Primary and secondary fusion integrated ring network box multi-source collaborative protection method and system

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical fields of power distribution, power supply network protection control and power distribution automation, in particular to a primary and secondary fusion integrated looped network box multi-source collaborative protection method and system. The method obtains primary side current, voltage and zero sequence measurement data, secondary side protection starting event, switch opening and closing state, communication link state and feeder topology state; performs timestamp correction and protection determination window alignment on multi-source protection data, determines the trust level according to measurement continuity, topology consistency, adjacent node event consistency and historical deviation; generates a protection setting value candidate set according to the feeder topology and power supply direction, and corrects the criterion weight, action threshold, action time limit and blocking condition of overcurrent, zero sequence, direction and backup protection according to the trust level, and outputs the protection control instruction. The present application can reduce the misoperation, refusal to operate and overstep operation caused by topology switching, communication jitter and data mismatch, and improve the protection selectivity and traceability.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the fields of power distribution, power supply network protection and control, and power distribution automation, specifically to a method and system for multi-source collaborative protection of integrated primary and secondary ring network boxes. Background Technology

[0002] Integrated ring main units (RMUs) are used for distribution network segmentation, interconnection, power transfer, and fault isolation. Their protection and control are typically achieved collaboratively by primary-side switchgear, inductance measurement circuits, secondary protection and control devices, and communication interfaces. In conventional schemes, the RMU collects data such as feeder current, voltage, zero-sequence current, switch open / close positions, and protection start signals. The secondary protection devices make judgments based on pre-set overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection settings. When the detected value reaches the action threshold and meets the delay condition, the protection device outputs trip, block, or alarm commands. For scenarios with feeder automation functions, the RMU can also upload local events to the master station or adjacent terminals. The master station or distributed logic determines the fault section based on switch positions, fault current direction, and protection action information, and then issues isolation or power transfer control commands. The technical basis of this type of scheme is fixed settings, fixed coordination levels, and pre-configured topology relationships. It is suitable for operating conditions where the power supply path is relatively stable, communication is reliable, and adjacent protection node information is consistent.

[0003] In existing integrated primary and secondary ring network enclosure multi-source collaborative protection schemes, multi-source data is typically used as auxiliary information for protection decision-making. Primary-side measurement data is used to establish protection initiation conditions, secondary-side protection events are used for action confirmation, switch status is used to determine topology connectivity, communication link status is used to determine the availability of remote information, and information transmitted from adjacent ring network enclosures is used to assist in locating faulty sections. In actual processing, various types of data generally enter the protection and control device according to a fixed sampling period or a fixed transmission period, and then the device caches and compares them according to a preset window. For topology changes, protection strategy adjustments are usually completed through manual tuning, master station reconfiguration, or switching of multiple preset settings. For data anomalies, conventional handling methods include timeout rejection, quality bit judgment, communication interruption blocking, or continuing operation according to the default protection logic. The above methods are simple to implement and easy to deploy in engineering, but the sampling time, transmission delay, anomaly behavior, and reliability are not consistent among different data sources, and fixed windows and fixed settings are difficult to reflect the real-time operating status.

[0004] The main technical problem is that existing integrated primary and secondary ring main units still use fixed protection settings and fixed data quality rules to perform protection judgments when the ring network power supply path switches, sectional switch states change, adjacent node protection events are sent concurrently, or communication links experience short-term jitter. They fail to uniformly align the time of primary-side measurement data, secondary-side protection events, switch states, communication states, and feeder topology states, and this leads to incorrect combinations of data from different sources within the same protection judgment period. If low-reliability measurement values, delayed adjacent node events, or switch states that have not yet completed topology updates are directly used to determine action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions, the protection device may identify non-faulty section disturbances as faulty sections, or determine faulty section signals as not meeting action conditions, resulting in decreased protection selectivity. The core of this problem is not the lack of measurement types, but the lack of a reliability coordination judgment mechanism for multi-source protection data that matches the real-time topology and power supply direction. Summary of the Invention

[0005] The purpose of this invention is to provide a method and system for multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box, which can effectively solve the problems mentioned in the background art.

[0006] To achieve the above objectives, the technical solution adopted by the present invention is as follows: A multi-source collaborative protection method for a primary and secondary integrated ring network enclosure includes: acquiring primary-side current, voltage and zero-sequence measurement data, secondary-side protection start events, switch opening and closing status, communication link status and feeder topology status of the primary and secondary integrated ring network enclosure to form multi-source protection data; The multi-source protection data is timestamped and the protection decision window is aligned. The reliability level of each data source is determined based on measurement continuity, topological consistency, consistency of events between adjacent nodes, and historical deviation. A set of candidate protection settings is generated based on the feeder topology and power supply direction; Based on the aforementioned confidence level, the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection are collaboratively modified, and multi-source collaborative protection control commands matching the current operating state are output.

[0007] Preferably, the multi-source protection data is timestamped and the protection decision window is aligned, including: establishing source-end time identifiers based on the generation time of the protection start event, the primary side measurement sampling time, the secondary side state change time, and the data reception time of adjacent nodes, respectively; The transmission delay distribution of each data source is determined based on the communication link status; The multi-source protection data belonging to the same protection disturbance process are mapped to the same protection determination window; For data that exceeds the protection decision window but is related to continuous changes in the switch opening and closing state, a delay association flag is set, and the timing relationship between the data and the corresponding protection start event is preserved.

[0008] Preferably, the step of determining the reliability level of each data source based on measurement continuity, topological consistency, consistency of adjacent node events, and historical deviation includes: verifying the changing trend of adjacent sampling points of the primary current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data; Verify the connection relationship between the switch open / closed state and the feeder topology state; Perform direction and timing consistency verification on the local protection start event and the protection start event sent by the adjacent ring network box; Compare the current measurement deviation with the historical deviation range under the same operating conditions; The results of each verification are merged into a sequence of confidence levels for use in the correction of protection criteria.

[0009] Preferably, a set of candidate protection settings is generated based on the feeder topology and power supply direction, including: identifying single-sided power supply, interconnection transfer, segmented operation, and ring network standby operation modes based on the switch opening and closing status; Based on the identified operating mode, determine the possible flow direction of the fault current and the direction of protection coordination; Select a combination of overcurrent, zero-sequence, directional, and backup protection settings from the preset setting range that matches the protection coordination direction; For data segments with adjacent node protection activation events, apply collaborative blocking constraints to form a candidate set of protection settings corresponding to the current topology.

[0010] Preferably, determining the transmission delay distribution of each data source based on the communication link status includes: determining the delay fluctuation range based on the arrival interval of continuously uploaded messages from the same data source, the continuity of message sequence numbers, and the link retransmission identifier. Match the delay fluctuation range with the protection determination window; Set a temporary decision flag for data located at the boundary of the delay fluctuation range; When the supplementary data corresponding to the postponement determination identifier is received in the subsequent protection determination window, the supplementary data is backfilled into the original protection disturbance process according to the source end time identifier, and the time sequence arrangement of the multi-source protection data is updated.

[0011] Preferably, the step of verifying the direction and timing consistency between the local protection start event and the protection start event sent by the adjacent ring network box includes: extracting the direction of local current change, the direction of zero-sequence component change, and the protection start type of adjacent nodes; The electrical adjacency relationship between the local node and its neighboring nodes is determined based on the feeder topology. Generate an event consistency constraint chain according to the described electrical adjacency relationship; Data sources that do not satisfy the event consistency constraint chain are marked as conflicting data sources; The trust level of the conflicting data source is reduced, and its participation in the action threshold adjustment is restricted in the protection criterion modification.

