A method and system for dynamic access control of a vehicle communication network of a working machine

Abstract

The application discloses an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network dynamic access control method and system, a cloud certificate platform data processing method, a vehicle terminal data processing method and a user terminal data processing method. The cloud certificate platform data processing method is used for being responsible for global identity, access control strategy and certificate management. The vehicle terminal data processing method is used for being responsible for authentication, authentication and emergency. The user terminal data processing method is used for being responsible for safe storage and proxy calculation. The engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network dynamic access control method and system provided by the application systematically solve the problems of access control security, real-time performance and robustness of engineering machinery vehicles in complex, high security requirement and network condition changeable construction operation environments.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to a dynamic access control method and system for an onboard communication network of engineering machinery, belonging to the field of communication security technology. Background Technology

[0002] With the deepening development of intelligent construction machinery, the access security of its vehicle-mounted communication network faces increasingly severe challenges. Traditional access control methods generally adopt static permission allocation based on fixed roles, which is difficult to adapt to the complex and ever-changing temporary tasks on construction sites. The granularity of permissions is coarse and prone to over-granting. At the same time, its authentication mechanism is usually relatively simple, and there is a risk of replay attacks and impersonation.

[0003] In addition, existing solutions lack the ability to perform real-time fine-grained authentication and dynamic policy adjustment for individual user operation commands. Furthermore, in work sites with unstable or interrupted networks, the user authorization process can easily come to a complete standstill, making it difficult to guarantee the continuity of operations and meet emergency needs.

[0004] Therefore, there is an urgent need to design an intelligent access control method that can achieve scenario-based dynamic authorization, strong security authentication, command-level real-time control, and offline emergency response capabilities. Summary of the Invention

[0005] Objective: In order to overcome the shortcomings of the existing technology, the present invention provides a dynamic access control method and system for on-board communication networks of engineering machinery.

[0006] Technical solution: To solve the above technical problems, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows:

[0007] Firstly, a dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network specifically includes: a cloud certificate platform data processing method, a vehicle terminal data processing method, and a user terminal data processing method.

[0008] The cloud certificate platform data processing method is used to manage global identity, access control policies, and certificates.

[0009] The vehicle terminal data processing method is used for authentication, authorization, and emergency response.

[0010] The user terminal data processing method is responsible for secure storage and proxy computing.

[0011] Optionally, the cloud certificate platform data processing method specifically includes:

[0012] Step 1: Initial registration of vehicles and users and issuance of long-term certificates.

[0013] Step 2: Dynamic issuance of scenario-based micro-certificates.

[0014] Step 3: Continuous monitoring and dynamic upgrade of access control policies.

[0015] Optionally, the vehicle terminal data processing method specifically includes:

[0016] Step 1: Strong two-factor authentication and session establishment.

[0017] Step 2: Continuous authentication of vehicle operation commands.

[0018] Step 3: Offline emergency response and local certificate issuance.

[0019] Optionally, the user terminal data processing method specifically includes:

[0020] Step 1: Storage and renewal of long-term certificates and micro certificates.

[0021] Step 2: Respond to the authentication challenge.

[0022] Step 3: Generate and submit vehicle operation instructions.

[0023] Secondly, a dynamic access control system for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network specifically includes: a cloud certificate platform data processing module, a vehicle terminal data processing module, and a user terminal data processing module.

[0024] The cloud certificate platform data processing module is responsible for global identity, access control policies, and certificate management.

[0025] The vehicle terminal data processing module is responsible for authentication, authorization, and emergency response.

[0026] The user terminal data processing module is responsible for secure storage and proxy computing.

[0027] Beneficial Effects: This invention provides a dynamic access control method and system for onboard communication networks of construction machinery. This invention enables dynamic authorization based on the minimum permissions for specific user tasks, ensuring on-site, secure, and reliable two-way authentication. It also supports real-time authentication and compliance checks for each user operation command, and can dynamically adjust access policies and even revoke access credentials instantly based on continuous cloud monitoring and analysis results. Furthermore, in special circumstances such as network interruptions, a local offline micro-certificate issuance mechanism on the vehicle terminal ensures the continuity of temporary authorization, thereby systematically solving the access control security, real-time performance, and robustness issues faced by construction machinery vehicles in complex, high-safety-requirement, and variable network conditions during construction operations. Compared with existing technologies, the advantages of this invention are as follows:

[0028] (1) The two-layer certificate system architecture of “long-term identity certificate + scenario-based micro certificate”: long-term identity certificate is used to establish the lifelong basic identity of the vehicle and the user, and then combined with micro certificate issued by the cloud policy model, which has short-term validity and minimal operation permissions for dynamic authorization, thus realizing the dynamic, refined and temporary permissions from the architecture.

