Method and device for detecting illegal tracking equipment, electronic equipment and storage medium

Abstract

The application relates to a method and device for detecting illegal tracking equipment, electronic equipment and a storage medium. The method comprises the following steps: a vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts a cellular network signal to a surrounding area of a vehicle, wherein the vehicle-mounted virtual base station is constructed by a multi-antenna array arranged on the vehicle, and the cellular network signal is used to enable cellular communication equipment in the surrounding area of the vehicle to access the vehicle-mounted virtual base station; the vehicle-mounted virtual base station receives an uplink signal fed back by the accessed cellular communication equipment, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication equipment to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal; the uplink signal is analyzed, cellular communication equipment that cannot be confirmed as legal is regarded as suspicious equipment, and multi-dimensional features of the suspicious equipment are obtained; and if the multi-dimensional features of the suspicious equipment meet preset illegal tracking equipment determination conditions, the suspicious equipment is preliminarily determined as illegal tracking equipment in the vehicle. The application simplifies the detection process of illegal tracking equipment.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of vehicle safety technology, and in particular to a method, apparatus, electronic device and storage medium for detecting illegal tracking devices. Background Technology

[0002] In the field of vehicle safety and privacy protection, illegal tracking devices have become a significant threat to users' driving safety and personal privacy. These illegal tracking devices typically have built-in cellular communication modules that can continuously upload real-time vehicle location information to third-party terminals via cellular networks, causing security issues such as user location privacy leaks and trip monitoring.

[0003] Current methods for detecting illegal tracking devices primarily rely on professional-grade signal detection equipment. Specialized technicians manually scan vehicles point-by-point at fixed locations to check for abnormal cellular signals inside the vehicle. This method requires specialized personnel to operate the equipment, making the process cumbersome and requiring a high level of expertise. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This application provides a method, apparatus, electronic device, and storage medium for detecting illegal tracking devices, in order to solve the problem of the complexity of the illegal tracking device detection process.

[0005] Firstly, this application provides a method for detecting illegal tracking devices, the method comprising: The vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts cellular network signals to the area surrounding the vehicle. The vehicle-mounted virtual base station is constructed from a multi-antenna array deployed on the vehicle. The cellular network signals are used to enable cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. The vehicle-mounted virtual base station receives uplink signals fed back by connected cellular communication devices, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication device to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal; By analyzing the uplink signals, cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate are identified as suspicious devices, and multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious devices are obtained. If the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions, then the suspicious device is preliminarily determined to be an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

[0006] Optionally, the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions include at least one of the following determination sub-conditions: The signal strength of the suspected device remained within a preset signal strength range during the vehicle's movement; The data transmission frequency of the suspicious device exhibits a periodic reporting characteristic; The communication content of the suspicious device includes location information reporting features; The device identifier of the suspicious device corresponds to a number segment dedicated to the Internet of Things.

[0007] Optionally, after initially determining that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle, the method further includes: The vehicle-mounted virtual base station is controlled to disconnect from the suspicious device, so that the suspicious device can resume communication with the public cellular base station; After detecting a change in the vehicle's location, the suspicious device is accessed again via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station to obtain the multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious device; If a vehicle is detected to have changed location multiple times and then connects to the suspicious device, and the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions, then the suspicious device is ultimately determined to be an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

[0008] Optionally, after initially determining that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle, the method further includes: Based on the signal strength of the illegal tracking device, determine the physical location and relative distance of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle; Based on the physical orientation and the relative distance, the installation location of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle is determined; The installation location of the illegal tracking device is pushed to a preset terminal to prompt the user to check for the illegal tracking device.

[0009] Optionally, by analyzing the uplink signals, cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate are identified as suspicious devices, including: By analyzing the uplink signal, the device identifier of the cellular communication device that has been connected to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station is determined; If the device identifier does not exist in the preset whitelist, the cellular communication device corresponding to the device identifier is determined to be a suspicious device, wherein the preset whitelist records the device identifiers of legitimate cellular communication devices in the vehicle.

[0010] Optionally, the method further includes: The system uses a dynamic learning mechanism to record cellular communication devices that are present in vehicles for extended periods and have no tracking characteristics. The learned device identifier of the cellular communication device is added to the preset whitelist.

[0011] Optionally, the multi-antenna array includes six directional antennas arranged on the left front door, right front door, left rear door, right rear door, front of the vehicle, and rear of the vehicle, with the radiation direction of each antenna in the multi-antenna array pointing towards the interior of the vehicle.

[0012] Secondly, this application provides a detection device for illegal tracking devices, the device comprising: A broadcast module is used to broadcast cellular network signals to the area surrounding the vehicle via an onboard virtual base station, wherein the onboard virtual base station is constructed from a multi-antenna array deployed on the vehicle, and the cellular network signals are used to enable cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the onboard virtual base station. The receiving module is used to receive uplink signals fed back by the connected cellular communication device through the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication device to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal; The analysis module is used to analyze the uplink signal to identify cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate as suspicious devices, and to obtain multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious devices. The determination module is used to initially determine that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle if the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions.

