A reactor trip control method, system and reactor trip breaker cabinet

Abstract

The application discloses a reactor trip control method and system and a reactor trip breaker cabinet, relates to the technical field of safety class electrical control of nuclear power plants, and constructs a contact matrix formed by the connection of normally open contacts of intermediate relays at a control loop level, and executes a two-out-of-four voting logic judgment by using the contact matrix, so that the breaker will only execute a tripping action when at least two independent protection sequences simultaneously output a tripping instruction, thereby effectively avoiding the breaker tripping problem caused by the tripping instruction wrongly sent by a single protection sequence fault, preventing the system from entering a degraded operation state, and significantly reducing the unplanned reactor trip risk.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application relates to the field of electrical control technology for nuclear power plant safety levels, and in particular to a reactor shutdown control method, system, and reactor shutdown circuit breaker cabinet. Background Technology

[0002] In nuclear power plants, the reactor shutdown circuit breaker system is an extremely critical safety-grade electrical device. It is mainly used to cut off the power supply to the control rod drive mechanism when an emergency trip command is received, thereby realizing the emergency shutdown of the reactor. Its operational reliability is directly related to the safe and stable operation of the nuclear power plant. Therefore, the shutdown circuit breaker system must have high reliability to prevent failure to operate and minimize false trips.

[0003] In existing technologies, reactor shutdown circuit breaker systems typically employ a control method where multiple signal channels correspond one-to-one with each circuit breaker, meaning each signal channel independently controls the tripping action of a single circuit breaker. This control method has a significant drawback: when one of the signal channels malfunctions or falsely sends a tripping command, the corresponding circuit breaker will immediately perform a tripping operation, causing the system corresponding to that channel to transition from normal redundant operation to degraded operation. At this point, the system's redundancy protection capability is degraded, posing a safety hazard.

[0004] Furthermore, the existing control methods lack effective signal verification and interlocking mechanisms, making it impossible to effectively intercept false triggering of a single signal channel. This not only easily leads to unplanned circuit breaker tripping, affecting the normal operation and stability of the unit, but also increases the intervention costs for maintenance personnel. It requires timely manual intervention to restore the system's redundant state, further increasing the risk of unplanned shutdowns. At the same time, it fails to meet the core requirements of nuclear power plants for high safety and high reliability in shutdown control. Summary of the Invention

[0005] To address the aforementioned problems, this application provides a reactor shutdown control method, system, and reactor shutdown circuit breaker cabinet, including the following: In a first aspect, this application provides a reactor shutdown control method, applied to a reactor shutdown control system, the control system comprising a contact matrix formed by normally open contacts of intermediate relays, the method comprising: Obtain the trip commands output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor; The intermediate relay receives the tripping command output by each group of protection sequences, causing the normally open contact of the intermediate relay to change from the open state to the closed state. The four-out-of-two voting logic is executed based on the aforementioned contact matrix; When the result of the two-out-of-four voting logic is a valid tripping condition, the power supply circuit corresponding to the shunt coil is turned on. The circuit breaker is driven by the shunt coil that is powered to perform the tripping action, thereby completing the reactor shutdown control.

[0006] Optionally, the series-parallel topology of the contact matrix is ​​configured such that the electrical circuit of the contact matrix is ​​turned on if and only if any two or more of the four independent protection sequences simultaneously output a tripping command.

[0007] Optionally, the method further includes: During normal operation of the circuit breaker, a detection current is injected in parallel into the shunt coil circuit through the test unit; Monitor the impedance change of the shunt coil circuit; When an impedance abnormality is detected, a shunt coil fault alarm signal is output.

[0008] Optionally, the circuit breaker includes a main circuit breaker and a bypass circuit breaker, wherein the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker are connected in parallel; the method further includes: When conducting periodic tests on the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker, first control the bypass circuit breaker to close. After the bypass circuit breaker is closed, the main circuit breaker is then controlled to open. After the main circuit breaker is opened, control the main circuit breaker to close. After the main circuit breaker is closed, the bypass circuit breaker is then controlled to open.

