An electronic seal monitoring system and monitoring method

CN122551471APending Publication Date: 2026-08-11SHANGHAI TONG MING INFORMATION POLYTRON TECH INC
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Patent Information

Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-05-18
Publication Date
2026-08-11

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

但此类方案仍存在明显局限:其一,防护时机滞后,仅能在封条已被实质破坏、剥离或脱落之后才能触发检测,无法在拆封行为发生的初始阶段进行提前预警与现场记录,异常发现不及时,防护存在明显空窗期;其二,整体安全防护机制不完善,无法对封条应用前后的异常状态进行全面判断与有效甄别;其三,身份核验与防伪能力不足,封条易被仿冒、替换或篡改,安全性与追溯性仍然较弱;其四,系统整体可靠性不足,在复杂使用环境下容易出现监测失效,难以满足高安全性场景的连续稳定监管需求

Benefits of technology

1.采用一次性电子封条与可重复使用监控主机的分离式架构,主机可反复复用,仅需更换封条耗材,可降低使用与运维成本,同时兼顾经济高效与安全管控特性;

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Abstract

This application relates to seal data monitoring and identification technology, and discloses an electronic seal monitoring system and method, including an electronic seal and a monitoring host. The electronic seal is equipped with an anti-tamper detection circuit, an encryption chip, and a first electrical interface. The anti-tamper detection circuit and the encryption chip are both electrically connected to the first electrical interface. The monitoring host includes a main control module, an environmental sensing module, a communication module, and a second electrical interface. The environmental sensing module, the communication module, and the second electrical interface are all electrically connected to the main control module. The monitoring host is detachably electrically connected to the first electrical interface through the second electrical interface. The main control module is configured to: enter a pre-removal warning state when the environmental sensing module detects a valid proximity event and the anti-tamper detection circuit remains intact; and trigger a tamper alarm when a change in the state of the anti-tamper detection circuit is detected or the electrical connection between the monitoring host 20 and the electronic seal 10 is broken. This application has a graded protection effect of prior warning of proximity and alarm upon tampering.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of seal data monitoring and identification technology, and in particular to an electronic seal monitoring system and monitoring method. Background Technology

[0002] Seals, as a commonly used anti-theft and anti-tampering device, are widely used in logistics, warehousing, power equipment, and financial escort, among other fields. Their function is to physically seal and identify the integrity and security of the sealed object. Traditional seals, mostly paper-based, rely solely on their physical integrity for status identification. They generally suffer from drawbacks such as inability to monitor in real time, weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities, limited functionality, and difficulty in tracing anomalies, making them unsuitable for high-security scenarios.

[0003] To enhance the intelligence and tamper resistance of seals, existing technologies have developed electronic seal structures with conductive circuit detection capabilities. These structures utilize conductive circuits embedded within the seal, breaking the circuit when the seal is torn, peeled, or damaged, thus enabling open-circuit detection and status identification. However, these solutions still have significant limitations: First, the protection timing is delayed, triggering detection only after the seal has been substantially damaged, peeled, or detached. This prevents early warning and on-site recording during the initial stages of tampering, resulting in untimely anomaly detection and a significant security gap. Second, the overall security mechanism is incomplete, failing to comprehensively assess and effectively identify abnormal states before and after seal application. Third, identity verification and anti-counterfeiting capabilities are insufficient; seals are easily counterfeited, replaced, or tampered with, leaving security and traceability relatively weak. Fourth, the overall system reliability is insufficient, prone to monitoring failures in complex operating environments, making it difficult to meet the continuous and stable monitoring requirements of high-security scenarios.

[0004] Therefore, in response to the problems of lagging detection, incomplete protection, weak anti-counterfeiting capabilities, and insufficient system reliability in existing technologies, there is a need for an intelligent seal monitoring solution that can identify risks in advance, respond quickly to anomalies, and combine security and anti-counterfeiting capabilities. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the aforementioned technical problems, this application provides an electronic seal monitoring system and method.

[0006] Firstly, the electronic seal monitoring system provided in this application adopts the following technical solution: An electronic seal monitoring system includes a disposable electronic seal and a reusable monitoring host. The electronic seal is equipped with an anti-tamper detection circuit, an encryption chip, and a first electrical interface. The anti-tamper detection circuit and the encryption chip are both electrically connected to the first electrical interface. The monitoring host includes a main control module, an environmental sensing module, a communication module, and a second electrical interface. The environmental sensing module, the communication module, and the second electrical interface are all electrically connected to the main control module. The monitoring host is detachably electrically connected to the first electrical interface through the second electrical interface. The communication module is used to electrically connect to a backend management platform. The main control module is configured to: enter a pre-removal warning state when the environmental sensing module detects a valid proximity event and the anti-tamper detection circuit remains intact; and trigger a tamper alarm when a change in the state of the anti-tamper detection circuit is detected, or when the electrical connection between the monitoring host and the electronic seal is detected to be broken.

[0007] By adopting the above technical solution, this system uses an architecture that separates disposable electronic seals from reusable monitoring hosts. The electronic seals, as consumables, can be replaced separately, while the monitoring hosts can be continuously reused, reducing overall usage costs and maintenance expenses, and avoiding resource waste caused by overall scrapping. At the same time, combined with encryption chips and tamper detection circuits, it can prevent security risks such as seal forgery, illegal replacement, and unauthorized reuse. On this basis, it realizes a hierarchical protection mechanism of "early warning upon proximity and alarm upon tampering". Compared with the shortcomings of traditional seals that can only be traced after the fact, it can realize risk intervention in advance and real-time alarm, improving the security and response efficiency of sealing and management.

[0008] Optionally, the electronic seal includes a paper substrate layer, an anti-tamper detection circuit embedded in the paper substrate layer, and an adhesive backing layer on the back of the paper substrate layer. The peel force between the adhesive backing layer and the surface to be adhered is greater than the bonding force between the anti-tamper detection circuit and the paper substrate layer.

