An oil and gas pipeline post-earthquake operation control method based on multi-source monitoring information fusion

Abstract

The application belongs to the technical field of oil and gas pipeline safe operation and emergency control, and specifically discloses a kind of post-earthquake operation control method for oil and gas pipeline based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, comprising the following steps: taking valve room-valve room or valve room-station as interval section unit, obtaining risk stake in each interval section;Risk stake is divided into multiple risk information levels with different confidence levels according to information source;For any interval section, if leakage is detected based on SCADA pressure monitoring or major threat of fault is detected based on IMS monitoring, stop transmission instruction is directly output;Otherwise, calculate the comprehensive risk score of each level according to the level of risk stake and disaster type, then weighted sum to get the section shutdown index;According to the classification threshold corresponding to the landform type, the section shutdown index is mapped to the operation control level and the instruction is output.The application can quickly and accurately generate differentiated pipeline operation control instructions for different sections.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This application belongs to the field of oil and gas pipeline safe operation and emergency control technology, and more specifically, relates to a method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion. Background Technology

[0002] Long-distance oil and gas pipelines, as typical linear lifeline engineering projects, involve various complex engineering sites such as underground laying, bridge crossing, and tunneling. They are highly susceptible to damage from a series of chain reactions of disasters, including earthquake fault displacement, co-seismic landslides, and bridge fractures, leading to significant failures such as oil and gas leaks or even explosions. Therefore, adjusting the real-time pipeline operation status (shutdown, pressure reduction, and normal operation) based on earthquake disaster information after an earthquake is crucial for ensuring energy transportation and the safety of people's lives and property. Currently, various pipeline earthquake monitoring, early warning, and shutdown methods have been gradually developed and applied both domestically and internationally to ensure the safe and efficient operation of pipelines; however, these methods have significant limitations. For example: Existing technologies include a comprehensive approach combining strong-motion monitoring and fault displacement monitoring. Digital strong-motion meters are deployed at key distribution stations, triggering alarms based on preset three-level thresholds and automatically shutting off gas supply valves for emergency shut-off. Simultaneously, GPS monitoring stations are deployed at pipeline-fault intersections, calculating the relative displacement of the two fault plates and comparing it to preset thresholds to determine whether to halt transmission. Another technology constructs a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system, using sensors to collect parameters such as flow rate, pressure, temperature, and liquid level along the entire pipeline. Whether to halt transmission is determined manually or based on thresholds using real-time data. Still other technologies deploy multiple detection devices at pipeline-fault intersections in earthquake-affected areas to acquire monitoring data on the pipeline structure and environmental factors immediately after an earthquake, supporting pipeline safety assessment, damage assessment, and emergency management.

[0003] However, the main problems with the existing pipeline shutdown monitoring methods mentioned above are as follows: Firstly, they only address single scenarios where pipelines intersect with fractures, while earthquakes can cause multiple chain reactions such as fracture displacement, landslides, soil liquefaction, bridge failure, and tunnel failure. The aforementioned methods cannot provide comprehensive recommendations for pipeline shutdowns under multiple earthquake disaster scenarios, resulting in insufficient accuracy in judgment. Secondly, they determine whether to shut down pipelines based on monitoring values, but the type of disaster corresponding to these values ​​is unclear. For example, the safety of a pipeline that is not leaking but is affected by landslide soil and rock cannot be accurately determined. Strong ground motion monitoring results can only reflect surface acceleration, but whether landslides or other disasters will occur under this acceleration and whether the pipeline will definitely be affected are unknown.

[0004] In addition, existing technologies have the following shortcomings: they fail to fully utilize monitoring data from the entire pipeline, with various types of data often used independently, lacking a unified fusion and processing mechanism, which affects the accuracy of comprehensive judgment; the shutdown control lacks a repeatable and executable technical process to generate operation control commands, resulting in slow response speed; it is difficult to carry out differentiated control for valve chamber sections, which can easily lead to excessive shutdown or control lag; and there is a lack of a rapid response mechanism, making it difficult to quickly complete the technical judgment of the pipeline's operating status in the short time following an earthquake.

[0005] Therefore, how to quickly and accurately generate differentiated pipeline operation control commands for different sections after an earthquake is an urgent problem to be solved. Summary of the Invention

[0006] To address the shortcomings of existing technologies, the purpose of this application is to provide a post-earthquake operation control method for oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, which can quickly and accurately generate differentiated pipeline operation control commands for different sections after an earthquake.

[0007] To achieve the above objectives, in a first aspect, this application provides a method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, comprising the following steps: S10 uses valve chamber-valve chamber or valve chamber-station as the interval unit. After the earthquake, the pipeline pile points in each interval that are identified as high-risk are obtained as risk piles. S20, the risk piles are divided into multiple risk information levels with different confidence levels according to the source of risk information. The multiple risk information levels include risk information based on SCADA pressure monitoring, risk information based on IMS special monitoring, risk information based on quantitative model calculation, and risk information based on semi-quantitative model calculation. S30: For any section, if a pipeline leak is detected based on the risk information from SCADA pressure monitoring, or if fault activity is detected based on the risk information from IMS special monitoring and poses a significant direct threat to the pipeline, a stop command will be output directly and the processing of that section will be terminated; otherwise, S40 will be executed. S40, For this interval, based on the risk information level and disaster type of each risk pile, according to the preset disaster type score parameters and the preset aggregation rules of multiple risk piles in the same level, calculate the comprehensive risk score of each risk information level, and then according to the preset level weight parameters, sum the comprehensive risk scores of each level to obtain the interval suspension index. S50: Based on the preset grading threshold corresponding to the terrain type of the section, the calculated section stop index is mapped to the operation control level, and the operation control command corresponding to the operation control level is output.

