Data security issuing method, system and device based on key injection and medium

Abstract

The application mainly relates to the technical field of automobile engineering, and discloses a data security issuing method, system and device based on key injection and a medium. The method comprises the following steps: transmitting an encryption key to a server end and a vehicle end respectively; transmitting a private key to the server end and transmitting public key information corresponding to the private key to the vehicle end; acquiring ciphertext generated based on the encryption key and signature information generated based on the private key of the server end; sending a data packet comprising the ciphertext and the signature information to the vehicle end; and when the vehicle end verifies the signature information successfully by using the public key information, allowing the vehicle end to decrypt the ciphertext by using the encryption key to acquire data in the ciphertext. The application simultaneously realizes the confidentiality, integrity and authenticity of data in an untrusted vehicle end environment, and ensures that any verification failure can reliably terminate subsequent operations.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of automotive engineering technology, specifically to a method, system, device, and medium for secure data delivery based on key injection. Background Technology

[0002] With the development of intelligent connected vehicles and vehicle-road cooperative technologies, vehicles, as distributed mobile terminals, frequently need to receive firmware upgrade packages, high-precision maps, and sensitive configuration data from the cloud. However, vehicles are often in physically accessible but communicationally exposed untrusted environments, making them highly vulnerable to security threats such as man-in-the-middle attacks, firmware tampering, and malicious code injection. If upgrade packages or sensitive data are eavesdropped on, forged, or replaced during transmission and processing, it will directly lead to loss of vehicle control, leakage of user privacy, or reverse engineering and theft of intellectual property. Therefore, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data transmission has become a critical security requirement.

[0003] Existing single-point protection solutions cannot simultaneously guarantee data confidentiality and authenticity. Symmetric encryption key distribution is vulnerable to theft, while digital signatures cannot prevent plaintext reverse engineering. The simple decrypt-then-verify design allows tampered data to easily enter the vehicle's processes, consuming resources and introducing unknown vulnerabilities, lacking a mechanism for triggering circuit breakers upon failure. Furthermore, software-based distribution of private keys makes it difficult to guarantee their unextractability, rendering the signature system ineffective. Therefore, there is an urgent need for a layered protection solution that organically integrates secure injection, cryptographic signatures, and rigorous circuit breaker verification. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention provides a data security distribution method, system, device, and medium based on key injection, which simultaneously achieves data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of source in an untrusted vehicle environment, and ensures that any verification failure can reliably terminate subsequent operations.

[0005] This invention provides a method for secure data delivery based on key injection, the method comprising: The encryption key is transmitted to both the server and the vehicle. The private key is transmitted to the server, and the public key information corresponding to the private key is transmitted to the vehicle. Obtain the ciphertext generated by the server based on the encryption key and the signature information generated based on the private key; The data packet, including the ciphertext and the signature information, is sent to the vehicle terminal. When the vehicle terminal successfully verifies the signature information using the public key information, it is allowed to use the encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data in the ciphertext.

[0006] Optionally, transmitting the encryption key to the server and the vehicle respectively includes: The original symmetric key is split into layers and double-obfuscated to generate multiple double-obfuscated secondary subkeys. Each of the secondary subkeys is written to the target storage location on the server side to complete the transmission of the encryption key.

[0007] Optionally, the step of performing hierarchical splitting and double obfuscation on the original symmetric key to generate multiple double-obfuscated secondary sub-keys includes: The original symmetric key is divided into two equal-length first-level subkeys, and the first key confusion algorithm is used to confuse the two first-level subkeys respectively. After the obfuscation operation is completed, the obfuscated first-level subkey is split to obtain multiple second-level subkeys of equal length; A second key obfuscation algorithm is used to perform a second obfuscation operation on all second-level subkeys to generate four second-level subkeys that have undergone double obfuscation.

[0008] Optionally, before the vehicle-side device decrypts the ciphertext using the encryption key, the method further includes: Obtain the four secondary subkeys; The decontamination algorithm corresponding to the second key contamination algorithm is invoked to decrypt the four secondary subkeys; The four decrypted secondary subkeys are reassembled into two primary subkeys in a preset order; The decontamination algorithm corresponding to the first key obfuscation algorithm is invoked to decrypt the two first-level subkeys; The two decrypted first-level subkeys are combined and recombined to obtain the original symmetric key, which is used to decrypt the ciphertext.