[0012] Preferably, the step of merging the various verification results into a confidence level sequence for participating in the correction of protection criteria includes: establishing a sub-item confidence state for the measurement continuity verification result, topology consistency verification result, adjacent node event consistency verification result, and historical deviation comparison result; The order in which the trusted states of each item are generated is based on the data source type and the current operating mode. When any sub-item trust state conflicts with other sub-item trust states, the primary trust state and the secondary trust state are determined according to the combination order. The primary and secondary trust states are mapped to three trust levels: high trust, available with reduced weight, and isolated.

[0013] Preferably, the step of adding cooperative locking constraints to data segments with adjacent node protection start events includes: identifying the upstream node, downstream node, and connecting node corresponding to the adjacent node protection start events; The sequential action relationship between local protection and adjacent node protection is determined based on the protection coordination direction. In the set of candidate protection settings, configure backup protection delay constraints and directional protection blocking constraints for non-boundary nodes; Reserve operating conditions for boundary nodes that are consistent with the possible direction of fault current flow; The set of values ​​that do not satisfy the sequential action relationship will be removed from the protection set of candidates.

[0014] Preferably, the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection are collaboratively modified according to the aforementioned trust level, including: using the protection criterion corresponding to the high-trust data source as the primary criterion; Use the protection criteria corresponding to the available downweighted data sources as auxiliary criteria; Exclude the protection criteria corresponding to isolated data sources from the action threshold modification; Perform upper and lower level protection time limit coordination verification and direction consistency verification on the protection setting candidate set; The verified setpoint combination is converted into the multi-source collaborative protection control command.

[0015] A multi-source collaborative protection system for a primary and secondary integrated ring network enclosure includes a processor and a memory. The memory stores a computer program that can be executed by the processor. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it acquires the primary side current, voltage and zero-sequence measurement data, secondary side protection start events, switch opening and closing status, communication link status and feeder topology status of the primary and secondary integrated ring network enclosure, and forms multi-source protection data. The multi-source protection data is timestamped and the protection decision window is aligned. The reliability level of each data source is determined based on measurement continuity, topological consistency, consistency of events between adjacent nodes, and historical deviation. A set of candidate protection settings is generated based on the feeder topology and power supply direction; Based on the aforementioned confidence level, the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection are collaboratively modified, and multi-source collaborative protection control commands matching the current operating state are output.

[0016] Compared with the prior art, the beneficial effects of the present invention are as follows: 1. By performing timestamp correction and protection decision window alignment on primary-side current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data, secondary-side protection activation events, switch opening and closing status, communication link status, and feeder topology status, data belonging to the same fault disturbance process can participate in the judgment under a unified time sequence, reducing data mismatch caused by sampling period differences and transmission delays. By determining the data source reliability level through measurement continuity, topology consistency, adjacent node event consistency, and historical deviation, high-reliability data, usable deweighted data, and data that should be isolated can be distinguished, preventing low-reliability data from participating in protection action threshold and action time limit correction with equal weight. By combining feeder topology status and power supply direction to generate a protection setting candidate set, and by collaboratively correcting the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection, protection control commands can be kept consistent with the current operating mode. This processing logic directly addresses the protection selectivity degradation caused by fixed settings and fixed quality rules, ensuring that protection judgments are based on the joint constraints of multi-source data reliability and real-time topology relationships.

[0017] 2. Regarding secondary technical effects, the delay fluctuation range, the postponement judgment mark, and the supplementary data backfilling process enable delayed data caused by short-term jitter in the communication link to be re-integrated into the original protection disturbance process according to the source end time mark, reducing the loss of protection information caused by simple timeout rejection. Event consistency constraint chains, conflict data source marking, and trust level downgrading processing enable verification between local protection start events and adjacent ring network box protection start events according to electrical adjacency relationships, reducing the impact of single-point abnormal data on protection setting correction. Operating mode identification, protection coordination direction determination, and collaborative blocking constraint processing enable protection setting combinations under single-sided power supply, interconnected power transfer, segmented operation, and ring network standby states to be filtered according to topological relationships. Performing upper and lower level protection time limit coordination verification and direction consistency verification on candidate setting combinations before forming control commands can reduce the number of setting combinations that do not conform to coordination relationships entering the actual control process, enhancing the traceability of event recording, fault review, and subsequent parameter correction. Attached Figure Description

[0018] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the overall process of multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box according to the present invention. Figure 2 This is a flowchart of the multi-source protection data timestamp correction, protection determination window attribution, delay association identifier setting, and supplementary data backfilling process of the present invention; Figure 3 The flowchart illustrates the generation of multi-source data trust levels, conflict identification, determination of primary and secondary trust status, and protection criteria of this invention. Figure 4 The flowchart for identifying the operating mode, generating the candidate set of protection values, adding collaborative locking constraints, and verifying the candidate value combination of the present invention is as follows: Figure 5 This is a flowchart illustrating the data processing pipeline and record write-back process of the processor executing a computer program in memory according to the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0019] The technical solutions of the embodiments of the present invention will be clearly and completely described below with reference to the accompanying drawings. Obviously, the described embodiments are only some, not all, of the embodiments of the present invention. Based on the embodiments of the present invention, all other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art without creative effort are within the scope of protection of the present invention.

[0020] Please refer to Figure 1This embodiment provides a method and system for multi-source coordinated protection of integrated primary and secondary ring main units (RMUs). The method is applied to the protection and control processing of RMUs in distribution networks. The processed objects include primary-side current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data; secondary-side protection activation events; switch opening and closing status; communication link status; and feeder topology status. Primary-side current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data characterize the electrical quantities of the feeder operation. Secondary-side protection activation events characterize the activation status of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection. Switch opening and closing status determines the conduction relationship between the node where the RMU is located and adjacent feeder nodes. Communication link status describes the availability of data transmission between local and adjacent RMUs. Feeder topology status determines the current power supply path and protection coordination direction. After the above data enters the same protection processing flow, a multi-source protection data cache is first formed, and then categorized according to source time, reception time, and event type. For data belonging to the same disturbance process, a protection decision window is used for time alignment. For data from different sources with different delays, the receiving order is not directly used in the protection decision; instead, corrections are made based on the source timestamp and communication link status. Through this processing method, the data used for protection decision-making is no longer limited to a single current or a single protection start signal, but is composed of electrical quantities, protection events, switch states, communication states, and topology states, reflecting the operating status of the integrated primary and secondary ring network enclosure under the current power supply mode. The advantage of this embodiment is that it unifies the originally scattered protection data onto a single decision basis, reducing protection logic mismatches caused by inconsistent data arrival order.

[0021] In this embodiment, reference Figure 2 Timestamp correction for multi-source protection data is based on the protection disturbance reference time. The protection disturbance reference time can be selected as the source time of the local protection activation event or the source time when the primary current surge first exceeds the activation condition. When data from a certain data source arrives at the processing flow, its source sampling time, reception time, and corresponding communication link status are recorded. For data from adjacent ring network boxes, if the communication link status indicates retransmission, buffering, or abnormal arrival intervals, it is not directly included in the current protection judgment window based on the reception time, but is corrected based on the link delay estimate. The time correction amount is calculated according to the following formula:

[0022] in, This represents the correction time deviation of the i-th type of data source relative to the protection disturbance reference time. This represents the source time carried by the i-th type of data source. This represents the estimated transmission delay obtained based on the communication link status. This indicates the reference time for protection disturbances. Its physical meaning is to eliminate the direction of data advance or lag, retaining only the magnitude of the time deviation. For example, it represents the source time of the protection activation event of an adjacent ring main unit. The estimated transmission delay is 100.012 seconds. The local protection disturbance reference time is 0.006 seconds. If it is 100.020 seconds, then A value of 0.002 seconds indicates that the event, after delay correction, falls within the same short-time variation range as the local disturbance process. If another data source is calculated... If the data significantly exceeds the current protection decision window, it is saved as delayed associated data and does not directly participate in the current action threshold correction. The advantage of this embodiment is that protection decisions no longer rely solely on the order of reception, thus preserving the true timing relationship between different data sources.

