An environmental protection facility remote operation and maintenance data encryption transmission method and system

Abstract

The application discloses an environmental protection facility remote operation and maintenance data encryption transmission method and system, and relates to the technical field of communication security; the method comprises the following steps: acquiring environmental protection facility operation data collected by a field terminal, generating process causal data units, and distinguishing cause side data units and result side data units; a process causal relationship table is established according to historical operation data, and the process causal data units are encrypted and packaged with field sequence information; when a communication link is unavailable, local ciphertext cache queues are written, and after communication is restored, process causal time lag inverted groups are identified according to the process causal relationship table and the cache queues, the field process sequence is rearranged and restored through causal index information and a remote platform, and remote operation and maintenance credible records are generated. The application can ensure the safety of encrypted transmission, reduce abnormal source judgment deviation caused by network interruption and ciphertext backflow, and reduce operation and maintenance record distortion.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of communication security technology, and in particular to a method and system for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data for environmental protection facilities. Background Technology

[0002] With the continuous construction of industrial wastewater treatment facilities, modular sewage treatment facilities, and online pollution source monitoring facilities, remote operation and maintenance of environmental protection facilities has gradually become an important method for water quality monitoring, equipment status management, alarm tracing, and operation and maintenance scheduling. On-site, operational data such as chemical oxygen demand, ammonia nitrogen, suspended solids, pH, flow rate, pump and valve status, aeration status, alarm events, and control responses are typically collected through water quality monitoring instruments, equipment status acquisition units, data acquisition and transmission instruments, or edge gateways, and then uploaded to a remote platform via communication networks. Due to the dispersed locations of environmental protection facilities and the complex on-site network conditions, the remote operation and maintenance data transmission process not only needs to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data content, but also needs to ensure that the retransmitted data after network outages, weak networks, or link switching can be identified and processed by the remote platform according to the actual on-site process sequence.

[0003] Existing remote operation and maintenance systems for environmental protection facilities typically focus on encrypting and transmitting monitoring data, authenticating identities, resuming interrupted transmissions, or locally caching and retransmitting data to prevent theft, tampering, or loss during transmission. However, the operational data of environmental protection facilities is not isolated ordinary communication data, but rather has obvious process sequence relationships and processing time lag relationships. For example, abnormalities in dosing of chemical pumps, aeration equipment, sudden changes in influent flow, or membrane filtration unit will often be reflected in changes in water quality indicators such as chemical oxygen demand, ammonia nitrogen, suspended solids, or pH after a certain period of time. When a network outage occurs at the field end, different types of data may enter different cache queues and be retransmitted in encrypted form according to different batches, priorities, or scheduling orders after the communication link is restored. This results in the water quality monitoring data on the result side arriving at the remote platform before the corresponding equipment status data, alarm data, or control response data on the cause side. In scenarios where encrypted data is retransmitted after a network outage, if the remote platform still uses the receiving time or the order of retransmission arrival as the basis for updating the operating status and judging the source of anomalies, it is easy to cause a time lag phenomenon where the result of water quality anomalies precedes the cause of equipment anomalies. This can lead to historical retransmission data being mistakenly received as current real-time data, old statuses overwriting new statuses, deviations in judging the source of anomalies, distorted statistics on the duration of anomalies, and inaccurate operation and maintenance reports. Summary of the Invention

[0004] The purpose of this invention is to address the shortcomings of existing technologies, such as the difficulty for remote platforms to identify the causal sequence of on-site processes in environmental protection facility operation data during network outage recovery and encrypted data re-injection scenarios. This leads to water quality anomalies being received and processed before equipment anomalies, resulting in biased judgment of anomaly sources and distortion of operation and maintenance records. Therefore, this invention proposes a method and system for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data for environmental protection facilities.

[0005] To address the problems existing in the prior art, the present invention adopts the following technical solution: A method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data for environmental protection facilities, comprising: S1. Acquire the environmental protection facility operation data collected on-site, generate process cause-effect data units according to the collection order, and mark the equipment status data, alarm data and control response data as cause-side data units, and mark the water quality monitoring data as result-side data units; S2. Establish a process causal relationship table based on the historical operation data of the same environmental protection facility. The process causal relationship table represents the sequential relationship between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit. S3. Encrypt and encapsulate the process cause-effect data unit with field sequence information to obtain an encrypted encapsulated data packet; S4. When the communication link is unavailable, write the encrypted and encapsulated data packet into the local ciphertext buffer queue; S5. After the communication link is restored, identify the process causal delay inversion group based on the process causal relationship table and the local encrypted buffer queue. S6. Based on the identification results of the process causal time delay inversion group, perform retransmission of the encrypted encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted cache queue, and rearrange the identified process causal time delay inversion group on the remote platform to generate a remote operation and maintenance trusted record.

[0006] Preferably, the process causal data unit includes the acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, data payload, and preceding data summary. The field incrementing sequence number is continuously generated by the field end according to the acquisition completion order, and the preceding data summary is obtained by the previous process causal data unit through summary processing.

[0007] Preferably, the environmental protection facility operation data includes water quality monitoring data, equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data. The water quality monitoring data includes one or more of chemical oxygen demand, ammonia nitrogen, suspended solids, pH, and flow rate. The equipment status data includes the operating status of one or more of the following: dosing pumps, aeration equipment, booster pumps, return pumps, valves, and membrane filtration units.

[0008] Preferably, a process cause-and-effect table is established, including: From the historical operation data during the continuous online operation of the same environmental protection facility, identify the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit that belong to the same processing module or have an upstream and downstream processing relationship. When there are sequential correlation records in the historical operation data where the collection time of the cause-side data unit is earlier than that of the result-side data unit, a process causal relationship item is generated. The process causal relationship item includes the cause-side data type, the cause-side process object, the result-side data type, the result-side process object, and the process time lag range. The process time lag range is determined based on the time interval between the collection time of the cause-side data unit and the collection time of the result-side data unit in the sequential correlation records.

[0009] Preferably, the process causal data unit is encrypted and encapsulated with on-site sequence information, including: Symmetric encryption is applied to the data payload to obtain the ciphertext payload; The data collection time, incremental on-site serial number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and preceding data summary are used as authentication-related information to participate in integrity verification and generate authentication labels. The encrypted data packet is formed by the encrypted payload, the authentication tag, and the transmission header. The transmission header includes the facility identifier, the processing module identifier, the field incrementing sequence number, the acquisition time, and the data type identifier.

[0010] Preferably, when the communication link is unavailable, writing the encrypted encapsulated data packet into a local ciphertext buffer queue includes: The on-site system continues to collect operational data from environmental protection facilities and continues to generate encrypted and encapsulated data packets; The encrypted and encapsulated data packets are written into the local ciphertext cache queue according to the processing module identifier, data type identifier, and field incrementing sequence number. The preceding data digest maintains the continuity between the last successfully sent data packet before the network outage and the data packets generated during the outage.

[0011] Preferably, identifying the process causal time delay inversion group includes: The encrypted encapsulated data packet carrying the cause-side data unit is used as the cause-side data packet, and the encrypted encapsulated data packet carrying the result-side data unit is used as the result-side data packet. Read the cause-side data packets and result-side data packets from the same processing module within the local encrypted cache queue; When the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet match the process causality item in the process causality table, and the acquisition time relationship between the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet falls within the process time delay range of the corresponding process causality item, and the cause-side data packet precedes the result-side data packet in the field acquisition order, while the result-side data packet is located before the cause-side data packet in the order to be retransmitted formed by the local encrypted buffer queue, the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet are marked as the process causality time delay inverted group.