[0009] Optionally, the specific methods for transmitting the private key to the server include: The original private key is split into two private key segments, and a third key obfuscation algorithm is used to obfuscate the two private key segments respectively to obtain obfuscated private key blocks; The obfuscated private key block is written to the target storage location on the server side to complete the transmission of the private key.

[0010] Optionally, the specific method for transmitting the public key information corresponding to the private key to the vehicle terminal includes: The original certificate data is obfuscated using the fourth obfuscation algorithm to obtain the obfuscated certificate. The obfuscated certificate is injected into a specific storage location of the target file to complete the transmission of the public key information.

[0011] Optionally, before the vehicle verifies the signature information using the public key information, the method further includes: The obfuscated certificate is decrypted and restored to the original certificate using the deobfuscated algorithm corresponding to the fourth obfuscation algorithm. The original certificate serves as the verification signature for the public key information.

[0012] The present invention also provides a data security distribution system based on key injection, the system including a distribution device, a server, and an in-vehicle system; The dispensing device is used for: The encryption key is transmitted to both the server and the vehicle. The private key is transmitted to the server, and the public key information corresponding to the private key is transmitted to the vehicle. Obtain the ciphertext generated by the server based on the encryption key and the signature information generated based on the private key; The data packet, including the ciphertext and the signature information, is sent to the vehicle terminal. When the vehicle terminal successfully verifies the signature information using the public key information, it is allowed to use the encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data in the ciphertext. The server is used for: Receive the encryption key and the private key; The data to be sent is encrypted using the encryption key to generate the ciphertext; The ciphertext is digitally signed using the private key to generate the signature information; The vehicle infotainment system is used for: Receive the encryption key and the public key information; The signature information is verified using the public key information; If the verification is successful, the ciphertext is decrypted using the encryption key to obtain the data to be sent. If verification fails, the decryption operation will be terminated.

[0013] The present invention also provides an electronic device, the electronic device including a memory and a processor, the memory storing a computer program, and the processor executing the computer program to implement the data security delivery method based on key injection as described in any of the preceding claims.

[0014] The present invention also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the data security delivery method based on key injection as described in any of the preceding claims.

[0015] The present invention has at least the following beneficial effects: First, the server generates ciphertext using a pre-set encryption key, ensuring data confidentiality during transmission and vehicle-side storage. Since the vehicle-side environment is untrusted, the decryption key is securely injected rather than transmitted online to prevent eavesdropping. Second, the server generates a signature on the data using its private key and sends a data packet containing both the ciphertext and signature to the vehicle-side. The vehicle-side verifies the signature using a pre-set public key. Because the private key is held only by the legitimate server and cannot be forged on an untrusted vehicle-side, successful verification simultaneously confirms the integrity and authenticity of the data packet. Finally, the scheme strictly defines the mandatory order and logical dependency of verification before decryption. Decryption is allowed only when verification is successful, constituting a reliable circuit breaker mechanism. If public key verification fails due to data tampering or forgery, the vehicle-side logic immediately terminates and refuses to perform any subsequent decryption operations, ensuring that malicious or corrupted data does not enter the vehicle-side core processing flow, thus reliably terminating risky operations. Attached Figure Description

[0016] The accompanying drawings are provided to further understand the technical solutions of the present invention and constitute a part of the specification. They are used together with the embodiments of the present invention to explain the technical solutions of the present invention, and do not constitute a limitation on the technical solutions of the present invention.

[0017] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a data security distribution method based on key injection. Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of symmetric key obfuscation in a data security distribution method based on key injection. Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the steps for symmetric key recovery in a data security distribution method based on key injection. Figure 4 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps involved in verifying signature information in a data security distribution method based on key injection. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a data security distribution system based on key injection. Figure 6 This is another schematic diagram of a data security distribution system based on key injection; Figure 7 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of an encryption module in a data security distribution system based on key injection. Figure 8 This is a flowchart of the decryption module steps in a data security distribution system based on key injection. Detailed Implementation

[0018] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this invention clearer, the invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the invention.