[0009] Secondly, this application provides a reactor shutdown control system, which includes: The instruction receiving module, consisting of an intermediate relay group, is used to receive the tripping instructions output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor respectively. The normally open contact of the instruction receiving module changes from the open state to the closed state in response to the tripping instruction. The voting determination module is composed of a contact matrix formed by the normally open contacts, and is used to perform a two-out-of-four voting logic determination. The power supply control module, corresponding to the shunt coil power supply circuit, has its conduction state controlled by the two-out-of-four voting logic judgment result output by the voting judgment module. The tripping drive module, corresponding to the shunt coil, is used to receive power when the power supply control module is turned on, and to drive the circuit breaker to perform the tripping action.

[0010] Optionally, the series-parallel topology of the voting determination module is configured such that the electrical circuit of the voting determination module is turned on only when any two or more of the four independent protection sequences simultaneously output tripping commands.

[0011] Optionally, the system further includes: The circuit diagnostic module, corresponding to the test unit, is connected in parallel with the circuit of the tripping drive module. It is used to inject detection current into the circuit of the tripping drive module during normal operation of the circuit breaker and monitor the impedance change of the circuit of the tripping drive module; and when an impedance abnormality is detected, it outputs a shunt coil fault alarm signal.

[0012] Optionally, the circuit breaker includes a main circuit breaker and a bypass circuit breaker, wherein the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker are connected in parallel; the system further includes: An operation interlock module, corresponding to a key switch, the operation interlock module having a bypass circuit breaker permitted position and a main circuit breaker permitted position; Under periodic test conditions, after the operation interlock module switches to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position, it controls the bypass circuit breaker to perform a closing operation; after the operation interlock module switches to the main circuit breaker's allowed position, it controls the main circuit breaker to perform a opening operation; after the main circuit breaker completes the closing operation, the operation interlock module switches to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position and controls the bypass circuit breaker to perform a opening operation.

[0013] Optionally, the system is configured with multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers. The molded case circuit breakers are non-protected circuit breakers and only have shunt tripping function, which are used to cooperate with the tripping drive module to complete the tripping action.

[0014] Thirdly, this application provides a reactor shutdown circuit breaker cabinet, comprising: Multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers, wherein the molded case circuit breakers are non-protected circuit breakers and only have shunt tripping function, and the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker in each pair of molded case circuit breakers are connected in parallel. The intermediate relay group is used to receive the tripping commands output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor and drive the normally open contacts of the intermediate relay group to operate. The contact matrix, formed by connecting the normally open contacts, is used to implement the two-out-of-four voting logic. The shunt coil, whose power supply circuit is connected in series with the output terminal of the contact matrix, is used to drive the molded case circuit breaker to perform a tripping action when the two-out-of-four voting logic is true.

[0015] Fourthly, this application provides an apparatus comprising a memory and a processor, the memory for storing instructions or code, and the processor for executing the instructions or code to cause the apparatus to perform the reactor shutdown control method described in any implementation of the first aspect.

[0016] Fifthly, this application provides a computer-readable storage medium storing code, wherein when the code is executed, a device executing the code implements the reactor shutdown control method described in any of the implementations of the first aspect.

[0017] This application provides a reactor shutdown control method. When executing the method, the tripping commands output by four independent protection sequences of the reactor are first acquired. Then, the tripping commands output by each protection sequence are received via intermediate relays, causing the normally open contacts of the intermediate relays to change from an open state to a closed state. Next, a two-out-of-four voting logic is executed based on the contact matrix. Finally, when the two-out-of-four voting logic result is a valid tripping condition, the power supply circuit corresponding to the shunt coil is activated, so that the circuit breaker is driven to perform a tripping action through the powered shunt coil, completing the reactor shutdown control. In this way, by constructing a contact matrix formed by the normally open contacts of intermediate relays at the control circuit level, and using this contact matrix to perform the two-out-of-four voting logic, the circuit breaker will only perform a tripping action when at least two independent protection sequences simultaneously output tripping commands. This effectively avoids the problem of circuit breaker erroneous tripping caused by a single protection sequence failure, prevents the system from entering a degraded operation state, and significantly reduces the risk of unplanned reactor shutdown. Attached Figure Description

