Internet of vehicles batch verification and privacy protection data aggregation system and method

Abstract

The application discloses a kind of vehicle networking batch verification and privacy protection data aggregation system and method, belong to vehicle networking security and smart grid data processing field, this system is based on hierarchical distributed network topology, using improved Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm to the electric energy transaction data is encrypted, and is combined with the BLS short signature of aggregability.Data is aggregated from bottom to top between smart meter nodes, and the final control center only needs to verify a single aggregation signature once, to confirm the integrity of all data, then decrypt to obtain the total of electricity consumption data, to support power grid scheduling.This scheme realizes the efficiency of data processing, end-to-end privacy protection and low overhead of edge computing.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of vehicle network security and smart grid data processing, specifically to a data aggregation system and method for batch verification and privacy protection in vehicle networks. Background Technology

[0002] With the popularization of new energy vehicles and the development of smart grids, vehicle-to-grid (V2G) technology has become an important component of the energy system. In V2G systems, electric vehicles not only function as electrical consumers but also as mobile energy storage units, feeding power back to the grid to achieve peak shaving and valley filling and load optimization. To implement refined scheduling, the control center needs to collect charging and discharging data from a massive number of distributed smart meters.

[0003] However, this process faces a series of key technical challenges: First, the data reported by smart meters contains sensitive information such as users' charging time, frequency, and power consumption. If transmitted unprotected, this can easily lead to user privacy leaks. Second, smart meters are mostly embedded devices with weak computing power and high energy consumption, making them unable to withstand complex encryption and signature operations. Third, existing solutions often rely on a single aggregation gateway, posing a single point of failure risk. Furthermore, traditional solutions require individual authentication of each smart meter's signature, with verification overhead increasing linearly with the number of nodes, resulting in low efficiency and difficulty meeting large-scale real-time requirements. Finally, internal attackers may steal user data through collusion attacks. While existing technologies such as blockchain-based data aggregation schemes (e.g., CN202511773160.4) improve security and reliability, they still have shortcomings in terms of edge device computational overhead, verification efficiency, and architectural robustness. Therefore, there is an urgent need for an efficient, lightweight, and privacy-preserving V2G data aggregation method to address these issues. Summary of the Invention

[0004] This invention aims to provide a data aggregation system and method for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles (V2G) to solve the problems of low data processing efficiency, insufficient privacy protection, limited computing resources of edge terminals, and single points of failure in the system architecture faced by existing technologies in large-scale V2G scenarios.

[0005] A first aspect of the present invention provides a data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), the system comprising multiple smart meters (SM) and a control center (CC), wherein: Multiple smart meters (SMs) are interconnected in a hierarchical distributed network topology. A control center (CC) is communicatively connected to the top-level node of the hierarchical network topology. Each of the smart meters is equipped with a data encryption module and a signature module, which are used to perform homomorphic encryption and digital signature on locally acquired electricity transaction data. Each non-leaf node of the smart meter is also equipped with an aggregation module for homomorphically aggregating its own and all direct child nodes' ciphertext data, and homomorphically aggregating the corresponding digital signatures. The control center (CC) is configured with a batch verification module and a decryption module. The batch verification module is used to verify the validity of the aggregate signature received from the top-level node in one go. The decryption module is used to decrypt the aggregate ciphertext after the verification is passed to obtain the sum of the electricity transaction data.

[0006] Furthermore, the system also includes power plants (PPs). After the control center (CC) decrypts and obtains the sum of power trading data, it generates corresponding grid dispatch instructions and sends them to the power plants (PPs) to execute power allocation.

[0007] Furthermore, the hierarchical distributed network topology is a complete binary tree structure, and each smart meter is assigned a unique identity identifier (ID) and a location identifier (LID) to identify its position in the tree.

[0008] Furthermore, the data encryption module employs an improved Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the parameters in the system public key of the improved Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm... Set as ,in The modulus in the encryption key of the Paillier encryption system is used to simplify modular exponentiation in the encryption process to modular multiplication.