[0019] Please refer to Figure 1 , Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of a data security distribution method based on key injection.

[0020] This embodiment provides a data security distribution method based on key injection, including: S101. Transmit the encryption key to the server and the vehicle respectively.

[0021] S102. Transmit the private key to the server and transmit the public key information corresponding to the private key to the vehicle.

[0022] S103. Obtain the ciphertext generated based on the encryption key and the signature information generated based on the private key from the server.

[0023] S104. Send the data packet containing ciphertext and signature information to the vehicle.

[0024] S105. When the vehicle terminal successfully verifies the signature information using the public key information, it is allowed to use the encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data in the ciphertext.

[0025] Understandably, in this embodiment, firstly, the server generates ciphertext using a pre-set encryption key, ensuring the confidentiality of data during transmission and vehicle-side storage. Since the vehicle-side environment is untrusted, the decryption key must be securely injected rather than transmitted online to prevent eavesdropping. Secondly, the server generates a signature on the data using its private key and sends a data packet containing the ciphertext and signature to the vehicle-side. The vehicle-side verifies the signature using a pre-set corresponding public key. Since the private key is held only by a legitimate server and cannot be forged on an untrusted vehicle-side, successful verification simultaneously confirms the integrity and authenticity of the data packet's origin. Finally, the scheme strictly defines the mandatory order and logical dependency of verification before decryption. Decryption is allowed when verification is successful, constituting a reliable circuit breaker mechanism. Once public key verification fails due to data tampering or forgery, the vehicle-side logic will immediately terminate and refuse to execute any subsequent decryption operations, ensuring that malicious or corrupted data does not enter the vehicle-side core processing flow, thereby reliably terminating risky operations.

[0026] In some embodiments, step S101 includes: The original symmetric key is split into layers and double-obfuscated to generate multiple double-obfuscated secondary subkeys; each secondary subkey is written to the target storage location on the server to complete the transmission of the encryption key.

[0027] Understandably, this embodiment achieves deep protection throughout the key's entire lifecycle by disassembling the original key into multiple secondary subkeys and performing double obfuscation. Firstly, the subkeys are stored in a distributed manner, meaning that even if an attacker physically breaches a single storage location, they cannot recover the original key, eliminating the risk of single-point extraction. Secondly, double obfuscation prevents the subkeys from directly exposing their plaintext form, effectively resisting static reverse engineering. Thus, the key achieves anti-extraction and anti-recovery effects in an untrusted environment, providing an unshakeable foundation of trust for subsequent encryption, signing, and circuit breaker verification chains.

[0028] Specifically, the methods for generating multiple second-level subkeys that have undergone double obfuscation include: The original symmetric key is divided into two equal-length first-level subkeys, and the first key obfuscation algorithm is used to obfuscate the two first-level subkeys respectively. After the obfuscation operation is completed, the obfuscated first-level subkeys are split to obtain multiple equal-length second-level subkeys. The second key obfuscation algorithm is used to perform a second obfuscation operation on all second-level subkeys to generate four second-level subkeys that have undergone double obfuscation.

[0029] Please refer to Figure 2 , Figure 2 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of symmetric key obfuscation in a data security distribution method based on key injection.

[0030] First, the original 16-byte key is split into two 8-byte first-level subkeys. A specific obfuscation algorithm is used to obfuscate these two 8-byte first-level subkeys to obtain two obfuscated first-level subkeys. Then, these two obfuscated first-level subkeys are split into four 4-byte second-level subkeys. A different differential obfuscation algorithm is then used to obfuscate these four 4-byte second-level subkeys a second time to finally obtain four 4-byte obfuscated second-level subkeys.

[0031] Understandably, this embodiment constructs a high-strength key form protection through a tiered segmentation and obfuscation process. First, the original key is segmented and then obfuscated, breaking the mathematical continuity of the key itself. A second obfuscation algorithm is introduced to perform a secondary transformation on the subkeys, completely disrupting the patterns between the fragments. The four subkeys after double obfuscation do not carry the statistical characteristics of the original key. Even if an attacker obtains all the fragments, they cannot perform mathematical reconstruction without knowing the two independent obfuscation algorithms. This design eliminates the possibility of reverse reconstruction from the source of the key form, achieving a deep anti-extraction effect.

