A method and apparatus for coordinated testing of a reactor protection device

CN122592059APending Publication Date: 2026-08-18CHINA ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE CO LTD
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Patent Information

Application Number
CN202610637423.7
Authority / Receiving Office
CN · China
Patent Type
Applications(China)
Current Assignee / Owner
Filing Date
2026-05-11
Publication Date
2026-08-18

AI Technical Summary

Technical Problem

[0005]为了解决现有技术中安全性和可靠性低的问题,本申请提供了一种电抗器保护装置的协同测试方法和装置

Benefits of technology

本申请提供的电抗器保护装置的协同测试方法针对性覆盖误动工况和拒动工况,构造测试场景,能实现电抗器保护装置测试过程中的隐性逻辑缺陷,测试更全面、贴合现场实际,也就是测试可靠性更高。另外,本申请能够避免设备损坏、电网扰动和试验操作风险,试验安全可控,也就是测试安全性较高。

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Abstract

The application provides a kind of reactive protection device cooperative testing method and device. According to the misoperation condition and the refusal condition of the reactive protection device, the anti-misoperation test case and the anti-refusal test case are generated. According to the anti-misoperation test case and / or the anti-refusal test case, the test scene is constructed, and then the test of the reactive protection device is realized according to the test scene. The application covers the misoperation condition and the refusal condition, constructs the test scene, can realize the hidden logic defect in the test process of the reactive protection device, the test is more comprehensive, which is more in line with the actual situation, that is, the test reliability is higher. In addition, the application can avoid equipment damage, power grid disturbance and test operation risk, and the test is safe and controllable, that is, the test safety is higher.
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Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of relay protection technology, specifically to a collaborative testing method and apparatus for reactor protection devices. Background Technology

[0002] As a key device in the power system for limiting current variations, compensating reactive power, filtering and stabilizing voltage, the reliability of reactor protection devices used to protect reactors is directly related to the safe operation of the power system.

[0003] The relevant technologies typically employ the following methods to test reactor protection devices: (1) Testing the operating characteristics of reactor protection devices through faults and voltage / current transformer disconnections. There is a lack of systematic and dynamic testing for operating conditions that cause reactor protection devices to malfunction (such as voltage transformer disconnection, primary system voltage disturbance, power oscillation, or slow-changing or nonlinear operating conditions such as no-load inrush current). The operating conditions that cause reactor protection devices to malfunction are often difficult to accurately simulate using static testing methods, which makes it easy for reactor protection devices to malfunction in actual operation, leading to serious consequences such as over-level tripping of the power grid. In other words, the testing safety of reactor protection devices is low.

[0004] (2) Under operating conditions such as single-phase ground faults in reactors, relevant technologies use zero-sequence overcurrent protection to test reactor protection devices. Because the fault current is lower than the normal load current and the waveform has randomness, asymmetry, and nonlinear distortion characteristics, the reactor protection device is prone to failure to operate. In other words, the test reliability of reactor protection devices is low. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the issues of low safety and reliability in existing technologies, this application provides a collaborative testing method and apparatus for reactor protection devices.

[0006] In a first aspect, this application provides a collaborative testing method for reactor protection devices, which may include: Based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device, generate test cases for preventing maloperation and test cases for preventing failure-to-operation.

[0007] Construct test scenarios based on anti-malfunction test cases and anti-refusal test cases.

[0008] The reactor protection device was tested according to the test scenario.

[0009] In some possible implementations, anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases are generated based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device, including: Simulations were performed on the malfunction condition to obtain the first electrical characteristic data, and simulations were performed on the non-operation condition to obtain the second electrical characteristic data.

[0010] Piecewise linear fitting is performed on the first electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing malfunction, and piecewise linear fitting is performed on the second electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing failure to operate.

[0011] Optionally, the malfunction conditions include at least one of the following: abnormal output of the current transformer, open circuit of the voltage transformer, voltage disturbance of the primary system, power oscillation of the primary system, and no-load inrush current of the primary system.

[0012] Failure to operate conditions include: a single-phase high-resistance ground fault or an inter-turn short circuit fault occurring in the reactor.

[0013] Optionally, the anti-maloperation test cases include a first verification test case and a second verification test case. The first verification test case verifies whether the secondary circuit's blocking logic can be activated normally and whether the abnormal state can be located under abnormal conditions. The second verification test case verifies the time criterion and logical relationship in the reactor protection device.