[0009] Furthermore, the signature module adopts a bilinear pairing-based BLS short signature mechanism, whereby each smart meter generates its own signature key pair and signs the message containing its own ciphertext and identity identifier.

[0010] A second aspect of the present invention provides a method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation in vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks, applied to a V2X data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy-preserving V2X networks mentioned in the first aspect of the present invention. The method includes the following steps: S1: The control center (CC) generates global system parameters and keys, assigns identity and location identifiers to each smart meter (SM), and constructs the hierarchical distributed network topology. S2: Each SM collects local electricity trading data, generates the first ciphertext using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, and generates the first signature using an identity-based signature algorithm; S3: Each non-leaf node's SM receives the ciphertext and signature uploaded by its direct child nodes, aggregates the ciphertext using the homomorphic addition homomorphism of homomorphic encryption, and aggregates the signature using the aggregatability of the signature. The aggregated result is then uploaded to the parent node until the top-level node forms the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature. S4: The control center (CC) receives the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, performs a batch verification using bilinear pairing operations, and after successful verification, decrypts the final aggregated ciphertext using the system private key to obtain the sum of smart meter data across the entire network, and formulates a power grid dispatching strategy based on this.

[0011] Furthermore, in S1, the control center (CC) generates global system parameters and keys, assigns identity and location identifiers to each smart meter (SM), and constructs the hierarchical distributed network topology, including: S101: System parameter generation, generating the system public key based on the Paillier encryption scheme. and private key are ; Define the cyclic group for bilinear pairing , , Bilinear mapping and secure hash function ; S102: Smart meter registration, for each smart meter Register with the control center (CC) and obtain a unique identifier. Location identifiers containing parent-child node relationships ; S103: Key derivation, for each smart meter Randomly generate a secret value Used as its private key for signing, and based on this, its public key for signing is calculated. .

[0012] Furthermore, in S2, each SM collects local electricity trading data, generates a first ciphertext using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, and generates a first signature using an identity-based signature algorithm, including: S201: Data encryption, for each smart meter. Collect electricity consumption data Using the Paillier additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, random numbers are generated. Calculate encrypted ciphertext ; Furthermore, the encrypted ciphertext expression is,

[0013] In the formula, For the first Smart meters The raw electricity consumption data collected from it It is generated after encryption and is used for subsequent secure transmission and aggregation calculation; For the first Smart meters Raw electricity consumption data collected (plaintext); The public key modulus of the Paillier encryption system; The integer randomly selected by the smart meter during encryption. (i.e., model) In the integer multiplication group and (coprime numbers) Introduced as a randomization factor, it ensures that even when encrypting the same plaintext... Each encryption produces ciphertext It is also different; this provides semantic security, preventing attackers from inferring plaintext information from ciphertext. This indicates that the entire encryption calculation is performed in the module. The operations are performed within the arithmetic system, which is the domain of the Paillier encryption algorithm. All operations (here, multiplication and exponentiation) must ultimately be performed on... Take the mold.

[0014] S202: Data signature, for each smart meter Based on the improved BLS signature scheme, generate messages. Digital signature ,in At least includes the identity identifier With the encrypted ciphertext ; S203: Data Reporting: Each smart meter will report a data tuple containing the ciphertext, signature, and public key. , , It is sent to its parent node.

[0015] Furthermore, in S3, each non-leaf node's SM receives the ciphertext and signature uploaded by its direct child nodes, aggregates the ciphertext using the homomorphic addition property of homomorphic encryption, and aggregates the signature using the aggregatability property of the signature. The aggregated result is then uploaded to the parent node, until the top-level node forms the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, including: S301: From the bottom to the top of the tree structure, each intermediate aggregation node receives data from the child nodes and performs aggregation operations without decryption. Furthermore, the aggregation operation includes ciphertext aggregation, signature aggregation, and public key aggregation, wherein: The expression for ciphertext aggregation is,

[0016] In the formula, This represents the ciphertext after aggregation; Indicates from the The original ciphertext of each child node; This indicates the ciphertext received from all child nodes. Perform the product operation; The expression for signature aggregation is,

[0017] In the formula, This represents the aggregated digital signature. Indicates from the first The original digital signature of the individual smart meter; The expression for public key aggregation is:

[0018] In the formula, This represents the aggregated public key; Indicates the first The signature public key of a smart meter.