[0008] As a further preferred embodiment, in step S20, the risk information levels are arranged in descending order of confidence level as follows: The first level is based on the SCADA pressure monitoring system, which is used to monitor pipeline operating pressure and leakage. The second level is based on the IMS monitoring system, which is used for systematic monitoring of fault displacement and pipeline safety at the intersection of pipelines and faults. The third level is based on quantitative model calculations, used to calculate the comparison between the actual strain value of the pipeline after the earthquake and the safety design value of the pipeline before the earthquake. The fourth level, based on a semi-quantitative model, is used to output the semi-quantitative level assessment results of pipeline seismic damage risk.

[0009] As a further preferred option, the specific conditions for directly outputting the stop command in step S30 are: the first level has identified a leak, or the pipeline and fault monitoring system in the second level reflects that there is a great risk to the pipeline.

[0010] As a further preferred option, in step S40, the formula for calculating the section stoppage index is:

[0011] In the formula, For section s The section outage index; w i For the first i Weight parameters for each risk information level; For section s In the i The comprehensive risk score under each risk information level; m is the number of risk information levels.

[0012] As a further preferred embodiment, the hierarchical weight parameters are configured in descending order of confidence level according to the risk information level, that is, the first-level weight parameter is greater than the second-level weight parameter, the second-level weight parameter is greater than the third-level weight parameter, and the third-level weight parameter is greater than the fourth-level weight parameter.

[0013] As a further preferred embodiment, the disaster type score parameter is configured as follows: In the first level, the score corresponding to high-intensity pressure fluctuation is 10, the score corresponding to medium-intensity pressure fluctuation is 5, and the score corresponding to low-intensity pressure or no fluctuation is 0. In the second level, the score for bridge or tunnel crossing projects is 10, the score for landslide geological disasters is 8, and the score for seismic ground motion monitoring is 5. In the third level, the score for fault sections, bridges or tunnels crossing projects is 10, the score for landslide geological hazards is 8, and the score for earthquake impact is 7. In the fourth level, the score for a fault segment is 10 for high-risk situations, the score for a bridge or tunnel crossing project is 9, the score for a landslide geological hazard is 8, and the score for the impact of ground motion is 7; the score for a fault segment is 5 for relatively high-risk situations, the score for a bridge or tunnel crossing project is 4, the score for a landslide geological hazard is 3, and the score for the impact of ground motion is 3.

[0014] As a further preferred option, the preset aggregation rule for multiple risk piles within the same level is either an accumulation method or a weighted method based on the number of piles.

[0015] As a further preferred option, the landform types include mountainous areas and plains; Under mountainous conditions, the preset grading thresholds are as follows: when the section outage index is greater than 3, it corresponds to immediate outage inspection; when it is greater than 2 and less than or equal to 3, it corresponds to reduced pressure operation and intensified monitoring; when it is greater than 1 and less than or equal to 2, it corresponds to key observation; and when it is less than or equal to 1, it corresponds to maintaining normal operation. Under plain conditions, the preset classification thresholds are as follows: when the section outage index is greater than 4, it corresponds to immediate outage inspection; when it is greater than 3 and less than or equal to 4, it corresponds to reduced pressure operation and intensified monitoring; when it is greater than 2 and less than or equal to 3, it corresponds to key observation; and when it is less than or equal to 2, it corresponds to maintaining normal operation.

[0016] As a further preferred embodiment, the operation control levels include red, orange, yellow, and green, corresponding to four operation control commands: immediate shutdown and inspection, reduced-voltage operation and intensified monitoring, key observation, and maintaining normal operation, respectively. The instructions include: Immediate shutdown and inspection; issuing shutdown orders immediately, dispatching repair teams to the site, and activating the leak emergency plan; pressure reduction and enhanced monitoring instructions include reducing the pressure to 60% to 70% of the design pressure and preparing shutdown plans; key observation instructions include completing drone inspections within 24 hours and focusing on high-risk pile locations; and maintaining normal operation instructions include operating as planned and maintaining monitoring by the monitoring center.

[0017] Secondly, this application provides a post-earthquake operation control system for oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, comprising the steps of implementing any one of the methods described above, including: The multi-source data access module is used to access SCADA pressure monitoring data, IMS special monitoring data, quantitative model calculation results, semi-quantitative model evaluation results, and pipeline basic geographic information. The risk pile collection module is used to map the risk piles identified after the earthquake to the corresponding valve chamber-valve chamber section or valve chamber-station section according to the pile number attribution relationship; The section outage index calculation module is used to calculate the section outage index for each section based on the hierarchical weight parameters, disaster type score parameters, and risk pile aggregation rules. The operation control decision module is used to determine the operation control level based on the section outage index and the corresponding decision threshold; The control command generation module is used to convert the operation control level into machine-recognizable control commands. The control commands include section number, target valve chamber number, target equipment number, control level, action type, pressure setpoint, execution priority, execution time limit, verification conditions, and feedback requirements. The communication interface module is used to send control commands to the existing SCADA system of the pipeline, the dispatch control platform, the station control system, or the valve chamber RTU / PLC control terminal; The valve chamber actuator control module is used to receive control signals output by the valve chamber RTU / PLC and drive the corresponding valve actuator to move. The valve actuator includes a main valve, a shut-off valve, a regulating valve, and a vent valve. The execution feedback verification module is used to receive feedback information such as valve position feedback, valve on / off status, pipeline pressure, flow rate, temperature, alarm status, and communication status, and to determine whether the control command has been successfully executed. If the system does not receive execution confirmation within a preset time, or if the feedback status is inconsistent with the target status, an execution failure alarm is generated, and the control status of that section is upgraded to manual review or a higher-level emergency response status.