[0023] In one embodiment, the protection decision window adopts a dynamic window structure. For local primary-side measurement data, the data is continuously entered into the window according to the sampling sequence; for secondary-side protection initiation events, the data is entered into the window according to the event trigger time; for switch opening and closing states, the data is entered into the window according to the change time and the stable state before and after the change; for communication link states, the data is entered into the window according to message continuity, reception interval, and retransmission flag; for feeder topology states, the data is determined jointly by the most recent topology confirmation result and the current switch state change. The protection decision window is not a fixed reception buffer, but is formed by expanding forward and backward from the disturbance reference time. The forward expansion is used to retain the load baseline and voltage baseline before the disturbance occurs, and the backward expansion is used to receive delayed events and switch state feedback from adjacent nodes. If a piece of data has exceeded the current window when it is received, but its source time is within the window after correction, the data is backfilled into the corresponding disturbance process; if the source time does not match the window, but is associated with continuous switch changes, a delay association flag is set so that it enters the subsequent review process instead of being directly discarded. This window processing logic ensures that the data used by overcurrent, zero-sequence, direction, and backup protection maintains the same time basis. The advantage of this embodiment is that it can reduce the sensitivity of a fixed time window to communication jitter and the lateness of adjacent events.

[0024] Table 1 shows the classification method of multi-source protection data in this embodiment. The processing attributes listed in Table 1 are used to explain the differences in processing after different data enter the protection judgment process. In actual implementation, corresponding fields can be established according to the data dictionary of the ring network box protection and control software, without requiring changes to the structure of the primary and secondary integrated ring network box.

[0025] Table 1. Classification method of multi-source protection data in this embodiment.

[0026] In one embodiment, reference Figure 3 The determination of the reliability level is composed of measurement continuity, topology consistency, adjacent node event consistency, and historical deviation. Measurement continuity is used to determine whether the current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data show a trend consistent with the fault disturbance along the time series. Topology consistency is used to determine whether the switch opening and closing status is consistent with the connection relationship recorded in the feeder topology. Adjacent node event consistency is used to determine whether the local protection start event and the protection start event sent to the adjacent ring network box meet the electrical adjacency constraints in terms of direction, timing, and start type. Historical deviation is used to determine the degree of deviation between the current measurement value and the historical stable operating range under the same operating mode. The verification results are not directly binarized, but are converted into reliable state values ​​of the same dimension, and then form a reliability level sequence. The reliability level sequence is generated according to the data source, which can be a local current measurement source, a local voltage measurement source, a local zero-sequence measurement source, a local protection event source, a switch status source, a communication status source, an adjacent node event source, and a topology status source. Each data source corresponds to a reliability level within the current protection judgment window. The advantage of this embodiment is that it can process abnormal data, late data, and data that does not match the topology in a hierarchical manner, avoiding the complete rejection or complete acceptance of all data.

[0027] In this embodiment, the trust level fusion calculation is performed according to the following formula:

[0028] in, This represents the overall confidence value of the i-th type of data source; Indicates the measurement of continuous state value. Indicates the topology consistency state value. This indicates the consistency status value of events between adjacent nodes. Indicates historical deviation state values; , , , These represent the fusion weights for the corresponding verification items, where each fusion weight is a non-negative number and their sum is 1. Physically, This indicates the reliability of the data source within the current protection decision window for modifying protection criteria. For example, a current measurement source... It is 0.90. It is 0.80. It is 0.70. The fusion weight is 0.85. , , , If the values ​​are 0.35, 0.25, 0.20, and 0.20 respectively, then... The value is 0.8275. If the event source of another adjacent node within the same window... Even with strong measurement correlations, a low reliability level can lead to a downgrade to a usable, weighted, or isolated level due to insufficient event consistency. The advantage of this embodiment is that the reliability level is not determined by a single quality factor, but rather by a combination of electrical quantities, topology, events, and historical operating conditions.

[0029] In one embodiment, the three trust levels—high trust, availability downweighted, and isolation—are determined jointly based on a comprehensive trust value and conflict status. When When the data source is within a high-confidence range and there are no topological conflicts, event direction conflicts, or timing conflicts, it corresponds to a high-confidence level; when When the data source is in the middle range, or when there is a slight time skew that can be explained by communication delays, a reduced weighting level is available; when When the data source has a low isolation level, or when there are topology conflicts, direction conflicts, or protection initiation type conflicts that cannot be explained by delay, the corresponding isolation level is determined. Protection criteria corresponding to high-reliability data sources can be used as primary criteria to participate in the correction of action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions; protection criteria corresponding to usable deweighted data sources are only used as auxiliary criteria to supplement consistency; isolated data sources do not participate in action threshold correction and are only retained in the event log. For contradictory data sources within the same protection decision window, a combination order is formed according to the data source type and current operating mode. For example, in a scenario where the topology has just switched but the switch status has been confirmed, the switch status source and the topology status source are prioritized for updating the power supply direction; in a scenario where there is jitter in the communication link, the local primary side measurement source takes precedence over adjacent event sources that arrive late. The advantage of this embodiment is that it can form an executable decision order when data conflicts occur, avoiding repeated switching of protection logic between multiple mutually exclusive conclusions.

[0030] Table 2 shows the correspondence between trust levels and protection criterion participation methods. Table 2 illustrates how the protection and control software performs layered processing on different data sources before generating control commands.

[0031] Table 2. Correspondence between Trust Level and Protection Criterion Participation Method

[0032] In one embodiment, reference Figure 4The feeder topology and power supply direction are used to generate a candidate set of protection settings. The topology consists of the ring main unit's own switch opening / closing status, the connection relationship between adjacent nodes, and the power supply path. When the switch opening / closing status changes, the protection and control software does not directly call the fixed settings, but first identifies the current operating mode. Operating modes include single-sided power supply, interconnection transfer, segmented operation, and ring main unit standby, all of which are related to the coordination of the ring main unit's protection. After identifying the operating mode, the system determines the possible direction of the fault current based on the power supply direction, and then determines the coordination direction between the local protection and the protection of adjacent nodes. The candidate set of settings comes from a preset setting domain, which includes optional combinations of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection. The system filters the preset setting domain based on the current topology, power supply direction, and protection events of adjacent nodes, deleting setting combinations that are inconsistent with the protection coordination direction, and adding cooperative blocking constraints to data segments with adjacent node protection start events. This candidate set is not simply a switching of multiple sets of settings, but rather a verifiable set of protection strategies formed under real-time topology constraints. The advantage of this embodiment is that the protection setting selection changes synchronously with the power supply path and the status of adjacent nodes, reducing the adaptation deviation of fixed settings during power transfer or segmented operation.

[0033] In this embodiment, the topology candidate matching value is calculated jointly based on node connection relationships, power supply direction, and protection direction:

[0034] in, This represents the matching value of the k-th candidate topology path; This represents the set of node connection edges contained in the k-th candidate topology path; u and v represent adjacent ring network boxes or feeder nodes; This indicates the switch connection state between node u and node v, with 1 for on and 0 for off. This indicates whether the power supply direction of the connected edge is consistent with the current topology inference direction; 1 indicates consistency, and 0 indicates inconsistency. This indicates whether the protection coordination direction corresponding to the connection edge matches the candidate set value combination; a value of 1 indicates a match, and a value of 0 indicates a mismatch. Physically, The larger the value, the more connecting edges in the candidate topology path satisfy the triple constraints of conduction, power supply direction, and protection direction. For example, if a candidate path contains 3 connecting edges, all 3 are conducting, 2 of them have directions consistent with protection, and 1 does not have a direction consistent with protection, then... The value is 2; another candidate path contains two connecting edges, both of which satisfy the triple constraint, then... The value is 2. Further selection will require consideration of trust level and protection timeframe, and should not be based solely on... The final control command is determined separately. The advantage of this embodiment is that topology screening is constrained by connection status, power supply direction, and protection coordination, avoiding the need to rely solely on the switch open / closed position to determine the operating mode.