[0029] (2) A strong authentication mechanism that integrates near-field physical binding and out-of-band password challenge: The vehicle generates a QR code containing a dynamic challenge value, which is combined with the user terminal’s private key signature response and simultaneously requires Bluetooth or NFC near-field connection, thus providing dual protection for the authenticity of the user’s physical presence and effectively resisting remote attacks.

[0030] (3) Micro-certificate-based continuous authentication model: During the vehicle-user session establishment phase, the user's micro-certificate undergoes triple verification of cryptography, status, and certificate compliance. During the session, each user command is authenticated at the command level based on the permission set issued by the platform in real time and the permission set bound to the micro-certificate, realizing the transformation from one-time authentication to continuous verification.

[0031] (4) Dynamic upgrade of cloud access policy: The cloud uses federated learning to update access control policies and maps and generates permission sets to be synchronized to vehicles; at the same time, the cloud uses machine learning to analyze behavior logs in real time to realize anomaly detection and risk response (such as immediate revocation of user certificates). Vehicles can receive and apply the real-time updated permission sets incrementally and feed back the execution logs to the cloud in real time, forming a closed loop of access policy generation and execution.

[0032] (5) The guarantee mechanism for offline emergency certificate issuance of vehicle terminals: When the network is interrupted, the vehicle terminal can issue short-term temporary micro-certificates to the user terminal using its own private key according to the preset local policy. Under the premise of ensuring basic security constraints, the continuity of vehicle critical operations is maintained, which solves the availability problem of access control system under special environment. Attached Figure Description

[0033] Figure 1 This is a flowchart of a dynamic access control method for an onboard communication network of engineering machinery.

[0034] Figure 2 This is a diagram of the architecture of a dynamic access control system for an onboard communication network for engineering machinery. Detailed Implementation

[0035] The technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the protection scope of the present invention.

[0036] The present invention will be further described below with reference to specific embodiments.

[0037] Example 1:

[0038] This embodiment introduces a dynamic access control method for onboard communication networks of engineering machinery, such as... Figure 1 As shown, this specifically includes: cloud certificate platform data processing methods, vehicle terminal data processing methods, and user terminal data processing methods.

[0039] The cloud certificate platform data processing method is responsible for global identity, access control policies, and certificate management. Specifically, it includes:

[0040] Step 1, Initial vehicle and user registration and long-term certificate issuance, specifically includes:

[0041] Retrieve vehicle information and user information. Vehicle information includes: Vehicle VIN code and vehicle public key. User information includes: User ID, role (e.g., vehicle operator, maintenance personnel, administrator), and user public key.

[0042] The cloud-based certificate platform verifies the authenticity of vehicle and user information, such as verifying the vehicle's VIN code through the enterprise's vehicle networking platform and verifying the user's identity through the enterprise's employee identity authentication platform. Once identity verification is successful, proceed to the next step.

[0043] Using the root private key of the cloud certificate platform, long-term certificates in X.509 format are issued for both the vehicle and the user, and stored on the vehicle terminal and the user terminal respectively.

[0044] This step is used to establish a lifelong basic identity for all communication entities (vehicles, users) within the system, which serves as a root of trust for subsequent dynamic authorization and issuance.

[0045] Step 2, dynamic issuance of scenario-based micro-certificates, specifically includes:

[0046] Obtain the user terminal's issuance request, which includes: vehicle VIN code, requesting user ID, and requesting task scenario code (e.g., crane hoisting operation).

[0047] Obtain context information uploaded by the vehicle terminal, including: real-time vehicle location, operating conditions, and environmental data.

[0048] Obtain the latest access control policy.

[0049] Input the user-issued request and vehicle context information into the access control policy, and output the permission set (e.g., allow operation of the boom and forearm, prohibit operation of the walking system).

[0050] The cloud-based certificate platform generates a short-term (e.g., 2-hour) micro-certificate based on the permission set, signs it with its own private key, and then distributes it to the user terminal. The micro-certificate contains the vehicle VIN, user ID, validity period, and permission set.

[0051] This step is used to transform static, long-term identities into dynamic, context-specific, and minimal temporary operating permissions, thereby implementing a dynamic access control mechanism.

[0052] Step 3, continuous monitoring and dynamic strategy upgrades, specifically including:

[0053] Obtain real-time behavior logs reported by the vehicle terminal, including user operation commands, authentication results, vehicle status, and other data.

[0054] Access the industry's real-time updated threat and vulnerability database.