[0013] Thirdly, this application provides an electronic device, comprising: at least one communication interface; at least one bus connected to the at least one communication interface; at least one processor connected to the at least one bus; and at least one memory connected to the at least one bus.

[0014] Fourthly, this application also provides a computer storage medium storing computer-executable instructions for executing the detection method for illegal tracking devices described in any of the preceding claims of this application.

[0015] The technical solutions provided in this application have the following advantages compared with the prior art: This application constructs a vehicle-mounted virtual base station by deploying a multi-antenna array on the vehicle, simulating the signal broadcasting and access management functions of a public cellular base station. When the vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts cellular network signals to the surrounding area, cellular communication devices in the vicinity of the vehicle will respond to the signals and actively connect, subsequently sending uplink interaction signals back to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. By analyzing the uplink signals forwarded by the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, suspicious devices are filtered from the connected cellular communication devices. Multi-dimensional features of the suspicious devices are then extracted and matched against preset criteria for identifying illegal tracking devices. When a match is successful, the suspicious device can be preliminarily identified as an illegal tracking device with the intent to leak privacy and to covertly locate its target. This application relies on a vehicle-mounted virtual base station, eliminating the need for specialized detection instruments and manual operation. It can automatically capture, identify, and determine illegal tracking devices during normal vehicle use, simplifying the detection process and reducing the barrier to entry and operational complexity for ordinary users. Attached Figure Description

[0016] The accompanying drawings, which are incorporated in and form part of this specification, illustrate embodiments consistent with this application and, together with the description, serve to explain the principles of this application.

[0017] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, for those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0018] One or more embodiments are illustrated by way of example with reference numerals in the accompanying drawings. These illustrations do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments. Elements with the same reference numerals in the drawings are denoted as similar elements. Unless otherwise stated, the figures in the drawings are not to be limited by scale.

[0019] Figure 1 A schematic diagram of a detection system for illegal tracking devices provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 A flowchart illustrating a method for detecting illegal tracking devices provided in this application embodiment; Figure 3 A schematic diagram of a multi-antenna array using six antennas; Figure 4 This application provides an overall flowchart for detecting illegal tracking devices. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of a detection device for illegal tracking equipment provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 This is a schematic diagram of the structure of an electronic device provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0020] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this application clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0021] The following disclosure provides numerous different embodiments or examples for implementing various structures of this application. To simplify the disclosure, specific examples of components and arrangements are described below. These are merely examples and are not intended to limit the scope of this application. Furthermore, reference numerals and / or letters may be repeated in different examples. Such repetition is for simplification and clarity and does not in itself indicate a relationship between the various embodiments and / or arrangements discussed.

[0022] To address the complexity of the illegal tracking device detection process mentioned in the background art, this application embodiment actively accesses cellular communication devices around the vehicle via an in-vehicle virtual base station, identifies devices that meet the illegal tracking device criteria as illegal tracking devices, and achieves automatic detection of illegal tracking devices.

[0023] This application embodiment is applied to vehicle safety monitoring, and the application scenarios include, but are not limited to: comprehensive investigation of illegal tracking devices in vehicles such as vehicles used by public figures, private passenger cars, and corporate official vehicles.

[0024] Optionally, in the embodiments of this application, the above-described method for detecting illegal tracking devices can be applied to, for example... Figure 1 The hardware environment comprised of the multi-antenna array 101, the control motherboard 103, and the terminal 105 shown. Figure 1 As shown, the multi-antenna array 101 is used to construct a vehicle-mounted virtual base station and broadcast signals to the vehicle interior and surrounding areas without dead zones, enabling cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the system. The multi-antenna array 101 receives uplink signals from the connected cellular communication devices and forwards them to the control motherboard 103. The control motherboard 103 analyzes the uplink signals, identifies suspicious devices and their multi-dimensional characteristics, and determines the illegal tracking device based on the multi-dimensional characteristic analysis. Finally, it sends the location information of the illegal tracking device to the terminal 105 via wireless communication. The wireless communication includes, but is not limited to, vehicle Ethernet, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and CAN bus. The terminal 105 includes, but is not limited to, a vehicle central control screen, a user's mobile phone, a tablet computer, and a personal computer.

[0025] The following will describe in detail a method for detecting illegal tracking devices provided in this application embodiment, taking its application to a control motherboard as an example, with specific implementation details. Figure 2 As shown, the specific steps are as follows: Step 201: Broadcast cellular network signals to the area surrounding the vehicle via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. The vehicle-mounted virtual base station is constructed from a multi-antenna array deployed on the vehicle. The cellular network signals are used to enable cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. Step 202: Receive uplink signals from connected cellular communication devices via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication device to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal; Step 203: By analyzing the uplink signal, cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate are identified as suspicious devices, and multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious devices are obtained; Step 204: If the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions, then the suspicious device is initially determined to be an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

[0026] In step 201, this application deploys a multi-antenna array on the vehicle. The multi-antenna array consists of multiple cellular communication antennas, each radiating towards the interior space of the vehicle, thus improving the signal reception quality for in-vehicle communication equipment. Simultaneously, the installation position and layout of each antenna are optimized through electromagnetic simulation, ensuring smooth connection and non-overlapping interference between the coverage areas of adjacent antennas, guaranteeing uniform and stable signal coverage across the entire area. The control motherboard has a built-in signal strength detection circuit that can collect and monitor the reception status and signal quality of each antenna in real time. When signal attenuation, interruption, or abnormal fluctuations are detected in a particular antenna, it can automatically switch to a backup processing mode, ensuring that the overall detection process remains uninterrupted and unaffected.