[0018] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in this embodiment or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiment or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are only some embodiments of this application. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0019] Figure 1 A flowchart illustrating a reactor shutdown control method provided in this application embodiment; Figure 2a A schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in this application embodiment; and the instruction access circuit corresponding to the V sequence; Figure 2b This is a schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in an embodiment of this application, corresponding to the instruction access circuit of the W sequence; Figure 2c This is a schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in an embodiment of this application, corresponding to the instruction access circuit of the X sequence; Figure 2d A schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in this application embodiment; and the instruction access circuit corresponding to the Y sequence; Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the contact matrix topology provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 4 A schematic diagram of the shunt coil circuit and online diagnostic unit provided in the embodiments of this application; Figure 5This is a schematic diagram of the power supply architecture for the reactor shutdown control system provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the local operation and anti-misoperation interlocking circuit provided in the embodiments of this application; Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a reactor shutdown control system provided in an embodiment of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0020] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of this application clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of this application, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of this application, all other embodiments obtained by those of ordinary skill in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of this application.

[0021] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a reactor shutdown control method provided in an embodiment of this application. (In conjunction with...) Figure 1 As shown, the reactor shutdown control method provided in this application embodiment may include: S101. Obtain the tripping commands output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor.

[0022] In this embodiment, the reactor protection system outputs tripping commands to the shutdown circuit breaker control system via four independent logic sequences: V sequence, W sequence, X sequence, and Y sequence. Each sequence's tripping command is transmitted independently and does not affect the others; these commands serve as input signals for subsequent voting logic.

[0023] Figure 2a This is a schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in an embodiment of this application, corresponding to the instruction access circuit of the V sequence. Figure 2b This is a schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in an embodiment of this application, corresponding to the instruction access circuit of the W sequence. Figure 2c This is a schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in an embodiment of this application, corresponding to the instruction access circuit of the X sequence. Figure 2d This is a schematic diagram of the signal access for the shutdown control loop provided in an embodiment of this application, corresponding to the instruction access circuit of the Y sequence.

[0024] like Figure 2a As shown, the remote tripping command from the V-series of the reactor protection system forms the power supply circuit for coil K11 through terminals X11:2 and X11:4, and the power supply circuit for coil K12 through terminals X11:3 and X11:5. When the V-series tripping command is valid, both relay coils are energized simultaneously, and their respective contacts actuate, synchronously transmitting signals to subsequent circuits. Figure 2b , Figure 2c and Figure 2d The control loops corresponding to the W sequence, X sequence, and Y sequence, respectively, have the same structure as... Figure 2a Similarly, they drive the relay coils of K21 and K22, K31 and K32, and K41 and K42 to operate respectively.

[0025] The command transmission lines for each sequence are physically independent, with no shared lines, effectively avoiding the simultaneous impact of common-mode faults on multiple signal sets. Furthermore, each sequence's command drives two relay coils: one relay drives the main circuit breaker, and the other drives the bypass circuit breaker. The main circuit breaker remains closed under normal operating conditions, while the bypass circuit breaker is open; both are functionally independent parallel circuit breakers. By setting four completely independent protection sequences to output commands separately, the independence and reliability of the protection system are improved from the signal source, reducing the impact of single-line or single-monitoring-element faults on the overall reactor shutdown control function and ensuring the stability and reliability of the protection command acquisition process.

[0026] S102. The intermediate relay receives the tripping command output by each group of protection sequences, so that the normally open contact of the intermediate relay changes from the open state to the closed state.

[0027] An intermediate relay is an electrical component used for signal conversion and isolation. Its input is a coil, and its output is multiple sets of mechanical contacts. When the coil is energized, the contact state changes: normally open contacts close, and normally closed contacts open. In the embodiments of this application, the tripping command of each protection sequence drives the corresponding intermediate relay. For example, in a reactor protection system, the V sequence signal drives intermediate relays K11 and K12, the W sequence signal drives intermediate relays K21 and K22, the X sequence signal drives intermediate relays K31 and K32, and the Y sequence signal drives intermediate relays K41 and K42. After receiving the tripping command, each intermediate relay changes its normally open contact from an open state to a closed state. In this way, the weak protection signal is converted into a dry contact signal that can carry a large current, used for the logic construction of subsequent control circuits.

[0028] S103. Perform a two-out-of-four voting logic based on the contact matrix.

[0029] A contact matrix is ​​a circuit network composed of normally open contacts of multiple intermediate relays connected in a specific series-parallel topology. This matrix is ​​connected in series in the power supply circuit of the shunt coil, and its conduction determines whether the shunt coil can be energized.

