An examinee identity authentication and check-in method and system based on encrypted credential multiplexing

Abstract

The application relates to an examinee identity authentication and sign-in system and method based on encrypted credential multiplexing, and relates to the technical field of educational examination informatization. The system comprises: a gate device arranged at an entrance of an examination site, integrated with an identity card reading module, a first face image collecting module and a first comparison module; a sign-in terminal arranged in each examination room, integrated with a second face image collecting module and a second comparison module; and an examination site server connected with the gate device and the sign-in terminal through an examination special network. The gate device verifies the on-site face image as a pass credential and writes the integrity protection code generated by a preset key; the sign-in terminal verifies the integrity protection code after obtaining the pass credential, and then restores the credential image and compares the restored credential image with the currently collected face image to complete the sign-in. The application realizes a two-level verification architecture through an encrypted credential multiplexing mechanism, reduces the cost of the examination room device, provides a hierarchical recovery and double-threshold fault tolerance mechanism, and guarantees the reliability and traceability of the entrance verification.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of information technology for educational examinations, specifically to a method and system for candidate identity verification and attendance tracking based on the reuse of encrypted credentials. Background Technology

[0002] In traditional national education examinations, candidate identity verification is typically completed one by one at the examination room entrance by invigilators using dedicated examination administration devices with built-in second-generation ID card SAM security reader chips: reading the ID card, capturing the candidate's face on-site, and comparing it with the registration photo. The drawbacks of this method are: high cost per device; invigilators need to handle both normal verification and abnormal document review simultaneously, diverting their invigilation attention; and fragmented data across examination rooms, making it impossible to track the candidate's facial image trajectory from entrance to seating in a unified manner.

[0003] Some existing technologies integrate ID card readers and facial recognition devices into turnstiles, comparing the face on-site with the photo on the ID card chip; if a match is found, the turnstile is opened for passage. However, such solutions only complete a single verification at the entrance and do not address the technical issue of how the verified data is securely transmitted as a pass to the downstream examination room terminals: there is no mechanism for generating, protecting the integrity of, and reusing the pass; independent ID card verification equipment is still needed in the examination room, or a cost-reduced architecture without card readers has not been established for the examination room terminals; the security risks of the pass being replaced, tampered with, or misused during storage or transmission are not identified and handled; the data link between abnormal document verification and normal automated verification is not unified, and the entire process of facial image trajectory archiving is incomplete. Summary of the Invention

[0004] In view of the above situation and to overcome the shortcomings of the prior art, the present invention provides a candidate identity verification and check-in method and system based on encrypted credential reuse, which at least partially solves the problems mentioned in the background art.

[0005] The technical solution adopted in this invention is as follows: In a first aspect, the present invention provides a candidate identity verification and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse, comprising: The barrier gate equipment, deployed at the entrance of the examination site, integrates an ID card reading module, a first face capture module, a first comparison module, and a gate arm control module; The check-in terminal, deployed in each examination room, integrates a second face capture module and a second comparison module; The examination center server is deployed within the examination center and communicates with the barrier gate equipment and the check-in terminal through the examination administration network. The barrier gate equipment is configured as follows: The ID card reading module reads the candidate's ID card information, the first face acquisition module captures the on-site face image, and the first comparison module performs face comparison. If the comparison is successful, the gate control module is controlled to open the gate to allow passage, and the on-site face image is used as the candidate's pass. An integrity protection code is written into the access credential. The integrity protection code is generated by performing an integrity operation on the preset key pair verification data. The check-in terminal is configured as follows: To obtain the candidate's pass, first verify the integrity protection code within it; if the verification passes, then restore the pass image. The second face acquisition module captures the current face image of the candidate entering the venue, and the second comparison module compares the current face image with the restored pass image. If the comparison is successful, the candidate is marked as having successfully checked in.

[0006] In a further embodiment, the barrier gate device is also configured to: The examination administration network is used to retrieve candidate registration information and standard photos from the registration database from the examination center server. The face comparison is as follows: the first comparison module performs a three-photo face comparison on the ID card chip photo, the standard photo in the registration database, and the on-site face image.

