An end-to-end encryption network system and encryption communication method based on anti-quantum algorithm

Abstract

This invention relates to an end-to-end encrypted network system and encrypted communication method based on quantum-resistant algorithms, belonging to the field of quantum secure communication technology. The system consists of client access devices and aggregation gateway devices. Each device is pre-assigned a unique identifier and configured with a path label list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel. The client access device first completes single-hop authentication with the aggregation gateway, and then performs cross-network key negotiation with the peer access device based on quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms such as Kyber. During the negotiation process, both parties exchange PQC public keys, generate random numbers, and exchange them using KEM encryption. Finally, an end-to-end session key is generated through XOR operation. The communication message is encapsulated with an inner encrypted tunnel header and a path label list. The aggregation gateway forwards the message hop-by-hop based solely on the labels and cannot decrypt the message payload. This invention solves the security risks caused by traditional IPSec hop-by-hop decryption and the problem that protocols such as SIP cannot traverse NAT, while achieving resistance to quantum computing attacks, possessing both high security and wide applicability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of quantum secure communication technology, specifically relating to an end-to-end encrypted network system and encrypted communication method based on a quantum-resistant algorithm. Background Technology

[0002] Existing network layer encryption technologies generally use IPSec or its variants as the encryption protocol, employing IKE as the key negotiation technology to negotiate keys between two routers, forming an encrypted tunnel. To provide encrypted network services, hop-by-hop encryption / decryption is required between network nodes. For the customer, the encrypted traffic between the two endpoints is decrypted and then re-encrypted at the operator / service provider's aggregation equipment. This means the aggregation equipment can see the plaintext of the customer's packets, posing a certain security risk.

[0003] To avoid decryption operations at intermediate network nodes, some existing multimedia communication protocols (such as SIP) typically exchange IP addresses between the two access terminals in the control plane protocol, allowing direct encryption and decryption of traffic between the two access terminals. However, considering that most terminals on the current network do not have public IP addresses and are located behind NAT, direct communication between the two ends is not possible, thus this solution is not universally applicable.

[0004] Furthermore, with the development of quantum computing, traditional public-key algorithms such as RSA / ECC can theoretically be broken by quantum computers. The industry is accelerating its migration to PQC (post-quantum cryptography). In August 2024, NIST in the United States released the first batch of PQC algorithm standards. my country is expected to release its relevant national cryptographic standards within two years. The underlying key exchange algorithm of protocols such as IPSec, the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, is also based on RSA or ECC algorithms and must migrate to PQC algorithms.

[0005] In addition, SR-MPLS / SRv6 (Segmented Routing Based on Multiprotocol Labeling / IPv6 Segmented Routing) networking technology can advertise node IDs based on routing protocols to form end-to-end tunnels, but it does not support node authentication or secure encrypted transmission.

[0006] In summary, existing IPSec or TLS-based encrypted tunneling technologies, when used in network applications, are vulnerable to being cracked by future quantum computers due to their reliance on the classic Diffie-Hellman algorithm, necessitating quantum-resistant modifications. Furthermore, traffic from the client to the VPN gateway is decrypted before being re-encrypted upon reaching another client. This results in plaintext transmission at the gateway, posing a security risk of information leakage. If the gateway is provided by an ISP, the client's traffic exists in plaintext on a different network device, which is unacceptable for clients with high security requirements.

[0007] Another type of control / forward separation protocol can also negotiate end-to-end encrypted communication, but it cannot communicate directly when NAT exists at both ends of the network, which limits the applicability of its solution. Summary of the Invention

[0008] The purpose of this invention is to provide an end-to-end encrypted network system and encrypted communication method based on quantum-resistant algorithms, enabling intermediate network nodes to forward messages without decryption.

[0009] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution of the present invention is: an end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm, comprising a client access device and an aggregation gateway device;

[0010] The customer access device is used to connect to the terminal devices of the customer site and establish an end-to-end encrypted tunnel with the peer customer access device.