[0014] The anti-failure test cases include stepped sensitivity test cases and inter-turn operating characteristic test cases. The stepped sensitivity test cases consist of test cases composed of characteristic parameter sequences of differential current and zero-sequence current for different transition resistances. The inter-turn operating characteristic test cases consist of test cases composed of zero-sequence electrical characteristic data or negative-sequence electrical characteristic data for different short-circuit turns ratios.

[0015] In other possible implementations, test scenarios are constructed based on anti-malfunction test cases and anti-failure test cases, including: Test scenarios can be obtained by using test cases to prevent accidental activation or test cases to prevent refusal to activate, or by combining test cases to prevent accidental activation and test cases to prevent refusal to activate in sequence and / or by interleaving states.

[0016] Furthermore, the test scenarios include a first test scenario and a second test scenario.

[0017] The first test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is subject to a failure-to-operate condition during the duration of the first state. The first state indicates that the reactor protection device enters a locked or monitored state due to a maloperation condition.

[0018] The second test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device experiences a maloperation condition during the duration of the second state. The second state is used to indicate the state in which the protection action value of the reactor protection device is lower than the preset protection action threshold value in the anti-maloperation test case.

[0019] In some other possible implementations, the reactor protection device is tested according to the test scenario, including: Electrical signals are obtained by simulating test scenarios using a testing device.

[0020] Under the excitation of electrical signals, the reactor protection device outputs a response signal.

[0021] The reactor protection device is evaluated based on the response signal, and the evaluation results are obtained.

[0022] The evaluation results include correct actions and incorrect actions. Incorrect actions include malfunctions and failures to operate by the reactor protection device.

[0023] Secondly, this application provides a collaborative testing device for reactor protection devices, which may include: The generation module is used to generate anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device.

[0024] The building module is used to construct test scenarios based on the anti-malfunction test cases and the anti-failure test cases.

[0025] The test module is used to test the reactor protection device according to the test scenario.

[0026] In some possible implementations, the generation module is specifically used for: Simulations were performed on the malfunction condition to obtain the first electrical characteristic data, and simulations were performed on the non-operation condition to obtain the second electrical characteristic data.

[0027] Piecewise linear fitting is performed on the first electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing malfunction, and piecewise linear fitting is performed on the second electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing failure to operate.

[0028] Optionally, the malfunction conditions include at least one of the following: abnormal output of the current transformer, open circuit of the voltage transformer, voltage disturbance of the primary system, power oscillation of the primary system, and no-load inrush current of the primary system.

[0029] Failure to operate conditions include: a single-phase high-resistance ground fault or an inter-turn short circuit fault occurring in the reactor.

[0030] For example, the anti-maloperation test case includes a first verification test case and a second verification test case. The first verification test case verifies whether the secondary circuit's blocking logic can be activated normally and whether the abnormal state can be located under abnormal conditions. The second verification test case verifies the time criterion and logical relationship in the reactor protection device.

[0031] The anti-failure test cases include stepped sensitivity test cases and inter-turn operating characteristic test cases. The stepped sensitivity test cases consist of test cases composed of characteristic parameter sequences of differential current and zero-sequence current for different transition resistances. The inter-turn operating characteristic test cases consist of test cases composed of zero-sequence electrical characteristic data or negative-sequence electrical characteristic data for different short-circuit turns ratios.

[0032] In some other possible implementations, the building module is specifically used for: The test scenario can be obtained by using anti-malfunction test cases or anti-refusal test cases as the test scenario, or by superimposing anti-malfunction test cases and anti-refusal test cases in a time sequence and / or interleaving states.

[0033] For example, the test scenarios include a first test scenario and a second test scenario.

[0034] The first test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is subject to a failure-to-operate condition during the duration of the first state. The first state indicates that the reactor protection device enters a locked or monitored state due to a maloperation condition.

[0035] The second test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device experiences a maloperation condition during the duration of the second state. The second state is used to indicate the state in which the protection action value of the reactor protection device is lower than the preset protection action threshold value in the anti-maloperation test case.

[0036] In some other possible implementations, the test module is specifically used for: Electrical signals are obtained by simulating test scenarios using a testing device.

[0037] Under the excitation of electrical signals, the reactor protection device outputs a response signal.

[0038] The reactor protection device is evaluated based on the response signal, and the evaluation results are obtained.

[0039] Optionally, the evaluation results include correct and incorrect actions. Incorrect actions include malfunctions and failures to operate by the reactor protection device.

[0040] In another aspect, this application also provides a computer device, including: one or more processors.

[0041] A processor is used to execute one or more programs.

[0042] Implement the collaborative testing method described above when one or more programs are executed by one or more processors.