[0018] The beneficial effects of this application are as follows: Compared with existing technologies, this application addresses the engineering realities of multiple cascading disasters induced by earthquakes, such as fault slippage, coseismic landslides, failure of cross-span structures, and seismic action. It uses the valve chamber-valve chamber / valve chamber-station section as the smallest control unit, uniformly collecting risk pile information within the section and dividing it into multiple levels according to the confidence level of the information source. Through a dual-channel mechanism of "directly triggering shutdown with high confidence + calculating the section shutdown index (SSI) and outputting it in stages for other scenarios," it achieves quantitative fusion and comparable processing of multi-source monitoring and assessment information. This enables the rapid and accurate output of directly executable section operation control commands (shutdown / pressure reduction / observation / maintenance) after an earthquake, avoiding the limitations of relying solely on a single monitoring threshold or single-scenario method, which can lead to limited applicability, excessive shutdowns, or delayed responses. This improves the response speed, judgment stability, and engineering feasibility of post-earthquake emergency response.

[0019] Furthermore, this application, by setting up a control command generation module, a communication interface module, a valve chamber actuator control module, and an execution feedback verification module, enables the section operation control results to be further converted into executable equipment-level control commands for valve chambers and stations. This mechanism can achieve the connection between section-level risk assessment results and actuators such as main valves, shut-off valves, pressure regulating equipment, pumps, and compressors, and verify the execution results through feedback information such as valve position, pressure, flow rate, and alarm status, thereby forming a closed-loop control process of "risk identification—section decision-making—command issuance—equipment execution—status feedback," improving the rapid response capability, judgment accuracy, and engineering feasibility of post-earthquake operation control schemes. Attached Figure Description

[0020] Figure 1 This is a schematic diagram of the decision-making model for pipeline section shutdown in earthquake zones provided in an embodiment of this application; Figure 2 This is the single-interval segment unit operation control decision-making process provided in the embodiments of this application. Detailed Implementation

[0021] To make the objectives, technical solutions, and advantages of this application clearer, the following detailed description is provided in conjunction with the accompanying drawings and embodiments. It should be understood that the specific embodiments described herein are merely illustrative and not intended to limit the scope of this application.

[0022] This application provides a method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, such as... Figure 1 As shown, the main processes include the following: (1) First, before the earthquake, the valve chamber-valve chamber or valve chamber-station section is used as the unit, and this unit is used as the output object of the final operation control evaluation result.

[0023] (2) Then, after the earthquake, the information of pipeline piles with risks (high risks) in the interval unit is extracted separately from all pile information and used as the calculation element for operation control decision. At the same time, according to the different sources of pile risk data, it is divided into four levels. The first to fourth levels are the SCADA pressure monitoring system status, IMS monitoring system status, quantitative model calculation status, and semi-quantitative model calculation status, respectively. The four levels also correspond to the sorting of pile risk results from high to low confidence. In addition, high-risk piles are not calculated repeatedly. For example, if the monitoring has already reported high risk, the quantitative and semi-quantitative results are no longer used.

[0024] (3) Then, the risk piles at different levels and their corresponding disaster types are brought into the comprehensive calculation method of "Segment Shutdown Index (SSI)". Based on the value of SSI, it is brought into the decision suggestion classification system for decision-making. From high to low, four operation control warning levels of red, orange, yellow and green are output, which correspond to "shutdown, pressure reduction, observation and maintaining the status quo" respectively, thereby outputting shutdown decision suggestions for different segments.

[0025] Another important point to note is that the SCADA system at the first level can directly identify the pipeline's operating pressure and leakage status, while the IMS monitoring at the second level systematically monitors certain fault-pipeline intersections. Both of these scenarios can directly reflect the pipeline's post-earthquake safety status. Therefore, if the first level has identified a leak or the second level has detected a significant impact of fault activity on the pipeline, these two scenarios can bypass calculation methods and classification systems to directly output segment control decision recommendations. Furthermore, units that have already output segment decision recommendations will not undergo secondary calculations.

[0026] (4) Finally, control decision levels and recommendations for different sections (valve chamber-valve chamber, or valve chamber-station) after the earthquake can be obtained.

[0027] It should be noted that the hierarchical weights, disaster type scores, SSI classification thresholds, and aggregation methods of multiple risk piles within the same section in this application can all be configured as system parameters. The weights, scores, and thresholds listed in the specification are only used to illustrate the calculation logic and implementation methods of this application and do not constitute a limitation on the scope of protection of this application. In actual engineering applications, the above parameters can be adjusted according to pipeline type, transport medium, topographic conditions, seismic zoning, operator safety strategy, historical earthquake damage data, expert experience, analytic hierarchy process (AHP), entropy weight method, or model training results, etc.

[0028] Table 1 illustrates the SSI division intervals and the corresponding decision-making recommendation classification system. The SSI index mentioned above will have different numerical ranges depending on the calculation method, and can be divided into different intervals. Different intervals correspond to different emergency measures.

[0029] Table 1. Schematic diagram of the segment outage index division and its corresponding decision-making recommendations.

[0030] Therefore, the key to implementing the decision-making recommendations lies in the calculation method of the "Sectional Outage Index (SSI)". Considering the decreasing confidence levels of pile risk corresponding to the SCADA pressure monitoring system, IMS monitoring system, quantitative model calculation, and semi-quantitative model calculation from the first to the fourth level, a multi-level index-based SSI calculation method is adopted. This method first considers the weight ratio of elements at different levels, then considers the pipeline seismic damage types corresponding to different risk piles, and uses a comprehensive index method to simultaneously consider the element level and specific classification to obtain the SSI.