[0032] In some embodiments, before the ciphertext is decrypted using the encryption key at the vehicle end, the method further includes: Obtain four secondary subkeys; call the decontamination algorithm corresponding to the second key obfuscation algorithm to decrypt the four secondary subkeys; reassemble the four decrypted secondary subkeys into two primary subkeys in a preset order; call the decontamination algorithm corresponding to the first key obfuscation algorithm to decrypt the two primary subkeys; integrate and reassemble the two decrypted primary subkeys to obtain the original symmetric key, which is used to decrypt the ciphertext.

[0033] Please refer to Figure 3 , Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the steps for symmetric key recovery in a data security distribution method based on key injection.

[0034] Obtain four 4-byte secondary subkeys that have undergone double obfuscation. Next, call the deobfuscation algorithm corresponding to the second key obfuscation algorithm to decrypt the four obfuscated secondary subkeys. After decryption, reassemble the four decrypted 4-byte secondary subkeys into two 8-byte primary subkeys in the corresponding order. Then, call the deobfuscation algorithm corresponding to the first key obfuscation algorithm to decrypt the reassembled two 8-byte primary subkeys a second time. Finally, integrate and reassemble the two decrypted 8-byte primary subkeys to obtain the original 16-byte symmetric key, completing the entire key restoration process.

[0035] It is understood that this embodiment establishes a tiered key reconstruction mechanism. If any key fragment, deobfuscation algorithm, or reconstruction order at any stage does not match the initial injection settings, the original key cannot be successfully recovered. This requires the vehicle-side decryption to be able to obtain all four sub-keys and master two independent deobfuscation algorithms, extending key security from passive storage to active reconstruction, achieving a highly controllable usage effect where there are no complete fragments or algorithms, i.e., no key.

[0036] In some embodiments, the specific methods for transmitting the private key to the server include: The original private key is split into two private key segments, and a third key obfuscation algorithm is used to obfuscate the two private key segments to obtain obfuscated private key blocks. The obfuscated private key blocks are then written to the target storage location on the server to complete the transmission of the private key.

[0037] Understandably, this embodiment decouples private key security from the symmetric key system, introducing an independent third obfuscation algorithm for segmented obfuscation. The private key is not transmitted or stored in its complete plaintext form, but exists in obfuscated fragments. Even if an attacker breaches the server-side storage defenses, they only obtain the private key block transformed by a specific algorithm. Without knowing the third obfuscation algorithm, it is impossible to reconstruct the original private key that could be used to forge signatures, thus eliminating the risk of trust collapse due to private key leakage at the source and ensuring the unforgeability of the signature system.

[0038] In some embodiments, the specific method for restoring the original private key is as follows: first, obtain two obfuscated private key blocks, decrypt the private key using the corresponding deobfuscation algorithm, and combine the two decrypted private key blocks to form the original private key.

[0039] In some embodiments, the specific methods for transmitting the public key information corresponding to the private key to the vehicle include: The original certificate data is obfuscated using a fourth obfuscation algorithm to obtain an obfuscated certificate. The obfuscated certificate is then injected into a specific storage location of the target file to complete the transmission of public key information.

[0040] In some embodiments, before verifying the signature information using the public key information at the vehicle end, the method further includes: The deobfuscated certificate is decrypted and restored to the original certificate using the deobfuscated algorithm corresponding to the fourth obfuscation algorithm. The original certificate serves as the verification signature for the public key information.

[0041] Understandably, this embodiment implements obfuscated injection and controlled restoration on the certificate, i.e., the public key carrier itself. The certificate is stored on the vehicle end in a form transformed by the fourth obfuscation algorithm. Static analysis cannot directly obtain the usable public key, eliminating the attack path of forging the signature verification environment by extracting the certificate. Before signature verification, the corresponding deobfuscation algorithm must be called to reconstruct the original certificate, binding the certificate's usability to its legitimate restoration process. This ensures that even if an attacker steals the obfuscated certificate, it cannot be made effective without the deobfuscation algorithm, achieving deep protection of the stealthy storage and on-demand display of public key information.