[0012] Preferably, the process causal time delay inversion group is retransmitted according to the on-site acquisition sequence and rearranged on a remote platform, including: For encrypted encapsulated data packets not marked as process causal time delay inversion groups, retransmit them according to the incremental sequence number on site; For encrypted encapsulated data packets that have been marked as process causal time delay inversion groups, first send the causal index information, and then retransmit the corresponding cause-side data packets and result-side data packets according to the field collection order; The causal index information includes the processing module identifier, the incremental sequence number of the cause-side site, the incremental sequence number of the result-side site, and the relationship between the two in terms of collection time.

[0013] After receiving the encrypted and encapsulated data packet, the remote platform verifies the authentication tag and the preceding data digest; After successful verification, the on-site process sequence during the network outage is reconstructed based on the data collection time, the incremental on-site sequence number, and the causal index information. When the remote platform receives the result-side data packet first but has not yet received the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information, it marks the result-side data packet as data to be confirmed by causality. After the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information arrives and is verified, it is written into the historical operation sequence according to the on-site collection order.

[0014] Preferably, generating a trusted remote operation and maintenance record includes: After the remote platform completes the rearrangement, it generates a reliable remote operation and maintenance record that includes the start time of the network outage, the end time of the network outage, the range of retransmitted data, the process cause-effect time delay inversion group, the result of the anomaly source judgment, and the status update result after retransmission. Among them, the start time of the network outage is determined by the detection time when the communication link is unavailable, and the end time of the network outage is determined by the detection time when the communication link is restored. The rearranged data is marked as supplementary recovery data, and the data for which causal confirmation has not yet been completed is kept as data pending causal confirmation.

[0015] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are: 1. This invention divides environmental protection facility operation data into cause-side data units and result-side data units at the field end, and generates process causal data units containing the collection time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and preceding data summary. This ensures that each piece of operation data is bound to the actual field collection sequence and the process object it belongs to before encrypted transmission. A process causal relationship table is established based on the valid historical operation data of the same environmental protection facility, and the reasonable lag relationship between cause-side data units and result-side data units is limited by the process time lag range. While ensuring the secure transmission of encrypted payloads, the remote platform can identify the data sequence relationship formed during network outages based on verifiable field sequence information and process causal relationships. This avoids judging the operating status of environmental protection facilities solely based on the platform's receiving time or the order of retransmission arrival, thereby reducing the deviation in judging the source of anomalies caused by the treatment of abnormal water quality results before the causes of equipment anomalies.

[0016] 2. This invention also corrects the problem of result-side data packets arriving before cause-side data packets during the encrypted data retransmission process after network outage by using a local encrypted cache queue, pending retransmission order identification, process causal time delay inversion group marking, causal index information transmission, and remote platform reordering mechanism. For result-side data packets that have not yet completed causal confirmation, the remote platform marks them as data pending causal confirmation and temporarily stores them in the pending confirmation cache area, without directly overwriting the current real-time status. After the corresponding cause-side data packet arrives and passes the authentication tag, preceding data digest, and process causal relationship verification, it is written into the historical operation sequence according to the on-site collection order and a remote operation and maintenance trusted record is generated. This can effectively distinguish between real-time data, retransmitted and restored data, and pending causal confirmation data, reducing the problems of historical retransmitted data overwriting real-time status, alarm traceability distortion, and inaccurate operation and maintenance reports, and improving the temporal reliability, anomaly traceability reliability, and operation and maintenance record consistency during the encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities. Attached Figure Description

[0017] The accompanying drawings, which are included to provide a further understanding of the invention and form part of this application, illustrate exemplary embodiments of the invention and, together with their description, serve to explain the invention and do not constitute an undue limitation thereof. In the drawings: Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating a method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data for environmental protection facilities, provided as an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0018] The technical solutions of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings of the embodiments of the present invention. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, and not all embodiments.

[0019] Example: Figure 1As shown, this embodiment provides a method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities, which is applied to data transmission scenarios between the on-site end of environmental protection facilities and a remote platform; In this embodiment, the field terminal refers to a device-side unit located at the environmental protection facility site, capable of collecting environmental protection facility operation data and communicating with a remote platform. It includes at least one of a data acquisition and transmission instrument, an edge gateway, a field controller, or an industrial communication device with data acquisition, encryption encapsulation, local caching, and retransmission capabilities. The remote platform refers to a data receiving and operation and maintenance management unit located in an operation and maintenance center, enterprise server, or cloud server. It is used to receive data packets uploaded from the field terminal and manage the environmental protection facility's operating status, alarm records, retransmitted data, and trusted operation and maintenance records. The specific hardware form of the field terminal and the remote platform is not limited, as long as they can execute the data acquisition, encrypted transmission, offline caching, retransmission rearrangement, and trusted record generation processes described in this embodiment. The environmental protection facility's on-site terminal includes water quality monitoring instruments, equipment status acquisition units, alarm acquisition units, control response acquisition units, an edge gateway, and a local storage unit; the remote platform is used to receive operational data uploaded by the environmental protection facility's on-site terminal, forming water quality trends, equipment operating conditions, alarm records, retransmission records, and reliable remote operation and maintenance records; the environmental protection facility is one of the following: industrial wastewater treatment facilities, modular wastewater treatment facilities, decentralized sewage treatment facilities, or pollution source online monitoring facilities; In this embodiment, the environmental protection facility operation data includes water quality monitoring data, equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data. Water quality monitoring data includes one or more of the following: chemical oxygen demand (COD), ammonia nitrogen, suspended solids, pH, and flow rate. Equipment status data includes the operating status of one or more of the following: dosing pumps, aeration equipment, booster pumps, return pumps, valves, and membrane filtration units. Alarm data includes one or more of the following: water quality exceeding limits alarms, equipment failure alarms, communication anomaly alarms, and process anomaly alarms. Control response data includes one or more of the following: remote parameter adjustment responses, equipment start / stop responses, alarm confirmation responses, and remote reset responses. In this embodiment, equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data are marked as cause-side data units because these data are used to characterize equipment actions, equipment failures, process disturbances, or maintenance operations that may cause changes in water quality; water quality monitoring data are marked as result-side data units because these data are used to characterize the treatment effect of environmental protection facilities, water quality change trends, or changes in discharge status; the cause-side data units and result-side data units are not divided based on the importance of the data, but rather based on their cause-effect attributes in the environmental treatment process.

[0020] The method in this embodiment includes the following steps; S1. Acquire the environmental protection facility operation data collected on-site and generate process causal data units according to the collection sequence; Specifically, the field terminal collects environmental protection facility operation data according to collection tasks or event triggering methods; the collection tasks are executed by the edge gateway or by the data acquisition and transmission instrument; for periodic water quality monitoring data, the field terminal acquires data according to the sampling cycle of the water quality monitoring instrument; for equipment status data, the field terminal acquires data based on equipment status changes or status polling results; for alarm data, the field terminal acquires data based on alarm triggering events; for control response data, the field terminal acquires data based on the execution feedback generated by remote control commands on the field equipment side. Whenever the field terminal completes the collection of one piece of environmental protection facility operation data, the field terminal generates a process causal data unit based on that environmental protection facility operation data; In this embodiment, the process causal data unit refers to the smallest business record unit formed based on a single piece of environmental protection facility operation data. It includes not only data payload but also information for determining the data's field acquisition sequence, the facility it belongs to, the processing module it belongs to, the data type it belongs to, and the process object it belongs to. The process causal data unit is used to establish the process sequence relationship between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit in subsequent steps and serves as the basis for generating encrypted encapsulated data packets. In other words, the process causal data unit is not an ordinary communication message but a data record that binds the environmental protection facility operation data with the field process sequence. The process causal data unit includes the acquisition time, field incremental sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, data payload, and preceding data summary; The data acquisition time is the time recorded by the field terminal clock when data acquisition is completed; the field incrementing sequence number is a sequence number continuously generated by the field terminal according to the order of data acquisition completion; the facility identifier is used to identify the environmental protection facility that generated this data; the processing module identifier is used to identify the processing module to which this data belongs, and the processing module includes one of the following: pretreatment module, biochemical treatment module, deep purification module, and electrical control and maintenance module; the data type identifier is used to identify whether this data belongs to water quality monitoring data, equipment status data, alarm data, or control response data; the process object identifier is used to identify the water quality instrument, pump, valve, tank, membrane filtration unit, aeration equipment, or dosing equipment corresponding to this data; the data payload is the actual business content of this data; the preceding data summary is the summary value obtained after summary processing of the previous process causal data unit; In practice, the field terminal maintains incremental field numbers according to facility identifiers and processing module identifiers, or maintains global incremental field numbers according to individual environmental protection facilities. When maintaining incremental field numbers according to processing modules, the facility identifier, processing module identifier, and incremental field number together determine the collection order of the process causal data unit within the corresponding processing module. When maintaining global incremental field numbers according to environmental protection facilities, the facility identifier and incremental field number together determine the collection order of the process causal data unit within the environmental protection facility.