[0019] S302: Delivered to the control center, the top-level root smart meter performs the above aggregation, and then aggregates the tuples ( , , It is sent to the control center.

[0020] Furthermore, in S4, the control center (CC) receives the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, performs a batch verification using bilinear pairing operations, and after successful verification, decrypts the final aggregated ciphertext using the system private key to obtain the sum of smart meter data across the entire network. Based on this, a power grid dispatching strategy is formulated, including: S401: Batch Signature Verification: After receiving the aggregated tuple, the control center utilizes the properties of bilinear pairing to verify the equation. To batch verify the integrity of all participating meter data, among which For identifiers related to aggregated messages; S402: Decrypt the total data: If the signature verification passes, the control center uses the private key. For the aggregated ciphertext Decryption is performed to obtain the sum of electricity consumption data from all meters. .

[0021] Furthermore, the sum of all electricity meter data is obtained. The specific decryption process is as follows:

[0022] In the formula, , represents an auxiliary function defined in the Paillier decryption algorithm; This represents the ciphertext after aggregation; and It is the private key portion of the Paillier encryption system. As a core component of Paillier's private key, it ensures that only authorized parties can decipher the plaintext, and is calculated using two large prime numbers. , The value of the Carmichael function. This is an auxiliary parameter for Paillier's private key and is a necessary correction factor for the decryption operation.

[0023] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: 1. The core innovation of this invention lies in its systematic architecture and algorithm optimization, which fundamentally solves the contradiction between insufficient edge computing power and cloud verification efficiency bottlenecks in large-scale V2G networks without sacrificing data security, achieving lightweight and high-performance processing across the entire chain. By optimizing the public key parameter g of Paillier homomorphic encryption to N+1, this invention simplifies the originally complex modular exponentiation operation at the smart meter end to a lightweight modular multiplication operation, greatly reducing the encryption computing load of resource-constrained edge devices. At the same time, combined with the aggregation characteristics of BLS short signatures, the signature verification of massive terminals by the control center is upgraded from traditional linear one-to-one verification to constant-level batch verification requiring only one bilinear pairing. While ensuring end-to-end data privacy is not leaked, this invention achieves a performance leap across the entire process from the edge to the cloud.

[0024] 2. The fully binary tree distributed aggregation architecture adopted in this invention completely abandons the traditional model of relying on a single centralized aggregation gateway. It pushes the data aggregation task down to each smart meter node in the network to complete collaboratively. This not only eliminates the risk of system paralysis caused by single point of failure, but also greatly improves the overall robustness of the V2G data acquisition system. In large-scale deployment scenarios, it demonstrates fault tolerance and operation and maintenance efficiency far superior to existing technologies.

[0025] Other features and advantages of the invention will be set forth in the description which follows, and will be apparent in part from the description, or may be learned by practicing the invention. The objects and other advantages of the invention may be realized and obtained by means of the structures pointed out in the description, claims and drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0026] To more clearly illustrate the technical solutions in the embodiments of the present invention or the prior art, the drawings used in the description of the embodiments or the prior art will be briefly introduced below. Obviously, the drawings described below are some embodiments of the present invention. For those skilled in the art, other drawings can be obtained based on these drawings without creative effort.

[0027] Figure 1 This is a structural diagram of a data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles according to one embodiment of the present invention.

[0028] Figure 2 This is a flowchart of a data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles according to one embodiment of the present invention.