[0035] In a preferred embodiment, the communication link status is used to calculate the delay fluctuation range. The protection and control software continuously records the arrival interval, message sequence number continuity, and retransmission flag of consecutively transmitted messages from the same data source. If the message sequence number is continuous and the arrival interval is stable, the delay fluctuation range of the data source is narrow; if there is a sequence number jump, duplicate message, retransmission flag, or short-term interruption, the delay fluctuation range of the data source widens. For data falling within the boundary of the delay fluctuation range, a deferred judgment flag is set, and it is not immediately used as the main criterion for action threshold correction. When the subsequent protection judgment window receives the corresponding supplementary data, the supplementary data is backfilled into the original protection disturbance process according to the source end time flag, and the timing arrangement of multi-source protection data is updated. The backfilling process only changes the data's attribution in the disturbance process and does not change the already formed event records. If the supplementary data confirms that there are missing events in the original judgment window, it is written into the protection process record as a review basis. The advantage of this embodiment is that short-term communication jitter is not simply equated with data unavailability, and late data can participate in subsequent review and reliability level updates after timing correction.

[0036] In this embodiment, the delay fluctuation boundary is calculated according to the following formula:

[0037] in, This represents the latency fluctuation boundary of the i-th type of data source; This indicates the average transmission latency of the data source under similar recent operating conditions; This indicates the degree of dispersion in the transmission delay of the data source; This represents the fluctuation coefficient corresponding to the state of the communication link. Physically, This is used to determine whether a data arrival delay can still be considered a reasonable delay within the same protection disturbance process. For example, the event source of a neighboring node... It takes 0.012 seconds. It takes 0.004 seconds. If it is 2, then The timeframe is 0.020 seconds. If a supplementary event is 0.015 seconds late relative to the protection decision window boundary, a delayed decision flag can be set and the event can wait for backfilling; if it is 0.050 seconds late, it will be recorded as abnormal data instead of participating in the current protection setting correction. The advantage of this embodiment is that the processing of late data has a calculable boundary, and the protection measurement and control software can handle both link stability and link jitter scenarios according to the same logic.

[0038] In a preferred embodiment, the adjacent node event consistency verification is based on the electrical adjacency relationship between the local node and adjacent nodes. The protection and control software extracts event vectors from the local current mutation direction, the zero-sequence component change direction, and the adjacent node protection activation type. The current mutation direction represents the directional change of the fault disturbance current at the local node, the zero-sequence component change direction represents the directional characteristics of grounding disturbances, and the protection activation type indicates whether the adjacent node has activated overcurrent, zero-sequence, directional, or backup protection. Subsequently, based on the feeder topology, it is determined whether there is a conductive connection between the local node and the adjacent node, whether the connection direction is consistent with the current power supply direction, and whether the protection activation sequence of the two nodes conforms to the fault propagation sequence. If the local node determines that the fault current points downstream, but the adjacent downstream node does not have a corresponding disturbance, and the communication link is normal, then the adjacent node event is inconsistent with the local event in direction. If the adjacent node event is late but the source time matches the local disturbance process, it is processed as delayed data and not directly marked as a conflict. The advantage of this embodiment is that the event consistency verification can distinguish between real directional conflicts and apparent conflicts caused by communication delays.

[0039] In this embodiment, the event consistency constraint chain is formed through three types of decision variables: direction, timing, and initiation type.

[0040] in, This indicates the consistency of events between local node a and its neighboring node b; This indicates whether the fault direction between local node a and its neighboring node b conforms to the topological constraints; a value of 1 indicates conformity, and a value of 0 indicates non-conformity. This indicates whether the event source times of the two nodes conform to the fault propagation sequence; a value of 1 indicates conformity, and a value of 0 indicates non-conformity. This indicates whether the protection activation type of the two nodes is compatible with the same disturbance process; 1 indicates compatibility and 0 indicates incompatibility. When either judgment value is 0... The value is 0. For example, if local node a detects a downstream overcurrent initiation, and its neighboring node b, located downstream, sends an overcurrent initiation event upstream, with the source node's event occurring later than local node a but within the same disturbance process, then... , , Both are 1. The value is 1; if the adjacent node b is upstream but its direction indicator is opposite to the fault direction shown by the local node a, then =0, The value is 0. The advantage of this embodiment is that conflicting data sources can be identified by explicit direction, timing, and type constraints, avoiding a rough judgment based solely on whether an event occurs.

[0041] In a preferred embodiment, the handling of conflicting data sources employs a combination of degradation and participation restriction. When the protection and control software determines that a data source does not meet the event consistency constraint chain, it does not immediately delete the data. Instead, it first determines, based on the communication link status, whether the conflict might be caused by delay, retransmission, or window mismatch. If the communication link status shows normal, and the source time, direction, and protection initiation type do not match the local disturbance process, the data source is marked as a conflicting data source and downgraded to the isolation level. If the communication link status shows a short-term anomaly, and the conflict is mainly manifested as timing offset, the data source is marked as a usable downgraded level, and its participation in action threshold adjustment is restricted. For usable downgraded data sources, their measurement trends or event types can be used to assist in confirming the existence of disturbances, but they must not trigger tripping or unlocking on their own. For isolated data sources, their content is only written to abnormal data records for subsequent review and does not enter the set of setting candidates for screening. The advantage of this embodiment is that abnormal information is retained without interfering with the current protection control, and the protection criterion correction can maintain clear data boundaries.

[0042] In a preferred embodiment, the trust level sequence is formed by combining sub-trust states. Measurement continuity verification results, topology consistency verification results, adjacent node event consistency verification results, and historical deviation comparison results respectively form sub-trust states. The protection and control software generates the combination order of sub-trust states based on the data source type and the current operating mode. In single-side power supply mode, the continuity of local primary current and zero-sequence measurement data is prioritized for identifying fault disturbances; in interconnected power supply mode, switch opening / closing status and topology consistency are prioritized for confirming the power supply direction; in segmented operation mode, adjacent node event consistency is used to limit the actions of non-boundary nodes; in ring network standby mode, historical deviation status is used to identify load baseline changes caused by standby paths. When any sub-trust state conflicts with other sub-trust states, the primary trust state and secondary trust state are determined according to the combination order. The primary trust state determines the highest availability level of the data source, and the secondary trust state determines whether to downgrade or isolate it. The advantage of this embodiment is that the trust level adjusts with changes in the operating mode, and it does not treat all scenarios with a fixed data source priority.

[0043] In a preferred embodiment, the cooperative blocking constraint is used to constrain the data segments corresponding to the protection start events of adjacent nodes. The protection and control software identifies the upstream node, downstream node, and tie node corresponding to the protection start events of adjacent nodes. The upstream node is used to determine whether the local node is on the fault current source side, the downstream node is used to determine whether the local node is on the fault current flow direction side, and the tie node is used to determine whether the power supply path passes through the backup connection. After the protection coordination direction is determined, a sequential action relationship is established between the local protection and the protection of adjacent nodes. For non-boundary nodes, the protection and control software configures backup protection delay constraints and directional protection blocking constraints in the setting candidate set; for fault section boundary nodes, the action conditions consistent with the possible flow direction of the fault current are retained. If a certain setting combination requires the non-boundary node to act earlier than the boundary node, or requires the directional protection to open when it is inconsistent with the fault flow direction, it is deleted from the candidate set. The advantage of this embodiment is that the blocking is not a fixed master-slave relationship, but is generated according to the current topology and adjacent events, and can be updated as the power supply path changes.

