A safety management and control method for limited space operation of an oil tank based on multi-source data fusion

Abstract

The present application relates to the technical field of safety monitoring of confined space operation in petroleum chemical industry, and discloses a safety control method for confined space operation of oil tank based on multi-source data fusion. Multi-source operation data is acquired and credibility is determined to obtain credible operation data. Personnel area change information and in-out tank operation information are correspondingly analyzed to reconstruct personnel operation stage. Personnel position is determined according to personnel operation state, and spatial fusion is performed on environmental monitoring information to obtain position environmental risk data. Environmental risk development time is analyzed, safety residual time is determined by combining operation residual time and evacuation time consumption, and safety risk data is generated. Risk control strategy is determined accordingly, access restriction is performed on personnel to be accessed, and early warning evacuation prompt is given to personnel in the tank. The present application can improve the reliability of personnel in-out tank state recognition and position environmental risk judgment, and match early warning timing with personnel safety evacuation demand.

Description

Technical Field

[0001] This invention relates to the field of safety monitoring technology for confined space operations in the petrochemical industry, and in particular to a safety management method for confined space operations in oil tanks based on multi-source data fusion. Background Technology

[0002] When carrying out tank cleaning, internal inspection, corrosion protection maintenance, and accessory replacement in petrochemical enterprises, for tasks that are difficult for mechanical equipment to complete, such as cleaning tank bottom residues, inspecting internal wall defects, and performing localized repairs, personnel still need to enter the tank interior where ventilation is limited and flammable or toxic gases may remain. On-site monitoring of personnel's actual working conditions and environmental safety is crucial. Current technologies typically utilize gas detectors to monitor gas concentration inside the tank, record personnel locations using positioning devices, and combine this with electronic work permits, personnel qualification information, tank entry / exit registration, and fixed time thresholds to implement access control, process monitoring, and timeout alarms.

[0003] However, existing technologies have significant limitations in practical applications. On the one hand, existing technologies struggle to uniformly correlate personnel location data, tank entry / exit records, and work permit data that suffer from asynchronous sampling, communication delays, or missing data, making it difficult to reliably determine the actual status of personnel entering and exiting the tank. On the other hand, existing technologies only issue alarms based on single gas concentrations or fixed work durations, making it difficult to combine factors such as gas changes corresponding to personnel locations, continuous work duration, the relationship between cumulative work and rest periods, and evacuation time to determine the remaining safe time, resulting in a mismatch between the timing of warnings and actual risks. Summary of the Invention

[0004] Based on the above analysis, the embodiments of the present invention aim to provide a safety management and control method for confined space operations in oil tanks based on multi-source data fusion, in order to solve the problems of inaccurate judgment of the status of workers entering and leaving the tank in this scenario and the mismatch between the timing of risk warning and the actual safety margin in the existing technology.

[0005] To achieve the above objectives, in a first aspect, the present invention proposes a safety management method for confined space operations in oil tanks based on multi-source data fusion, the method comprising: acquiring multi-source operation data for confined space operations in oil tanks and determining its reliability to obtain reliable operation data;

[0006] Based on the reliable operational data, the personnel area change information and tank entry and exit operation information are analyzed to reconstruct the personnel operation stage and obtain the personnel operation status.

[0007] Based on the personnel's work status, the personnel's location is determined, and environmental monitoring information corresponding to the personnel's location is extracted from reliable work data. The environmental monitoring information is then spatially fused to obtain location environmental risk data.

[0008] The location environmental risk data is analyzed for changes to obtain the environmental risk development time; the remaining operation time and evacuation time are determined based on the personnel's work status and reliable operation data; the remaining safe time is determined based on the environmental risk development time, the remaining operation time, and the evacuation time; and safety risk data is generated.

[0009] Based on the safety risk data, a risk control strategy is determined, and access restrictions are implemented for personnel to be admitted in accordance with the risk control strategy. Early warnings and evacuation prompts are issued to personnel inside the tank, thereby obtaining the safety control results.

[0010] Preferably, the location environmental risk data is analyzed for changes to obtain the environmental risk development time, including:

[0011] Extract location environmental risk data over a continuous period of time, determine the current risk status and risk change trend, and obtain environmental risk change data;

[0012] A safety boundary is preset, and a candidate development time for reaching the safety boundary is determined based on the difference between the environmental risk change data and the safety boundary.

[0013] The environmental risk development time is obtained by screening the candidate development times by minimum value.

[0014] Preferably, the candidate development time for reaching the safety boundary is determined based on the difference between the environmental risk change data and the safety boundary, including:

[0015] Based on the current risk status in the environmental risk change data and the safety boundary, a risk margin data is obtained by performing a differential calculation to obtain the risk margin data.

[0016] Arrival time prediction is performed based on the risk change trends in the risk margin data and environmental risk change data to obtain candidate development times. Preferably, the process of predicting arrival time based on the risk change trends in the risk margin data and environmental risk change data to obtain candidate development times includes: screening effective change trends towards the safety boundary from the risk change trends, determining the risk change rate corresponding to the effective change trend, and obtaining candidate development times based on the ratio of the risk margin data to the risk change rate. Preferably, determining the remaining safe time based on the environmental risk development time, the remaining operation time, and the evacuation time, and generating safety risk data, includes: filtering the environmental risk development time and the remaining operation time by minimum values ​​to obtain available remaining time.

[0017] Perform a difference analysis between the available remaining time and the evacuation time, and determine the safe remaining time based on the difference analysis results;

[0018] The remaining safe time is correlated with the personnel's work status and location to generate safety risk data. Preferably, a difference analysis is performed between the available remaining time and the evacuation time, and the remaining safe time is determined based on the difference analysis results. This includes: calculating the time difference between the available remaining time and the evacuation time to obtain the evacuation time margin, and determining the remaining safe time based on the evacuation time margin.

[0019] Preferably, determining a risk control strategy based on the safety risk data includes: matching the remaining safety time in the safety risk data with a preset control threshold, and determining the risk level in conjunction with the personnel's work status to obtain risk assessment data;

[0020] Based on the risk level and personnel work status in the risk assessment data, corresponding control measures are matched from the preset control rules to determine the risk control strategy.

[0021] Preferably, risk level is determined by combining personnel work status to obtain risk assessment data, including: matching the corresponding risk assessment conditions from preset status assessment rules according to the personnel work status;

[0022] The risk level is determined by correcting the interval matching results of the remaining safe time based on the risk assessment conditions, and risk assessment data is obtained.