[0029] Figure 3 This is a tree-like hierarchical aggregation diagram in one embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0030] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of the embodiments of the present invention clearer, the technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some embodiments of the present invention, not all embodiments. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0031] Example 1: In one embodiment, such as Figure 1 As shown, this embodiment provides a data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV). The system includes multiple smart meters (SM) and a control center (CC), wherein: Multiple smart meters (SMs) are interconnected in a hierarchical distributed network topology. A control center (CC) is communicatively connected to the top-level node of the hierarchical network topology. Each of the smart meters is equipped with a data encryption module and a signature module, which are used to perform homomorphic encryption and digital signature on locally acquired electricity transaction data. Each non-leaf node of the smart meter is also equipped with an aggregation module for homomorphically aggregating its own and all direct child nodes' ciphertext data, and homomorphically aggregating the corresponding digital signatures. The control center (CC) is configured with a batch verification module and a decryption module. The batch verification module is used to verify the validity of the aggregate signature received from the top-level node in one go. The decryption module is used to decrypt the aggregate ciphertext after the verification is passed to obtain the sum of the electricity transaction data.

[0032] Furthermore, the system also includes power plants (PPs). After the control center (CC) decrypts and obtains the sum of power trading data, it generates corresponding grid dispatch instructions and sends them to the power plants (PPs) to execute power allocation.

[0033] Specifically, by Figure 1 It can be seen that the data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles mainly consists of... The system consists of smart meters (SMs), a control center (CC), and power plants (PPs). Smart meters are installed at charging stations to measure electricity consumption, collect electricity trading data, and transmit this data to the next-level smart meter. The smart meters also aggregate, process, and transmit data collected by the next-level smart meters to the control center. The control center monitors electricity consumption, develops optimization strategies, and sends instructions to the power plant to control power distribution and optimize grid operation. The power plant is the energy source, which can be a traditional power plant or include renewable energy sources such as solar farms and wind farms. The power plant injects the generated electricity into the grid and receives instructions from the control center to support energy integration and management within the system.

[0034] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the hierarchical distributed network topology is a complete binary tree structure, and each smart meter is assigned a unique identity identifier (ID) and a location identifier (LID) to identify its position in the tree.

[0035] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the data encryption module employs an improved Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm, whose system public key contains parameters... Set as ,in The modulus in the encryption key of the Paillier encryption system is used to simplify modular exponentiation in the encryption process to modular multiplication.

[0036] Furthermore, in this embodiment, the signature module adopts a bilinear pairing-based BLS short signature mechanism, whereby each smart meter generates its own signature key pair and signs the message containing its own ciphertext and identity identifier.

[0037] Example 1 constructs a hierarchical distributed system for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), mainly comprising smart meters, a control center, and a power plant. The system adopts a complete binary tree topology, utilizes Paillier homomorphic encryption to protect user privacy throughout data transmission and aggregation, and employs BLS short signatures to achieve aggregatable digital signatures. Thus, the system can effectively perform batch verification of massive amounts of smart meter electricity transaction data. The control center only needs to perform one aggregated signature verification to confirm the integrity and source of all data, greatly reducing verification overhead and supporting rapid location of faulty nodes in case of verification failure. Simultaneously, hierarchical data aggregation is performed directly in encrypted form, avoiding the leakage of original sensitive information. After decryption at the control center to obtain the total power grid consumption, dispatch instructions are automatically generated, achieving a fully automated closed loop from data acquisition, privacy protection, batch verification to grid dispatch, significantly improving the operational efficiency and security of the smart grid.

[0038] Example 2: In one embodiment, such as Figure 2 As shown, a data aggregation method for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles is provided. Specifically, the core of this invention lies in constructing a complete technical closed loop of "initial registration → encrypted signature → hierarchical aggregation → batch verification and decryption".

[0039] The following explains the principles behind some key terms in this embodiment: Principle 1, Bilinear Pairing: set up For generators are Rank The cyclic additive group, where It is a prime number. Let them be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order. It is a bilinear mapping with the following properties: (1) Bilinear: for any , and integers a , b， satisfy: ; (2) Non-degeneracy: There is at least one pair , , making ; (3) Computability: For all p and q， There are efficient algorithms for computation. .