[0030] In this embodiment, the series-parallel topology of the contact matrix is ​​configured such that the electrical circuit of the contact matrix is ​​turned on if and only if any two or more of the four independent protection sequences simultaneously output a tripping command. Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of the contact matrix topology provided in the embodiments of this application, such as... Figure 3 As shown, tripping commands from the V, W, X, and Y sequences drive the corresponding relay contacts. The left matrix circuit is constructed using the normally open contacts of relays K11, K21, K31, and K41, while the right matrix circuit is constructed using the normally open contacts of relays K12, K22, K32, and K42. The two matrix circuits are symmetrical and independent, and are connected to the two power supply branches of the shunt coil, respectively. Each sequence of commands drives the two sets of relay contacts. For example, the V sequence command simultaneously drives the normally open contacts of relays K11 and K12 to close. These contacts are connected in a preset series-parallel configuration to form multiple conduction paths that satisfy the requirement of "simultaneous triggering of two sequences." When any two different sequence commands are effective simultaneously, the corresponding contacts close, forming a complete conduction circuit and enabling the contact matrix to conduct. In other words, if only sequence V outputs a tripping command, the circuit remains open and tripping will not be triggered because the corresponding path in the contact matrix does not meet the conduction condition. The contact matrix will only conduct when sequences V and W simultaneously output tripping commands, or when any two sequences from V and X, V and Y, W and X, W and Y, or X and Y simultaneously output tripping commands. This design ensures that a single protection sequence falsely issuing a tripping command due to a fault will not cause the circuit breaker to trip erroneously, guaranteeing that when a reactor shutdown is truly necessary, signals from any two sequences can reliably trigger tripping. The contact matrix executes this two-out-of-four voting logic, determining whether two or more tripping commands are issued simultaneously from the four input sequences.

[0031] S104. When the result of the four-out-of-two voting logic is a valid tripping condition, the power supply circuit corresponding to the shunt coil is turned on.

[0032] The shunt coil is the actuator inside the circuit breaker used to achieve remote tripping, and its power supply circuit typically uses a 220V AC control power supply. When the two-out-of-four voting logic determines a valid tripping condition, i.e., the contact matrix electrical circuit is activated, the 220V AC control power supply is applied to both ends of the shunt coil through the contact matrix, energizing the shunt coil. This step thus achieves the conversion from signal determination to execution drive.

[0033] S105. The circuit breaker is driven to perform a tripping action by the shunt coil that is powered, thereby completing the reactor shutdown control.

[0034] When the shunt coil is energized, its internal iron core generates electromagnetic force, which actuates the circuit breaker operating mechanism, causing the main contacts of the circuit breaker to open and thus cutting off the power supply to the reactor control rod drive mechanism. After the control rod drive mechanism is de-energized, the control rods fall rapidly into the reactor core under gravity, absorbing neutrons and halting the chain reaction, achieving an emergency safety shutdown. Through these steps, this application implements a highly reliable four-out-of-two voting logic at the single circuit breaker level, avoiding false tripping and system degradation caused by a single-channel failure, and improving the reliability of reactor shutdown control.

[0035] In one embodiment of this application, an online circuit diagnostic process is also configured, which can monitor the integrity of the shunt winding control circuit in real time during the long-term stable operation of the circuit breaker. During normal operation of the circuit breaker, a detection current is injected in parallel into the shunt winding coil circuit through a test unit. The test unit (e.g., Figure 4 The YO test unit (GY01) shown is connected in parallel with the shunt coil circuit. Figure 4 This is a schematic diagram of the shunt coil circuit and online diagnostic unit provided in the embodiments of this application, as shown below. Figure 4 As shown, the YO test unit GY01 forms a parallel structure with the power supply circuit of the shunt coil through its terminals, and can independently output detection signals without affecting the operation of the main circuit. During normal operation of the circuit breaker, the shunt coil is in a non-energized state. The test unit periodically injects a small detection current or pulse into the shunt coil circuit. The amplitude of this current is small and far from enough to drive the shunt coil to operate, so it will not affect the normal operation of the circuit breaker.