[0031] Therefore, the hierarchical weight parameters can be set based on the confidence level, real-time nature, and direct reflection of pipeline operating status of different risk information sources. The weight of the i-th risk information level is denoted as wi, forming a hierarchical weight vector W={w1,w2,...,wm}, where m is the number of risk information levels. Generally, SCADA pressure monitoring system information and IMS-specific monitoring information are direct or relatively direct monitoring information, and their confidence level is higher than that of model-calculated information; the confidence level of quantitative model calculation results is usually higher than that of semi-quantitative model evaluation results. Therefore, different weights can be configured according to the information confidence level from high to low. The weights shown in Table 2 are only one example parameter configuration.

[0032] Table 2. Schematic diagram of hierarchical weight parameter configuration

[0033] The example values ​​in Table 2 are only used to illustrate that risk information at different levels can be weighted and fused according to the difference in confidence level. In practical applications, they are not limited to the specific values ​​mentioned above.

[0034] Then, at the same level, different station numbers correspond to different earthquake hazard types. For example, at the semi-quantitative high-risk level, there are cases corresponding to crossings (tunnels, etc.) and spannings (bridges, etc.), as well as cases corresponding to geological hazards such as landslides. Therefore, different category scores are used: (1) Classification scores at the first level (SCADA) At the first level, there are two main categories: identified leaks and unidentified leaks (Table 3): ① If a leak has been identified, the unit with valve chamber-valve chamber or valve chamber-station as the interval is directly shut down. Since this interval has been shut down, it is not included in the SSI calculation method for the section shutdown index. ② If a leak has not been identified, there are operating pressure fluctuations caused by surface displacement due to seismic waves or geological disasters. Different scores are assigned according to the intensity of the pressure fluctuations, and then they are included in the calculation of the section shutdown index (SSI).

[0035] Within the same risk level, different risk types have varying degrees of impact on pipeline safety, therefore, category score parameters can be set. Category score parameters characterize the strength of the impact of different disaster types or risk states on section operation control decisions. The scores listed in Tables 3 to 7 are exemplary configurations and can be adjusted in actual projects based on the pipeline operator's safety management requirements, historical earthquake damage data, or expert assessment results.

[0036] Table 3. Schematic diagram of the configuration of score parameters for the first-level risk category.

[0037] (2) Second-level classification score (IMS monitoring) At the second level, since pipelines inevitably intersect with faults, a pipeline fault displacement monitoring system is systematically deployed in advance at the intersection of the pipeline and the fault (such as the Ji-Ning pipeline and the China-Myanmar pipeline). Therefore, at the second level, it can also be mainly divided into two categories: a dedicated fault displacement pipeline safety monitoring system and single-point pipeline seismic disaster monitoring (Table 4): ① If the fault displacement pipeline safety monitoring system has reflected that the pipeline has a great risk, the section unit will be directly shut down. Since this section unit has already been shut down, the SSI calculation method for the section shutdown index will not be used; ② If the fault displacement pipeline safety monitoring system has not reflected that the pipeline has a risk, it means that the earthquake-originating fault does not intersect with the pipeline. Therefore, the results of the second type of single-point pipeline seismic disaster monitoring can be used. At the same time, different scores are assigned according to the differences in pipeline vulnerability corresponding to the monitored objects. Among them, bridges and tunnels, which are crossing structures, have the highest scores, while the impact of seismic motion has the lowest scores. After being assigned scores, they are used in the calculation of the section shutdown index (SSI).

[0038] Table 4. Schematic diagram of the configuration of score parameters for the second-level risk category.

[0039] (3) Classification scores at the third level (based on a quantitative model) The third level, based on the quantitative model, mainly reflects the comparison between the actual calculated values ​​of pipeline strain after the earthquake and the pre-earthquake safety design values. If the calculated value is greater than the design value, it is considered unsafe, and the difference between the calculated and design values ​​is no longer further subdivided. Therefore, the third level can be mainly divided into four categories: the influence of faults, crossings, geological hazards, and seismic motion, each corresponding to different scores (Table 5). After being assigned scores, these scores are used in the calculation of the shutdown model.

[0040] Table 5. Schematic diagram of the configuration of score parameters for the third-level risk category.

[0041] (4) Classification scores at the fourth level (based on a semi-quantitative model) The fourth level is based on a semi-quantitative model. In fact, the semi-quantitative risk model has five levels: low, lower, medium, higher, and high. Considering that the confidence level of the semi-quantitative model is relatively low, the higher and higher risk levels are used for calculation. Both of these levels are divided into four categories: faults, crossings, geological hazards, and earthquakes. The scores corresponding to different risk levels can be found in Tables 6 and 7. That is, the score for high risk is higher than that for higher risk. After assigning scores, the data is used in the calculation of the shutdown model.

[0042] Table 6. Schematic diagram of risk category score parameter configuration for Level 4 (High Risk)

[0043] Table 7. Schematic diagram of risk category score parameter configuration for Level 4 (Higher Risk)

[0044] Subsequently, based on the hierarchical weight parameters and category score parameters, the comprehensive index method is used to calculate the section stoppage index (SSI) of a certain valve chamber section. For any valve chamber section s, the system first obtains the risk pile set Ps within the section, and divides the risk piles into different risk information levels according to the source of risk information, obtaining risk pile sets Ps(1), Ps(2), ..., Ps(m) for each level. Among them, Ps(i) represents the risk pile set belonging to the i-th risk information level within section s. For the i-th risk information level, the system reads the corresponding category score from the preset category score parameter table according to the disaster type corresponding to the risk pile. If there are multiple risk piles within the same level, the comprehensive risk score Rs(i) of that level can be obtained by the summation method, the weighted method by the number of piles, or other preset aggregation methods. The aggregation method can be configured according to the safety strategy of the pipeline operating unit. The section stoppage index SSIs of section s can be expressed as:

[0045] In the formula, SSIs is the segment outage index of segment s; w i Rs(i) represents the weight parameter of the i-th risk information level; Rs(i) represents the comprehensive risk score of segment s under the i-th risk information level; m represents the number of risk information levels.

