Key acquisition method and device against quantum computing attack and electronic equipment

Abstract

This application discloses a key acquisition method, apparatus, and electronic device resistant to quantum computing attacks, relating to the field of information security technology. The method includes: encapsulating and digitally signing a user-signed public key parsed from a first protocol ciphertext and a system-generated temporary quantum-resistant public key through a certificate issuance system to obtain a second protocol ciphertext; sending the second protocol ciphertext to a key management system; generating a third protocol ciphertext through the key management system based on the temporary quantum-resistant public key parsed from the second protocol ciphertext, the user-signed public key, and a system-generated target key pair and temporary key; sending the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system; and generating an encryption result of the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext. This application solves the technical problem of low key transmission security during the process of the certificate issuance system requesting a key from the key management system.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of information security technology, and more specifically, to a key acquisition method, apparatus, and electronic device resistant to quantum computing attacks. Background Technology

[0002] In traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) systems, the Certificate Authority (CA) is responsible for issuing and managing digital certificates, while the Key Management System (KMS) is used to generate, store, and manage keys. When a CA needs to issue a digital certificate for a specific entity (such as a user or device), it requests the corresponding encryption certificate key pair (including a public key and a private key) from the KMS. Currently, commonly used key request and transmission protocols are mainly based on classic Chinese cryptographic algorithms (SM2 / SM3 / SM4), which are vulnerable to quantum computing attacks.

[0003] With the rapid development of quantum computing technology, quantum computers pose a serious threat to classical Chinese cryptographic algorithms based on integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems. In the process of CA applying for keys from KMS, if traditional communication protocols and encryption algorithms are used, attackers can use quantum computers to crack the encryption information in the key transmission process in a short time, thereby obtaining the private key, which greatly damages the security of the entire PKI system.

[0004] There is currently no effective solution to the above problems. Summary of the Invention

[0005] This application provides a key acquisition method, apparatus, and electronic device resistant to quantum computing attacks, to at least solve the technical problem of low key transmission security during the process of a certificate issuance system requesting a key from a key management system.

[0006] According to one aspect of this application, a key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks is provided, comprising: verifying the signature of a first protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system; after the first protocol ciphertext has passed the signature verification, parsing the first protocol ciphertext to obtain a user-submitted user signature public key, and generating a temporary quantum-resistant key pair, wherein the temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm; encapsulating and digitally signing the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through the certificate issuance system to obtain a second protocol ciphertext, and sending the second protocol ciphertext to a key management system; and signing the second protocol ciphertext through the key management system. Verification: After the second protocol ciphertext passes signature verification, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain a temporary quantum-resistant public key and a user signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes a target public key and a target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. The key management system generates a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key, and sends the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system. The certificate issuance system generates the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and encryption result of the target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext, where the encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

[0007] Optionally, before verifying the first protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system, the key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks further includes: generating a certificate application form in a preset format based on the user's user signature public key and identity information, and sending the certificate application form to the registration system; parsing the certificate application form through the registration system to obtain the user signature public key; and encapsulating and digitally signing the user signature public key through the registration system to obtain the first protocol ciphertext.

[0008] Optionally, before generating a certificate application in a preset format based on the user's signature public key and identity information, the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks further includes: generating a quantum-resistant signature key pair for each of the L systems based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm, wherein the L systems include at least a certificate issuing system, a registration system, and a key management system, and the quantum-resistant signature key pair includes a quantum-resistant signature public key and a quantum-resistant signature private key; generating a signature application for each system based on the quantum-resistant signature public key for each system, and sending the signature application for each system to the root certificate issuing system; issuing a quantum-resistant signature certificate to the corresponding system through the root certificate issuing system based on each received signature application; controlling the certificate issuing system to exchange quantum-resistant signature certificates with the registration system, and controlling the certificate issuing system to exchange quantum-resistant signature certificates with the key management system.

[0009] Optionally, the first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified through a certificate issuance system, including: obtaining a first signature certificate through the certificate issuance system, wherein the first signature certificate is a quantum-resistant signature certificate of the registration system obtained through exchange; and verifying the first protocol ciphertext based on the first signature certificate through the certificate issuance system.

[0010] Optionally, the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated and digitally signed by a certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext, including: encapsulating the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key by a certificate issuance system to obtain a protocol message; and digitally signing the protocol message by the corresponding quantum-resistant private key of the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext.

[0011] Optionally, a third protocol ciphertext is generated by a key management system based on the target key pair, a temporary key, a temporary quantum-resistant public key, and a user-signed public key. This includes: encrypting the target private key in the target key pair using the temporary key through the key management system to obtain the encryption result of the target private key; encrypting the encryption result of the target private key using the temporary quantum-resistant public key to obtain the target encryption result; encrypting the temporary key using the user-signed public key to obtain the encryption result of the temporary key; and encapsulating and digitally signing the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key in the target key pair through the key management system to obtain the third protocol ciphertext.

[0012] Optionally, the certificate issuance system generates the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key encryption results based on the third protocol ciphertext, including: verifying the signature of the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system; after the third protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, parsing the third protocol ciphertext to obtain the target public key, target encryption results, and temporary key encryption results; generating the target signature certificate based on the user's signature public key; generating the target encryption certificate based on the target public key; and decrypting the target encryption results based on the temporary quantum-resistant private key to obtain the target private key encryption results.

[0013] Optionally, after generating the encryption results of the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system, the key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks further includes: encapsulating and digitally signing the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key through the certificate issuance system to obtain the fourth protocol ciphertext, and sending the fourth protocol ciphertext to the registration system; verifying the signature of the fourth protocol ciphertext through the registration system; after the fourth protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, parsing the fourth protocol ciphertext to obtain the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key; and sending the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key to the user through the registration system.

[0014] According to one aspect of this application, a key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks is provided, comprising: a first operation unit configured to verify the signature of a first protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system; after the first protocol ciphertext has passed the signature verification, parsing the first protocol ciphertext to obtain a user-submitted user signature public key, and generating a temporary quantum-resistant key pair, wherein the temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm; a second operation unit configured to encapsulate and digitally sign the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through a certificate issuance system to obtain a second protocol ciphertext, and sending the second protocol ciphertext to a key management system; and a third operation unit configured to process the second protocol ciphertext through the key management system. The system performs signature verification on the second protocol ciphertext. After the second protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it parses the second protocol ciphertext to obtain a temporary quantum-resistant public key and a user signature public key, and generates a target key pair and a temporary key. The target key pair includes a target public key and a target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. The fourth operation unit is used to generate a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key through the key management system, and sends the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system. The fifth operation unit is used to generate the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and encryption result of the target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system. The encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

[0015] According to another aspect of this application, a computer program product is also provided, which stores a computer program, wherein a key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks is provided to control the computer program product to execute any of the above-mentioned methods when the computer program is running.