[0036] Based on this, the impedance change of the shunt coil circuit is continuously monitored. The test unit calculates the impedance value of the shunt coil circuit in real time by analyzing the circuit response after the injection of detection current. Under normal conditions, the shunt coil has a normal DC resistance value, which is within a certain range. When an inter-turn short circuit occurs in the shunt coil, the circuit impedance will drop significantly from the normal value; when an open circuit occurs in the shunt coil, the circuit impedance will become infinite.

[0037] Based on real-time impedance monitoring results, a shunt coil fault alarm signal is promptly output when an impedance anomaly is detected. The test unit is equipped with alarm contacts; when infinite circuit impedance or a sharp drop in impedance exceeding a preset threshold is detected, the alarm contacts activate, outputting an alarm signal to the main instrumentation and control system via terminals. The shunt coil fault information is displayed in the main control room, prompting maintenance personnel to perform preventative maintenance. Through this online diagnostic function, this application upgrades the traditional periodic testing and corrective maintenance mode to a preventative maintenance mode, eliminating fault blind spots within test cycle intervals, achieving real-time detection of shunt coil faults, and further improving the safety and maintainability of the reactor shutdown control system.

[0038] The circuit breaker includes a main circuit breaker and a bypass circuit breaker, which are connected in parallel to form a switchable power supply branch. Figure 5 This is a schematic diagram of the power supply architecture for the reactor shutdown control system provided in an embodiment of this application, as shown below. Figure 5 As shown, the entire system is divided into two subgroups: a shutdown system subgroup 1 and a shutdown system subgroup 2, corresponding to two power supply links for 380V AC power and 110V DC power, respectively. Each power supply link has a pair of parallel circuit breakers. Taking the CLP51 circuit breaker cabinet as an example, circuit breakers GS051 and GS053 are connected in parallel, with GS051 serving as the main circuit breaker and GS053 as the bypass circuit breaker. The outgoing lines of both circuit breakers converge to supply power to the downstream emergency shutdown system. When either circuit breaker is in the closed state, the downstream load can receive normal power. In one implementation of this application, the control system is equipped with multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers. These molded case circuit breakers are non-protected circuit breakers and only have shunt tripping function, capable of receiving control loop commands to complete reliable tripping actions, matching the application requirements of reactor shutdown control.

[0039] In one implementation of this application, an interlocked test operation loop is also included, which implements strict periodic test anti-misoperation logic through hard wiring. Figure 6 A schematic diagram of the local operation and anti-misoperation interlocking circuit provided in the embodiments of this application is shown below. Figure 6 As shown, the circuit breaker is equipped with an electric operating mechanism and a local operating interface. The electric operating mechanism includes an electric operating motor, which enables electric closing and opening actions. The local operating circuit works in conjunction with the electric operating mechanism to achieve the test operation control of the circuit breaker. The local operating interface is equipped with a local / remote switching switch (SW01), a local closing button (SC01 / SC02, green marking), and a local opening button (SO01 / SO02, red marking) for local manual operation. During periodic tests, it is necessary to ensure that the reactor remains operational throughout the test, i.e., the main circuit maintains a reliable power supply path at all times.

[0040] This application includes test operation interlock logic, combined with... Figure 6The circuit structure incorporates an interlocking contact (SW01) in series with a three-position key switch for "main circuit breaker enabled, neutral position, and bypass circuit breaker enabled". This key switch is a lockable three-position switch, and its interlocking contact is connected in series with the mechanical auxiliary contact for circuit breaker closing to form a hard-wired interlocking circuit. If the bypass circuit breaker GS053 is not closed, even if the key switch is switched to the main circuit breaker enabled position, pressing the opening button SO01 will not activate the control circuit, and GS051 will remain closed. If GS053 is reliably closed, switching the key switch to the main circuit breaker enabled position and pressing the SO01 button will normally trigger the circuit to open, causing GS051 to perform the opening action.

[0041] During periodic testing of the main circuit breaker and bypass circuit breaker, the bypass circuit breaker is closed first. The operator first sets the key switch SW01 to the bypass circuit breaker's permitted position, which corresponds to the bypass circuit breaker's permitted position, neutral position, and main circuit breaker's permitted position. With the bypass circuit breaker in the permitted position, the bypass circuit breaker's closing button SC02 is pressed, and the bypass circuit breaker performs the closing operation. At this time, the main circuit breaker remains closed, and the two circuit breakers operate in parallel, sharing power, ensuring normal power supply to the downstream load.