[0007] In a further implementation, the integrity protection code is generated in the following manner: During the exam session initialization phase, the exam site server loads or generates an exam site-level master key, and derives a device key based on the master key and device identifier. The device key is then sent to the local secure storage area of ​​the barrier gate device and the check-in terminal in read-only mode. The barrier gate device serializes the candidate identification index, device identifier, session random code and verification timestamp to obtain a plaintext string, performs a keyed hash operation on the plaintext string using the device key, and writes the operation result as the integrity protection code into the access credential. During the check-in terminal verification, the same device key stored locally is used to perform a hash operation with the key again. The new operation result is compared with the extracted integrity protection code. If they are inconsistent, the verification is deemed to have failed.

[0008] Specifically, the verification process of the integrity protection code includes: Extract the verification data and integrity protection code from the pass; Obtain the device key stored locally; perform a new hash operation with the key. Compare the calculation result with the extracted protection code; If they match, the process is considered successful; otherwise, a tiered recovery procedure is executed.

[0009] In a further implementation, the check-in terminal is also configured as follows: If the verification fails, the system will automatically request the same candidate's access pass data from the test center server again and re-execute the integrity protection code verification. If the verification passes, the face comparison check-in will continue. If the verification still fails after a re-request, the current face image is compared with the standard photo in the candidate's registration database stored on the test center server. If the backup comparison passes, the check-in is marked as successful and the deviation is marked as passed.

[0010] In a further implementation, the check-in terminal represents the comparison result between the current face image and the access pass image as a similarity score, and is configured with a high threshold and a low threshold, wherein the low threshold is less than the high threshold; When the similarity score is greater than or equal to the high threshold, the check-in is marked as successful. When the similarity score is less than the low threshold, the check-in is marked as failed and a prompt to re-collect is given. When the similarity score is between the low threshold and the high threshold, it is determined to be in the borderline area. The check-in terminal automatically retrieves the candidate's registration database standard photo from the test center server and performs a backup comparison between the current face image and the registration database standard photo. If the backup comparison result is greater than or equal to the high threshold, the check-in is marked as successful and the appearance deviation status is marked. Otherwise, it enters the manual review interface.

[0011] In a further implementation, the candidate identity verification and check-in system also includes: A manual assistance workstation is set up at the entrance of the examination center and configured to handle abnormal entry situations. The verification data corresponding to the integrity protection code written in the access pass generated by the manual auxiliary workstation includes a pass source type code, which takes the value of either the first value indicating automatic verification of the barrier gate or the second value indicating manual channel review. The check-in terminal selects the corresponding key according to the credential source type code to perform integrity protection code verification, and further verifies with the test center server when the credential source type code is the second value. Only after the verification is passed can the subsequent face comparison proceed.

[0012] Secondly, this invention provides a method for candidate identity verification and check-in based on encrypted credential reuse, comprising the following steps: Verification steps at the gate: At the entrance of the examination site, the gate device reads the candidate's ID card information, collects the on-site facial image, and performs a three-photo facial comparison between the ID card chip photo, the standard photo in the registration database, and the on-site facial image. If the comparison is successful, the gate is opened and the candidate is allowed to pass. The on-site facial image is used as the pass certificate and an integrity protection code is written into it. Check-in process at the examination room: Inside the examination room, the check-in terminal obtains the candidate's access pass, first verifies the integrity protection code, and if the verification is successful, restores the access pass image, captures the candidate's current face upon entry and compares it with the access pass image, and if the comparison is successful, the check-in is successful.