[0042] Please refer to Figure 4 , Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the steps involved in verifying signature information in a data security distribution method based on key injection.

[0043] In one specific embodiment, specifically in an embodiment of OTA firmware upgrade and sensitive data transmission for a smart car, the in-vehicle decryption module receives data from the cloud and splits it into two parts: an encrypted upgrade package and signature information. The system then calculates the hash values ​​of these two parts and performs a rigorous comparison. If the hash values ​​match, the verification is successful and the decryption operation is executed, subsequently smoothly transitioning to the main upgrade and data transmission process. If the hash values ​​do not match, it indicates that the data may have been tampered with or corrupted. The system will immediately stop the upgrade and transmission process and return a specific error value to the cloud to terminate the operation.

[0044] Please refer to Figure 5 , Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of a data security distribution system based on key injection.

[0045] This embodiment also provides a data security distribution system based on key injection, the system including a distribution device 201, a server 202 and a vehicle-mounted unit 203.

[0046] The dispensing device 201 is used for: The encryption key is transmitted to both the server and the vehicle. The private key is transmitted to the server, and the corresponding public key information is transmitted to the vehicle. The ciphertext generated by the encryption key and the signature information generated by the private key are obtained from the server. The data packet containing the ciphertext and signature information is sent to the vehicle. When the vehicle successfully verifies the signature information using the public key, it is allowed to decrypt the ciphertext using the encryption key to obtain the data in the ciphertext.

[0047] Server 202 is used for: Receive the encryption key and private key; use the encryption key to encrypt the data to be sent, generating ciphertext; use the private key to digitally sign the ciphertext, generating signature information.

[0048] The vehicle infotainment system 203 is used for: Receive encryption key and public key information; verify the signature information using the public key information; if the verification is successful, decrypt the ciphertext using the encryption key to obtain the data to be sent; if the verification fails, terminate the decryption operation.

[0049] Please refer to Figure 6 , Figure 6 This is another structural diagram of a data security distribution system based on key injection.

[0050] This embodiment of the data security distribution system based on key injection includes a symmetric key injection module, an asymmetric key injection module, a symmetric key recovery module, an encryption module, and a decryption module. First, the symmetric key injection module injects the AES key into both the encryption and decryption modules. Then, the asymmetric key injection module injects the private key into the encryption module and the certificate into the decryption module. In a server environment, the encryption module encrypts and signs the upgrade package and sensitive data. In a vehicle environment, the decryption module first verifies the signature and decryption. If signature verification and decryption fail, the upgrade and data transmission processes are stopped, and an error value is returned. If signature verification and decryption succeed, the upgrade and data transmission processes proceed.

[0051] Please refer to Figure 7 , Figure 7 This is a flowchart illustrating the steps of an encryption module in a data security distribution system based on key injection.

[0052] First, the original symmetric key is obtained using the symmetric key recovery module, and the upgrade package and sensitive data are encrypted. Then, the hash value of the encrypted upgrade package and data is calculated using the SHA256 algorithm. Finally, the original private key is obtained using the asymmetric key recovery module, and the hash value is signed.

[0053] Please refer to Figure 8 , Figure 8 This is a flowchart of the decryption module steps in a data security distribution system based on key injection.

[0054] First, the original certificate is retrieved using the asymmetric key recovery module. The signed and encrypted upgrade package and data are then decrypted, and their hash values ​​and the encrypted upgrade package and data are obtained. The hash value of the encrypted upgrade package and data is calculated using the SHA256 algorithm. The hash value in the signature information is compared with the hash value calculated by the SHA256 algorithm. If the hash values ​​are the same, the decryption operation continues; otherwise, the decryption process terminates. The decryption operation uses the original symmetric key from the symmetric key recovery module to decrypt the encrypted upgrade package and data.