[0044] Table 3 illustrates the processing methods for different constraints in the candidate set of setpoints. This table explains how the protection and control software transforms topology, direction, and adjacent events into screening criteria for candidate setpoint combinations.

[0045] Table 3. Handling methods for different constraints in the candidate set of fixed values

[0046] In a preferred embodiment, the coordinated correction of protection criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions is performed based on a set of candidate settings, with the protection criterion corresponding to a high-reliability data source serving as the primary criterion in the correction. For example, when the local current measurement source is high-reliability and the directional protection is consistent with the topology power supply direction, the overcurrent protection candidate settings and the directional protection candidate settings can both enter the verification process. Protection criterions corresponding to deweighted data sources can be used as auxiliary criters, only to confirm whether the disturbance trend is consistent with the primary criterion, and cannot independently change the action threshold. Protection criters corresponding to isolated data sources are excluded from action threshold correction. Before candidate setting combinations enter the output process, they need to undergo upper and lower level protection time limit coordination verification and directional consistency verification. Time limit coordination verification is used to exclude combinations where non-boundary nodes act earlier than boundary nodes, and directional consistency verification is used to exclude combinations where the fault current may flow in the opposite direction. Verified setting combinations are converted into multi-source coordinated protection control commands, and the setting adjustment reason, reliability level change, participating data source, and blocking conditions are written into the commands. The advantage of this embodiment is that the control commands are formed by reliable data and topology constraints, and the output process has traceable intermediate evidence.

[0047] In this embodiment, the comprehensive cost of candidate setpoint combinations is calculated according to the following formula, and candidate combinations with smaller comprehensive costs and passing the verification are selected to enter the control command generation process:

[0048] in, This represents the total cost of the k-th candidate fixed value combination; This indicates the deviation between the action threshold and the current measurement state. This indicates deviations in the coordination of action time limits between superiors and subordinates; Indicates a conflicting term in the locking condition; This represents the trusted aggregate value of the data source associated with the k-th candidate value combination; , , , These represent the cost weights for each item, with each weight being a non-negative number and summing to 1. For example, consider a candidate combination... It is 0.20. It is 0.10. =0, It is 0.85. , , , If the values ​​are 0.35, 0.25, 0.25, and 0.15 respectively, then... The value is 0.1175. If the threshold for another candidate combination deviates slightly but... A value of 1 indicates the existence of a locking conflict, which increases the overall cost and leads to its removal during locking verification. The advantage of this embodiment is that the selection of candidate combinations is simultaneously constrained by measurement status, timing constraints, locking conditions, and data reliability, avoiding the output of control commands based solely on a single threshold value.

[0049] In a preferred embodiment, historical deviation comparison is used to assist in determining the reliability level. The protection and control software establishes historical operating segments according to the operating mode. These historical operating segments include current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement baselines and protection start-up records under single-sided power supply, interconnected power transfer, segmented operation, and ring network standby states. After the current protection judgment window enters the processing flow, the current measurement change is compared with the historical deviation range under the same operating mode. If the current current increment, voltage drop, or zero-sequence change matches the trend of similar disturbances in the history, the historical deviation state value remains high. If the current measurement change differs significantly from the baseline under the same operating mode, but the topology and adjacent events support the existence of a fault disturbance, the historical deviation state is only used as a secondary reliability state and cannot negate the primary criterion. Historical deviation comparison is not used to replace the protection start-up criterion, but only to correct the data source reliability level. This process can avoid historical load fluctuations being mistaken for faults and also avoid suppressing real fault disturbances due to insufficient historical samples. The advantage of this embodiment is that historical data is limited to the reliability level verification range and does not directly determine tripping or blocking control.

[0050] In a preferred embodiment, the operation mode identification is jointly completed through the switch open / closed status and the feeder topology status. When the ring main unit is in a single-side power supply state, the protection and control software identifies the only power source side and the load side, and the directional protection coordination direction is based on the power source side to the load side. When in a tie-to-supply state, the protection and control software determines the new power source based on the tie switch's closed position and the original power supply path switch status, and recalculates the upstream and downstream relationships of the local node in the topology. When in a segmented operation state, the protection and control software divides adjacent protection ranges based on the segment switch status to avoid incorrect coordination caused by crossing disconnected segments. When in a ring main standby state, the protection and control software retains standby path information, but does not include non-conductive paths as fault current channels in the candidate setting selection. Whenever the switch status changes, the operation mode identification result is written into the protection judgment window along with the change time of the same source end, and triggers the regeneration of the setting candidate set. The advantage of this embodiment is that the protection strategy adjustment follows the topology change, rather than relying on manual switching or fixed operation mode assumptions.

[0051] In a preferred embodiment, the multi-source collaborative protection control instructions include protection action activation, protection action blocking, action time limit adjustment, candidate setting activation, and event log writing. Protection action activation is generated only when the main criterion meets the action condition, direction consistency is achieved, and the blocking condition is not triggered. Protection action blocking is generated when an adjacent node is identified as the boundary of the fault section and the local node is a non-boundary node. Action time limit adjustment is generated when the local node is in a backup protection relationship or when there is an available reduced-weight data source; it is used to extend or maintain the action time limit without shortening it with reduced-weight data. Candidate setting activation is generated after the setting combination passes topology conduction, power supply direction, adjacent events, time limit coordination, and data reliability constraints. Event log writing includes the data source participating in the judgment, reliability level, time correction result, candidate setting screening result, and output instruction. All of the above instructions are generated by the protection measurement and control software according to the same protection disturbance process and are associated with the source-end time identifier. The advantage of this embodiment is that the output instruction is consistent with the intermediate judgment data, allowing the protection decision chain to be restored during fault review.

[0052] In a preferred embodiment, the protection process record is used for subsequent parameter correction. After each protection start-up, protection lockout, setting candidate screening, or control command output, the protection measurement and control software writes the time alignment result, reliability level sequence, conflicting data sources, topology matching value, candidate setting combination, and final output result of this disturbance process into the recording area. If subsequent manual review or master station confirmation confirms that the faulty section is consistent with the local judgment, the disturbance process can be used as a historical sample under the same operating mode; if the review result shows an anomaly in a certain data source, the historical deviation state value of that data source under the same communication link state or the same operating mode is corrected. The recording area does not change the completed protection actions; it is only used for reliability level fusion and delay fluctuation calculation in subsequent protection judgment windows. This processing method allows the protection measurement and control software to improve reliability level judgment using the operation record without allowing historical data to bypass topology and protection coordination verification. The advantage of this embodiment is that the protection strategy has a traceable data source and can reduce the impact of repeated abnormal data on the judgment process in subsequent operations.

[0053] In one embodiment, reference Figure 5The integrated primary and secondary ring network enclosure multi-source collaborative protection system includes a processor and a memory. The memory stores computer programs that can be executed by the processor. When the computer program is executed by the processor, it completes the acquisition of multi-source protection data, timestamp correction, protection decision window alignment, reliability level determination, generation of protection setting candidate set, criterion weight correction, action threshold correction, action time limit correction, blocking condition correction, and output of multi-source collaborative protection control commands. The multi-source protection data acquisition program segment reads primary side current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data from the local protection measurement and control data area, secondary side protection start events from the event data area, switch open / close status from the status data area, communication link status from the communication data area, and feeder topology status from the topology data area. The time correction program segment forms a protection decision window based on the source time, reception time, and delay estimate. The reliability level program segment generates a reliability level sequence based on measurement continuity, topology consistency, adjacent node event consistency, and historical deviation. The candidate set program segment filters setting combinations based on feeder topology status and power supply direction. The control output program segment generates protection control commands based on the reliability level and candidate combinations. The advantage of this embodiment is that the method processing logic can be implemented by a processor executing a computer program, which is convenient for deployment in the integrated primary and secondary ring network box protection and control software.