[0016] According to another aspect of this application, an electronic device is also provided, wherein the electronic device includes one or more processors and a memory for storing one or more programs, wherein when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors implement the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks described above.

[0017] In this application, the first protocol ciphertext is first verified by a certificate issuance system. After the first protocol ciphertext passes signature verification, it is parsed to obtain the user-submitted user signature public key and generate a temporary quantum-resistant key pair. This temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm. Then, the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated and digitally signed by the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext. This second protocol ciphertext is then sent to a key management system. Finally, the key management system verifies the signature of the second protocol ciphertext. After name verification, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes the target public key and the target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. Subsequently, the key management system generates the third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key, and sends the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system. Then, the certificate issuance system generates the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and the encryption result of the target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext. The encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

[0018] As can be seen from the above, this application adopts a method of co-encryption using quantum-resistant keys and symmetric keys. It uses a certificate issuance system to dynamically generate temporary quantum-resistant key pairs and, together with the user's signature public key, constructs a hierarchical authentication transmission channel. This achieves the goal of avoiding the risk of exposing the private key in the classical Chinese cryptographic algorithm system during the key application process. Thus, it achieves the technical effect of being compatible with the decryption structure of the classical Chinese cryptographic algorithm PKI system without modifying the user terminal. This solves the technical problem of low key transmission security during the process of the certificate issuance system applying for keys from the key management system. Attached Figure Description

[0019] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of this application and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments and are used to explain this application, but do not constitute an undue limitation of this application. In the drawings:

[0020] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an optional key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks according to an embodiment of this application;

[0021] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of an optional quantum-resistant signature certificate exchange method according to an embodiment of this application;

[0022] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of an optional dual-certificate application method according to an embodiment of this application;

[0023] Figure 4 This is a flowchart of an optional target key pair application method according to an embodiment of this application;

[0024] Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an optional key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks according to an embodiment of this application;

[0025] Figure 6 This is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0026] To enable those skilled in the art to better understand the present application, the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments in the present application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort should fall within the scope of protection of the present application.

[0027] It should be noted that the terms "first," "second," etc., in the specification, claims, and accompanying drawings of this application are used to distinguish similar objects and are not necessarily used to describe a specific order or sequence. It should be understood that such data can be interchanged where appropriate so that the embodiments of this application described herein can be implemented in orders other than those illustrated or described herein. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion; for example, a process, method, system, product, or apparatus that comprises a series of steps or units is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to such processes, methods, products, or apparatus.

[0028] It should also be noted that all information and data (including but not limited to information used for display and analysis) involved in this application are authorized by the user or fully authorized by all parties. For example, if there is an interface between this system and the relevant user or organization, before obtaining the relevant information, it is necessary to send a request to the aforementioned user or organization through the interface, and obtain the relevant information only after receiving consent from the aforementioned user or organization.

[0029] Furthermore, the collection, storage, use, processing, transmission, provision, disclosure, and application of relevant information and data involved in this application all comply with the relevant laws, regulations, and standards of the relevant regions, and necessary security measures have been taken. They do not violate public order and good morals. In addition, this application provides corresponding operation entry points for users to choose to agree to authorization or refuse authorization. If the user chooses to refuse authorization, the corresponding expert decision-making process will be initiated.

[0030] In one optional related technical embodiment, a key protection method based on a signed digital envelope is provided. The basic principle of the signed digital envelope is as follows: a temporary symmetric key is generated; this symmetric key is used to encrypt a key pair requested from a KMS; and the KMS uses the public key of the signing certificate to encrypt the temporary symmetric key. After receiving the signed digital envelope, the user uses the private key corresponding to the signing certificate to decrypt the ciphertext of the symmetric key, obtaining the symmetric key. The user then uses the symmetric key to decrypt the requested key, obtaining the encryption certificate key. However, the above-mentioned key protection method based on a signed digital envelope still carries the risk of key leakage.

[0031] The technical objective of this application is to prevent the keys requested by the CA from the KMS from being cracked by quantum computing. At the same time, it adopts temporary quantum-resistant keys, generating a quantum-resistant key for each request, which effectively solves the problem of low security of PKI systems caused by the loss of quantum-resistant keys.

[0032] The present invention will now be described in detail with reference to various embodiments.

[0033] Example 1

[0034] According to an embodiment of this application, an embodiment of a key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks is provided. It should be noted that the steps shown in the flowchart in the accompanying drawings can be executed in a computer system such as a set of computer-executable instructions. Furthermore, although a logical order is shown in the flowchart, in some cases, the steps shown or described may be executed in a different order than that shown here.

[0035] This application provides a quantum-resistant key acquisition system (hereinafter referred to as the acquisition system) for executing the quantum-resistant key acquisition method of this application. Figure 1 This is a flowchart of an optional key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks according to an embodiment of this application, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the method includes the following steps:

[0036] Step S101: The first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified by the certificate issuance system. After the first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified, the first protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the user-submitted user signature public key and generate a temporary quantum-resistant key pair. The temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm.

[0037] Optionally, the preset quantum-resistant algorithm can be set to the ML-KEM (Module-Lattice-Based Key-Encapsulation Mechanism) algorithm, and the temporary quantum-resistant key pair generated based on the ML-KEM algorithm includes the ML-KEM private key (i.e., the temporary quantum-resistant private key) and the ML-KEM public key (i.e., the temporary quantum-resistant public key).

[0038] Optionally, the user signature public key submitted by the user still uses the signature public key format in the traditional national cryptographic algorithm PKI system. The implementation of this technical solution does not require changing the certificate application process on the user side, that is, it does not require modifying the user terminal or client.

[0039] Optionally, after receiving the first protocol ciphertext sent by the registration system, the certificate issuance system performs signature verification on the first protocol ciphertext based on the quantum-resistant signature certificate of the registration system pre-stored in the certificate issuance system. The signature verification refers to using the issued quantum-resistant signature certificate to perform mathematical verification on the signature value in the first protocol ciphertext, thereby preventing attackers from forging the first protocol ciphertext and ensuring the security of the starting point of the subsequent key application process.

[0040] Optionally, the certificate issuance system enhances its resilience against quantum attacks by generating temporary quantum-resistant key pairs. In traditional schemes, key transmission relies on static or long-term keys, which are easily cracked by quantum computing. The temporary quantum-resistant key pairs generated by the certificate issuance system are used only in a single session. Even if intercepted, attackers cannot apply them to other sessions, thereby reducing the risk of data leakage.

[0041] Step S102: The temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated and digitally signed by the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext, and the second protocol ciphertext is sent to the key management system.