[0055] Understandably, the combined application of the national cryptographic SM2 asymmetric algorithm and the AES symmetric algorithm, along with a dual key obfuscation mechanism involving secondary obfuscation of the symmetric key, private key splitting obfuscation, and direct certificate obfuscation, significantly increases the difficulty of reverse engineering and theft of the key, ensuring key security during transmission and storage. Simultaneously, SHA256 hash value signature verification effectively prevents tampering with upgrade packages and sensitive data, meeting the high-level requirements of vehicle information security. The use of the SM2 national cryptographic algorithm complies with relevant Chinese vehicle information security standards, is widely adaptable to the encryption and decryption needs of various intelligent connected vehicles, and is suitable for multiple scenarios such as upgrade package transmission and sensitive data exchange; it eliminates the need for external security hardware expansion chips, effectively saving raw material and hardware costs.

[0056] It will be understood by those skilled in the art that all or some of the steps and apparatuses in the methods disclosed above can be implemented as software, firmware, hardware, and suitable combinations thereof. Some or all of the physical components can be implemented as software executed by a processor, such as a central processing unit, digital signal processor, or microprocessor, or as hardware, or as an integrated circuit, such as an application-specific integrated circuit. Such software can be distributed on a computer-readable medium, which can include computer storage media (or non-transitory media) and communication media (or transient media). As is known to those skilled in the art, the term computer storage media includes volatile and non-volatile, removable and non-removable media implemented in any method or technology for storing information (such as computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data). Computer storage media includes, but is not limited to, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, flash memory or other memory technologies, CD-ROM, digital versatile disc (DVD) or other optical disc storage, magnetic cartridges, magnetic tape, disk storage or other magnetic storage devices, or any other medium that can be used to store desired information and is accessible to a computer. As is known to those skilled in the art, communication media typically contain computer-readable instructions, data structures, program modules, or other data in modulated data signals such as carrier waves or other transmission mechanisms, and may include any information delivery medium.

[0057] It is understood that the content of the above method embodiments is applicable to this system embodiment. The specific functions implemented in this system embodiment are the same as those in the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved in the above method embodiments.

[0058] This application also provides an electronic device, which includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement any of the above-mentioned data security distribution methods based on key injection.

[0059] It is understood that the content of the above method embodiments is applicable to the embodiments of this electronic device. The specific functions implemented by the embodiments of this electronic device are the same as those of the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved by the above method embodiments.

[0060] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a processor-executable program, which, when executed by a processor, is used to implement the data security distribution method based on key injection as described in any of the above specific embodiments.

[0061] This application also discloses a computer program product, including a computer program or computer instructions, which are stored in a computer-readable storage medium. The processor of a computer device reads the computer program or computer instructions from the computer-readable storage medium and executes the computer program or computer instructions, causing the computer device to perform the data security distribution method based on key injection as described in any of the preceding embodiments.

[0062] It is understood that the content of the above method embodiments is applicable to this storage medium embodiment. The specific functions implemented in this storage medium embodiment are the same as those in the above method embodiments, and the beneficial effects achieved are also the same as those achieved in the above method embodiments.

[0063] The terms “first,” “second,” “third,” “fourth,” etc. (if present) in the specification and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented, for example, in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms “comprising” and “having,” and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatuses. It should be understood that in this application, “at least one” means one or more, and “more than one” means two or more.

[0064] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed systems, apparatuses, and methods can be implemented in other ways. For example, the apparatus embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for instance, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another device, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the couplings or direct couplings or communication connections shown or discussed may be indirect couplings or communication connections through some interfaces, devices, or units, and may be electrical, mechanical, or other forms.

[0065] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0066] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0067] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as USB flash drives, portable hard drives, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), magnetic disks, or optical disks.

[0068] Although the description of this application has been quite detailed and particularly focused on several of the described embodiments, it is not intended to limit itself to any of these details or embodiments or any particular embodiment. Rather, it should be considered as effectively covering the intended scope of this application by referring to the appended claims and taking into account the prior art, which provides for a broad possible interpretation of these claims. Furthermore, the foregoing description of this application with respect to embodiments foreseeable by the inventors is intended to provide a useful description, and non-substantial modifications to this application that have not yet been foreseen may still represent equivalent modifications.

