Network security protection methods based on zero-trust architecture

Abstract

This invention relates to a network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, belonging to the field of network information security and communication access control technology. It extracts identity interaction electromyography data and physical channel delay hop count parameters from access requests initiated by clients; uses a weighted convolution algorithm to perform matrix Kronecker product and time-weighted salt value dot product operations on the normalized data to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence; calls a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine to reconstruct heterogeneous access paths and logical ports based on fingerprint hashes and stress loads; and establishes a software-defined network flow table to forward service traffic when the fingerprint matches the permission state matrix. In case of mismatch, the packet header is edited in-situ to silently isolate the traffic to a shadow node, and random file and protocol replacement and reorganization are triggered when the instruction cross-entropy is abnormal. This application eliminates static exposure surfaces and achieves trusted flow across the entire link.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of network information security and communication access control technology, specifically, it relates to a network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture. Background Technology

[0002] As enterprise IT boundaries become increasingly generalized, zero-trust architectures, including software-defined boundaries and identity verification and access management, are widely deployed at gateway nodes. Existing zero-trust network security solutions typically follow a "verify first, connect later" execution logic, with their core protection focus heavily on inbound authentication and static permission table mapping. Once a client completes identity verification using a digital certificate or multi-factor credentials, the gateway usually allows the transport layer control protocol connection directly and routes the access request to a fixed internal virtual private network Internet Protocol address and a preset service listening port.

[0003] However, when faced with complex and ever-changing network penetration surfaces, the static execution logic of existing technologies exposes deep-seated technical limitations. First, pre-authentication mechanisms struggle to continuously address context hijacking during legitimate session cycles. Once a client encounters a man-in-the-middle attack or credential theft after establishing a connection, attackers can directly reuse the established legitimate transport layer channel to launch internal network resource probing. Existing gateway response systems largely rely on out-of-band audit servers to perform offline reassembly analysis of all application layer packets, consuming significant hardware instruction cycles and causing a decline in line-speed forwarding performance. Furthermore, the issuance of blocking commands typically has a lag of several minutes to several hours. Second, the physical exposure surface of internal business systems remains constant over a long period. The application programming interface paths and listening ports of real servers are relatively static in the physical space. Once an external scanner captures the protocol response rules of a specific port, it can continuously launch targeted penetration attacks against that static interface. Moreover, existing architectures often employ static blocking strategies that disconnect TCP connections in their bypass interception branches. This easily leads to false alarms and interruptions of normal business operations due to slight channel disturbances, and the disconnection action immediately exposes the defense intervention status to the attack source. Finally, the existing mechanism lacks end-point control over the plaintext data of services flowing downlink to the terminal's physical memory. After being decrypted at the terminal, the downlink data load usually resides unprotected in user-space memory page frames. If the terminal encounters physical bus sniffing or cross-privilege level memory dump operations, the plaintext data remaining in the terminal's memory is extremely vulnerable to direct theft. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to provide a network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, which solves the problem that existing zero-trust gateways lack continuous dynamic intervention on the physical link environment and read-only memory of the terminal after the session is established, resulting in serious delays and passive leaks in defense when legitimate accounts are hijacked, internal network lateral scanning is performed, and terminal memory data is retained.

[0005] The objective of this invention can be achieved through the following technical solutions:

[0006] A network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, applied to a zero-trust gateway node, includes receiving an access request initiated by a client for a target resource, extracting the visitor's identity credentials from the access request, and performing initial identity verification based on the visitor's identity credentials; the method further includes:

[0007] S1. Extract the dynamic interaction feature array of the client's identity and the physical environment channel state feature array when the client initiates the access request;

[0008] S2. Using a preset weighted convolution algorithm, matrix fusion calculation is performed on the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence.

[0009] S3. Based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource, call the dynamic topology heterogeneous engine to generate target interface mapping rules, and reconstruct the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rules.

[0010] S4. When the real-time logical fingerprint sequence matches the current permission status matrix of the target resource, the traffic of the access request is routed to the target logical interface for business interaction.

[0011] Furthermore, the extraction of the client's dynamic identity interaction feature array and physical environment channel state feature array when initiating the access request includes:

[0012] Collect the key press time interval sequence and touch operation trajectory coordinate stream of the client when initiating the access request, as the original identity interaction data;

[0013] Extract the network latency fluctuation rate, edge node hop count, and data packet arrival time interval when the client establishes a connection with the zero-trust gateway node as the raw physical channel data;

[0014] The original identity interaction data and the original physical channel data are normalized respectively to generate the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array.

[0015] Furthermore, the step of using a preset weighted convolution algorithm to perform matrix fusion calculation on the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence includes:

[0016] The identity dynamic interaction feature array is transformed into a first feature vector, and the physical environment channel state feature array is transformed into a second feature vector;

[0017] Obtain the system timestamp of the zero-trust gateway node, and use a hash function to convert the system timestamp into a time-weighted salt matrix;

[0018] Calculate the Kronecker product of the first eigenvector and the second eigenvector to obtain the fusion matrix;

[0019] The fusion matrix and the time-weighted salt matrix are multiplied by a dot product to output the real-time logical fingerprint sequence.

[0020] Furthermore, after outputting the real-time logical fingerprint sequence, the method further includes:

[0021] Extract the latest keystroke time interval sequence and the latest network latency fluctuation rate of the client according to a preset time period;

[0022] Based on the latest keystroke time interval sequence and the latest network latency volatility, the updated logical fingerprint sequence is recalculated and output, and then the updated logical fingerprint sequence is used to overwrite the real-time logical fingerprint sequence.

[0023] Furthermore, the step of generating target interface mapping rules by invoking the dynamic topology heterogeneous engine based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource includes:

[0024] Query the baseline service registry to obtain the original application programming interface definition data and original port number of the target resource;

[0025] The hash seed is extracted based on the byte features of the real-time logical fingerprint sequence, and the mapping offset step size is determined according to the current load pressure value.

[0026] Using the hash seed and the mapping offset step size as inputs to the pseudo-random number generator, a dynamic routing path sequence and an interface renaming dictionary are generated, and the dynamic routing path sequence and the interface renaming dictionary are used as the target interface mapping rules.

[0027] Furthermore, the step of reconstructing the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rule includes:

[0028] Modify the request path field in the original application programming interface definition data according to the interface renaming dictionary to generate a heterogeneous access path;

[0029] A software-defined network forwarding flow table is established based on the dynamic routing path sequence to map traffic entering and leaving the original port number to the logical port corresponding to the heterogeneous access path;

[0030] The heterogeneous access path and the logical port are encapsulated using a pre-defined dynamic encapsulation protocol to generate the target logical interface.

[0031] Furthermore, the method also includes:

[0032] When the real-time logical fingerprint sequence does not match the current permission status matrix of the target resource, the routing action for the target logical interface is intercepted.

[0033] Read the target resource identifier in the access request, and start the physically isolated shadow container engine to generate a virtual pseudo-shadow node that is isomorphic to the target resource data;

[0034] The access request is seamlessly redirected to the mimicry shadow node for isolation.

[0035] Furthermore, after seamlessly redirecting the access request to the mimicry shadow node for isolation processing, the process also includes:

[0036] Capture the sequence of instructions executed by the client inside the mimicry shadow node;

[0037] Extract the opcode distribution frequency of the instruction detection sequence. When the opcode distribution frequency exceeds the preset threat baseline distribution range, trigger the logical topology reconstruction instruction of the mimicry shadow node.