[0043] Furthermore, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium on which a computer program is stored. When the computer program is executed, it implements the collaborative testing method described above.

[0044] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of this application are as follows: The collaborative testing method for reactor protection devices provided in this application specifically covers maloperation and failure-to-operate conditions, constructing test scenarios that can detect hidden logic defects in the reactor protection device testing process. This results in more comprehensive testing that closely reflects actual field conditions, thus enhancing test reliability. Furthermore, this application avoids risks such as equipment damage, power grid disturbances, and operational risks during testing, ensuring safe and controllable testing, thus achieving high test safety.

[0045] This application constructs test scenarios by using test cases to prevent false triggering and prevent refusal to trigger, thus reproducing the real working conditions of multiple protection logics coupled and mutually constraining under complex on-site operation. It is no longer limited to single isolated test cases, but is more in line with the actual on-site operating logic, thereby further improving the reliability of the test.

[0046] The technical solution provided in this application does not require artificially creating malfunctions or failures to operate on the primary equipment of a real reactor. Verification is completed through simulation test cases and conflict scenarios, avoiding the safety risks of equipment tripping, equipment damage, and system disturbances caused by on-site testing. In other words, the technical solution provided in this application can prevent actual on-site faults and avoid the risk of equipment damage.

[0047] The test scenario constructed in this application is a pre-modeled, configurable, and reproducible virtual scenario. The test process is controllable and has clear boundaries, which will not affect the stability of the power grid and ensure the safe operation of the power grid and test equipment. Attached Figure Description

[0048] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this application or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0049] Figure 1 This is a schematic flowchart of a collaborative testing method for reactor protection devices in the embodiments of this application; Figure 2 This is a schematic structural diagram of a simulation model in an embodiment of this application; Figure 3 This is a schematic structural diagram of a collaborative testing device for a reactor protection device in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0050] The technical solutions in this application will now be described with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0051] The terms "first," "second," etc., used in the specification, embodiments, claims, and drawings of this application are for distinguishing purposes only and should not be construed as indicating or implying relative importance or order. Furthermore, the terms "comprising" and "having," and any variations thereof, are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such as including a series of steps or units. A method, system, product, or apparatus is not necessarily limited to those steps or units explicitly listed, but may include other steps or units not explicitly listed or inherent to these processes, methods, products, or apparatuses.

[0052] It should be understood that in this application, "at least one (item)" means one or more, and "more than" means two or more. "And / or" is used to describe the relationship between related objects, indicating that three relationships can exist. For example, "A and / or B" can represent three cases: only A exists, only B exists, and both A and B exist simultaneously, where A and B can be singular or plural. The character " / " generally indicates that the preceding and following related objects are in an "or" relationship. "At least one (item) of the following" or similar expressions refer to any combination of these items, including any combination of single or plural items. For example, at least one (item) of a, b, or c can represent: a, b, c, "a and b", "a and c", "b and c", or "a and b and c", where a, b, and c can be single or multiple.

[0053] Example 1: This application provides a collaborative testing method for reactor protection devices. For example... Figure 1 As shown, the collaborative testing method 100 includes the following steps: Step S1: Generate test cases for preventing maloperation and test cases for preventing failure to operate based on the maloperation and failure to operate conditions of the reactor protection device.

[0054] Step S2: Construct test scenarios based on the anti-malfunction test cases and anti-failure test cases. There can be one or more test scenarios, that is, at least one test scenario must be constructed.

[0055] Step S3: Test the reactor protection device according to the test scenario.

[0056] Optionally, the above-mentioned malfunction conditions include at least one of the following: abnormal output of current transformer, open circuit of voltage transformer, voltage disturbance of primary system, power oscillation of primary system (oscillation range can be 0.5Hz to 2Hz), and no-load inrush current of primary system.

[0057] An abnormality at the output of a current transformer can be caused by a single-phase ground fault, a gradual or sudden drop in the sampling current to near the non-zero operating threshold (0.04A to 0.07A).

[0058] The aforementioned failure-to-operate conditions include: a single-phase high-resistance ground fault or an inter-turn short-circuit fault in the reactor. A single-phase high-resistance ground fault can be a single-phase ground fault with a high transition resistance (e.g., 50Ω, 150Ω, 300Ω) at the end of the reactor's internal leads. An inter-turn short-circuit fault can be a minor inter-turn short circuit in the reactor windings (e.g., 1%, 3%, 5% turns ratio).