[0023] Preferably, correcting the interval matching result of the remaining safety time according to the risk assessment conditions includes: determining the risk correction direction and correction level corresponding to the personnel's work status according to the risk assessment conditions, and adjusting the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result according to the risk correction direction and correction level to obtain the risk level and generate risk assessment data. Preferably, determining the risk correction direction and correction level corresponding to the personnel's work status according to the risk assessment conditions includes: when the personnel's work status is a waiting-to-enter state, determining the risk correction direction to be maintained;

[0024] When the personnel's work status is either in-tank work or evacuation, the risk correction direction is determined to be upward, and the correction level is determined based on the number of times the remaining safety time is lower than the preset control threshold in the risk judgment conditions.

[0025] In a second aspect, the present invention provides an electronic device including a memory and a processor, wherein the memory stores a computer program, and the processor executes the computer program to implement the steps of the method in the first aspect.

[0026] Thirdly, the present invention provides a computer-readable storage medium having a computer program stored thereon, wherein the computer program, when executed by a processor, implements the steps of the method in the first aspect.

[0027] Compared with the prior art, the present invention has the following beneficial effects:

[0028] 1. This invention reconstructs the personnel operation phase by assessing the reliability of multi-source operation data such as personnel positioning data, tank entry and exit operation information, and work permit data, and by performing corresponding analysis on personnel area change information and tank entry and exit operation information. Even when there are asynchronous sampling, communication delays, missing data, or contradictory records, it can still accurately determine the actual entry and exit status of personnel, reducing misjudgments of status caused by abnormal single data source.

[0029] 2. This invention determines the development time of environmental risks by spatially fusing and analyzing environmental monitoring information corresponding to personnel locations. It then calculates the remaining safe time by combining the remaining work time and evacuation time, thereby implementing access restrictions and early warning evacuations. This avoids relying solely on single gas concentrations or fixed work durations for alarms, ensuring that the timing of warnings matches the actual safety margin and evacuation needs of personnel. Furthermore, the above-mentioned technical solutions can be combined to achieve more optimal combinations. Other features and advantages of this invention will be set forth in the following description, and some advantages may become apparent from the description or be learned by practicing the invention. The objectives and other advantages of this invention are realized and obtained through the description and accompanying drawings. Attached Figure Description

[0030] The accompanying drawings are for illustrative purposes only and are not intended to limit the invention. Throughout the drawings, the same reference numerals denote the same parts.

[0031] Figure 1 This is a flowchart illustrating the implementation of a safety management method for confined space operations in oil tanks based on multi-source data fusion, according to an embodiment of the present invention. Detailed Implementation

[0032] To make the technical means, creative features, objectives, and effects of this invention easier to understand, the invention is further described below with reference to specific embodiments. However, the following embodiments are merely preferred embodiments of this invention and not all of them. Other embodiments obtained by those skilled in the art based on the embodiments described herein without creative effort are all within the protection scope of this invention.

[0033] A specific embodiment of the present invention discloses a method for safety management and control of confined space operations in oil tanks based on multi-source data fusion, such as... Figure 1 As shown. The method includes steps S1 to S5. S1: Obtain multi-source operation data for confined space operations in oil tanks and determine its reliability to obtain reliable operation data.

[0034] Specifically, before the operation begins, an operation control object corresponding to this operation is established based on the confined space operation ticket and the tank cleaning operation plan, and a unified operation identifier is configured for the operation control object.

[0035] The operational control targets include at least the tank identification, tank spatial structure data, manhole location, tank working area, monitoring area, outer warning area, inner alarm area, planned working time, list of authorized operators, list of designated monitoring personnel, personnel qualification requirements, gas safety limits, continuous working time limits, and work-to-rest ratio limits.

[0036] The unified operation identifier is used to associate data generated by different equipment and different business systems with the same operation in the confined space of the oil tank, so as to avoid the mixing of data from adjacent oil tanks or adjacent operation batches.

[0037] The multi-source operation data includes personnel location data, environmental monitoring information, personnel information data, work permit data, tank entry and exit operation information, and operation process data.

[0038] The personnel positioning data is collected by UWB positioning equipment and includes at least personnel identification, beacon identification, positioning time, three-dimensional coordinates, positioning accuracy, and base station reception status.

[0039] Environmental monitoring information is collected by gas detection devices located at different positions and heights inside the oil tank, including at least the device identification, collection location, collection height, collection time, oxygen concentration, combustible gas concentration, hydrogen sulfide concentration, carbon monoxide concentration, and device status.

[0040] Personnel information data should include at least the personnel identification, job type, confined space operation qualification, training validity period, and the work team to which they belong.

[0041] Work permit data should include at least the work ticket status, permitted work period, work object, approval status, and safety measure confirmation status.

[0042] The information for tank entry and exit operations should include at least the tank entry confirmation time, tank exit confirmation time, operator identification, on-site photos, and mobile terminal location submitted by the mobile terminal.

[0043] The operational data should include at least the status of ventilation equipment, alarm records, personnel evacuation records, online status of mobile terminals, and on-site handling feedback.

[0044] Furthermore, to address the issue of inconsistent sampling periods from different data sources, time correspondence is established for multi-source operation data according to a unified fusion window.

[0045] In this embodiment, the sampling period for UWB positioning data is 1 second, the sampling period for gas detection data is 5 seconds, and the status scanning period for the work permit management platform is 10 seconds. Therefore, 10 seconds is selected as the basic fusion window.

[0046] Data that are within the same basic fusion window, have the same unified operation identifier, and whose personnel identifier, equipment identifier, or oil tank identifier can be correspondingly collected into the same fusion record.

[0047] For data that crosses the boundaries of the fusion window, it is assigned to the corresponding fusion window according to the data acquisition time, and the time when the data arrives at the job safety management server is not used to replace the data acquisition time, thereby reducing the impact of communication delay on the time correspondence results.

[0048] After completing time mapping and object association, a reliability assessment is performed on each data source. Data reliability is determined at least based on device online integrity rate, device calibration validity, data freshness, and continuous data stability. For personnel location data, continuous data stability is also determined considering positioning accuracy and base station reception status; for environmental monitoring information, continuous data stability is also determined considering measurement accuracy and continuous concentration changes. For the i-th data source, its data reliability... Calculate according to the following formula: ,in, This represents the online integrity rate of the device corresponding to the i-th data source, which is determined by the ratio of the number of data entries actually received to the number of data entries that should be received within the current fusion window.

[0049] This indicates the validity of the equipment calibration. When the equipment is within its calibration validity period and its self-test is normal, it indicates that the calibration is valid. Set to 1; when the device exceeds the calibration validity period or the device self-test fails, Take 0.