Claims

1. A data security issuing method based on key injection, characterized in that, The method includes: The encryption key is transmitted to both the server and the vehicle. The private key is transmitted to the server, and the public key information corresponding to the private key is transmitted to the vehicle. Obtain the ciphertext generated by the server based on the encryption key and the signature information generated based on the private key; The data packet, including the ciphertext and the signature information, is sent to the vehicle terminal. When the vehicle terminal successfully verifies the signature information using the public key information, it is allowed to use the encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data in the ciphertext.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The step of transmitting the encryption key to the server and the vehicle respectively includes: The original symmetric key is split into layers and double-obfuscated to generate multiple double-obfuscated secondary subkeys. Each of the secondary subkeys is written to the target storage location on the server side to complete the transmission of the encryption key.

3. The method of claim 2, wherein, The original symmetric key is split into layers and subjected to double obfuscation to generate multiple double-obfuscated secondary sub-keys, including: The original symmetric key is divided into two equal-length first-level subkeys, and the first key confusion algorithm is used to confuse the two first-level subkeys respectively. After the obfuscation operation is completed, the obfuscated first-level subkey is split to obtain multiple second-level subkeys of equal length; A second key obfuscation algorithm is used to perform a second obfuscation operation on all second-level subkeys to generate four second-level subkeys that have undergone double obfuscation.

4. The method of claim 3, wherein, Before the vehicle-side device decrypts the ciphertext using the encryption key, the method further includes: Obtain the four secondary subkeys; The decontamination algorithm corresponding to the second key contamination algorithm is invoked to decrypt the four secondary subkeys; The four decrypted secondary subkeys are reassembled into two primary subkeys in a preset order; The decontamination algorithm corresponding to the first key obfuscation algorithm is invoked to decrypt the two first-level subkeys; The two decrypted first-level subkeys are combined and recombined to obtain the original symmetric key, which is used to decrypt the ciphertext.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, The specific methods for transmitting the private key to the server include: The original private key is split into two private key segments, and a third key obfuscation algorithm is used to obfuscate the two private key segments respectively to obtain obfuscated private key blocks; The obfuscated private key block is written to the target storage location on the server side to complete the transmission of the private key.

6. The method of claim 1, wherein, The specific methods for transmitting the public key information corresponding to the private key to the vehicle include: The original certificate data is obfuscated using the fourth obfuscation algorithm to obtain the obfuscated certificate. The obfuscated certificate is injected into a specific storage location of the target file to complete the transmission of the public key information.

7. The method of claim 6, wherein, Before the vehicle-side verifies the signature information using the public key information, the method further includes: The obfuscated certificate is decrypted and restored to the original certificate using the deobfuscated algorithm corresponding to the fourth obfuscation algorithm. The original certificate serves as the verification signature for the public key information.

8. A data security issuing system based on key injection, characterized in that, The system includes a distribution device, a server, and an in-vehicle infotainment system; The dispensing device is used for: The encryption key is transmitted to both the server and the vehicle. The private key is transmitted to the server, and the public key information corresponding to the private key is transmitted to the vehicle. Obtain the ciphertext generated by the server based on the encryption key and the signature information generated based on the private key; The data packet, including the ciphertext and the signature information, is sent to the vehicle terminal. When the vehicle terminal successfully verifies the signature information using the public key information, it is allowed to use the encryption key to decrypt the ciphertext to obtain the data in the ciphertext. The server is used for: Receive the encryption key and the private key; The data to be sent is encrypted using the encryption key to generate the ciphertext; The ciphertext is digitally signed using the private key to generate the signature information; The vehicle infotainment system is used for: Receive the encryption key and the public key information; The signature information is verified using the public key information; If the verification is successful, the ciphertext is decrypted using the encryption key to obtain the data to be sent. If verification fails, the decryption operation will be terminated.

9. An electronic device, comprising: The electronic device includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the data security delivery method based on key injection as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program, the computer program comprising instructions that, when executed by a computer, cause the computer to perform the method of any one of claims 1 to 9. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it implements the data security delivery method based on key injection as described in any one of claims 1 to 7.

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