[0042] After the bypass circuit breaker is closed, the main circuit breaker is then controlled to open. After confirming the bypass circuit breaker is closed, the operator switches the key switch to the main circuit breaker's permitted position. In the permitted position, the main circuit breaker's open button SO01 is pressed, and the main circuit breaker performs the open operation. At this time, because the bypass circuit breaker is still closed, the downstream load is independently powered by the bypass circuit breaker, and the reactor control rod drive mechanism remains powered, preventing a reactor shutdown. Simultaneously, this operation method effectively verifies the integrity of the main circuit breaker's open function.

[0043] After the main circuit breaker is opened, it is controlled to close. After the opening test of the main circuit breaker is completed, the operator presses the closing button SC01 of the main circuit breaker, and the main circuit breaker performs the closing operation and returns to the closed state. At this time, the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker are once again in a dual-circuit parallel power supply state, and the closing function of the main circuit breaker is synchronously verified.

[0044] After the main circuit breaker is closed, the bypass circuit breaker is then opened. After the main circuit breaker is reopened, the operator switches the key switch back to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position and presses the bypass circuit breaker's open button SO02. The bypass circuit breaker then performs the open operation. Once GS053 is confirmed to be open, the single-item test step is complete. At this time, because the main circuit breaker is in the closed state, the downstream load is independently powered by the main circuit breaker, and the reactor control rod drive mechanism continues to operate under energized conditions, preventing a reactor shutdown. After the test, the operator then keeps the bypass circuit breaker in the open state, and the system returns to normal operation with the main circuit breaker independently powered.

[0045] Through the above-mentioned hard-wired interlocking logic, this application realizes the electrical forced interlocking protection of circuit breaker operation. Relying on the key switch position restriction and the linkage interlocking of the circuit breaker auxiliary contacts, it can effectively avoid human error scenarios, eliminate the risk of plant shutdown caused by accidental tripping of multiple circuit breakers due to misoperation, and comprehensively improve the operational safety level of nuclear power supply circuits.

[0046] The above are some specific implementations of a reactor shutdown control method provided in the embodiments of this application. Based on this, this application also provides a corresponding system and a reactor shutdown circuit breaker cabinet. The system provided in the embodiments of this application will be described below with reference to the corresponding accompanying drawings.

[0047] Figure 7 This is a schematic diagram of a reactor shutdown control system provided as an embodiment of this application. Figure 7 As shown in the embodiment of this application, the reactor shutdown control system 700 includes: The instruction receiving module 710 is composed of an intermediate relay group and is used to receive the tripping instructions output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor respectively. The normally open contact of the instruction receiving module changes from the open state to the closed state in response to the tripping instruction. The voting determination module 720 is composed of a contact matrix formed by the normally open contacts, and is used to perform a two-out-of-four voting logic determination. The power supply control module 730 corresponds to the shunt coil power supply circuit, and its conduction state is controlled by the two-out-of-four voting logic judgment result output by the voting judgment module. The tripping drive module 740, corresponding to the shunt coil, is used to receive power when the power supply control module is turned on, and to drive the circuit breaker to perform the tripping action.

[0048] In one implementation of this application, the series-parallel topology of the voting determination module is configured such that the electrical circuit of the voting determination module is turned on when any two or more of the four independent protection sequences simultaneously output a tripping command.

[0049] In one implementation of this application, the system further includes: The circuit diagnostic module, corresponding to the test unit, is connected in parallel with the circuit of the tripping drive module. It is used to inject detection current into the circuit of the tripping drive module during normal operation of the circuit breaker and monitor the impedance change of the circuit of the tripping drive module; and when an impedance abnormality is detected, it outputs a shunt coil fault alarm signal.

[0050] In one implementation of this application, the circuit breaker includes a main circuit breaker and a bypass circuit breaker, wherein the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker are connected in parallel; the system further includes: An operation interlock module, corresponding to a key switch, the operation interlock module having a bypass circuit breaker permitted position and a main circuit breaker permitted position; Under periodic test conditions, after the operation interlock module switches to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position, it controls the bypass circuit breaker to perform a closing operation; after the operation interlock module switches to the main circuit breaker's allowed position, it controls the main circuit breaker to perform a opening operation; after the main circuit breaker completes the closing operation, the operation interlock module switches to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position and controls the bypass circuit breaker to perform a opening operation.