[0011] The aggregation gateway device is used to perform access authentication on the customer access devices and forward encrypted messages between the customer access devices according to the path label list.

[0012] The client access device is pre-configured with a path label list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel, and the path label list consists of device identifiers traversed by the end-to-end encrypted tunnel.

[0013] After being authenticated by the aggregation gateway device, the client access device negotiates a key with the peer client access device based on the quantum-resistant cryptography PQC algorithm to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key.

[0014] The customer access device uses the encryption key to encrypt user traffic, generates an encrypted message carrying the path label list, and sends the encrypted message to the aggregation gateway device;

[0015] The aggregation gateway device parses the path tag list in the encrypted message, forwards it hop-by-hop according to the path tag list, and does not decrypt the payload data of the encrypted message.

[0016] Furthermore, the key negotiation process between the client access device and the peer client access device based on the quantum-resistant cryptography PQC algorithm includes:

[0017] The initiating client access device sends a public key exchange request to the end client access device, the request carrying the PQC public key of the initiating client access device and the path tag list;

[0018] The end-client access device receives the request, verifies that the path tag list in reverse order matches the locally configured end-to-end encrypted tunnel, stores the PQC public key of the initiating end-client access device, and returns a public key exchange response to the initiating end-client access device, the response carrying the PQC public key of the end-client access device;

[0019] The initiating client access device stores the PQC public key of the end client access device.

[0020] Furthermore, the process by which the client access device generates the end-to-end communication encryption key specifically includes:

[0021] The initiating client access device generates a first random number and uses the PQC public key of the end client access device to encrypt the first random number using the key encapsulation mechanism KEM to obtain the first encrypted payload.

[0022] The initiating client access device sends the first encrypted payload to the end client access device;

[0023] The end-user access device uses its own PQC private key to decrypt the first encrypted payload to obtain the plaintext of the first random number.

[0024] The end-user access device generates a second random number and uses the PQC public key of the initiating end-user access device to encrypt the second random number using KEM to obtain a second encrypted payload.

[0025] The end-user access device sends the second encrypted payload to the initiating end-user access device;

[0026] The initiating client access device uses its own PQC private key to decrypt the second encrypted payload to obtain the plaintext of the second random number;

[0027] The initiating client access device calculates the XOR value of the first random number plaintext and the second random number plaintext, and uses it as the end-to-end communication encryption key;

[0028] The end-user access device calculates the XOR value of the first random plaintext and the second random plaintext in the same way, and uses it as the end-to-end communication encryption key.

[0029] Furthermore, the encrypted message format consists of an outer IP / UDP header, an inner encrypted tunnel header, a path label list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel, and an encrypted data payload.

[0030] Furthermore, the quantum-resistant cryptographic PQC algorithm used by the client access device is the Kyber KEM algorithm.

[0031] Furthermore, the aggregation gateway device can perform access authentication for customer access devices in the following ways: authentication based on username and password, or authentication based on pre-set certificates.

[0032] Furthermore, the length of the path label list is a sequence that includes at least two device identifiers, which are 16-bit or 32-bit numeric identifiers.

[0033] Furthermore, the system supports forwarding paths through N aggregation gateway devices, where N is an integer greater than or equal to 1; in scenarios where N is greater than 1, the packets sent by the initiating client access device are forwarded hop-by-hop through the N aggregation gateway devices based on the path label list until they reach the end client access device.

[0034] This invention also provides an end-to-end encrypted communication method based on a quantum-resistant algorithm, applied to a client access device in a system as described above, comprising:

[0035] The system authenticates itself with the aggregation gateway device and generates its own quantum-resistant cryptographic PQC public key pair after successful authentication.