[0009] By adopting the above technical solution, when the seal is attempted to be torn but has not yet completely detached from the pasted surface, the anti-tamper detection circuit can be preferentially broken or deformed due to the tearing of the paper substrate, resulting in a change in electrical state. This allows the system to trigger an alarm before the sealed state of the item is substantially damaged. This not only structurally improves the loophole of not alarming when forcibly opened, but also maximizes the integrity of the sealed item, achieving the pre-emptive protection effect of "early warning when unsealing is attempted and detection when unauthorized touch is detected".

[0010] Optionally, a unique identification code is embedded in the encryption chip. The monitoring host reads the unique identification code to establish an identity binding between the monitoring host and the current electronic seal.

[0011] By adopting the above technical solution, each seal has a unique and tamper-proof identity, and the host automatically verifies its legality, which can prevent acts such as forging seals, replacing seals, and unauthorized reuse, and realize the traceability of the seal throughout its entire life cycle.

[0012] Optionally, the environmental perception module includes a proximity detection unit and an image acquisition unit; both the proximity detection unit and the image acquisition unit are electrically connected to the main control module; in the pre-removal warning state, the main control module is configured to: wake up the image acquisition unit based on the valid proximity signal output by the proximity detection unit to perform silent pre-recording and caching of on-site data, maintain monitoring of the anti-tamper detection circuit, and push warning information to the backend management platform through the communication module.

[0013] By adopting the above technical solution, when personnel or moving targets approach the seal, the proximity detection unit can send a proximity signal to the main control module. The main control module then pushes early warning information to the backend management platform in real time to promptly remind managers to pay attention to abnormal dynamics around the seal. At the same time, it wakes up the image acquisition unit in advance to perform silent recording and data caching, thus achieving early warning. Even if the seal has not been actually damaged at this time, it can preserve on-site audiovisual evidence in advance, providing a basis for subsequent event tracing and responsibility determination.

[0014] Optionally, the monitoring host also includes an alarm notification module, which is electrically connected to the main control module. When a tamper alarm is triggered, the main control module is configured to: control the alarm notification module to output an alarm signal, lock the cached on-site data in the early warning state as preliminary evidence, and upload the alarm information, preliminary evidence, and real-time on-site data to the backend management platform through the communication module.

[0015] By adopting the above technical solution, local audio-visual warnings can be quickly triggered when the package is unsealed. At the same time, the warning cache and real-time images are uploaded as a complete data chain, realizing simultaneous on-site warning and evidence preservation, which facilitates rapid handling and post-event traceability.

[0016] Optionally, the monitoring host is also equipped with a host anti-tamper component, which is electrically connected to the main control module; the host anti-tamper component includes an anti-tamper button and / or a door magnetic detection unit located on the back of the monitoring host; the main control module is configured to activate a tamper alarm when the host anti-tamper component is triggered.

[0017] By adopting the above technical solution, the monitoring host itself is protected against tampering. When the host is illegally disassembled, pried, or separated, an alarm is immediately triggered, blocking the attack path of "disassembling the host first and then removing the seal".

[0018] Optionally, the monitoring host also includes a power supply module, which is electrically connected to the main control module and is used to supply power to the monitoring host and the connected electronic seals.

[0019] By adopting the above technical solution, the host is independently powered and supports power outage recovery, which can ensure that it can still monitor, alarm and upload data normally when there is an external power outage or the line is cut off.

[0020] Optionally, the first electrical interface and the second electrical interface are mutually compatible magnetic waterproof docking interfaces, and the monitoring host and the electronic seal are connected by a detachable electrical connection through the magnetic waterproof docking interfaces.

[0021] By adopting the above technical solutions, magnetic docking enables rapid alignment and connection, and instant connection with a single suction. The waterproof structure adapts to complex environments such as outdoors, humidity, and transportation, and installation and replacement are efficient and convenient.

[0022] Secondly, the electronic seal monitoring method provided in this application adopts the following technical solution: An electronic seal monitoring method, applied to the monitoring host in the aforementioned electronic seal monitoring system, includes the following steps: S1, in response to the electrical connection established between the second electrical interface and the first electrical interface of the electronic seal, reading the identity information of the electronic seal to complete the binding, and entering the monitoring state; S2, acquiring environmental perception signals and the status signal of the tamper detection circuit; when the environmental perception signal indicates the existence of a valid approach event, and the status signal indicates that the tamper detection circuit remains intact, generating a pre-removal warning message, and silently caching the on-site audio-visual data; S3, when the status signal indicates that the tamper detection circuit has changed, or when the electrical connection between the first electrical interface and the second electrical interface is detected to be disconnected, determining it as a tampering event, triggering a local tampering alarm, and uploading the on-site data and alarm information cached in the warning stage to the backend management platform; S4, if the status signal does not indicate that the tamper detection circuit has changed within a preset time after the silent caching is started, clearing the cache and entering a sleep state.

[0023] By adopting the above technical solution, the monitoring host can autonomously complete the entire process of seal identification reading and binding, status monitoring, early warning control and alarm uploading. While realizing proximity warning, tampering alarm and evidence pre-caching, the host-side intelligent control can realize timeout sleep and low power consumption operation. At the same time, based on the separation architecture of disposable electronic seal and reusable monitoring host, the host reuse feature further ensures the economy and practicality of security management.

[0024] Optionally, step S1, which involves reading the identity information of the electronic seal to complete the binding process, specifically includes: S11. Read the unique identification code in the encryption chip of the electronic seal through the second electrical interface; S12. Compare the unique identification code with the pre-acquired legal identification code; if the comparison is consistent, the currently accessed electronic seal is determined to be legal, a binding is established and the system enters the monitoring state.

[0025] By adopting the above technical solution, the monitoring host performs local verification of the unique identification code of the encryption chip, first verifying its legality before performing binding and monitoring, blocking illegal access behaviors such as forging seals and replacing seals, further ensuring the authenticity and reliability of the binding relationship between the host and the seal, and improving the overall security of supervision.