[0050] This indicates data freshness, determined by the interval between the data acquisition time and the end time of the current fusion window. The larger the interval, the better. The lower.

[0051] It represents the stability of continuous data and is determined based on the degree of data abrupt changes in multiple adjacent fusion windows, the operating status of the equipment, and the positioning accuracy or measurement accuracy.

[0052] in, Determined based on the ratio of the actual number of data entries received to the number of data entries that should be received within the current fusion window; The value is 1 when the equipment calibration is valid, and 0 when the equipment exceeds the calibration validity period or the self-test is abnormal. The time interval is determined based on the time difference between the data acquisition time and the current fusion window end time; the larger the time interval, the better. The smaller; It is determined based on the degree of fluctuation in continuous data; the greater the fluctuation in continuous data, the better. The smaller. All values ​​are represented using dimensionless numerical values ​​between 0 and 1.

[0053] The confidence threshold can be calibrated based on historical normal operation data and abnormal data. Specifically, data that is within the calibration validity period, has normal communication status, and has been manually verified to be without abnormalities is considered as normal samples, while data that is temporarily offline, has failed calibration, has significant drift, or has severe time delay is considered as abnormal samples. The retention rate of normal samples and the rejection rate of abnormal samples under different confidence thresholds are calculated, and the value that can balance the retention of normal samples and the rejection of abnormal samples is selected as the confidence threshold.

[0054] In this embodiment, the confidence threshold is set to 0.80. In practical applications, it can be adapted according to equipment performance, on-site wireless communication conditions, and tank structure.

[0055] For missing data, the compensation result is not directly recognized as true safety data. When a single gas detection device experiences data loss for a short period of time, while other gas detection devices are functioning normally, a risk estimate can be generated based on the available gas detection devices in the vicinity, and this risk estimate is marked as estimated data.

[0056] The estimated data is used only to maintain the continuity of subsequent risk change analysis. When the number of effective gas detection devices is insufficient, the spatial coverage of effective devices cannot cover personnel locations, or the data reliability is lower than the reliability threshold, the corresponding environmental state will be marked as unconfirmable, and the estimated data will not be used to determine the unconfirmable environment as a safe environment.

[0057] For example, if a gas detection device is required to report two data points within a 10-second fusion window and actually reports two complete data points, then its online integrity rate is [value missing]. The value is 1.00. If the device is within its calibration validity period, then the calibration validity is... The value is 1.00. Data freshness. The stability of continuous data is 0.98. If the value is 0.96, then the data reliability of this device is: Since 0.9408 is higher than the confidence threshold of 0.80, the data from this device can be considered reliable environmental monitoring information. Another gas detection device only reported one data point within the same fusion window, indicating a low online integrity rate. The value is 0.50. If its calibration validity... Data freshness and continuous data stability If the values ​​are 1.00, 0.95, and 0.93 respectively, then the data reliability of this device is: Since 0.4418 is below the confidence threshold of 0.80, the data from this device is not used to output a safety conclusion.

[0058] After completing the above processing, reliable operational data is obtained. The reliable operational data includes at least the reliable location of personnel, reliable environmental monitoring information, valid work permit status, valid personnel qualification status, valid tank entry and exit operation information, and the reliability of each data source.

[0059] The trusted operational data serves as a unified data foundation for subsequent personnel operation phase reconstruction, location and environmental risk calculation, remaining operation time calculation, and risk management strategy determination, thereby reducing errors caused by communication delays, equipment failures, and single points of failure.

[0060] S2, based on the reliable operation data, perform corresponding analysis on the personnel area change information and tank entry and exit operation information to reconstruct the personnel operation stage and obtain the personnel operation status.

[0061] Specifically, based on the tank's spatial structure data and manhole locations, pre-establish the following zones: external safety zone, outer warning zone, inner alarm zone, manhole transition zone, internal work zone, and monitoring zone.

[0062] The boundaries of each region are represented by polygon vertex coordinates. The reliable locations of personnel in the reliable operational data are spatially matched with the boundaries of each region to determine the region where the personnel are located at each positioning time.

[0063] Whether a person's location is within a polygonal area can be determined using the ray method. Specifically, a ray is drawn from the person's location in a predetermined direction, and the number of intersections between the ray and the boundary of the polygonal area determines whether the person's location is within the corresponding area.

[0064] Furthermore, the regional matching results in the continuous fusion window are sorted according to the personnel identification and positioning time, and the process of personnel moving from one region to another adjacent region is extracted to form the personnel region change information.

[0065] The personnel area change information includes at least the personnel identifier, the area before the change, the area after the change, the time of the area change, the duration of continuous stay, and the corresponding location reliability.

[0066] This invention does not directly determine whether a person enters or exits the tank based on a single UWB positioning coordinate, but instead simultaneously verifies the order in which a person continuously traverses multiple areas and the duration of continuous stay in the corresponding areas.

[0067] When the personnel area change information sequentially indicates that personnel have entered the outer ring warning area, inner ring alarm area, manhole transition area and tank working area from the outside safety area, and have stayed continuously in the tank working area for the tank entry confirmation time, a positioning and tank entry judgment is formed.

[0068] The tank entry confirmation time can be determined based on historical positioning trajectories. Specifically, historical positioning trajectories of personnel who normally pass near the manhole but do not actually enter the oil tank are collected, and the distribution of their dwell time near the boundary of the working area inside the tank is statistically analyzed. The 95th percentile of the dwell time is added to one positioning sampling period as the initial value of the tank entry confirmation time, and then corrected according to the results of on-site trial operation.

[0069] This process can eliminate false tank entry judgments caused by personnel staying briefly at the area boundary or by the instantaneous drift of a single positioning point.

[0070] Furthermore, the trusted location, continuous stay duration, and mobile terminal online status of the designated monitoring personnel are extracted from the trusted operation data. The monitoring conditions are deemed valid when the designated monitoring personnel are located within the monitored area, the location data trustworthiness reaches the trusted threshold, the continuous stay within the monitored area reaches the monitoring confirmation duration, and the mobile terminal is online.

[0071] The duration of monitoring confirmation can be determined based on historical location data of the monitoring personnel's normal short-term movement within the monitoring area boundary, and should be less than the maximum allowable off-duty time specified on site.

[0072] The system performs a correlation analysis between the tank entry judgment and the tank entry / exit operation information. The basic correlation conditions are that the personnel identification is the same, the unified operation identification is the same, and the time interval between the tank entry judgment and the tank entry operation information is within a preset correlation window.