[0042] Optionally, after the certificate issuance system parses the first protocol ciphertext to obtain the user signature public key, the certificate issuance system encapsulates the parsed user signature public key and its own generated temporary quantum-resistant public key to obtain the text in the CA-KMS communication protocol format. Then, the certificate issuance system digitally signs the text in the CA-KMS communication protocol format using the signature quantum-resistant private key pre-generated by the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext.

[0043] Optionally, the certificate issuance system actively transmits the temporary quantum-resistant public key to the key management system through the second protocol ciphertext, realizing the collaboration of key encapsulation. Subsequently, the key management system needs to use the temporary quantum-resistant public key to encrypt the target key pair applied for by the user, ensuring that the encrypted information corresponding to the target key pair (i.e. the target encryption result) can only be decrypted by the certificate issuance system, forming an end-to-end quantum-resistant encryption channel.

[0044] Step S103: The second protocol ciphertext is signed and verified by the key management system. After the second protocol ciphertext is signed and verified, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes the target public key and the target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm.

[0045] Optionally, the aforementioned preset symmetric encryption algorithm can be set to the SM4 national cryptographic algorithm, and the temporary key generated based on the SM4 national cryptographic algorithm is the SM4 key.

[0046] Optionally, after receiving the second protocol ciphertext sent by the certificate issuing system, the key management system performs signature verification on the second protocol ciphertext based on the quantum-resistant signature certificate of the certificate issuing system pre-stored in the key management system, in order to confirm that the second protocol ciphertext truly comes from the certificate issuing system and is not a forged node, thus preventing attackers from hijacking key applications.

[0047] Optionally, by generating both the target key pair and the temporary key simultaneously through the key management system, a combination of symmetric encryption and quantum-resistant encryption technologies can be achieved, providing dual protection for the target private key applied for by the user. After the target private key is generated by the key management system, it is first encrypted with an SM4 key and then with an ML-KEM public key, forming a composite encryption structure of "SM4+ML-KEM". Even if the SM4 national cryptographic algorithm is cracked by an attacker, the target private key is still protected by the ML-KEM public key encryption, thereby improving the security of data during transmission.

[0048] Step S104: The key management system generates a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, temporary key, temporary quantum-resistant public key, and user signature public key, and sends the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system.

[0049] Optionally, the key management system does not directly return the generated target key pair to the user in plaintext. Instead, it first encrypts the target private key in the target key pair using a temporary key, and then encrypts it a second time using a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated by the certificate issuance system, thus obtaining the target encryption result (i.e., a composite structure obtained by double encryption of the target private key with an SM4 temporary key and an ML-KEM public key). After that, the key management system encrypts the temporary key based on the user's signature public key, obtaining the encryption result of the temporary key. Then, the key management system encapsulates and digitally signs the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key in the target key pair, obtaining the third protocol ciphertext. At this point, the attacker must crack both the SM4 and ML-KEM algorithms to obtain the target private key, thereby increasing the difficulty of the attack and ensuring the security of the target private key during transmission.

[0050] Step S105: The certificate issuance system generates the encryption results of the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext, wherein the encryption result of the target private key is generated based on a temporary key.

[0051] Optionally, after the certificate issuance system receives the third protocol ciphertext, it first verifies the signature of the third protocol ciphertext based on the quantum-resistant signature certificate of the key management system pre-stored in the certificate issuance system. After the third protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it parses the third protocol ciphertext to obtain the parsing result. The parsing result includes the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key. The certificate issuance system constructs a dual certificate based on the target public key in the parsing result and the user's submitted user signature public key. The dual certificate includes a target encryption certificate and a target signature certificate. At the same time, the certificate issuance system decrypts the target encryption result to obtain the encryption result corresponding to the target private key (i.e., the ciphertext obtained by encrypting the target private key using the SM4 algorithm). Subsequently, the certificate issuance system forwards the dual certificates and the encryption result corresponding to the target private key through the registration system in a hierarchical manner and returns them to the user.

[0052] Optionally, generating the encrypted result of dual certificates and the target private key through a certificate issuance system can achieve the following technical effects:

[0053] (1) Implement dual certificate issuance: The target signing certificate is used to prove the identity of the user entity, and the target public key contained in the target encryption certificate is used to encrypt sensitive data. The target signing certificate and the target encryption certificate are separated, which can meet the compliance requirements of key usage isolation in high security scenarios.

[0054] (2) The target private key is never exposed in plaintext: The entire delivery process of the target private key is in an encrypted state (SM4 encryption). The certificate issuance system only performs one layer of decryption and will not access the plaintext private key, thus ensuring the security of the target private key during transmission.

[0055] As can be seen from the above, this application adopts a method of co-encryption using quantum-resistant keys and symmetric keys. It uses a certificate issuance system to dynamically generate temporary quantum-resistant key pairs and, together with the user's signature public key, constructs a hierarchical authentication transmission channel. This achieves the goal of avoiding the risk of exposing the private key in the classical Chinese cryptographic algorithm system during the key application process. Thus, it achieves the technical effect of being compatible with the decryption structure of the classical Chinese cryptographic algorithm PKI system without modifying the user terminal. This solves the technical problem of low key transmission security during the process of the certificate issuance system applying for keys from the key management system.

[0056] In one optional embodiment, before the first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified by the certificate issuance system, a certificate application form in a preset format is first generated based on the user's user signature public key and identity information, and the certificate application form is sent to the registration system. Then, the registration system parses the certificate application form to obtain the user signature public key. Finally, the registration system encapsulates and digitally signs the user signature public key to obtain the first protocol ciphertext.

[0057] Optionally, the user submits a certificate application in PKCS10 format (i.e., the preset format) through the registration system. Then, the registration system parses the certificate application to obtain the user's signature public key and encapsulates the user's signature public key into text in the CA-RA communication protocol format. After that, the CA-RA communication protocol format text is digitally signed using a signature quantum-resistant private key pre-generated by the registration system to obtain the first protocol ciphertext.

[0058] Optionally, the registration system generates the first protocol ciphertext through the above steps, which can achieve the following technical effects:

[0059] (1) Ensure the integrity and credibility of the certificate application content: The certificate application submitted by the user is parsed by the registration system (RA), the user's signature public key is extracted, and the application data is digitally signed by the registration system's own quantum-resistant signature private key, so that the CA can verify that the application does indeed come from a legitimate registration system and has not been tampered with during transmission;

[0060] (2) The starting point of the key security application chain: The generation step of the first protocol ciphertext mentioned above is the pre-process of the key application process between CA and KMS. The original certificate application submitted by the user is parsed by the registration system, and the parsed data (including the user's signature public key) is standardized, encapsulated and digitally signed. This provides reliable data input for the CA to use quantum-resistant certificate verification and initiate a secure key application to KMS. It is the foundation of the entire quantum-resistant protection protocol chain.