[0054] In this embodiment, the computer program in the memory can be organized according to a data processing pipeline. The data access program segment is responsible for adding a unified event identifier to data from different data areas. The event identifier includes the disturbance reference time, data source type, source time, and reception time. The timing processing program segment is responsible for performing timestamp correction and window attribution judgment. The credibility judgment program segment is responsible for calling the verification rules for measurement continuity, topology consistency, adjacent node event consistency, and historical deviation, and converting the sub-item results into high credibility, availability downweighting, and isolation levels. The topology processing program segment is responsible for updating the current conduction connection relationship and power supply direction according to the switch opening and closing status. The setting value processing program segment is responsible for forming a candidate set from the preset setting value domain and attaching cooperative blocking constraints to the corresponding candidate combinations. The output program segment is responsible for converting the candidate combinations that pass the verification into protection action opening, protection action blocking, action time limit adjustment, or candidate setting value activation instructions. The recording program segment is responsible for saving the intermediate data of this disturbance process. The advantage of this embodiment is that data is transmitted between the various processing program segments through a unified event identifier, reducing the inconsistency of states between different processing logics.

[0055] In a preferred embodiment, the processor performs a correlation cache on the time correction results and the confidence level results when executing the computer program. The correlation cache uses the disturbance reference time as an index to store the source time, correction time deviation, confidence level, existence of conflicts, and participation in the setting candidate selection for each type of data source during the same disturbance process. If a postponement flag still exists at the end of the protection decision window, the processor retains the correlation cache for that disturbance process until supplementary data arrives or the cache review conditions expire. After the supplementary data arrives, the processor backfills it into the corresponding disturbance process based on the source time flag, updating the confidence level sequence and event records. If the corresponding control command has already been output when the supplementary data arrives, the supplementary data does not change the already output command; it only serves as a review record and a basis for subsequent parameter correction. This caching process avoids late data overwriting the current control results and also avoids record breaks caused by directly deleting late data. The advantage of this embodiment is that real-time protection control and post-event review data have clear boundaries.

[0056] In a preferred embodiment, the protection and control software employs interpretable filtering records when deleting or retaining candidate setting combinations. Each candidate combination is assigned a candidate identifier, which is associated with overcurrent protection settings, zero-sequence protection settings, directional protection settings, backup protection settings, blocking conditions, and the corresponding power supply direction. When the processor performs topology continuity verification on candidate combinations, it marks those not on the conduction path as topology mismatches; when performing power supply direction verification, it marks those with protection directions opposite to the possible flow of fault current as directional mismatches; when performing adjacent event verification, it marks those with violations of sequential action relationships as cooperative mismatches; and when performing reliability level verification, it marks those with actions relying on isolated data sources to complete action threshold corrections as data mismatches. Only candidate combinations not deleted by the above markings are included in the comprehensive cost calculation. The advantage of this embodiment is that there are corresponding judgment criteria for both the deletion and retention of setting combinations, facilitating the review of protection events.

[0057] In a preferred embodiment, the protection and control software performs a consistency check on the timing coordination of upper and lower level protection before outputting multi-source collaborative protection control commands. The check targets the sequential relationship of actions between the local ring network box and adjacent upstream nodes, adjacent downstream nodes, and interconnecting nodes. The processor determines whether the local node is located at the boundary of a candidate fault section based on the topology status. If the local node is a boundary node and the fault direction is consistent, the local action opening condition is retained; if the local node is a non-boundary node and a high-reliability protection start event already exists at an adjacent boundary node, a delay constraint or blocking constraint is set for the local backup protection. For scenarios where adjacent node communication is abnormal but local electrical quantities are highly reliable, the processor retains the backup action condition of the local protection, while not using the absence of adjacent events as the sole basis for opening directional protection. This processing can maintain the protection boundary when adjacent data is missing, while avoiding unconditional blocking caused by communication abnormalities. The advantage of this embodiment is that the coordination of upper and lower level protection is constrained by topology, direction, and reliability level, making it suitable for scenarios with changing power supply paths.

[0058] In a preferred embodiment, the system only provides protection process records and verification information for the human-machine interface display, and does not consider ordinary data display as a necessary condition for protection determination. The displayed content includes the disturbance process number, protection disturbance reference time, reliability level of each data source, time correction deviation, topology matching results, reason for candidate combination deletion, final control command, and supplementary data backfill status. Operators can query the protection process based on the records, but the display or confirmation operation does not participate in real-time protection action opening, blocking, or action time limit adjustment. When the protection measurement and control software generates control commands, it only relies on the data sources, topology constraints, and setpoint candidate sets that have been verified. This processing method avoids introducing management confirmation processes into the protection control path, keeping the protection control path calculable, verifiable, and independently operable. The advantage of this embodiment is that the boundary between protection control and data display is clear, and control commands do not rely on manual confirmation or subjective judgment.

[0059] In a preferred embodiment, when processing multiple consecutive disturbances, the system establishes an independent event chain for each disturbance process. If multiple current surges, switch changes, or adjacent protection activation events occur within a short period, the processor determines whether they belong to the same disturbance process or a new disturbance process based on the source time, disturbance direction, and topology status. Data belonging to the same disturbance process are grouped into the same protection decision window; data belonging to a new disturbance process establishes a new window and a confidence level sequence. If the previous disturbance process still has a deferred decision flag, the subsequent disturbance process does not reuse the confidence level of the previous disturbance process, but can inherit the already confirmed topology status. For subsequent load transfer disturbances caused by switch changes, the processor records them separately from the original fault disturbance, and does not mistakenly classify the normal load changes after the transfer into the fault current continuation process. The advantage of this embodiment is that the data boundaries between multiple disturbances can be kept clear, reducing the aliasing of protection decisions caused by consecutive events.

[0060] In a preferred embodiment, the computer program also stores historical operating segment indexes for similar operating modes in memory. These historical operating segments are not individually categorized by device number, but rather by a combination index based on power supply method, topology connection status, protection coordination direction, and communication link status. When performing historical deviation comparisons, the processor prioritizes calling historical segments that match the current combination index; if no completely matching historical segment exists, it calls segments with the same topology connection status and power supply direction as auxiliary references. The current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement baselines in the historical segments are used to generate... It does not directly participate in the calculation of the action threshold. If historical data shows significant fluctuations in the current baseline under the same operating mode, and the current topology and adjacent events support the existence of a fault, the processor reduces the influence order of historical deviation terms, ensuring that measurement continuity and event consistency are in a state of primary reliability. The advantage of this embodiment is that historical data is used to supplement the reliability level and does not form a separate control basis for protection actions.

[0061] In a preferred embodiment, the protection and control software restricts the available deweighted data sources to the range of auxiliary criteria. Auxiliary criteria can participate in disturbance trend confirmation, event attribution confirmation, and supplementary record confirmation, but cannot independently change the action threshold, shorten the action time limit, or independently release directional protection interlocking. If the primary criterion is highly reliable and the auxiliary criterion is consistent with the primary criterion, the candidate combination retains its original value and corrects the direction; if the auxiliary criterion is inconsistent with the primary criterion, the candidate combination enters a consistency review, and the processor decides whether to delete it based on the topology state and event consistency constraint chain. If the primary criterion is missing and only available deweighted data sources exist, the processor maintains the original protection strategy or executes a conservative judgment for backup protection, without generating open instructions based on the deweighted data. The advantage of this embodiment is that the deweighted data is still utilized, but its influence in protection control is not expanded.