[0038] According to the logical topology reconstruction instruction, the file system directory and network interconnection protocol inside the mimicry shadow node are randomly replaced and reorganized.

[0039] Furthermore, the process of routing the traffic of the access request to the target logical interface for business interaction also includes:

[0040] Intercept the downlink response data packets returned by the target resource to the client;

[0041] Extract the prefix feature segment of the real-time logical fingerprint sequence as the beacon generation vector;

[0042] The application layer payload of the downlink response data packet is XORed and obfuscated using the beacon generation vector. A time decay counter field is then inserted into the header of the obfuscated data packet to generate a response data packet carrying a logical beacon, which is then sent to the client.

[0043] Furthermore, after sending to the client, the process also includes:

[0044] Receive the beacon acknowledgment data packet returned by the client, the beacon acknowledgment data packet carrying a local check vector independently calculated by the client based on the current local physical environment channel state;

[0045] Compare the Euclidean distance between the beacon generation vector and the local verification vector;

[0046] When the Euclidean distance is greater than a preset distance threshold or the value of the time decay counter field is cleared to zero, a logical destruction command is sent to the client to cause the client to unload the downlink response data packet stored in memory.

[0047] The beneficial effects of this invention are:

[0048] 1. This application utilizes accelerated hardware such as field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) to collect raw interactive electromyographic data from operator key presses and touch inputs, as well as physical channel parameters such as network hop count and latency. It then directly generates a real-time logical fingerprint sequence using matrix Kronecker product and time-weighted salt value interference. This mechanism avoids the drawback of conventional pre-verification losing control after session establishment. The gateway can continuously invoke a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine based on the fingerprint sequence to reconstruct the access path and logical ports of target resources in real time. Through dynamic refreshing of the software-defined network forwarding flow table, the risk of brute-force attacks on the static exposure surface of backend business systems is eliminated, achieving a paradigm shift from static policy table comparison to multi-dimensional spatiotemporal physical entanglement in the admission mechanism.

[0049] 2. To address abnormal connection traffic caused by fingerprint mismatch, this solution abandons the traditional static blocking and reset mechanism. Instead, it utilizes the underlying network processor chip to rewrite the destination Internet Protocol address and port in the packet header at the network control plane. This smoothly diverts suspicious sessions to physically isolated, data-isolated pseudo-shadow nodes without the client's awareness. Simultaneously, it delves down to the micro-instruction execution level to statistically analyze the cross-entropy deviation of the opcode call flow. When the deviation exceeds the limit, a pseudo-random permutation matrix is ​​used in real-time to XOR-shuffle the file system directory and network protocol stack within the shadow node. This method continuously consumes the penetration resources of the threat source while maintaining the survival of external connections, effectively cutting off the lateral movement path within the internal network.

[0050] 3. This application intercepts downlink response data packets in the cloud outbound direction, utilizes the real-time logical fingerprint prefix shared by the cloud and the endpoint as a variable flow key, performs line-rate bit-by-bit modulo-2 addition XOR obfuscation on the pure application layer load, and embeds a time-decay counter header that adaptively adjusts based on server load pressure. On the endpoint, the underlying channel signal-to-noise ratio and bus parameters are periodically and independently collected to generate a local check vector. The gateway monitors the Euclidean geometric distance between the local vector and the generated vector, and proactively dispatches out-of-band logical destruction instructions when channel physical characteristics change abruptly or the countdown reaches zero. The endpoint security process directly calls DoD-compliant overwrite logic to perform multiple rounds of alternating bit overwrite on the target page frame, completely blocking the risk of plaintext scraping and restoration after the terminal is physically controlled or unauthorized data dumping. Attached Figure Description

[0051] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention, the accompanying drawings used in the description of the embodiments will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0052] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of the dynamic access control process for the zero-trust gateway of the present invention.

[0053] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the principle of multidimensional feature entanglement matrix fusion in this invention.

[0054] Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the mimicry shadow trapping and bypass isolation process of the present invention;

[0055] Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram illustrating the principle of intrinsic topology reorganization of shadow nodes in this invention.

[0056] Figure 5 This is a flowchart of the downlink load beacon implantation and self-destruction process of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0057] The technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0058] Example 1

[0059] like Figure 1-2As shown, this embodiment provides a network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, applied to a zero-trust gateway node. The method includes receiving an access request initiated by a client for a target resource, extracting the visitor's identity credentials from the access request, and performing initial identity verification based on the visitor's identity credentials. The method further includes: extracting a dynamic interaction feature array of the client's identity and a physical environment channel state feature array when the client initiates the access request; performing matrix fusion calculation on the dynamic interaction feature array of the identity and the physical environment channel state feature array using a preset weighted convolution algorithm to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence; based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource, calling a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine to generate target interface mapping rules, and reconstructing the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rules; when the real-time logical fingerprint sequence matches the current permission state matrix of the target resource, routing the traffic of the access request to the target logical interface for business interaction. The step of extracting the dynamic interaction feature array of the client's identity and the physical environment channel state feature array when the client initiates the access request includes: collecting the key press time interval sequence and touch operation trajectory coordinate stream when the client initiates the access request as the original identity interaction data; extracting the network latency fluctuation rate, edge node hop count, and data packet arrival time interval when the client establishes a connection with the zero-trust gateway node as the original physical channel data; and performing normalization processing on the original identity interaction data and the original physical channel data respectively to generate the dynamic interaction feature array of the identity and the physical environment channel state feature array. The step of using a preset weighted convolution algorithm to perform matrix fusion calculation on the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence includes: converting the identity dynamic interaction feature array into a first feature vector and the physical environment channel state feature array into a second feature vector; obtaining the system timestamp of the zero-trust gateway node and converting the system timestamp into a time-weighted salt matrix using a hash function; calculating the Kronecker product of the first feature vector and the second feature vector to obtain a fusion matrix; and performing a dot product operation between the fusion matrix and the time-weighted salt matrix to output the real-time logical fingerprint sequence. After outputting the real-time logical fingerprint sequence, the step further includes: extracting the latest keystroke time interval sequence and the latest network latency volatility of the client according to a preset time period; recalculating and outputting an updated logical fingerprint sequence based on the latest keystroke time interval sequence and the latest network latency volatility, and using the updated logical fingerprint sequence to overwrite the real-time logical fingerprint sequence.The step of generating target interface mapping rules by invoking a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource includes: querying the baseline service registry to obtain the original application programming interface definition data and the original port number of the target resource; extracting a hash seed based on the byte features of the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and determining the mapping offset step size based on the current load pressure value; using the hash seed and the mapping offset step size to input a pseudo-random number generator to generate a dynamic routing path sequence and an interface renaming dictionary, and using the dynamic routing path sequence and the interface renaming dictionary as the target interface mapping rules. The step of reconstructing the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rules includes: modifying the request path field in the original application programming interface definition data according to the interface renaming dictionary to generate a heterogeneous access path; establishing a software-defined network forwarding flow table according to the dynamic routing path sequence to map traffic entering and leaving the original port number to the logical port corresponding to the heterogeneous access path; and encapsulating the heterogeneous access path and the logical port using a preset dynamic encapsulation protocol to generate the target logical interface.