[0036] Obtain a pre-configured list of end-to-end encrypted tunnel path labels, wherein the list of path labels consists of device identifiers traversed by the end-to-end encrypted tunnel;

[0037] Based on the PQC public key, key negotiation is performed with the peer client access device to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key;

[0038] Receive user traffic from terminal devices, encrypt the user traffic using the encryption key, and generate an encrypted message carrying the path tag list;

[0039] The encrypted message is sent to the aggregation gateway device so that the aggregation gateway device forwards it according to the path label list without decrypting the payload of the encrypted message.

[0040] Furthermore, the step of negotiating a key with the peer client access device based on the PQC public key to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key specifically includes:

[0041] Send a public key exchange request to the peer client access device, the request carrying the local PQC public key and the path tag list;

[0042] Receive the public key exchange response returned by the peer client access device and store the peer PQC public key in it;

[0043] Generate a first random number, encrypt the first random number using the peer PQC public key using the KEM key encapsulation mechanism, and then send it to the peer client access device;

[0044] Receive the second random number ciphertext encrypted by the peer client access device using the local PQC public key, and decrypt it using the local PQC private key to obtain the second random number plaintext.

[0045] The end-to-end communication encryption key is obtained by calculating the XOR value between the first random number plaintext and the second random number plaintext.

[0046] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0047] 1. Compared with the standard IPSec's hop-by-hop key negotiation and encryption / decryption technology, this invention can perform end-to-end key negotiation in multi-hop networking to achieve end-to-end encryption processing, and can also support quantum-resistant key exchange methods.

[0048] 2. Compared with direct encrypted client-to-client communication negotiated by control-forward separation protocols such as SIP, a convergence gateway device can be used for forwarding, thereby achieving NAT traversal.

[0049] 3. Compared with end-to-end tunneling technologies such as SR-MPLS / SRv6, this invention also has authentication and encryption functions. Attached Figure Description

[0050] Figure 1 This is the architecture of the system of the present invention.

[0051] Figure 2 This is a schematic diagram of the traffic packet format between access devices.

[0052] Figure 3 This is a key exchange process for a single aggregation node in one embodiment of the present invention.

[0053] Figure 4 This is another embodiment of the present invention, showing the process of multiple aggregation nodes.

[0054] In the diagram: 101-102 Aggregation equipment, 103-105 User access equipment, 106-108 User terminals. Detailed Implementation

[0055] The technical solution of the present invention will now be described in detail with reference to the accompanying drawings.

[0056] This invention provides an end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm, including a client access device and an aggregation gateway device;

[0057] The customer access device is used to connect to the terminal devices of the customer site and establish an end-to-end encrypted tunnel with the peer customer access device.

[0058] The aggregation gateway device is used to perform access authentication on the customer access devices and forward encrypted messages between the customer access devices according to the path label list.

[0059] The client access device is pre-configured with a path label list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel, and the path label list consists of device identifiers traversed by the end-to-end encrypted tunnel.

[0060] After being authenticated by the aggregation gateway device, the client access device negotiates a key with the peer client access device based on the quantum-resistant cryptography PQC algorithm to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key.

[0061] The customer access device uses the encryption key to encrypt user traffic, generates an encrypted message carrying the path label list, and sends the encrypted message to the aggregation gateway device;

[0062] The aggregation gateway device parses the path tag list in the encrypted message, forwards it hop-by-hop according to the path tag list, and does not decrypt the payload data of the encrypted message.

[0063] This invention also provides an end-to-end encrypted communication method based on a quantum-resistant algorithm, applied to a client access device in a system as described above, comprising:

[0064] The system authenticates itself with the aggregation gateway device and generates its own quantum-resistant cryptographic PQC public key pair after successful authentication.

[0065] Obtain a pre-configured list of end-to-end encrypted tunnel path labels, wherein the list of path labels consists of device identifiers traversed by the end-to-end encrypted tunnel;

[0066] Based on the PQC public key, key negotiation is performed with the peer client access device to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key;

[0067] Receive user traffic from terminal devices, encrypt the user traffic using the encryption key, and generate an encrypted message carrying the path tag list;

[0068] The encrypted message is sent to the aggregation gateway device so that the aggregation gateway device forwards it according to the path label list without decrypting the payload of the encrypted message.