[0062] In a preferred embodiment, the processing of isolated data sources is bound to event logging. Isolated data sources include topology conflict data, directional conflict data, unexplainable timing conflict data, and data dependent on abnormal communication links. The processor writes the isolated data sources into an abnormal data record, recording the isolation cause, source time, reception time, conflict object, and corresponding protection judgment window. Isolated data sources do not participate in action threshold correction, candidate setpoint combination generation, or latch release judgment. If subsequent supplementary data proves that the isolation cause can be explained by communication delay, the isolation record is retained, and the data source can re-enter the available downweighting or high-confidence level judgment during subsequent disturbances, without reversing the modification of already completed control instructions. The advantage of this embodiment is that the exclusion of abnormal data has a recorded basis, and after subsequent communication recovery, the historical isolation state will not have a long-term impact on similar data sources.

[0063] In a preferred embodiment, after the protection control command is generated, the system binds the command with a trust level sequence, candidate combination identifier, and topology version. The topology version is formed by the switch open / closed state and the feeder topology state. When a subsequent switch state change causes a change in the topology version, the candidate combination corresponding to the original control command is no longer directly reused, and the processor regenerates a new set of protection setting candidates. If the topology version remains unchanged but only the communication link state changes, the processor updates the delay fluctuation boundary and the trust level sequence, but does not re-identify the power supply direction. If a topology version change occurs simultaneously with an adjacent protection event, the processor prioritizes determining the topology version activation order based on the switch change source time, and then assigns the adjacent events to the protection decision window under the corresponding topology version. The advantage of this embodiment is that the control command is bound to the topology conditions that generated the command, avoiding the continued use of the old protection strategy after a topology change.

[0064] In a preferred embodiment, when the multi-source collaborative protection method operates in a tie-and-switch power supply scenario, the processor detects the tie switch being closed and changes in the original power supply path switch state, and then re-identifies the power supply direction. The original upstream node may become a downstream node, and the original downstream node may also become a new source of fault current. The processor generates a set of setting candidates based on the new power supply direction and performs coordination verification on the directional protection and backup protection. If the source time of the protection activation event of an adjacent node is earlier than the topology change effective time, the event is classified into the original topology version; if the source time is later than the topology change effective time, it is classified into the new topology version. For data at the topology change boundary, the processor sets a delay association flag and performs verification in conjunction with the continuity of switch states. This processing can distinguish protection disturbances before and after the power supply path switching, avoiding mistaking normal direction changes during the power transfer process as fault direction reversals. The advantage of this embodiment is that the protection strategy is re-established with the tie-and-switch power supply status and does not depend on a fixed power supply direction.

[0065] In a preferred embodiment, when the multi-source collaborative protection method operates in a segmented operation scenario, the processor divides the feeder into different protection ranges based on the open state of the segment switches. For adjacent node events crossing open segments, if the topology continuity constraint is not met, the adjacent event is not included in the local protection setting candidate set for screening, but is only saved as a remote disturbance record. For adjacent node events within the same continuity segment, the processor generates an event consistency constraint chain according to the electrical adjacency relationship, and determines whether the local node should be considered a boundary node or a non-boundary node based on the possible flow direction of the fault current. If the local node is a non-boundary node and the adjacent boundary node has met the high-confidence start-up condition, the local backup protection enters a delay or blocking constraint. If a segment state change causes the original protection range to reconnect, the processor recalculates the topology candidate matching value and the protection coordination direction. The advantage of this embodiment is that the segment open boundary is included in the protection determination, reducing the interference of events crossing open segments on local protection.

[0066] In a preferred embodiment, when the multi-source collaborative protection method operates in a ring network standby scenario, the standby path information is stored in the topology state, but non-conductive standby connections are not included in the possible flow direction of fault current. When calculating topology candidate matching values, the processor will include non-conductive connections... Set the value to 0 so that the corresponding candidate path cannot pass the topology continuity constraint. If the backup path becomes conductive after fault isolation, the processor generates a new topology version based on the switch change source time and regenerates the protection setting candidate set under the new version. The load current change generated after the power transfer enters the new protection judgment window and is processed separately from the original fault disturbance process. If an event from an adjacent node arrives across the backup path, but the backup path is not conductive in the topology version corresponding to the event source time, the event will not participate in the local action threshold correction. The advantage of this embodiment is that the existence of the backup path will not be mistakenly used as an actual conductive path in fault judgment, and the protection strategy is regenerated after the topology version changes.

[0067] In a preferred embodiment, when the processor modifies the directional protection blocking condition, it determines it based on the direction of local current mutation, the direction of zero-sequence component change, the topology power supply direction, and the direction of adjacent node events. If the direction of local current mutation matches the topology power supply direction, and the consistency of adjacent node events satisfies the constraint chain, the directional protection opening condition can enter the candidate combination verification. If the direction of local current mutation does not match the topology power supply direction, but the zero-sequence component change and adjacent node events both indicate the existence of a reverse fault channel, the processor retains the corresponding candidate combination until directional consistency verification, without immediately deleting it. If the reverse information comes from an available deweighted data source, the candidate combination cannot independently open directional protection, but can only be used as a basis for judging the delay of backup protection. If the reverse information comes from an isolated data source, the candidate combination is deleted. The advantage of this embodiment is that the directional protection blocking condition is linked to the data reliability level, avoiding incorrect opening caused by reverse power flow or communication anomalies.

[0068] In a preferred embodiment, the processor separately processes the action threshold corrections for overcurrent protection and zero-sequence protection. The overcurrent protection action threshold is mainly affected by the continuity of local current measurement, power supply direction, and timing coordination between upper and lower levels; the zero-sequence protection action threshold is mainly affected by the continuity of zero-sequence measurement, the direction of grounding disturbance, and zero-sequence protection activation events at adjacent nodes. If the overcurrent measurement source is highly reliable and the zero-sequence measurement source is available but weighted, the overcurrent protection candidate combination can continue to be verified, while the zero-sequence protection candidate combination only participates in auxiliary confirmation. If the zero-sequence measurement source is highly reliable and the zero-sequence protection events at adjacent nodes meet consistency constraints, the zero-sequence protection candidate combination enters the boundary node judgment. If the overcurrent and zero-sequence criteria conflict, the processor determines the primary reliable state based on the protection activation type, topology power supply direction, and historical deviation status. The advantage of this embodiment is that the measurement sources and coordinating events of different protection types are processed separately, reducing the impact of one protection criterion anomaly on other protection criteria.

[0069] In a preferred embodiment, after the system outputs the multi-source collaborative protection control command, it retains the correspondence between the original protection settings and the corrected candidate settings. The processor writes the original setting combination identifier, the candidate setting combination identifier, the correction basis, and the verification result into the event log. If the subsequent topology state returns to the original operating mode, the processor does not directly restore the original setting combination, but instead re-executes time alignment, trust level determination, and candidate set generation. If the multi-source data trust level under the original operating mode still meets the corresponding constraints, the original setting combination can be re-entered for screening as a candidate combination. If the communication link state or the event state of adjacent nodes has changed, the original setting combination needs to be re-verified for delay fluctuation, event consistency, and time limit coordination. The advantage of this embodiment is that the setting restoration is not a simple rollback, but a reconfirmation based on the current data and topology conditions.