[0061] (3) Maintain protocol compatibility and traceability: The certificate application form adopts a preset format, which is convenient for the automatic parsing and processing of the registration system. The digital signature value in the first protocol ciphertext is generated using a quantum-resistant algorithm to meet security requirements.

[0062] In one optional embodiment, before generating a certificate application in a preset format based on the user's signature public key and identity information, a quantum-resistant signature key pair is first generated for each of the L systems based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm. The L systems include at least a certificate issuing system, a registration system, and a key management system. The quantum-resistant signature key pair includes a quantum-resistant signature public key and a quantum-resistant signature private key. Then, a signature application for each system is generated based on the quantum-resistant signature public key for each system, and the signature application for each system is sent to the root certificate issuing system. Then, the root certificate issuing system issues a quantum-resistant signature certificate to the corresponding system based on each received signature application. Subsequently, the certificate issuing system and the registration system are controlled to exchange quantum-resistant signature certificates, and the certificate issuing system and the key management system are also controlled to exchange quantum-resistant signature certificates.

[0063] In one alternative embodiment, Figure 2 This is a flowchart of an optional quantum-resistant signature certificate exchange method according to an embodiment of this application, such as... Figure 2 As shown, the method includes:

[0064] (1) CA, RA, and KMS generate quantum-resistant key pairs based on quantum-resistant algorithms (such as ML-DSA (Module-Lattice-Based Digital Signature Algorithm) and SLH-DSA (Stateless Hash-Based Digital Signature Algorithm)). They also generate certificate application forms based on the public keys in the quantum-resistant key pairs and issue quantum-resistant signature certificates through a trusted root CA.

[0065] (2) Control the exchange of certificates between CA and RA, and control the exchange of certificates between CA and KMS. It should be noted that the calling process between the three systems is: RA calls CA, CA calls KMS. Therefore, the above two exchange operations can be completed.

[0066] Optionally, the above steps can achieve the following technical effects:

[0067] (1) Establish a system identity authentication foundation based on quantum-resistant algorithms: By generating independent quantum-resistant signature key pairs for the Certificate Authority (CA), Registration Authority (RA), and Key Management System (KMS), and having the root certificate authority issue quantum-resistant signature certificates, it is ensured that each system has verifiable identity credentials based on post-quantum cryptography in communication.

[0068] (2) The starting point for realizing trusted communication between systems: After each system completes the exchange of quantum-resistant signature certificates, subsequent communication between CA, RA and KMS (such as key application, response, etc.) can be verified by digital signature based on these certificates to ensure the authenticity and integrity of the message source and prevent man-in-the-middle attacks or forged requests.

[0069] (3) Provide a secure foundation for subsequent quantum-resistant key transmission: The deployment of quantum-resistant signature certificates is a prerequisite for subsequent protocols (such as using quantum-resistant encryption algorithms such as ML-KEM to protect key pair transmission), ensuring that the signature process of the entire key application process is not threatened by quantum computing, and improving the security of the overall PKI system in a quantum environment.

[0070] (4) Maintain a clear hierarchical structure and separation of responsibilities in the system architecture: Each system independently generates and holds its own signature key pair, and the certificate is uniformly issued by the root CA, which conforms to the existing trust model of PKI. There is no need to reconstruct the system architecture. Only quantum-resistant upgrades are introduced at the identity authentication layer to achieve a smooth transition.

[0071] In summary, the steps in the above embodiments construct a verifiable system identity based on quantum-resistant digital signatures, providing the necessary quantum-resistant authentication foundation for the subsequent secure application of encrypted key pairs between the CA and KMS.

[0072] In one optional embodiment, the step of signing and verifying the first protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system includes: firstly, obtaining a first signature certificate through the certificate issuance system, wherein the first signature certificate is a quantum-resistant signature certificate obtained from the registration system through exchange; and then, signing and verifying the first protocol ciphertext based on the first signature certificate through the certificate issuance system.

[0073] Optionally, by obtaining a quantum-resistant signature certificate from the registration system through a certificate issuance system and verifying the signature of the first protocol ciphertext based on the quantum-resistant signature certificate, it can be ensured that the first protocol ciphertext originates from a trusted registration system and has not been tampered with during transmission. Since the quantum-resistant signature certificate is issued based on a quantum-resistant signature algorithm (such as ML-DSA or SLH-DSA), its signature process has the ability to resist quantum computing attacks, thereby maintaining the authenticity of identity and data integrity in a quantum computing environment. This prevents attackers from forging the identity of the registration system or tampering with key application requests, thus improving the security of communication between the CA and RA.

[0074] In one optional embodiment, the step of encapsulating and digitally signing the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through a certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext includes: first, encapsulating the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through a certificate issuance system to obtain a protocol message; then, digitally signing the protocol message with the corresponding quantum-resistant private key of the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext.

[0075] Optionally, after the certificate issuance system parses the first protocol ciphertext to obtain the user signature public key, the certificate issuance system encapsulates the parsed user signature public key and its own generated temporary quantum-resistant public key to obtain the text in the CA-KMS communication protocol format. Then, the certificate issuance system digitally signs the text in the CA-KMS communication protocol format using the signature quantum-resistant private key pre-generated by the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext.

[0076] Optionally, by encapsulating the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user's signing public key into text in the CA-KMS communication protocol format through a certificate issuance system, and then digitally signing the CA-KMS communication protocol format text using the certificate issuance system's own quantum-resistant private key, a second protocol ciphertext can be obtained, achieving the following technical effects:

[0077] (1) Ensure the integrity of the protocol message: Digital signatures enable the receiver (such as KMS) to verify that the message has not been tampered with during transmission. Any modification to the message content will result in signature verification failure.

[0078] (2) Authentication of the sender's identity: The receiver uses the quantum-resistant public key known to the certificate issuing system (verified by the pre-exchanged certificate) to verify the signature, confirming that the message does indeed come from a legitimate certificate issuing system, and preventing forgery or man-in-the-middle attacks.

[0079] (3) Establish a quantum-resistant identity authentication chain: Since the signature uses a quantum-resistant algorithm (such as ML-DSA or SLH-DSA), the identity authentication process is still secure in a quantum computing environment, avoiding the risk of failure of traditional RSA / ECDSA signatures under quantum attacks.

[0080] In one optional embodiment, the step of generating the third protocol ciphertext includes: first, encrypting the target private key in the target key pair based on a temporary key using a key management system to obtain the encryption result of the target private key; then, encrypting the encryption result of the target private key based on a temporary quantum-resistant public key using a key management system to obtain the target encryption result; subsequently, encrypting the temporary key based on a user signature public key using a key management system to obtain the encryption result of the temporary key; and finally, encapsulating and digitally signing the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key in the target key pair using a key management system to obtain the third protocol ciphertext.

