Navigation jamming method and system for drone countermeasure

Abstract

The application provides a navigation interference method and system for unmanned aerial vehicle countermeasures. The method obtains target observation and link monitoring data to form a target state representation including proximity state, motion trend, hovering state, link continuity and area constraint state. A navigation trust competition index is calculated based on the representation to determine a navigation trust competition state. A restricted navigation interference action is selected from a preset set according to the state. A control device executes the action, and a safety disposal result is formed according to the area safety, safe behavior, legal link protection and risk trigger state after execution. The application connects state representation, trust competition determination, action selection and result formation in series, so that the interference process has the effects of state determination, action selection and result differentiation, and effectively avoids the excessive disposal risk caused by fixed intensity interference.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention belongs to the field of drone countermeasures and low-altitude security technology, and particularly relates to a navigation jamming method and system for drone countermeasures. Background Technology

[0002] With the rapid development of the low-altitude economy, consumer drones, industrial drones, and autonomous flight platforms, drones are widely used in surveying and inspection, logistics delivery, emergency rescue, and security patrols. However, incidents of unauthorized drones intruding into airport airspace, major event areas, energy facilities, regulatory sites, military management zones, and densely populated areas are also increasing. Existing drone countermeasures typically include radio detection, radar detection, electro-optical tracking, communication jamming, navigation jamming, protocol interception, and physical interception, with communication jamming and navigation jamming being more commonly used in engineering projects. Existing communication jamming typically reduces the external control continuity of the target drone by affecting remote control links, image transmission links, or other control links; existing navigation jamming typically affects the target's use of navigation information, making it difficult for it to maintain its intended flight path; some systems also select appropriate jamming equipment or jamming levels based on target distance, azimuth, spectrum intensity, target type, or human threat level. While these methods can prevent further intrusion under certain conditions, significant compatibility and security issues remain in practical engineering applications. First, many systems rely primarily on target distance, spectrum intensity, or threat level for initial intervention, lacking a unified assessment of external states such as deceleration, hovering, decreased link continuity, or return-to-home tendency. This can lead to insufficient intervention while the target is still stably intruding, or increased interference when the target is approaching safety protection measures. Second, existing systems typically process target motion information, communication link information, and area security constraints separately. Trajectories output by radar or optoelectronic devices, link activity output by radio detection equipment, and area boundaries provided by electronic fences or security platforms often fall into different modules, lacking a unified target state representation for selecting navigation interference actions. This can result in inconsistent decision-making. Third, communication and navigation interventions are often used in parallel in many schemes, lacking a clear progression between intervention actions and the target's flight control external state. This can easily lead to fixed-pattern or progressively stronger interventions, potentially causing dangerous return-to-home, abnormal drift, unstable landing, or crossing of the core area. Another engineering problem is that airports, major events, parks and other scenarios usually have legitimate communication links, security buffer zones and core protected objects. Countermeasures need to consider whether the target has entered the authorized countermeasure zone, whether it is close to the security buffer zone, whether the action may affect the legitimate link, and whether the target has entered the safe direction after the action. Traditional solutions focus more on whether the interference is effective and do not pay enough attention to whether the result of the action truly forms a safe state such as departure, hovering control, safe return or controlled landing.Therefore, although existing technologies have the capabilities of target discovery, link detection, and jamming execution, there is still a need for a method that can organically connect minimum target state data, navigation trust contention state, restricted navigation jamming actions, and safety handling results, so that the countermeasure process can shift from extensive suppression to state-matching, restricted, and result-determinable navigation jamming handling. Summary of the Invention

[0003] This invention discloses a navigation jamming method and system for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to solve the problems mentioned in the background art.

[0004] To achieve the above objectives, a first aspect of the present invention provides a navigation jamming method for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the method comprising:

[0005] Acquire target observation data and link monitoring data of the target UAV to form a target state characterization, which includes target approach state, target motion trend, hovering state, target link continuity and preset area constraint state;

[0006] The navigation trust contention state is determined based on the target state representation.

[0007] Based on the navigation trust contention state, a restricted navigation interference action is selected from a preset action set;

[0008] The control and disposal equipment executes the restricted navigation interference actions to achieve a safe disposal result for the UAV.

[0009] Furthermore, the acquisition of target observation data and link monitoring data of the target UAV to form a target state characterization includes:

[0010] Collect target observation results output by low-altitude surveillance radar, electro-optical tracking equipment or target tracking equipment, and sort them to obtain target position and target velocity;

[0011] The target's approach status is determined based on the relationship between the target's location and the boundary of the authorized countermeasure zone;

[0012] The target's motion trend is determined based on the changes in the target's position and velocity at consecutive time intervals;

[0013] The hovering state is determined based on the changes in the target position and the target speed within the time window;

[0014] The continuity of the target link is determined by recording the activity changes of the target-related wireless link using radio detection equipment;

[0015] Read the preset region configuration and determine the constraint state of the preset region.

[0016] Further, determining the navigation trust contention state based on the target state representation includes:

[0017] The target approach state, the target motion trend, the hovering state, and the target link continuity are each mapped to a normalized state quantity;

[0018] Calculate the first-order state contribution of the target approach state, the target motion trend, the hovering state, and the target link continuity;

[0019] The second-order coupling contribution is obtained by calculating the product of the target approach state and the hovering state, and the product of the target motion trend and the target link continuity.

[0020] Calculate the navigation trust competition index based on the first-order state contribution, the second-order coupling contribution, and the preset region constraint state;

[0021] The navigation trust competition state is determined based on the navigation trust competition index and the state boundary threshold. The navigation trust competition state includes normal intrusion state, mild trust competition state, obvious trust competition state, or protection critical state.

[0022] Further, the step of selecting restricted navigation interference actions from a preset action set based on the navigation trust contention state includes:

[0023] The action level table is read based on the navigation trust contention status to determine the range of candidate actions;

[0024] For each candidate action within the candidate action range, obtain the state adaptation contribution, safety constraint deduction value, and action intensity level;

[0025] Based on the state adaptation contribution, the safety constraint deduction value, the action intensity level, and the expected action intensity level corresponding to the navigation trust contention state, calculate the action selection value for each candidate action;

[0026] The candidate action with the largest selected action value is determined as the restricted navigation interference action.

[0027] Furthermore, the preset action set includes observation hold actions, low-intensity navigation guidance actions, restricted navigation interference actions, restricted navigation interference actions with short-term communication continuity reduction, hold actions, and reduction actions;

[0028] When the navigation trust contention state is a normal intrusion state, the candidate action range includes the observation-hold action and the lowest level of handling action;

[0029] When the navigation trust contention state is a mild trust contention state, the candidate action range includes the observation hold action and the low-intensity navigation guidance action;

[0030] When the navigation trust contention state is a clear trust contention state, the candidate action range includes the restricted navigation interference action and the restricted navigation interference action with short-term communication continuity reduction.

[0031] When the navigation trust contention state is a protection critical state, the candidate action range includes the hold action and the weakening action.

[0032] Furthermore, after determining the candidate action with the largest selected action value as the restricted navigation interference action, the method further includes:

[0033] Generate an action package, which includes action type, execution device identifier, handling level, execution direction, duration level, and stop condition;

[0034] Check whether the target is within the manageable space and check whether the legal link protection conditions allow the corresponding management level;

[0035] If all checks are satisfied, the action package will be sent to the processing linkage controller;

[0036] If any check fails, the action package will be downgraded to an observation-hold action or a manual follow-up action prompt.

[0037] Furthermore, the control and handling device performs the restricted navigation interference action, including:

[0038] The action package corresponding to the restricted navigation interference action is sent to the handling linkage controller;

[0039] The handling linkage controller calls the corresponding navigation jamming device or communication coordination device to execute according to the handling level and action area in the action package;

[0040] During execution, the position, speed, and hovering status output by the target tracking device are continuously read, as well as the trigger status of the legal link protection conditions.

[0041] If no device availability feedback is received, the device execution feedback is inconsistent with the action package, target tracking is lost, or the legitimate link protection condition is triggered, the enhanced navigation interference action should be stopped immediately, while the tracking and alarm status should be maintained.

[0042] Furthermore, the formation of the drone safety handling result includes:

[0043] Acquire the security status of the target area, the security behavior status of the target, the legal link protection status, and the risk trigger status;

[0044] Calculate the positive contributions of the target area security status, the target security behavior status, and the legal link protection status, and subtract the risk trigger status to obtain the security handling judgment quantity;

[0045] Based on the safety handling judgment quantity and stopping conditions, the safety handling result of the UAV is determined. The safety handling result of the UAV includes departure handling result, hovering control result, safe return result, controllable landing result, manual follow-up handling result, or risk termination handling result.