[0069] The following is a detailed implementation process of the present invention.

[0070] This invention proposes an end-to-end encrypted network system based on PQC post-quantum algorithm, the key points of which are as follows:

[0071] 1. The system consists of customer access devices and operator / service provider aggregation gateways. Multiple terminal devices of customer sites are connected to the customer access devices, and communication between two customer sites is encrypted through the customer access devices.

[0072] 2. Assign a unique identifier to each access device / aggregation device, typically represented by a 16-bit or 32-bit number.

[0073] 3. Configure several end-to-end encrypted tunnels and their path label lists on the access device. The label list consists of a list of device identifiers on the end-to-end encrypted tunnel. For example, the list [1,2,3,5] indicates that the end-to-end tunnel is identified as 1 at its local end, passes through intermediate aggregation devices identified as 2 and 3, and the terminal device is identified as 5.

[0074] 4. The access device first authenticates with the aggregation device to ensure that only legitimate devices can access the network. This authentication method uses either a username / password or a certificate. Simultaneously, it generates its own PQC public / private key pair for subsequent key negotiation.

[0075] 5. After the initiating access device is authenticated, it first initiates a PQC public key exchange process to the end device of the tunnel according to the configured end-to-end encrypted tunnel. The message carries a tag list and is sent to the aggregation device.

[0076] 6. The aggregation device forwards the data according to the tag list until it reaches the end device.

[0077] 7. The terminal device reverses the tag list and sends its public key to the sender, thus completing the public key exchange.

[0078] 8. The initiating node generates a random number A, encrypts it using the peer node's public key, and sends it to the peer along with a tag stack. After being forwarded by the aggregation device, it reaches the end node. The end node decrypts the random number A using its own private key and generates a random number B, encrypts it using the initiating node's public key, and sends it to the initiating node. Upon receiving the message, the initiating node confirms its receipt. Both parties use random number A ⊕ random number B as the encryption key for their communication.

[0079] 9. Both parties use the negotiated key to encrypt the messages. Each message carries a list of path tags. The aggregation device forwards the messages only according to the tags and does not need to decrypt the traffic, thus achieving end-to-end encryption.

[0080] like Figure 1 As shown, the present invention discloses an end-to-end encrypted network system based on PQC post-quantum algorithm, comprising the following devices:

[0081] Aggregation devices 101-102 are responsible for access authentication and label forwarding of access devices.

[0082] 103-105, User access devices, are responsible for establishing end-to-end encrypted tunnels between each other, accessing user terminals, encrypting user traffic, and forwarding traffic through the end-to-end encrypted tunnels.

[0083] 106-108, User terminals, send and receive traffic through user access devices.

[0084] Appendix Figure 2 It is a schematic diagram of the traffic packet format between access devices, consisting of an outer IP / UDP header, an inner encrypted tunnel header, a tag list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel, and an encrypted data payload.

[0085] Figure 3 This is Embodiment 1 of the present invention, which implements an end-to-end encrypted tunnel process for a convergence device.

[0086] Assume that forwarding labels have been assigned to the access devices and aggregation devices. Aggregation devices 1 / 2 have been assigned label value 1 / 2; access devices 1 / 2 / 3 have been assigned labels 3 / 4 / 5 respectively.

[0087] In steps 301-302, access devices 1 and 2 are configured to enable end-to-end encrypted tunnels and corresponding tag lists, respectively. The tag list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel of access device 1 is [3,1,4], and the tag list for the encrypted tunnel of access device 2 is [4,1,3]. After enabling the end-to-end tunnel, the access devices generate their own PQC algorithm public-private key pairs. In this embodiment, the PQC Kyber-768 KEM (key encapsulation mechanism) algorithm is used to generate a public-private key pair, but using other PQC KEM algorithms will not affect the effect of this invention.