[0013] The beneficial effects achieved by the present invention using the above system and method are as follows: The examination room check-in terminal does not need to be equipped with an ID card reading module and a SAM security card reader chip. It can use ordinary tablet computers or electronic class signs, which greatly reduces the organization and implementation costs of educational examinations. By writing an integrity protection code generated by integrity calculation using a pre-set key into the access pass, any modification, replacement, or forgery of the pass data can be detected during the transfer of the pass from the gate to the examination room check-in terminal, thus solving the technical blind spot of secure data reuse after verification that is not addressed in existing gate solutions. By setting up a tiered recovery process, the system can automatically retry or enable backup comparison when the credential verification fails, thus avoiding the mistaken blocking of legitimate candidates due to network transmission errors or equipment compatibility issues. By setting up a dual-threshold fault-tolerant comparison mechanism, it is possible to effectively distinguish between natural facial feature drift caused by makeup, changes in lighting, etc., and genuine proxy test-taking behavior, thus meeting the strict requirements of national-level examinations for the reliability of entry verification. This system and method handle all operational data, from gate verification, pass generation and verification, exam room check-in to abnormal situation processing. All data is aggregated to the exam center server via the exam administration network, forming a complete image trajectory archive from the exam center entrance to the exam room seating, providing a solid data audit foundation for the fairness and impartiality of the exam. Attached Figure Description

[0014] Figure 1 This invention provides an embodiment of a candidate authentication and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse. Figure 2 This is a block diagram of the hardware composition of the barrier gate device proposed in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 3 This is a flowchart of the gate verification process proposed in an embodiment of the present invention; Figure 4 This is a flowchart of the examination room check-in process proposed in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0015] The accompanying drawings are provided to further understand the embodiments and form part of the specification. They are used together with the embodiments for explanation and do not constitute a limitation on the embodiments. Detailed Implementation

[0016] The technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection.

[0017] In the description of the embodiments, it should be understood that the terms "upper", "lower", "front", "rear", "left", "right", "top", "bottom", "inner", "outer", etc., indicate the orientation or positional relationship based on the orientation or positional relationship shown in the drawings. They are only for the convenience of describing the embodiments and simplifying the description, and do not indicate or imply that the device or element referred to must have a specific orientation, or be constructed and operated in a specific orientation. Therefore, they should not be construed as limitations on the embodiments.

[0018] Existing examination room equipment is costly, and invigilators need to handle both normal verification and abnormal document review simultaneously, diverting their invigilation efforts. Data is fragmented across examination rooms, making it impossible to track the entire process of a candidate's facial image from entrance to seating. Some existing technologies integrate ID card readers and facial recognition devices into turnstiles, comparing the face with the ID card chip photo; if a match is found, the turnstile is opened. However, this solution only completes a single verification at the entrance and does not address the technical issue of how the verified data is securely transmitted as a pass to downstream examination room terminals: there is no mechanism for pass generation, integrity protection, or downstream reuse; independent ID card verification equipment is still needed within the examination room, or a cost-reduced architecture without card readers has not been established for examination room terminals; the security risks of credentials being replaced, tampered with, or misused during storage or transmission are not identified and addressed; the data link between abnormal document review and normal automated verification is not unified, and the entire process of facial image tracking is not fully archived.

[0019] Recognizing the above problems, this application proposes and discloses a candidate identity verification and check-in system and method based on encrypted credential reuse, which can use the on-site facial image generated after verification at the gate as an access credential and securely reuse it at the examination room check-in terminal to prevent the credential from being tampered with, replaced or impersonated.

[0020] Example 1, see Figure 1 and Figure 2 This embodiment provides a candidate authentication system and method based on encrypted credential reuse, the system comprising: The barrier gate equipment, deployed at the entrance of the examination site, integrates an ID card reading module, a first face capture module, a first comparison module, and a gate arm control module; The check-in terminal, deployed in each examination room, integrates a second face capture module and a second comparison module; The examination center server is deployed within the examination center and communicates with the gate equipment and the check-in terminal through the examination administration network.

[0021] In this embodiment, the ID card reading module includes a SAM security module certified by the Ministry of Public Security, which can read ID card chip data and extract ID card number, name, and chip photo; the face acquisition module is a visible light or infrared camera installed on the front or top of the gate, which simultaneously acquires on-site face images when candidates swipe their cards; the comparison module is a face feature extraction and comparison engine, which can be embedded in a local processor or remotely access the computing power of the examination site server; the gate control module is a motor drive plus position sensor, which receives the gate opening command to drive the wing gate or swing gate to open; the barrier gate equipment communicates with the examination administration network through the main control unit and connects to the examination site server.

[0022] In this embodiment, the check-in terminal can be a regular tablet or an electronic class sign, which communicates with the examination center server through the examination administration network.