[0059] Optionally, the aforementioned anti-maloperation test cases include a first verification test case and a second verification test case. The first verification test case verifies whether the secondary circuit's blocking logic can be activated normally and whether the abnormal state can be located under abnormal conditions. The second verification test case verifies the time criterion and logical relationship in the reactor protection device.

[0060] The aforementioned anti-failure test cases include stepped sensitivity test cases and inter-turn operation characteristic test cases. The stepped sensitivity test cases consist of test cases composed of characteristic parameter sequences of differential current and zero-sequence current for different transition resistances. The inter-turn operation characteristic test cases consist of test cases composed of zero-sequence electrical characteristic data or negative-sequence electrical characteristic data for different short-circuit turns ratios.

[0061] Among them, the anti-malfunction test cases are designed to attack and verify the security of the protection logic (anti-malfunction).

[0062] For example, a threshold-precise positioning attack: by fitting the CT current descent curve, the current is precisely controlled to cross the set boundary such as the "no current threshold" and the "CT disconnection start threshold", to verify whether the interlocking logic can be correctly started in the early stage of an anomaly and not be mistakenly opened due to threshold deviation.

[0063] For example, time and state attacks: simulate a signal that "differential current exceeds the limit but does not exceed 1.2 times the rated current" for different durations (e.g., 5.9 seconds, 6.1 seconds) to attack the time criterion; or simulate injecting anomalies under different initial loads or existing alarm states to attack the logic state machine.

[0064] The anti-rejection test cases are designed to verify the sensitivity and reliability of the protection logic (anti-rejection).

[0065] For example, a high-resistance grounding sensitivity step test: Based on the fitted data, a series of differential current and zero-sequence current characteristic value sequences corresponding to different transition resistances (such as 300Ω, 200Ω, 150Ω, 100Ω, 50Ω) are generated. These are then injected sequentially through static testing to verify whether the differential protection or zero-sequence protection can reliably operate at or below the set value (e.g., corresponding to 150Ω), and whether it can reliably alarm and not malfunction above the set value.

[0066] For example, slight inter-turn operation characteristic test: Fit zero-sequence voltage / current characteristic curves under different turns ratios (e.g., k=1%, 3%, 5%). Through injection test, verify whether the inter-turn protection can reliably operate or issue a high-level alarm at the specified operating turns ratio (e.g., ≥3%), and whether it can produce observable characteristic quantity changes at a slighter turns ratio (e.g., 1%).

[0067] In some possible implementations, step S1 generates anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device, including: Simulations were performed on the malfunction condition to obtain the first electrical characteristic data, and simulations were performed on the non-operation condition to obtain the second electrical characteristic data.

[0068] Piecewise linear fitting is performed on the first electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing malfunction, and piecewise linear fitting is performed on the second electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing failure to operate.

[0069] For electrical waveforms with obvious nonlinear characteristics, piecewise linear fitting can approximate the original waveform with sufficient accuracy, thereby generating effective test cases.

[0070] In this embodiment of the application, simulation models can be constructed to simulate malfunction and failure to operate. For example... Figure 2 As shown, the simulation model includes a primary system, a reactor protection device, and a secondary circuit. Figure 2 (Middle dashed line). The primary system may include reactor X, current transformer CT, voltage transformer PT, etc. Figure 2 In the diagram, S1 and S2 represent power sources, T represents a transformer, and S represents a circuit breaker. FD1, FD2, FD3, and FD4 are all fault points.

[0071] In some other possible implementations, step S2 involves constructing test scenarios based on anti-malfunction test cases and anti-failure test cases, including: Test scenarios can be obtained by using test cases to prevent accidental activation or test cases to prevent refusal to activate, or by combining test cases to prevent accidental activation and test cases to prevent refusal to activate in sequence and / or by interleaving states.

[0072] In other words, a single test scenario can be built using only anti-misoperation test cases or anti-rejection test cases, or test cases can be built based on anti-misoperation test cases and anti-rejection test cases (which can be logical conflict test scenarios).

[0073] Optionally, the test scenarios include a first test scenario and a second test scenario.

[0074] The first test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is subject to a failure-to-operate condition during the duration of the first state. The first state indicates that the reactor protection device enters a locked or monitored state due to a maloperation condition.

[0075] The second test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device experiences a maloperation condition during the duration of the second state. The second state is used to indicate the state in which the protection action value of the reactor protection device is lower than the preset protection action threshold value in the anti-maloperation test case.