[0073] After meeting the basic requirements, further verify the work permit status, personnel qualification status, monitoring conditions, and environmental status.

[0074] When the work permit is valid, the personnel qualifications match the planned job type, the monitoring conditions are valid, the environmental condition is reliable and safe, the positioning and tank entry judgment is successful, and the tank entry operation information is valid, the personnel's work status will be changed from the waiting entry status to the tank entry work status.

[0075] When a complete positioning and tank entry judgment has been formed, but no valid tank entry operation information has been obtained, the actual entry fact reflected by the continuous positioning trajectory is not discarded. Instead, a "suspected tank entry" label is added to the personnel's work status, triggering a tank entry record missing prompt, and requiring the safety officer to review it.

[0076] After the safety officer confirms, the entry record is supplemented. Before the safety officer completes the review, safety controls are implemented as if personnel are already inside the tank. This avoids situations where mobile terminal registration is missed, resulting in unmonitored personnel inside the tank, while also preserving the system's judgment and manual confirmation process for later traceability.

[0077] When personnel already working inside the tank move from the working area to the manhole transition area, or when valid exit operation information is obtained, their work status is updated to evacuation status.

[0078] The evacuation status indicates that personnel still need to complete the movement from their current location to a safe area outside the tank. Calculations of environmental risks and evacuation time will not cease until personnel have actually reached the safe area outside the tank, even after the submission of exit operation information.

[0079] When the personnel area change information in the evacuation state sequentially indicates that the personnel have moved from the working area inside the tank through the manhole transition area, the inner ring alarm area, and the outer ring warning area to the safe area outside the tank, and have stayed in the safe area outside the tank for a period of time until the tank exit confirmation is reached, a positioning exit judgment is formed.

[0080] If the location-based out-of-tank judgment corresponds to the valid out-of-tank operation information, then the current in-tank entry record is closed.

[0081] If the tank exit determination is successful, but the tank exit operation information is missing, a "System presumes tank exit completed" flag will be added to the personnel's work status, the presumed tank exit time will be recorded, and a record supplement prompt will be sent to the safety officer. After confirmation by the safety officer, the tank entry record will be closed.

[0082] In one exemplary execution, at 09:05, the reliable positioning trajectory of worker Zhang passed through the outer safety area, the outer warning area, the inner alarm area, the manhole transition area, and the inner working area of ​​the tank in sequence, and stayed in the inner working area of ​​the tank for 30 seconds.

[0083] Meanwhile, Zhang submitted confirmation information for entering the tank via a mobile terminal. Zhang's personnel qualifications matched the planned job type, his work permit was valid, the monitoring conditions were valid, and the environmental condition was trustworthy and safe. Therefore, Zhang's personnel work status was changed from pending entry to working inside the tank.

[0084] During the subsequent evacuation, Zhang did not submit confirmation information for leaving the tank via his mobile terminal. However, his reliable location trajectory passed through the working area inside the tank, the manhole transition area, the inner alarm area, the outer warning area, and the safety area outside the tank in sequence. He stayed in the safety area outside the tank for 60 seconds. Therefore, the system determined that he had left the tank and added the "system presumes he has left the tank" label and notified the safety officer to verify.

[0085] This process can identify missing exit records approximately one minute after personnel actually exit the tank, eliminating the need to wait for the next day or other fixed periods to uniformly correct the entry and exit records.

[0086] The personnel's work status is obtained through the above processing. The personnel's work status is associated with and stored with the personnel identifier, status start time, current location, and anomaly identifier, serving as the basis for subsequent determination of personnel location, calculation of remaining work time, determination of risk correction direction, and implementation of access or evacuation control.

[0087] S3. Determine the personnel location based on the personnel's work status, extract environmental monitoring information corresponding to the personnel location from reliable work data, and perform spatial fusion on the environmental monitoring information to obtain location environmental risk data.

[0088] Specifically, the personnel involved in environmental risk calculations are determined based on their work status.

[0089] When a person's work status is either inside the tank or evacuated, extract the person's reliable location within the current fusion window.

[0090] When a person is in the "waiting to enter" state, the reliable location of the person in the outer warning area, inner alarm area, or near the manhole is extracted to determine the environmental status and subsequent access conditions corresponding to their location.

[0091] When multiple trusted location points exist within the current fusion window, the valid location point whose time is closest to the end of the fusion window is selected as the personnel's location.

[0092] When the reliability of the latest location point is insufficient, select the second most recent reliable location point within the same fusion window and retain the location time difference.

[0093] If no reliable location point exists within the current fusion window, the personnel location will be marked as unconfirmable, and no safety access conclusion allowing personnel to enter the oil tank will be output.

[0094] Based on the determined personnel locations, environmental monitoring information that was collected within the same fusion window, has valid equipment status, and whose data credibility reaches the credibility threshold is extracted from the trusted operational data.

[0095] The correlation between environmental monitoring information and personnel location considers not only the collection time but also the collection location and height of the gas detection equipment to avoid using the gas concentration at a single detection point near the manhole to represent the entire internal environment of the tank. For Class j gas, at the personnel location... and time The location corresponds to the estimated concentration Determined according to the following formula: ,in, This represents the concentration of the j-th type of gas collected by the i-th effective gas detection device at time t. This represents the spatial fusion weight of the i-th gas detection device for the person's location p. Spatial fusion weight Determine according to the following formula: ,in, Indicates the first The reliability of data from a gas detection device at time t; Indicates the first The sampling location of the gas detection device and the location of the personnel Spatial distance between them; This represents the distance correction amount used to avoid a denominator of zero. Distance Correction Amount Determined based on UWB positioning accuracy and gas detection equipment position calibration accuracy. The spacing should be less than the spacing between normal gas detection devices, and not less than the position resolution of the personnel positioning system.

[0096] In this embodiment, exemplarily, The distance is set to 0.1 meters. After the above processing, gas detection devices that are closer to people and have higher data reliability have a greater spatial fusion weight.

[0097] When data from a gas detection device is labeled as estimated data, the estimated data can be used for continuous risk trend reference. However, when calculating the estimated concentration corresponding to the location used to output safety conclusions, the spatial fusion weight of the estimated data should be reduced, or it should not be used as valid environmental monitoring information.

[0098] When there are insufficient effective gas detection devices, or when there are no effective gas detection devices around the personnel location that meet the spatial coverage requirements, the location environmental risk data will be marked as unconfirmable.

[0099] The required spatial coverage can be configured before the start of the operation based on the size of the oil tank, the effective detection range of the gas detection equipment, and the spacing between the equipment, and can be verified on-site using portable gas detection results.