[0027] Driven by the control motherboard, the multi-antenna array broadcasts cellular network signals to the vehicle's interior and surrounding areas in a coordinated manner according to a preset layout, jointly completing the directional transmission and omnidirectional reception of cellular signals. By constructing an all-around, dead-zone-free signal transmission and reception space inside and outside the vehicle, and in conjunction with standard cellular communication protocol processing capabilities, the multi-antenna array forms a vehicle-mounted virtual base station capable of providing signal broadcasting, terminal access, and link management functions. This vehicle-mounted virtual base station can completely simulate the workflow of a public cellular base station, providing standardized and stable access services and communication link establishment capabilities for cellular communication devices around the vehicle, enabling various cellular communication devices to actively respond and connect.

[0028] Multi-antenna arrays can be arranged in various ways. For example, with four antennas, they can be positioned at the four corners of the vehicle (left front, right front, left rear, and right rear), achieving basic signal coverage of the vehicle area while reducing the number of antennas required. With six antennas, they can be positioned at the left front door, right front door, left rear door, right rear door, front of the vehicle, and rear of the vehicle, forming a 360-degree signal coverage area around the vehicle, ensuring that any illegal tracking devices installed anywhere on the vehicle can be effectively detected. With eight antennas, an additional antenna is added to the roof and chassis, improving the three-dimensionality and comprehensiveness of the signal coverage. Furthermore, a rotatable antenna design can be used, with a motor driving the antenna to rotate and scan, enabling signal detection while reducing the number of antennas required. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of a multi-antenna array using six antennas.

[0029] The vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts cellular network signals to the vehicle interior and surrounding areas. These cellular network signals are compatible with multiple cellular communication standards such as 2G, 3G, 4G, 5G, and NB-IoT, and are used to provide accessible communication services to surrounding cellular communication devices, thereby enabling cellular communication devices in the vehicle interior and surrounding areas to actively respond and access the vehicle-mounted virtual base station.

[0030] In step 202, when cellular communication devices around the vehicle receive the cellular network signal broadcast by the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, they will initiate an access request to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station according to the standard cellular communication protocol and complete the access process. After successfully accessing the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, the cellular communication devices will send uplink signals to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station to maintain the communication link and report their own device status. After receiving the uplink signal, the vehicle-mounted virtual base station will forward it to the control board for processing. The uplink signal is the basic interaction signal after the device accesses the system, which can intuitively reflect the device's existence status, communication capabilities, and basic device attributes, facilitating the subsequent identification of the device and extraction of information by the control board.

[0031] In step 203, the control motherboard analyzes and extracts data from the received uplink signal, reconstructing key information such as device identification, signal strength, data transmission frequency, and communication content. Based on the extracted device identification, the control motherboard identifies cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate in-vehicle communication devices or owner-authorized communication devices as suspicious devices. Then, the control motherboard integrates the device identification, signal strength, data transmission frequency, and communication content of the suspicious devices into multi-dimensional features. These multi-dimensional features reflect the actual operating status and communication behavior of the suspicious devices.

[0032] In step 204, the control board matches the multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious device with preset illegal tracking device determination criteria. These criteria are pre-defined overall judgment rules based on the inherent operating characteristics of illegal tracking devices. Since the purpose of illegal tracking devices is to covertly collect vehicle location information and periodically upload it to a third party via cellular networks, their signal characteristics and communication behavior are significantly different from ordinary cellular devices. When the multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious device match the illegal tracking device determination criteria, the control board initially determines that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device with the purpose of privacy leakage and covert positioning.

[0033] This application constructs a vehicle-mounted virtual base station by deploying a multi-antenna array on the vehicle, simulating the signal broadcasting and access management functions of a public cellular base station. When the vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts cellular network signals to the surrounding area, cellular communication devices in the vicinity of the vehicle will respond to the signals and actively connect, subsequently sending uplink interaction signals back to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. By analyzing the uplink signals forwarded by the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, suspicious devices are filtered from the connected cellular communication devices. Multi-dimensional features of the suspicious devices are then extracted and matched against preset criteria for identifying illegal tracking devices. When a match is successful, the suspicious device can be preliminarily identified as an illegal tracking device with the intent to leak privacy and to covertly locate its target. This application relies on a vehicle-mounted virtual base station, eliminating the need for specialized detection instruments and manual operation. It can automatically capture, identify, and determine illegal tracking devices during normal vehicle use, simplifying the detection process and reducing the barrier to entry and operational complexity for ordinary users.