[0046] When there is no risk stake in a certain level, the comprehensive risk score corresponding to that level can be zero; when a risk stake has been identified and participated in decision-making by a high-confidence level, the risk information that is repeated with the risk stake in the low-confidence level will not be counted again, so as to avoid risk amplification caused by repeated calculation.

[0047] The Segment Outage Index (SSI) can be calculated using the comprehensive index method described above. The system can then map the SSI to the corresponding operational control level based on preset SSI classification threshold parameters. Considering the differences in pipeline seismic damage types and risk development characteristics under different terrain conditions such as mountainous and plain areas, the SSI classification thresholds can be configured according to different terrain types. Tables 8 and 9 provide examples of SSI classification threshold parameters for mountainous and plain conditions, but do not constitute a limitation on the specific thresholds specified in this application.

[0048] Table 8. Schematic diagram of SSI classification threshold parameter configuration under mountainous conditions.

[0049] Table 9. Schematic diagram of SSI grading threshold parameter configuration under plain conditions

[0050] Based on the above, the operational control decision evaluation results of all interval units within the earthquake influence range can be obtained, as shown in Table 10 below.

[0051] Table 10. Schematic diagram of the output fields for the Section Outage Index (SSI) calculation results and operation control recommendations.

[0052] Table 10 illustrates the organization of the control system's output fields. The specific SSI values, operating control levels, and emergency measures are automatically generated by the system based on the actual input risk stake information, parameter configuration table, and SSI classification thresholds.

[0053] Therefore, based on the above entire process, actual decision-making can be made for a certain section unit. Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of the section shutdown decision-making process. The complete process of section shutdown decision-making begins with the definition of the section as a unit of valve chamber or station and the collection of information on its four levels of risk stakes. This process first follows the principle of safety priority, and makes an immediate judgment on the risk with the highest confidence level: ① If the first-level SCADA system directly detects a pipeline leak, it will immediately trigger the highest emergency response – directly outputting the “immediately stop transmission and inspect” command and terminating the subsequent assessment of this segment, ensuring that the most urgent risks are dealt with instantly.

[0054] ② If the above-mentioned direct shutdown conditions based on the first-level SCADA monitoring of leakage do not exist, then proceed with this step. Use the second-level IMS specialized monitoring system to determine whether the fault activity has posed a significant direct threat to the pipeline. If a significant threat is identified, the highest level of emergency response will be triggered immediately—directly outputting the "Immediate Shutdown and Inspection" command and terminating subsequent assessments of that section to ensure that the most urgent risks are addressed instantly.

[0055] ③ If the above-mentioned direct shutdown conditions do not exist, then the comprehensive risk assessment method will be used to run this step. The system will summarize and process all other risk stake information within this interval. At this time, the core calculation method can be selected for quantitative assessment based on data conditions or preset strategies: a. The weighted comprehensive method based on multi-level indicators calculates the weighted sum as SSI by assigning each risk stake its corresponding level weight and the score of the disaster type it represents; b. After obtaining the SSI value, match the corresponding mountainous or plain decision classification system according to the landform type of the interval segment, based on the respective methods. c. By comparing the SSI value, the decision range is determined by "immediately stop transmission", "reduce pressure", "monitor closely", or "maintain normal operation", and a clear emergency operation instruction is output.

[0056] The entire process integrates direct judgment and precise calculation, and incorporates a built-in anti-duplication assessment mechanism. This ensures that while responding quickly to confirmed risks, it can also address complex potential risks in a structured and differentiated scientific manner, thus forming a standardized emergency decision-making process that combines speed and accuracy, with a closed loop from data input to instruction output.

[0057] The “hierarchical weight” and “category score” mentioned in Figure 2 are both configurable parameters of the system. When there are multiple risk stakes at the same level in the same segment, the system first obtains the aggregated risk score of that level according to the preset aggregation rules, and then participates in the SSI calculation.

[0058] Furthermore, the interface method between the control system and the valve chamber actuator in this application, as well as the logic for issuing control commands, are as follows: Furthermore, the post-earthquake operation control method of this application can be automatically executed by the pipeline post-earthquake operation control system. The control system may include a multi-source data access module, a risk pile collection module, a section shutdown index calculation module, an operation control decision module, a control command generation module, a communication interface module, a valve chamber actuator control module, and an execution feedback verification module.

[0059] The multi-source data access module is used to access SCADA pressure monitoring data, IMS special monitoring data, quantitative model calculation results, semi-quantitative model evaluation results, and pipeline basic geographic information. The risk pile aggregation module maps post-earthquake identified risk piles to corresponding valve chamber-valve chamber sections or valve chamber-station sections according to their pile number affiliation. The section shutdown index calculation module calculates the SSI for each section based on hierarchical weight parameters, disaster type score parameters, and risk pile aggregation rules. The operation control decision module classifies the section operation control level into immediate shutdown inspection, pressure reduction operation with intensified monitoring, key observation, or maintaining routine operation based on the SSI value and corresponding decision threshold.

[0060] The control command generation module is used to convert operational control levels into machine-readable control commands. Control commands include at least the section number, target valve chamber number, target equipment number, control level, action type, pressure setpoint, execution priority, execution time limit, verification conditions, and feedback requirements.