[0060] Existing zero-trust gateways typically rely solely on static policy matching at the perimeter. After a legitimate account is hijacked, attackers often exploit the original session context to initiate lateral movement within the internal network. Conventional response mechanisms rely on out-of-band auditing systems to block requests within minutes or even hours, inherently introducing latency. This implementation configures the execution entity as a gateway server equipped with a multi-core CPU and a field-programmable gate array (FPGA) accelerator card. When receiving an access request from a client for a target resource, the gateway server's network interface card receives transport layer data packets. The CPU schedules the kernel protocol stack to read the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) payloads, parses the X.509 format digital certificate or static password string, and compares the SHA-256 hash value with the identity management server's credential database in memory to complete initial identity verification. If only conventional control logic is used, the connection channel is established at this point, but man-in-the-middle attacks or malicious automated scripts can reuse this TCP connection. In this solution, the CPU triggers a low-level deep feature acquisition module via a system call. This module injects a hook at the operating system kernel level, starting the client monitoring process and the gateway-side socket detector. The client-side keyboard filter driver intercepts hardware interrupts and records the absolute system clock difference vector between two consecutive key presses and releases. The display driver layer captures the sequence of two-dimensional Cartesian coordinate points on the screen and the movement time interval when a touch operation occurs, forming the original identity interaction data of microscopic physical operation habits. On the gateway side, the packet capture module of the kernel network protocol stack parses the request message header flowing into the gateway interface, reads the Time to Live (TTL) field in the Internet Protocol header, and calculates the number of hops through edge nodes by subtracting the received TTL value from the baseline initial value. It records the microsecond-level timestamp sequence of the message arriving at the network interface card, calculates the data packet arrival time interval by the first-order difference between adjacent message timestamps, and calculates the network latency fluctuation rate by combining it with the average latency within the historical sliding window, forming the original physical channel data. The data type of the original identity interaction data is an integer microsecond count and coordinate pixel value, while the original physical channel data is a floating-point millisecond-level latency and a short integer hop count. The field-programmable gate array (FPGA) accelerator card receives the above multi-source heterogeneous data streams through the internal high-speed peripheral interconnect standard bus, and loads the data into the on-chip static random access memory (SRAM) by enabling the direct memory access channel. The hardware pipeline module inside the accelerator card performs Min-Max linear mapping operations on the acquired data, synchronously mapping absolute measurement values ​​of different dimensions to a range of values. The real number domain space is used to output the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array, which are scale-discretion eliminated.

[0061] In the core step of feature fusion, conventional vector concatenation or direct weighted summation schemes cannot represent cross-dimensional nonlinear interactions. If simple vector concatenation is used, identity features and channel features are algebraically isolated, allowing attackers to bypass the fusion by simply simulating individual data features. This solution employs a fusion architecture that uses high-dimensional matrix Kronecker product interference with time-weighted salt values. The matrix computation logic unit inside the field-programmable gate array (FPGA) reads the dynamic interaction feature array of identity from the on-chip static random access memory (SRAM) and reconstructs it into a first feature vector in row vector form. Its dimensions are configured as constants. The range of values ​​is limited to A positive integer; simultaneously read the physical environment channel state feature array and reconstruct it into a second feature vector in column vector form. Its dimensions are configured as constants. The range of values ​​is limited to The CPU reads the system motherboard's read-only memory (ROM) real-time clock register to obtain the current absolute microsecond-level system timestamp, which is 64 bits wide. The CPU's internal cryptographic hardware execution engine calls the built-in SHA-256 hardware logic circuit to directly perform a one-way hash operation on the timestamp value, outputting a fixed-width 256-bit hash digest. The system performs cyclic shifting and truncation operations on this 256-bit digest according to the target output space size requirements, reconstructing a matrix with the same dimension in physical memory. Time-weighted salt matrix .

[0062] The values ​​of each element in this salt value matrix are in the floating-point range. The multiply-accumulate logic array configured inside the field-programmable gate array initiates parallel processing logic and executes the first feature vector. With the second eigenvector The Kronecker product operation outputs a space with an expansion dimension of . fusion matrix Fusion Matrix Internal row index is And the column index is The element calculation logic is expressed by the following mathematical formula, where The range of values ​​is the set of positive integers. , The range of values ​​is the set of positive integers. : The Kronecker product operation described above establishes a tensor mapping structure that fully covers the relationship between operational behavior and channel characteristics without losing underlying dimensional information. The multiplier array inside the accelerator card retrieves the fusion matrix stored in the on-chip cache in parallel. With time-weighted salt matrix Perform the Adamas dot product operation on elements at the same coordinate positions to directly output the real-time logical fingerprint sequence. .

[0063] Real-time logical fingerprint sequence internal elements The value of is uniquely determined by the following mathematical formula: The generation of this fingerprint sequence does not employ a complex backpropagation neural network model because neural networks consume excessive CPU instruction cycles during the inference phase, failing to meet the single-packet processing time constraints required by the zero-trust gateway when facing high-concurrency data streams. This solution achieves parameter coupling of identity, channel, and absolute time through hardware-level operations of Kronecker product and pure algebraic matrix dot product. The CPU's internal programmable interrupt controller triggers interrupt requests based on the hardware timer cycle parameters set by the system kernel. Each time an interrupt is triggered, the CPU scheduler hooks the deep feature acquisition module in kernel mode to extract newly generated low-level driver layer measurement data and NIC receive queue indicators from the client, directly transmitting the data block to the accelerator card's input buffer register to re-execute the aforementioned matrix transformation process, generating an updated logical fingerprint sequence. The CPU's memory addressing management unit directly modifies the virtual-to-physical address mapping pointer in the memory control block, pointing it to the starting address of the physical contiguous page containing the updated logical fingerprint sequence, thus achieving a periodic full overwrite of the fingerprint state vector.

[0064] Conventional zero-trust access control issues permissions based on static policy tables. Once the gateway verifies the credentials, it directly forwards the connection to a fixed internal VPN IP address and a preset port number. The drawback of this architecture is that the network topology and application programming interface (API) paths of the internal business systems remain constant in the physical space. Once an external attacker discovers the protocol response mechanism of a specific port through pre-scanning, they can continuously target that exposure surface for penetration. This solution uses a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine that rewrites service interfaces based on fingerprint features. The central processing unit (CPU) uses the target service identifier parsed from the network packet header to query the baseline service registry residing in the gateway's high-speed static cache using the direct memory access controller, reading the original API definition data and original port number configured in the static state for the target resource. The dynamic topology heterogeneous engine directly reads the real-time logical fingerprint sequence. A pre-specified 32-byte data block at a predetermined offset is used as the initialization hash seed. The central processing unit (CPU) monitors the packet inbound and outbound rates in the queue of the gateway server's underlying network interface card driver, and simultaneously uses Simple Network Management Protocol (SMMP) to poll the CPU's runtime status register of the target backend server to obtain the current system load value. Its range of values ​​is defined as the set of constants. The percentage value. The dynamic topology heterogeneous engine uses a preset piecewise linear function to calculate the current mapping offset step size. The mapping logic of piecewise linear functions follows the following mathematical formula, where the constant piecewise critical point is set as follows: :

[0065] Symbols in the formula This indicates the floor function, and the output is the result. The range is limited to positive integers. When the backend server experiences a potential traffic surge or is in a critical denial-of-service state, the mapping offset step size increases in a stepwise manner, directly changing the transition interval of the pseudo-random sequence generation state. The dynamic topology heterogeneous engine uses the extracted 32-byte hash seed to directly load and reset the internal state vector array of the Mason rotation algorithm pseudo-random number generator to map the offset step size. As the step span parameter for the iterative output cycle of the pseudo-random number generator, the generated pseudo-random bitstream is extracted and segmented according to the bit width standard specified in the protocol. This dynamically generates a single-use dynamic routing path sequence and an interface renaming dictionary. The interface renaming dictionary contains a complete mapping rule between the original resource request string and a random-length hexadecimal character sequence. The string processing unit of the central processing unit directly reads this interface renaming dictionary and modifies the Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) request path field in the original application programming interface definition data to the renamed heterogeneous access path.