[0088] Steps 303-304: Authentication is performed between access device 1 and the aggregation device to ensure the legitimacy of access device 1. Authentication can be performed using a username, password, or a pre-configured certificate. Only after successful authentication will the aggregation device receive and forward subsequent traffic from access device 1.

[0089] Steps 305-306: Authentication is performed between access device 2 and the aggregation device to ensure the legitimacy of access device 2. Authentication can be performed using a username, password, or a pre-configured certificate. Only after successful authentication will the aggregation device receive and forward subsequent traffic from access device 2.

[0090] Step 307: Access device 1 knows that the label of the peer access device is 4 according to the configured end-to-end encrypted tunnel label list [3,1,4], and initiates a public key exchange with the peer. The message carries the public key generated by the aforementioned Kyber algorithm and the forwarded label list [3,1,4].

[0091] Step 308: When the message arrives at the aggregation device, it determines that it is the second hop in the label list with a label value of 1 and the label value of the next hop is 4 based on the label list and label pointer. It then looks up the local label table and forwards the message to the access device 2.

[0092] Step 309: Access device 2 receives the public key exchange message and determines whether the reversed tag stack of the message matches the locally configured end-to-end tunnel. If they match, it stores the peer's public key and then sends a PQC public key exchange response, carrying its own Kyber algorithm public key and the tag list of the end-to-end encrypted tunnel.

[0093] Step 310: The aggregation device forwards the negotiation message to the access device 1 according to the tag list.

[0094] Step 311: After receiving the public key exchange response from Access Device 2, Access Device 1 saves the other party's public key and generates a random number A. It then uses the Kyber algorithm and the other party's public key to perform KEM encryption and encapsulation on the random number A. The encapsulated message is sent to the aggregation device, carrying the tag stack of the end-to-end tunnel.

[0095] Step 312: The aggregation device forwards the message to the access device 2 according to the tag list.

[0096] Steps 313-314: Access device 2 receives a random number A encrypted by access device 1 using its own public key, decrypts it using its own private key to obtain the plaintext of random number A; at the same time, it generates a random number B, encrypts and encapsulates random number B using the public key of access device 1, and sends it to access device 1 through the end-to-end tunnel.

[0097] Step 315: Access device 1 uses its private key to decrypt the encrypted message of random number B sent by access device 2, obtains the plaintext of random number B, and uses the XOR of random number A and random number B as the final encryption key.

[0098] Step 316: Access device 2 uses the same algorithm to calculate random numbers A / B to obtain the encryption key.

[0099] Step 317: For traffic received from the terminal, the access devices 1 and 2 encrypt the data using the key negotiated in the above steps, transmit it through an end-to-end encrypted tunnel, carry a tag list, and the aggregation device forwards it according to the tags. There is no need to encrypt or decrypt the traffic, thus realizing an end-to-end encrypted network system.

[0100] Figure 4 This is Embodiment 2 of the present invention, which implements an end-to-end encrypted tunnel process with two aggregation devices. This process can be extended to a general N (N>2) aggregation devices.

[0101] Assume that forwarding labels have been assigned to the access devices and aggregation devices. Aggregation devices 1 and 2 have been assigned label values ​​1 and 2, respectively; access devices 1, 2, and 3 have been assigned labels 3, 4, and 5, respectively.

[0102] Steps 401-402: Access devices 1 and 3 are configured to enable end-to-end encrypted tunnels and corresponding tag lists, respectively. The tag list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel of access device 1 is [3,1,2,5], and the tag list for the encrypted tunnel of access device 3 is [5,2,1,3]. After enabling the end-to-end tunnel, each access device generates its own PQC algorithm public-private key pair. In this embodiment, the PQC Kyber-768 algorithm is used to generate a public-private key pair.

[0103] Steps 403-404: Authentication is performed between access device 1 and the aggregation device to ensure the legitimacy of access device 1. Authentication can be performed using a username, password, or a pre-configured certificate. Only after successful authentication will the aggregation device receive and forward subsequent traffic from access device 1.