[0046] Further, determining the safety handling result of the drone based on the safety handling judgment quantity and the stopping conditions includes:

[0047] When the target leaves the authorized countermeasure area or enters the direction outside the safety buffer zone, and the safety handling determination value is in a higher range, it is determined as the departure handling result;

[0048] When the target is within the safety buffer and hovers stably, and the legitimate link protection status is good, it is determined as the hovering control result;

[0049] When the target enters the return route without crossing the core protection area, it is determined as a safe return result;

[0050] When the target forms a stable descent trend within the preset safe area, it is determined to be the controllable landing result;

[0051] When the target is in a state that can be monitored but still requires manual confirmation, it is determined to be the result of the manual follow-up processing;

[0052] When the risk trigger status increases, or the legitimate link protection condition is triggered, the risk termination and disposal result is determined.

[0053] A second aspect of the invention provides a navigation jamming system for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), the system comprising:

[0054] The target state characterization generation unit is used to acquire target observation data and link monitoring data of the target UAV and form a target state characterization. The target state characterization includes target approach state, target motion trend, hovering state, target link continuity and preset area constraint state.

[0055] A navigation trust contention state determination unit is used to determine the navigation trust contention state based on the target state representation.

[0056] A restricted navigation interference action selection unit is used to select a restricted navigation interference action from a preset action set based on the navigation trust contention state;

[0057] An action execution and feedback unit is used to control the handling device to perform the restricted navigation interference action;

[0058] The safety handling result formation unit is used to acquire the target area safety status, target safety behavior status, legal link protection status, and risk trigger status after execution, and form the drone safety handling result.

[0059] The beneficial technical effects of the present invention are at least as follows:

[0060] To address the aforementioned issues, this invention provides a navigation jamming method and system for UAV countermeasures. First, it achieves a unified representation of multi-source detection data and regional constraints, integrating target motion, link continuity, and regional configuration into a target state representation, thus resolving the inconsistency in decision-making caused by data dispersion in existing systems. Second, it accurately identifies the target's flight control state by introducing a first-order state contribution and a second-order scenario coupling term to calculate the navigation trust competition index, avoiding misjudgments and premature actions caused by single low-speed or link abrupt changes. Third, it achieves adaptive matching between jamming actions and target states by selecting restricted navigation jamming actions through state adaptation, safety constraint deduction, and action overshoot suppression, overcoming the drawback of fixed-intensity jamming easily leading to dangerous return-to-home or unstable landings, ensuring precise correspondence between action intensity and state. Finally, it balances legitimate link protection with the determineability of the handling results, using communication attenuation as a collaborative means to serve navigation soft countermeasures, and transforming the handling endpoint into a clear safety state such as whether the target enters departure, hovering, or safely returns, enabling the countermeasure process to achieve engineering effects of state determineability, action selectability, and result distinguishability. Attached Figure Description

[0061] The present invention will be further described with reference to the accompanying drawings, but the embodiments in the drawings do not constitute any limitation on the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on the following drawings without creative effort.

[0062] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram illustrating an application scenario of the navigation jamming method for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0063] Figure 2 This is an overall flowchart of a navigation jamming method for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) according to an embodiment of the present invention.

[0064] Figure 3 This is a diagram showing the state characterization recalculation results of the ORION public unmanned aerial vehicle trajectory data in an embodiment of the present invention.

[0065] Figure 4 This is a block diagram of a navigation jamming system for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0066] Embodiments of the present invention are described in detail below. Examples of these embodiments are shown in the accompanying drawings, wherein the same or similar reference numerals denote the same or similar elements or elements having the same or similar functions throughout. The embodiments described below with reference to the accompanying drawings are exemplary and are only used to explain the present invention, and should not be construed as limiting the present invention.

[0067] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating an application scenario of a navigation jamming method for countering unmanned aerial vehicles according to at least one embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0068] like Figure 1 As shown, a low-altitude security system is deployed within the authorized countermeasure zone 100 (e.g., the perimeter of an airport, a major event venue, an industrial park, an area surrounding energy facilities, or a regulatory site). This low-altitude security system includes a low-altitude surveillance radar 101, an electro-optical tracking device 102, a radio detection device 103, a response and linkage controller 104, a navigation jamming device 105, and a communication coordination device 106. A monitoring range 107 is located outside the authorized countermeasure zone 100, and a security buffer zone 108 and a core protected object 109 are located inside the authorized countermeasure zone 100. When an unauthorized UAV target 110 moves from the outside of the authorized countermeasure zone 100 toward the core protected object 109, the low-altitude surveillance radar 101 outputs the target spot, the electro-optical tracking device 102 outputs the target frame and position change, the radio detection device 103 records the activity information of the target's related wireless links, and the handling linkage controller 104 executes the navigation jamming method proposed in this application based on the above information, controlling the navigation jamming device 105 and the communication coordination device 106 to carry out restricted navigation jamming actions on the UAV target 110, ultimately forming UAV safety handling results such as departure handling, hovering control, safe return, controlled landing, manual follow-up handling, or risk termination handling.

[0069] Figure 2 An overall flowchart of a navigation jamming method for countering unmanned aerial vehicles according to at least one embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0070] In step 201, the minimum target state data is obtained to form a target state representation.

[0071] Specifically, this step serves as the initial step of the entire method, used to generate a target state representation that can be directly used in subsequent steps before implementing UAV navigation interference. Before initiating navigation jamming, the on-site countermeasures system needs to obtain the minimum state information necessary to support subsequent judgments. This includes the proximity relationship between the target UAV and the authorized countermeasures area, whether the target's flight behavior shows signs of deceleration or hovering, whether the target's relevant wireless links remain continuous, and the corresponding handling constraints for the current target's location. After detecting a UAV target within the authorized countermeasures area and its outer monitoring range, the system assigns a target number and aggregates target observation results from low-altitude surveillance radar, electro-optical tracking equipment, low-altitude monitoring platform interfaces, or existing target tracking equipment within the same time window. Low-altitude surveillance radar can output the target's point traces at continuous intervals; electro-optical tracking equipment can output the target bounding box and, combined with ranging information or gimbal pointing, obtain the target's position changes; the low-altitude monitoring platform interface can output the track data of identified targets; and existing target tracking equipment can output the fused target position and velocity. Based on temporal consistency and spatial proximity, the system merges the observation results of the same target under the same target number and organizes the position, velocity, and hovering status around that target number. Position is used to determine the target's positional relationship relative to the authorized countermeasure zone boundary and the safety buffer zone. Velocity is used to determine whether the target is continuously approaching, decelerating, or moving away. Hovering state is obtained from position and velocity changes within the same time window. For example, if the target's position changes little and its velocity remains low over several consecutive sampling times, the system classifies it as hovering. If the target maintains continuous displacement and moves towards the authorized countermeasure zone, the system classifies it as non-hovering. This processing transforms the original point, target bounding box, or track data into a target motion state that can serve subsequent navigation trust contention assessments.

[0072] The system simultaneously organizes target link continuity data using radio detection equipment or spectrum monitoring equipment. Within the same time window, the radio detection or spectrum monitoring equipment records the appearance, disappearance, sudden changes, and direction information of target-related wireless links. Combining the consistency between the target's location and the link direction, and the temporal correlation between changes in target movement and changes in link activity, the system determines whether a link can be considered a target-related link. For example, if a wireless link activity is consistently present in a certain direction before the target UAV begins to turn or accelerate, and that direction coincides with the target's location, the system classifies the link as a target-related link. If the link experiences a short-term interruption, sudden change, or significantly longer activity interval as the target approaches the authorized countermeasures zone, the system classifies the link status as declining continuity. If the link consistently and stably appears within the time window, the system classifies it as a continuous link. If the complex electromagnetic environment at the site prevents a stable confirmation of the correspondence between the link and the target, the system classifies it as an unconfirmable link. Preset area constraint data is provided by the area file configured during the system deployment phase or by the security platform, including authorized countermeasures zone boundaries, security buffer zones, and legal link protection conditions. The authorized countermeasure zone boundary is used to determine whether the target is within the permissible spatial range for action. The safety buffer zone is used to determine whether the target has approached a location where it can be safely hovered, removed, or manually handled. The legal link protection conditions are used to restrict navigation interference actions or communication coordination actions during the subsequent action selection phase. For example, in a major event security scenario, the authorized countermeasure zone can be set around the venue perimeter, the safety buffer zone can be set on the side away from crowds and core facilities, and the legal link protection conditions can include on-site command and communication, security video transmission links, and authorized inspection equipment links.