[0066] The OpenFlow control plane daemon running on the CPU directly reads the aforementioned dynamically generated routing path sequence and converts it into a configuration instruction stream targeting the underlying hardware forwarding table of the programmable switch chip. When generating flow table entries, the control plane directly constructs flow table rules containing exact matching fields for the source Ethernet MAC address, destination Ethernet MAC address, Internet Protocol Version 4 (IPV4) packet source address, destination address, Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) number, and original port number. The matching action attribute is explicitly configured to modify the TCP destination port field in the packet header, rewriting it to a dynamically generated internal private logical port value. The CPU directly sends the updated flow table configuration to the dedicated application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC) switch chip integrated within the gateway via the high-speed peripheral bus interface. After this flow table mechanism takes effect, data packets directly accessing the original port number are discarded in the hardware ingress buffer pool by the ASIC switch chip's default discard rule because they cannot match the flow table forwarding action. For legitimate service traffic routed to the private logical port, the gateway server's underlying tunnel encapsulation engine performs network layer reconstruction on the generated heterogeneous access paths and logical ports. The encapsulation engine appends a tunnel header using a generic routing encapsulation protocol to the original transport layer payload message, constructing the target logical interface. After completing the heterogeneous topology rewriting, the CPU's access control daemon retrieves the current permission state matrix of the target resource stored in a protected read-only memory area. This matrix stores fingerprint feature reference vectors representing the admission requirements of the logical interface at different security levels. The CPU's internal floating-point unit directly calls internal instructions to calculate the real-time logical fingerprint sequence. Euclidean distance measure with the preset reference vector in the current permission state matrix Distance calculation strictly follows the following mathematical formula, where This represents the first row of a real-time logical fingerprint sequence after it has been expanded into a one-dimensional row vector. Each element value This represents the first position in the reference vector. There are 1 reference value, with a total dimension length of 1. :

[0067] Controller determines distance measurement Does the value of satisfy the preset inequality judgment condition? Among them, the determination threshold The value is set to a fixed positive real constant. If the above condition is met, the central processing unit issues a direct forwarding instruction, and the underlying switching plane directly introduces the data stream of the session connection into the target logical interface based on the updated OpenFlow flow table entries, establishing a low-level communication link with the backend real physical server cluster. The entire process utilizes physical hardware-level tensor transformation mechanisms and OpenFlow flow table rewriting actions to establish dynamic access logic, eliminating the long-term security risks exposed by static network configuration.

[0068] Example 2

[0069] like Figure 3-4 As shown, this embodiment provides a network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, applied to a zero-trust gateway node. The method includes receiving an access request initiated by a client for a target resource, extracting the visitor's identity credentials from the access request, and performing initial identity verification based on the visitor's identity credentials. The method further includes: extracting a dynamic interaction feature array of the client's identity and a physical environment channel state feature array when the client initiates the access request; performing matrix fusion calculation on the dynamic interaction feature array of the identity and the physical environment channel state feature array using a preset weighted convolution algorithm to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence; based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource, calling a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine to generate target interface mapping rules, and reconstructing the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rules; when the real-time logical fingerprint sequence matches the current permission state matrix of the target resource, routing the traffic of the access request to the target logical interface for business interaction. The method further includes: intercepting routing actions for the target logical interface when the real-time logical fingerprint sequence does not match the current permission state matrix of the target resource; reading the target resource identifier in the access request and starting a physically isolated shadow container engine to generate a virtual mimicry shadow node that is isomorphic to the target resource data; and seamlessly redirecting the access request to the mimicry shadow node for isolation processing. After seamlessly redirecting the access request to the mimicry shadow node for isolation processing, the method further includes: capturing the instruction probe sequence executed by the client inside the mimicry shadow node; extracting the opcode distribution frequency of the instruction probe sequence; and triggering a logical topology reconstruction instruction for the mimicry shadow node when the opcode distribution frequency exceeds a preset threat baseline distribution range; and randomly permuting and reorganizing the file system directory and network interconnection protocol inside the mimicry shadow node according to the logical topology reconstruction instruction.

[0070] Current mainstream zero-trust security gateways, when handling multi-factor credential verification edge requests, are limited by the static transport layer connection reset mechanism in their execution logic. Directly returning a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) RST reset message to the initiator generates a very high proportion of false alarms and service interruption events. Upon receiving the network layer disconnection command, the initiator immediately detects the intervention of the defense strategy, then replaces the host proxy node and adjusts the penetration script to re-initiate the connection attempt. This implementation, as a bypass defense closed loop for the mainline service access control branch, uses a gateway physical server with an integrated multi-core CPU with a clock speed of 2.5GHz to 3.8GHz, an Intel VT-x hardware virtualization underlying instruction set unit, and a network processor chip with an independent direct memory access control unit. The client-initiated request message completes the TCP three-way handshake to establish a connection. The gateway CPU schedules the operating system kernel network stack to verify the static password credentials or digital signature carried by the request. The system then triggers multi-source physical channel feature extraction logic and a dynamic heterogeneous routing control module in parallel.

[0071] The gateway's central processing unit reads and records an array of dynamic interaction features related to the identity of the user, covering the absolute clock cycle from button press to release, as well as an array of physical environment channel state features containing lifetime difference, hop count, and nanosecond-level time intervals. This data is then fed into a hardware multiplier-accumulator via the motherboard bus channel to perform Kronecker product tensor expansion operations. The output space mapping dimension is configured as follows: The real-time logical fingerprint sequence is generated. The central processing unit (CPU) addresses the non-volatile memory area within the external solid-state storage medium, extracts the current permission state matrix representing the boundary benchmark of legitimate business behavior, and calls the internal floating-point arithmetic unit to perform Euclidean geometric spatial distance measurement calculations. If the measured fingerprint feature coordinates deviate from the minimum boundary value of the reference state matrix by more than the constant-set security threshold, the system determines that the fingerprint sequence and the permission matrix state are mismatched. At this time, the packet processing core in the CPU skips the normal action of sending a connection reset frame to the external network card queue, and uses the internal integrated circuit bus control channel to forcibly write a special hardware policy with the action flag set to drop forwarding into the inbound routing lookup table of the programmable network processor chip, silently severing the default underlying forwarding link from the ingress physical network card to the business logic isolation area for this session.

[0072] This solution faces an engineering trade-off between the latency of trap environment construction and the fidelity of fingerprint simulation in the technical implementation of seamless traffic separation and isolation of business sessions. Conventional architectures often use a dedicated Linux virtual machine pre-deployed behind a physical bypass switch as a fixed honeypot server. The dedicated virtual machine and the production host are usually on different network segments, and the increased round-trip time latency introduced by cross-segment forwarding often exceeds 15 milliseconds. Furthermore, differences in the compilation parameters between the dedicated virtual machine's operating system kernel and the business node can cause nanosecond-level deviations in system call response times. Advanced persistent penetration scripts have the capability to measure packet round-trip latency and probe Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) option fingerprints. Upon detecting environmental parameter drift, they will actively deregister the current transport layer socket and terminate sniffing. Existing gateway devices are limited by the interrupt handling bottlenecks of gigabit network cards and central processing units. If application-layer software proxies are used for protocol remapping, data packets undergo layer-by-layer encapsulation and decapsulation through sockets, resulting in a discontinuous recalculation of the sequence number and acknowledgment number in the TCP header. Consequently, the fingerprint traces left by proxy intervention cannot be eliminated. This solution bypasses the conventional out-of-band honeypot architecture. The shadow container engine runs directly in the gateway host kernel layer by mounting the host machine's hardware-level virtualization management module. The central processing unit extracts the target resource identifier from the Hypertext Transfer Protocol request header of the intercepted inbound message and reads the underlying file system snapshot and dependent library image file that are completely identical to the production system corresponding to the target resource identifier through local read-only storage media mapping on the host machine.