[0104] Steps 405-406: Authentication is performed between access device 3 and the aggregation device to ensure the legitimacy of access device 3. Authentication can be performed using a username, password, or a pre-configured certificate. Only after successful authentication will the aggregation device receive and forward subsequent traffic from access device 3.

[0105] Steps 407-409: Access device 1, based on the configured end-to-end encrypted tunnel tag list [3,1,2,5], knows that the tag of the peer access device is 4, and initiates a public key exchange with the peer. The message carries its own public key generated by the aforementioned Kyber algorithm and the forwarded tag list [3,1,2,5]. Aggregation devices 1 / 2 forward the message according to the tag list, and the public key exchange request reaches access device 3.

[0106] Step 410: Access device 3 receives the public key exchange message and determines whether the reversed tag stack of the message matches the locally configured end-to-end tunnel. If they match, it stores the peer's public key and then sends a PQC public key exchange response, carrying its own Kyber algorithm public key and the tag list of the end-to-end encrypted tunnel.

[0107] Steps 411-412: Aggregation devices 1 / 2 perform hop-by-hop forwarding of packets according to the information in the tag list, so that the packets reach access device 1.

[0108] Step 413: After receiving the public key exchange response from Access Device 3, Access Device 1 saves the other party's public key and generates a random number A. It then uses the Kyber algorithm and the other party's public key to perform KEM encryption and encapsulation on the random number A. The encapsulated message is sent to the aggregation device, carrying the tag stack of the end-to-end tunnel.

[0109] Steps 414-415: Aggregation device 1 / 2 forwards the message to access device 3 according to the tag list.

[0110] Steps 416-418: Access device 3 receives a random number A encrypted by access device 1 using its own public key, decrypts it using its own private key to obtain the plaintext of random number A; at the same time, it generates a random number B, encrypts and encapsulates random number B using the public key of access device 1, and sends it to access device 1 through the end-to-end tunnel, which is forwarded by the tag of aggregation device 2 / 1 in between.

[0111] Step 419: Access device 1 uses its private key to decrypt the encrypted message of random number B sent by access device 3 to obtain the plaintext of random number B, and uses the XOR of random number A and random number B as the final encryption key.

[0112] Step 420: Access device 3 uses the same algorithm to calculate random number A / B to obtain the final encryption key.

[0113] Step 421: For traffic received from the terminal, the access devices 13 encrypt the data using the key negotiated in the above steps, transmit it through an end-to-end encrypted tunnel, carry a tag list, and the aggregation device forwards it according to the tags. No encryption or decryption processing of the traffic is required, thus achieving end-to-end encryption.

[0114] The above are preferred embodiments of the present invention. Any changes made to the technical solution of the present invention that do not exceed the scope of the technical solution of the present invention shall fall within the protection scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. An end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm, characterized in that, This includes customer access equipment and aggregation gateway equipment; The customer access device is used to connect to the terminal devices of the customer site and establish an end-to-end encrypted tunnel with the peer customer access device. The aggregation gateway device is used to perform access authentication on the customer access devices and forward encrypted messages between the customer access devices according to the path label list. The client access device is pre-configured with a path label list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel, and the path label list consists of device identifiers traversed by the end-to-end encrypted tunnel. After being authenticated by the aggregation gateway device, the client access device negotiates a key with the peer client access device based on the quantum-resistant cryptography PQC algorithm to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key. The customer access device uses the encryption key to encrypt user traffic, generates an encrypted message carrying the path label list, and sends the encrypted message to the aggregation gateway device; The aggregation gateway device parses the path tag list in the encrypted message, forwards it hop-by-hop according to the path tag list, and does not decrypt the payload data of the encrypted message.