[0100] The spatial fusion process of hydrogen sulfide concentration is used as an example for illustration. The following values ​​are exemplary implementation data. Personnel location is... = (6.0, 4.0, 1.2) meters. The spatial distances between the three effective gas detection devices and the personnel are 1.02 meters, 2.02 meters and 3.00 meters, respectively. The corresponding data confidence levels are 0.96, 0.94 and 0.92, respectively, and the corresponding hydrogen sulfide concentrations are 3.4 mg / m³, 2.8 mg / m³ and 2.2 mg / m³, respectively.

[0101] when When the distance is 0.1 meters, the spatial fusion weight corresponding to the first gas detection device is: The spatial fusion weight corresponding to the second gas detection device is: The spatial fusion weight corresponding to the third gas detection device is: The estimated hydrogen sulfide concentration at the personnel location is: The calculated hydrogen sulfide concentration at the personnel's location was approximately 3.18 mg / m³.

[0102] The results are closer to the first gas detection device that is closest to the personnel and has higher data reliability, while retaining the spatial distribution information reflected by the other effective gas detection devices.

[0103] Using the same method, calculate the oxygen concentration, combustible gas concentration, hydrogen sulfide concentration, and carbon monoxide concentration corresponding to the personnel's location.

[0104] By combining personnel identification, personnel location, estimated concentrations of each gas at its location, identification of equipment involved in spatial fusion, data reliability of each equipment, spatial coverage status, and collection time, location environmental risk data is obtained.

[0105] The location environmental risk data is used to extract the current risk status and risk change trend within a continuous period, so that the environmental risk assessment corresponds to the actual working location of specific personnel.

[0106] S4, perform change analysis on the location environmental risk data to obtain the environmental risk development time; determine the remaining operation time and evacuation time based on the personnel operation status and reliable operation data; determine the remaining safety time based on the environmental risk development time, the remaining operation time and the evacuation time; and generate safety risk data.

[0107] Specifically, location and environmental risk data for consecutive time periods are extracted based on personnel identification and collection time.

[0108] The length of the continuous period is determined based on the gas detection sampling cycle, the rate of change in on-site ventilation, and the early warning sensitivity, and should include at least multiple fusion windows that can reflect continuous changes.

[0109] In this embodiment, the basic fusion window is 10 seconds, which can determine the current risk status and risk change trend from the location environmental risk data of the most recent few minutes.

[0110] The current risk status includes the location of each gas, its current concentration, and the spatial coverage status.

[0111] The risk change trends include the direction and rate of change of oxygen concentration, the direction and rate of change of combustible gas concentration, the direction and rate of change of hydrogen sulfide concentration, and the direction and rate of change of carbon monoxide concentration.

[0112] By combining the current risk status and the trend of risk change, we can obtain environmental risk change data.

[0113] The rate of risk change can be determined as the ratio of the change in concentration at a location to the corresponding time interval over a continuous period.

[0114] To avoid short-term fluctuations within a single fusion window directly determining the development time of environmental risks, records with insufficient data reliability are removed before calculating the rate of risk change.

[0115] When estimated data exists within a continuous time period, the corresponding estimated identifier is retained, and the existing data is judged to be sufficient to support a safety conclusion according to the adverse principle.

[0116] When the number of valid records is insufficient, the development time of environmental risks is marked as unconfirmable, and subsequent risk control strategies are used to prohibit new personnel from entering the oil tank.

[0117] Furthermore, the safety boundaries of each gas indicator are read from the work permit data.

[0118] For risk indicators such as combustible gases, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon monoxide whose concentrations are increasing, the difference between the safety upper limit and the current concentration in the current risk state is calculated to obtain the corresponding risk margin data.

[0119] In the case of a decrease in oxygen concentration, the difference between the current oxygen concentration and the lower limit of oxygen safety is calculated to obtain the corresponding risk margin data.

[0120] If any gas indicator has reached or exceeded the safety boundary, the candidate development time corresponding to that gas indicator is set to 0, and a flag indicating that the safety boundary has been reached is added.

[0121] Based on the risk change trends in environmental risk change data, select effective change trends that move towards the safety boundary.

[0122] For risk indicators such as flammable gases, hydrogen sulfide, and carbon monoxide whose concentrations are increasing, only the risk trend of a continuous increase in concentration is identified as a valid trend.

[0123] For oxygen indicators, only the risk trend of a continuous decrease in oxygen concentration is identified as an effective trend.

[0124] Risk trends that change away from the safety boundary, have a rate of change of 0, or have insufficient data validity are not used to calculate finite candidate development time.

[0125] For effective trends of change toward the safety boundary, the candidate development time to reach the safety boundary is determined based on the ratio of risk margin data to the corresponding rate of risk change.

[0126] For hazardous gases with increasing concentration Its candidate development time Calculate according to the following formula: ,in, Indicates the first Safety upper limit for this type of gas; This represents the current estimated concentration of the j-th type of gas corresponding to the personnel's location; Indicates the first The rate of risk change of similar gases toward their safe upper limits.

[0127] For cases where oxygen concentration is decreasing, the difference between the current oxygen concentration at the personnel's location and the lower limit of oxygen safety is divided by the rate of oxygen decrease to obtain the candidate development time for oxygen.

[0128] The minimum value of the candidate development time corresponding to each effective gas indicator is selected, and the minimum candidate development time is determined as the environmental risk development time.

[0129] The environmental risk development time refers to the predicted time required to reach any safety boundary, assuming the current risk trend continues.

[0130] In one example, if the hydrogen sulfide concentration at Zhang's current location increases from 0.8 mg / m³ to 3.2 mg / m³ within 10 minutes, then the rate of change of risk associated with hydrogen sulfide is: The safety limit for hydrogen sulfide in this operation permit is 5 mg / m³. Therefore, the risk margin for hydrogen sulfide is 5 - 3.2 = 1.8 mg / m³, and the candidate development time for hydrogen sulfide is T = 1.8 ÷ 0.24 = 7.5 minutes.

[0131] If the candidate development times for oxygen, combustible gas, and carbon monoxide are all greater than 7.5 minutes within the same continuous time period, then 7.5 minutes will be determined as the environmental risk development time.

[0132] Furthermore, the remaining time for the task is determined based on the personnel's work status and reliable work data.

[0133] When the personnel are in the tank working state or in the evacuation state, the current continuous working time and the cumulative working time of the day are determined based on the effective tank entry time, and the remaining time of a single continuous operation and the remaining time of the cumulative working time of the day are calculated respectively.