[0073] The shadow container engine invokes the Linux kernel-level namespace isolation mechanism and control group physical resource quota interface to generate a pseudo-shadow node with microsecond-level startup overhead within the gateway's local reserved memory space. To eliminate the characteristics of an idle system at the data content level, the shadow container engine uses a built-in data generation module to read the table structure definition description file of the original production system's structured storage engine. This module, based on data anonymization logic, calls a chaotic mapping function to generate forged encrypted data blocks that conform to the original data constraint types and record counts but exclude genuine business attributes. These blocks are dynamically mounted to the shadow node's database instance buffer pool, completing the bidirectional isomorphic masquerading between the physical storage surface and the data interaction surface. The specific implementation steps for redirecting information flows are executed using the high-speed packet editing engine within the programmable network processor chip. The network processor chip identifies and matches the source medium access control address and transport layer source port number of the client to be isolated, bypassing the central processing unit's protocol stack unpacking logic and performing in-situ frame modification on the hardware forwarding plane. While maintaining Internet Protocol header verification and preventing bit flipping, the hardware arithmetic unit reads the mask register and directly performs bitwise AND and OR operations on the destination Internet Protocol address and destination port number fields in the packet header to rewrite them. This rewrites the physical network layer address pointing to the real resource to the isolated Internet Protocol address and random dynamic listening port requested by the mimicry shadow node on the internal bridge device. Without any reassembly or interruption in the packet transmission sequence, the client is smoothly diverted to a bypass isolation container space to continue its probing requests. After the client data stream is fully guided into the mimicry shadow node, the system's security defenses shift directly to real-time behavioral detection of unknown binary vulnerability exploit payloads.

[0074] Traditional border gateways integrate antivirus scanning engines based on static rule bases. Their underlying processing mechanism obtains the complete binary data payload through streaming file reconstruction, calculates MD5 or SHA-256 hash features, and then performs string searches in the local blacklist database. However, against advanced penetration code employing AES dynamic encryption algorithms or dynamic polymorphic shell obfuscation, static feature extraction logic becomes completely ineffective. If the system performs deep file reconstruction analysis on each data packet stream, it will cause a precipitous drop in the overall forwarding throughput of the gateway. This solution abandons the feature detection paradigm based on static file reconstruction and penetrates the monitoring layer to the micro-instruction execution space of the operating system kernel. The central processing unit (CPU) calls a kernel-level behavior auditing module resident in the underlying virtual machine monitor module of the shadow node through the host kernel interface. This module relies on the enhanced Berkeley packet filter framework and dynamically inserts probes at the system call entry table and core kernel function pointers of the shadow operating system to capture in real time all micro-machine instruction streams dispatched to the CPU by the client agent process during runtime.

[0075] The system categorizes the instruction set according to its functional attributes into instruction sets including arithmetic instructions, addressing and jumping instructions, and privileged memory access instructions. A standardized basic opcode type, wherein the total number of categories is limited to a constant. The cache analyzer inside the central processing unit intercepts the continuous instruction stream captured by the probe, and processes it at a fixed time interval. Using milliseconds as the sliding sampling window, the absolute number of calls for each type of standardized opcode within the current sliding window is counted in real time, and then divided by the total number of instructions to calculate the measured vector of opcode distribution frequency. The measured vector inside the first... The elements are denoted as the measured probability parameters. Its value range is strictly normalized to the real number interval. And it satisfies the full probability summation constraint.

[0076] The system is pre-configured with a baseline vector for the frequency of normal business operation codes at the factory. The first of the vectors Each element is denoted as the baseline reference probability parameter. Its value range is also... The baseline vector is fitted by the distribution parameters of the underlying instruction calls accumulated by the real production system running standard business logic such as web access and database read and write over a long period of time without external interference. It represents the probability topology of the underlying micro-instruction execution when the host system is in a healthy steady state.

[0077] After capturing the real-time opcode call data, the hardware floating-point unit inside the central processing unit initiates the cross-entropy deviation measurement. The evaluation calculation is as follows. The physical meaning of this index is used to measure the divergence deviation of the probability distribution of the currently intercepted unknown instruction sequence relative to the system's normal steady-state execution logic. The specific calculation steps directly call the hardware logarithmic multiplier logic circuit, and the operation process strictly follows the following mathematical formula:

[0078] In the formula It is a natural logarithm function. When a legitimate user performs normal page browsing operations, the instruction set calls are mainly concentrated in the range of ordinary memory addressing and standard network socket read / write opcodes. The calculated cross-entropy deviation measure is... It maintains low fluctuations within a small constant range. When an attacker, redirected to a shadow node, attempts to perform malicious lateral movement using automated payloads such as kernel stack overflow exploration, arbitrary address writing, or high-frequency non-standard interrupt calls, the measured probability parameter corresponding to the low-frequency privileged opcode... It will rise sharply, causing the deviation measure to increase. The values ​​exhibit an exponential surge trend. The comparator gate array of the central processing unit outputs the deviation measure in real time. With respect to the safety critical deviation threshold constant stored in the read-only protection register Perform high-frequency comparison at the hardware clock level. The value range of this threshold constant is limited in practical configurations. When the comparison circuit outputs a high-level signal confirming that the relational expression is satisfied... When the system determines that the current operation command distribution of the client has completely broken through the threat baseline distribution range, it triggers the host control bus of the gateway central processor to directly dispatch logical topology reconstruction commands to the underlying container guardian of the target mimicry shadow node.

[0079] Upon receiving a logical topology reconfiguration command, the shadow container execution environment enters a self-evolutionary reshaping phase. Existing dynamic defense architectures often employ a coarse-grained update strategy of fully restarting container instances, i.e., forcibly destroying the old container and launching a new clean node. This implementation method forcibly closes the socket connections established by the client at the moment of destroying the old instance. If the penetration script detects the pipeline rupture, it will immediately stop activity and go into hibernation, thus the system loses its ability to continuously capture the characteristics of subsequent high-order attack payloads. This solution adopts an internal configuration dynamic replacement and reorganization mechanism that maintains the continuous connection of the underlying physical sockets.

[0080] The instruction scheduling module inside the central processing unit captures the reconstruction trigger signal and extracts the cross-entropy deviation metric generated at the trigger moment. The low-order floating-point mantissa sequence is used as the initial seed for the pseudo-random number generator to generate a confusion permutation matrix used to drive the internal topology shuffling. During the file system directory reconstruction phase, the shadow host's underlying storage driver directly intercepts the container's addressing operations pointing to the virtual file system. By modifying the virtual-physical mapping table between the directory entries of the underlying virtual file system level and the physical storage block index nodes in real time, it renames the default system dependency library mount points, executable program storage paths, and other system-level directory paths to randomly generated fixed-length hexadecimal hash strings, and simultaneously modifies the system environment variable pointer configuration values ​​for the system dynamic linker to find runtime libraries. During the network interconnection protocol reorganization phase, the shadow node's underlying network interface stack controller hooks into the internal message processing flow of the virtual Ethernet card, using a hardware acceleration module to perform real-time XOR bitwise operations on the internal virtual port number bound to the current container listening service and the upper-layer network application layer protocol header.

