in that, include: The system includes a trusted weighing device terminal, a user-side APP, a recycling worker-side APP, a platform server, a blockchain-based evidence storage module, and a traceability verification module. Among them, the trusted weighing device is equipped with a multimodal sensor unit, a security chip and trusted execution environment, an anti-tamper detection module and a communication module to generate trusted weighing data packets; The user-side APP is used to display the weighing process and results, obtain the user's digital signature, and send it back. The recycler's app is used to initiate weighing, display the process, obtain and send back the recycler's digital signature; The platform server is used to receive data packets, verify third-party signatures, perform remote proofs, construct evidence storage data, and associate orders with on-chain transaction IDs. The blockchain evidence storage module is used to upload the evidence hash to the blockchain to form an immutable record; The traceability verification module provides a public verification entry point, performs hash comparison, signature verification, firmware verification, and provides a visual replay of the weighing process.

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