[0026] In summary, this application includes at least one of the following beneficial technical effects: 1. It adopts a separate architecture of disposable electronic seals and reusable monitoring host. The host can be reused repeatedly, and only the seal consumables need to be replaced, which can reduce the cost of use and maintenance, while taking into account both economic efficiency and security control characteristics. 2. A two-level response mechanism of "proximity warning and tamper alarm" has been constructed. The monitoring host realizes the early warning, which can not only intervene in risks in advance, but also form a complete chain of evidence, solving the problems of traditional seals being unable to prevent problems in advance and difficult to trace afterward. 3. By using encrypted chip identity verification and dual anti-tamper protection of the host, it prevents illegal acts such as forgery, replacement, and unauthorized reuse, blocks malicious disassembly attack paths, and comprehensively improves the security and reliability of sealed supervision. Attached Figure Description

[0027] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the electronic seal monitoring system provided in the embodiments of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the electronic seal provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of the monitoring host provided in the embodiments of this application; Figure 4 This is an exploded view of the structure of the monitoring host provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 5 This is a flowchart of the electronic seal monitoring method provided in the embodiments of this application.

[0028] Explanation of reference numerals in the attached figures: 10. Electronic seal; 11. Anti-tamper detection circuit; 12. Encryption chip; 13. Paper substrate layer; 14. First electrical interface; 15. Adhesive backing layer; 16. Front label layer; 17. Avoidance window; 20. Monitoring host; 21. Main control module; 22. Environmental sensing module; 221. Proximity detection unit; 222. Image acquisition unit; 223. Infrared sensing module; 23. Communication module; 24. Second electrical interface; 25. Alarm prompt module; 26. Host anti-tamper component; 261. Anti-tamper button; 27. Power supply module; 28. Front cover; 29. ​​Back cover; 291. Mounting plate; 30. Backend management platform. Detailed Implementation

[0029] The following is in conjunction with the appendix Figure 1 -Appendix Figure 5 This application will be described in further detail.

[0030] This application discloses an electronic seal monitoring system. (Refer to...) Figure 1 The electronic seal monitoring system includes a disposable electronic seal 10 and a reusable monitoring host 20. The electronic seal 10 is equipped with an anti-tamper detection circuit 11, an encryption chip 12, and a first electrical interface 14. Both the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 and the encryption chip 12 are electrically connected to the first electrical interface 14. The monitoring host 20 includes a main control module 21, an environmental sensing module 22, a communication module 23, and a second electrical interface 24. Both the environmental sensing module 22, the communication module 23, and the second electrical interface 24 are electrically connected to the main control module 21. The second electrical interface 24 is detachably electrically connected to the first electrical interface 14, and the communication module 23 is used to electrically connect to the backend management platform 30. The main control module 21 is configured to: enter the pre-removal warning state when the environmental perception module 22 detects a valid approach event and the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 remains intact; and trigger a tamper alarm when the state of the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 changes, or the electrical connection between the monitoring host 20 and the electronic seal 10 is broken (e.g., the electrical connection between the first electrical interface 14 and the second electrical interface 24 is broken). A valid approach event refers to a person / object entering a preset monitoring range of 0.5-2m from the monitoring host and being continuously (e.g., for more than 5 minutes) detected by the proximity detection unit and / or infrared sensing module, excluding invalid triggers such as small animals, brief passages, and long-distance interference.

[0031] Understandably, this system adopts an architecture that separates the disposable electronic seal 10 from the reusable monitoring host 20. The electronic seal 10, as a consumable, can be replaced separately, while the monitoring host 20 can be continuously reused, reducing overall usage costs and maintenance expenses, and avoiding resource waste caused by overall scrapping. At the same time, combined with the encryption chip 12 and the tamper detection circuit 11, it can prevent security risks such as seal forgery, illegal replacement, and unauthorized reuse. On this basis, it realizes a hierarchical protection mechanism of "early warning upon proximity and alarm upon damage". Compared with the shortcomings of traditional seals that can only be traced after the fact, it can realize risk intervention in advance and real-time alarm, improving the security and response efficiency of sealing and management.

[0032] Reference Figure 2In one embodiment, the electronic seal 10 includes an adhesive backing layer 15, a paper substrate layer 13, and a front label layer 16 stacked sequentially from bottom to top. The adhesive backing layer 15 is a pressure-sensitive adhesive layer or a butyl rubber adhesive layer, preferably a high-temperature resistant and weather-resistant acrylic pressure-sensitive adhesive, used to firmly bond to the metal, plastic, or paper surface of the protected object. The paper substrate layer 13 is high-density kraft paper or coated paper, preferably 0.1mm to 0.3mm thick, with a smooth surface and certain tear resistance, serving as the bearing substrate for the tamper detection circuit 11. (Refer to...) Figure 2 A flexible printed circuit board (FPC) is sandwiched between the paper substrate layer 13 and the front label layer 16. The FPC is preferably an ultra-thin flexible circuit board made of polyimide (PI) or polyester (PET) substrate, with a thickness not exceeding 0.1 mm, to meet the requirements for a thinner sealing strip. An encryption chip 12 and a first electrical interface 14 are integrated on the FPC. The encryption chip 12 is a security chip with a code-fixing function, capable of encrypting and securely outputting the identification code to prevent unauthorized reading, copying, or tampering of internal data. The encryption chip 12 can work with the monitoring host 20 to achieve encrypted authentication, identity verification, and data verification, allowing reading of internal information only after legal authorization verification, thus improving the anti-counterfeiting security and anti-cracking capabilities of the sealing strip. The first electrical interface 14 includes a wired or wireless communication interface. A conductive line is attached to the paper substrate layer 13. The conductive line is preferably made of thin materials such as printed conductive silver paste lines, conductive carbon ink lines, or flexible copper foil wires, which can maintain the integrity of the sealing strip. It is continuously laid out along the length of the paper substrate layer 13, covering the main stress area of ​​the sealing strip, so that the conductive line is more likely to break when the sealing strip is torn, cut, or forcibly peeled off. The two ends of the conductive line are electrically connected to the flexible printed circuit board to form an anti-tamper detection circuit 11 connected to the first electrical interface 14. For example, by sandwiching anisotropic conductive film or conductive silver paste layer and other conductive adhesive layer materials at the connection between the two, the conductive connection can be maximized, reducing the possibility of loose connections and detachment, and ensuring the stability of the circuit connection. In another embodiment, the tamper detection circuit 11 can be directly connected between the conductive line and the first electrical interface 14 without being transferred through a flexible printed circuit board; the front label layer 16 is a matte PET or coated paper label layer, and product information, warning signs or visual identification codes (not shown in the figure) can be printed on the surface. A clearance window 17 corresponding to the position of the first electrical interface 14 is provided on it. The clearance window 17 is a rectangular or oval opening. The first electrical interface 14 is exposed through the clearance window 17 for physical / wireless connection with the monitoring host 20 or the reading and writing device.