[0073] The computational processing in this step adopts the approach of state-space representation and feature vector construction in pattern recognition, compressing the observations related to target countermeasure judgment within the same time window into a finite-dimensional state representation. Conventional state vectors typically directly retain continuous observations such as target coordinates and velocity. This application, combined with the UAV navigation interference scenario, transforms the target position into an approach state, target velocity and continuous position changes into motion trends, position and velocity changes within a short time window into a hovering state, wireless link activity changes into a link continuity state, and preset area configuration into an area constraint state. All of the above are expressed using normalized or hierarchical state quantities, enabling them to be directly used in subsequent steps for navigation trust contention state judgment. The target state representation is expressed as:

[0074] ;

[0075] in, Indicates time The target state representation is the state data output from this step to the next step. The target proximity status is indicated by comparing the target's location with the authorized countermeasure zone boundary and the safety buffer zone, and can be categorized as low proximity, medium proximity, or high proximity. It represents the target's movement trend, which is derived from the changes in position and velocity over consecutive moments, and can be categorized as an exit trend, a deceleration trend, or an intrusion trend. The hovering state is indicated by changes in position and velocity within a short time window, and can be categorized as non-hovering or hovering. The continuity of the target link is represented by the radio detection equipment or spectrum monitoring equipment, which summarizes the continuous occurrence, interruption, sudden change or unconfirmed state of the target-related link. It can be summarized as continuous, decreasing continuity or unconfirmed. This represents the preset area constraint state, derived from the authorized countermeasure area boundary, security buffer, and legal link protection conditions. It can be organized into manageable constraint states or restricted manageable constraint states. Each component enters as a normalized or hierarchical state variable. ,make This can serve as a unified input for determining the navigation trust contention state in the next step. To ensure that the state representation has an executable source, the system outputs determinism only when the track continuity for the same target number satisfies the minimum observation window set during the deployment phase. If there is a target association conflict between radar, photoelectric or monitoring interfaces, or if a stable correspondence cannot be established between the target link and the target location, the corresponding component will be written as an unconfirmed component, and the system will not directly trigger a higher level of handling due to a single uncertain component.

[0076] Taking an airport perimeter control scenario as an example, a target moves from outside the authorized countermeasures zone towards the safety buffer zone. The radar continuously outputs the target's location, optoelectronic equipment tracks the target and confirms its spatial position change, and radio detection equipment detects a consistently occurring target-related link in the same location. The system, based on the area boundary and safety buffer zone configuration, will... Organize into a medium approximation; based on continuous position and velocity changes, This is considered an intrusive trend; based on the target maintaining continuous displacement within this time window, [the following will be considered]. Organize as non-hovering; based on the stable emergence of the wireless link, Organize into a continuous sequence; based on the fact that no legitimate link protection condition was triggered in this direction, The constraints are then reorganized into a manageable state. This results in... This indicates that the target is in a near-stable intrusion state, and the next step can be based on this to determine if it is closer to a normal intrusion state. If the same target's speed decreases significantly after entering the vicinity of the security buffer, its position changes little within a short time window, and a short-term interruption occurs in the target's related links, then the system will... Organize into medium or high proximity, and The trend is consolidating and slowing down. Organize into hover, Organize into a continuous decline, and continue reading. The regional constraint state in the middle; new This indicates that the target's movement is becoming more conservative and the link continuity is decreasing. The next step can be based on this to determine whether it has entered a state of mild trust contention or obvious trust contention. If a target is flying at low speed outside the authorized countermeasure zone, with little change in position over a short period of time, but its approach state remains low and its movement trend does not show an intrusion trend, then the following is formed: It can distinguish the target from a target that has entered the authorized countermeasure zone and slowed down and hovered, reducing the risk of premature action caused by a single low-speed phenomenon.

[0077] The output of this step is the target state representation. The raw electro-optical imagery is used to extract the UAV target bounding box and position changes; the raw radio data is used to establish link continuity; and the raw flight path fragments are used to form approach status, motion trends, and hovering status. The next step involves... , , , and Composition Through this state representation, the target motion observations, target link continuity observations, and preset area constraints that can be obtained on-site are uniformly converted into inputs for navigation interference decision-making, providing a direct basis for subsequently determining the navigation trust competition state.

[0078] In step 202, the navigation trust competition state is determined based on the target state representation.

[0079] This step represents the target state established in the previous step. As input, approach the target state Target movement trend Hovering state Target link continuity and preset region constraint state All are incorporated into the same judgment process to obtain the navigation trust competition status. Step 201 has already organized the on-site low-altitude surveillance radar, electro-optical tracking equipment, radio detection equipment, and the preset area configuration into a state representation for navigation interference decision-making; therefore, this step directly uses... A state transition is performed. The engineering implications of this transition are: when a target approaches the authorized countermeasure zone, and its movement trend changes from stable intrusion to deceleration or hovering, and the continuity of the target's related links decreases, the target UAV is more likely to be in a state of reduced confidence in the current navigation and control inputs by the flight controller; when the target is moving at low speed but still outside the zone, or when the link changes but the target's movement remains stable and it is leaving the field, the state determination should remain at a lower level. Therefore, step 202 transforms the target state representation from step 201 into a basis for action selection that can be directly used in the next step, ensuring that subsequent restricted navigation interference actions match the target's current external flight controller behavior.

[0080] The underlying algorithm used in this step is derived from multi-criteria weighted judgment methods in the fields of mathematics and pattern recognition. These methods typically linearly combine multiple normalized evaluation quantities according to weights, and then obtain discrete levels based on threshold intervals. In this application, the traditional weighted judgment is modified to address navigation trust competition in UAV navigation interference scenarios: on the one hand, , , and These represent the contributions of four types of states: spatial proximity, motion conservatism, hovering indications, and link instability. On the other hand, a system is introduced to... and The second-order coupling term is used to highlight the combination phenomenon in the UAV countermeasure scenario. This indicates that the target has approached the authorized countermeasure zone or safety buffer zone and is showing signs of hovering, which is a space-triggered characteristic suitable for characterizing the target's flight control entering a conservative behavior. This indicates that the target's motion tends to be conservative and accompanied by a decrease in link continuity, which is suitable for characterizing the process of the target shifting from stable execution under external control to unstable control or a tendency towards autonomous protection. This coupling term originates from the idea of ​​second-order polynomial characteristic crossover, that is, adding the product of two state variables to the first-order state contribution to express the combined effect; this application limits this idea to two sets of combined relationships directly related to UAV navigation trust competition, making the calculation results more consistent with the navigation interference handling logic in the authorized countermeasure area.

[0081] Before entering the calculation, the system converts each component output in step 201 into a normalized state quantity according to the level table configured in the deployment phase. It can be mapped from low proximity, medium proximity, and high proximity as follows: , , ; The intrusion trend, deceleration trend, and exit trend can be mapped to respectively as , , The tendency to exit positions corresponds to a higher risk tolerance. It can be mapped from non-hovering and hovering to respectively. , ; This can be mapped from link continuity, link unverifiable, and decreased continuity to... , , ; The restricted disposal constraint state and the disposable constraint state can be mapped to respectively as , The above mapping values ​​can be configured according to the type of protected object during system deployment. For example, for airport airspace, the values ​​corresponding to medium approach and continuous descent can be increased, while for ordinary campuses, more gradual values ​​can be used. However, within the same deployment scenario, each mapping value is limited to a certain range. to Within the normalized range, and the same state level table remains unchanged during the same handling task. If the corresponding protection link, protection orientation, or protection period in the legitimate link protection condition table is marked as strongly triggered, the system will... The state is marked as a restricted action constraint, and in step 203, the candidate actions are further restricted, rather than relying solely on... The system reduces the value of the navigation trust contention index to address risks on legitimate links. The system calculates the navigation trust contention index using the following formula. :

[0082] ;