[0081] The above execution process ensures the client maintains normal responses to the underlying Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) keep-alive messages, guaranteeing uninterrupted external physical connection channels. Because the container's internal file system structure and network access interfaces have undergone deep refactoring, the sensitive file relative path pointers, memory handle variables, and local service open topology lists collected by attackers using directory traversal techniques all become invalid within milliseconds. When malicious scripts continue to initiate privileged file calls or internal port connection probes based on outdated topology parameters, their issued instructions are directly thrown by the container's virtualization layer as a low-level segmentation fault exception with no corresponding mapped path, successfully locking the threat source into a continuously collapsing pseudo-space where it consumes ineffective resources.

[0082] Example 3

[0083] like Figure 5 As shown, this embodiment provides a network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, applied to a zero-trust gateway node. The method includes receiving an access request from a client for a target resource, extracting the visitor's identity credentials from the access request, and performing initial identity verification based on the visitor's identity credentials. The method further includes: extracting a dynamic interaction feature array of the client's identity and a physical environment channel state feature array when the client initiates the access request; performing matrix fusion calculation on the dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array using a preset weighted convolution algorithm to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence; based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource, calling a dynamic topology heterogeneous engine to generate target interface mapping rules, and reconstructing the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rules; when the real-time logical fingerprint sequence matches the current permission state matrix of the target resource, routing the traffic of the access request to the target logical interface for business interaction. The method further includes: intercepting the downlink response data packet returned by the target resource to the client; extracting the prefix feature segment of the real-time logical fingerprint sequence as a beacon generation vector; using the beacon generation vector to perform XOR obfuscation calculation on the application layer load of the downlink response data packet, and inserting a time decay counter field into the header of the obfuscated data packet to generate a response data packet carrying a logical beacon and sending it to the client. After sending it to the client, the method further includes: receiving a beacon acknowledgment data packet returned by the client, the beacon acknowledgment data packet carrying a local check vector independently calculated by the client based on the current local physical environment channel state; comparing the Euclidean distance between the beacon generation vector and the local check vector; when the Euclidean distance is greater than a preset distance threshold or the value of the time decay counter field is cleared to zero, issuing a logical destruction command to the client to cause the client to unload the downlink response data packet stored in memory.

[0084] In a conventional zero-trust gateway's unidirectional control architecture, after the client passes inbound verification and establishes a transport layer session, the response load for downlink traffic to the terminal's physical memory only provides standard transport layer security protocol link-level encryption and decryption. Decrypted downlink plaintext data resides directly in the user-space memory page frame of the terminal's operating system. If, during session maintenance, an attacker uses a local physical bus mounting tool to steal control, or a malicious Trojan directly bypasses privilege levels to dump physical memory via the / dev / mem interface, the plaintext data residing in the volatile storage unit will be completely read. This implementation, as the final execution link managing the downlink data lifecycle in the complete protection architecture, uses a gateway hardware platform with a 64-bit RISC multi-core CPU configured with a clock frequency of 2.8GHz to 4.0GHz, an integrated dedicated programmable hardware XOR gate stream processing array, and an external independent hardware deep packet inspection engine. The gateway's central processing unit (CPU) schedules the system kernel network stack to receive the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection establishment payload, completes digital credential verification, and calls the pre-processor to output a real-time logical fingerprint sequence that integrates identity EMG parameters and network layer latency hop count, as well as the heterogeneous target logical interface. During the execution cycle of matching the target resource access permission state matrix and introducing the service request into the heterogeneous interface, the downlink packet interference scheduler within the CPU simultaneously initiates logical beacon obfuscation and end-side self-destruct control services.

[0085] The current industry practice for protecting terminal memory data involves forcibly delivering and silently loading a heavyweight file system and clipboard isolation driver at the Windows WFP (Windows Filtering Platform) level to the client. Existing mainstream operating systems (such as Android 14, iOS 17, and Windows 11 kernel isolation mode) forcibly reject the loading of external binary files that are not Microsoft WHQL certified or signed by third-party kernel-level drivers, resulting in a high failure rate for third-party isolation driver installation. These sandbox drivers operate at the standard filtering layer of the operating system kernel and cannot effectively intercept cross-privilege level dumping and theft behaviors that exploit zero-day privilege escalation vulnerabilities to directly manipulate the CPU memory management unit or initiate direct memory access reads. This solution abandons the global intrusive control strategy targeting the client's operating system kernel permissions and adopts a technical approach that embeds dynamic beacon genes within the application layer load.

[0086] The gateway's central processing unit directly issues internal control commands to drive the external hardware deep packet inspection engine to forcibly intercept all downlink application layer service response data packets returned to the client by the backend service cluster along the physical switching gateway by attaching packet sniffing pointers to the NF_INET_POST_ROUTING hook point in the host operating system kernel.

[0087] Achieving a line-speed encryption / decryption mechanism that integrates the real-time spatiotemporal entanglement of downlink streaming load and edge-cloud physical channel states faces a profound contradiction between encryption / decryption throughput latency and the risk of static key retention in terminal memory. This implementation presents the downlink processing logic in a lengthy and detailed manner. Conventional data leakage prevention schemes, after intercepting downlink load, often use the standard AES-256 symmetric encryption algorithm to perform secondary encapsulation on application layer data. This scheme requires the client daemon process to hold the corresponding decryption symmetric key in a local static buffer for an extended period. Attackers can extract the plaintext decryption key residing in memory simply by using a local kernel-level privilege escalation script to call the ptrace system call or read the process's / proc / [pid] / mem space. If an elliptic curve-based asymmetric encryption / decryption algorithm is used to process each packet of downlink streaming data, the arithmetic logic units of the gateway and terminal-side central processing units will incur extremely high instruction execution overhead due to high-frequency large number modular exponentiation operations. The average forwarding time per packet often exceeds 120 milliseconds, which cannot meet the high-concurrency throughput requirements of gigabit-level backbone gateways with millions of data packets per second. This scheme utilizes real-time updated edge-cloud shared physical fingerprint features as encryption and decryption parameters for variable pseudo-random streams without preset states.

[0088] The gateway's central processing unit (CPU) directly extracts the real-time logical fingerprint sequence bound to the current session cycle using the on-chip cache controller. It reads the continuous static bit stream from the absolute starting physical address offset zero in the sequence through the built-in bit truncation logic circuit, and directly outputs the beacon generation vector dedicated to downlink load XOR obfuscation. Beacon generation vector The total bit width is configured as a static system constant parameter. In practice, the value of the engineering is limited to Bit. The hardware parser inside the hardware deep packet inspection engine captures downlink data packets, directly stripping the Ethernet data link layer frame header, the 20-byte fixed Internet Protocol (IP) header, and the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) header, outputting the pure application layer payload data block carried internally. .