2. The end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The key negotiation process between the client access device and the peer client access device based on the quantum-resistant cryptography PQC algorithm includes: The initiating client access device sends a public key exchange request to the end client access device, the request carrying the PQC public key of the initiating client access device and the path tag list; The end-client access device receives the request, verifies that the path tag list in reverse order matches the locally configured end-to-end encrypted tunnel, stores the PQC public key of the initiating end-client access device, and returns a public key exchange response to the initiating end-client access device, the response carrying the PQC public key of the end-client access device; The initiating client access device stores the PQC public key of the end client access device.

3. The end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 2, characterized in that, The process by which the client access device generates an end-to-end communication encryption key specifically includes: The initiating client access device generates a first random number and uses the PQC public key of the end client access device to encrypt the first random number using the key encapsulation mechanism KEM to obtain the first encrypted payload. The initiating client access device sends the first encrypted payload to the end client access device; The end-user access device uses its own PQC private key to decrypt the first encrypted payload to obtain the plaintext of the first random number. The end-user access device generates a second random number and uses the PQC public key of the initiating end-user access device to encrypt the second random number using KEM to obtain a second encrypted payload. The end-user access device sends the second encrypted payload to the initiating end-user access device; The initiating client access device uses its own PQC private key to decrypt the second encrypted payload to obtain the plaintext of the second random number; The initiating client access device calculates the XOR value of the first random number plaintext and the second random number plaintext, and uses it as the end-to-end communication encryption key; The end-user access device calculates the XOR value of the first random plaintext and the second random plaintext in the same way, and uses it as the end-to-end communication encryption key.

4. The end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The encrypted message format consists of an outer IP / UDP header, an inner encrypted tunnel header, a path label list for the end-to-end encrypted tunnel, and an encrypted data payload.

5. An end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The quantum-resistant cryptographic PQC algorithm used by the client access device is the KEM algorithm, which includes Kyber.

6. The end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The aggregation gateway device performs access authentication for customer access devices in two ways: authentication based on username and password, or authentication based on pre-set certificates.

7. An end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The length of the path label list is a sequence that includes at least two device identifiers, which are 16-bit or 32-bit numeric identifiers.

8. An end-to-end encrypted network system based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 1, characterized in that, The system supports forwarding paths through N aggregation gateway devices, where N is an integer greater than or equal to 1. In scenarios where N is greater than 1, packets sent by the initiating client access device are forwarded hop-by-hop through the N aggregation gateway devices based on the path label list until they reach the end client access device.

9. An end-to-end encrypted communication method based on a quantum-resistant algorithm, applied to a client access device in any of the systems described in claims 1-9, characterized in that, include: The system authenticates itself with the aggregation gateway device and generates its own quantum-resistant cryptographic PQC public key pair after successful authentication. Obtain a pre-configured list of end-to-end encrypted tunnel path labels, wherein the list of path labels consists of device identifiers traversed by the end-to-end encrypted tunnel; Based on the PQC public key, key negotiation is performed with the peer client access device to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key; Receive user traffic from terminal devices, encrypt the user traffic using the encryption key, and generate an encrypted message carrying the path tag list; The encrypted message is sent to the aggregation gateway device so that the aggregation gateway device forwards it according to the path label list without decrypting the payload of the encrypted message.

10. The end-to-end encrypted communication method based on a quantum-resistant algorithm according to claim 9, characterized in that, The steps of performing key negotiation with the peer client access device based on the PQC public key to generate an end-to-end communication encryption key specifically include: Send a public key exchange request to the peer client access device, the request carrying the local PQC public key and the path tag list; Receive the public key exchange response returned by the peer client access device and store the peer PQC public key in it; Generate a first random number, encrypt the first random number using the peer PQC public key using the KEM key encapsulation mechanism, and then send it to the peer client access device; Receive the second random number ciphertext encrypted by the peer client access device using the local PQC public key, and decrypt it using the local PQC private key to obtain the second random number plaintext. The end-to-end communication encryption key is obtained by calculating the XOR value between the first random number plaintext and the second random number plaintext.

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