[0051] In one implementation of this application, the system is configured with multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers. The molded case circuit breakers are non-protected circuit breakers and only have shunt tripping function, which are used to cooperate with the tripping drive module to complete the tripping action.

[0052] This application also provides a reactor shutdown circuit breaker cabinet, including multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers, intermediate relay groups, contact matrices, and shunt coils. The multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers are non-protective circuit breakers with only shunt tripping functionality. The main circuit breaker and bypass circuit breaker in each pair are connected in parallel. The intermediate relay group receives tripping commands from the four independent protection sequences of the reactor and drives the normally open contacts of the intermediate relay group to operate. The contact matrix, formed by connecting normally open contacts, is used to implement a two-out-of-four voting logic. The power supply circuit of the shunt coil is connected in series at the output of the contact matrix and is used to drive the molded case circuit breakers to perform tripping operations when the two-out-of-four voting logic is valid. The main circuit breaker and bypass circuit breaker of each pair of molded case circuit breakers are connected in parallel, and the output terminals are combined to supply power downstream, which can meet the requirements of online non-stop reactor testing. This invention uses an unprotected molded case circuit breaker. This circuit breaker is not equipped with a thermal trip unit or a short-circuit magnetic trip unit. It belongs to the type of molded case circuit breaker with shunt trip function, which is simple in structure, highly reliable and maintenance-free.

[0053] This application also provides corresponding devices and computer storage media for implementing the solutions provided in this application.

[0054] The device includes a memory and a processor. The memory stores instructions or code, and the processor executes the instructions or code to cause the device to perform the method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0055] The computer storage medium stores code, and when the code is run, the device running the code implements the method described in any embodiment of this application.

[0056] As can be seen from the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that all or part of the steps in the methods of the above embodiments can be implemented by means of software plus a general-purpose hardware platform. Based on this understanding, the technical solution of this application can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a storage medium, such as a read-only memory (ROM) / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., including several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, a server, or a network communication device such as a router) to execute the methods described in various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments of this application.

[0057] It is understood that in the specific embodiments of this application, the user information (including but not limited to user device information, user personal information, etc.) and data (including but not limited to data used for analysis, data stored, data displayed, etc.) involved need to obtain user permission or consent when the above embodiments of this application are applied to specific products or technologies, and the collection, use and processing of related data need to comply with the relevant laws, regulations and standards of relevant countries and regions.

[0058] It should be noted that, in this document, relational terms such as "first" and "second" are used only to distinguish one entity or operation from another, and do not necessarily require or imply any such actual relationship or order between these entities or operations. Furthermore, the terms "comprising," "including," or any other variations thereof are intended to cover non-exclusive inclusion, such that a process, method, article, or apparatus that comprises a list of elements includes not only those elements but also other elements not expressly listed, or elements inherent to such a process, method, article, or apparatus. Without further limitations, an element defined by the phrase "comprising one..." does not exclude the presence of other identical elements in the process, method, article, or apparatus that includes said element.

[0059] It should also be noted that the various embodiments in this specification are described in a progressive manner, and the same or similar parts between the various embodiments can be referred to mutually. Each embodiment focuses on describing the differences from other embodiments. In particular, for the device and system embodiments, since they are basically similar to the method embodiments, the description is relatively simple, and the relevant parts can be referred to the description of the method embodiments. The device and system embodiments described above are merely illustrative. The units described as separate components may or may not be physically separate, and the components indicated as units may or may not be physical units, that is, they may be located in one place or distributed across multiple network units. Some or all of the modules can be selected to achieve the purpose of the solution in this embodiment according to actual needs. Those skilled in the art can understand and implement this without creative effort.

[0060] The above description is merely one specific embodiment of this application, but the scope of protection of this application is not limited thereto. Any variations or substitutions that can be easily conceived by those skilled in the art within the technical scope disclosed in this application should be included within the scope of protection of this application. Therefore, the scope of protection of this application should be determined by the scope of the claims.