[0033] Furthermore, the peel force between the adhesive layer 15 and the adhered surface is greater than the bonding force between the conductive line and the paper substrate layer 13. When the sealing strip is torn, peeled, or cut by external force, the tamper detection circuit 11, relative to the overall separation of the adhesive layer 15 from the adhered surface, will break or deform first, changing the on / off state of the tamper detection circuit 11. This changes the circuit state at the first electrical interface 14, allowing the connected monitoring host 20 to detect it. The tamper detection circuit 11 can use either an open-circuit detection circuit or a closed-circuit detection circuit to achieve tamper identification. When using an open-circuit detection circuit, the conductive line remains connected under normal use, and the tamper detection circuit 11 is in a conductive state. When the sealing strip is damaged, the conductive line breaks, and the circuit switches from conductive to disconnected. When using a closed-circuit detection circuit, the conductive line remains in a preset disconnected state under normal use, and the tamper detection circuit 11 is in an open-circuit state. When the sealing strip is damaged, the circuit switches from open to conductive. When the sealing strip is torn, peeled, or cut by external force, the conductive circuit deformation triggers the circuit to conduct, and the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 switches from an open circuit state to a conducting state, forming a closed circuit. For example, the conductive circuit can adopt a two-section conductive structure with intervals, and the two sections of conductive structure maintain a preset gap. Under normal conditions, they are insulated from each other and disconnected. When the sealing strip is squeezed, bent, or stretched under external force, the two sections of conductive structure come into contact with each other and achieve electrical conduction, thereby triggering a change in the circuit state.

[0034] The anti-tampering principle of the electronic seal 10 in this embodiment is as follows: the adhesive layer 15 fixes the seal strip to the surface of the protected object. Utilizing a peel force difference design, when the seal strip is illegally opened, torn, or cut, the conductive lines preferentially break or deform, thereby causing a reversal in the electrical state of the anti-tampering detection circuit 11. The monitoring host 20 is connected to the anti-tampering detection circuit 11 through the first electrical interface 14, continuously collecting circuit continuity signals, comparing the real-time signals with a preset normal state, and determining whether the seal strip has been illegally opened.

[0035] It is understood that this application forms an integrated anti-tamper detection circuit 11. Utilizing the structural setting that the peel force between the adhesive layer 15 and the adhered surface is greater than the bonding force between the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 and the paper substrate layer 13, the conductive lines in the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 can preferentially break or deform when the sealing strip is subjected to illegal peeling or tearing, before it has completely detached from the adhered surface. This causes an irreversible change in the circuit state, and the monitoring host 20 can detect the change in circuit state in real time and issue an alarm in a timely manner. The system completes state identification and abnormal response at the same time as the unsealing action occurs. That is, when the seal is attempted to be torn but has not completely detached from the adhered surface, the system can trigger an alarm before the sealed state of the item is substantially damaged. This structurally improves the loophole of not alarming when forcibly unsealed, and maximizes the integrity of the sealed item, achieving a pre-protection effect of "early warning for unsealable attempts and detection for illegal touches." At the same time, it can prevent the protected object from being privately opened, damaged, and then restored.

[0036] In one embodiment, the peel strength between the adhesive layer 15 and the bonded surface is ≥5N / 25mm, and the bonding strength between the conductive lines and the paper substrate layer 13 is ≤3N / 25mm.

[0037] Specifically, the peel strength of the adhesive layer 15 is set to be no less than 5N / 25mm, preferably 6N / 25mm to 10N / 25mm, which ensures that the sealing strip will not accidentally fall off in daily transportation, handling, and slight contact scenarios, and ensures the bonding stability during normal use. The bonding strength between the conductive line and the paper substrate layer 13 is set to be no more than 3N / 25mm, preferably 1N / 25mm to 2N / 25mm, which can prevent the line from accidentally breaking or deforming due to slight bending or vibration, and ensure that the line breaks or deforms first when the sealing strip is subjected to unauthorized tearing.

[0038] It is understandable that the unit N / 25mm refers to the tensile force that a 25mm wide sample withstands during the peel test. By quantifying and matching the two types of strength, it can be ensured that when the sealing strip is peeled off by external force, the conductive circuit will break before the adhesive layer 15, thus enabling the tamper detection circuit 11 to achieve a reliable and stable irreversible state change, improving the reliability and consistency of tamper triggering.

[0039] In one embodiment, a unique identification code (UID) is embedded in the encryption chip 12. This identification code is written into the hardware through mask or fuse technology when the chip leaves the factory. It has an immutable physical property, which can ensure that each seal has a unique and immutable identity. The host automatically verifies the legality, which can prevent the forgery of seals, replacement of seals, and unauthorized reuse, and realize the traceability of the seal throughout its entire life cycle.

[0040] In one embodiment, the upper surface of the front label layer 16 is printed with an identification code (not shown in the figure). The identification code is associated with a unique identifier and includes, but is not limited to, one-dimensional barcodes, two-dimensional codes (such as QR codes, Data Matrix codes), and character codes.