[0081] Optionally, the key management system encapsulates the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key in the target key pair into response data in the CA-KMS communication protocol format, and uses the key management system's own quantum-resistant private key to digitally sign the response data in the CA-KMS communication protocol format to obtain the third protocol ciphertext.

[0082] Optionally, the above steps achieve dual protection for the target private key in the target key pair through a layered encryption mechanism. Specifically, the key management system first encrypts the target private key using a temporary key (i.e., the SM4 key). Then, it encrypts the encrypted private key again using a temporary quantum-resistant public key (i.e., the ML-KEM public key) provided by the CA. This ensures that even if the SM4 temporary key is leaked, attackers cannot recover the target private key without the corresponding quantum-resistant private key. At the same time, the key management system encrypts the SM4 temporary key itself using the user-signed public key, ensuring that only a trusted user holding the corresponding user-signed private key can decrypt the SM4 temporary key and then decrypt the target private key, thereby further improving the security of the target private key delivery process.

[0083] In one optional embodiment, the steps of generating a target signature certificate, a target encryption certificate, and a target private key encryption result based on a third protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system include: first, verifying the signature of the third protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system; after the third protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, parsing the third protocol ciphertext to obtain the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of a temporary key; then, generating a target signature certificate based on the user's signature public key and a target encryption certificate based on the target public key through a certificate issuance system; and finally, decrypting the target encryption result based on a temporary quantum-resistant private key through a certificate issuance system to obtain the encryption result of the target private key.

[0084] Optionally, after the certificate issuance system receives the third protocol ciphertext, it first uses the quantum-resistant signature certificate of the key management system pre-stored in the certificate issuance system to verify the signature of the third protocol ciphertext, ensuring the integrity and trustworthiness of the communication data. After the digital verification is successful, the certificate issuance system parses the content of the third protocol ciphertext to obtain the SM4+ML-KEM double encryption result of the target public key and target private key applied for by the user (i.e., the target encryption result), as well as the encryption result corresponding to the SM4 temporary key. Subsequently, the certificate issuance system issues a target signature certificate based on the user-provided user signature public key and issues a target encryption certificate based on the target public key returned by KMS, completing the generation of dual certificates. At the same time, the certificate issuance system uses its locally generated temporary quantum-resistant private key to decrypt the SM4+ML-KEM double encryption result of the target private key, recovering the target private key ciphertext encrypted by the SM4 temporary key.

[0085] Optionally, the encryption result of the target private key and the process of obtaining the dual certificates described above can achieve the following technical effects:

[0086] (1) Communication data anti-tampering and identity authentication: The source of the third protocol ciphertext is verified through the anti-quantum signature mechanism to prevent man-in-the-middle from forging or tampering with key application requests.

[0087] (2) Compatible with existing key processing procedures: After decryption, the target private key exists in the form of traditional national cryptographic algorithms (such as SM4 algorithm), without the need to modify the client or terminal system, thus achieving compatibility with the PKI system.

[0088] In one optional embodiment, after generating the encryption results of the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system, firstly, the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key are encapsulated and digitally signed by the certificate issuance system to obtain the fourth protocol ciphertext, and the fourth protocol ciphertext is sent to the registration system. Then, the fourth protocol ciphertext is verified by the registration system. After the fourth protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it is parsed to obtain the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key. Finally, the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key are sent to the user through the registration system.

[0089] Optionally, the certificate issuance system encapsulates the encryption results of the target signature certificate, the target encryption certificate, and the target private key into response data corresponding to the CA-RA communication protocol format, and uses the certificate issuance system's own quantum-resistant private key to digitally sign the response data corresponding to the CA-RA communication protocol format to obtain the fourth protocol ciphertext. Then, after the registration system receives the fourth protocol ciphertext, the registration system verifies the signature of the fourth protocol ciphertext based on the pre-stored quantum-resistant signature certificate of the certificate issuance system.

[0090] Optionally, the steps in the above embodiments ensure that the transmitted return data is not tampered with by encapsulating the encryption results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key in the certificate issuance system and using a quantum-resistant key for integrity protection; the registration system only parses the data after verifying the validity of the signature, preventing illegal or tampered parsing content from entering the system; finally, the registration system securely transmits the parsed certificate and encrypted private key to the user. This process achieves the following technical effects:

[0091] (1) Data integrity guarantee: Through quantum-resistant digital signature verification, it is ensured that the certificate and encryption private key transmitted from CA to RA are not tampered with or forged during the transmission process.

[0092] (2) Trusted identity authentication: Only CAs holding quantum-resistant private keys are allowed to send data to RAs. RAs verify the source of the data by verifying the CA’s quantum-resistant public key certificate.

[0093] (3) Secure distribution: The encrypted private key is always transmitted in ciphertext form and is not decrypted in the middle, which reduces the risk of private key leakage.

[0094] (4) Clear system boundaries: RA only acts as an intermediate forwarding node and does not participate in key generation or decryption, thus reducing the system attack surface.

[0095] In one alternative embodiment, Figure 3 This is a flowchart of an optional dual-certificate application method according to an embodiment of this application, such as... Figure 3 As shown, the method includes:

[0096] (1) The user submits a certificate application form in PKCS10 format in RA.

[0097] (2) The RA extracts the user signature public key submitted by the user from the certificate application, encapsulates it, and obtains the application certificate in the CA-RA communication protocol format. The RA uses the private key corresponding to the quantum-resistant signature certificate (i.e. the quantum-resistant signature private key in the quantum-resistant signature key pair) stored in the RA to sign the entire application certificate in the CA-RA communication protocol format to ensure the integrity of the data and obtain the ciphertext data to be sent to the CA.

[0098] (3) After receiving the ciphertext data sent by RA, CA first uses RA's quantum-resistant signature certificate to verify the signature. After the verification is successful, CA parses the CA-RA communication protocol, obtains the user's signature public key, assembles the application certificate in the CA-KMS communication protocol format, and then applies to KMS for an encryption key pair. CA uses the private key corresponding to the quantum-resistant signature certificate pre-stored in CA to sign the entire application certificate in the CA-KMS communication protocol format to ensure the integrity of the data and obtain the ciphertext data to be sent to KMS.

[0099] (4) After receiving the ciphertext data from the CA, KMS first verifies the signature using the CA's quantum-resistant signature certificate. If the verification is successful, it parses the CA-KMS communication protocol, generates the target key pair, encapsulates the response data in the CA-KMS communication protocol format, and uses the private key corresponding to the quantum-resistant signature certificate pre-stored by KMS to sign the entire returned data, ensuring data integrity. This yields the ciphertext data to be returned to the CA. For detailed application procedures, see [link to application process]. Figure 4 .