[0055] The cloud-based certificate platform performs real-time analysis of behavior logs to detect abnormal patterns, such as frequent invalid commands and unauthorized access attempts. Based on these abnormal patterns, it generates alarm messages to notify platform operations and maintenance personnel. If the alarm message indicates a high risk and operations and maintenance personnel fail to address it promptly, the cloud-based certificate platform has the right to independently execute response strategies, such as generating a micro-certificate revocation command and sending it to the vehicle terminal.

[0056] The cloud-based certificate platform dynamically updates access control policies by aggregating execution feedback vectors from multiple vehicle terminals and combining them with an industry-wide, real-time updated threat and vulnerability database. It then synchronizes the permission sets mapped to these access control policies to the vehicle terminals. The vehicle terminals can receive these updated permission sets in real time and seamlessly upgrade them locally within the vehicle.

[0057] This step optimizes the strategy from static to dynamic intelligence and enables near real-time blocking of high-risk operations on the vehicle, forming a closed loop of "monitoring-analysis-decision-execution".

[0058] The vehicle terminal data processing method, responsible for authentication, authorization, and emergency response, can be a vehicle's TBOX, gateway, display, or domain controller, and specifically includes:

[0059] Step 1: Strong two-factor authentication and session establishment, specifically including:

[0060] When a user arrives at the construction site of the engineering machinery, they can activate the "Connect Vehicle" function on their user terminal.

[0061] The vehicle terminal generates a timestamp and a one-time random challenge value, which are then encoded into a QR code and displayed on the cockpit screen. Simultaneously, Bluetooth / NFC is activated to prepare for near-field connection.

[0062] Factor 1 (Out-of-band cryptography): The user terminal scans the QR code, signs the challenge value using the user's private key, and sends the challenge response and long-term certificate back to the vehicle terminal via Bluetooth / NFC channel.

[0063] Factor 2 (Near Field Physics): The vehicle terminal verifies the Bluetooth / NFC connection signal strength within a very short distance range.

[0064] After successful out-of-band cryptographic and near-field physical two-factor authentication, the vehicle terminal obtains the micro-certificate from the user terminal and performs cryptographic verification, status verification, and certificate compliance verification on the micro-certificate. Upon successful verification, a secure session channel is established between the vehicle terminal and the user terminal, and the permission set from the micro-certificate is loaded into memory as the basis for subsequent instruction-level authentication.

[0065] This step verifies the validity of the micro-certificate and the user's near-field communication, ensuring the user's identity is legitimate and physically present, and defending against remote relay attacks.

[0066] Step 2: Instruction-level continuous authentication, specifically including:

[0067] Obtain vehicle operation commands from the user terminal.

[0068] After verifying the digital signature based on the user's private key in the vehicle operation command, the vehicle terminal parses and maps the command to the corresponding permission set. The permission set stored in the vehicle terminal is the intersection of the user terminal's micro-certificate permission set and the permission set dynamically updated and issued by the cloud certificate platform. If a vehicle operation command cannot be mapped to the corresponding permission set, the vehicle terminal refuses to receive the command and sends a rejection response to the user terminal. After parsing and mapping the command to the corresponding permission set, the vehicle terminal forwards the command to the in-vehicle bus ECU for execution.

[0069] The process of vehicle terminal signing and verifying vehicle operation commands and mapping permission sets generates relevant logs that are reported to the cloud certificate platform.

[0070] This step transforms one-time authentication into continuous verification, ensuring that commands are filtered according to the principle of least privilege. Each command sent from the user terminal to the vehicle terminal is first initially filtered by the micro-certificate permission set in the user terminal before being signed and sent to the vehicle terminal. After receiving the command, the vehicle terminal verifies the signature of each command. Once the verification is successful, it is mapped to the permission set stored in the vehicle terminal (the permission set stored in the vehicle terminal is the intersection of the user terminal's micro-certificate permission set and the permission set dynamically updated and issued by the cloud certificate platform). This enables dynamic, real-time, and fine-grained control of the vehicle operation process.

[0071] Step 3: Offline emergency response and local certificate issuance, specifically including:

[0072] When a network interruption is detected and the local offline policy is met, a temporary micro-certificate with a validity period of no more than 2 hours is issued using the vehicle's private key.

[0073] The vehicle terminal is permitted to issue a temporary micro-certificate to the user terminal when all of the following conditions are met:

[0074] (1) The vehicle terminal detected no effective network connection for 30 consecutive minutes.

[0075] (2) The user terminal completes physical presence verification through the near-field authentication function.

[0076] (3) The valid long-term identity certificate role presented by the user terminal belongs to the pre-set offline authorized role set.