[0083] in, Represented by the target state The calculated navigation trust contention index is used to determine the navigation trust contention status. ; The preset area constraint state is obtained by reading the authorized countermeasure area boundary, security buffer and legal link protection conditions in step 201 and then mapping it to a normalized state quantity according to the level table configured in the deployment phase. The target proximity status is represented by step 201, which is based on the relationship between the target location and the authorized countermeasure zone boundary and the security buffer zone, and is mapped to the normalized proximity degree in this step. The target motion trend is represented by the information obtained in step 201 based on the changes in position and velocity over consecutive time intervals, and is mapped to the normalized conservative motion degree in this step. The hovering state is represented by the position and velocity changes obtained in step 201 based on the changes in position and velocity within a short time window, and is mapped to the normalized hovering degree in this step. The target link continuity is represented by the data collected in step 201 based on the target-related link continuity, interruption, sudden change or unconfirmed state output by the radio detection equipment or spectrum monitoring equipment, and is mapped to the normalized link instability in this step. This indicates the scene coupling strength, which is configured during the system deployment phase based on the type of protected object and the handling strategy. is a non-negative dimensionless coefficient. In the formula... For the first-order state contribution, the four weights correspond to the basic contributions of the approach state, motion trend, hovering state, and link continuity in the determination, and the sum of the four basic weights is... ; The contribution term for second-order coupling; denominator This is used to ensure that the first-order contribution term and the coupling contribution term are within the same normalization range. Each input component is a normalized state variable. It is also a normalized state index. If a component is not confirmed in the current window, it is included in the calculation according to the unconfirmation level value of that component, and an unconfirmation mark is retained in the state sequence for reducing the intensity of subsequent actions or narrowing the candidate range.

[0084] The derivation of the above formula is as follows: First, the basic state contribution is obtained by classical weighted determination. This contribution reflects the individual effects of target proximity, motion conservatism, hovering, and link instability; then, scene coupling contribution is constructed based on the idea of ​​second-order feature cross-conversion. ,in Emphasizing the combined phenomenon of "approaching the area and hovering," Emphasizing the combined phenomenon of "motor conservatism and link instability"; subsequently through This yields a comprehensive quantity that includes first-order contributions and coupling contributions; finally, it is divided by... This keeps the overall quantity within the normalization range and multiplies it by the regional constraint state. This ensures that the state determination is consistent with the authorized countermeasure zone and the legal link protection conditions. Thus, a single low-speed event, a single link mutation, or a single proximity phenomenon will only have a limited impact through the first-order term, while when multiple phenomena related to navigation trust contention occur simultaneously, the second-order coupling term will increase... This makes it easier to enter a higher state level.

[0085] Calculated Subsequently, the system converts it into a navigation trust contention state based on the state boundary threshold configured during the deployment phase. The state transition uses a continuous interval determination method, specifically:

[0086] ;

[0087] in, Indicates time The navigation trust contention state is the state result output from this step to the next step; This indicates a normal intrusion state, where the corresponding target still exhibits a stable approach or stable intrusion. This indicates a state of mild trust competition, corresponding to some of the phenomena that the target begins to exhibit, such as slowing down, brief pauses, or a decrease in link continuity. This indicates a clear state of trust competition, corresponding to the simultaneous appearance of conservative signs in the target's movement and signs of link instability. This indicates a critical protection state, corresponding to safety protection actions such as the target approaching hovering, low-speed departure, safe return, or controlled landing. , and This represents the three state boundary thresholds configured during the deployment phase, and is based on... The order setting. Because To normalize the state index, the threshold also uses the same normalization configuration. The logical relationship between this formula and the previous formula is: the previous formula outputs the value from step 201... Converted into a continuous navigation trust competition index This formula then converts the continuous exponent into a discrete state that can be directly used in the next step. If the deployment phase threshold is not configured, the order does not meet the above relationship, or the number of samples in the status confirmation window is insufficient, the system will not output a high-level status. Instead, it maintains the observation state and prompts for reloading the configuration.

[0088] Taking a single state determination in an airport perimeter management scenario as an example, the system configuration... and configure , , When a target enters the safety buffer zone from outside the authorized countermeasure zone, the target state representation formed in step 201 shows that... This indicates that the target is in a state of near-target; This indicates that the target remains an intrusive trend; This indicates that the target is not hovering. This indicates that the target-related links are continuous; This indicates that the current state is a manageable constraint state. Substituting this into the calculation, the first-order state contribution is... The contribution of second-order coupling is Comprehensive calculation yielded This value is less than ,therefore This result indicates that although the target entered the vicinity of the relevant area, its movement remained stable, with weak hovering and link instability indicators. The next step can be based on... Select either the observation hold action or the lowest level of response action.

[0089] If the same target continues to approach the safety buffer within a subsequent time window, its velocity decreases, its position change diminishes, and the target-related links experience a brief interruption. After step 201 forms a new target state representation, This indicates an increased proximity to the target; This indicates that the target's motion trend has changed to a deceleration trend; This indicates that the target is hovering or nearly hovering. This indicates a decrease in the continuity of the target link; This indicates that the current state is still a manageable constraint state. Substituting this into the calculation, the first-order state contribution is... The contribution of second-order coupling is Comprehensive calculation yielded This value is greater than ,therefore This result indicates that the target is approaching a critical protection state, and the next step can be based on... Choose to maintain or reduce the action to keep the target hovering, departing at low speed, or returning safely.

[0090] In a perimeter scenario within a park, a target is hovering at low speed outside the authorized countermeasures zone. Step 201 may yield the following result: However, since the target is still located outside the region and has not yet formed an intrusion relationship towards the core region, , , , Still using At that time, the contribution of the first-order state is The contribution of second-order coupling is Comprehensive calculation yielded This value is less than ,therefore This result allows for the differentiation between low-speed hovering targets and those that enter the authorized countermeasure zone and exhibit deceleration, hovering, and decreased link continuity, facilitating restraint in subsequent actions.

[0091] During continuous processing, the system processes adjacent time windows in the same manner. Perform calculations and obtain the continuous results The process of selecting an action is input as a state sequence. If the adjacent window... If the state remains consistent, the system passes this state as a stable state to the next step; if adjacent windows remain consistent... In the event of a brief change in status, the system can confirm the status level after multiple consecutive windows reach the same state, according to the confirmation rules set during the deployment phase. For example, if a target experiences a speed decrease due to a brief wind disturbance, but then recovers and intrudes in the next window... It can continue to be maintained When the target exhibits approach, deceleration, hovering, and decreased link continuity over multiple consecutive windows, It can be stably confirmed as or This process ensures that the state output is consistent with the continuity of the UAV's flight in the field, and also provides a stable basis for selecting restricted navigation interference actions in the next step.

[0092] In one specific embodiment, to illustrate that the state representation in steps 201 and 202 can be incorporated into the state determination process from real trajectory data, the allowed trajectory 1, allowed trajectory 2, and non-allowed trajectory 1 from the publicly available ORION UAV trajectory data are used for recalculation. This publicly available data source is the ORION:DroneTrajectoryVerificationviaRemoteIdentificationMessages data warehouse, which states that its data consists of real UAV flight data, and the original positioning records include the collection timestamp, latitude, and longitude. In this embodiment, the allowed trajectory in the publicly available data is used as the authorized reference track, and the non-allowed trajectory is used as the target track to be determined. The system reads the original latitude and longitude of each valid positioning point in the non-allowed trajectory and calculates the spherical distance from that point to the nearest recorded point in the two allowed trajectories. This distance, in meters, is used to determine the degree of deviation of the target from the authorized reference track. To avoid introducing fields not provided in the publicly available data, this embodiment does not deduce the true speed or hovering state from the fixed timestamps of non-permitted trajectories. Instead, it only organizes the motion trend of increasing deviation, decreasing deviation, or slowing change based on the spatial deviation changes of adjacent samples. Since the publicly available data does not include the target wireless link continuity field, the link continuity is written at the "link unconfirmed" level in step 201, i.e. The hovering state is written as a non-hovering observation, that is... In the deployment configuration of this embodiment, a flight path distance of no more than 20 meters is classified as low approach, a distance greater than 20 meters but no more than 80 meters is classified as medium approach, and a distance greater than 80 meters is classified as high approach; the state boundary threshold still adopts the threshold from the aforementioned airport perimeter example. , and The table below extracts representative samples from unauthorized tracks numbered 90 to 115. It shows that when the deviation of the unauthorized target track from the authorized reference track increases from 16.5 meters to 146.1 meters, the system adjusts the approach state from low to high and records the increased deviation in the motion trend. When the deviation subsequently decreases to 9.5 meters, the system adjusts the motion trend to a decrease in deviation or a slowing of change, and the state level drops back to a lower level. This result demonstrates that true latitude and longitude tracks can form a closed loop from track input, state representation, state index to navigation trust contention state without relying on artificial threat levels or introducing interference frequencies, power, or waveform parameters.