[0076] For example, the first test scenario could be to identify a real fault amidst an anomaly: The device is first simulated to enter a "sampling anomaly monitoring" or "CT disconnection lockout" state due to a Class A anomaly (such as a slow decrease in CT current). During this state, a real Class B fault (such as a ground fault via a 180Ω transition resistor) is superimposed. The test requires the device to be able to identify that the characteristics of the superimposed fault exceed the anomaly lockout range, or to activate an independent emergency release criterion, reliably release the lockout of the real fault, and operate correctly.

[0077] For example, the second test scenario could be a logic game between preventing false triggering and preventing failure to trigger: simulating a boundary-critical Class B fault where a characteristic quantity is exactly at the critical point of the action threshold (e.g., differential current fluctuating between 0.9 and 1.1 times the setpoint). Simultaneously, a slight Class A disturbance (e.g., a small-amplitude load disturbance or oscillation) is superimposed. The test requires the device to effectively filter out the disturbance, make clear and correct decisions regarding the critical fault (selecting an alarm or action based on the setpoint), and should not cause false triggering or delay or failure to trigger a fault that should have been triggered due to the disturbance.

[0078] Optionally, testing can be performed using only anti-maloperation test cases or only anti-failure test cases. For example, for scenarios where it is only necessary to verify whether the blocking logic of the protection device is correct under CT disconnection conditions, anti-maloperation test cases can be executed alone; for scenarios where it is only necessary to verify the protection sensitivity under high-resistance grounding faults, anti-failure test cases can be executed alone. The collaborative testing method provided in this application does not require the simultaneous use of both types of test cases, but rather provides a test framework that can be flexibly combined.

[0079] When it is necessary to test the coordinated response capability of protection devices under complex operating conditions, anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases can be time-sequentially superimposed and / or state-interleaved to construct a logical conflict test scenario. This logical conflict test scenario is a preferred, but not the only, test scenario in this application.

[0080] In some other possible implementations, step S3 involves testing the reactor protection device according to the test scenario, including: Electrical signals are obtained by simulating test scenarios using a testing device (which can be a high-precision tester).

[0081] Under the excitation of electrical signals, the reactor protection device outputs a response signal.

[0082] The reactor protection device is evaluated based on the response signal, and the evaluation results are obtained.

[0083] The evaluation results include correct actions and incorrect actions. Incorrect actions include malfunctions and failures to operate by the reactor protection device.

[0084] In this embodiment, a 500kV reactor protection device can be tested. When a reactor malfunctions, the protection device enters a locked state when the secondary circuit is abnormal, but fails to identify the actual fault and execute protection actions in this locked state. By constructing a scenario of current transformer current descent and high-resistance grounding conflict using the collaborative testing method of this embodiment, the decision-making capability of the reactor protection device in the locked state is verified. Using the testing method provided in this embodiment, the protection device can still reliably identify a 50Ω transition resistor high-resistance grounding fault after the current descent is near the threshold and it enters the locked state, and completes the protection action within 20ms, avoiding the risk of malfunction. Based on the test results, the locking logic and fault identification algorithm of the reactor protection device can be further optimized to improve its reliability under complex operating conditions.

[0085] The protection device for a 220kV dry-type air-core reactor can also be tested. A minor inter-turn short-circuit fault occurred in the 220kV dry-type air-core reactor, but the protection device failed to identify and execute protection actions in a timely manner, leading to the expansion of the fault. By constructing a conflict scenario between a minor inter-turn short circuit and a voltage transformer disconnection using the collaborative testing method of this application, the decision-making ability of the protection device under conflicting information is verified. Using the testing method provided in this application, the protection device can generate an observable change in zero-sequence voltage fluctuation when there is a minor inter-turn short circuit with a 1% turns ratio; it can correctly identify and block the voltage transformer disconnection anomaly; and in the intertwined scenario, the protection device can correctly distinguish between the actual fault and the abnormal operating condition, avoiding failure to operate due to the voltage transformer disconnection. Based on the test results, the inter-turn short-circuit detection algorithm and the voltage transformer disconnection blocking mechanism of the protection device are optimized to improve its sensitivity under weak faults and its reliability under abnormal operating conditions.

[0086] Example 2: Based on the same inventive concept, embodiments of this application also provide a collaborative testing device for reactor protection devices. For example... Figure 3 As shown, the collaborative testing device 200 includes: The generation module 201 is used to generate anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device.

[0087] Module 202 is used to build test scenarios based on anti-malfunction test cases and anti-failure test cases.

[0088] Test module 203 is used to test the reactor protection device according to the test scenario.