[0034] As an optional implementation, since illegal tracking devices are typically fixed inside vehicles and operate silently for extended periods, they are used to covertly collect real-time vehicle location information and upload the location data to a third-party platform via cellular networks at fixed intervals. Therefore, they are clearly distinguishable from legitimate in-vehicle communication devices in terms of signal strength variations, data transmission patterns, communication content, and device identification types. Based on these characteristics, the pre-defined criteria for determining illegal tracking devices in this application include satisfying at least one of the following sub-conditions: The signal strength of the suspicious device remained within the preset signal strength range while the vehicle was moving. The data transmission frequency of suspicious devices exhibits a periodic reporting characteristic; The communication content of suspicious devices contains location information reporting characteristics; The device identifier of a suspicious device corresponds to a number segment dedicated to the Internet of Things.

[0035] Regarding the first sub-condition, the signal strength of the suspicious device remains within a preset signal strength range while the vehicle is moving. Since illegal tracking devices are typically fixed in a specific location within the vehicle and do not move with personnel entering or exiting, their relative position to the vehicle's antenna array remains stable. Therefore, the signal strength of the illegal tracking device does not fluctuate significantly during vehicle movement, remaining within a stable range; whereas ordinary communication devices experience significant signal strength fluctuations due to personnel carrying them or changes in location. Based on this characteristic, when the signal strength of a suspicious device remains stable for an extended period, it can be determined that it is an illegal tracking device fixedly installed inside the vehicle.

[0036] Regarding the second sub-condition, the suspicious device's data transmission frequency exhibits a periodic reporting characteristic. Illegal tracking devices do not require real-time communication; they only need to upload location data at fixed time intervals, such as every tens of seconds or minutes. Therefore, their data transmission behavior shows a clear periodic pattern. Ordinary communication devices, on the other hand, exhibit random and sudden communication behavior, lacking a fixed periodic reporting pattern. By identifying periodic reporting characteristics, it is possible to effectively distinguish between passively operating illegal tracking devices and actively used legitimate communication devices such as mobile phones.

[0037] Regarding the third sub-condition, the communication content of a suspicious device contains location information reporting characteristics. The core function of an illegal tracking device is to send vehicle location data outwards, and its communication content packets will inevitably contain typical location reporting content such as location information, coordinate information, and trip records. The communication content of ordinary communication devices is mostly conventional data such as voice, web pages, and social media messages, and rarely continuously sends location data packets. Therefore, when location information continuously appears in the communication content, it reflects that the device has tracking and positioning attributes.

[0038] Regarding the fourth sub-condition, the suspicious device's device identifier corresponds to a number segment dedicated to the Internet of Things (IoT). To reduce costs and simplify communication, illegal tracking devices commonly use dedicated IoT SIM cards for data transmission, such as NB-IoT or eMTC. The number segment corresponding to their device identifier is clearly distinguishable from ordinary mobile phone user identification codes; for example, the device identifier might be IMSI (International Mobile Subscriber Identity). While legitimate vehicle-mounted devices may use IoT SIM cards, they are pre-classified as legitimate devices. Therefore, devices using unauthorized IoT SIM card number segments are highly likely to be third-party devices used for covert tracking.

[0039] This application assesses suspicious devices based on four dimensions: signal stability, communication patterns, data content, and device identity, achieving automated identification of illegal tracking devices without manual analysis. This identification method aligns with the actual operating characteristics of illegal tracking devices, effectively improving detection accuracy while avoiding misidentification of legitimate communication devices.

[0040] As an optional implementation, in the complex communication environment of a real vehicle, relying solely on a single detection to determine if a suspicious device meets the criteria for an illegal tracking device is susceptible to factors such as temporary in-vehicle equipment, brief signal anomalies, and external interference, potentially leading to misjudgments and the incorrect identification of legitimate cellular communication devices as illegal tracking devices. To further improve the accuracy and reliability of the detection results and reduce the system's misjudgment rate, this application introduces a secondary verification mechanism after the control motherboard initially determines that a suspicious device is an illegal tracking device within the vehicle. Only when the secondary verification result also meets the criteria for an illegal tracking device is the suspicious device finally confirmed as an illegal tracking device. The secondary verification process includes the following steps: Step S11: Control the vehicle-mounted virtual base station to disconnect the communication connection with the suspicious device, so that the suspicious device can resume communication with the public cellular base station; Step S12: After detecting a change in the vehicle's location, reconnect to the suspicious device via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station and obtain the multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious device; Step S13: If the vehicle changes location multiple times and connects to the suspicious device, and the multi-dimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions, then the suspicious device is finally determined to be an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

[0041] In step S11, the control motherboard sends a link disconnect command to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. Based on this command, the vehicle-mounted virtual base station actively disconnects the established communication connection with the currently suspected device, releasing the communication link resources of the suspected device within the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. This allows the suspected device to return to the search state of the public cellular network and automatically restores normal communication connections with surrounding public cellular base stations. By actively disconnecting the communication link, the vehicle-mounted virtual base station avoids occupying the communication resources of the suspected device for an extended period, providing clean and interference-free detection conditions for subsequent re-access, re-collection of features, and re-evaluation, while ensuring that the normal communication functions of legitimate communication devices are not affected.