[0041] Furthermore, the identification code can be printed using invisible anti-counterfeiting inks (such as ultraviolet fluorescent inks, infrared excitation inks, or thermochromic inks). Under normal light, the identification code is invisible or appears as a regular pattern, only revealing itself under specific wavelengths of light or specific temperature conditions. This design increases the difficulty of counterfeiting the identification code, achieving the first layer of visual anti-counterfeiting. The identification code and the unique identifier (UID) within the encryption chip 12 have a pre-defined mapping relationship. For example, a direct mapping where the information content of the identification code is completely identical to the content of the unique identifier facilitates rapid comparison by humans and machines; or an encrypted mapping, where the identification code is a derived sequence generated from the unique identifier through a specific algorithm (such as a hash algorithm, symmetric / asymmetric encryption algorithm). This design makes it impossible to deduce the real ID of the internal chip through reverse engineering even if the surface QR code information is illegally obtained, further reducing the possibility of counterfeiting the seal; it can also be dynamically associated, that is, the identification code contains an index address (such as a URL) pointing to a remote database. The monitoring host 20 accesses the server by scanning the identification code to obtain the chip encrypted information uniquely bound to the physical seal, realizing a closed-loop verification of "online + offline".

[0042] Understandably, by printing an identification code associated with the internal chip on the front label layer 16, inspection personnel can quickly obtain the identification code on the front label layer 16 using a scanning device (such as a smartphone or barcode scanner) to perform preliminary logistics status inquiries and asset registration. After the identification code is verified, the monitoring host 20 further reads the unique identification code within the chip through the first electrical interface 14. The system automatically compares the consistency between the identification code and the chip's UID. If the mapping relationship between the two does not match, the seal is determined to be counterfeit or maliciously swapped, even if its appearance is intact. Under the premise of confirming the legitimacy of the identity, the system simultaneously detects the on / off status of the tamper detection circuit 11. Only when the "identity is consistent" and the "circuit is closed" is the protected object determined to be in a safe state. This multi-level management mechanism is adapted to scenarios such as logistics distribution, document management, and precision instrument sealing. It improves the problem of low reading efficiency and easy forgery of identity in traditional seals during inspections: in large-scale warehousing, rapid traceability can be achieved through long-distance barcode scanning; during key inspections, physical security is ensured through encrypted verification of the internal chip. Meanwhile, as a redundant backup, the identification code can still retain basic visual traceability even in extreme situations such as chip damage caused by strong magnetic fields, thus improving the reliability of the sealing strip's entire lifecycle management.

[0043] In one embodiment, the electronic seal 10 and the monitoring host 20 also integrate a pair of mutually inductive radio frequency (RF) induction coils (not shown in the figure). On the electronic seal 10 side, the RF induction coil is electrically connected to the encryption chip 12, allowing external wireless devices to read the unique identification code. On the monitoring host 20 side, the RF induction coil is electrically connected to the main control module 21. By setting the RF induction coil, non-contact wireless reading of identity information can be achieved, facilitating the monitoring host 20 to complete anti-counterfeiting verification and adapting to logistics, warehousing, and container inspection scenarios. In terms of specific structural implementation, the RF induction coil can be a miniature copper foil coil directly etched or printed on a flexible printed circuit board (FPC) or rigid PCB substrate.

[0044] Understandably, the above design implements a dual-channel status reading mechanism of "wired contact + wireless radio frequency". This not only facilitates the monitoring host 20 to complete non-contact anti-counterfeiting verification and anti-tampering inspection without damaging the appearance of the sealing strip; but also enables the wireless acquisition of the legal identity of the sealing strip and the record of damage through the radio frequency induction coil in extreme scenarios (such as when the conductive contact used for identification of the first electrical interface 14 is oxidized or physically damaged and cannot be wired), as a subsequent tracking record, improving the robustness (fault tolerance) and adaptability of the system, and adapting to complex industrial scenarios such as logistics transportation, customs sealing, and power cabinet inspection without opening the box.

[0045] Reference Figure 1 Figure 3 and Figure 4 In one embodiment, the environmental perception module 22 in the monitoring host 20 includes a proximity detection unit 221 and an image acquisition unit 222; both the proximity detection unit 221 and the image acquisition unit 222 are electrically connected to the main control module 21; in the pre-removal warning state, the main control module 21 is configured to: wake up the image acquisition unit 222 to perform silent pre-recording and caching of on-site data according to the valid proximity signal output by the proximity detection unit 221, maintain monitoring of the anti-tamper detection circuit 11, and push warning information to the backend management platform 30 through the communication module 23.

[0046] Specifically, refer to Figure 3 and Figure 4The monitoring host 20 includes a front cover 28, a rear cover 29, and a mounting plate 291 fitted onto the rear cover 29. The mounting plate 291 is used to quickly fix the monitoring host 20 to the substrate or mounting surface, ensuring both installation stability and convenient subsequent disassembly and reuse, adapting to the installation needs of different storage scenarios. The front cover 28 and the rear cover 29 interlock to form a sealed housing space. The entire housing is sealed to adapt to various indoor and outdoor environments, preventing dust and moisture from damaging internal components. The main circuit modules are integrated within the housing space via PCB circuit boards. The modules are rationally laid out, with compact wiring, and do not interfere with each other. Specifically, they include a main control module 21, an environmental sensing module 22, a communication module 23, an alarm prompting module 25, and a power supply module 27. (See the schematic diagram.) Figure 4 Only some modules are shown in the figure, and not all circuit modules are shown. For example, communication module 23 is not separately labeled in the figure.

[0047] Specifically, in one embodiment, the environmental perception module 22 includes an image acquisition unit 222 and a proximity detection unit 221. In another embodiment, the environmental perception module 22 includes an image acquisition unit 222, a proximity detection unit 221, and an infrared sensing module 223. The image acquisition unit 222 can be a camera module, a miniature visual acquisition module, etc., used to acquire scene information when an alarm is triggered. The proximity detection unit 221 can be a microwave sensing or capacitive sensing device used to monitor the approaching behavior of people or objects in the area in real time. The infrared sensing module 223, on the one hand, assists in identifying moving targets based on changes in heat sources, and works with the proximity detection unit 221 to accurately determine valid approach events. On the other hand, it provides infrared supplementary lighting for the camera module in low-light / nighttime environments to ensure clear imaging by the camera module. Figure 3 As shown in the view of the monitoring host 20, the image acquisition unit 222 (camera module) and the infrared sensing module 223 are arranged in the light-transmitting area reserved in the front cover 28, and the proximity detection unit 221 is set at the end of the rear cover 29 facing the monitoring direction. Through the joint detection of multiple sensors, the reliability and response speed of target recognition can be improved, the probability of false triggering and missed detection can be reduced, and all-round monitoring of the status around the seal can be realized.