[0089] In some possible implementations, the generation module 201 is specifically used for: Simulations were performed on the malfunction condition to obtain the first electrical characteristic data, and simulations were performed on the non-operation condition to obtain the second electrical characteristic data.

[0090] Piecewise linear fitting is performed on the first electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing malfunction, and piecewise linear fitting is performed on the second electrical characteristic data to obtain test cases for preventing failure to operate.

[0091] Optionally, the malfunction conditions include at least one of the following: abnormal output of the current transformer, open circuit of the voltage transformer, voltage disturbance of the primary system, power oscillation of the primary system, and no-load inrush current of the primary system.

[0092] Failure to operate conditions include: a single-phase high-resistance ground fault or an inter-turn short circuit fault occurring in the reactor.

[0093] For example, the anti-maloperation test case includes a first verification test case and a second verification test case. The first verification test case verifies whether the secondary circuit's blocking logic can be activated normally and whether the abnormal state can be located under abnormal conditions. The second verification test case verifies the time criterion and logical relationship in the reactor protection device.

[0094] The anti-failure test cases include stepped sensitivity test cases and inter-turn operating characteristic test cases. The stepped sensitivity test cases consist of test cases composed of characteristic parameter sequences of differential current and zero-sequence current for different transition resistances. The inter-turn operating characteristic test cases consist of test cases composed of zero-sequence electrical characteristic data or negative-sequence electrical characteristic data for different short-circuit turns ratios.

[0095] In some other possible implementations, the building module 202 is specifically used for: Test scenarios can be obtained by using test cases to prevent accidental activation or test cases to prevent refusal to activate, or by combining test cases to prevent accidental activation and test cases to prevent refusal to activate in sequence and / or by interleaving states.

[0096] For example, the test scenarios include a first test scenario and a second test scenario.

[0097] The first test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is subject to a failure-to-operate condition during the duration of the first state. The first state indicates that the reactor protection device enters a locked or monitored state due to a maloperation condition.

[0098] The second test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device experiences a maloperation condition during the duration of the second state. The second state is used to indicate the state in which the protection action value of the reactor protection device is lower than the preset protection action threshold value in the anti-maloperation test case.

[0099] In some possible implementations, test module 203 is specifically used for: Electrical signals are obtained by simulating test scenarios using a testing device.

[0100] Under the excitation of electrical signals, the reactor protection device outputs a response signal.

[0101] The reactor protection device is evaluated based on the response signal, and the evaluation results are obtained.

[0102] Optionally, the evaluation results include correct and incorrect actions. Incorrect actions include malfunctions and failures to operate by the reactor protection device.

[0103] Example 3 This application also provides a collaborative testing system for reactor protection devices. The collaborative testing system may include a simulation system, an intelligent test control unit, an analog output unit, a data acquisition and analysis unit, a communication interface module, and a synchronization clock module.

[0104] The real-time simulation system is used to build high-precision reactor and power grid models, supports real-time simulation and dynamic parameter adjustment, and is the core of the bidirectional boundary condition simulation in step one.

[0105] The intelligent test control unit is responsible for test case generation, scenario switching control, and test process coordination. It has a built-in fitting algorithm and logic rule library to generate test cases to prevent malfunctions, test cases to prevent failures to operate, and logical conflict test cases combined according to preset strategies. The logic rule library supports the formal description of the logical criteria of the protection device (such as interlocking conditions, action thresholds, and timing requirements), transforming them into rule expressions that can be recognized by the test system, so as to automatically construct logical conflict test scenarios.

[0106] Analog output unit: Typically a high-precision protection tester, supporting high-precision current / voltage signal output. It has multi-channel synchronization and complex timing programming capabilities, and can accurately output various fitted waveforms and conflict scenario combinations of signals for applying excitation to the device under test.

[0107] Data acquisition and analysis unit: used to acquire the internal soft messages, hard contact actions, waveform data, etc. of the device under test in real time, providing a panoramic analysis perspective and providing a data foundation for the analysis in step four.

[0108] Communication interface module: Enables data communication and command synchronization between various modules (such as simulation system, test instrument, protection device, host computer), and often supports protocols such as IEC 61850.

[0109] Synchronization clock module: Adopts GPS / BeiDou synchronization clock to ensure that the time synchronization accuracy of each test device is ≤±1μs, ensuring the consistency and repeatability of the test.