[0042] In step S12, the control motherboard obtains the vehicle's current geographical location information in real time through the vehicle's built-in positioning module, continuously monitoring whether the vehicle's location has changed effectively. When it detects that the vehicle has moved to a new location area or that the geographical environment of the vehicle is significantly different from the previous detection location, the control motherboard again drives the onboard virtual base station to broadcast cellular network signals to the surrounding area of ​​the vehicle, causing the suspicious device to re-search for and reconnect to the onboard virtual base station in the new location environment. After the suspicious device completes its reconnection, the control motherboard uses the onboard virtual base station to collect information such as the signal strength, data transmission patterns, communication content, and device identification of the suspicious device again, fully extracting the multi-dimensional features of the suspicious device in the new location and new link state.

[0043] In step S13, the control board matches the newly acquired multidimensional features with the illegal tracking device determination criteria to determine whether the suspicious device's behavior characteristics in the new environment and new link still conform to the inherent attributes of an illegal tracking device. If, after the vehicle changes location multiple times, the results of the re-detection of the suspicious device after each reconnection are consistent with the first result, that is, the multidimensional features of the suspicious device all meet the preset illegal tracking device determination criteria, it indicates that the suspicious device is not a temporarily connected interference device, but a device that is fixedly attached to the vehicle and continuously maintains tracking behavior. The control board finally confirms that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device, completing the accurate identification of the illegal tracking device.

[0044] This application introduces a continuous multiple detection mechanism after location migration, which can eliminate single-shot misjudgments caused by factors such as temporary equipment, signal fluctuations, and environmental interference. This makes the detection results more consistent with the inherent characteristics of illegal tracking devices, which are fixedly installed, move with vehicles, and continuously report their location, thereby improving the accuracy and reliability of illegal tracking device identification. At the same time, actively disconnecting the link and restoring the device's communication with public cellular base stations can avoid interfering with the normal use of legitimate communication devices, balancing detection effectiveness and user communication experience.

[0045] As an optional implementation, step 203, which identifies cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate as suspicious devices by analyzing the uplink signal, includes: analyzing the uplink signal to determine the device identifier of the cellular communication device that has been connected to the vehicle virtual base station; if the device identifier does not exist in the preset whitelist, then the cellular communication device corresponding to the device identifier is determined to be a suspicious device, wherein the preset whitelist records the device identifiers of legitimate cellular communication devices in the vehicle.

[0046] The control board parses and extracts information from the uplink signals forwarded by the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, obtaining the device identifiers of cellular communication devices connected to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. These device identifiers uniquely identify the corresponding cellular communication devices. The control board then matches these device identifiers against a pre-defined whitelist. This whitelist contains pre-recorded device identifiers of authorized cellular communication devices within the vehicle, including the original vehicle communication module and commonly used mobile terminals. If a device identifier is not in the pre-defined whitelist—meaning the cellular communication device is not considered an authorized vehicle device—the control board identifies the corresponding cellular communication device as suspicious, facilitating subsequent multi-dimensional feature analysis and illegal tracking.

[0047] This application filters suspicious devices by comparing device identifiers with a preset whitelist. It can quickly eliminate authorized and legitimate communication devices inside vehicles in the early stages of detection, reduce the number of devices that need to be analyzed later, shorten the overall detection time, and improve the identification efficiency of illegal tracking devices.

[0048] As an optional implementation, the preset whitelist needs to be dynamically updated. The update process of the preset whitelist is as follows: record cellular communication devices that appear in the vehicle for a long time without tracking characteristics through a dynamic learning mechanism; add the device identifier of the learned cellular communication device to the preset whitelist.

[0049] During daily vehicle use, the control board is equipped with a dynamic learning mechanism that runs continuously, constantly monitoring, identifying, and recording the behavior of cellular communication devices connected to the vehicle and in the surrounding area. The dynamic learning mechanism refers to the ability to autonomously identify, filter, and automatically update the whitelist of legitimate devices through preset learning rules and feature judgment logic, without requiring manual configuration or maintenance by the user.

[0050] The dynamic learning mechanism uses the frequency of device appearance and compliance of behavioral characteristics as the judgment dimensions. For the accessed cellular communication devices, it first counts their access frequency and stable appearance duration within a preset learning period. When a device meets the criteria of being stably present within the vehicle's communication coverage area for multiple consecutive driving cycles and having an access frequency that reaches a preset threshold, it is determined to be a device that appears in the vehicle for a long time. Then, the control board continuously extracts the communication behavior characteristics of the device and monitors its signal strength changes, data transmission patterns, communication content, device identification type, and other dimensions at all times. If, after continuous monitoring, the device does not exhibit the four characteristics of continuously stable signal strength, periodic data reporting, reporting location information in communication content, and belonging to the IoT dedicated number segment, then it is determined that the device has no tracking characteristics.