[0093]

[0094] Figure 3 The left side shows the relative positions of permitted and prohibited tracks in the local plane coordinates of the ORION public data. The right side shows the distance changes of each sample point of the prohibited track relative to the nearest recorded point of the permitted track, as well as the changes in the state index obtained from the distance and state adjustment rules. Since the distance curves in the figure are directly recalculated from the public latitude and longitude positioning points, the vertical axis unit is meters, and the state index is a normalized dimensionless quantity. Therefore, there is no problem of mixing distance and state dimensions. This embodiment proves that the minimum target state data required for steps 201 and 202 of this application can be generated by closing the real track data. Furthermore, when the link field is unconfirmed and the timestamp cannot be used for velocity derivation, the system can still avoid outputting an excessively high handling state through the unconfirmation level and conservative state confirmation rules, thereby reducing the risk of over-handling due to incomplete data fields.

[0095] The output of this step is the navigation trust contention state. . The target state representation output from step 201 Navigation Trust Competition Index It is obtained by converting the threshold range and is specifically expressed as follows: , , or .in, To provide the next step for selecting the observation hold action, This will allow for the selection of low-intensity navigation guidance actions in the next step. This allows for the selection of restricted navigation interference actions in the next step, which can be coordinated with short-term communication continuity reduction actions. This provides the basis for selecting whether to maintain or reduce the action in the next step. Through this state transition, step 202 transforms the target state representation into the direct state basis required for selecting navigation interference actions, allowing the entire handling chain to naturally advance from the formation of the target state to the selection of restricted navigation interference actions.

[0096] In step 203, a restricted navigation interference action is selected based on the navigation trust contention state.

[0097] Specifically, this step involves analyzing the navigation trust contention status output in the previous step. As input, Converted into restricted navigation interference actions executable within the authorized countermeasures area. Step 202 has summarized the target UAV's external flight performance, link continuity changes, and regional constraints as follows: , , or ,in This indicates a normal intrusion state. This indicates a state of mild trust and competition. This indicates a clear state of trust and competition. This indicates a critical protection state. This step directly uses the state result to select the action: when... When the system tends to choose between maintaining observation or the lowest level of intervention; when When the system tends to select low-intensity navigation guidance, when At this time, the system tends to select restricted navigation interference and, when the configuration allows, to reduce short-term communication continuity; when At this time, the system tends to choose to maintain or reduce the action, keeping the target in hover, departure, safe return, or controllable handling direction. Therefore, step 203 follows the state result of step 202, transforming "what navigation trust contention state the target is in" into "what restricted navigation interference action is currently being performed", providing direct action input for the next step to actually call up the handling equipment.

[0098] During the deployment phase, the system establishes an action set and an action level table. Each action in the action set corresponds to a handling level that the device can execute. The action set can include observation and hold actions, low-intensity navigation guidance actions, restricted navigation interference actions, restricted navigation interference actions with short-term communication continuity reduction, hold actions, and mitigation actions. Observation and hold actions correspond to continuous tracking and situational awareness; low-intensity navigation guidance actions correspond to activating a low-level navigation guidance level to reduce the stability of the target's continued intrusion mission; restricted navigation interference actions correspond to activating a navigation interference level restricted by area constraints within the authorized countermeasures area; restricted navigation interference actions with short-term communication continuity reduction correspond to simultaneously invoking a short-term, directional, and restricted communication continuity reduction level outside of the navigation interference level; hold actions correspond to maintaining the current handling level, allowing the target to continue hovering, leaving, or safely returning; mitigation actions correspond to lowering the handling level, allowing the target to smoothly transition when it is close to safety protection behavior. The action level table records each type of action. Corresponding candidate action range The table includes the state adaptation contribution, action security constraint deduction value, and action intensity level for each candidate action. This table is configured together with the authorized countermeasure area boundary, security buffer, legal link protection conditions, and device handling level. The action set only calls the levels that have been pre-set and deployed and permitted in the authorized countermeasure device. The action package does not temporarily generate new carrier frequency points, transmit powers, or unregistered action areas in this method. If the handling device does not report the availability status of the corresponding level, the action will not enter the current candidate action range.

[0099] Action candidate range Based on the current navigation trust competition status Directly determine. If , This includes observation hold actions and minimum-level handling actions. The minimum-level handling action is the lowest intensity preset setting in the action level table, typically corresponding to observation hold or the lowest intensity navigation guidance. , This includes observation-holding maneuvers and low-intensity navigation-guided maneuvers; if , This includes restricted navigation jamming actions and restricted navigation jamming actions with short-term communication discontinuity reduction; if , This includes maintaining and reducing actions. This candidate range establishes a direct connection between the action selection process and the output of step 202. For example, in an airport airspace scenario, if the output of step 202... This indicates that the target has exhibited a clear state of trust competition, and the candidate range read by the system prioritizes covering restricted navigation interference actions; in major event security scenarios, if step 202 outputs... This indicates that the target is approaching the critical protection state, and the candidate range read by the system prioritizes covering both the maintenance action and the reduction action.

[0100] The action selection algorithm in this step is derived from the utility maximization method in classical decision theory. The basic idea of ​​this method is to calculate a comprehensive utility value for each action among a finite number of candidate actions and select the action with the highest comprehensive utility value. This application modifies the algorithm to suit the UAV navigation interference scenario, decomposing the comprehensive utility into three parts: state adaptation contribution, safety constraint deduction, and action overshoot suppression. The state adaptation contribution represents the competition state between the candidate action and the current navigation trust. The degree of matching; security constraint deduction is used to represent the degree to which candidate actions occupy the legal link protection conditions, security buffer, and target security handling direction; action overshoot suppression is used to represent the degree of deviation between the intensity of candidate actions and the expected intensity of actions in the current state. The overshoot suppression term adopts the absolute deviation form, which is derived from the deviation penalty idea commonly used in optimization problems. This application uses it to constrain the intensity of navigation interference actions so that the intensity of actions corresponds to the current state of the target.

[0101] ;

[0102] in, Indicates time The selected restricted navigation interference action is the action result output from this step to the next step. This indicates candidate actions, provided by the set of actions configured during the deployment phase; Indicates a state of competition with current navigation trust. The corresponding range of candidate actions is determined by the action level table. Read; The contribution of state adaptation is determined by the current state in the action level table. With candidate actions The corresponding cell provides the value, and a higher value indicates that the candidate action is more suitable for the current state; This represents the safety constraint deduction value, determined during the system deployment phase based on candidate actions. The impact levels of the protection conditions for legitimate links, security buffers, and target security handling directions are configured. This represents the security constraint coefficient, which is configured during the system deployment phase based on the type of protected object. Indicates candidate actions The intensity level of the action is determined by the equipment's handling gear configuration; Indicates the current navigation trust competition status. The corresponding expected action intensity level is obtained from the action level table; This represents the overshoot suppression coefficient, which is configured during the system deployment phase according to the handling safety requirements. In the formula... , , , , and All values ​​are hierarchical or normalized configuration values, so items within the same bracket can be added or subtracted for comparison. The calculation results are used to compare the relative priorities among candidate actions. and It is a non-negative dimensionless coefficient. If If the value is empty due to legitimate link protection, device unavailability, or insufficient authorized area, the system will not execute navigation interference actions and will instead output observation-hold action or manual resuscitation prompts. If multiple candidate actions have the same maximum value, the system will prioritize the action with the lower intensity level. Smaller movements.

[0103] The derivation of the above formula is as follows: First, using the basic form of utility maximization, within the range of candidate actions... Select the action with the highest overall utility; then write the matching relationship between the current state and the action as follows: ,make More suitable for observation and maintenance More suitable for low-intensity navigation guidance More adaptable to restricted navigation interference, To better adapt and maintain or reduce; then write the security constraints within the authorized countermeasures area as This allows actions with high spillover impact, those that occupy many legitimate link protection conditions, or those that may deviate from the direction of safe handling to receive higher deductions; finally, add This makes the actual intensity level of the candidate action... Expected intensity level of the current state Maintaining consistency. The computational logic of this formula subjectes action selection to constraints of state adaptability, safety constraints, and strength matching relationships simultaneously, thereby ensuring the output of step 202 remains consistent. Convert to executable .