[0134] Simultaneously, the remaining time for the permitted work is calculated based on the work permit's end time. Remaining time for the work. Determined according to the following formula: .

[0135] in, Indicates the permitted duration of a single continuous operation; Indicates the current continuous working time of personnel; This indicates the cumulative working hours allowed for personnel on that day; This indicates the total working hours of the personnel on that day; Indicates the remaining time of the current job permit.

[0136] When the ratio of work time to rest time exceeds the configured ratio, any remaining time is not greater than 0, or the effective tank entry time cannot be confirmed, the remaining work time will be treated as an unfavorable condition.

[0137] For personnel awaiting entry, their available work time slots are determined based on the planned work time, the remaining permitted work time, and the estimated duration of a single work session. These available work time slots are used for subsequent enforcement of access restrictions.

[0138] Furthermore, based on personnel location and tank space structure data, the evacuation path length from the personnel's current location to the manhole exit, and then from the manhole exit to the safe area outside the tank, is determined.

[0139] Based on historical evacuation drill trajectories, a conservative movement speed was determined, and the evacuation time was calculated by considering the additional time required for personnel to pass through manholes and the safety handling allowance. Evacuation Time Calculate according to the following formula: .

[0140] in, Indicates the length of the evacuation path from the current location of personnel to the safe area outside the tank; This indicates a conservative movement speed determined based on historical evacuation drill trajectories; Indicates the additional time required for personnel to pass through the manhole; This indicates the time allotted for on-site confirmation, instruction transmission, and safe handling. The conservative movement speed is not directly determined by the average movement speed of personnel during normal operations. Instead, it is selected based on the historical evacuation trajectories corresponding to different locations inside the tank, or determined in reverse based on the high percentile of the evacuation time, to cover adverse situations such as personnel carrying protective equipment, passing through manholes, and on-site congestion.

[0141] The available remaining time is obtained by minimizing the environmental risk development time and remaining operational time. Determined according to the following formula: ,in, Indicates the time frame for the development of environmental risks. This indicates the remaining time for the operation. The available remaining time represents the short period of time that personnel can continue to be in the current working state before the environmental risks reach the safety boundary or the operation duration conditions expire.

[0142] Subsequently, a difference analysis is performed between the available remaining time and the evacuation time to calculate the time difference between them, thus obtaining the evacuation time margin. Based on this evacuation time margin, the safe remaining time is determined. Safe Remaining Time Determine according to the following formula: When the evacuation time margin is greater than 0, the evacuation time margin is determined as the remaining safe time.

[0143] When the evacuation time margin is not greater than 0, the corresponding zero or negative value is retained to indicate that the time required for personnel to complete the safe evacuation is insufficient, and in the subsequent risk assessment process, it is classified into the control range corresponding to the cessation of operations or emergency evacuation.

[0144] In the example above, Zhang's environmental risk development time was 7.5 minutes.

[0145] Mr. Zhang has been working continuously for 67 minutes. The maximum continuous working time for a single session is 90 minutes. Therefore, the remaining time for his single continuous working session is: 90 - 67 = 23 minutes.

[0146] Zhang's cumulative remaining work time and remaining work permit time were both greater than 23 minutes on that day, therefore his remaining work time was 23 minutes.

[0147] By filtering the environmental risk development time of 7.5 minutes and the remaining operation time of 23 minutes, the available remaining time is found to be 7.5 minutes.

[0148] Based on historical evacuation drills, the total time required for Zhang to evacuate from his current location to the safe area outside the tank, including the path movement time and manhole passage time, is 3.2 minutes. A safety handling time of 2 minutes is allowed. Therefore, the evacuation time is: =3.2 + 2 = 5.2 minutes. The evacuation time margin and remaining safe time are: =7.5 - 5.2 = 2.3 minutes. This result indicates that although Zhang still has 23 minutes left before the fixed continuous operation time limit, after considering the gas change trend corresponding to the current location of the personnel and the time required to complete the safe evacuation, the actual remaining safe time is only 2.3 minutes.

[0149] Finally, the remaining safe time is associated with the corresponding personnel's work status and location, and the environmental risk development time, remaining work time, evacuation time, gas indicators that lead to the minimum environmental risk development time, and data reliability status are recorded to generate safety risk data.

[0150] The safety risk data is used for the next step of risk level determination and risk control strategy matching, so that the early warning timing can simultaneously reflect the speed of environmental risk development, operation time limit and the time required for personnel to evacuate from the current location.

[0151] S5. Determine the risk control strategy based on the safety risk data, implement access restrictions on personnel to be admitted according to the risk control strategy, issue early warnings and evacuation prompts to personnel inside the tank, and obtain the safety control results.

[0152] Specifically, the remaining safe time in the safety risk data is matched with the preset control threshold to obtain the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result.

[0153] The preset control thresholds are determined based on historical emergency evacuation drills. Specifically, the 95th percentile of the time required for personnel to evacuate from different locations inside the tank to a safe area outside the tank can be calculated, and this, combined with on-site confirmation and instruction transmission time, is used to determine the early warning threshold. At the same time, the value corresponding to 0 remaining safe time is set as the stop-work threshold.

[0154] Each preset control threshold is arranged from highest to lowest value to form a preset control threshold sequence.

[0155] In this embodiment, the risk levels are exemplarily set as Level 1 Normal, Level 2 Warning, Level 3 Stop Work, and Level 4 Emergency Evacuation.

[0156] When the remaining safe time is greater than the early warning threshold, the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result is Level 1. When the remaining safe time is greater than 0 but not greater than the early warning threshold, the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result is Level 2. When the remaining safe time is not greater than 0, the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result is Level 3. When any gas indicator has reached or exceeded the safety boundary, or when the environmental condition is unconfirmed and there are personnel inside the tank, the initial risk level is directly determined to be Level 4.

[0157] The risk level names and number of risk levels mentioned above are exemplary settings. In actual implementation, they can be configured without changing the ascending relationship of risk levels from low to high.

[0158] Furthermore, based on the personnel's work status, the corresponding risk assessment conditions are matched from the preset status assessment rules.

[0159] The preset state determination rules at least record the risk correction direction and correction level determination method corresponding to the pending entry state, tank operation state, and evacuation state, respectively.

[0160] The interval matching results of the remaining safety time are corrected according to the risk assessment conditions to avoid the same risk disposal results for personnel who have not yet entered the oil tank and personnel who are already inside the oil tank due to the same remaining safety time.

[0161] When the personnel's work status is "awaiting entry", the risk correction direction is determined to be "maintain", the correction level is 0, and the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result is retained.