[0021] When generating the preceding data summary, the field terminal performs summary processing on the acquisition time, field increment sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and data payload in the previous process causal data unit to obtain the preceding data summary, and writes the preceding data summary into the current process causal data unit; for cases of power failure restart or the absence of a previous process causal data unit during the first acquisition, the field terminal sets the preceding data summary to the initial summary value and records the start event corresponding to the initial summary value locally; In this embodiment, the digest processing is implemented using existing digest algorithms, such as the national cryptographic digest algorithm or other digest algorithms that can output a fixed-length digest value; the purpose of digest processing is to maintain the continuity verification relationship between adjacent process causal data units, rather than to replace encryption processing. After generating the process causal data unit, the field end marks the process causal data unit with either the cause side or the result side according to the data type identifier; In this embodiment, the cause-side data unit refers to the process causal data unit that may cause subsequent water quality changes in the environmental treatment process, and its corresponding data is at least one of equipment status changes, alarm triggering, or control response events; the result-side data unit refers to the process causal data unit used to characterize the environmental treatment effect or water quality change results, and its corresponding data is water quality monitoring data; the division between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit is based on their cause-effect attributes in the environmental treatment process, rather than based on the data acquisition equipment type or the importance of the data; If the data type identifier corresponds to equipment status data, alarm data, or control response data, then the process causal data unit is marked as a cause-side data unit; if the data type identifier corresponds to water quality monitoring data, then the process causal data unit is marked as a result-side data unit; this marking result is used to subsequently establish a process causal relationship table and identify process causal time delay inversion groups. For example, in an industrial wastewater treatment facility, the dosing pump status acquisition unit collected data at 10:01 AM that the dosing pump speed was abnormally reduced. The field end generated a process cause-and-effect data unit and marked it as a cause-side data unit according to the data type identifier. The chemical oxygen demand online monitoring instrument collected data at 10:12 AM that the chemical oxygen demand was increased. The field end generated another process cause-and-effect data unit and marked it as a result-side data unit according to the data type identifier.

[0022] S2. Establish a process cause-and-effect relationship table based on the historical operation data of the same environmental protection facility; The historical operation data generated during the continuous online operation of the same environmental protection facility can be obtained from the on-site terminal or remote platform; the historical operation data includes historical process causal data units and corresponding cause-side markers or result-side markers. After acquiring historical operational data, the field terminal or remote platform first performs validity screening on the historical operational data. The validity screening includes: retaining data records formed when the communication link is available, retaining data records with verified authentication tags and continuous preceding data summaries, removing data records marked as retransmission recovery data, removing data records marked as data awaiting causal confirmation, and removing data records formed when water quality monitoring instruments, equipment status acquisition units, or edge gateways are in a fault alarm state. The historical operational data after validity screening serves as the basis for establishing the process causal relationship table. Through the above screening, the process causal relationship table is derived from the same environmental protection facility during the operation phase when communication is continuous, data is complete, and the status of the acquisition equipment is reliable, thus avoiding the use of data that has been retransmitted after network outages, data that has failed authentication, data with discontinuous summaries, or data from acquisition equipment failures as the basis for establishing the process causal relationship table. When establishing the process causal relationship table, historical operating data after validity screening is collected based on facility identification and treatment module identification to obtain the historical operating data sequence of each treatment module within the same environmental protection facility; for treatment modules with upstream and downstream treatment relationships, cross-module historical operating data sequences are also established based on the upstream and downstream relationships between treatment modules; for example, the pretreatment module is located upstream of the biochemical treatment module, and the biochemical treatment module is located upstream of the deep purification module; From the historical operational data sequence that has been filtered for validity, determine the cause-side data units and the result-side data units; for any cause-side data unit and any result-side data unit, they are determined to be a sequentially related record only if the following conditions are met simultaneously: The cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit belong to the same environmental protection facility; the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit belong to the same processing module, or belong to processing modules with upstream and downstream processing relationships; the cause-side process object corresponding to the cause-side data unit and the result-side process object corresponding to the result-side data unit have a corresponding relationship in wastewater treatment processes; the cause-side data unit is an equipment status change, alarm trigger, or control response event; the result-side data unit shows a water quality change relative to the normal baseline in the valid historical operating data of the result-side process object; the data collection time of the cause-side data unit is earlier than the data collection time of the result-side data unit; The normal baseline is formed by continuous water quality monitoring values ​​of the same process object in valid historical operating data; the water quality change refers to the deviation of the water quality monitoring value of the result-side data unit from the normal baseline, or the result-side data unit carrying one of the following: water quality exceeding limit alarm, trend change, or instrument output abnormality; the normal baseline and the water quality change indicator both originate from the historical operating data of the same environmental protection facility or the output results of the water quality monitoring instrument.

[0023] If the water quality monitoring value corresponding to the result-side data unit changes relative to the normal baseline, and this change occurs after the cause-side data unit, then the result-side data unit is considered as a candidate result-side data unit to form a sequential association record with the cause-side data unit. Thus, the sequential association record is not determined solely by the order of data collection, but also by facility affiliation, treatment module relationship, process object correspondence, cause-side event attributes, and result-side water quality change. When creating sequential records, the field or remote platform also determines the process correspondence between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit based on the data type identifier and process object identifier. For example, abnormal dosing pump status corresponds to changes in pH or chemical oxygen demand; abnormal aeration equipment operation corresponds to changes in ammonia nitrogen; sudden changes in influent flow rate correspond to changes in suspended solids or chemical oxygen demand; and abnormal membrane filtration unit operation corresponds to changes in suspended solids. For each sequentially associated record, the time interval between the collection time of the cause-side data unit and the collection time of the result-side data unit is calculated. This time interval is used to characterize the actual process lag time after the occurrence of the corresponding cause-side data unit in the environmental protection facility, when the result-side data unit changes. For multiple sequentially associated records corresponding to the same cause-side data type, the same cause-side process object, the same result-side data type, and the same result-side process object, the time intervals corresponding to each sequentially associated record are collected to form a time interval set, and the process lag range is determined based on this time interval set. When determining the process time delay range, abnormal time intervals are first removed from the time interval set. The abnormal time intervals include the time intervals corresponding to data records that fail authentication tag verification, the time intervals corresponding to data records with discontinuous preceding data summaries, the time intervals corresponding to data records marked as data to be retransmitted and recovered, the time intervals corresponding to data records marked as data to be confirmed as causal, and the time intervals corresponding to data records formed when the acquisition device is in a fault alarm state. After removing abnormal time intervals, the process time delay range is determined based on the remaining time intervals. In one embodiment, the minimum time interval among the remaining time intervals is taken as the lower limit of the process time delay range, and the maximum time interval among the remaining time intervals is taken as the upper limit of the process time delay range. In another embodiment, when there are still abnormal time intervals corresponding to equipment maintenance records, data acquisition equipment fault records, or communication anomaly records among the remaining time intervals, the abnormal time intervals are removed first, and then the minimum and maximum values ​​among the remaining time intervals after removal are taken as the lower and upper limits of the process time delay range.