[0100] (5) After receiving the ciphertext response data from KMS, CA first uses KMS's quantum-resistant signature certificate to verify the signature. After the verification is successful, CA parses the CA-KMS communication protocol, obtains the target public key in the target key pair and the original user signature public key, issues dual certificates, assembles the response data in the CA-RA communication protocol format, and uses the private key corresponding to the quantum-resistant signature certificate pre-stored by CA to sign the entire response data in the CA-RA communication protocol format to ensure the integrity of the data and obtain the ciphertext data that needs to be returned to RA.

[0101] (6) After receiving the ciphertext response data from the CA, the RA first uses the CA's quantum-resistant signature certificate to verify the signature. After the verification is successful, the RA parses the CA-RA communication protocol, obtains the dual certificates and the encrypted target private key, and returns them to the user.

[0102] In one alternative embodiment, Figure 4 This is a flowchart of an optional target key pair application method according to an embodiment of this application, such as... Figure 4 As shown, the method includes:

[0103] (1) CA requests the target key pair from KMS. First, CA generates a temporary quantum-resistant key pair, assembles the user signature public key and the public key in the temporary quantum-resistant key pair to obtain the application certificate in the CA-KMS communication protocol format, and signs the entire application certificate in the CA-KMS communication protocol format using the private key corresponding to the quantum-resistant signature certificate pre-stored by CA to obtain the ciphertext data to be sent to KMS.

[0104] (2) After receiving the ciphertext data sent by the CA, KMS performs signature verification and parsing operations to obtain the transmitted user signature public key and temporary quantum-resistant public key. KMS generates a target key pair and an SM4 temporary key. Then, it first uses the SM4 temporary key to encrypt the target private key in the target key pair to obtain temporary ciphertext 1 (i.e., the encryption result of the target private key). Then, it uses the transmitted CA's temporary quantum-resistant public key to encrypt temporary ciphertext 1 to obtain the actual ciphertext (i.e., the target encryption result). After that, it uses the user signature public key to encrypt the SM temporary key to obtain the encryption result corresponding to the temporary key. It assembles the target encryption result, the encryption result corresponding to the temporary key, and the target public key to obtain the response data in the CA-KMS communication protocol format and returns it to the CA.

[0105] (3) After the CA receives the response data, it performs verification and parsing operations to obtain the target encryption result, the encryption result corresponding to the temporary key and the target public key. Then, it uses the temporary quantum-resistant private key to decrypt the target encryption result and obtains the ciphertext (i.e., temporary ciphertext 1) corresponding to the target private key protected by the SM4 algorithm. Then, it assembles the temporary ciphertext 1, the target public key and the encryption result corresponding to the temporary key into an encryption key protection structure.

[0106] Optionally, the user information requested in the above communication protocol is set as follows:

[0107] AppUserInfo::= SEQUENCE{

[0108] userCertNo / / User certificate serial number

[0109] userPubKey / / User certificate public key (signing public key)

[0110] notBefore / / Validity period start time

[0111] notAfter / / Expiry date

[0112] username / / Username

[0113] dsCode / / Optional

[0114] extendInfo / / Extended information

[0115] pqcProtectKey PQCProtectKey / / Quantum-resistant protection key

[0116] }

[0117] PQCProtectKey::= SEQUENCE{

[0118] pqcOid OBJECT IDENTIFIER / / Uses the ML-KEM algorithm object identifier as defined in RFC 9935, such as id-alg-ml-kem-512

[0119] subjectPublicKey BIT STRING / / ML-KEM public key data

[0120] }

[0121] Optionally, the steps for parsing the public key according to the above communication protocol include:

[0122] (1) Parse AppUserInfo and obtain the pqcProtectKey data.

[0123] (2) Obtain the pqcOid field in pqcProtectKey to get the corresponding algorithm.

[0124] (3) Obtain the subjectPublicKey field in pqcProtectKey to get the corresponding public key data.

[0125] (4) According to the algorithm, query the BC library (a cryptographic library) based on the public key data to obtain the public key object.

[0126] Example 2

[0127] This application embodiment can also provide a key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks. It should be noted that the key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks in this application embodiment can be used to execute the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks provided in this application embodiment. The following is a description of the key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks provided in this application embodiment.

[0128] According to an embodiment of this application, an apparatus for implementing the above-described key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks is also provided. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of an optional key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks according to an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 5 As shown, the device includes: a first operation unit 501, a second operation unit 502, a third operation unit 503, a fourth operation unit 504, and a fifth operation unit 505.

[0129] Optionally, the first operation unit 501 is used to verify the signature of the first protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system. After the first protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it parses the first protocol ciphertext to obtain the user-submitted user signature public key and generates a temporary quantum-resistant key pair, wherein the temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm; the second operation unit 502 is used to encapsulate and digitally sign the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through a certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext and send the second protocol ciphertext to the key management system; the third operation unit 503 is used to verify the signature of the second protocol ciphertext through the key management system and, in the second protocol ciphertext... After the signature verification, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes a target public key and a target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. The fourth operation unit 504 is used to generate the third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key through the key management system, and send the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system. The fifth operation unit 505 is used to generate the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and the encryption result of the target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system. The encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

[0130] In one optional embodiment, the key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks further includes: a certificate application generation unit, a certificate application parsing unit, and a first protocol ciphertext generation unit.

[0131] Optionally, the certificate application generation unit is used to generate a certificate application in a preset format based on the user's user signature public key and identity information before signing and verifying the first protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system, and to send the certificate application to the registration system; the certificate application parsing unit is used to parse the certificate application through the registration system to obtain the user signature public key; and the first protocol ciphertext generation unit is used to encapsulate and digitally sign the user signature public key through the registration system to obtain the first protocol ciphertext.

[0132] In one optional embodiment, the quantum-resistant key acquisition device further includes: a quantum-resistant key pair generation unit, a signature application generation unit, a quantum-resistant signature certificate issuance unit, and a quantum-resistant signature certificate exchange unit.

[0133] Optionally, the quantum-resistant key pair generation unit is used to generate quantum-resistant key pairs for each of the L systems based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm before generating a certificate application form in a preset format based on the user's user signature public key and identity information. The L systems include at least a certificate issuing system, a registration system, and a key management system. Each quantum-resistant key pair includes a quantum-resistant public key and a quantum-resistant private key. The signature application form generation unit is used to generate a quantum-resistant signature application form for each system based on the quantum-resistant public key for each system, and send the quantum-resistant signature application form for each system to the root certificate issuing system. The quantum-resistant signature certificate issuing unit is used to issue quantum-resistant signature certificates to the corresponding systems through the root certificate issuing system based on each received signature application form. The quantum-resistant signature certificate exchange unit is used to control the exchange of quantum-resistant signature certificates between the certificate issuing system and the registration system, and to control the exchange of quantum-resistant signature certificates between the certificate issuing system and the key management system.