[0040] Principle 2, Pailier Encryption System: In the Paillier cryptosystem, when two messages... and Using the same public key k Encryption (represented as respectively) and ), their sum It can be obtained by calculating the product of its corresponding ciphertext. That is: This property, known as additive homomorphism, allows computations (such as summation) to be performed directly on encrypted data without decryption, thus protecting data privacy. The Paillier cryptosystem consists of three key algorithms: Key generation algorithm: The algorithm is probabilistic and uses safety parameters. and two large prime numbers and Generate a key; it outputs a private key. and a public key ; Encryption algorithm: It is also probabilistic, and uses the public key to access the message. Encrypt and generate ciphertext. ; Finally, the decryption algorithm: The algorithm is deterministic; it accepts ciphertext. and private key to generate the original plaintext message .

[0041] The method described in this embodiment specifically includes the following steps: Step S1, System Initialization and Registration: The control center (CC) generates global system parameters and keys, assigns identity and location identifiers to each smart meter (SM), and constructs the hierarchical distributed network topology; Furthermore, the control center (CC) generates global system parameters and keys, assigns identity and location identifiers to each smart meter (SM), and constructs the hierarchical distributed network topology, including: Step S101: System parameter generation, generating a system public key based on the Paillier encryption scheme. and private key are ; Define the cyclic group for bilinear pairing , , Bilinear mapping and secure hash function ; Specifically, the system generates public and private keys and public parameters by randomly selecting two large prime numbers. and To make it satisfy the greatest common divisor ,make and Choose an integer Calculate the modular inverse required for decryption. ,in , Modulus of composite number; For encryption randomization parameters; Used to construct a private key ; The function required for decryption is defined as a specific linear transformation under modular arithmetic; the bilinear pairing parameters are set: the order is chosen as... addition cyclic group and Define a bilinear mapping for , For the order of The multiplicative cyclic group, the safe hash function is represented as Then the entire common parameter is represented as ,in, and They are respectively and The generator.

[0042] Step S102: Smart meter registration, for each smart meter Register with the control center (CC) and obtain a unique identifier. Location identifiers containing parent-child node relationships ; Specifically, smart meters Send a registration request to the Control Center (CC), according to the registration order established by the Control Center. The information is stored in a tree structure by the system, and then the corresponding identity identifier is... and location identifiers Return to ,in The location containing parent-child node relationships.

[0043] Step S103: Key derivation for each smart meter Randomly generate a secret value Used as its private key for signing, and based on this, its public key for signing is calculated. .

[0044] Specifically, smart meters Select random number and ,Will As an encrypted random number, it ensures the semantic security of encryption and does not affect the decryptability of the result during aggregation; As a smart meter The BLS signature private key.

[0045] Step S2, Data Encryption and Signature: Each SM collects local electricity trading data, generates the first ciphertext using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, and generates the first signature using an identity-based signature algorithm; Furthermore, each SM collects local electricity transaction data, generates a first ciphertext using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, and generates a first signature using an identity-based signature algorithm, including: Step S201: Data encryption, each smart meter Collect electricity consumption data Using the Paillier additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, random numbers are generated. Calculate encrypted ciphertext ; Furthermore, the encrypted ciphertext expression is,

[0046] In the formula, For the first Smart meters The raw electricity consumption data collected from it It is generated after encryption and is used for subsequent secure transmission and aggregation calculation; For the first Smart meters Raw electricity consumption data collected (plaintext); The public key modulus of the Paillier encryption system; The integer randomly selected by the smart meter during encryption. (i.e., model) In the integer multiplication group and (coprime numbers) Introduced as a randomization factor, it ensures that even when encrypting the same plaintext... Each encryption produces ciphertext It is also different; this provides semantic security, preventing attackers from inferring plaintext information from ciphertext. This indicates that the entire encryption calculation is performed in the module. The operations are performed within the arithmetic system, which is the domain of the Paillier encryption algorithm. All operations (here, multiplication and exponentiation) must ultimately be performed on... Take the mold.