[0089] The deep packet inspection engine utilizes a high-speed internal direct memory access channel directly connected to a dedicated programmable hardware XOR gate stream processing array to continuously feed application-layer payload data blocks into the XOR processing pipeline. The control logic within the stream processing array automatically obtains the total byte length of the application-layer payload data block and generates a vector width based on the beacon. Perform equidistant cutting, breaking down the data into multiple fixed-length blocks; for those at the end whose length is not divisible by the bit width... For the remaining data segments, the array controller calls the built-in Mason swivel pseudo-random bit generator to output a stream of bytes with no specific business logic, and performs end-of-data padding and alignment according to the PKCS#7 specification. The XOR stream processing array integrates... Parallel XOR logic gates directly address and retrieve beacon generation vectors The internal bit array is divided into blocks of application layer payload data that are sequentially fed into the register array in time. The physical corresponding bits perform pure hardware cycle bit-by-bit modulo-2 addition logic calculations, outputting obfuscated load blocks with extremely high ciphertext entropy values ​​that cannot be deduced through frequency analysis at line speed. Where positive integer subscripts This represents the order in which each data block enters the computation pipeline. Within a single block, the index starts from the beginning position... The output result of each bit is uniquely determined by the following algebraic Boolean logic expression, where the operator... For standard bitwise XOR operation logic, parameters The range of values ​​for is limited to the set of integers. :

[0090] This XOR obfuscation mapping mechanism physically binds the data payload to the microscopic dynamic fingerprint of the current communication cycle, completely avoiding the physical vulnerability of long-term fixed storage of keys on the endpoint. After completing the batch XOR reconstruction of application layer payload blocks, the protocol reassembly core of the gateway's central processing unit forcibly writes an 8-byte custom protocol extension prefix at the very beginning of the packaged obfuscated payload application layer message. This prefix is ​​used to load the time decay counter field of the control endpoint's lifecycle. The counter field is assembled from two completely independent data structures: the high-order 4 bytes carry the absolute second-level timestamp captured by the gateway motherboard hardware clock at the time of obfuscation, and the low-order 4 bytes carry the maximum number of clock ticks assigned by the system to allow the packet to survive in the receiver's volatile memory medium. Total number of ticks in the limiting period. The initial value assigned is controlled by the current load pressure of the target backend resources. Dynamic reverse linear compensation calculation. When monitoring detects that the number of concurrent connections handled by the backend core database server cluster is approaching the threshold or is undergoing large-scale abnormal credential replay detection, the gateway must proactively reduce the time window during which output data is exposed within the memory of uncontrollable remote nodes. The arithmetic calculation unit inside the central processing unit reads the real-time updated percentage load pressure value. (The range of values ​​is) Substituting into the following algebraic formula generates The initial integer value, the upper limit parameter of the static dwell reference in the formula is configured as follows: The environmental compensation ratio coefficient is configured as a constant. :

[0091] The formula calculation result, after being rounded down, outputs a valid positive integer count value. The complete data body, carrying a custom attenuation prefix and XOR obfuscation application load, is returned to the operating system kernel protocol stack for layer-by-layer encapsulation of standard transport and network layer verification header parameters. Finally, a response data packet carrying a logical beacon is generated and sent outbound to the corresponding client via the physical network interface card. A lightweight zero-trust proxy process embedded within the client device system intercepts the downlink response message at the underlying socket layer, parses and reads the time attenuation counter field contained in the header, and directly loads it into the system kernel's high-precision timer polling list to start a decrementing countdown. Addressing the monitoring limitations of conventional zero-trust management systems that fall into a security black hole after the client disconnects from the external network, this solution constructs an active verification and forced memory erasure mechanism based on continuous differential comparison of bidirectional channel dynamic parameters. A background channel environment verification daemon process mounted inside the gateway's central processing unit opens an independent transmission control protocol port and continuously waits to receive encrypted beacon confirmation data packets from the client according to the system's set 10-second heartbeat clock cycle. If a client operator attempts to disconnect the continuous audit link to the cloud by physically disconnecting the network twisted-pair cable or forcibly shutting down the wireless fidelity adapter through the operating system interface after obtaining critical response data, and the gateway-side daemon fails to capture the heartbeat liveness frame of the corresponding session for three consecutive sampling cycles, the hardware directly determines that the communication link has experienced an untrusted state change and immediately cuts off the key maintenance entry mapping for that connection on the gateway side. Within the normal network connection keep-alive operation channel, the beacon acknowledgment data packets periodically returned by the client encapsulate a local check vector independently extracted and generated by the terminal based on local real-time underlying physical parameters. .

[0092] Local verification vector The static caching and copying logic of data sent from the cloud is completely eliminated during the generation process. At the millisecond level during the assembly of the heartbeat message, the client-side underlying hardware parameter monitoring probe directly reads the physical layer received signal strength indicator parameters of the wireless base station connected to the host hardware, the instantaneous congestion clock deviation difference of the local network card hardware transmit queue buffer, and the millivolt-level core bus fluctuation values ​​output by the terminal motherboard power management chip. The agent program calls the SHA algorithm engine and matrix truncation logic, which are completely consistent with the gateway-side architecture, to independently calculate and generate the actual environmental fingerprint vector locally on the terminal. Its total output bit width is consistent with the system's preset constant. Strict consistency must be maintained. The arithmetic logic acceleration module of the gateway's central processing unit reads the local check vector carried in the inbound packet. Simultaneously, it utilizes memory pointers to directly retrieve the cached original beacon generation vector within the current specific secure socket context. The system will assign both sets of bit widths the same. The discrete binary sequence is mapped to Within a continuous real coordinate space, the on-chip multiply-accumulator array is invoked to calculate the Euclidean distance metric between two multidimensional coordinate points. This distance metric parameter characterizes the absolute discrete offset of the physical layer communication environment at the current client terminal's operating moment relative to the anchored reference channel state at the gateway's initial sending moment. Its calculation process is expressed by the following mathematical formula, where... and Represent the original generated vector and the end-side measured verification vector at the th... The floating-point normalized quantized value obtained by mapping on the orthogonal characteristic axes, index parameter The range of values ​​is the set of positive integers. :

[0093] The aforementioned geometric distance measurement calculation exhibits high sensitivity to microscopic disturbances in the underlying channel environment. When the underlying network link parameters of the client maintain physical continuity, the element difference between the measured vector and the original vector is close to zero, resulting in a high degree of sensitivity in the distance measurement. It remains within an extremely low noise floor range. If an external intruder forcibly sets up a man-in-the-middle wireless hijacking bridge during communication, maliciously changes the border gateway protocol routing path, or hooks the underlying NDIS (Network Driver Interface Standard) sending and calling by implanting a malicious dynamic link library locally on the terminal, the physical layer micro-processing delay, jitter variance, and noise floor signal-to-noise ratio parameters of the data packets in the end-to-cloud round-trip link will undergo physical abrupt changes, causing the calculated Euclidean distance metric to be affected. A sharp, non-linear deviation occurs.