[0162] If the personnel to be entered are not yet in the risky environment inside the tank, the system can prevent them from entering the tank through access restrictions. Therefore, it is not necessary to compensate for the uncertainty of their evacuation process by raising the risk level.

[0163] When the personnel's work status is either in-tank or evacuated, the risk correction direction is determined to be upward, and the correction level is determined based on the number of times the remaining safe time is lower than the preset control threshold in the risk assessment conditions.

[0164] Specifically, the remaining safe time is compared with each preset control threshold, arranged in descending order of value. The correction level increases by one level for each preset control threshold the remaining safe time falls below; the correction level is 0 if the remaining safe time is not lower than any preset control threshold.

[0165] According to the risk correction direction and correction level, the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result is adjusted to obtain the risk level.

[0166] When the adjusted risk level exceeds the preset maximum risk level, the final risk level shall be determined according to the preset maximum risk level.

[0167] Risk assessment data is generated by combining risk level, initial risk level, risk correction direction, correction level, personnel work status, and corresponding judgment criteria.

[0168] For example, the warning advance threshold can be set to 5 minutes and the work stoppage threshold can be set to 0 minutes, thus forming two preset control thresholds of 5 minutes and 0 minutes.

[0169] Zhang's remaining safe time is 2.3 minutes, which is less than 5 minutes but not less than 0 minutes. Therefore, the number of times Zhang's remaining safe time is lower than the preset control threshold is 1, and the correction level is Level 1.

[0170] The initial risk level obtained by interval matching based on the remaining safe time is level two. Since Zhang's work status is inside the tank, the risk correction direction is upward. Therefore, the initial risk level is increased by one level, resulting in a level three risk level.

[0171] This result prompted the system to do more than just warn that the risk was approaching the safety boundary; it instructed Zhang, who was already inside the oil tank, to stop his current operation and begin evacuation.

[0172] When personnel with the same remaining safety time are in a waiting-to-enter state, the risk correction direction is maintained, the risk level remains at level two, and access restrictions are used to prevent the personnel from entering the oil tank.

[0173] Based on the risk level and personnel work status in the risk assessment data, the corresponding control measures are matched from the preset control rules to determine the risk control strategy.

[0174] Level 1 risks should be monitored as normal. Personnel awaiting entry should be allowed to complete the access process only when work permits, personnel qualifications, environmental reliability, and monitoring conditions are all valid.

[0175] Level 2 risk corresponds to restricting new personnel from entering and sending an early warning to the workers, supervisors, and safety officers inside the tank, reminding them to gather their tools and prepare for evacuation.

[0176] Level 3 risk corresponds to prohibiting new personnel from entering, stopping operations inside the tank, sending evacuation notices to personnel inside the tank, and sending alarms to monitoring personnel and safety officers.

[0177] Level 4 risk response requires immediate evacuation of personnel inside the tank, continuous output of on-site audible and visual alarms and mobile terminal alarms, and sending emergency notifications to the safety officer and project manager.

[0178] In particular, when reliable operational data indicates that the gas data is not reliable enough, the work permit is invalid, the personnel qualifications do not match the planned job type, the monitoring conditions are invalid, or the gas indicators in the tank do not meet the requirements, in accordance with the fail-safe principle, new personnel will be directly prohibited from entering the oil tank.

[0179] Based on the aforementioned risk control strategy, access restriction instructions, early warning prompts, or evacuation instructions are output to the corresponding mobile terminals, on-site audio-visual alarm devices, and work permit management platform, and personnel area change information and on-site handling feedback are continuously collected.

[0180] When a person is restricted from entering, record the reason for the restriction, the start time of the restriction, and the conditions for lifting the restriction.

[0181] When personnel inside the tank receive an evacuation alert and begin moving from the work area inside the tank to the manhole transition area, their work status is updated to evacuation status, and their location and evacuation time are continuously determined until they reach a safe area outside the tank.

[0182] Once all personnel inside the tank have reached the safe area outside the tank, the evacuation alarm should be turned off, and the alarm trigger time, evacuation start time, and evacuation completion time should be recorded.

[0183] The time record is used for subsequent verification of conservative movement speed, early warning threshold, and safety handling time.

[0184] In this embodiment, Zhang's final risk level is level three. The system sends a prompt to Zhang to stop the current operation and evacuate along the predetermined evacuation path, prohibits Li, who is in the waiting-to-enter state, from entering the tank, and sends alarms to the monitoring personnel Wang and the safety officer.

[0185] After the system detected that Zhang had entered the manhole transition area from the tank's working area, it updated his personnel status to evacuation status and continuously tracked his reliable location trajectory.

[0186] After Zhang reached the safe area outside the tank and remained there continuously for the required time to confirm exiting the tank, the system deactivated the evacuation alarm.

[0187] The resulting safety control results include at least personnel access status, risk level, control measures already implemented, the status of issuing warnings or evacuation orders, the status of personnel evacuation completion, and corresponding time records.

[0188] Through the above S1 to S5, this embodiment first determines the credibility of multi-source operation data that is asynchronously sampled, has missing data, or has contradictory records, and then reconstructs the personnel operation stage based on continuous personnel area change information and tank entry and exit operation information.

[0189] Based on this, the location of personnel is spatially integrated with multi-point environmental monitoring information. The remaining safe time is determined according to the development time of environmental risks, the remaining time of operation, and the time spent on evacuation. The initial risk level is then modified in combination with the personnel's work status, and finally, access restrictions, risk warnings, and personnel evacuation control are implemented.

[0190] This process avoids directly determining the safety status of personnel from a single location point, a single mobile terminal operation, or a single gas detection value, ensuring that risk warnings are issued when personnel still have the conditions to safely evacuate.

[0191] The method described in this embodiment can be executed by an electronic device. The electronic device includes a processor and a memory, the memory storing a computer program, and when the processor executes the computer program, it implements the above-described S1 to S5.

[0192] Those skilled in the art should understand that the embodiments of the present invention can be implemented using a pure hardware architecture, a pure software architecture, or an integrated hardware and software architecture. The present invention can be prepared as a computer program product, which can be stored in various non-volatile computer-readable storage media, including but not limited to solid-state drives, flash memory chips, mobile storage devices, optical discs, cloud storage servers, and other standardized storage media, and is not limited to traditional storage media.

[0193] Based on the foregoing description in conjunction with the accompanying drawings, those skilled in the art will understand that the embodiments of this application can also be implemented by software programs. Therefore, this application also provides a computer-readable storage medium. This computer-readable storage medium stores computer-readable instructions thereon, which, when executed by one or more processors, implement the method described above in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.