[0077] (4) The operation type requested by the user matches the list of allowed operations in the offline policy package cached locally (e.g., "vehicle basic action operation" permission can only be issued to the "driver" role).

[0078] (5) The current vehicle is not in a high-risk state (e.g., the vehicle does not have serious fault codes).

[0079] Based on local offline policy conditions, determine whether the current user terminal and scenario meet the conditions for issuing temporary micro-certificates offline.

[0080] Using the vehicle terminal's local private key, a short-term (e.g., 30 minutes) temporary micro-certificate with highly restricted permissions is issued and sent to the user terminal to replace the expired micro-certificate. Simultaneously, the issuance log is cached locally and reported to the cloud certificate platform after network recovery.

[0081] This step is designed to ensure vehicle operational availability in extreme situations by sacrificing some flexibility (fewer permissions, shorter timeframes) while ensuring user identity and pre-defined basic policies. It is a key design feature for robustness.

[0082] The user terminal data processing method, which is responsible for secure storage and proxy computation, specifically includes:

[0083] Step 1: Storage and Update, specifically including:

[0084] Obtain long-term user certificates and micro certificates from the cloud certificate platform, and obtain temporary micro certificates from the vehicle terminal.

[0085] Store user long-term certificates, micro certificates, and temporary micro certificates in a secure area.

[0086] This step is the cornerstone of secure user identity storage and maintains up-to-date policy awareness synchronized with the cloud, providing a foundation for participation in authentication and command generation.

[0087] Step 2: Respond to the certification challenge, which includes:

[0088] The user terminal initiates the "Connect to Vehicle" function to obtain the dynamic challenge value of the vehicle terminal.

[0089] The user terminal retrieves the private key from the secure area, digitally signs the dynamic challenge value, and sends the authentication response and the user's long-term certificate to the vehicle terminal via Bluetooth / NFC channel. The vehicle terminal uses the public key in the user terminal's long-term certificate to verify the challenge value signature.

[0090] This step is a core part of the vehicle terminal and user terminal identity authentication.

[0091] Step 3: Generating and submitting vehicle operation instructions, specifically including:

[0092] The user terminal triggers vehicle operation commands (such as sending a "lift boom" command).

[0093] Before the command is sent, the permission set in the user terminal micro certificate can make a preliminary compliance judgment on the vehicle operation command, and provide prompts or block obvious violations, thereby reducing the burden on the vehicle terminal.

[0094] After the initial compliance assessment of the vehicle operation instructions is passed, the vehicle operation instructions are attached with a digital signature based on the private key of the micro-certificate or temporary micro-certificate, encapsulated and encoded into a standard protocol, and sent to the vehicle terminal.

[0095] This step is used to perform preliminary compliance filtering of vehicle operation commands from the user terminal, thereby improving the overall system efficiency and user experience.

[0096] Example 2:

[0097] This embodiment introduces a dynamic access control system for an onboard communication network of engineering machinery, such as... Figure 2 As shown, it specifically includes: a cloud certificate platform data processing module, a vehicle terminal data processing module, and a user terminal data processing module.

[0098] The cloud certificate platform data processing module is responsible for global identity, access control policies, and certificate management.

[0099] The vehicle terminal data processing module is responsible for authentication, authorization, and emergency response.

[0100] The user terminal data processing module is responsible for secure storage and proxy computing.

[0101] Example 3:

[0102] This embodiment describes the implementation process of a dynamic access control system for an onboard communication network of engineering machinery, specifically including:

[0103] The cloud-based certificate platform serves as the central hub for trust and policy management across the entire system, and comprises the following subsystems:

[0104] Identity Certificate Management System: When a vehicle leaves the factory, a unique identity certificate is issued for each vehicle. The certificate and its private key are stored in the vehicle's hardware security module. At the same time, personal identity certificates are issued for various vehicle users (such as vehicle operators, maintenance personnel, and management personnel), serving as their root identity in the system.

[0105] Vehicle terminal information acquisition system: Receives and processes data uploaded by vehicle terminals in real time, including: {vehicle time and location information: GPS location; UTC time}, {vehicle operating condition information: current operating mode, such as transportation, excavation, loading, hoisting, etc.; key sensor status, such as engine speed, load weight; alarms and fault codes}, {vehicle network information, such as trusted Wi-Fi, cellular network}.

[0106] Micro Certificate Issuance System: Receives authorization requests from users or upstream business systems, dynamically generates a minimal permission statement with rich constraints by combining vehicle terminal information and a predefined security policy library, and issues a short-term valid micro certificate based on this statement. The micro certificate is signed using the private key of the cloud certificate platform, making it a sub-credential trusted by the vehicle user.