[0061] The communication interface module is used to send control commands to the existing SCADA system, dispatch control platform, station control system, or valve chamber RTU / PLC control terminal of the pipeline. Communication methods may include wired private network, fiber optic communication, wireless communication, or satellite communication; the data interface may use OPC, Modbus, IEC 60870-5-104, DNP3, MQTT, HTTP API, or a proprietary communication protocol already used by the pipeline operator. This application does not limit the specific communication protocol, as long as it can achieve the issuance of control commands and feedback of execution status.

[0062] The valve chamber actuator control module receives control signals from the RTU / PLC and drives the corresponding valve actuator to operate. Valve actuators may include main valves, shut-off valves, regulating valves, venting valves, or other actuators related to pipeline operation control. The operating modes of valve actuators include closing, opening, holding, adjusting to a target opening degree, or adjusting to a target pressure condition.

[0063] The execution feedback verification module receives feedback information such as valve position, valve on / off status, pipeline pressure, flow rate, temperature, alarm status, and communication status, and determines whether the control command has been successfully executed. If the system does not receive execution confirmation within a preset time, or if the feedback status is inconsistent with the target status, an execution failure alarm is generated, and the control status of that section is upgraded to manual review or a higher-level emergency response status.

[0064] In one implementation, the control system generates and issues operation control commands according to the following logic.

[0065] First, the system determines the upstream valve chamber, downstream valve chamber, related station, and target actuator corresponding to the valve chamber-valve chamber section or valve chamber-station section based on the spatial range of the section, and establishes the mapping relationship between the section and the actuator.

[0066] Second, the system generates section-level control schemes based on the operational control decision results. If the section decision result is "immediately stop transmission and inspect," the control scheme includes measures such as isolating the section, stopping or restricting the continued input of media, triggering the leakage emergency plan, dispatching repair teams, and conducting on-site inspections. If the section decision result is "reduced pressure operation and increased monitoring," the control scheme includes measures such as reducing pipeline operating pressure, adjusting the operating conditions of station pumps or compressors, increasing monitoring frequency, and preparing a shutdown plan. If the section decision result is "focused observation," the control scheme includes maintaining the existing operating status, increasing monitoring frequency, and generating drone inspection or manual inspection tasks. If the section decision result is "maintain routine operation," the control scheme includes maintaining the original operating conditions and continuing monitoring.

[0067] Third, the control command generation module decomposes the section-level control scheme into equipment-level control commands. For example, for the "immediately stop transmission and inspect" command, the system can generate shut-off commands to the main valves or shut-off valves of the upstream and downstream valve chambers of the target section, and generate stop or reduce transmission commands to the relevant stations; for the "reduced pressure operation, increased monitoring" command, the system can generate pressure setpoint adjustment commands to the station's pressure control equipment, pressure regulating equipment, pump or compressor control system; for the "focused observation" command, the system can generate non-valve action commands such as increasing the sampling frequency, increasing alarm threshold attention, and dispatching inspection tasks.

[0068] Fourth, the control system issues commands according to preset permission modes. For high-emergency situations where SCADA has identified a leak or IMS has identified the impact of significant fault activity, the system can directly issue emergency shutdown or section isolation commands after the safety interlock conditions are met. For non-highest-emergency situations such as reduced pressure operation or key observation, the system can generate control suggestions and issue them after confirmation by dispatch personnel, or it can issue them automatically according to the operator's preset strategy. The above permission modes can be configured by the pipeline operator according to safety management requirements.

[0069] Fifth, after receiving the control command, the RTU / PLC first performs local interlock verification. Local interlock verification includes communication status verification, valve current position verification, power source status verification, pressure boundary condition verification, upstream and downstream equipment status verification, and field safety condition verification. If the verification passes, the RTU / PLC outputs a digital, analog, or bus control signal to drive the valve actuator; if the verification fails, the RTU / PLC refuses to execute the command and returns a reason for rejection to the control system.

[0070] Sixth, after the valve actuator completes its action, it feeds back information such as valve opening degree, on / off status, execution time, fault status, and changes in pipeline pressure and flow to the control system. The control system determines whether the command was executed successfully based on the feedback information. If successful, it updates the operating status of that section; if unsuccessful, it triggers an alarm, resends the command, escalates the response, or switches to manual control mode.

[0071] Table 11. Schematic diagram of the correspondence between operating control levels and valve chamber actuator actions.

[0072] The equipment action relationships in Table 11 are an illustrative control logic. Specific actions can be adjusted according to the pipeline transport medium, station process, valve chamber configuration, operator's emergency plan, and on-site safety interlock conditions.

[0073] The key technical aspects of the implementation scheme of this application are mainly reflected in the following aspects: (1) A unified judgment framework for multiple earthquake hazards and chain disasters This application addresses the practical engineering challenges of earthquakes potentially triggering a chain reaction of multiple hazards, including fault slippage, coseismic landslides, failure of bridges / tunnels and other crossing structures, and seismic motion. It constructs a unified operational control judgment framework for multi-hazard scenarios. Specifically, by aggregating risk pile information within a section according to risk source and hazard type, and simultaneously considering risk level (confidence level) and hazard type score in the section shutdown index (SSI) calculation, it achieves unified quantification and comparability of risk information under different hazard scenarios. This enables the output of section-level operational control commands applicable to multi-hazard situations.

[0074] (2) Using the valve chamber section as the smallest operating control unit, the result can be directly executed. This application does not take the entire pipeline or a large section of pipeline as the control object, but takes the interval between valve chambers or between valve chambers and stations as the smallest evaluation and control unit, so that the post-earthquake control results can be directly mapped to the valve control and scheduling execution unit, avoiding the unnecessary impact of the coarse-grained control method of shutting down the entire line, and improving the operability of emergency response.