[0051] After the control motherboard learns about a cellular communication device that appears in the vehicle for a long time without tracking characteristics through a dynamic learning mechanism, it determines that the device is legitimate. The control motherboard extracts the device identifier of the cellular communication device and automatically adds it to the preset whitelist, thereby realizing the autonomous learning, dynamic expansion and real-time updating of the whitelist database without the need for manual configuration and maintenance by the user.

[0052] As an optional implementation, after the control board finally determines that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device, it can also perform in-vehicle positioning and location prompts for the illegal tracking device, so that the user can quickly find and remove it. The specific implementation process is as follows: Based on the signal strength of the illegal tracking device, determine the physical location and relative distance of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle; Based on physical location and relative distance, determine the installation location of illegal tracking devices inside the vehicle; The location of the illegally tracked device is pushed to a preset terminal to prompt the user to check for the illegally tracked device.

[0053] The control board receives uplink signals from the illegal tracking device via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, acquires the signal strength values ​​received by each antenna in the multi-antenna array, and compares and calculates the differences in signal strength among the multiple antennas. Because the relative positions of different antennas to the illegal tracking device vary, the received signal strengths exhibit regular differences. Based on these differences, the control board calculates and determines the physical orientation and relative distance of the illegal tracking device relative to the multi-antenna array.

[0054] After obtaining the physical location and relative distance of the illegal tracking device, the control board matches and maps the relative positioning results with the vehicle's preset spatial structure model. Combined with the actual installation position of the multi-antenna array on the vehicle, the relative positioning results are converted into the absolute position inside the vehicle, thereby determining the specific installation area of ​​the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle, such as the door interior, center console, trunk, headliner, or chassis.

[0055] The control board pushes the determined installation location information to the preset terminal through the wireless communication module, prompting the user to check and investigate the corresponding location, and quickly complete the location and removal of illegal tracking devices.

[0056] This application utilizes the signal strength of an in-vehicle virtual base station to locate illegal tracking devices within the vehicle and pushes the location information to the user terminal in real time, eliminating the tedious process of blindly searching and checking every point on the vehicle. This positioning method leverages existing multi-antenna array hardware resources, eliminating the need for additional positioning sensors or detection devices. Without increasing system complexity or cost, it improves the efficiency of detecting illegal tracking devices and further simplifies the user's operation process.

[0057] This application also provides a schematic diagram of the detection process for illegal tracking devices, such as... Figure 4 As shown, it includes the following content.

[0058] Step 401: Multi-antenna array collaboratively constructs vehicle-mounted virtual base station.

[0059] The control motherboard drives multiple cellular antennas to work together to form 360° signal coverage without dead angles inside the vehicle; through protocol simulation and signal broadcasting capabilities, it constructs an in-vehicle virtual base station that can provide access services to the outside world.

[0060] Step 402: The vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts cellular network signals, enabling surrounding cellular communication devices to connect.

[0061] The vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts multi-standard cellular network signals to the inside and outside of the vehicle, attracting various cellular communication devices to actively search, connect, and establish communication links.

[0062] Step 403: Obtain the uplink signal of the connected cellular communication device.

[0063] The connected cellular communication device sends an uplink signal to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. After the vehicle-mounted virtual base station forwards the signal, the control motherboard extracts the device identifier.

[0064] Step 404: Compare the device identifier in the uplink signal with the whitelist to filter out suspicious devices.

[0065] The control board will match the extracted device identifier with a preset whitelist, and devices not in the whitelist will be identified as suspicious devices.

[0066] Step 405: Extract multidimensional features of suspicious devices.

[0067] The control board further analyzes suspicious devices, extracting multi-dimensional features such as signal strength, data transmission frequency, communication content, and device identification.

[0068] Step 406: Based on multi-dimensional features and illegal tracking device determination criteria, it is initially determined to be an illegal tracking device.

[0069] The control board matches multi-dimensional features with the criteria for identifying illegal tracking devices. If the criteria are met, the device is initially identified as an illegal tracking device.

[0070] Step 407: Secondary verification and judgment to finally identify illegal tracking devices.

[0071] The control board actively disconnects from the suspicious device, restoring its communication with the public base station; it reconnects and re-detects after the vehicle's location changes; only after multiple consecutive consistent results are the device finally confirmed as an illegal tracking device.

[0072] Step 408: Locate the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

[0073] The control board calculates the orientation and distance of the illegal tracking device relative to the multi-antenna array based on the signal strength difference of multiple antennas. Combined with the vehicle structure model, it determines the specific installation location of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle. The control board pushes the detection results, device location, and alarm information to the vehicle central control or user terminal through the wireless communication module, prompting the user to remove the illegal tracking device.

[0074] This application also provides a detection system for illegal tracking devices. The system comprises a multi-antenna array module, a control motherboard module, a power management module, and a wireless communication module. These modules work together to detect illegal tracking devices. All modules are integrated into a waterproof and shockproof metal casing, improving the system's durability and reliability in vehicle driving environments. The functions of each module are as follows.

[0075] I. Multi-antenna array module.