[0104] In the action level table, It can be configured according to the degree of adaptation between states and actions. For example, The observation maintains the action. The settings are relatively high; the low-intensity navigation guidance actions are set to a lower setting; and the restricted navigation interference actions are set to the lowest setting. The low-intensity navigation guidance action settings are relatively high; The restricted navigation interference action setting is relatively high; The settings for maintaining and reducing motion are relatively high. The configuration can be based on the impact level of the action on the legal link protection conditions, security buffer, and security handling direction, such as the observation-holding action. The minimum intensity is low, the minimum intensity is medium, the minimum intensity is high, the minimum intensity is high, and the minimum intensity is high when the minimum intensity is low. The ... According to the equipment level or handling level configuration, the observation and hold action corresponds to a lower intensity, the low intensity navigation guidance action corresponds to a low level handling intensity, the restricted navigation interference action corresponds to a medium level handling intensity, the restricted navigation interference action with short-term communication continuity reduction corresponds to a higher handling intensity, and the hold action and the reduction action correspond to the maintenance or reduction of handling intensity. This reflects the expected intensity of action in the current situation. Corresponding observation intensity, Corresponding to mild induction intensity, Corresponding to the limited interference intensity, The intensity can be maintained or reduced accordingly.

[0105] Taking a major event security scenario as an example, step 202 outputs... This indicates that the target has entered a state of mild trust competition. The action level table reads the range of candidate actions. This includes observation-holding actions and low-intensity navigation-guided actions. Assume the state adaptation contribution of observation-holding actions. for Safety constraint deduction value for Action intensity level for State adaptation contribution of low-intensity navigation-guided actions for Safety constraint deduction value for Action intensity level for ;current Corresponding expected action intensity for Safety constraint factor Pick Overshoot suppression coefficient Pick The selected value for the observation and maintenance action is... The selected action value for low-intensity navigation guidance actions is The system selected low-intensity navigation guidance actions as... The results indicate that after the target transitioned from stable intrusion to mild trust competition, the action shifted from observation to low-intensity navigation-induced behavior, and the action intensity was related to... The expected intensity is consistent.

[0106] In the airport perimeter scene, step 202 outputs... This indicates a clear state of trust competition for the target. Candidate action range This includes restricted navigation jamming actions and restricted navigation jamming actions with short-term communication discontinuity degradation. Assuming the restricted navigation jamming actions... for , for , for Restricted navigation jamming actions with reduced short-term communication continuity for , for , for ;current Corresponding expected action intensity for , Pick , Pick The selected action value for restricted navigation interference actions is... The action selection value for restricted navigation interference actions with reduced short-term communication continuity is... The system selected restricted navigation interference actions as... This result demonstrates the role of security constraints in the selection of actions within the authorized countermeasures area: even if the action state adaptation contribution is high due to the short-term communication continuity reduction, the system still selects a restricted navigation interference action that better matches the current state and security constraints when the security constraint deduction and strength deviation are large.

[0107] In the park perimeter scene, step 202 outputs... This indicates that the target is approaching a critical protection state, such as when the target is hovering within the safety buffer zone or moving slowly away from the core area. Candidate action range. This includes maintaining the movement and reducing the movement. Let's assume maintaining the movement... for , for , for ; weaken the movement for , for , for ;current Corresponding expected action intensity for , Pick , Pick The selected value for the action to maintain the action is... The selected value for weakening the action is The system selects the weakening action as This result indicates that when the target is already in a state close to safe protection behavior, the action selection shifts in the direction of reduction, providing an execution basis for the next step to result in departure, hovering control, or safe return.

[0108] This step will also select An organization is a package of actions that can be performed by a device. An action package includes the action type, the device identifier, the handling level, the direction or area of ​​action, the duration level, and the stopping conditions. The action type is determined by... The decision; the identification of the executing equipment is given by the equipment list during the deployment phase, such as navigation jamming equipment, directional disposal equipment, or disposal linkage controllers within the authorized area; the disposal level is determined by... The corresponding device level is read; the execution direction or area of ​​action is limited by the authorized countermeasure zone boundary and the safety buffer configuration; the duration level and stopping conditions are configured by the action level table, for example, low-intensity navigation guidance actions correspond to short-term execution level, restricted navigation interference actions correspond to restricted execution level, hold actions correspond to maintaining the current safety trend, and weaken actions correspond to reducing the handling level. Before the action packet is generated, the system also checks whether the target is still within the handleable space corresponding to the authorized countermeasure zone or the safety buffer, and checks whether the legal link protection conditions allow the corresponding handling level; if any check is not met, the action packet is downgraded to observation hold, weaken, or manual follow-up handling prompt. Thus, When passed to the next step, it already has the information needed to actually call the device, and it will not deviate from the authorized area, legal link protection, and device level boundaries.

[0109] The output of this step is the selected restricted navigation interference action. . The navigation trust contention state output from step 202 The results are obtained after candidate action range reading, state adaptation contribution comparison, safety constraint deduction, and action overshoot suppression. Specifically, these actions can be observation-hold actions, low-intensity navigation-guided actions, restricted navigation interference actions, restricted navigation interference actions with short-term communication continuity reduction, hold actions, or reduction actions. The next step directly uses... As the input for execution, the corresponding navigation interference device, the handling linkage controller, or the necessary communication coordination handling device is invoked to carry out the actual handling, so that the navigation trust competition state determination is advanced to the execution of restricted navigation interference actions.

[0110] In step 204, restricted navigation interference actions are performed and a safe handling result for the UAV is generated.

[0111] Specifically, this step involves selecting the restricted navigation interference action output in the previous step. As input, and according to The action type, executing device identifier, handling level, execution direction or area of ​​effect, duration level, and stopping conditions carried in the data are executed on-site. Step 203 has already been based on the navigation trust contention status. Complete the selected action, make This step involves sending the action package, which becomes readable by the device, to the handling and coordination controller within the authorized countermeasure area. The controller then invokes the corresponding navigation jamming equipment, directional control equipment, or necessary communication coordination equipment, and executes the action according to the control level and area of ​​effect specified in the action package. If... To maintain the observation and operation, the linkage controller maintains target tracking and the equipment's ready-to-execute state; if For low-intensity navigation and guidance actions, the response controller activates a low-level navigation and guidance mode to reduce the stability of the target's continued intrusion mission; if For restricted navigation jamming actions, the response linkage controller invokes navigation jamming devices within the authorized area and limits the direction of action to the authorized countermeasure space where the target is located; if To mitigate limited navigation interference actions with reduced short-term communication continuity, the handling linkage controller simultaneously invokes short-term, directional, and limited communication coordination devices while executing the navigation interference actions; if To maintain the action, the control linkage maintains the current handling level, ensuring the target continues its hovering, departure, or safe return trajectory; if To mitigate the impact, the handling linkage controller lowers the handling level, ensuring a smooth transition as the target approaches the safety protection mechanism. This execution method results in the output of step 203. The entire process enters the on-site handling phase. The action type determines the execution category, the executing equipment identifier determines the target, the handling level determines the equipment's preset working level, the execution direction or area of ​​action determines the scope of action, the duration level determines the length of the action execution phase, and the stopping condition determines when the action ends or manual handling is switched. If the handling linkage controller does not receive feedback that the equipment is available, the equipment execution feedback is inconsistent with the action package, target tracking is lost, or the legal link protection condition is triggered during execution, the handling linkage controller immediately stops the enhanced navigation interference action, retains the tracking and alarm status, and marks the result of this action as insufficient execution conditions or risk termination to avoid continuing execution in the absence of closed-loop feedback.

[0112] During the execution of the action, the linkage controller is based on The stopping conditions in the system determine the outcome of the target handling phase. These stopping conditions are configured in the action level table during the deployment phase and may include: target entering the safety buffer zone, target leaving the authorized countermeasure zone, target hovering stably within the safety buffer zone, target entering the safe return direction, target exhibiting a controllable descent trend, legal link protection conditions being triggered, target exhibiting abnormal instability, or reaching the action duration level limit. The handling linkage controller continuously reads the position, velocity, and hovering status output by the target tracking device, and also reads the trigger status of the legal link protection conditions; these readings are used only for confirmation. The execution results are consistent with the original data processing in step 201. For example, after a low-intensity navigation guidance maneuver is executed, the target speed decreases and enters the safety buffer zone. The system terminates the maneuver according to the stopping condition and generates a hovering control or departure response result. After a restricted navigation interference maneuver is executed, the target turns to the safe return direction and does not cross the core protection area. The system terminates the enhanced response and generates a safe return response result. After a weakening maneuver is executed, the target continues to move away from the authorized countermeasures area. The system generates a departure response result and switches the equipment to observation mode.