[0024] The process time lag range is derived from the valid historical operating data of the same environmental protection facility, and the impact of communication anomalies, retransmission and recovery, pending causal confirmation, equipment maintenance, and data acquisition equipment failure on the time lag range is excluded. This allows the process time lag range to characterize the actual process lag pattern between the corresponding cause-side process object and the result-side process object in the environmental protection facility. This method enables the process time lag range to adapt to the equipment scale, treated water volume, water quality fluctuation characteristics, and treatment module layout of the environmental protection facility. In this embodiment, the process time lag range refers to the time interval between the occurrence of a cause-side data unit and the occurrence of a corresponding water quality change in the result-side data unit. This range is used to define whether there is a reasonable process lag relationship between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit. For example, changes in equipment status usually do not immediately manifest as water quality changes at the moment of receipt on the remote platform, but rather as changes in water quality monitoring data after the on-site treatment process has undergone reaction, flow, mixing, or treatment. Therefore, the process time lag range is used to exclude data combinations that are only earlier in time but do not conform to the lag pattern of the treatment process.

[0025] The process causality table includes at least one process causality item; In this embodiment, the process causality table refers to a data table used to record the process sequence relationship between cause-side data units and result-side data units within the same environmental protection facility; the process causality item is a relationship record in the process causality table, used to indicate that there is a process sequence relationship between a certain cause-side data type and cause-side process object and a certain result-side data type and result-side process object; the process causality item does not mean that all data that comes first is the cause, but rather that within the same facility, the same treatment module, or a treatment module with upstream and downstream treatment relationships, the cause-side process object and the result-side process object have a corresponding relationship in the wastewater treatment process, and their historical operating data can form a sequence relationship record; Each process causal relationship item includes the cause-side data type, the cause-side process object, the result-side data type, the result-side process object, and the process time delay range; the process causal relationship table is used to subsequently determine whether there is a process causal relationship between the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet during the network outage retransmission process, and whether the relationship between their acquisition times falls within the corresponding process time delay range; When the process causality table is established by the remote platform, the remote platform sends the process causality table or the process causality items corresponding to the environmental protection facilities at the field end to the field end while the communication link is available; the field end saves the process causality table or the corresponding process causality items locally, and uses them to identify process causality time delay inversion groups after the communication link is restored; when inversion identification is performed by the remote platform, the field end first uploads the queue index information of the local encrypted cache queue, and the remote platform performs inversion identification based on the queue index information and the process causality table; For example, for the biochemical treatment module of an industrial wastewater treatment facility, historical operating data shows that after the aeration equipment malfunctions, the ammonia nitrogen monitoring data usually changes over a period of time. The remote platform uses the operating status of the aeration equipment as the cause-side data type and the cause-side process object, and the ammonia nitrogen monitoring data as the result-side data type and the result-side process object. Based on the time interval between the aeration equipment malfunction collection time and the ammonia nitrogen change collection time in the historical sequential records, the corresponding process time lag range is formed.

[0026] S3. Encrypt and encapsulate the process cause-effect data unit with field sequence information to obtain an encrypted encapsulated data packet; Before sending the process causal data unit, the field terminal performs encrypted encapsulation with field sequence information on the process causal data unit; The field end extracts the data payload from the process causal data unit and encrypts the data payload using a symmetric encryption method to obtain the ciphertext payload. The key used for symmetric encryption is negotiated between the field end and the remote platform when establishing a secure communication session, or it is pre-distributed by the remote platform to the secure storage area of ​​the field end. The symmetric encryption method is implemented using an existing authentication encryption algorithm or an existing block cipher encryption algorithm. The field terminal uses the acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and preceding data summary as authentication association information to participate in integrity verification and generate an authentication tag. The authentication tag is used to verify whether the transmission header and encrypted payload have been tampered with, and to verify whether the field sequence information is consistent with the encrypted payload. The field end consists of a encrypted payload, an authentication tag, and a transmission header to form an encrypted and encapsulated data packet. In this embodiment, the encrypted encapsulated data packet refers to a transmission unit formed by encrypting and encapsulating process causal data units. It includes a ciphertext payload, an authentication tag, and a transmission header. The ciphertext payload is used to protect the content security of the data payload, the authentication tag is used to verify the integrity of the transmission header and the ciphertext payload, and the transmission header is used to retain the field acquisition sequence and data ownership information. The encrypted encapsulated data packet differs from ordinary encrypted messages in that, while encrypting and protecting the data payload, it retains the field sequence information in the acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, and data type identifier as verifiable information, so as to facilitate subsequent retransmission and rearrangement after network outage. The transmission header includes a facility identifier, a processing module identifier, an incremental field sequence number, a collection time, and a data type identifier. The transmission header enables the remote platform to determine the environmental protection facility, processing module, data type, and field collection order to which the encrypted data packet belongs without directly reading the plaintext data payload after receiving the encrypted data packet. In this embodiment, the transmission header does not contain plaintext business data that directly characterizes specific water quality values ​​or equipment operating parameters; the remote platform only decrypts the encrypted payload and reads the data payload after the authentication tag is verified; in this way, the encrypted encapsulation of data packets can both protect the content security of the environmental protection facility operation data and retain the on-site sequence information required for subsequent retransmission and rearrangement. After the abnormal status data of the dosing pump is generated into a process causal data unit, the field end encrypts its data payload into a ciphertext payload and uses the acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and preceding data summary to generate an authentication tag. After receiving the encrypted and encapsulated data packet, the remote platform confirms that the data packet has not been tampered with through the authentication tag and confirms the position of the data packet in the field acquisition sequence based on the transmission header.

[0027] S4. When the communication link is unavailable, write the encrypted and encapsulated data packet into the local ciphertext buffer queue; Specifically, the field terminal monitors the status of the communication link between itself and the remote platform in real time. When the field terminal does not receive confirmation from the remote platform when sending encrypted and encapsulated data packets, or when the field terminal detects that the network connection is broken, the link switching is not completed, or the remote platform is unreachable, it determines that the communication link is unavailable and records the detection time when the communication link is unavailable. This detection time is used to determine the start time of the network outage. During periods when the communication link is unavailable, the field end does not stop collecting data on the operation of environmental protection facilities; the field end continues to generate process causal data units according to S1, continues to generate encrypted encapsulated data packets according to S3, and writes the encrypted encapsulated data packets into the local ciphertext cache queue; The local encrypted cache queue is used to store encrypted and encapsulated data packets generated during network outages; In this embodiment, the local encrypted buffer queue refers to a local storage queue used by the field end to store encrypted and encapsulated data packets during the period when the communication link is unavailable. Its storage object is the encrypted and encapsulated encrypted data packets, not the decrypted plaintext data. The order to be retransmitted refers to the actual retransmission order formed by the field end after the communication link is restored, based on the data type buffer segment, retransmission scheduling status, and platform confirmation status of each encrypted and encapsulated data packet in the local encrypted buffer queue. The order to be retransmitted may be consistent with the field acquisition order, or it may be inconsistent with the field acquisition order due to differences in batch encapsulation of different data type buffer segments, queue verification, or retransmission scheduling. When writing to the local encrypted cache queue, the field terminal records the queue position of the encrypted and encapsulated data packet according to the processing module identifier, data type identifier, and field incrementing sequence number; During the network outage, the field terminal classifies and caches encrypted and encapsulated data packets according to their data type identifiers. Specifically, encrypted and encapsulated data packets carrying water quality monitoring data, equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data form corresponding data type cache segments. Each data type cache segment retains the field-incrementing sequence number and acquisition time of its respective encrypted and encapsulated data packet. After the communication link is restored, the field end determines the order of data to be retransmitted based on the amount of data in different data type cache segments in the local encrypted cache queue, the platform's retransmission confirmation status, and the communication link availability status. Since different data type cache segments may be batch-encapsulated and retransmitted separately, the order of data to be retransmitted may differ from the field acquisition order. For example, water quality monitoring data packets carrying result-side data units may be located at the beginning of the order of data to be retransmitted because they were batch-encapsulated earlier, while device status data packets carrying cause-side data units may be located at the end of the order of data to be retransmitted because of event queue verification or authentication tag verification. This results in the result-side data packets being located before the cause-side data packets in the order of data to be retransmitted. The order to be retransmitted is the actual order obtained by the field end based on the local encrypted buffer queue formed during the network outage and the retransmission scheduling status after communication is restored. This embodiment does not require the field end to actively change the field acquisition order to create an inversion. Instead, when there is already an inconsistency between the order to be retransmitted and the field acquisition order, the process causal time delay inversion group is identified and rearranged. By clarifying the formation mechanism of the order of data to be retransmitted, it can be determined that the inverted process causal time delay is not caused by data content errors, but by the inconsistency between the retransmission scheduling order of different data type buffer segments after network outage and the actual process order on site.