[0047] Step S202: Data signing, for each smart meter Based on the improved BLS signature scheme, generate messages. Digital signature ,in At least includes the identity identifier With the ciphertext ; Specifically, The message to be signed is a data set or string containing information that needs to be signed to verify its integrity and origin; this includes timestamp information, ensuring the timeliness of the signature, resistance to replay attacks, and the smart meter's identification identifier. and the encrypted ciphertext it generates Its role in the process: as a hash function. The input is used to generate a hash value. Then use the private key Perform a signature operation on the hash value ( ).

[0048] Step S203: Data Reporting: Each smart meter will report a data tuple containing the ciphertext, signature, and public key. , , It is sent to its parent node.

[0049] Step S3, Distributed hierarchical aggregation: The SM of each non-leaf node receives the ciphertext and signature uploaded by its direct child nodes, aggregates the ciphertext using the homomorphic addition homomorphism of homomorphic encryption, and aggregates the signature using the aggregatability of the signature. The aggregation result is uploaded to the parent node until the top-level node forms the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature. Furthermore, the distributed hierarchical aggregation includes: Step S301: From the bottom to the top of the tree structure, each intermediate aggregation node receives the data from the child node and performs the aggregation operation without decryption. Furthermore, the aggregation operation includes ciphertext aggregation, signature aggregation, and public key aggregation, wherein: The expression for ciphertext aggregation is,

[0050] In the formula, This represents the ciphertext after aggregation; Indicates from the The original ciphertext of each child node; This indicates the ciphertext received from all child nodes. Perform the product operation; The expression for signature aggregation is,

[0051] In the formula, This represents the aggregated digital signature. Indicates from the first The original digital signature of the individual smart meter; The expression for public key aggregation is:

[0052] In the formula, This represents the aggregated public key; Indicates the first The signature public key of a smart meter.

[0053] Furthermore, during the aggregation process, signatures... and public key aggregation method and ciphertext The supported homomorphic properties are matched, enabling the control center to perform batch source authentication and integrity verification of all underlying raw data by verifying a single aggregate signature.

[0054] Step S302: Delivered to the control center, after the top-level root smart meter performs the above aggregation, the aggregated tuple ( , , It is sent to the control center.

[0055] Specifically, such as Figure 3 As shown, each tree node stores the index of the registered smart meters. Each smart meter aggregates the electricity consumption data and signatures of its child nodes, and this aggregation proceeds layer by layer towards the root node. When the aggregated signature verification at the control center fails, the error report can be quickly detected using the aggregated signature verification method based on a complete binary tree, significantly reducing the overhead of error detection.

[0056] Step S4, Batch Verification and Decryption: The control center (CC) receives the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, and performs a batch verification using bilinear pairing operation; after successful verification, the final aggregated ciphertext is decrypted using the system private key to obtain the sum of smart meter data across the entire network, and a power grid dispatching strategy is formulated based on this.

[0057] Furthermore, the batch verification and decryption includes: Step S401: Batch signature verification: After receiving the aggregated tuple, the control center utilizes the properties of bilinear pairing to verify the equation. To batch verify the integrity of all participating meter data, among which For identifiers related to aggregated messages; Step S402: Decrypt the total data: If the signature verification passes, the control center uses the private key. For the aggregated ciphertext Decryption is performed to obtain the sum of electricity consumption data from all meters. .

[0058] Furthermore, the sum of all electricity meter data is obtained. The specific decryption process is as follows:

[0059] In the formula, , represents an auxiliary function defined in the Paillier decryption algorithm; This represents the ciphertext after aggregation; and It is the private key portion of the Paillier encryption system. As a core component of Paillier's private key, it ensures that only authorized parties can decipher the plaintext, and is calculated using two large prime numbers. , The value of the Carmichael function. This is an auxiliary parameter for Paillier's private key and is a necessary correction factor for the decryption operation.