[0194] Through the above description of the embodiments, those skilled in the art can clearly understand that each embodiment can be implemented by means of software plus necessary general-purpose hardware platforms, and of course, it can also be implemented by hardware. Based on this understanding, the above technical solutions, in essence or the part that contributes to the prior art, can be embodied in the form of a software product. This computer software product can be stored in a computer-readable storage medium, such as ROM / RAM, magnetic disk, optical disk, etc., and includes several instructions to cause a computer device (which may be a personal computer, server, or network device, etc.) to execute the methods described in the various embodiments or some parts of the embodiments.

[0195] It should be noted that although the operations of the method of this application are described in a specific order in the accompanying drawings, this does not require or imply that these operations must be performed in that specific order, or that all the operations shown must be performed to achieve the desired result. On the contrary, the steps depicted in the flowchart can be performed in a different order. Additionally or alternatively, certain steps may be omitted, multiple steps may be combined into one step, and / or one step may be broken down into multiple steps.

[0196] It should be understood that when the terms "first," "second," "third," and "fourth," etc., are used in the claims, specification, and drawings of this application, they are used only to distinguish different objects and not to describe a specific order. The terms "comprising" and "including" as used in the specification and claims of this application indicate the presence of the described features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, and / or components, but do not exclude the presence or addition of one or more other features, integrals, steps, operations, elements, components, and / or collections thereof.

[0197] It should also be understood that the terminology used in this specification is for the purpose of describing particular embodiments only and is not intended to limit the application. As used in this specification and claims, the singular forms “a,” “an,” and “the” are intended to include the plural forms unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. It should also be understood that the term “and / or” as used in this specification and claims refers to any combination and all possible combinations of one or more of the associated listed items, and includes such combinations.

[0198] Although the embodiments of this application are as described above, the content is merely an example adopted for the purpose of facilitating understanding of this application and is not intended to limit the scope and application scenarios of this application. Any person skilled in the art described in this application may make any modifications and changes in the form and details of the implementation without departing from the spirit and scope disclosed in this application, but the scope of patent protection of this application shall still be determined by the scope defined in the appended claims.

Claims

1. A method for safety management and control of confined space operations in oil tanks based on multi-source data fusion, characterized in that, include: Acquire multi-source operation data for confined space operations in oil tanks and determine its reliability to obtain reliable operation data; Based on the reliable operational data, the personnel area change information and tank entry and exit operation information are analyzed to reconstruct the personnel operation stage and obtain the personnel operation status. The personnel location is determined based on their work status. Environmental monitoring information corresponding to the personnel location is extracted from reliable work data. The environmental monitoring information is then spatially fused to obtain location environmental risk data. The environmental risk data at the location is analyzed for changes to obtain the development time of the environmental risk; Based on the personnel's work status and reliable work data, determine the remaining work time and evacuation time. Based on the environmental risk development time, remaining work time, and evacuation time, determine the remaining safe time and generate safety risk data. Based on the safety risk data, a risk control strategy is determined, and access restrictions are implemented for personnel to be admitted in accordance with the risk control strategy. Early warnings and evacuation prompts are issued to personnel inside the tank, thereby obtaining the safety control results.

2. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, The location environmental risk data is analyzed for changes to obtain the environmental risk development time, including: Extract location environmental risk data over a continuous period of time, determine the current risk status and risk change trend, and obtain environmental risk change data; A safety boundary is preset, and a candidate development time for reaching the safety boundary is determined based on the difference between the environmental risk change data and the safety boundary. The environmental risk development time is obtained by screening the candidate development times by minimum value.

3. The method according to claim 2, characterized in that, Based on the difference between the environmental risk change data and the safety boundary, candidate development times for reaching the safety boundary are determined, including: Based on the difference between the current risk status in the environmental risk change data and the safety boundary, risk margin data is obtained; Arrival time is predicted based on the risk margin data and the risk change trend in the environmental risk change data to obtain candidate development times.

4. The method according to claim 3, characterized in that, Based on the risk margin data and the risk change trends in the environmental risk change data, arrival time prediction is performed to obtain candidate development times, including: Filter the effective trends of risk change towards the safety boundary, determine the risk change rate corresponding to the effective trend, and obtain the candidate development time based on the ratio of the risk margin data to the risk change rate.

5. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the environmental risk development time, remaining operation time, and evacuation time, the remaining safety time is determined, and safety risk data is generated, including: The available remaining time is obtained by filtering the environmental risk development time and the remaining operation time by minimum value; Perform a difference analysis between the available remaining time and the evacuation time, and determine the safe remaining time based on the difference analysis results; The remaining safe time is correlated with the personnel's work status and location to generate safety risk data.

6. The method according to claim 5, characterized in that, A difference analysis is performed between the available remaining time and the evacuation time. Based on the difference analysis results, the safe remaining time is determined, including: Calculate the time difference between the available remaining time and the evacuation time to obtain the evacuation time margin, and determine the safe remaining time based on the evacuation time margin.

7. The method according to claim 1, characterized in that, Based on the aforementioned security risk data, risk management strategies are determined, including: Based on the remaining safety time in the safety risk data and the preset control threshold, the risk level is determined by interval matching and combined with the personnel's work status to obtain risk assessment data; Based on the risk level and personnel work status in the risk assessment data, corresponding control measures are matched from the preset control rules to determine the risk control strategy.

8. The method according to claim 7, characterized in that, Risk levels are determined by combining personnel's work status, resulting in risk assessment data, including: Based on the personnel's work status, the corresponding risk assessment conditions are matched according to the preset status assessment rules; The risk level is determined by correcting the interval matching results of the remaining safe time based on the risk assessment conditions, and risk assessment data is obtained.

9. The method according to claim 8, characterized in that, The interval matching result of the remaining safe time is corrected according to the risk assessment conditions, including: Based on the risk assessment conditions, determine the risk correction direction and correction level corresponding to the personnel's work status, and adjust the initial risk level corresponding to the interval matching result according to the risk correction direction and correction level to obtain the risk level and generate risk assessment data.

10. The method according to claim 9, characterized in that, Based on the aforementioned risk assessment criteria, the risk correction direction and correction level corresponding to the personnel's work status are determined, including: When the personnel's work status is "awaiting entry", the risk correction direction is determined to be "maintain". When the personnel's work status is either in-tank work or evacuation, the risk correction direction is determined to be upward, and the correction level is determined based on the number of times the remaining safety time is lower than the preset control threshold in the risk judgment conditions.

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