[0048] Understandably, when personnel or moving targets approach the seal, the proximity detection unit 221 can send a proximity signal to the main control module 21. The main control module 21 then pushes early warning information to the backend management platform 30 in real time to promptly remind management personnel to pay attention to abnormal dynamics around the seal. On the other hand, it also wakes up the image acquisition unit 222 in advance to perform silent recording and data caching, thus achieving early warning. Even if the seal has not yet been actually damaged, it can preserve on-site audiovisual evidence in advance, providing a basis for subsequent event tracing and responsibility determination.

[0049] Specifically, the alarm notification module 25 may use an indicator light, a horn, or a sound and light linkage component, and be installed near the light-transmitting and sound-emitting holes reserved in the housing to ensure that the alarm signal can be clearly transmitted outward. The alarm notification module 25 is electrically connected to the main control module 21; when a tamper alarm is triggered, the main control module 21 is configured to: control the alarm notification module 25 to output an alarm signal, lock the cached on-site data in the early warning state as preliminary evidence, and upload the alarm information, preliminary evidence, and real-time on-site data to the backend management platform 30 through the communication module 23.

[0050] Understandably, when the seal is detected to have been illegally broken, the system can immediately trigger a local audible and visual alarm to deter violations in real time. At the same time, the system will upload the cached data from the early warning stage and the real-time captured images to the backend management platform 30 to form a complete data chain, so as to realize the synchronization of on-site warning and evidence solidification, which will facilitate the rapid handling and subsequent traceability by management personnel.

[0051] It should be noted that the power supply module 27 is electrically connected to the main control module 21 and is used to supply power to the monitoring host 20 and the connected electronic seal 10. The monitoring host 20 is independently powered and supports power outage recovery, ensuring that it can still monitor, alarm, and upload data normally when there is an external power outage or the line is cut off.

[0052] Reference Figure 4 In one embodiment, the monitoring host 20 is further provided with a host anti-tamper component 26, which is electrically connected to the main control module 21. The host anti-tamper component 26 includes an anti-tamper button 261 located on the back of the monitoring host 20. The anti-tamper button 261 is normally pressed and kept in a conductive state by the mounting carrier. When the monitoring host 20 is pried or lifted, the anti-tamper button 261 springs back and disconnects, thereby triggering a detection signal. In another embodiment, the host anti-tamper component 26 may also include a door magnetic detection unit. The door magnetic detection unit is formed by the cooperation of a sensing component located inside the host and a magnetic component located on the carrier. For example, the sensing component of the door magnetic detection unit is located inside the back cover 29 of the host, and the magnetic component is located at a corresponding position on the mounting plate 291. When the host and the mounting plate are separated, the magnetic cooperation is broken, which can also generate a trigger signal. The main control module 21 is configured to activate a tamper alarm when the host anti-tamper component 26 is triggered.

[0053] It is understood that the monitoring system of this application can provide anti-tamper protection for the monitoring host 20 itself. By setting the host anti-tamper component 26 on the monitoring host 20, the monitoring host 20 can be provided with double anti-tamper protection. No matter if the host is illegally pried, disassembled or separated from the installation carrier, an alarm can be triggered, effectively blocking the attack path of first removing the monitoring host 20 and then destroying the electronic seal 10, and further improving the security and anti-tampering capability of the overall monitoring system.

[0054] In one embodiment, the first electrical interface 14 and the second electrical interface 24 are mutually matched magnetic waterproof docking interfaces, and the monitoring host 20 and the electronic seal 10 form a detachable electrical connection through the magnetic waterproof docking interfaces.

[0055] Specifically, refer to Figure 2 The first electrical interface 14 is a magnetic docking port, which is located on the paper substrate layer 13. A corresponding clearance window 17 is provided on the front label layer 16. The corresponding areas of the two are covered with waterproof sealant. If the waterproof rating of IP65 is met, the waterproof sealant seals the gap between the front label layer 16 and the first electrical interface 14.

[0056] Understandably, the magnetic docking ports enable quick alignment and connection, while the waterproof sealant protects the conductive contacts, reducing moisture and dust intrusion and improving the adaptability and reliability of the sealing strip in various operating environments. This localized potting waterproof protection structure mitigates internal circuit oxidation or micro-short circuits caused by prolonged exposure to outdoor logistics, rain, snow, or high-humidity cold chain environments, enhancing the product's weather resistance and adapting to complex outdoor, humid, and transportation environments. Installation and replacement are also efficient and convenient.

[0057] Furthermore, this detachable magnetic docking structure also constitutes a protection node against removal from the system. When the monitoring host 20 is in monitoring mode, the main control module 21 continuously monitors the communication signal or circuit level with the electronic seal 10 through the second electrical interface 24. If an unauthorized person attempts to bypass the tear detection of the paper substrate layer 13 by directly removing the monitoring host 20, the magnetic interface will disconnect instantly, causing the electrical connection to be lost. The main control module 21 will immediately determine this as an abnormal electrical connection disconnection event and trigger a tamper alarm, thereby blocking the attack vulnerability of directly separating the host by bypassing the paper seal.