[0107] The cloud certificate platform issues micro-certificates based on a federated learning strategy. It aggregates execution feedback vectors corresponding to access control policies from multiple vehicle terminals, trains a context-to-permission granularity mapping network using a differential privacy-preserving security mechanism, and dynamically updates the security policy library. Specifically, this includes:

[0108] Step 1.1: The cloud certificate platform receives the execution feedback vector of the access control policy uploaded by each vehicle terminal. The execution feedback vector includes {context_hash, authorization type code perm_id, operation success flag success, and anomaly detection tag anomaly}. An example of the execution feedback vector is: {context_hash=0xabc, perm_id=0x07, success=1, anomaly=0}.

[0109] Step 1.2: The cloud certificate platform adds differential privacy noise to each execution feedback vector uploaded by the vehicle terminal and then performs secure aggregation to obtain the aggregation result, ensuring that the specific vehicle or location cannot be deduced.

[0110] Step 1.3: Update the access control policy using the aggregation results. Input the vehicle context information into the updated access control policy and output the optimal permission set.

[0111] Step 1.4: Push the updated permission set to all vehicle terminals through a secure channel to achieve hot update of access control permissions.

[0112] Step 1.5: The user terminal issues vehicle operation commands, invokes the permission set of the micro-certificate, and automatically performs compliance verification of the vehicle operation commands, replacing the process of manually writing vehicle access rules. The cloud certificate platform can enable the entire construction machinery fleet to collectively learn how to dynamically authorize more securely and accurately without leaking the original sensitive data of each vehicle, thereby achieving adaptive optimization of access control policies and permission sets.

[0113] Microcertificates use the X.509 v3 format and embed user permissions and context constraint descriptions in their custom extended fields, including:

[0114] mc:targetEquipment: The specific device identifier that this certificate authorizes access to.

[0115] mc:permissionMatrix: A fine-grained access matrix that explicitly lists each onboard electronic control unit that is allowed access to, along with its executable operations (read, write, calibration, reset, etc.) and the valid range of values ​​for its operating parameters.

[0116] mc:validityContext: Defines a dynamic set of context conditions for certificate validity, including an absolute time window, relative time (e.g., 4 hours from the first use), dynamic geofence (which can be updated as the vehicle moves), and a combination of operating conditions that the vehicle must meet.

[0117] mc:usagePolicy: Use policies such as maximum number of connections, whether to allow session persistence, and whether to require secondary biometric verification of the operator.

[0118] Micro Certificate Management System: Maintains a global list of revoked micro certificates. When a certificate needs to be revoked, the cloud sends the revocation command to the vehicle terminal in real time based on a predefined protocol such as MQTT, ensuring that the security policy takes effect within seconds.

[0119] The vehicle terminal serves as the security boundary and policy enforcement element for both internal and external vehicle networks. It incorporates a built-in cryptographic algorithm engine and includes the following modules:

[0120] Secure Communication Proxy Module: Responsible for establishing a TLS / DTLS secure channel with cloud services and vehicle user terminals based on two-way certificate authentication.

[0121] Micro Certificate Verification Module: When a vehicle user terminal attempts to connect to the vehicle, this module performs a rigorous verification process.

[0122] a) Cryptographic verification: Use the platform's public key to verify the validity of the long-term certificate and micro certificate signature presented by the user terminal, and match the vehicle VIN code in the micro certificate to ensure that the certificate chain can be traced back to the local device certificate.

[0123] b) Status verification: Check the cloud or local cache to confirm that the micro certificate has not been revoked.

[0124] c) Certificate Compliance Verification: Real-time comparison of the vehicle's current status with the constraints embedded in the micro-certificate, including: {Time Constraints: Certificate Effective Date, Certificate Expiration Date}, {Geofence: Geographical Location Range Defined by the Certificate}, and {Working Condition Constraints: Current Vehicle Operating Mode}. Once all constraints are verified successfully, a session is established and the detailed permission set of the micro-certificate is loaded.

[0125] Access control module: Performs real-time authentication on control commands (such as Set_Engine_RPM=1500) or data requests sent from user terminals. The authentication is based not only on the static permission list, but also on dynamic checks of command parameters (such as determining whether the target RPM value of 1500 exceeds the limit).