[0076] The vehicle is equipped with six cellular signal antennas in a symmetrical six-point layout, providing 360° omnidirectional cellular signal coverage around the vehicle and ensuring effective detection of any illegal tracking devices installed inside the vehicle. Each antenna receives uplink signals from surrounding cellular communication devices and transmits the signals synchronously to the control motherboard module via shielded cables.

[0077] II. Control motherboard module.

[0078] The control motherboard module is the core processing unit of the system. It consists of a high-performance embedded processor, a dedicated signal processing chip, and a high-speed memory. Each component adopts a star topology and is connected to a multi-antenna array to ensure stable and reliable signal transmission.

[0079] A dedicated signal processing chip receives uplink signals from a multi-antenna array module and extracts information such as signal strength, transmission pattern, communication content, and device identification. High-performance embedded processors acquire and extract data from dedicated signal processing chips and execute algorithmic logic such as feature analysis, whitelist comparison, and illegal device determination. High-speed memory is used to store a preset whitelist database and process logs.

[0080] III. Wireless Communication Module.

[0081] The wireless communication module is integrated on the control motherboard and establishes a direct data interaction channel with the high-performance embedded processor. It is used to receive the judgment results, alarm information and device positioning data output by the control motherboard, and synchronously transmit the above data to the vehicle central control system to realize the display of detection results, alarm prompts and location push.

[0082] IV. Power Management Module.

[0083] The power management module connects to the vehicle's power system, providing a stable and compatible operating voltage for the multi-antenna array module, control motherboard module, and wireless communication module. It also features overload protection functions such as overcurrent, overvoltage, and short circuit protection to ensure stable operation of the system in the complex power environment of the vehicle.

[0084] This application also provides a detection device for illegal tracking devices, such as Figure 5 As shown, the device includes: The broadcast module 501 is used to broadcast cellular network signals to the area around the vehicle via an onboard virtual base station. The onboard virtual base station is constructed by a multi-antenna array deployed on the vehicle. The cellular network signals are used to enable cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the onboard virtual base station. The receiving module 502 is used to receive uplink signals fed back by the connected cellular communication devices through the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication devices to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal. Analysis module 503 is used to analyze uplink signals to identify cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate as suspicious devices and to obtain multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious devices. The determination module 504 is used to initially determine that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle if the multi-dimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions.

[0085] Optionally, the determining module 504 is used to determine that a suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle when at least one of the following determination sub-conditions is met: The signal strength of the suspicious device remained within the preset signal strength range while the vehicle was moving. The data transmission frequency of suspicious devices exhibits a periodic reporting characteristic; The communication content of suspicious devices contains location information reporting characteristics; The device identifier of a suspicious device corresponds to a number segment dedicated to the Internet of Things.

[0086] Optionally, the device is also used for: Control the vehicle-mounted virtual base station to disconnect from the communication connection with the suspicious device, so that the suspicious device can resume communication with the public cellular base station; After detecting a change in the vehicle's location, the suspicious device is accessed again via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station to obtain its multi-dimensional characteristics. If a vehicle is detected to have changed location multiple times and then connects to a suspicious device, and the multidimensional characteristics of the suspicious device meet the preset criteria for determining an illegal tracking device, then the suspicious device is preliminarily identified as an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

[0087] Optionally, the device is also used for: Based on the signal strength of the illegal tracking device, determine the physical location and relative distance of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle; Based on physical location and relative distance, determine the installation location of illegal tracking devices inside the vehicle; The location of the illegally tracked device is pushed to a preset terminal to prompt the user to check for the illegally tracked device.

[0088] Optionally, the analysis module 503 is used for: By analyzing the uplink signals, the device identifiers of the cellular communication devices that have been connected to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station are determined. If the device identifier does not exist in the preset whitelist, the cellular communication device corresponding to the device identifier is determined to be a suspicious device. The preset whitelist records the device identifiers of legitimate cellular communication devices in the vehicle.

[0089] Optionally, the device is also used for: The system uses a dynamic learning mechanism to record cellular communication devices that are present in vehicles for extended periods and have no tracking characteristics. Add the learned device identifiers of cellular communication devices to the preset whitelist.

[0090] Optionally, the multi-antenna array includes six directional antennas arranged on the left front door, right front door, left rear door, right rear door, front of the vehicle, and rear of the vehicle, with the radiation direction of each antenna in the multi-antenna array pointing towards the interior of the vehicle.

[0091] like Figure 6 As shown, this application provides an electronic device including a processor 601, a communication interface 602, a memory 603, and a communication bus 604, wherein the processor 601, the communication interface 602, and the memory 603 communicate with each other through the communication bus 604.

[0092] Memory 603 is used to store computer programs.

[0093] In one embodiment of this application, the processor 601, when executing the program stored in the memory 603, implements the illegal tracking device detection method provided in any of the foregoing method embodiments.

[0094] This application also provides a computer-readable storage medium storing a computer program thereon, which, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the illegal tracking device detection method provided in any of the foregoing method embodiments.

[0095] The device embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components shown as units may or may not be physical units; that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of this embodiment according to actual needs.