[0134] In an optional embodiment, the first operation unit 501 includes a signature certificate acquisition subunit and a signature verification subunit.

[0135] Optionally, the signature certificate acquisition subunit is used to acquire a first signature certificate through the certificate issuance system, wherein the first signature certificate is a quantum-resistant signature certificate of the registration system obtained through exchange; the signature verification subunit is used to verify the signature of the first protocol ciphertext based on the first signature certificate through the certificate issuance system.

[0136] In one optional embodiment, the second operation unit 502 includes a message encapsulation subunit and a message signing subunit.

[0137] Optionally, the message encapsulation subunit is used to encapsulate the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through the certificate issuance system to obtain the protocol message; the message signing subunit is used to digitally sign the protocol message through the signature quantum-resistant private key corresponding to the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext.

[0138] In one optional embodiment, the fourth operation unit 504 includes: a first encryption subunit, a second encryption subunit, a third encryption subunit, and a data operation subunit.

[0139] Optionally, the first encryption subunit is used to encrypt the target private key in the target key pair based on the temporary key through the key management system to obtain the encryption result of the target private key; the second encryption subunit is used to encrypt the encryption result of the target private key based on the temporary quantum-resistant public key to obtain the target encryption result; the third encryption subunit is used to encrypt the temporary key based on the user signature public key to obtain the encryption result of the temporary key; and the data operation subunit is used to encapsulate and digitally sign the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key in the target key pair through the key management system to obtain the third protocol ciphertext.

[0140] In one optional embodiment, the fifth operation unit 505 includes: a ciphertext verification and parsing subunit, a dual certificate generation subunit, and a decryption subunit.

[0141] Optionally, the ciphertext verification and parsing subunit is used to verify the signature of the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system. After the third protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it is parsed to obtain the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key. The dual certificate generation subunit is used to generate a target signature certificate based on the user's signature public key and a target encryption certificate based on the target public key. The decryption subunit is used to decrypt the target encryption result based on the temporary quantum-resistant private key to obtain the encryption result of the target private key.

[0142] In one optional embodiment, the key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks further includes: a sixth operation unit, a seventh operation unit, and a data return unit.

[0143] Optionally, the sixth operation unit is used to encapsulate and digitally sign the encrypted results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key of the user through the certificate issuance system based on the third protocol ciphertext, thereby obtaining the fourth protocol ciphertext, and sending the fourth protocol ciphertext to the registration system; the seventh operation unit is used to verify the signature of the fourth protocol ciphertext through the registration system, and after the fourth protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, parse the fourth protocol ciphertext to obtain the encrypted results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key; the data return unit is used to send the encrypted results of the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key to the user through the registration system.

[0144] It should be noted that the first operation unit 501, the second operation unit 502, the third operation unit 503, the fourth operation unit 504 and the fifth operation unit 505 mentioned above correspond to steps S101 to S105 in the method embodiment. The instances and application scenarios implemented by the above units and the corresponding steps are the same, but are not limited to the content disclosed in the above embodiment.

[0145] Example 3

[0146] Embodiments of this application can also provide an electronic device. Figure 6 This is a structural block diagram of an electronic device according to an embodiment of this application, such as... Figure 6 As shown, the electronic device includes: one or more ( Figure 6 (Only one is shown) Processor 602, memory 604, memory controller, and peripheral interface, wherein the peripheral interface is connected to the radio frequency module, audio module and display.

[0147] The memory can be used to store software programs and modules, such as the program instructions / modules corresponding to the methods and devices in the embodiments of this application. The processor executes various functional applications and data processing by running the software programs and modules stored in the memory, thereby realizing the above-mentioned key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks.

[0148] The memory may include high-speed random access memory (RAM), and may also include non-volatile memory, such as one or more magnetic storage devices, flash memory, or other non-volatile solid-state memory. In some instances, the memory may further include memory remotely located relative to the processor, which can be connected to the terminal via a network. Examples of such networks include, but are not limited to, the Internet, intranets, local area networks (LANs), mobile communication networks, and combinations thereof.

[0149] The processor can access information and applications stored in memory via a transmission device to execute the following steps: First, the first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified using a certificate issuance system. After the first protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it is parsed to obtain the user-submitted user signature public key and generates a temporary quantum-resistant key pair, which includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm. Second, the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated and digitally signed using the certificate issuance system to obtain a second protocol ciphertext, which is then sent to the key management system. Third, the second protocol ciphertext is signed using the key management system. After the signature verification of the second protocol ciphertext, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user's signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes a target public key and a target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. The key management system generates a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user's signature public key, and sends the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system. The certificate issuance system generates the user's target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and encryption result of the target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext, where the encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

[0150] This application provides a key acquisition scheme resistant to quantum computing attacks. The scheme employs a combined encryption method of quantum-resistant and symmetric keys. It dynamically generates temporary quantum-resistant key pairs through a certificate issuance system and constructs a layered authentication transmission channel in conjunction with the user's signed public key. This achieves the goal of avoiding the risk of exposing private keys in the classical Chinese cryptographic algorithm system during the key application process. This results in the technical effect of being compatible with the decryption structure of the classical Chinese cryptographic algorithm PKI system without modifying the user terminal, thereby solving the technical problem of low key transmission security during the key application process from the certificate issuance system to the key management system.

[0151] Those skilled in the art will understand that Figure 6 The structure shown is for illustrative purposes only. Electronic devices can also be smartphones, tablets, PDAs, mobile internet devices, PADs, and other terminal devices. Figure 6 This does not limit the structure of the aforementioned electronic device. For example, electronic devices may also include components that are more... Figure 6 The more or fewer components shown (such as network interfaces, display devices, etc.), or having the same Figure 6 The different configurations shown.

[0152] Those skilled in the art will understand that all or part of the steps in the various methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by a program instructing the hardware related to the terminal device. The program can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, which may include: flash drive, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), disk or optical disk, etc.

[0153] Example 4

[0154] Embodiments of this application may also provide a storage medium.

[0155] Optionally, in this embodiment of the application, the storage medium can be used to store the program code executed by the key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks provided in the above method embodiment.

[0156] Optionally, in this embodiment, the storage medium may be located in any computer terminal in a group of computer terminals in a computer network, or in any mobile terminal in a group of mobile terminals.

[0157] This application also provides a computer program product that, when executed on a data processing device, is suitable for performing key acquisition method steps resistant to quantum computing attacks.

[0158] The sequence numbers of the embodiments in this application are for descriptive purposes only and do not represent the superiority or inferiority of the embodiments.