[0113] This step uses a safety handling judgment quantity. The results after the action is executed are summarized. This calculation method is derived from the classic multi-criteria scoring method, which combines multiple normalized evaluation quantities according to weights to form a comprehensive judgment quantity. This application modifies this method to address UAV navigation interference, using target area safety status, target safety behavior status, and legal link protection status as positive contributions, and risk triggering status as a deduction item. Target area safety status indicates whether the target has moved away from the core area or entered the safety buffer zone; target safety behavior status indicates whether the target has formed a hovering, low-speed departure, safe return, or controllable landing trend; legal link protection status indicates whether the user's legal link remains within protection conditions; and risk triggering status indicates the degree of risk of target abnormal instability, actions exceeding the duration level, or the triggering of stopping conditions. The safety handling judgment quantity is expressed as:

[0114] ;

[0115] in, Indicates time The safety handling assessment metric after the action is executed is used to determine the safety handling outcome of the drone. ; It represents the security status of the target area, which is obtained by sorting out the relationship between the target position output by the target tracking device and the authorized countermeasure area and the security buffer. It is converted into a normalized state quantity before entering the calculation. The closer the target is to the security buffer or the departure direction, the higher the value. It represents the target's safe behavior state, which is obtained by organizing the target's speed, hovering state and direction of motion, and is converted into a normalized state quantity before entering the calculation. The value is higher when the target is hovering, departing at low speed, returning safely, or has a controllable landing trend. This indicates the protection status of a legitimate link, which is obtained from the triggering of the legitimate link protection conditions and converted into a normalized state quantity before entering the calculation. The value is higher when the legitimate link is under protection conditions. The risk trigger state is represented by the target's abnormal instability trend, the upper limit of the action duration level, and the triggering of the stopping condition. It is converted into a normalized state quantity before entering the calculation. The more obvious the risk trigger, the higher the value. , , and These represent the configured weights of regional security, target security behavior, legitimate link protection, and risk triggering in the result determination, respectively. These weights are set during the system deployment phase based on the type of protected object and the handling strategy, and are all non-negative dimensionless weights. All quantities involved in the calculation are normalized state quantities, therefore... This comprehensive status assessment value is used to classify the safety response outcome. It is preferred to use this value during deployment. and make The same normalization scale is used as the risk trigger level; if the protected link, protected location, or protected period in the legitimate link protection condition table is marked as strongly triggered, or the target's abnormal instability trend is marked as strongly triggered by the risk rule, then even if The values ​​remain in a high range, and the handling results are prioritized for risk termination handling.

[0116] The derivation of the above formula is as follows: First, a multi-criteria scoring method is used to determine the basic form of the comprehensive judgment quantity, and the multiple result quantities after the treatment are weighted and combined; then, combined with the engineering objectives after the execution of UAV navigation interference, whether the target is in a safe area is written into the formula. Whether the target constitutes safe flight behavior is written into Write whether the legitimate link is under protection conditions. Write the abnormal instability, exceeding the duration level, or risk stopping conditions into the code. Then , and Set as a positive contribution item, Set as a deduction item. This way, when the target enters the safe buffer and hovers stably, and Simultaneously improve; when the legitimate link is in good condition. Improvement; when the target exhibits abnormal instability or risk-stopping conditions are triggered, Increase and decrease This decision quantifies the field results after the equipment has performed its operation, transforming them into parameters that can be used to determine... The unified result quantity.

[0117] According to the handling linkage controller The range and specific stopping conditions form the result of the safe handling of the drone. When the target leaves the authorized countermeasure zone or enters the direction outside the safety buffer zone, and When it is in the higher range, The result is determined to be an off-site disposal; when the target is within the safety buffer and hovering stably, and the legitimate link protection status is good, The result was determined to be a hovering control outcome; when the target enters the return route that does not cross the core protection area... The result is confirmed as a safe return; when the target forms a stable descent trend within the preset safe area, The landing outcome is determined to be controllable; when the target is in a state that can be monitored but still requires manual confirmation, physical interception, or alert measures. The result was determined to be a manual reconnection; when the risk trigger status increases, or the legitimate link protection conditions are triggered, The outcome was determined to be a risk termination measure, and the enhanced navigation interference was terminated by the response linkage controller, switching to tracking, alarm, or manual handling mode. The above results are consistent with... The execution of the action directly corresponds to step 204, making it the actual completion step of the entire method. If the target tracking data is interrupted within the result confirmation window, or if the safety behavior status contradicts the area safety status, the system will not output deterministic results such as departure, safe return, or controlled landing. Instead, it will output the manual follow-up handling result or the risk termination handling result, and retain the most recent one. , , and As a record of the review.

[0118] Taking a major event security scenario as an example, step 203 outputs... This is a low-intensity navigation guidance action. The action package specifies the execution device as a navigation guidance device within the authorized area, the handling level as low, the execution area as the direction of the target's safety buffer zone, the duration level as short-term execution, and the stopping condition as the target enters the safety buffer zone or achieves stable hovering. After the action is executed, the target's speed decreases and it enters the safety buffer zone. Its position changes minimally within the continuous observation window, and the legal link protection conditions remain within acceptable limits. If configured during the deployment phase... , , , and sorted out , , , ,but The result falls within the higher handling outcome range, and the target meets the stopping conditions for stable hovering within the safety buffer zone; therefore, the system generates a hovering control result. The system will then switch the control linkage to either manual intervention or physical treatment preparation mode.

[0119] In the airport perimeter scene, step 203 outputs: This is a restricted navigation jamming action. The action package specifies the executing device as a navigation jamming device within the authorized area, the handling level as restricted, and the execution direction as the authorized countermeasure area corresponding to the target's location. After the action is executed, the target does not continue to intrude into the core area but instead turns to the preset safe return direction. The target's trajectory is far away from the runway core area, and the legitimate link protection conditions remain good. (If this is properly organized...) , , , And using the same set of weights, then The result falls within the higher handling outcome range, and the target has entered the safe return direction; therefore, the system generates a safe return result. End enhanced response mode and continue tracking until the target leaves the authorized countermeasure zone.

[0120] In the park perimeter scene, step 203 outputs To mitigate the impact, the action package specifies a reduction in the current handling level, with the stopping condition being the target leaving the safety buffer zone or continuing to move away from the core area. After the action is executed, the target maintains a low speed away from the core facilities of the park, and the handling linkage controller reduces the equipment from the restricted navigation interference level to the hold or observation level. If this is properly organized... , , , ,but The system generates an exit disposal result. If, during the same process, the legitimate link protection conditions are triggered or the target exhibits an abnormal instability trend, then... Rise to If all other states remain similar, The risk level is significantly reduced, and the stopping condition indicates that the risk has been terminated; the system then generates a risk termination handling result. Switch the device to tracking, alarm, or manual handling mode.

[0121] The output of this step is the result of the drone safety handling. . Selected restricted navigation interference actions The results generated after execution can be specific to departure handling, hovering control, safe return to base, controlled landing, manual follow-up handling, or risk termination handling. At this point, step 201 forms the target state representation. Step 202 is by Determine the navigation trust contention status Step 203 is by Selected restricted navigation interference actions Step 204 is executed. and form This completes the continuous process from acquiring the target state, judging trust competition, selecting restricted actions, to actual safety handling.

[0122] Figure 4 A block diagram of a navigation jamming system for countering unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) according to at least one embodiment of the present disclosure is shown.

[0123] like Figure 4 As shown, the system includes:

[0124] The target state characterization generation unit 401 is used to receive data from low-altitude surveillance radar, electro-optical tracking equipment, radio detection equipment, low-altitude monitoring platform interface, and preset area configuration, and to generate a target state characterization. The target state representation generation unit 401 is specifically used to collect target observation results, determine the target approach state, target motion trend, hovering state, target link continuity and preset area constraint state, and combine the above states into a target state representation.

[0125] Navigation trust contention state determination unit 402 is used to determine the target state based on the target state representation. Calculate the navigation trust competition index And determine the navigation trust contention state based on the state boundary threshold. The navigation trust contention state determination unit 402 is specifically used to convert each component into a normalized state quantity, calculate the first-order state contribution and the second-order coupling contribution, calculate the navigation trust contention index, and determine the navigation trust contention state according to the threshold interval.

