A method, system and storage medium for generating and cross-institutional verifying a signing obligation accompanying certificate
Patent Information
- Application Number
- CN202610941287.0
- Authority / Receiving Office
- CN · China
- Patent Type
- Applications(China)
- Current Assignee / Owner
- Filing Date
- 2026-06-28
- Publication Date
- 2026-10-09
AI Technical Summary
针对现有签署凭证难以跨机构独立验证的问题,本发明提供一种签署义务随行凭证生成与跨机构验证方法、系统及存储介质
其一,签署义务随行凭证可跨机构独立离线验证,使签署结果跨机构可采信;其二,验证义务被履行/签名有效/未篡改、不依赖签发机构在线;其三,为安全义务执行证明方法 执行凭证的签署实例,与编织构成签署闭环。
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Figure CN122885975A_ABST
Abstract
Description
Technical Field
[0001] This invention relates to the fields of data security and electronic signatures, and in particular to a method, system, and storage medium for generating accompanying credentials for signing obligations and supporting cross-agency verification. Background Technology
[0002] The results of electronic signatures need to be credible to other institutions: these institutions must confirm that the signing obligation has been fulfilled and the signature is valid. If the document relies on online endorsement by the issuing institution, cross-institutional acceptance is limited.
[0003] Existing electronic signature credentials largely rely on the issuing authority, are difficult to verify independently offline by other institutions, and have limited inter-institutional recognition. Therefore, how to generate accompanying credentials containing a set of obligations and an SM2 signature, enabling them to be independently verified by other institutions, is a key issue for cross-institutional acceptance of signing results. Summary of the Invention
[0004] (a) Technical problems to be solved To address the problem that existing signing credentials are difficult to verify independently across institutions, this invention provides a method, system, and storage medium for generating and cross-institutionally verifying accompanying signing obligations credentials.
[0005] (II) Technical Solution This invention generates a signing obligation credential (including the obligation set, SM2 signature, object / subject identifier, and time) after the signing obligation is fulfilled. The credential is carried with the signing result and can be independently verified offline by other organizations using a public key (confirming that the obligation has been fulfilled / the signature is valid / has not been tampered with). The credential is a signing instance of the security obligation execution proof method, which, together with the signing obligation integrated weaving method based on the signing security ontology, forms a signing closed loop.
[0006] (III) Beneficial Effects First, the accompanying certificate of signing obligation can be independently verified offline across institutions, making the signing result credible across institutions; second, the verification of the fulfillment of the obligation / validity of the signature / unaltered status does not depend on the online presence of the issuing institution; third, it serves as an example of the signing of the certificate as proof of the execution of security obligations, forming a signing closed loop with the weaving. Attached Figure Description
[0007] Figure 1 A schematic diagram illustrating the generation and cross-agency verification of the Obligation to Sign (ODP-Sig) document.
[0008] Figure 2 A schematic diagram of the structure of the Obligation to Sign Certificate (ODP-Sig).
[0009] Figure 3 This is a schematic diagram of independent verification across institutions.
[0010] Figure 4 Flowchart for ODP-Sig generation and verification.
[0011] Figure 5 A schematic diagram illustrating the connection between the security obligation execution proof method and the integrated weaving method of signing obligations based on the signing security ontology. Detailed Implementation
[0012] The present invention will be further described in detail below with reference to the accompanying drawings, taking the generation of accompanying certificates of signing obligations and cross-institutional verification as an example.
[0013] 1. Overall Mechanism See Figure 1 Once signed, an ODP-Sig certificate containing the obligation set and SM2 signature is generated, which is carried with the signature and can be independently verified across organizations.
[0014] 2. Voucher Structure See Figure 2 ODP-Sig includes a set of signing obligations, SM2 signature, subject identifier, and time.
[0015] 3. Independent verification across institutions See Figure 3 Other institutions can independently verify and confirm that the obligation has been fulfilled, the signature is valid, and the signature has not been tampered with by using the public key.
[0016] 4. Generation and Verification Process See Figure 4 It fulfills the signing obligation, generates ODP-SIG, carries the credential with the signing, and independently verifies the public key across institutions.
[0017] 5. Integration with methods for proving the performance of security obligations and methods for weaving together signing obligations based on a security ontology. See Figure 5 ODP-Sig is a signing example of the execution certificate of the security obligation execution proof method, which, together with the signing obligation integrated weaving method based on the signing security ontology, constitutes a closed loop of signing obligation weaving → performance → proof. The above embodiments are for illustration only and not for limitation; all equivalent substitutions and improvements made within the spirit and principles of this invention should be included within the protection scope of this invention.
Claims
1. A method for generating and cross-institutionally verifying accompanying documents for signing obligations, characterized in that, include: After the signatory fulfills its signing obligation, a signing obligation accompanying certificate is generated, which includes a signing obligation set and an SM2 digital signature; The signing obligation credential is carried along with the signing result; the signing obligation credential can be independently verified by other institutions using the corresponding public key.
2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The accompanying certificate of signing obligation also includes the signatory identifier, the signatory entity identifier, and the signing time.
3. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The cross-institutional verification is performed by other institutions holding the corresponding public key, without relying on the issuing institution being online.
4. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The verification confirms that the signing obligation has been fulfilled, the SM2 signature is valid, and the certificate has not been tampered with.
5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The accompanying certificate for signing obligations supports cross-institutional mutual recognition.
6. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The accompanying certificate for signing obligations is an example of a certificate proving the performance of security obligations in a signing scenario.
7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The set of signing obligations refers to the signing obligations performed in this signing.
8. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The certificate is integrated with the signing obligation, and the weaving, performance, and certification constitute a closed loop for signing.
9. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The credentials can be verified offline.
10. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of generating and verifying the credentials will be documented.
11. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The digital signature uses the SM2 algorithm, and the credential digest uses the SM3 algorithm.
12. A system for generating and verifying accompanying documents for signing obligations, characterized in that, include: The generation module is used to generate a certificate containing the obligation set and SM2 signature after the signing obligation is fulfilled; the carrying module is used to carry the certificate with the signing result. A verification module is provided for other organizations to independently verify the information using a public key; the system is used to execute the method described in any one of claims 1 to 11.
13. A computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, characterized in that, When the computer program is executed by a processor, it implements the method of any one of claims 1 to 11.