[0028] For encrypted and encapsulated data packets within the same processing module, the field end maintains a continuous incremental sequence number; for encrypted and encapsulated data packets of different data types, the field end retains their data type identifier, so that subsequent encrypted and encapsulated data packets carrying cause-side data units and encrypted and encapsulated data packets carrying result-side data units can be distinguished. During periods when the communication link is unavailable, the last successfully sent encrypted encapsulated data packet before the network outage and the first encrypted encapsulated data packet generated during the network outage maintain a continuous relationship through a preceding data digest; adjacent encrypted encapsulated data packets generated during the network outage also maintain a continuous relationship through a preceding data digest; thus, even if the data is not uploaded to the remote platform in real time during the network outage, the field end can still maintain the continuity of the collection order. In practice, the local encrypted cache queue is stored in the local storage unit of the edge gateway or in the local storage unit of the data acquisition and transmission device. When the field end writes to the local encrypted cache queue, it retains the complete content of the encrypted encapsulated data packet, including the transmission header, encrypted payload and authentication tag. It does not regenerate the acquisition time of the data during the network outage, nor does it rewrite the field incrementing sequence number according to the transmission time after the network is restored. For example, if the communication between the field terminal and the remote platform is interrupted at 10:00 AM and the communication link is unavailable, the dosing pump will first experience insufficient dosing, followed by an increase in the chemical oxygen demand (COD) monitoring data. The field terminal will generate encrypted data packets containing the abnormal dosing pump status and encrypted data packets containing the increased COD data, and write them into the local encrypted cache queue in the actual collection order. Even if the above data is retransmitted after the network is restored at 11:00 AM, its collection time and field increment sequence number will still maintain the actual order during the network outage at 10:00 AM.

[0029] S5. After the communication link is restored, identify the process causal delay inversion group based on the process causal relationship table and the local encrypted buffer queue. The field end continuously monitors the communication link status; when the field end re-establishes the communication connection with the remote platform and can receive confirmation from the remote platform for test data packets or retransmission requests, it is determined that the communication link has been restored, and the detection time when the communication link is restored is recorded; this detection time is used to subsequently determine the end time of the network outage. After the communication link is restored, the field terminal reads the local encrypted buffer queue and forms a retransmission order based on the local encrypted buffer queue. The retransmission order is formed by the retransmission scheduling result of different data type queues in the local encrypted buffer queue, or by the original buffering strategy of the field terminal. Since different types of data are located in different buffer queues or have different retransmission priorities, the retransmission order may not be consistent with the field acquisition order. The field terminal uses the encrypted encapsulated data packet carrying the cause-side data unit as the cause-side data packet and the encrypted encapsulated data packet carrying the result-side data unit as the result-side data packet; then, it reads the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet from the local encrypted cache queue within the same processing module. For the read cause-side data packets and result-side data packets, the field terminal determines the cause-side data type, cause-side process object, result-side data type, result-side process object, cause-side acquisition time, result-side acquisition time, cause-side field increment sequence number, and result-side field increment sequence number based on their transmission headers; the field terminal then matches the cause-side data type, cause-side process object, result-side data type, and result-side process object with the process causality items in the process causality table; When both the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet meet the following conditions, the field terminal will mark the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet as a process cause-effect time delay inversion group: First, the cause-side data packets and the result-side data packets belong to the same environmental protection facility and to the same processing module or to processing modules with upstream and downstream processing relationships respectively; Second, the cause-side data unit carried by the cause-side data packet and the result-side data unit carried by the result-side data packet conform to the same process causality item in the process causality table; Third, the data packet on the cause side is collected earlier than the data packet on the result side, and the time interval between the two collection times falls within the process time delay range of the corresponding process causal relationship item. Fourth, the in-situ increment sequence number of the cause-side data packet is earlier than the in-situ increment sequence number of the result-side data packet; Fifth, in the order of data to be retransmitted formed by the local encrypted buffer queue, the result-side data packet is placed before the cause-side data packet; If the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet satisfy the first to fourth items, but not the fifth item, it indicates that the two have a causal relationship in the field process sequence, but the order of data to be retransmitted has not been reversed. The field end will retransmit the data according to the field incremental sequence number. If the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet satisfy the fifth item, but not any of the first to fourth items, they will not be marked as a process causal time delay inversion group. Instead, they will be processed as ordinary retransmitted data or submitted to the remote platform for confirmation. Based on the above rules, the identification of process causal time delay inversion groups is based on facility affiliation, processing module relationship, process causal relationship item, process time delay range, on-site incremental sequence number and order to be supplemented, avoiding the determination of process causal inversion based solely on a single time sequence relationship.

[0030] In this embodiment, the process causal time delay inversion group refers to a data combination consisting of at least one cause-side data packet and at least one result-side data packet. In the field acquisition sequence, the cause-side data packet precedes the result-side data packet, and both conform to the process causal relationship item and the corresponding process time delay range in the process causal relationship table. However, in the order to be retransmitted, the result-side data packet is located before the cause-side data packet. The process causal time delay inversion group is used to identify data combinations that may cause the remote platform to misjudge the result as preceding the cause during the network outage retransmission encrypted text re-feedback process. In this embodiment, the on-site data collection order is determined by the on-site incremental sequence number and verified by the collection time. If the on-site incremental sequence number is inconsistent with the order reflected by the collection time, the on-site end will mark the relevant data packets as data to be verified by the platform and include them in the rearrangement and verification process of the remote platform during retransmission. For example, the local encrypted buffer queue contains a cause-side data packet carrying data on insufficient dosing by the dosing pump and a result-side data packet carrying data on increased chemical oxygen demand (COD). The process causality table indicates that there is a corresponding process causality relationship between insufficient dosing by the dosing pump and increased COD, and the relationship between their acquisition times falls within the process time delay range of this process causality relationship. The field incrementing sequence number shows that insufficient dosing by the dosing pump occurred before increased COD. However, in the order of data to be transmitted in the local encrypted buffer queue, the COD increase data packet is located before the insufficient dosing pump data packet. At this time, the field end marks these two data packets as a process causality time delay inversion group.