[0023] In this embodiment, the test center server is deployed in the test center computer room, storing all candidate registration information, test room arrangements, access pass image files, and check-in records for the test center, and communicating with the gate equipment and check-in terminals through the test administration network.

[0024] It is worth noting that the system also includes an examination administration platform, which is deployed in county, city or provincial examination institutions and communicates with the examination site server through the examination administration network. It is used for importing and distributing candidate data, initial configuration, and summary reporting.

[0025] Example 2, see Figure 3 Facial recognition and access pass generation at the gate: S1. The ID card reading module reads the chip and extracts the ID card number and chip photo; S2. The main control unit queries the test center server through the examination administration network to retrieve the registration information using the ID number; if the information cannot be found, it will prompt that the candidate is not in this session or is not in this test center, and refuse to open the gate. S3, The first face acquisition module acquires face images from the scene; S4. The first comparison module performs facial comparison. If the comparison is successful, the identity is determined to be consistent.

[0026] In a preferred embodiment, the face comparison involves performing a three-photo face comparison on the ID card chip photo, the standard photo in the registration database, and the on-site face image. The similarity between the on-site face image and the standard photo in the registration database, as well as the similarity between the on-site face image and the ID card chip photo, are calculated respectively. If both reach a preset threshold or the weighted fusion score reaches a threshold, the result is considered successful.

[0027] S5. After successful verification, use the on-site facial image as the pass and perform the following operations: Construct verification data, including candidate identification index, barrier gate device identifier, random code for the current verification session, and verification timestamp.

[0028] During the exam session initialization phase, the exam center server loads or generates an exam center-level master key. Based on this master key and device identifier, a device key is obtained through a key derivation function. This device key is then distributed in read-only mode to the local secure storage area of ​​the barrier gate device and the check-in terminal.

[0029] S6. Use the device key to perform a keyed hash operation on the verification data to obtain the integrity protection code.

[0030] The integrity protection code is written into the metadata area of ​​the pass image file header to obtain the encrypted pass file.

[0031] In this embodiment, the candidate identification index is a hash truncated from the ID card number or the registration number, the barrier gate device identifier is a preset number or MAC address, and the current verification session random code is a 16-byte random number.

[0032] In this embodiment, the integrity protection code is written into the APPn segment of the JPEG header, the tEXt block of the PNG header, or a separate auxiliary file to ultimately obtain the encrypted pass file.

[0033] S7. The main control unit uploads the access pass file to the test center server; S8. Subsequently, the gate control module opens the gate to allow passage, and the display screen or voice module provides guidance information for the examination room.

[0034] Example 3, see Figure 4 Examination room verification of credentials and sign-in: F1. The check-in terminal obtains the candidate's access pass from the test center server; F2. Extract the integrity protection code and verification data from the pass; Retrieve the same device key from the local secure storage area; Use the key to perform a new hash operation on the verification data, and compare the new result with the extracted integrity protection code. F3. If they match, restore the pass image and proceed to face comparison.

[0035] If there is a discrepancy, the verification is deemed unsuccessful, and a tiered recovery process is initiated.

[0036] F4. Collect the current facial image of the candidate entering the venue through the second facial recognition module; F5. The second comparison module compares the current face image with the restored pass image. If the comparison is successful, the check-in is marked as successful.

[0037] Example 4, see Figure 4 Tiered recovery process: R1. If the verification fails, the check-in terminal will automatically request the same candidate's access pass data from the test center server again. R2. Re-execute the integrity protection code verification. If the verification passes, continue to restore the voucher image, perform face comparison check-in, and record the "Voucher verification failed for the first time - automatic recovery successful" log.

[0038] R3. If the verification still fails after a re-request, the current face image is compared with the standard photo of the candidate in the registration database stored on the test center server. If the backup comparison is successful, the check-in is marked as successful and the deviation is marked as passed.

[0039] R4. If the backup comparison is still uncertain, the check-in fails and the candidate enters the structured manual review interface. The invigilator confirms or rejects the check-in and generates a review log with a reason code.