[0070] In a preferred embodiment, when the processor performs record write-back, it archives the current control results according to the disturbance process, topology version, and data source reliability level. The archived content includes a primary measurement sequence, protection initiation event sequence, switch status sequence, communication link status sequence, topology version sequence, reliability level sequence, candidate setting combination sequence, and control command sequence. The archived data is used for subsequent historical deviation comparison, delay fluctuation boundary updates, and adjacent event consistency verification. The archived data is not directly used as the trigger condition for the next protection action; only the results recalculated in the next protection decision window can participate in control command generation. If there is an isolated data source in the archived data, the processor retains the reason for the isolation and uses it as a historical deviation reference when subsequent data from the same source enters, without automatically lowering the level of subsequent data from the same source based on the isolation record. The advantage of this embodiment is that historical records are included in subsequent calculations but do not replace real-time protection decisions.

[0071] In a preferred embodiment, the above method and system form a closed-loop protection processing flow. After multi-source protection data enters the processor, it is timestamped to form a protection decision window; the primary criterion, auxiliary criterion, and isolated data are distinguished by the reliability level; a set of protection setting candidates is generated by identifying the topology status and power supply direction; candidate combinations are screened by cooperative interlocking constraints, upper and lower level protection time limit coordination verification, and direction consistency verification; control instructions are formed by comprehensive cost calculation; and subsequent historical deviation and delay fluctuation calculations are supported by event record write-back. Each processing link takes local electrical quantities, secondary protection events, switch status, communication link status, and feeder topology status as inputs, without requiring the addition of collection objects unrelated to ring network box protection, nor changing the primary equipment structure. The advantage of this embodiment is that, in addition to fixed setting values ​​and fixed data quality rules, a multi-source collaborative protection processing chain matching the real-time topology, power supply direction, and data reliability level is formed.

Claims

1. A method for multi-source collaborative protection of a complete ring network enclosure integrating primary and secondary protection, characterized in that, include: Acquire the primary side current, voltage and zero-sequence measurement data, secondary side protection start events, switch opening and closing status, communication link status and feeder topology status of the integrated primary and secondary ring network box to form multi-source protection data; The multi-source protection data is timestamped and the protection decision window is aligned. The reliability level of each data source is determined based on measurement continuity, topological consistency, consistency of events between adjacent nodes, and historical deviation. A set of candidate protection settings is generated based on the feeder topology and power supply direction; According to the aforementioned confidence level, the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection are collaboratively modified, and multi-source collaborative protection control commands that match the current operating state are output. The multi-source protection data is timestamped and the protection decision window is aligned, including: establishing source-end time identifiers based on the generation time of the protection start event, the primary side measurement sampling time, the secondary side state change time, and the data reception time of adjacent nodes, respectively; The transmission delay distribution of each data source is determined based on the communication link status; The multi-source protection data belonging to the same protection disturbance process are mapped to the same protection determination window; For data that exceeds the protection judgment window but is related to continuous changes in the switch opening and closing state, a delay association flag is set, and the timing relationship between the data and the corresponding protection start event is retained. The determination of the reliability level of each data source based on measurement continuity, topological consistency, consistency of adjacent node events, and historical deviation includes: verifying the changing trend of adjacent sampling points of the primary current, voltage, and zero-sequence measurement data. Verify the connection relationship between the switch open / closed state and the feeder topology state; Perform direction and timing consistency verification on the local protection start event and the protection start event sent by the adjacent ring network box; Compare the current measurement deviation with the historical deviation range under the same operating conditions; The results of each verification are merged into a confidence level sequence for use in the correction of protection criteria; A set of protection setting candidates is generated based on the feeder topology and power supply direction, including: identifying single-sided power supply, interconnection transfer, segmented operation and ring network standby operation modes based on the switch opening and closing status; Based on the identified operating mode, determine the possible flow direction of the fault current and the direction of protection coordination; Select a combination of overcurrent, zero-sequence, directional, and backup protection settings from the preset setting range that matches the protection coordination direction; For data segments with adjacent node protection activation events, apply collaborative blocking constraints to form a candidate set of protection settings corresponding to the current topology.

2. The method for multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box according to claim 1, characterized in that, Determining the transmission delay distribution of each data source based on the communication link status includes: determining the delay fluctuation range based on the arrival interval of continuously uploaded messages from the same data source, the continuity of message sequence numbers, and the link retransmission identifier. Match the delay fluctuation range with the protection determination window; Set a temporary decision flag for data located at the boundary of the delay fluctuation range; When the supplementary data corresponding to the postponement determination identifier is received in the subsequent protection determination window, the supplementary data is backfilled into the original protection disturbance process according to the source end time identifier, and the time sequence arrangement of the multi-source protection data is updated.

3. The method for multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of verifying the direction and timing consistency between local protection start events and protection start events transmitted from adjacent ring network boxes includes: extracting the direction of local current mutation, the direction of zero-sequence component change, and the protection start type of adjacent nodes. The electrical adjacency relationship between the local node and its neighboring nodes is determined based on the feeder topology. Generate an event consistency constraint chain according to the described electrical adjacency relationship; Data sources that do not satisfy the event consistency constraint chain are marked as conflicting data sources; The trust level of the conflicting data source is reduced, and its participation in the action threshold adjustment is restricted in the protection criterion modification.

4. The method for multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box according to claim 1, characterized in that, The process of integrating the various verification results into a confidence level sequence for participating in the correction of protection criteria includes: establishing sub-item confidence states for measurement continuity verification results, topology consistency verification results, adjacent node event consistency verification results, and historical deviation comparison results; The order in which the trusted states of each item are generated is based on the data source type and the current operating mode. When any sub-item trust state conflicts with other sub-item trust states, the primary trust state and the secondary trust state are determined according to the combination order. The primary and secondary trust states are mapped to three trust levels: high trust, available with reduced weight, and isolated.

5. The method for multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box according to claim 1, characterized in that, The addition of cooperative locking constraints to data segments with adjacent node protection activation events includes: identifying the upstream node, downstream node, and communication node corresponding to the adjacent node protection activation event; The sequential action relationship between local protection and adjacent node protection is determined based on the protection coordination direction. In the set of candidate protection settings, configure backup protection delay constraints and directional protection blocking constraints for non-boundary nodes; Reserve operating conditions for boundary nodes that are consistent with the possible direction of fault current flow; The set of values ​​that do not satisfy the sequential action relationship will be removed from the protection set of candidates.

6. The method for multi-source collaborative protection of a primary and secondary integrated ring network box according to claim 2, characterized in that, According to the aforementioned trust level, the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection are collaboratively modified, including: using the protection criterion corresponding to the high-trust data source as the primary criterion; Use the protection criteria corresponding to the available downweighted data sources as auxiliary criteria; Exclude the protection criteria corresponding to isolated data sources from the action threshold modification; Perform upper and lower level protection time limit coordination verification and direction consistency verification on the protection setting candidate set; The verified setpoint combination is converted into the multi-source collaborative protection control command.

7. A primary and secondary integrated ring network box multi-source collaborative protection system, characterized in that, The method for implementing any one of claims 1 to 6 includes a processor and a memory, wherein the memory stores a computer program executable by the processor, and the computer program, when executed by the processor, performs the following: acquiring primary-side current, voltage and zero-sequence measurement data, secondary-side protection start events, switch on / off status, communication link status and feeder topology status of the primary and secondary integrated ring network box, and forming multi-source protection data; The multi-source protection data is timestamped and the protection decision window is aligned. The reliability level of each data source is determined based on measurement continuity, topological consistency, consistency of events between adjacent nodes, and historical deviation. A set of candidate protection settings is generated based on the feeder topology and power supply direction; Based on the aforementioned confidence level, the criterion weights, action thresholds, action time limits, and blocking conditions of overcurrent protection, zero-sequence protection, directional protection, and backup protection are collaboratively modified, and multi-source collaborative protection control commands matching the current operating state are output.

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