[0075] (3) Based on the "point-segment mapping" mechanism of risk stakes, unify the organization of spatial risk information. This application uses piles to represent spatial locations along the pipeline axis, and defines high-risk piles identified after the earthquake as "risk piles." Furthermore, risk piles are assigned to corresponding valve chamber sections according to their pile numbers, thus achieving a mapping from "point-based risk" to "section-based decision-making." This data organization mechanism provides a unified and clear data input structure for subsequent SSI calculations and hierarchical output.

[0076] (4) Multi-level risk information system and confidence ranking to improve the reliability of integrated judgment. This application categorizes risk information into four levels based on its source (SCADA stress monitoring, IMS special monitoring, quantitative model, and semi-quantitative model), and clearly ranks them from high to low confidence levels. At the same time, it introduces a "high confidence level priority" fusion rule: if high-level information has already been determined to be high-risk, it will not be repeatedly included in the results of lower levels, thereby reducing the interference of information redundancy and conflict on the judgment results and improving the robustness of the comprehensive assessment.

[0077] (5) The dual-channel mechanism of "direct trigger judgment + comprehensive index evaluation" balances speed and accuracy. This application establishes a direct triggering channel and a comprehensive assessment channel: when the first-level SCADA identifies a leak, or the second-level IMS identifies fault activity posing a significant direct threat to the pipeline, the highest-level emergency command (immediate shutdown and inspection) is directly output, and subsequent assessments of that section are terminated; if the direct shutdown conditions are not triggered, the comprehensive index assessment channel is activated, using multi-source information to calculate the SSI and output commands in a tiered manner. This mechanism ensures that confirmed high risks can be quickly addressed, while simultaneously providing a structured and quantitative assessment of potential complex risks.

[0078] (6) Based on the hierarchical weight and disaster type score of SSI construction, realize the quantitative fusion of multi-source information. This application proposes a Sectional Outage Index (SSI), which calculates the SSI by setting configurable hierarchical weight parameters for different risk information levels and configurable category score parameters for different disaster types. Combined with risk pile aggregation rules, the SSI is calculated using a comprehensive index method, thereby transforming multi-source monitoring and assessment information into a unified and comparable numerical indicator to support subsequent classification judgments and command outputs. The aforementioned hierarchical weight parameters, category score parameters, risk pile aggregation rules, and SSI classification thresholds can all be configured according to the engineering application scenario and are not limited to a fixed set of values.

[0079] (7) Introduce a landform type-differentiated threshold system to improve the scene adaptability of the classification judgment. This application introduces a differentiated decision classification system for landform types such as "mountainous / plain" in the SSI grading stage (as illustrated in Tables 8 and 9), so that the same SSI value can be matched with a more reasonable emergency level range under different landform conditions, thereby improving the applicability and generalization ability of the method under different regional geological environments and disaster characteristics.

[0080] (8) Implement a mechanism to prevent duplicate evaluations and a closed-loop output mechanism to reduce redundant calculations and ensure process standardization. This application stipulates that once a valve chamber section has been controlled by a direct trigger channel output control command, that section will no longer be included in the SSI calculation; simultaneously, the four-level warning levels (red / orange / yellow / green) of the channel output are comprehensively evaluated and correspond one-to-one with the four types of commands: "stop supply, reduce pressure, observe, and maintain" (as shown in Table 1), forming a closed-loop standardized process from data input, judgment calculation to command output (as shown in Table 1). Figure 2 This facilitates systematic deployment and project implementation.

[0081] (9) Control command conversion and feedback verification mechanism for valve chamber actuators This application not only outputs the section-level operation control level, but also further converts section-level decision results such as "immediately stop transmission and inspect, reduce pressure and increase monitoring, focus on observation, and maintain normal operation" into equipment-level control commands that can be recognized by valve chambers, stations, and related actuators. Through a control command generation module, communication interface module, RTU / PLC control terminal, and execution feedback verification module, it realizes the issuance of commands, execution of actions, and status feedback from risk assessment results to actuators such as main valves, shut-off valves, pressure regulating equipment, pumps, or compressors, thereby improving the feasibility of this application in engineering control systems.

[0082] Those skilled in the art will readily understand that the above description is merely a preferred embodiment of this application and is not intended to limit this application. Any modifications, equivalent substitutions, and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this application should be included within the protection scope of this application.

Claims

1. A method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, characterized in that, Includes the following steps: S10 uses valve chamber-valve chamber or valve chamber-station as the interval unit. After the earthquake, the pipeline pile points in each interval that are identified as high-risk are obtained as risk piles. S20, the risk piles are divided into multiple risk information levels with different confidence levels according to the source of risk information. The multiple risk information levels include risk information based on SCADA pressure monitoring, risk information based on IMS special monitoring, risk information based on quantitative model calculation, and risk information based on semi-quantitative model calculation. S30: For any section, if a pipeline leak is detected based on the risk information from SCADA pressure monitoring, or if fault activity is detected based on the risk information from IMS special monitoring and poses a significant direct threat to the pipeline, a stop command will be output directly and the processing of that section will be terminated; otherwise, S40 will be executed. S40, For this interval, based on the risk information level and disaster type of each risk pile, according to the preset disaster type score parameters and the preset aggregation rules of multiple risk piles in the same level, calculate the comprehensive risk score of each risk information level, and then according to the preset level weight parameters, sum the comprehensive risk scores of each level to obtain the interval suspension index. S50: Based on the preset grading threshold corresponding to the terrain type of the section, the calculated section stop index is mapped to the operation control level, and the operation control command corresponding to the operation control level is output.

2. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S20, the risk information levels are arranged from highest to lowest confidence as follows: The first level is based on the SCADA pressure monitoring system, which is used to monitor pipeline operating pressure and leakage. The second level is based on the IMS monitoring system, which is used for systematic monitoring of fault displacement and pipeline safety at the intersection of pipelines and faults. The third level is based on quantitative model calculations, used to calculate the comparison between the actual strain value of the pipeline after the earthquake and the safety design value of the pipeline before the earthquake. The fourth level, based on a semi-quantitative model, is used to output the semi-quantitative level assessment results of pipeline seismic damage risk.

3. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 2, characterized in that, In step S30, the specific conditions for directly outputting the stop command are: the first level has identified a leak, or the pipeline and fault monitoring system in the second level reflects that there is a great risk to the pipeline.

4. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 1, characterized in that, In step S40, the formula for calculating the section stoppage index is: In the formula, For section s The section outage index; w i For the first i Weight parameters for each risk information level; For section s In the i Comprehensive risk score under each risk information level; m represents the number of risk information levels.

5. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 4, characterized in that, The hierarchical weight parameters are configured in descending order of confidence level according to the risk information level, that is, the first-level weight parameter is greater than the second-level weight parameter, the second-level weight parameter is greater than the third-level weight parameter, and the third-level weight parameter is greater than the fourth-level weight parameter.

6. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The disaster type score parameter is configured as follows: In the first level, the score corresponding to high-intensity pressure fluctuation is 10, the score corresponding to medium-intensity pressure fluctuation is 5, and the score corresponding to low-intensity pressure or no fluctuation is 0. In the second level, the score for bridge or tunnel crossing projects is 10, the score for landslide geological disasters is 8, and the score for seismic ground motion monitoring is 5. In the third level, the score for fault sections, bridges or tunnels crossing projects is 10, the score for landslide geological hazards is 8, and the score for earthquake impact is 7. In the fourth level, the score for a fault segment is 10 for high-risk situations, the score for a bridge or tunnel crossing project is 9, the score for a landslide geological hazard is 8, and the score for the impact of ground motion is 7; the score for a fault segment is 5 for relatively high-risk situations, the score for a bridge or tunnel crossing project is 4, the score for a landslide geological hazard is 3, and the score for the impact of ground motion is 3.

7. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The preset aggregation rule for multiple risk piles within the same level is either the cumulative method or the weighted method based on the number of piles.

8. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The landform types include mountainous areas and plains; Under mountainous conditions, the preset grading thresholds are as follows: when the section outage index is greater than 3, it corresponds to immediate outage inspection; when it is greater than 2 and less than or equal to 3, it corresponds to reduced pressure operation and intensified monitoring; when it is greater than 1 and less than or equal to 2, it corresponds to key observation; and when it is less than or equal to 1, it corresponds to maintaining normal operation. Under plain conditions, the preset classification thresholds are as follows: when the section outage index is greater than 4, it corresponds to immediate outage inspection; when it is greater than 3 and less than or equal to 4, it corresponds to reduced pressure operation and intensified monitoring; when it is greater than 2 and less than or equal to 3, it corresponds to key observation; and when it is less than or equal to 2, it corresponds to maintaining normal operation.

9. The method for post-earthquake operation control of oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion as described in claim 1, characterized in that, The operation control levels include red, orange, yellow, and green, which correspond to four operation control commands: immediate shutdown and inspection, reduced-voltage operation and intensified monitoring, key observation, and maintaining normal operation, respectively. The instructions include: Immediate shutdown and inspection; issuing shutdown orders immediately, dispatching repair teams to the site, and activating the leak emergency plan; pressure reduction and enhanced monitoring instructions include reducing the pressure to 60% to 70% of the design pressure and preparing shutdown plans; key observation instructions include completing drone inspections within 24 hours and focusing on high-risk pile locations; and maintaining normal operation instructions include operating as planned and maintaining monitoring by the monitoring center.

10. A post-earthquake operation control system for oil and gas pipelines based on multi-source monitoring information fusion, characterized in that, The steps for implementing the method according to any one of claims 1 to 9 include: The multi-source data access module is used to access SCADA pressure monitoring data, IMS special monitoring data, quantitative model calculation results, semi-quantitative model evaluation results, and pipeline basic geographic information. The risk pile collection module is used to map the risk piles identified after the earthquake to the corresponding valve chamber-valve chamber section or valve chamber-station section according to the pile number attribution relationship; The section outage index calculation module is used to calculate the section outage index for each section based on the hierarchical weight parameters, disaster type score parameters, and risk pile aggregation rules. The operation control decision module is used to determine the operation control level based on the section outage index and the corresponding decision threshold; The control command generation module is used to convert the operation control level into machine-recognizable control commands. The control commands include section number, target valve chamber number, target equipment number, control level, action type, pressure setpoint, execution priority, execution time limit, verification conditions, and feedback requirements. The communication interface module is used to send control commands to the existing SCADA system of the pipeline, the dispatch control platform, the station control system or the valve chamber RTU / PLC control terminal; The valve chamber actuator control module is used to receive control signals output by the valve chamber RTU / PLC and drive the corresponding valve actuator to move. The valve actuator includes a main valve, a shut-off valve, a regulating valve, and a vent valve. The execution feedback verification module is used to receive feedback information such as valve position feedback, valve on / off status, pipeline pressure, flow rate, temperature, alarm status, and communication status, and to determine whether the control command has been successfully executed. If the system does not receive execution confirmation within a preset time, or if the feedback status is inconsistent with the target status, an execution failure alarm is generated, and the control status of that section is upgraded to manual review or a higher-level emergency response status.

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