[0058] This application also discloses an electronic seal monitoring method, applied to the monitoring host 20 in the electronic seal monitoring system of any of the above embodiments, including the following steps: S1. In response to the electrical connection established between the second electrical interface 24 and the first electrical interface 14 of the electronic seal 10, the identity information of the electronic seal 10 is read to complete the binding and enter the monitoring state; S2. Acquire environmental sensing signals and the status signals of the anti-tamper detection circuit 11; when the environmental sensing signal indicates that there is a valid approach event and the status signal indicates that the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 is intact, generate a pre-removal warning message and perform silent caching of on-site audio-visual data. S3. When the status signal indicates that the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 has changed, or when the electrical connection between the first electrical interface 14 and the second electrical interface 24 is detected to be disconnected, it is determined to be a tampering event, triggering a local tampering alarm, and uploading the field data and alarm information cached in the early warning stage to the backend management platform 30. S4. If the status signal does not indicate a change in the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 within the preset time after the silent buffer is started, the buffer is cleared and the system enters a sleep state.

[0059] For example, this monitoring method can be applied to a warehouse material box sealing supervision scenario: Workers fix the electronic seal 10 to the material box and connect the first electrical interface 14 of the seal to the second electrical interface 24 of the monitoring host 20. The monitoring host 20 automatically reads the seal's unique identity information, completes the binding after verification, and then automatically enters a 24-hour monitoring state. Subsequently, when personnel approach the material box, the proximity detection unit 221 and the infrared sensing module 223 in the host jointly detect valid approach behavior (i.e., excluding invalid triggers such as small animals, brief passages, and long-distance interference, only identifying continuous approach and attempts to touch the seal). At this time, the seal tamper detection circuit 11 is still intact, and the host generates a removal signal. The system provides an early warning system, simultaneously and silently activating the image acquisition unit 222 to record on-site footage and cache data, preserving preliminary evidence. If the electronic seal 10 is subsequently torn or damaged, causing the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 to disconnect, or if the monitoring host 20 is forcibly removed from the electronic seal 10, causing the magnetic electrical interface to disconnect, the host immediately identifies this as an illegal damage event, simultaneously triggering a local audible and visual alarm to deter unauthorized personnel. The system also uploads the cached footage and real-time alarm information from the warning phase to the backend management platform 30. If only unrelated personnel briefly pass by, and the seal remains intact within a preset timeframe, the host automatically clears the temporary cache, and modules such as the main control module 21 and the image acquisition unit 222 enter sleep mode to reduce overall power consumption. Preferably, the preset timeframe is 30 seconds to 5 minutes, which can be customized according to different usage scenarios such as warehousing and logistics.

[0060] Understandably, the monitoring host 20 autonomously completes the entire process of seal identification reading and binding, status monitoring, early warning control and alarm uploading. While realizing proximity warning, tampering alarm and evidence pre-caching, it achieves timeout sleep and low power consumption operation through intelligent control on the host side. At the same time, based on the separate architecture of disposable electronic seal 10 and reusable monitoring host 20, the reusability of the host further ensures the economy and practicality of security management.

[0061] It should be noted that the timing of uploading warning information and cached on-site data in this application can be flexibly configured according to the network environment and power consumption requirements of the application scenario in actual applications, and is not limited to a single execution order.

[0062] In one specific embodiment (real-time response mode), after generating pre-demolition warning information, the main control module 21 immediately pushes the warning information (such as a lightweight text status command) to the backend management platform 30 via the communication module 23 to achieve the earliest possible intervention from the backend. Meanwhile, the on-site audiovisual data is silently recorded and cached locally by the image acquisition unit 222. When a destructive event triggers an alarm, the cached on-site data is then uploaded as preliminary evidence via the communication module 23. This mode is suitable for scenarios with high timeliness requirements and sufficient power supply.

[0063] In another specific embodiment (low-power / weak network combined transmission mode), after generating the pre-tamper warning information, the main control module 21 does not perform network data interaction, but instead silently stores it locally along with the on-site audio-visual data recorded by the image acquisition unit 222. If no subsequent destructive event occurs, the entire data is cleared and released after a preset time. If the state change of the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 is determined to be a destructive event, the main control module 21 merges the warning information, alarm information, and on-site data cached during the warning stage into data packets, and uploads them to the backend management platform 30 in one package through the communication module 23. This mode can reduce the number of invalid network wake-ups and reduce the communication power consumption of the monitoring host 20, and is especially suitable for battery-powered applications with unstable network signals, such as field logistics and long-distance escort.

[0064] Furthermore, step S1, which involves reading the identity information of the electronic seal 10 to complete the binding process, specifically includes: S11. Read the unique identification code in the encryption chip 12 of the electronic seal 10 through the second electrical interface 24; S12. Compare the unique identification code with the pre-acquired legal identification code; if the comparison is consistent, the currently accessed electronic seal 10 is determined to be legal, a binding is established and the system enters the monitoring state; if the comparison is inconsistent, the binding is refused and an identity abnormality alarm message is generated.

[0065] During the actual sealing process, staff only need to electrically connect the compliant electronic seal 10 to the monitoring host 20. The monitoring host 20 can automatically read the unique identification information of the encryption chip 12 built into the seal and, according to the configuration policy, quickly compare it with the locally stored legitimate identity database, or request a legitimate identification code from the backend management platform 30 for online verification in real time. Only when the identification code matches successfully will the system confirm the seal's legitimacy and officially activate monitoring; if a forged, tampered, or unauthorized electronic seal 10 is connected, the host will refuse to bind it and report an alarm, thereby reducing the risk of unauthorized access.

[0066] Understandably, the monitoring host 20 verifies the unique identification code of the encryption chip 12 locally or in the cloud, verifying its legitimacy before binding and monitoring, thus blocking unauthorized access behaviors such as forging or replacing seals, further ensuring the authenticity and reliability of the binding relationship between the host and the seal, and improving overall regulatory security.