[0060] Based on the system architecture of Example 1, Example 2 provides a clear and complete methodology for "initial registration → encryption and signing → hierarchical aggregation → batch verification and decryption". This method, through four standardized steps—system initialization and registration (parameter generation, meter registration, and key derivation), data encryption and signing (Paillier encryption and BLS signing), distributed hierarchical aggregation (homomorphic aggregation of ciphertext and signature), and batch verification and decryption (batch verification based on bilinear pairing and final decryption)—makes the implementation plan concrete and operable. This process not only inherits the advantages of Example 1 in privacy protection (homomorphic encryption) and efficient verification (aggregated signature), but also further clarifies the technical implementation and security mechanisms of each stage through detailed algorithm descriptions and step decomposition, thereby enhancing the system's reliability, deployability, and scalability. It provides clear guidance for engineering practice and effectively promotes the deep integration of vehicle-to-everything (V2X) and smart grids.

[0061] Although this application has been described in detail with reference to the foregoing embodiments, those skilled in the art should understand that modifications can still be made to the technical solutions described in the foregoing embodiments, or equivalent substitutions can be made to some of the technical features; and these modifications or substitutions do not cause the essence of the corresponding technical solutions to deviate from the spirit and scope of the technical solutions of the embodiments of this application.

Claims

1. A data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), characterized in that, include: Multiple smart meters (SMs) are interconnected in a hierarchical distributed network topology. A control center (CC) is communicatively connected to the top-level node of the hierarchical network topology. Each of the smart meters is equipped with a data encryption module and a signature module, which are used to perform homomorphic encryption and digital signature on locally acquired electricity transaction data. Each non-leaf node of the smart meter is also equipped with an aggregation module for homomorphically aggregating its own and all direct child nodes' ciphertext data, and homomorphically aggregating the corresponding digital signatures. The control center (CC) is configured with a batch verification module and a decryption module. The batch verification module is used to verify the validity of the aggregate signature received from the top-level node in one go. The decryption module is used to decrypt the aggregate ciphertext after the verification is passed to obtain the sum of the electricity transaction data.

2. The data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The hierarchical distributed network topology is a complete binary tree structure, and each smart meter is assigned a unique identity identifier (ID) and a location identifier (LID) to identify its position in the tree.

3. The data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles as described in claim 1, characterized in that: The data encryption module employs an improved Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm, and the parameters in the system public key of the improved Paillier homomorphic encryption algorithm are... Set as ,in The modulus in the encryption key of the Paillier encryption system is used to simplify modular exponentiation in the encryption process to modular multiplication.

4. The data aggregation system for batch verification and privacy protection in the Internet of Vehicles as described in claim 1 or 2, characterized in that: The signature module adopts a bilinear pairing-based BLS short signature mechanism. Each smart meter generates its own signature key pair and signs the message containing its own ciphertext and identity identifier.

5. A method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation in the Internet of Vehicles (IoV), applied to the system described in any one of claims 1-4, characterized in that, The method includes the following steps: The control center (CC) generates global system parameters and keys, assigns identity and location identifiers to each smart meter (SM), and constructs the hierarchical distributed network topology. Each SM collects local electricity trading data, generates the first ciphertext using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, and generates the first signature using an identity-based signature algorithm; Each non-leaf node's SM receives the ciphertext and signature uploaded by its direct child nodes, aggregates the ciphertext using the homomorphic addition homomorphism of homomorphic encryption, and aggregates the signature using the aggregatability of the signature. The aggregated result is then uploaded to the parent node until the top-level node forms the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature. The control center (CC) receives the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, performs a batch verification using bilinear pairing operations, and after successful verification, decrypts the final aggregated ciphertext using the system private key to obtain the sum of smart meter data across the entire network, and formulates a power grid dispatching strategy based on this.