Claims

1. A reactor shutdown control method, characterized by, An application in a reactor shutdown control system, the control system comprising a contact matrix formed by normally open contacts of intermediate relays, the method comprising: Obtain the trip commands output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor; The intermediate relay receives the tripping command output by each group of protection sequences, causing the normally open contact of the intermediate relay to change from the open state to the closed state. The four-out-of-two voting logic is executed based on the aforementioned contact matrix; When the result of the two-out-of-four voting logic is a valid tripping condition, the power supply circuit corresponding to the shunt coil is turned on. The circuit breaker is driven by the shunt coil that is powered to perform the tripping action, thereby completing the reactor shutdown control.

2. The method of claim 1, wherein, The series-parallel topology of the contact matrix is ​​configured such that the electrical circuit of the contact matrix is ​​turned on if and only if any two or more of the four independent protection sequences simultaneously output a trip command.

3. The method of claim 1, wherein, The method further includes: During normal operation of the circuit breaker, a detection current is injected in parallel into the shunt coil circuit through the test unit; Monitor the impedance change of the shunt coil circuit; When an impedance abnormality is detected, a shunt coil fault alarm signal is output.

4. The method of claim 1, wherein, The circuit breaker includes a main circuit breaker and a bypass circuit breaker, wherein the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker are connected in parallel; the method further includes: When conducting periodic tests on the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker, first control the bypass circuit breaker to close. After the bypass circuit breaker is closed, the main circuit breaker is then controlled to open. After the main circuit breaker is opened, control the main circuit breaker to close. After the main circuit breaker is closed, the bypass circuit breaker is then controlled to open.

5. A reactor shutdown control system characterized by, The system includes: The instruction receiving module, consisting of an intermediate relay group, is used to receive the tripping instructions output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor respectively. The normally open contact of the instruction receiving module changes from the open state to the closed state in response to the tripping instruction. The voting determination module is composed of a contact matrix formed by the normally open contacts, and is used to perform a two-out-of-four voting logic determination. The power supply control module, corresponding to the shunt coil power supply circuit, has its conduction state controlled by the two-out-of-four voting logic judgment result output by the voting judgment module. The tripping drive module, corresponding to the shunt coil, is used to receive power when the power supply control module is turned on, and to drive the circuit breaker to perform the tripping action.

6. The system of claim 5, wherein, The series-parallel topology of the voting determination module is configured such that the electrical circuit of the voting determination module is turned on only when any two or more of the four independent protection sequences simultaneously output tripping commands.

7. The system of claim 5, wherein, The system also includes: The circuit diagnostic module is connected in parallel with the circuit of the tripping drive module. It is used to inject detection current into the circuit of the tripping drive module during normal operation of the circuit breaker and monitor the impedance change of the circuit of the tripping drive module. When an impedance abnormality is detected, it outputs a shunt coil fault alarm signal.

8. The system of claim 5, wherein, The circuit breaker includes a main circuit breaker and a bypass circuit breaker, wherein the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker are connected in parallel; the system further includes: An operation interlock module, corresponding to a key switch, the operation interlock module having a bypass circuit breaker permitted position and a main circuit breaker permitted position; Under periodic test conditions, after the operation interlock module switches to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position, it controls the bypass circuit breaker to perform a closing operation; after the operation interlock module switches to the main circuit breaker's allowed position, it controls the main circuit breaker to perform a opening operation; after the main circuit breaker completes the closing operation, the operation interlock module switches to the bypass circuit breaker's allowed position and controls the bypass circuit breaker to perform a opening operation.

9. The system of claim 5, wherein, The system is configured with multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers. These molded case circuit breakers are non-protected circuit breakers and only have shunt tripping function, which are used to cooperate with the tripping drive module to complete the tripping action.

10. A reactor trip breaker cabinet characterized by, include: Multiple pairs of molded case circuit breakers, wherein the molded case circuit breakers are non-protected circuit breakers and only have shunt tripping function, and the main circuit breaker and the bypass circuit breaker in each pair of molded case circuit breakers are connected in parallel. The intermediate relay group is used to receive the tripping commands output by the four independent protection sequences of the reactor and drive the normally open contacts of the intermediate relay group to operate. The contact matrix, formed by connecting the normally open contacts, is used to implement the two-out-of-four voting logic. The shunt coil, whose power supply circuit is connected in series with the output terminal of the contact matrix, is used to drive the molded case circuit breaker to perform a tripping action when the two-out-of-four voting logic is true.

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