[0126] Offline micro-certificate issuance module: When a network interruption is detected and the local offline policy is met, a temporary micro-certificate with a validity period of no more than 2 hours is issued using the vehicle's private key. The vehicle terminal is allowed to issue temporary micro-certificates to users when all of the following conditions are met:

[0127] a) The vehicle terminal detected no valid network connection for 30 consecutive minutes;

[0128] b) The user terminal completes physical presence verification through the near-field authentication function;

[0129] c) The valid long-term identity certificate presented by the user belongs to a pre-set set of offline authorized roles;

[0130] d) The type of operation requested by the user matches the list of allowed operations in the locally cached offline policy package;

[0131] e) The vehicle is not currently in a high-risk condition (e.g., the vehicle does not have any serious fault codes).

[0132] Security audit module: Generates logs of all connection events, authentication decisions, control commands, and vehicle status snapshots, and reports them to the cloud-based security operations center.

[0133] The offline micro-certificate issuance module specifically includes:

[0134] Step 2.1, Cryptographic Verification: Use the platform's public key to verify the validity of the long-term certificate and micro certificate signature presented by the user terminal, match the vehicle VIN code in the micro certificate, and ensure that the certificate chain can be traced back to the local device certificate.

[0135] Step 2.2, Status Verification: Query the cloud or local cache to confirm that the micro certificate has not been revoked.

[0136] Step 2.3, Certificate Compliance Verification: The current vehicle status is compared in real-time with the constraints embedded in the micro-certificate, including: {Time Constraints: Certificate effective date, Certificate expiration date}, {Geofence: Geographical location range defined by the certificate}, and {Working Condition Constraints: Current vehicle operating mode}. Once all constraints are verified successfully, a session is established and the permission set is loaded.

[0137] Step 2.4: The vehicle terminal detected no valid network connection for 30 consecutive minutes.

[0138] Step 2.5: The user terminal completes physical presence verification through the near-field authentication function.

[0139] Step 2.6: The valid long-term identity certificate presented by the user belongs to the pre-set set of offline authorized roles.

[0140] Step 2.7: Match the user's requested operation type to the allowed operation list in the locally cached offline policy package.

[0141] Step 2.8: The current vehicle condition is not in a high-risk state (e.g., the vehicle does not have any serious fault codes).

[0142] The user terminal is used by vehicle operators, maintenance personnel, etc., via dedicated mobile devices (tablets, mobile phones) or remote control software, and has the following modules:

[0143] User key storage module: Utilizes the terminal device's TEE or security chip to securely store the user's personal long-term identity certificate private key, with all private key operations completed in a secure environment.

[0144] User Certificate Management Module: Manages all micro-certificates currently held by the user. Supports automatic certificate renewal, expiration reminders, and one-click application. The signing private key corresponding to the micro-certificate is generated and stored locally on the terminal, ensuring the non-repudiation of operations.

[0145] Near Field Connectivity Module: Provides near field interaction functions such as Bluetooth, NFC, and QR code scanning to establish an initial, out-of-band authenticated physical connection with the target vehicle, preventing "fake base station" attacks at the wireless network level.

[0146] Biometric binding module: Force fingerprint or facial recognition when a user performs high-risk operations, and embed the biometric hash into the instruction signature.

[0147] Furthermore, the method for implementing dynamic access control in the above-described system includes the following steps:

[0148] S1: Vehicle and User Identity Initialization. Before leaving the factory, construction machinery vehicles complete an online application for a long-term identity certificate upon their first power-on, and the certificate is stored in the vehicle's hardware security module. For new vehicle users, the administrator creates a user profile on the cloud certificate platform, specifies the user's role, department, and initial permission scope, and issues a personal long-term identity certificate. The certificate is encrypted and pushed to the trusted execution environment or security chip of the user's secure terminal. Upon first login, the user must complete biometric binding to activate the long-term identity certificate usage rights.

[0149] S2: Contextualized micro-certificate issuance. When a user needs to perform a specific task (such as triggering a maintenance work order), the user terminal or upstream business system sends a request to the cloud certificate platform. The platform calls the access control policy trained by the micro-certificate issuance system, outputs an optimal set of permissions with minimal privileges, issues a micro-certificate bound to that permission set, and pushes it to the user terminal.

[0150] S3: Establishment of a secure session between the vehicle and the user. Upon arrival at the construction site, the user activates the "Connect to Vehicle" function on their terminal. A dynamic QR code is generated on the display screen inside the vehicle's cab, containing a timestamp and a one-time random challenge value. The user terminal scans this QR code and signs the random challenge value using their private key, generating an out-of-band authentication response. Simultaneously, the user terminal establishes short-range communication with the vehicle terminal via Bluetooth or NFC, completing physical layer binding and near-field interaction to prevent initial authentication from being completed off-site.