6. The method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The control center (CC) generates global system parameters and keys, assigns identity and location identifiers to each smart meter (SM), and constructs the hierarchical distributed network topology, including: Generate system public keys based on Paillier encryption. and private key are ; Define the cyclic group for bilinear pairing , , Bilinear mapping and secure hash function ; Each smart meter Register with the control center (CC) and obtain a unique identifier. Location identifiers containing parent-child node relationships ; Each smart meter Randomly generate a secret value Used as its private key for signing, and based on this, its public key for signing is calculated. .

7. The method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described in claim 5, characterized in that, Each SM collects local electricity trading data, generates a first ciphertext using a homomorphic encryption algorithm, and generates a first signature using an identity-based signature algorithm, including: Smart meters Collect electricity consumption data Using the Paillier additive homomorphic encryption algorithm, random numbers are generated. Calculate encrypted ciphertext ; Smart meters Based on the improved BLS signature scheme, generate messages. Digital signature ,in At least includes the identity identifier With the encrypted ciphertext ; Each smart meter will contain a data tuple containing ciphertext, a signature, and a public key. , , It is sent to its parent node.

8. The method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described in claim 7, characterized in that, The encrypted ciphertext expression is: In the formula, For the first Smart meters The raw electricity consumption data collected from it It is generated after encryption and is used for subsequent secure transmission and aggregation calculation; For the first Smart meters Raw electricity consumption data collected; The public key modulus of the Paillier encryption system; This is an integer randomly selected by the smart meter during encryption. This means that all operation results must ultimately be true. Take the mold.

9. The method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described in claim 5, characterized in that, Each non-leaf node's SM receives the ciphertext and signature uploaded by its direct child nodes, aggregates the ciphertext using the homomorphic addition property of homomorphic encryption, and aggregates the signature using the aggregatability property of the signature. The aggregated result is then uploaded to the parent node, until the top-level node forms the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, including: From the bottom to the top of the tree structure, each intermediate aggregation node receives data from its child nodes and performs an aggregation operation without decryption. The aggregation operations include ciphertext aggregation, signature aggregation, and public key aggregation, specifically including: The expression for ciphertext aggregation is, In the formula, This represents the ciphertext after aggregation; Indicates from the The original ciphertext of each child node; This indicates the ciphertext received from all child nodes. Perform the product operation; The expression for signature aggregation is, In the formula, This represents the aggregated digital signature. Indicates from the first The original digital signature of the individual smart meter; The expression for public key aggregation is: In the formula, This represents the aggregated public key; Indicates the first The signature public key of the individual smart meter; The data is delivered to the control center. After the top-level root smart meter performs the above aggregation, it will aggregate the tuples (...). , , It is sent to the control center.

10. The method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described in claim 5, characterized in that, The control center (CC) receives the final aggregated ciphertext and aggregated signature, and performs a batch verification using bilinear pairing operations. After successful verification, the final aggregated ciphertext is decrypted using the system's private key to obtain the sum of data from all smart meters in the network. Based on this, a power grid dispatching strategy is formulated, including: Batch signature verification: After receiving the aggregated tuple, the control center utilizes the properties of bilinear pairing to verify the equation. To batch verify the integrity of all participating meter data, among which For identifiers related to aggregated messages; Decrypting the total data: If the signature verification passes, the control center uses the private key. For the aggregated ciphertext Decryption is performed to obtain the sum of electricity consumption data from all meters. .

11. The method for batch verification and privacy-preserving data aggregation for vehicle-to-everything (V2X) networks as described in claim 10, characterized in that, The sum of all electricity meter data is obtained. The specific decryption process is as follows: In the formula, , represents an auxiliary function defined in the Paillier decryption algorithm; This represents the ciphertext after aggregation; and It is the private key portion of the Paillier encryption system. As a core component of Paillier's private key, This is an auxiliary parameter for Paillier's private key, used for correction during decryption operations.

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