[0031] S6. Based on the identification results of the process causal time delay inversion group, perform retransmission of the encrypted encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted cache queue, and rearrange the identified process causal time delay inversion group on the remote platform to generate a remote operation and maintenance trusted record. After identifying the process causal time delay inversion group, the field terminal performs retransmission on the encrypted encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted buffer queue; For encrypted encapsulated data packets that are not marked as process causal time delay inversion groups, the field end retransmits them according to the field increment sequence number; retransmitting according to the field increment sequence number can ensure that the order of data received by the remote platform is consistent with the order of field acquisition, thereby reducing the impact of out-of-order retransmission on remote operation and maintenance status updates. For encrypted encapsulated data packets marked as process causal time delay inversion groups, the field terminal first sends causal index information, and then retransmits the corresponding cause-side data packets and result-side data packets according to the field acquisition order; the causal index information includes the processing module identifier, the cause-side field incremental sequence number, the result-side field incremental sequence number, and the acquisition time relationship between the two; In this embodiment, the causal index information refers to the index record used to associate the cause-side data packets and the result-side data packets on the remote platform side. The causal index information does not replace the encrypted and encapsulated data packets themselves, nor does it carry water quality values ​​or equipment operating parameters. Instead, it instructs the remote platform to verify and rearrange the relevant data packets as the same process causal time-delay inverted group by using the processing module identifier, the cause-side field incremental sequence number, the result-side field incremental sequence number, and the collection time relationship. Causal index information is used to alert the remote platform that there is a risk of process causal time lag inversion in related data packets that arrive subsequently or have already arrived, and that they need to be rearranged according to the field collection order rather than the platform receiving order.

[0032] After receiving the encrypted and encapsulated data packet, the remote platform verifies the authentication tag and the preceding data digest. When verifying the authentication tag, the remote platform uses the key or authentication verification method corresponding to the field end to verify the transmission header, encrypted payload, and authentication association information. If the authentication tag verification fails, the remote platform refuses to write the encrypted and encapsulated data packet into the historical operation sequence and generates a data integrity exception record. When verifying the preceding data digest, the remote platform compares the received previous process causal data unit digest with the preceding data digest carried in the current encrypted and encapsulated data packet. If the preceding data digest is not continuous, the remote platform marks the relevant data packets as data to be confirmed in sequence and requests the field end to resend the data packets in the missing interval. Once the authentication label and preceding data digest have been verified, the remote platform reconstructs the on-site process sequence during the network outage based on the collection time, the on-site incremental sequence number, and the causal index information. When reconstructing the on-site process sequence, the remote platform does not use the platform receiving time as the sole sorting criterion, but instead uses the on-site incremental sequence number as the primary sorting criterion, the collection time as the verification criterion, and the causal index information as the verification criterion for process causal relationships. When the remote platform receives the result-side data packet first but has not yet received the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information, the remote platform marks the result-side data packet as data pending causal confirmation and temporarily stores the result-side data packet. In this embodiment, the data pending causal confirmation refers to data that the remote platform has received result-side data packets but has not yet received cause-side data packets indicated by causal index information, or data that has not yet completed authentication tag verification, preceding data digest verification, and process causal relationship verification. The data pending causal confirmation is temporarily stored in the pending confirmation cache area of ​​the remote platform and does not directly overwrite the existing state of the platform as the current real-time state. The retransmission and recovery data refers to retransmission data that the remote platform has completed authentication tag verification, preceding data digest verification, and causal confirmation, and has written into the historical operation sequence according to the on-site collection order. The retransmission and recovery data is used to update historical trends, alarm records, and remote operation and maintenance trusted records. The result-side data packets marked as data awaiting causal confirmation are only written to the confirmation buffer of the remote platform and not to the current real-time status area. The remote platform records the facility identifier, processing module identifier, field incremented sequence number, acquisition time, data type identifier, process object identifier, and cause-side field incremented sequence number indicated by the causal index information in the confirmation buffer of the result-side data packets. When the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information arrives and passes the authentication tag verification and preceding data digest verification, the remote platform performs causal confirmation between the result-side data packet in the confirmation buffer and the cause-side data packet. After successful causal confirmation, the two are written into the historical operation sequence according to the on-site collection order, and the result-side data packet is updated from pending causal confirmation data to retransmitted recovery data. If the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information does not arrive or fails verification, the remote platform maintains the pending causal confirmation status of the result-side data packet and records the reason for the incomplete causal confirmation in the remote operation and maintenance trusted record. By implementing the above-mentioned handling rules, the remote platform can avoid directly overwriting the current real-time status with historical water quality data that has not yet been confirmed for causal relationship, thereby reducing false alarms, missed alarms, and misjudgments of abnormal sources caused by the back-up transmission of encrypted data after network outages.

[0033] After the remote platform completes the rearrangement, it generates a trusted remote operation and maintenance record. In this embodiment, the remote operation and maintenance trusted record refers to the record formed by the remote platform after the network outage retransmission is completed, which describes the data retransmission and process causal rearrangement process during the network outage. The remote operation and maintenance trusted record includes at least the network outage start time, network outage end time, retransmission data range, process causal time delay inversion group, anomaly source judgment result, and status update result after retransmission. The remote operation and maintenance trusted record is used to distinguish real-time data, retransmission recovery data, and data pending causal confirmation, and is used to support subsequent alarm tracing, anomaly source analysis, and operation and maintenance report generation. The trusted remote operation and maintenance record includes the network outage start time, network outage end time, retransmission data range, process cause-effect time delay inversion group, anomaly source judgment result, and status update result after retransmission; the network outage start time is determined by the detection time when the communication link is unavailable, and the network outage end time is determined by the detection time when the communication link is restored; the retransmission data range is determined by the acquisition time, field increment sequence number, and processing module identifier corresponding to the first and last retransmission encrypted encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted buffer queue; The anomaly source judgment result is generated based on the process causal time delay inversion group that has completed causal confirmation; the anomaly source judgment result in this embodiment is used to represent the anomaly source candidates formed by the remote platform based on the process causal time delay inversion group that has completed causal confirmation and their corresponding basis, and does not exclude that the data packets on the same result side are also affected by other unconnected data sources or external operating condition changes. For process causal time delay inversion groups that have completed causal confirmation, the remote platform takes the causal process object corresponding to the causal data packet as the candidate anomaly source, takes the equipment status change, alarm trigger or control response event carried by the causal data packet as the anomaly source event, and takes the water quality change carried by the result data packet as the anomaly result record. The remote platform generates anomaly source judgment result based on the anomaly source candidate, anomaly source event, anomaly result record and their sequential relationship in the field collection order. When a result-side data packet corresponds to multiple cause-side data packets, the remote platform determines whether each cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet conform to the process causality table and the process time delay range. For cause-side data packets that meet the conditions, they are all written into the remote operation and maintenance trusted record as candidates for anomaly sources. For cause-side data packets that do not meet the conditions, they are not considered as candidates for anomaly sources for the result-side data packet. Therefore, the anomaly source judgment result is not directly generated by the platform receiving time, but is generated by the process causality time delay inversion group after the causality confirmation is completed. For data rearranged by the remote platform, the remote platform marks it as retransmission and recovery data; for data for which causal confirmation has not yet been completed, the remote platform keeps it as data pending causal confirmation; for data that cannot be verified by authentication tags or preceding data digests, the remote platform generates an anomaly verification record and does not write it as trusted running data into the historical running sequence.