[0110] Example 4: Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides a computer device, which includes a processor and a memory. The memory stores a computer program, which includes program instructions. The processor executes the program instructions stored in the computer storage medium. The processor may be a Central Processing Unit (CPU), or other general-purpose processors, digital signal processors (DSPs), application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs), field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs), or other programmable logic devices, discrete gate or transistor logic devices, discrete hardware components, etc. It is the computing and control core of the terminal, and is suitable for implementing one or more instructions. Specifically, it is suitable for loading and executing one or more instructions in the computer storage medium to implement the corresponding method flow or corresponding function, so as to realize the steps of the collaborative testing method provided in the above embodiments.

[0111] Example 5: Based on the same inventive concept, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium, specifically a computer-readable storage medium (Memory). A computer-readable storage medium is a memory device in a computer device used to store programs and data. It is understood that the computer-readable storage medium here can include both the built-in storage medium in the computer device and extended storage media supported by the computer device. The computer-readable storage medium provides storage space that stores the terminal's operating system. Furthermore, this storage space also stores one or more instructions suitable for loading and execution by a processor. These instructions can be one or more computer programs (including program code). It should be noted that the computer-readable storage medium here can be high-speed RAM or non-volatile memory, such as at least one disk storage device. The processor can load and execute one or more instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium to implement the steps of the collaborative testing method provided in the above embodiments.

[0112] Those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments of the application can be provided as a method, system, or computer program product. Therefore, the application can take the form of a completely hardware embodiment, a completely software embodiment, or an embodiment combining software and hardware aspects. Furthermore, the application can take the form of a computer program product embodied on one or more computer-usable storage media (including, but not limited to, disk storage, CD-ROM, optical storage, etc.) containing computer-usable program code.

[0113] The application is described with reference to flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams of methods, apparatus (systems), and computer program products according to embodiments of the application. It will be understood that each block of the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, and combinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and / or block diagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. These computer program instructions can be provided to a processor of a general-purpose computer, special-purpose computer, embedded processor, or other programmable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such that the instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer or other programmable data processing apparatus, generate instructions for implementing the flowchart... Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 A device that provides the functions specified in one or more boxes.

[0114] These computer program instructions may also be stored in a computer-readable storage medium that can direct a computer or other programmable data processing device to function in a particular manner, such that the instructions stored in the computer-readable storage medium produce an article of manufacture including instruction means, which are implemented in a process Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1The function specified in one or more boxes.

[0115] These computer program instructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmable data processing equipment to cause a series of operational steps to be performed on the computer or other programmable equipment to produce a computer-implemented process, thereby providing instructions that execute on the computer or other programmable equipment for implementing the process. Figure 1 One or more processes and / or boxes Figure 1 The steps of the function specified in one or more boxes.

[0116] The above are merely examples of the application and are not intended to limit the application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, improvements, etc., made within the spirit and principles of the application shall be included within the scope of the claims of the pending application.

Claims

1. A collaborative testing method for a reactor protection device, characterized in that, include: Generate anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device; Construct test scenarios based on the anti-malfunction test cases and / or the anti-failure test cases; The reactor protection device is tested according to the test scenario.

2. The collaborative testing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The generation of anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device includes: The malfunction condition is simulated to obtain first electrical characteristic data, and the non-operation condition is simulated to obtain second electrical characteristic data. Piecewise linear fitting is performed on the first electrical characteristic data to obtain the anti-maloperation test cases, and piecewise linear fitting is performed on the second electrical characteristic data to obtain the anti-failure test cases.

3. The collaborative testing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The malfunction conditions include at least one of the following: abnormal output of current transformer, open circuit of voltage transformer, voltage disturbance of primary system, power oscillation of primary system, and no-load inrush current of primary system. The failure to operate conditions include: a single-phase high-resistance ground fault or an inter-turn short circuit fault occurring in the reactor.

4. The collaborative testing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The anti-maloperation test cases include a first verification test case and a second verification test case; wherein, the first verification test case is used to verify whether the secondary circuit's blocking logic can be started normally and whether the abnormal state can be located under abnormal conditions; the second verification test case is used to verify the time criterion and logic relationship in the reactor protection device; The anti-failure test cases include stepped sensitivity test cases and inter-turn operation characteristic test cases; wherein, the stepped sensitivity test cases are test cases composed of characteristic parameter sequences of differential current and zero-sequence current for different transition resistances; the inter-turn operation characteristic test cases are test cases composed of zero-sequence electrical characteristic data or negative-sequence electrical characteristic data for different short-circuit turns ratios.

5. The collaborative testing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The step of constructing a test scenario based on the anti-malfunction test cases and / or the anti-failure test cases includes: The test scenario is obtained by using the anti-malfunction test case or the anti-refusal test case as the test scenario, or by superimposing the anti-malfunction test case and the anti-refusal test case in a time sequence and / or interleaving them in a state.