[0040] Example 5, Dual-threshold fault-tolerant comparison: The check-in terminal represents the comparison result between the current face image and the access card image as a similarity score, and is configured with a high threshold and a low threshold, where the low threshold is less than the high threshold.

[0041] When the similarity score is greater than or equal to the high threshold, the check-in is marked as successful.

[0042] When the similarity score is less than the low threshold, the check-in is marked as failed and the candidate is prompted to adjust their position and re-collect the data. If the score remains below the low threshold after multiple consecutive attempts, the failed status is handed over to the invigilator for processing.

[0043] When the similarity score is between the low threshold and the high threshold, it is determined to be in the borderline area. The check-in terminal automatically retrieves the candidate's standard photo from the registration database from the test center server and performs a backup comparison between the current face image and the standard photo in the registration database to obtain a backup similarity score. If the backup similarity score is greater than or equal to the high threshold, the check-in is marked as successful and labeled "Secondary verification passed - appearance deviation", and the deviation log is recorded. If the backup similarity score still falls into the borderline area or is lower than the low threshold, the system enters the structured manual review interface.

[0044] The structured manual review interface displays the current face image, pass image, and standard photo from the registration database side by side, along with the similarity values ​​of the three images. After the supervisor verifies the candidate's information, a controlled manual confirmation or rejection operation is performed. The entire process generates a review log with a reason code and uploads it to the test center server.

[0045] In a further implementation, the candidate identity verification and check-in system also includes: A manual assistance workstation is set up at the entrance of the examination center and configured to handle abnormal entry situations. The verification data corresponding to the integrity protection code written in the access pass generated by the manual auxiliary workstation includes a pass source type code, which takes the value of either the first value indicating automatic verification of the barrier gate or the second value indicating manual channel review. The check-in terminal selects the corresponding key according to the credential source type code to perform integrity protection code verification, and further verifies with the test center server when the credential source type code is the second value. Only after the verification is passed can the subsequent face comparison proceed.

[0046] In this embodiment, the manual assistance workstation is set up next to the gate at the entrance of the examination site. It is equipped with a camera or high-speed scanner and OCR software and is staffed by examination personnel to handle abnormal situations such as temporary ID cards, demagnetized documents, and household registration certificates. For example, if a candidate holds a temporary ID card or a household registration certificate with a photo issued by the police station, the examination personnel need to verify the candidate's identity first. This is mainly done through APP authentication or other government system authentication, and then by taking a photo of the candidate's document or certificate to obtain the candidate's identity photo and reading the candidate's name and ID number through OCR recognition. After retrieving the candidate's information from the system, the first identity verification process is carried out.

[0047] It should be noted that, in this document, the terms “comprising,” “including,” or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such process, method, article, or apparatus.

[0048] Although embodiments have been shown and described, it will be understood by those skilled in the art that various changes, modifications, substitutions and variations can be made to these embodiments without departing from the material and spirit.

[0049] The embodiments have been described above, and such description is not restrictive. The figures shown are only one embodiment, and the actual structure is not limited to this. In short, if those skilled in the art are inspired by this description and design similar structures and embodiments without departing from the inventive spirit, they should all fall within the scope of protection.

Claims

1. A candidate authentication and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse, the system comprising: The barrier gate equipment, deployed at the entrance of the examination site, integrates an ID card reading module, a first face capture module, a first comparison module, and a gate arm control module; The check-in terminal, deployed in each examination room, integrates a second face capture module and a second comparison module; The examination center server is deployed within the examination center and communicates with the barrier gate equipment and the check-in terminal through the examination administration network. The barrier gate equipment is configured as follows: The ID card reading module reads the candidate's ID card information, the first face acquisition module captures the face image on-site, the first comparison module performs face comparison, and if the comparison is successful, the gate control module is controlled to open the gate to allow passage, and the on-site face image is used as the candidate's pass. An integrity protection code is written into the access credential. The integrity protection code is generated by performing an integrity operation on the preset key pair verification data. The check-in terminal is configured as follows: To obtain the candidate's pass, first verify the integrity protection code within it; if the verification passes, then restore the pass image. The second face acquisition module captures the current face image of the candidate entering the venue, and the second comparison module compares the current face image with the restored pass image. If the comparison is successful, the candidate is marked as having successfully checked in.