[0034] For example, in an industrial wastewater treatment facility, during a network outage at the field end, data packets were generated indicating insufficient dosing by the dosing pump and an increase in chemical oxygen demand (COD). Since the COD increase data packet preceded the insufficient dosing data packet in the transmission order, the field end marked them as a process causal time-delay inverted group. After network recovery, the field end first sent causal index information, and then retransmitted the insufficient dosing data packet and the COD increase data packet according to the field collection order. The remote platform, based on the causal index information, confirmed that insufficient dosing was the cause-side data packet and the COD increase was the result-side data packet, and recorded insufficient dosing first and COD increase later according to the incremental field sequence number. Thus, the remote platform can establish a correlation between COD increase and insufficient dosing, avoiding misjudging COD increase as an unexplained sudden anomaly. In another embodiment, during the network outage at the field end, abnormal data packets for aeration equipment and data packets for increased ammonia nitrogen are generated. After the communication link is restored, if the data packet for increased ammonia nitrogen is located before the data packet for abnormal aeration equipment in the order of pending retransmission formed by the local encrypted buffer queue, the field end identifies that the two belong to the process causal time delay inversion group based on the process causal relationship table. When the remote platform receives the data packet for increased ammonia nitrogen but has not yet received the data packet for abnormal aeration equipment, it marks the data packet for increased ammonia nitrogen as data pending causal confirmation and does not immediately generate the final abnormality source judgment based on it. When the data packet for abnormal aeration equipment arrives and passes verification, the remote platform rearranges the data according to the field collection order and updates the data packet for increased ammonia nitrogen to the retransmission recovery data. At the same time, it records the inversion group and the status update result after retransmission in the remote operation and maintenance trusted record. In another embodiment, during the network outage at the field end, data packets of sudden increase in influent flow and increase in suspended solids are generated. If there is a process causal relationship between sudden increase in influent flow and increase in suspended solids in the process causal relationship table, and the relationship between the two acquisition times falls within the process time delay range, then when the field end discovers that the order of data to be retransmitted is reversed, it marks it as a process causal time delay reversed group. After the remote platform completes the rearrangement, it records sudden increase in influent flow as a candidate abnormal source and increase in suspended solids as an abnormal result, thereby reducing the risk of misjudging abnormal sources caused by network outage retransmission. In this embodiment, the historical operation data filtering rules are used to ensure the reliability of the data source in the process causal relationship table; the process causal relationship item formation conditions are used to avoid inferring the cause-effect relationship solely based on the order of data collection; the process time delay range determination method is used to limit the reasonable process lag interval between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit; the pending transmission order formation mechanism is used to explain the specific reasons for the process causal time delay inversion during the network outage retransmission process; the process causal time delay inversion group identification rules are used to identify data combinations whose on-site process order is opposite to the pending transmission order from the local encrypted cache queue; the pending causal confirmation data processing rules are used to prevent historical retransmission result-side data from directly overwriting the current real-time state; and the anomaly source judgment result formation basis is used to write the cause-side process object and result-side water quality changes that have completed causal confirmation into the remote operation and maintenance reliable record.

[0035] Through the above steps, this embodiment combines the field acquisition sequence, process causal relationship table, local encrypted cache queue, process causal time delay inversion group and remote platform reordering process without changing the encrypted payload content. This enables the remote platform to distinguish between real-time data, retransmitted recovery data and data awaiting causal confirmation, avoiding the process cause-effect relationship inversion caused by network outage retransmission of encrypted data.

[0036] This embodiment also provides a remote operation and maintenance data encryption transmission system for environmental protection facilities. The system is used to execute the above-mentioned remote operation and maintenance data encryption transmission method for environmental protection facilities. The system includes a field acquisition module, a process cause-effect modeling module, an encryption encapsulation module, a network outage caching module, an inverted identification module, a retransmission and rearrangement module, and a trusted record generation module. The field acquisition module is set up at the field end to collect operational data of environmental protection facilities. It generates process causal data units according to the acquisition sequence, and marks equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data as cause-side data units, and water quality monitoring data as result-side data units. When generating process causal data units, the field acquisition module writes the acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, data payload, and preceding data summary. The process causal modeling module is set up at the field or remote platform to establish a process causal relationship table based on historical operation data of the same environmental protection facility. The module performs validity screening on the historical operation data, identifying cause-side and result-side data units belonging to the same processing module or having upstream / downstream processing relationships from the filtered historical operation data. When the two data units satisfy the following relationships—facility affiliation, processing module relationship, process object correspondence, cause-side event attributes, result-side water quality change, and the sequence of data collection—a sequential association record is generated. The module generates process causal relationship items based on these sequential association records. Each process causal relationship item includes cause-side data type, cause-side process object, result-side data type, result-side process object, and process time delay range. The encryption and encapsulation module is set up at the field end to encrypt and encapsulate the process causal data units with field sequence information, resulting in an encrypted and encapsulated data packet. The encryption and encapsulation module performs symmetric encryption on the data payload to obtain a ciphertext payload. The acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and preceding data digest are used as authentication association information to participate in integrity verification and generate an authentication tag. The encrypted and encapsulated data packet is formed by the ciphertext payload, authentication tag, and transmission header. The network outage buffer module is located at the field end and is used to write encrypted and encapsulated data packets into the local ciphertext buffer queue when the communication link is unavailable. During the communication link outage, the network outage buffer module continues to receive encrypted and encapsulated data packets generated by the encryption and encapsulation module and writes them into the local ciphertext buffer queue according to the processing module identifier, data type identifier, and field incrementing sequence number. At the same time, it maintains the continuity between the last successfully sent data packet before the network outage and the data packets generated during the network outage through the preceding data digest. The network outage buffer module is also used to form data type buffer segments according to the data type identifier and, after the communication link is restored, cooperate with the retransmission and rearrangement module to form the order to be retransmitted. The inverted data identification module is set up at the field end or a remote platform. After the communication link is restored, it identifies the process causal time delay inverted groups based on the process causal relationship table and the local encrypted buffer queue. The inverted data identification module takes the encrypted package data carrying the cause-side data unit as the cause-side data packet and the encrypted package data carrying the result-side data unit as the result-side data packet. When the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet belong to the same environmental protection facility and the same processing module or the processing modules with upstream and downstream processing relationships, and the cause-side data unit carried by the cause-side data packet and the result-side data unit carried by the result-side data packet conform to the same process causal relationship item in the process causal relationship table, and the acquisition time relationship between the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet falls within the process time delay range of the corresponding process causal relationship item, and the cause-side data packet precedes the result-side data packet in the field acquisition order, while the result-side data packet is located before the cause-side data packet in the order to be retransmitted formed by the local encrypted buffer queue, the inverted data identification module marks the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet as the process causal time delay inverted group. The retransmission and reordering module includes a field retransmission unit and a platform reordering unit. The field retransmission unit is located at the field end and is used to retransmit encrypted encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted cache queue according to the identification results of the process causal time delay inversion group. For encrypted encapsulated data packets not marked as process causal time delay inversion group, the field retransmission unit retransmits them according to the field incremental sequence number. For encrypted encapsulated data packets already marked as process causal time delay inversion group, the field retransmission unit first sends the causal index information, and then retransmits the corresponding cause-side data packets and result-side data packets according to the field collection order. The platform reordering unit is located on the remote platform and is used to receive encrypted encapsulated data packets, verify the authentication tag and the preceding data digest, and reconstruct the field process sequence during the network outage period according to the collection time, the field incremental sequence number and the causal index information. The trusted record generation module is set on a remote platform and is used to generate a remote operation and maintenance trusted record after the retransmission and rearrangement module completes the rearrangement. The remote operation and maintenance trusted record includes the network outage start time, network outage end time, retransmission data range, process causal time delay inversion group, anomaly source judgment result, and status update result after retransmission. The trusted record generation module is also used to mark the rearranged data as retransmission recovery data and keep the data that has not yet completed causal confirmation as data to be confirmed. The trusted record generation module also generates anomaly source judgment result based on the process causal time delay inversion group that has completed causal confirmation. Among them, the causal process object corresponding to the causal data packet is used as anomaly source candidate, the equipment status change, alarm trigger or control response event carried by the causal data packet is used as anomaly source event, and the water quality change carried by the result data packet is used as anomaly result record. Each module in the above system embodiment is implemented by software programs, or by a combination of field hardware, remote platform servers, and software programs; the field terminal is an edge gateway, a data acquisition and transmission device, or an industrial control device with local storage and encrypted computing capabilities; the remote platform is deployed in an enterprise operation and maintenance center server, an environmental protection facility operation and maintenance platform server, or a cloud server; the data interaction between each module is performed according to the steps in the above method embodiment.