[0151] S4: Vehicle-User Two-Way Authentication. During the TLS handshake process, the user terminal presents its micro-certificate. The vehicle terminal's micro-certificate verification module performs cryptographic verification, status verification, and certificate compliance verification on the certificate. Only when all three verifications pass is the session authorized, and the vehicle terminal loads the permission set from the micro-certificate.

[0152] S5: Vehicle-User Command-Level Authentication and Execution. Throughout the vehicle-user session lifecycle, each operation command issued by the user terminal is accompanied by a digital signature based on the user's private key. After verifying the signature of each command, the vehicle terminal performs command-level authentication based on the loaded user permission set and the command set issued in real-time by the platform, and checks whether the command parameters comply with dynamic constraints to prevent unauthorized operations. The vehicle terminal forwards all authenticated commands to the in-vehicle bus ECU for execution, and simultaneously generates an operation log which is uploaded to the cloud. If command authentication fails, the command is ignored, and the security event is reported to the cloud.

[0153] S6: Continuous monitoring and dynamic policy adjustment in the cloud. The cloud-based security operations center analyzes the operation logs of vehicles across the network in real time, continuously updating access control policies using a federated learning strategy. New policies are mapped to permission sets and distributed to the vehicle in incremental fragments, enabling dynamic updates of permission sets. Simultaneously, the cloud utilizes machine learning models to detect abnormal behavior patterns. Once a risky operation significantly deviates from the authorization of the micro-certificate is detected, the relevant micro-certificate can be revoked automatically or upon administrator confirmation via the real-time certificate status distribution service. Upon receiving the instruction, the vehicle terminal immediately terminates its session with the relevant user.

[0154] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention. It should be noted that for those skilled in the art, several improvements and modifications can be made without departing from the principle of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications should also be considered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method of dynamic access control for a work machine on-board communication network, characterized by: Specifically, it includes: Cloud certificate platform data processing methods, vehicle terminal data processing methods, and user terminal data processing methods; The cloud certificate platform data processing method is used to manage global identity, access control policies, and certificates. The vehicle terminal data processing method is used for authentication, authorization, and emergency response. The user terminal data processing method is responsible for secure storage and proxy computing.

2. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The cloud certificate platform data processing method specifically includes: Step 1: Initial vehicle and user registration and long-term certificate issuance; Step 2: Dynamic issuance of scenario-based micro-certificates; Step 3: Continuous monitoring and dynamic upgrade of access control policies.

3. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The vehicle terminal data processing method specifically includes: Step 1: Strong two-factor authentication and session establishment; Step 2: Continuous authentication of vehicle operation commands; Step 3: Offline emergency response and local certificate issuance.

4. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 1, characterized in that: The user terminal data processing method specifically includes: Step 1: Storage and renewal of long-term certificates and micro certificates; Step 2: Respond to the certification challenge; Step 3: Generate and submit vehicle operation instructions.

5. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 2, characterized in that: The initial registration of vehicles and users, and the issuance of long-term certificates, specifically include: Obtain vehicle information and user information; The cloud-based certificate platform verifies the authenticity of vehicle and user information; Using the root private key of the cloud certificate platform, long-term certificates are issued for vehicles and users respectively, and stored on the vehicle terminal and user terminal respectively. The dynamic issuance of the scenario-based micro-certificate specifically includes: Obtain the user terminal's issuance request; Obtain the context information uploaded by the vehicle terminal; Obtain the latest access control policy; Input the user's signature request and vehicle context information into the access control policy, and output the permission set; The cloud certificate platform generates a short-term micro-certificate based on the permission set, signs it with its own private key, and then sends it to the user terminal. The continuous monitoring and dynamic upgrade of access control policies specifically include: Obtain real-time behavior logs reported by the vehicle terminal; Access the industry's real-time updated threat and vulnerability database; The cloud certificate platform performs real-time analysis of behavior logs, detects abnormal patterns, and generates alarm information to notify platform operation and maintenance personnel based on the abnormal patterns; if the alarm information is determined to be high-risk and the operation and maintenance personnel fail to handle it in a timely manner, the cloud certificate platform will automatically execute response strategies. The cloud-based certificate platform dynamically updates access control policies by aggregating execution feedback vectors of access control policies from multiple vehicle terminals and combining them with an updated threat and vulnerability database. It also synchronizes the permission sets mapped by the access control policies to the vehicle terminals, which then receive the updated permission sets from the platform in real time.

6. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 3, characterized in that: The strong two-factor authentication and session establishment specifically include: The user terminal initiates the "Connect to Vehicle" function; The vehicle terminal generates a timestamp and a one-time random challenge value, which are then encoded into a QR code and displayed on the cockpit screen. At the same time, Bluetooth / NFC is activated to prepare for near-field connection. The user terminal scans the QR code, signs the challenge value using the user's private key, and sends the challenge response and long-term certificate back to the vehicle terminal via Bluetooth / NFC channel; The vehicle terminal verifies that the Bluetooth / NFC connection signal strength is within a very short range. After successful authentication, the vehicle terminal obtains the micro certificate through the user terminal and performs cryptographic verification, status verification, and certificate compliance verification on the micro certificate. After successful verification, a secure session channel is established between the vehicle terminal and the user terminal, and the permission set in the micro certificate is loaded into memory. The continuous authentication of vehicle operation commands specifically includes: Obtain vehicle operation commands from the user terminal; After verifying the digital signature based on the user's private key in the vehicle operation command, the vehicle terminal parses and maps the vehicle operation command to the corresponding permission set. The permission set stored in the vehicle terminal is the intersection of the user terminal's micro-certificate permission set and the permission set dynamically updated and issued by the cloud certificate platform. If the vehicle operation command cannot be mapped to the corresponding permission set, the vehicle terminal refuses to receive the vehicle operation command and sends a rejection response to the user terminal. After parsing and mapping the vehicle operation command to the corresponding permission set, the vehicle terminal forwards the vehicle operation command to the in-vehicle bus ECU for execution. The process of vehicle terminal signing and verifying vehicle operation commands and mapping permission sets generates relevant logs that are reported to the cloud certificate platform. The offline emergency response and local certificate issuance specifically include: When a network interruption is detected and the local offline policy is met, a temporary micro certificate with a validity period of no more than t hours is issued using the vehicle's private key and sent to the user terminal to replace the expired micro certificate; at the same time, the issuance log is cached locally and reported to the cloud certificate platform after the network is restored. The vehicle terminal is permitted to issue a temporary micro-certificate to the user terminal when all of the following conditions are met: (1) The vehicle terminal detected no valid network connection for 30 consecutive minutes; (2) The user terminal completes physical presence verification through the near-field authentication function; (3) The valid long-term identity certificate role presented by the user terminal belongs to the pre-set offline authorized role set; (4) The type of operation requested by the user matches the list of allowed operations in the offline policy package cached locally; (5) The current vehicle is not in a high-risk state.

7. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 4, characterized in that: The storage and updating of the long-term certificate and micro certificate specifically include: Obtain long-term user certificates and micro certificates from the cloud certificate platform, and obtain temporary micro certificates from the vehicle terminal; Store user long-term certificates, micro certificates, and temporary micro certificates in a secure area; The response authentication challenge specifically includes: The user terminal initiates the "Connect to Vehicle" function to obtain the dynamic challenge value of the vehicle terminal; The user terminal retrieves the private key in the secure area, digitally signs the dynamic challenge value, and sends the authentication response and the user's long-term certificate to the vehicle terminal via Bluetooth / NFC channel. The vehicle terminal uses the public key in the user terminal's long-term certificate to verify the challenge value signature. The generation and submission of vehicle operation instructions specifically include: The user terminal triggers vehicle operation commands; Before the vehicle operation command is sent, the permission set in the user terminal micro certificate performs a preliminary compliance judgment on the vehicle operation command, and provides a prompt or blocks obvious violations. After the initial compliance assessment of the vehicle operation instructions is passed, the vehicle operation instructions are attached with a digital signature based on the private key of the micro-certificate or temporary micro-certificate, encapsulated and encoded into a standard protocol, and sent to the vehicle terminal.

8. The dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 4, characterized in that: t=0.5。 9. A dynamic access control method for an engineering machinery vehicle-mounted communication network according to claim 5, characterized in that: The format of the micro certificate includes: mc:targetEquipment: A specific device identifier authorized by the certificate for access; mc:permissionMatrix: A fine-grained access matrix that explicitly lists each onboard electronic control unit that is allowed access, along with its executable operations and the valid range of values ​​for its operating parameters; mc:validityContext: Defines a dynamic set of context conditions for certificate validity, including absolute time window, relative time, dynamic geofence, and a combination of operating conditions that the vehicle must meet; mc:usagePolicy: Usage policy.

10. A dynamic access control system for an onboard communication network of engineering machinery, characterized in that: Specifically, it includes: Cloud certificate platform data processing module, vehicle terminal data processing module and user terminal data processing module; The cloud certificate platform data processing module is responsible for global identity, access control policies and certificate management. The vehicle terminal data processing module is responsible for authentication, authorization, and emergency response. The user terminal data processing module is responsible for secure storage and proxy computing.

Images