2. The system as claimed in claim 1, wherein, In a further embodiment, the barrier gate device is also configured to: The examination administration network is used to retrieve candidate registration information and standard photos from the registration database from the examination center server. The face comparison is as follows: the first comparison module performs a three-photo face comparison on the ID card chip photo, the standard photo in the registration database, and the on-site face image.

3. The candidate identity verification and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse according to claim 1, characterized in that, The integrity protection code is generated in the following manner: During the exam session initialization phase, the exam site server loads or generates an exam site-level master key, and derives a device key based on the master key and device identifier. The device key is then sent to the local secure storage area of ​​the barrier gate device and the check-in terminal in read-only mode. The barrier gate device serializes the candidate identification index, device identifier, session random code and verification timestamp to obtain a plaintext string, performs a keyed hash operation on the plaintext string using the device key, and writes the operation result as the integrity protection code into the access credential. During the check-in terminal verification, the same device key stored locally is used to perform a hash operation with the key again. The new operation result is compared with the extracted integrity protection code. If they are inconsistent, the verification is deemed to have failed.

4. The candidate identity verification and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse according to claim 1, characterized in that, The verification process for the integrity protection code includes: Extract the verification data and integrity protection code from the pass; Obtain the device key stored locally; perform a new hash operation with the key. Compare the calculation result with the extracted protection code; If they match, the process is considered successful; otherwise, a tiered recovery procedure is executed.

5. The candidate identity verification and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse according to claim 1, characterized in that, The check-in terminal is also configured to: If the verification fails, the system will automatically request the same candidate's access pass data from the test center server again and re-execute the integrity protection code verification. If the verification passes, the face comparison check-in will continue. If the verification still fails after a re-request, the current face image is compared with the standard photo in the candidate's registration database stored on the test center server. If the backup comparison passes, the check-in is marked as successful and the deviation is marked as passed.

6. The candidate identity verification and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse according to claim 1, characterized in that, The check-in terminal represents the comparison result between the current face image and the access card image as a similarity score, and is configured with a high threshold and a low threshold, wherein the low threshold is less than the high threshold; When the similarity score is greater than or equal to the high threshold, the check-in is marked as successful. When the similarity score is less than the low threshold, the check-in is marked as failed and a prompt to re-collect is given. When the similarity score is between the low threshold and the high threshold, it is determined to be in the borderline area. The check-in terminal automatically retrieves the candidate's registration database standard photo from the test center server and performs a backup comparison between the current face image and the registration database standard photo. If the backup comparison result is greater than or equal to the high threshold, the check-in is marked as successful and the appearance deviation status is marked. Otherwise, it enters the manual review interface.

7. The candidate identity verification and check-in system based on encrypted credential reuse according to claim 1, characterized in that, The candidate identity verification and check-in system also includes: A manual assistance workstation is set up at the entrance of the examination center and configured to handle abnormal entry situations. The verification data corresponding to the integrity protection code written in the access pass generated by the manual auxiliary workstation includes a pass source type code, which takes the value of either the first value indicating automatic verification of the barrier gate or the second value indicating manual channel review. The check-in terminal selects the corresponding key according to the credential source type code to perform integrity protection code verification, and further verifies with the test center server when the credential source type code is the second value. Only after the verification is passed can the subsequent face comparison proceed.

8. A method for candidate identity verification and check-in based on encrypted credential reuse, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: Verification steps at the gate: At the entrance of the examination site, the gate device reads the candidate's ID card information, collects the on-site facial image, and performs a three-photo facial comparison between the ID card chip photo, the standard photo in the registration database, and the on-site facial image. If the comparison is successful, the gate is opened and the candidate is allowed to pass. The on-site facial image is used as the pass certificate and an integrity protection code is written into it. Check-in process at the examination room: Inside the examination room, the check-in terminal obtains the candidate's access pass, first verifies the integrity protection code, and if the verification is successful, restores the access pass image, captures the candidate's current face upon entry and compares it with the access pass image, and if the comparison is successful, the check-in is successful.

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