[0067] In summary, the electronic seal monitoring system of this application can construct a protection system from multiple dimensions. In terms of security level, it first achieves source access control through the unique identification code of the encrypted chip 12 combined with more than 30 identity verifications on the local or backend management platform, preventing the access of counterfeit or illegally replaced seals, thus establishing the first line of identity security defense. Then, it achieves accurate identification of personnel approach through multi-sensor collaborative perception, providing early warning and silently caching on-site data before the tampering occurs, thus completing data pre-processing. Finally, it forms a dual anti-tamper protection through the anti-tamper detection circuit 11 and the host anti-tamper component 26, monitoring the status of the seal and the host in real time. In the event of damage, a local alarm is immediately triggered and a report is sent to the backend. Simultaneously, independent power supply and power outage recovery design ensure uninterrupted monitoring and alarm operation even under extreme conditions. In terms of effectiveness, this application achieves a shift from passive alarm to proactive prediction, forming a complete data chain through pre-warning caching and alarm-time uploading, facilitating rapid subsequent handling and traceability. Furthermore, it adopts an architecture of 10 disposable electronic seals plus 20 reusable monitoring hosts, ensuring seal security while reducing usage and maintenance costs. It combines high security, intelligence, and economy, making it suitable for full-cycle security supervision in various scenarios such as warehousing, logistics, and material management.

[0068] The above are all preferred embodiments of this application, and are not intended to limit the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, all equivalent changes made in accordance with the structure, shape and principle of this application should be covered within the scope of protection of this application.

Claims

1. An electronic seal monitoring system, characterized by include: A disposable electronic seal (10) is provided with an anti-tamper detection circuit (11), an encryption chip (12) and a first electrical interface (14). The anti-tamper detection circuit (11) and the encryption chip (12) are both electrically connected to the first electrical interface (14). A reusable monitoring host (20) includes a main control module (21), an environmental sensing module (22), a communication module (23), and a second electrical interface (24). The environmental sensing module (22), the communication module (23), and the second electrical interface (24) are all electrically connected to the main control module (21). The monitoring host (20) is detachably electrically connected to the first electrical interface (14) through the second electrical interface (24). The communication module (23) is used to electrically connect to the backend management platform (30). The main control module (21) is configured to: enter the pre-removal warning state when the environmental perception module (22) detects a valid approach event and the anti-tamper detection circuit (11) remains intact; and trigger a tamper alarm when the state of the anti-tamper detection circuit (11) is detected to have changed, or when the electrical connection between the monitoring host (20) and the electronic seal (10) is detected to be disconnected.

2. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 1, wherein, The electronic seal (10) includes a paper substrate layer (13), the tamper detection circuit (11) is embedded in the paper substrate layer (13), the back of the paper substrate layer (13) is provided with an adhesive layer (15), the peel force between the adhesive layer (15) and the surface to be pasted is greater than the bonding force between the tamper detection circuit (11) and the paper substrate layer (13).

3. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 1, wherein, The encryption chip (12) has a unique identification code embedded in it. The monitoring host (20) reads the unique identification code to establish the identity binding between the monitoring host (20) and the current electronic seal (10).

4. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 1, wherein, The environmental perception module (22) includes a proximity detection unit (221) and an image acquisition unit; both the proximity detection unit (221) and the image acquisition unit (222) are electrically connected to the main control module (21); In the pre-removal warning state, the main control module (21) is configured to: wake up the image acquisition unit (222) according to the valid proximity signal output by the proximity detection unit (221) to perform silent pre-recording and caching of on-site data, maintain monitoring of the anti-tamper detection circuit (11), and push warning information to the back-end management platform (30) through the communication module (23).

5. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 4, wherein, The monitoring host (20) also includes an alarm prompting module (25), which is electrically connected to the main control module (21); When the tamper alarm is triggered, the main control module (21) is configured to: control the alarm prompt module (25) to output an alarm signal, lock the field data cached in the early warning state as preliminary evidence, and upload the alarm information, the preliminary evidence and real-time field data to the backend management platform (30) through the communication module (23).

6. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 1, wherein, The monitoring host (20) is also provided with a host anti-tamper component (26), which is electrically connected to the main control module (21); the host anti-tamper component (26) includes an anti-tamper button (261) and / or a door magnetic detection unit located on the back of the monitoring host (20); the main control module (21) is configured to trigger a tamper alarm when the host anti-tamper component (26) is triggered.

7. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 1, wherein, The monitoring host (20) also includes a power supply module (27), which is electrically connected to the main control module (21) and is used to supply power to the monitoring host (20) and the connected electronic seal (10).

8. The electronic seal monitoring system of claim 1, wherein, The first electrical interface (14) and the second electrical interface (24) are mutually matched magnetic waterproof docking interfaces, and the monitoring host (20) and the electronic seal (10) are connected by the magnetic waterproof docking interfaces to form a detachable electrical connection.

9. An electronic seal monitoring method applied to the monitoring host as claimed in any one of claims 1, 3-8, characterized by, Including the following steps: S1. In response to the electrical connection established between the second electrical interface (24) and the first electrical interface (14) of the electronic seal (10), the identity information of the electronic seal (10) is read to complete the binding and enter the monitoring state; S2. Acquire environmental sensing signals and the status signals of the anti-tamper detection circuit (11); when the environmental sensing signal indicates that there is a valid approach event and the status signal indicates that the anti-tamper detection circuit (11) is intact, generate a pre-removal warning message and perform silent caching of on-site audio-visual data. S3. When the status signal indicates that the anti-tamper detection circuit (11) has changed, or when the electrical connection between the first electrical interface (14) and the second electrical interface (24) is detected to be disconnected, it is determined to be a tampering event, triggers a tampering alarm, and uploads the field data and alarm information cached in the early warning stage to the backend management platform (30). S4. If the status signal does not indicate a change in the anti-tamper detection circuit (11) within a preset time after the silent buffer is started, the buffer is cleared and the device enters a sleep state.

10. The electronic seal monitoring method according to claim 9, characterized in that, Step S1, which involves reading the identity information of the electronic seal (10) to complete the binding process, specifically includes: S11. Read the unique identification code in the encryption chip (12) in the electronic seal (10) through the second electrical interface (24); S12. Compare the unique identification code with the pre-acquired legal identification code; if the comparison is consistent, determine that the currently accessed electronic seal (10) is legal, establish the binding and enter the monitoring state.