[0037] The above description is only a preferred embodiment of the present invention, but the scope of protection of the present invention is not limited thereto. Any equivalent substitutions or modifications made by those skilled in the art within the scope of the technology disclosed in the present invention, based on the technical solution and inventive concept of the present invention, should be covered within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data for environmental protection facilities, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S1. Acquire the environmental protection facility operation data collected on-site, generate process cause-effect data units according to the collection order, and mark the equipment status data, alarm data and control response data as cause-side data units, and mark the water quality monitoring data as result-side data units; S2. Establish a process causal relationship table based on the historical operation data of the same environmental protection facility. The process causal relationship table represents the sequential relationship between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit. S3. Encrypt and encapsulate the process cause-effect data unit with field sequence information to obtain an encrypted encapsulated data packet; S4. When the communication link is unavailable, write the encrypted and encapsulated data packet into the local ciphertext buffer queue; S5. After the communication link is restored, identify the process causal delay inversion group based on the process causal relationship table and the local encrypted buffer queue. S6. Based on the identification results of the process causal time delay inversion group, perform retransmission of the encrypted encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted cache queue, and rearrange the identified process causal time delay inversion group on the remote platform to generate a remote operation and maintenance trusted record.

2. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process causal data unit includes the acquisition time, field incrementing sequence number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, data payload, and preceding data summary. The field incrementing sequence number is continuously generated by the field terminal according to the acquisition completion order, and the preceding data summary is obtained by summarizing the previous process causal data unit.

3. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 2, characterized in that, The environmental protection facility operation data includes water quality monitoring data, equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data. The water quality monitoring data includes one or more of chemical oxygen demand, ammonia nitrogen, suspended solids, pH, and flow rate. The equipment status data includes the operating status of one or more of the following: dosing pumps, aeration equipment, booster pumps, return pumps, valves, and membrane filtration units.

4. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 2, characterized in that, Establish a process cause-and-effect table, including: From the historical operation data during the continuous online operation of the same environmental protection facility, identify the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit that belong to the same processing module or have an upstream and downstream processing relationship. When there are sequential correlation records in the historical operation data where the collection time of the cause-side data unit is earlier than that of the result-side data unit, a process causal relationship item is generated. The process causal relationship item includes the cause-side data type, the cause-side process object, the result-side data type, the result-side process object, and the process time lag range. The process time lag range is determined based on the time interval between the collection time of the cause-side data unit and the collection time of the result-side data unit in the sequential correlation records.

5. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 2, characterized in that, Encrypting and encapsulating the process causal data units with on-site sequence information, including: Symmetric encryption is applied to the data payload to obtain the ciphertext payload; The data collection time, incremental on-site serial number, facility identifier, processing module identifier, data type identifier, process object identifier, and preceding data summary are used as authentication-related information to participate in integrity verification and generate authentication labels. The encrypted data packet is formed by the encrypted payload, the authentication tag, and the transmission header. The transmission header includes the facility identifier, the processing module identifier, the field incrementing sequence number, the acquisition time, and the data type identifier.

6. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 5, characterized in that, When the communication link is unavailable, the encrypted encapsulated data packet is written to the local ciphertext buffer queue, including: The on-site system continues to collect operational data from environmental protection facilities and continues to generate encrypted and encapsulated data packets; The encrypted and encapsulated data packets are written into the local ciphertext cache queue according to the processing module identifier, data type identifier, and field incrementing sequence number. The preceding data digest maintains the continuity between the last successfully sent data packet before the network outage and the data packets generated during the outage.

7. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 6, characterized in that, Identifying process causal time delay inversion groups includes: The encrypted encapsulated data packet carrying the cause-side data unit is used as the cause-side data packet, and the encrypted encapsulated data packet carrying the result-side data unit is used as the result-side data packet. Read the cause-side data packets and result-side data packets from the same processing module within the local encrypted cache queue; When the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet match the process causality item in the process causality table, and the acquisition time relationship between the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet falls within the process time delay range of the corresponding process causality item, and the cause-side data packet precedes the result-side data packet in the field acquisition order, while the result-side data packet is located before the cause-side data packet in the order to be retransmitted formed by the local encrypted buffer queue, the cause-side data packet and the result-side data packet are marked as the process causality time delay inverted group.

8. The method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data of environmental protection facilities according to claim 7, characterized in that, The process causal time delay inversion group was retransmitted according to the on-site acquisition sequence and rearranged on the remote platform, including: For encrypted encapsulated data packets not marked as process causal time delay inversion groups, retransmit them according to the incremental sequence number on site; For encrypted encapsulated data packets that have been marked as process causal time delay inversion groups, first send the causal index information, and then retransmit the corresponding cause-side data packets and result-side data packets according to the field collection order; The causal index information includes the processing module identifier, the incremental sequence number of the cause-side field, the incremental sequence number of the result-side field, and the relationship between the two in terms of collection time. After receiving the encrypted and encapsulated data packet, the remote platform verifies the authentication tag and the preceding data digest; After successful verification, the on-site process sequence during the network outage is reconstructed based on the data collection time, the incremental on-site sequence number, and the causal index information. When the remote platform receives the result-side data packet first but has not yet received the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information, it marks the result-side data packet as data to be confirmed by causality. After the cause-side data packet indicated by the causal index information arrives and is verified, it is written into the historical operation sequence according to the on-site collection order.

9. A method for encrypted transmission of remote operation and maintenance data for environmental protection facilities according to claim 8, characterized in that, Generate trusted remote operation and maintenance records, including: After the remote platform completes the rearrangement, it generates a reliable remote operation and maintenance record that includes the start time of the network outage, the end time of the network outage, the range of retransmitted data, the process cause-effect time delay inversion group, the result of the anomaly source judgment, and the status update result after retransmission. Among them, the start time of the network outage is determined by the detection time when the communication link is unavailable, and the end time of the network outage is determined by the detection time when the communication link is restored. The rearranged data is marked as supplementary recovery data, and the data for which causal confirmation has not yet been completed is kept as data pending causal confirmation.

10. A remote operation and maintenance data encryption transmission system for environmental protection facilities, applied to the remote operation and maintenance data encryption transmission method for environmental protection facilities as described in any one of claims 1-9, characterized in that, It includes a field data acquisition module, a process cause-effect modeling module, an encryption and encapsulation module, a network outage caching module, an inverted identification module, a retransmission and rearrangement module, and a trusted record generation module; The on-site data acquisition module collects environmental protection facility operation data, generates process cause-effect data units according to the acquisition sequence, and marks equipment status data, alarm data, and control response data as cause-side data units, and water quality monitoring data as result-side data units. The process causal modeling module establishes a process causal relationship table based on the historical operation data of the same environmental protection facility. The process causal relationship table represents the sequential relationship between the cause-side data unit and the result-side data unit. The encryption and encapsulation module performs encryption and encapsulation of the process cause-effect data unit with on-site sequence information to obtain an encrypted and encapsulated data packet. When the communication link is unavailable, the network disconnection caching module writes the encrypted and encapsulated data packets into the local ciphertext cache queue. After the communication link is restored, the inverted identification module identifies the process causal time delay inverted group based on the process causal relationship table and the local encrypted cache queue. The retransmission and rearrangement module retransmits the encrypted and encapsulated data packets in the local encrypted cache queue according to the identification results of the process causal time delay inversion group, and rearranges the identified process causal time delay inversion group on the remote platform. The trusted record generation module generates remote operation and maintenance trusted records based on the rearrangement results of the remote platform.

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