[0126] The restricted navigation interference action selection unit 403 is used to read the action level table, legal link protection conditions, and device availability status, and select the appropriate action based on the navigation trust contention status. Generate restricted navigation interference actions The restricted navigation interference action selection unit 403 is specifically used to determine the range of candidate actions, obtain the state adaptation contribution, safety constraint deduction value and action intensity level of each candidate action, calculate the action selection value of each candidate action, and determine the candidate action with the largest action selection value as the restricted navigation interference action.

[0127] Action execution and feedback unit 404 is used to process restricted navigation interference actions. The corresponding action package is sent to the handling linkage controller, navigation jamming device, directional handling device, or communication coordination device, and the device's available feedback, execution feedback, and stop condition trigger status are read. The action execution and feedback unit 404 is specifically used to execute restricted navigation jamming actions according to the handling level and area of ​​action in the action package, and continuously monitor the target status and legal link protection conditions during execution.

[0128] The security action result generation unit 405 is used to calculate the security action judgment quantity based on the security status of the target area, the security behavior status of the target, the legal link protection status, and the risk triggering status after execution. The system outputs the safety handling results for the drone. Specifically, the safety handling result formation unit 405 is used to determine the departure handling result, hovering control result, safe return result, controllable landing result, manual follow-up handling result, or risk termination handling result based on the safety handling judgment quantity and stopping conditions.

[0129] The aforementioned system can be deployed in low-altitude security platforms, countermeasure control hosts, or response linkage controllers within authorized countermeasure zones. Through this system architecture, the method steps... , , and Each has corresponding functional units and device execution links to avoid inconsistencies between the methods and the publicly available system.

[0130] It is worth noting that the specific workflow of the navigation jamming system for UAV countermeasures provided in this embodiment is the same as that of the navigation jamming method for UAV countermeasures described in the above embodiments, and will not be repeated here.

[0131] The above description represents the preferred embodiments of the present invention. It should be noted that those skilled in the art can make various improvements and modifications without departing from the principles of the present invention, and these improvements and modifications are also considered to be within the scope of protection of the present invention.

Claims

1. A navigation jamming method for drone countermeasures, characterized by, The method comprises the following steps: acquiring target observation data and link monitoring data of a target UAV, and forming a target state representation, wherein the target state representation comprises a target approaching state, a target motion trend, a hovering state, a target link continuity, and a preset region constraint state; The method comprises the following steps: collecting target observation results output by a low-altitude surveillance radar, an optical-electrical tracking device, or a target tracking device, and obtaining a target position and a target velocity by processing the target observation results; determining the target approaching state according to a relationship between the target position and a boundary of an authorized countermeasure region; determining the target motion trend according to changes in the target position and the target velocity at continuous time instants; determining the hovering state according to changes in the target position and the target velocity within a time window; determining the target link continuity by recording changes in activities of target-related wireless links by a radio detection device; reading a preset region configuration to determine the preset region constraint state; determining a navigation trust competition state based on the target state representation, wherein the determination comprises the following steps: mapping the target approaching state, the target motion trend, the hovering state, and the target link continuity into normalized state quantities respectively; calculating first-order state contributions of the target approaching state, the target motion trend, the hovering state, and the target link continuity; calculating a product of the target approaching state and the hovering state, and a product of the target motion trend and the target link continuity, to obtain second-order coupling contributions; calculating a navigation trust competition index according to the first-order state contributions, the second-order coupling contributions, and the preset region constraint state; determining the navigation trust competition state according to the navigation trust competition index and a state boundary threshold, wherein the navigation trust competition state comprises a normal intrusion state, a mild trust competition state, an obvious trust competition state, or a protection critical state; selecting a restricted navigation interference action from a preset action set based on the navigation trust competition state, wherein the selection comprises the following steps: reading an action level table according to the navigation trust competition state to determine a candidate action range; for each candidate action in the candidate action range, acquiring a state adaptation contribution, a safety constraint deduction value, and an action intensity level; calculating an action selection value of each candidate action according to the state adaptation contribution, the safety constraint deduction value, the action intensity level, and an expected action intensity level corresponding to the navigation trust competition state; determining the candidate action with the largest action selection value as the restricted navigation interference action; controlling a handling device to execute the restricted navigation interference action to form a UAV safety handling result. 2.The method for navigation jamming against UAVs according to claim 1, wherein, The preset action set comprises an observation maintaining action, a low-intensity navigation induction action, a restricted navigation interference action, a restricted navigation interference action with short-time communication continuity weakening, a maintaining action, and a weakening action. When the navigation trust competition state is a normal intrusion state, the candidate action range includes the observation keeping action and a minimum level handling action; When the navigation trust competition state is a mild trust competition state, the candidate action range includes the observation keeping action and the low-intensity navigation induction action; When the navigation trust competition state is an obvious trust competition state, the candidate action range includes the restricted navigation interference action and the restricted navigation interference action with short-time communication continuity weakening; When the navigation trust competition state is a protection critical state, the candidate action range includes the keeping action and the weakening action. 3.The method for navigation jamming against UAVs according to claim 1, wherein, After the candidate action with the maximum action selected value is determined as the restricted navigation interference action, the method further includes: generating an action package, the action package including an action type, an execution device identifier, a handling gear, an execution direction, a duration level, and a stop condition; checking whether the target is in a handleable space and whether a legal link protection condition allows the corresponding handling gear; if both checks are satisfied, issuing the action package to a handling linkage controller; if any check is not satisfied, downgrading the action package to an observation keeping action or a manual connection handling prompt.

4. The navigation jamming method for drone countermeasures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The control handling device executing the restricted navigation interference action includes: issuing the action package corresponding to the restricted navigation interference action to the handling linkage controller; The handling linkage controller invokes the corresponding navigation interference device or communication coordination device to execute according to the handling gear and action area in the action package; During execution, continuously read the position, speed, and hovering state output by the target tracking device, and read the trigger state of the legal link protection condition; If no device available feedback is received, the device execution feedback is inconsistent with the action package, the target tracking is lost, or the legal link protection condition is triggered, the enhanced navigation interference action is immediately stopped, and the tracking and alarm state is retained.

5. The navigation jamming method for drone countermeasures according to claim 1, characterized in that, The formation of the UAV safety handling result includes: obtaining a target area safety state, a target safety behavior state, a legal link protection state, and a risk trigger state; calculating the positive contribution of the target area safety state, the target safety behavior state, and the legal link protection state, and deducting the risk trigger state to obtain a safety handling decision quantity; determining the UAV safety handling result according to the safety handling decision quantity and the stop condition, the UAV safety handling result including a departure handling result, a hovering control result, a safe return result, a controllable landing result, a manual connection handling result, or a risk termination handling result.

6. The navigation jamming method for drone countermeasures according to claim 5, characterized in that, The determination of the UAV safety handling result according to the safety handling decision quantity and the stop condition includes: when the target leaves the authorized countermeasure area or enters the outside direction of the safety buffer area, and the safety handling decision quantity is in a higher interval, determining the departure handling result; when the target is in the safety buffer area and stably hovers, and the legal link protection state is good, determining the hovering control result; when the target enters a return direction without crossing the core protection area, determining the safe return result; When the target forms a stable descending trend within the preset safety area, the controllable landing result is determined; When the target is in a state that can be monitored but still needs manual confirmation, the manual continuation handling result is determined; When the risk trigger state is raised or the legal link protection condition is triggered, the risk termination handling result is determined.

7. A navigation jamming system for drone countermeasures, characterized in that, The navigation jamming system for unmanned aerial vehicle countermeasures comprises: a target state representation generation unit configured to obtain target observation data and link monitoring data of a target unmanned aerial vehicle, and form a target state representation, wherein the target state representation comprises a target approaching state, a target motion trend, a hovering state, a target link continuity, and a preset area constraint state; a navigation trust competition state determination unit configured to determine a navigation trust competition state based on the target state representation; a restricted navigation jamming action selection unit configured to select a restricted navigation jamming action from a preset action set based on the navigation trust competition state; an action execution and feedback unit configured to control a handling device to execute the restricted navigation jamming action; a safety handling result formation unit configured to obtain a target area safety state, a target safety behavior state, a legal link protection state, and a risk trigger state after execution, and form an unmanned aerial vehicle safety handling result.

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