[0096] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented using software plus a general-purpose hardware platform, or of course, using hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence or the parts that contribute to the related technology, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.

[0097] It should be understood that the terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particular exemplary embodiments only and is not intended to be limiting. Unless the context clearly indicates otherwise, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “described” as used herein may also include the plural forms. The terms “comprising,” “including,” “containing,” and “having” are inclusive and therefore indicate the presence of the stated features, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or combinations thereof. The method steps, processes, and operations described herein are not construed as requiring them to be performed in a particular order described or illustrated unless the order of performance is explicitly indicated. It should also be understood that additional or alternative steps may be used.

[0098] The above description is merely a specific embodiment of this application, enabling those skilled in the art to understand or implement this application. Various modifications to these embodiments will be readily apparent to those skilled in the art, and the general principles defined herein may be implemented in other embodiments without departing from the spirit or scope of this application. Therefore, this application is not to be limited to the embodiments shown herein, but is to be accorded the widest scope consistent with the principles and novel features claimed herein.

Claims

1. A method for detecting illegal tracking devices, characterized in that, The method includes: The vehicle-mounted virtual base station broadcasts cellular network signals to the area surrounding the vehicle. The vehicle-mounted virtual base station is constructed from a multi-antenna array deployed on the vehicle. The cellular network signals are used to enable cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the vehicle-mounted virtual base station. The vehicle-mounted virtual base station receives uplink signals fed back by connected cellular communication devices, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication device to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal; By analyzing the uplink signals, cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate are identified as suspicious devices, and multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious devices are obtained. If the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions, then the suspicious device is preliminarily determined to be an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The preset illegal tracking device determination conditions include at least one of the following determination sub-conditions: The signal strength of the suspected device remained within a preset signal strength range during the vehicle's movement; The data transmission frequency of the suspicious device exhibits a periodic reporting characteristic; The communication content of the suspicious device includes location information reporting features; The device identifier of the suspicious device corresponds to a number segment dedicated to the Internet of Things.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, After initially determining that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle, the method further includes: The vehicle-mounted virtual base station is controlled to disconnect from the suspicious device, so that the suspicious device can resume communication with the public cellular base station; After detecting a change in the vehicle's location, the suspicious device is accessed again via the vehicle-mounted virtual base station to obtain the multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious device; If a vehicle is detected to have changed location multiple times and then connects to the suspicious device, and the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions, then the suspicious device is ultimately determined to be an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, After initially determining that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle, the method further includes: Based on the signal strength of the illegal tracking device, determine the physical location and relative distance of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle; Based on the physical orientation and the relative distance, the installation location of the illegal tracking device inside the vehicle is determined; The installation location of the illegal tracking device is pushed to a preset terminal to prompt the user to check for the illegal tracking device.

5. The method of claim 1, wherein, Analysis of the uplink signals identifies the following cellular communication devices as suspicious devices: By analyzing the uplink signal, the device identifier of the cellular communication device that has been connected to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station is determined; If the device identifier does not exist in the preset whitelist, the cellular communication device corresponding to the device identifier is determined to be a suspicious device, wherein the preset whitelist records the device identifiers of legitimate cellular communication devices in the vehicle.

6. The method of claim 5, wherein, The method further includes: The system uses a dynamic learning mechanism to record cellular communication devices that are present in vehicles for extended periods and have no tracking characteristics. The learned device identifier of the cellular communication device is added to the preset whitelist.

7. The method of claim 1, wherein, The multi-antenna array includes six directional antennas arranged on the left front door, right front door, left rear door, right rear door, front of the vehicle, and rear of the vehicle. The radiation direction of each antenna in the multi-antenna array points towards the interior of the vehicle.

8. A device for detecting illegal tracking equipment, characterized in that The device includes: A broadcast module is used to broadcast cellular network signals to the area surrounding the vehicle via an onboard virtual base station, wherein the onboard virtual base station is constructed from a multi-antenna array deployed on the vehicle, and the cellular network signals are used to enable cellular communication devices around the vehicle to access the onboard virtual base station. The receiving module is used to receive uplink signals fed back by the connected cellular communication device through the vehicle-mounted virtual base station, wherein the uplink signal is a signal sent by the cellular communication device to the vehicle-mounted virtual base station in response to the cellular network signal; The analysis module is used to analyze the uplink signal to identify cellular communication devices that cannot be confirmed as legitimate as suspicious devices, and to obtain multi-dimensional characteristics of the suspicious devices. The determination module is used to initially determine that the suspicious device is an illegal tracking device inside the vehicle if the multidimensional features of the suspicious device meet the preset illegal tracking device determination conditions.

9. An electronic device, comprising: It includes a processor, a communication interface, a memory, and a communication bus, wherein the processor, the communication interface, and the memory communicate with each other through the communication bus; Memory, used to store computer programs; A processor, when executing a program stored in memory, implements the method described in any one of claims 1-7.

10. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, The computer-readable storage medium stores a computer program that, when executed by a processor, implements the method described in any one of claims 1-7.

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