[0159] In the above embodiments of this application, the descriptions of each embodiment have different focuses. For parts not described in detail in a certain embodiment, please refer to the relevant descriptions of other embodiments.

[0160] In the several embodiments provided in this application, it should be understood that the disclosed technical content can be implemented in other ways. The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative; for example, the division of units is only a logical functional division, and in actual implementation, there may be other division methods. For example, multiple units or components may be combined or integrated into another system, or some features may be ignored or not executed. Furthermore, the displayed or discussed mutual coupling, direct coupling, or communication connection may be through some interfaces; the indirect coupling or communication connection between units or modules may be electrical or other forms.

[0161] The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate. The components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the units can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0162] Furthermore, the functional units in the various embodiments of this application can be integrated into one processing unit, or each unit can exist physically separately, or two or more units can be integrated into one unit. The integrated unit can be implemented in hardware or as a software functional unit.

[0163] If the integrated unit is implemented as a software functional unit and sold or used as an independent product, it can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application, in essence, or the part that contributes to the prior art, or all or part of the technical solution, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product is stored in a storage medium and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute all or part of the steps of the methods described in the various embodiments of this application. The aforementioned storage medium includes various media capable of storing program code, such as a USB flash drive, read-only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), portable hard drive, magnetic disk, or optical disk.

[0164] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of this application. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principle of this application, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of this application.

Claims

1. A key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks, characterized in that, include: The first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified by the certificate issuance system. After the first protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, the first protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the user-submitted user signature public key and generate a temporary quantum-resistant key pair. The temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm. The temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated and digitally signed by the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext, and the second protocol ciphertext is sent to the key management system. The second protocol ciphertext is signed and verified by the key management system. After the second protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes a target public key and a target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. The key management system generates a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key, and sends the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system. The certificate issuance system generates the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and encryption result of the target private key based on the third protocol ciphertext, wherein the encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

2. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, Before verifying the signature of the first protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system, the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks further includes: A certificate application form in a preset format is generated based on the user's user signature public key and identity information, and the certificate application form is sent to the registration system; The user's signature public key is obtained by parsing the certificate application form through the registration system. The first protocol ciphertext is obtained by encapsulating and digitally signing the user's signature public key through the registration system.

3. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 2, characterized in that, Before generating a certificate application in a preset format based on the user's user signature public key and identity information, the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks further includes: Based on the preset quantum-resistant algorithm, a quantum-resistant signature key pair is generated for each of the L systems, wherein the L systems include at least the certificate issuance system, the registration system, and the key management system, and the quantum-resistant signature key pair includes a quantum-resistant public key and a quantum-resistant private key. Based on the quantum-resistant public key corresponding to each system, a signature application form corresponding to each system is generated, and the signature application form corresponding to each system is sent to the root certificate issuing system; The root certificate issuance system issues quantum-resistant signature certificates to the corresponding systems based on each received signature application. The system controls the certificate issuance system to exchange quantum-resistant signature certificates with the registration system, and also controls the certificate issuance system to exchange quantum-resistant signature certificates with the key management system.

4. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The first protocol ciphertext is signed and verified through a certificate issuance system, including: A first signature certificate is obtained through the certificate issuance system, wherein the first signature certificate is a quantum-resistant signature certificate obtained from the registration system through exchange; The certificate issuance system performs signature verification on the first protocol ciphertext based on the first signature certificate.

5. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated and digitally signed by the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext, which includes: The temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key are encapsulated by the certificate issuance system to obtain a protocol message; The protocol message is digitally signed using the quantum-resistant private key corresponding to the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext.

6. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The key management system generates a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key, including: The key management system encrypts the target private key in the target key pair based on the temporary key to obtain the encryption result of the target private key; The encryption result of the target private key is encrypted using the temporary quantum-resistant public key to obtain the target encryption result; The temporary key is encrypted based on the user's signature public key to obtain the encrypted result of the temporary key; The third protocol ciphertext is obtained by encapsulating and digitally signing the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key in the target key pair through the key management system.

7. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, The certificate issuance system generates the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key for the user based on the third protocol ciphertext, including: The third protocol ciphertext is signed and verified by the certificate issuance system. After the third protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, the third protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the target public key, the target encryption result, and the encryption result of the temporary key. The target signature certificate is generated based on the user's signature public key, and the target encryption certificate is generated based on the target public key; The target encryption result is decrypted based on the temporary quantum-resistant private key to obtain the encryption result of the target private key.

8. The key acquisition method against quantum computing attacks according to claim 1, characterized in that, After generating the target signature certificate, target encryption certificate, and target private key for the user based on the third protocol ciphertext through the certificate issuance system, the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks further includes: The certificate issuance system encapsulates and digitally signs the encryption results of the target signature certificate, the target encryption certificate, and the target private key to obtain the fourth protocol ciphertext, and then sends the fourth protocol ciphertext to the registration system. The fourth protocol ciphertext is signed and verified through the registration system. After the fourth protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, it is parsed to obtain the encryption results of the target signature certificate, the target encryption certificate, and the target private key. The registration system sends the encryption results of the target signature certificate, the target encryption certificate, and the target private key to the user.

9. A key acquisition device resistant to quantum computing attacks, characterized in that, include: The first operation unit is used to verify the signature of the first protocol ciphertext through a certificate issuance system. After the first protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, the first protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the user-submitted user signature public key and generate a temporary quantum-resistant key pair. The temporary quantum-resistant key pair includes a temporary quantum-resistant private key and a temporary quantum-resistant public key generated based on a preset quantum-resistant algorithm. The second operation unit is used to encapsulate and digitally sign the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key through the certificate issuance system to obtain the second protocol ciphertext, and send the second protocol ciphertext to the key management system. The third operation unit is used to perform signature verification on the second protocol ciphertext through the key management system. After the second protocol ciphertext passes the signature verification, the second protocol ciphertext is parsed to obtain the temporary quantum-resistant public key and the user signature public key, and a target key pair and a temporary key are generated. The target key pair includes a target public key and a target private key, and the temporary key is generated based on a preset symmetric encryption algorithm. The fourth operation unit is used to generate a third protocol ciphertext based on the target key pair, the temporary key, the temporary quantum-resistant public key, and the user signature public key through the key management system, and send the third protocol ciphertext to the certificate issuance system; The fifth operation unit is used to generate, through the certificate issuance system, the target signature certificate, the target encryption certificate, and the encryption result of the target private key of the user based on the third protocol ciphertext, wherein the encryption result of the target private key is generated based on the temporary key.

10. An electronic device, characterized in that, It includes one or more processors and a memory, the memory being used to store one or more programs, wherein when the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the one or more processors cause the one or more processors to implement the key acquisition method resistant to quantum computing attacks as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.

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