6. The collaborative testing method according to claim 5, characterized in that, The test scenarios include a first test scenario and a second test scenario; The first test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is superimposed with the failure to operate condition during the duration of the first state; wherein, the first state is used to indicate that the reactor protection device enters a locked or monitored state due to the maloperation condition; The second test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is superimposed with the maloperation condition during the second state duration; the second state is used to indicate that the protection action value of the reactor protection device is lower than the preset protection action threshold value in the anti-failure test case.

7. The collaborative testing method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The test of the reactor protection device according to the test scenario includes: The test scenario is simulated using a testing device to obtain electrical signals; Under the excitation of the electrical signal, the reactor protection device outputs a response signal; The reactor protection device is evaluated based on the response signal to obtain the evaluation result.

8. The collaborative testing method according to claim 7, characterized in that, The evaluation results include correct actions and incorrect actions; wherein, the incorrect actions include malfunction and failure to operate of the reactor protection device.

9. A collaborative testing device for a reactor protection device, characterized in that, include: The generation module is used to generate anti-maloperation test cases and anti-failure test cases based on the maloperation and failure-to-operation conditions of the reactor protection device; The construction module is used to construct test scenarios based on the anti-malfunction test cases and the anti-refusal-to-operate test cases; The test module is used to test the reactor protection device according to the test scenario.

10. The collaborative testing device according to claim 9, characterized in that, The generation module is specifically used for: The malfunction condition is simulated to obtain first electrical characteristic data, and the non-operation condition is simulated to obtain second electrical characteristic data. Piecewise linear fitting is performed on the first electrical characteristic data to obtain the anti-maloperation test cases, and piecewise linear fitting is performed on the second electrical characteristic data to obtain the anti-failure test cases.

11. The collaborative testing device according to claim 9, characterized in that, The malfunction conditions include at least one of the following: abnormal output of current transformer, open circuit of voltage transformer, voltage disturbance of primary system, power oscillation of primary system, and no-load inrush current of primary system. The failure to operate conditions include: a single-phase high-resistance ground fault or an inter-turn short circuit fault occurring in the reactor.

12. The collaborative testing device according to claim 9, characterized in that, The anti-maloperation test cases include a first verification test case and a second verification test case; wherein, the first verification test case is used to verify whether the secondary circuit's blocking logic can be started normally and whether the abnormal state can be located under abnormal conditions; the second verification test case is used to verify the time criterion and logic relationship in the reactor protection device; The anti-failure test cases include stepped sensitivity test cases and inter-turn operation characteristic test cases; wherein, the stepped sensitivity test cases are test cases composed of characteristic parameter sequences of differential current and zero-sequence current for different transition resistances; the inter-turn operation characteristic test cases are test cases composed of zero-sequence electrical characteristic data or negative-sequence electrical characteristic data for different short-circuit turns ratios.

13. The collaborative testing device according to claim 12, characterized in that, The building module is specifically used for: The test scenario is obtained by using the anti-malfunction test case or the anti-refusal test case as the test scenario, or by superimposing the anti-malfunction test case and the anti-refusal test case in a time sequence and / or interleaving them in a state.

14. The collaborative testing device according to claim 13, characterized in that, The test scenarios include a first test scenario and a second test scenario; The first test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is superimposed with the failure to operate condition during the duration of the first state; wherein, the first state is used to indicate that the reactor protection device enters a locked or monitored state due to the maloperation condition; The second test scenario is used to indicate that the reactor protection device is superimposed with the maloperation condition during the second state duration; the second state is used to indicate that the protection action value of the reactor protection device is lower than the preset protection action threshold value in the anti-failure test case.

15. The collaborative testing device according to claim 9, characterized in that, The testing module is specifically used for: The test scenario is simulated using a testing device to obtain electrical signals; Under the excitation of the electrical signal, the reactor protection device outputs a response signal; The reactor protection device is evaluated based on the response signal to obtain the evaluation result.

16. The collaborative testing device according to claim 15, characterized in that, The evaluation results include correct actions and incorrect actions; wherein, the incorrect actions include malfunction and failure to operate of the reactor protection device.

17. A computer device, characterized in that, include: One or more processors; The processor is used to store one or more programs; When the one or more programs are executed by the one or more processors, the collaborative testing method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8 is implemented.

18. A computer-readable storage medium, characterized in that, It contains a computer program, which, when executed, implements the collaborative testing method as described in any one of claims 1 to 8.