[0094] The gateway's central processing unit's hardware clock comparator continuously receives distance metrics output by the arithmetic acceleration unit. Real-time and fixed write-to-read-only memory sector safety distance limit constant Perform logical inequality comparisons, where constants are used. The range of values ​​is limited to The real value. The gateway-side timestamp synchronization daemon thread continuously polls to check if the time decay counter field recorded in the downlink packet header has been exhausted. When the hardware comparison gate determines that the distance out-of-bounds relationship is satisfied... Alternatively, when the gateway monitoring module confirms that the low-order tick parameter of the time decay counter carried in the downlink packet has been cleared to zero under the terminal-side timer decrement logic, the system determines that the physical host terminal where the service plaintext resides has lost its physical layer trust status or that the data static retention period has been completely terminated. At this time, the security control core of the gateway's central processing unit skips the timeout retransmission judgment logic of the upper-layer transmission control protocol and directly oversteps its authority to dispatch a high-priority out-of-band logical destruction instruction message to the target client. The destruction instruction message header is marked with an urgent bit and uses the RSA-2048-bit private key embedded in the gateway's hardware cryptographic module for low-level signature encryption. After the zero-trust proxy core embedded in the client captures the out-of-band destruction instruction, it calls the privileged system service interface at the operating system's underlying level, directly bypassing the memory protection lock set by the user-mode application on the target memory block, and forcibly locates the first address of all physical memory page frames that cache the plaintext payload of the downlink response data packet, the decrypted intermediate data, and the network buffer image file. To completely prevent professional forensic equipment from exploiting the weak hysteresis charge residue in memory semiconductor capacitor cells for low-temperature, slow-down physical layer data scraping and recovery, the client security agent process directly invokes memory erasure logic compliant with the US Department of Defense DoD 5220.22-M standard. This drives a local pseudo-random number generator to sequentially write all-zero byte sequences, all-one-byte sequences, and highly pseudo-random alternating bit streams to a specified physical memory address range, continuously executing at least three physical cycles of direct memory overwrite operations. This entire protection process transforms the real-time fluctuations in physical parameters of the end-cloud channel into a dynamic decryption key stream and a foundation for continuous link verification. It breaks through the passive defense mode of conventional gateways that limit defense boundaries to the network gateway, achieving proactive security control throughout the entire downlink data lifecycle, from gateway packet sending to end-side memory verification and final forced physical erasure.

[0095] In the description of this specification, the references to terms such as "an embodiment," "example," "specific example," etc., indicate that a specific feature, structure, material, or characteristic described in connection with that embodiment or example is included in at least one embodiment or example of the present invention. In this specification, the illustrative expressions of the above terms do not necessarily refer to the same embodiment or example. Furthermore, the specific features, structures, materials, or characteristics described may be combined in any suitable manner in one or more embodiments or examples.

[0096] The above description is merely an example and illustration of the concept of the present invention. Those skilled in the art can make various modifications or additions to the specific embodiments described or use similar methods to replace them, as long as they do not deviate from the concept of the invention or exceed the scope defined in the claims, they should all fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A network security protection method based on a zero-trust architecture, applied to a zero-trust gateway node, comprising receiving an access request initiated by a client for a target resource, extracting the visitor's identity credentials from the access request, and performing initial identity verification based on the visitor's identity credentials; characterized in that, The method further includes: S1. Extract the dynamic interaction feature array of the client's identity and the physical environment channel state feature array when the client initiates the access request; S2. Using a preset weighted convolution algorithm, matrix fusion calculation is performed on the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence. S3. Based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource, call the dynamic topology heterogeneous engine to generate target interface mapping rules, and reconstruct the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rules. S4. When the real-time logical fingerprint sequence matches the current permission status matrix of the target resource, the traffic of the access request is routed to the target logical interface for business interaction.

2. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The extraction of the client's identity dynamic interaction feature array and physical environment channel state feature array when initiating the access request includes: Collect the key press time interval sequence and touch operation trajectory coordinate stream of the client when initiating the access request, as the original identity interaction data; Extract the network latency fluctuation rate, edge node hop count, and data packet arrival time interval when the client establishes a connection with the zero-trust gateway node as the raw physical channel data; The original identity interaction data and the original physical channel data are normalized respectively to generate the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array.

3. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 2, characterized in that, The step of using a preset weighted convolution algorithm to perform matrix fusion calculation on the identity dynamic interaction feature array and the physical environment channel state feature array to generate a real-time logical fingerprint sequence includes: The identity dynamic interaction feature array is transformed into a first feature vector, and the physical environment channel state feature array is transformed into a second feature vector; Obtain the system timestamp of the zero-trust gateway node, and use a hash function to convert the system timestamp into a time-weighted salt matrix; Calculate the Kronecker product of the first eigenvector and the second eigenvector to obtain the fusion matrix; The fusion matrix and the time-weighted salt matrix are multiplied by a dot product to output the real-time logical fingerprint sequence.

4. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 3, characterized in that, After outputting the real-time logical fingerprint sequence, the method further includes: Extract the latest keystroke time interval sequence and the latest network latency fluctuation rate of the client according to a preset time period; Based on the latest keystroke time interval sequence and the latest network latency volatility, the updated logical fingerprint sequence is recalculated and output, and then the updated logical fingerprint sequence is used to overwrite the real-time logical fingerprint sequence.

5. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of generating target interface mapping rules by invoking the dynamic topology heterogeneous engine based on the real-time logical fingerprint sequence and the current load pressure value of the target resource includes: Query the baseline service registry to obtain the original application programming interface definition data and original port number of the target resource; The hash seed is extracted based on the byte features of the real-time logical fingerprint sequence, and the mapping offset step size is determined according to the current load pressure value. Using the hash seed and the mapping offset step size as inputs to the pseudo-random number generator, a dynamic routing path sequence and an interface renaming dictionary are generated, and the dynamic routing path sequence and the interface renaming dictionary are used as the target interface mapping rules.

6. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 5, characterized in that, The step of reconstructing the access address and communication protocol of the target resource into a target logical interface based on the target interface mapping rule includes: Modify the request path field in the original application programming interface definition data according to the interface renaming dictionary to generate a heterogeneous access path; A software-defined network forwarding flow table is established based on the dynamic routing path sequence to map traffic entering and leaving the original port number to the logical port corresponding to the heterogeneous access path; The heterogeneous access path and the logical port are encapsulated using a pre-defined dynamic encapsulation protocol to generate the target logical interface.

7. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The method further includes: When the real-time logical fingerprint sequence does not match the current permission status matrix of the target resource, the routing action for the target logical interface is intercepted. Read the target resource identifier in the access request, and start the physically isolated shadow container engine to generate a virtual pseudo-shadow node that is isomorphic to the target resource data; The access request is seamlessly redirected to the mimicry shadow node for isolation.

8. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 7, characterized in that, After seamlessly redirecting the access request to the mimicry shadow node for isolation, the process further includes: Capture the sequence of instructions executed by the client inside the mimicry shadow node; Extract the opcode distribution frequency of the instruction detection sequence. When the opcode distribution frequency exceeds the preset threat baseline distribution range, trigger the logical topology reconstruction instruction of the mimicry shadow node. According to the logical topology reconstruction instruction, the file system directory and network interconnection protocol inside the mimicry shadow node are randomly replaced and reorganized.

9. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of routing the traffic of the access request to the target logical interface for business interaction also includes: Intercept the downlink response data packets returned by the target resource to the client; Extract the prefix feature segment of the real-time logical fingerprint sequence as the beacon generation vector; The application layer payload of the downlink response data packet is XORed and obfuscated using the beacon generation vector. A time decay counter field is then inserted into the header of the obfuscated data packet to generate a response data packet carrying a logical beacon, which is then sent to the client.

10. The network security protection method based on zero-trust architecture according to claim 9, characterized in that, After being sent to the client, the process also includes: Receive the beacon acknowledgment data packet returned by the client, the beacon acknowledgment data packet carrying a local check vector independently calculated by the client based on the current local physical environment channel state; Compare the Euclidean distance between the beacon generation vector and the local verification vector; When the Euclidean distance is greater than a preset distance threshold or the value of the time decay counter field is cleared to zero, a logical destruction command is sent to the client to cause the client to unload the downlink response data packet stored in memory.

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